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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Operations Center  
Iran Working Group

IST:

Sitrep No. 13

Situation in Iran as of 1500 EST, November 8, 1979

The Iran Working Group established telephonic contact with the Iranian students occupying the Embassy. Although the students were evasive about the location of the hostages, they did reveal that a medical doctor had visited the Americans today. The students stressed repeatedly that no hostages would be released until the Shah was returned to Iran.

We have obtained independent verification that a Red Cross medical doctor, who was led blindfolded to the hostages, did visit the hostages this morning. The physician was only able to interview 12 persons. He found them to be generally in good health, not physically mistreated, but isolated in their contacts with one another. The ICRC has strongly recommended that we not publicize the doctor's visit at this time, lest we jeopardize future access. We are advising families that a trusted source has seen some of the hostages.

The Canadians have visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and were assured that Charge Laingen is well. Laingen has telexed the Department three times today and has phoned out to a couple of his diplomatic colleagues in Tehran. He is well although feeling somewhat isolated.

A flurry of diplomatic initiatives is underway in Tehran and elsewhere. EC-9 Ambassadors in Tehran are considering sending a delegation to Qum and the British Ambassador is seeking to remonstrate with the clergy. The Pope has agreed to do a first person note to Ayatollah Khomeini at the request of President Carter. The PLO mission in Tehran has reportedly been joined by Abu Jihad. Press accounts say the PLO will discuss the hostages.

At mid-day Tehran time, the Embassy compound is reported calm. The streets in front of the compound are roped off with revolutionary guards now more noticeable. A larger number of clergy are present inside.


There appear to be some major changes in the Revolutionary Council. According to one unconfirmed press report, Abbol Hassan Bani Sadr was named Foreign Minister. Bani Sadr, a so-called "Islamic economist", had advocated a radical solution to Iran's economic problems. He is close to Qum. The Swedes have heard a report that Ayatollah Montazri, President of the Council of Experts, would be named to the post. Neither candidate is noted for diplomatic prowess.

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per 6/7/06 NISC/HF  
6/29/06

We continue to receive reports of harassment to Americans. Confirmed incidents are not numerous and Tehran radio has broadcast frequent appeals in the name of Khomeini urging students not to hassle Americans.

The Iranian Embassy here has telephoned Qum to convey a sense of the domestic U.S. reaction to the seizure of the American Embassy. The Charge briefed the clergy on the intense reaction to the takeover and suggested that the release of hostages would be advisable. The Embassy here also appears to be worried over the prospect that the voluntary departure of the Shah would earn him considerable humanitarian sympathy at the expense of Khomeini.

  
Mark Johnson  
Iran Working Group  
Robert Steven  
Senior Watch Officer

## IRAN

## CANDIDATES-IRAN

WASHINGTON (AP) -- MOST PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES GINGERLY SKIRTED COMMENT ON THE CRISIS IN IRAN TODAY, SAYING IT SHOULD BE KEPT OUT OF POLITICS.

SEN. EDWARD M. KENNEDY SAID HE SUPPORTS PRESIDENT CARTER'S EFFORTS TO WIN RELEASE OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN, BUT SUGGESTED THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED FOR THE INCIDENT WHICH BEGAN WITH SEIZURE OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN TEHRAN ON SUNDAY.

"GIVEN THE VOLATILITY OF THE SITUATION, GIVEN THE FACT THAT OUR EMBASSY HAD BEEN SEIZED PREVIOUSLY, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WE SHOULD HAVE HAD SOME KIND OF CONTINGENCY PROGRAM IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE LIVES OF THE AMERICANS THERE," KENNEDY SAID. "I WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE HOPED THAT WE WOULD HAVE HAD ONE, AND THAT WE MIGHT STILL HAVE ONE."

REPUBLICAN JOHN CONNALLY HAS SUGGESTED THE GOVERNMENT TAKE A STRONG STAND ON IRAN AND DEPORT ANTI-U.S. DEMONSTRATORS WHO SEIZED THE STATUE OF LIBERTY ON MONDAY.

"ANY VISITOR TO THIS COUNTRY FROM A COUNTRY THAT IS HOSTILE TO US SHOULD BE TREATED WITH THE SAME COURTESY THAT OUR CITIZENS ARE TREATED WITH OVERSEAS," CONNALLY SAID.

SEN. HOWARD BAKER, R-TENN., CAMPAIGNING IN IOWA, SAID THE SITUATION IN IRAN IS SO "GRAVE" THAT ANY COMMENT MIGHT ENDANGER THE LIVES OF THE HOSTAGES.

ASKED ABOUT IRAN IN HIS PRESIDENTIAL ANNOUNCEMENT NEWS CONFERENCE, CALIFORNIA GOV. EDMUND G. BROWN JR., ALSO DECLINED COMMENT. BROWN, A DEMOCRAT, SAID THE SITUATION WAS IN THE HANDS OF THE PRESIDENT AND SHOULD NOT BE MADE A POLITICAL ISSUE UNTIL THE HOSTAGES ARE SAFE.

REPUBLICAN RONALD REAGAN'S HEADQUARTERS SAID HE WOULD HAVE NO OFFICIAL STATEMENT ON THE MATTER.

AP-WX-1108 1612EST

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NOVEMBER 8, 1979

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

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THE WHITE HOUSE

ANNOUNCEMENT BY JODY POWELL

The Briefing Room

(AT 4:50 P.M. EST)

MR. POWELL: Ladies and gentlemen, we are going to make a brief announcement here. I would like to let you file. I am sure you will have some other questions on other matters. There will be no filing, however, until this briefing is over because it is very important in the way that this is handled.

The President will postpone his visit to Canada to remain at the White House and continue to closely monitor the situation in Iran and direct efforts to secure the release of our people there. The visit to Canada will be rescheduled to a mutually convenient date early next year.

I want to stress that the President's decision to postpone this visit is not based on new developments or any expectation of an immediate change in the situation in Iran. Rather it is, as I stated earlier, based upon his desire to remain in Washington where his foreign policy advisors are immediately available and so that he can continue to monitor closely and direct the situation there.

Let me just say again that it would be a serious mistake for this decision to be treated or interpreted other than as I have given it to you. I think you can clearly understand why. You have my word of honor that what I have stated to you is the fact and I urge you in the strongest possible way not to speculate contrary to what I have just said to you.

Q What you are doing is putting another disclaimer on military action, right?

Q Can we file?

Q Can we file now, Jody?

Q Can we file this?

MR. POWELL: Yes, you may file.

## BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

L. BRUCE LAINGEN

### United States Ambassador to Malta

The President announced the recess appointment of L. Bruce Laingen as Ambassador to Malta on November 17. Ambassador Laingen has been serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs and will succeed Robert P. Smith, who has been appointed Ambassador to Ghana.

Mr. Laingen was born August 6, 1922, in Minnesota. He received his B.A. from St. Olaf College in 1947 and his M.A. from the University of Minnesota in 1949. He served with the United States Navy from 1943 to 1946.

Following his appointment in 1949, he served as Consular Officer in Hamburg (1951-53), then as economic officer in Tehran 1953-54 and 1955-56. From September 1954 to February 1955, he was Acting Principal Officer at Meshed. From 1956 to 1960 he served as Deputy, then Officer-in-Charge for Greek Affairs.

In 1960 Mr. Laingen was assigned to Karachi as Political Officer, then served as Officer-in-Charge of Pakistan/Afghanistan Affairs (1964 to 1967). He attended the National War College from 1967 to 1968, after which he was appointed Deputy Chief of Mission in Kabul. Since his return to Washington in 1971, he has served successively as Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan (1971-73), Country Director for India, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives Islands (June-August 1973), Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs (1973-75), and Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs (February, 1975-present).

He received the Meritorious Honor Award in 1967.

He is married to the former Penelope Babcock and they have three children.

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Memo No. 970-79

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

Denis Clift

SUBJECT:

Foreign Policy Breakfast,  
Friday, November 16, 1979, 7:30 a.m.Iran

Secretary Vance will provide an updated status report on developments relating to the hostages in Iran.

The Commerce paper on export control options available to the U.S. is attached at Tab A.

Zimbabwe/Rhodesia

Media reaction to the President's decision to continue sanctions against Rhodesia for the time being has been generally positive. Vance will provide an update of State's consultations with members of the Congress and of Jesse Helms' actions aimed at lifting sanctions.

Middle East

Vance can be expected to report on the status of Herman Eilts' mission. Bob Strauss leaves over the weekend for ceremonies at St. Catherine's Monastery on Monday marking the second anniversary of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. The Israeli decision to expel Nablus Mayor Shaka has cast a new cloud over the West Bank autonomy talks.

You may wish to mention that you will be addressing the International Israel Bond Dinner at the Washington Hilton on Sunday evening, November 18.

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Review on 11/15/99

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per 6/7/06 NSC LFR

DATE 6/29/06

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#### NATO/Theater Nuclear Forces ✓

Harold Brown will report on the results of his NATO meetings in Brussels this week - meetings which point, despite the Dutch, to a positive NATO decision in December to proceed with long range theater nuclear force modernization.

#### US-PRC Relations ✓

Following up on the hydroelectric agreement you signed in Beijing in August, Vice Premier Kang Shien gave a red carpet welcome to the Westinghouse delegation stating (PRC press report at Tab B) that "a wide scope existed for cooperation between China and the corporation since a large number of old enterprises in China would undergo technical transformation." You may wish to note the importance, given the magnitude of potential commercial deals for the US, of the government providing every appropriate assistance to US corporations in these contacts (also given the cutthroat approach our "friends" among the industrialized democracies take to commercial competition with the U.S.).

#### Caribbean ✓

In recent days I have reported on the increased attention the Administration is giving to U.S. policy toward the Caribbean. In my opinion it is important that the Administration take increased steps to show greater interest in the area and to show such important friends of the U.S. as the Bahamas and Barbados that it pays to have the U.S. as a friend. Secretary Vance may raise the question of a speaker for a major conference on the Caribbean scheduled for the end of this month in Miami which Mayor Ferre and Dante Fascell are sponsoring. The President has turned down a proposal that he address the conference. I see this as an important political address (both in terms of U.S. foreign policy and domestic politics). Zbig's memorandum to the President on the subject is at Tab C.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
The Assistant Secretary for Industry and Trade  
Washington, D.C. 20230

November 13, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: F. Lisle Widman  
Deputy Assistant Secretary for  
International Monetary Affairs  
Department of the Treasury

Thomas Leddy  
Director, Office of International  
Monetary Affairs  
Department of the Treasury

FROM: Stanley J. Marcuss  
Acting Assistant Secretary  
for Industry and Trade

SUBJECT: Export Control Options

Attached, as requested, is an outline of our export control options.

In a nutshell, there are three possible statutory bases for imposing controls: Export Administration Act; Trading with the Enemy Act; International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Each has its own requirements.

The Trading with the Enemy Act is probably not a viable option because it requires a declaration of war by the Congress.

The Export Administration Act is limited to the imposition of export controls and places a number of constraints on the use of export control authority.

The Emergency Economic Powers Act applies to all economic relations, including export controls, and requires the declaration of a national emergency. That Act also imposes a number of constraints on the exercise of its authority.

Whichever course of action is considered, careful consideration must be given to the issue of how far we want to go in efforts to control the activities of foreign subsidiaries of United States companies as well as foreign companies using U.S. goods or technology.

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DATE 6/29/06

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Also attached is a list of U.S. firms which had personnel in Iran as of November 3, 1979. Included are other major U.S. exporters to Iran which do not have personnel in that country.

Attachments

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## EXPORT CONTROL OPTIONS

### I. Total Export Embargo

The Export Administration Act (EAA) does not provide authority for a total embargo. The Conference Report on the EAA of 1979 makes this clear. Authority for a total economic embargo is contained in the:

(a) Trading with the Enemy Act - In order to impose such an embargo under this Act the President must ask the Congress to declare war.

(b) International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) - In order to impose an embargo under this Act, the President must take the following steps:

1. Declare a national emergency to deal with an "unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States;"
2. Issue an executive order specifying the controls to be imposed and delegating authority to implement them;
3. Consult, if at all possible, with the Congress before imposing the controls;
4. Consult regularly with the Congress as long as the controls are in place;
5. Report to the Congress immediately upon imposing controls. The report must contain the following information:

a) the circumstances which necessitate such exercise of authority;

b) why the President believes those circumstances constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States;

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- c) the authorities to be exercised and the actions to be taken in the exercise of those authorities to deal with those circumstances;
  - d) why the President believes such actions are necessary to deal with those circumstances; and
  - e) any foreign countries with respect to which such actions are to be taken, and why such actions are to be taken with respect to those countries.
- 6. Provide follow-up reports to the Congress at least once every six months describing the actions taken since the last report and any changes which have occurred concerning information previously reported;
  - 7. Maintain a file and index of all significant orders of the President. Each agency shall maintain a file and index of all rules and regulations taken to implement such orders.
  - 8. Transmit to the Congress all significant orders and rules and regulations under means to assure confidentiality where appropriate;
  - 9. Transmit to the Congress within 90 days after the end of each six month period after the declaration of national emergency a report on the total expenditures incurred by the U.S. Government during the six month period which are directly attributable to the imposition of controls;
  - 10. Transmit to the Congress a final report on all such expenditures not later than 90 days after termination of the national emergency.

Note: Under the IEEPA, the President may not control:

- 1) any postal, telegraphic, telephone, or other personal communication not involving a transfer of anything of value; or

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2) donations, by persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, of articles, such as food, clothing, and medicine intended to be used to relieve human suffering except to the extent that the President determines that such donations (A) would seriously impair his ability to deal with any national emergency declared under section 202 of this title, (B) are in response to coercion against the proposed recipient or donor, or (C) would endanger Armed Forces of the United States which are engaged in hostilities or are in a situation where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.

NOTE ALSO: National emergencies declared under the IEEPA can be terminated by a Congressional concurrent resolution.

## II. Embargo on Specific Commodity or Commodities

(e.g., transportation equipment, communications equipment, agricultural commodities, military items, etc.)

- (a) Nearly all military items are under "Munitions List" control. The President is authorized to control such items "in furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the U.S." under the Arms Export Control Act.
- (b) Other items could be controlled (and thus sale denied) under the foreign policy control provisions of the EAA. Medicines and medical equipment cannot be controlled under the authority of the EAA. Also, "it is the intent of Congress that the President not impose export controls under this (foreign policy) section on any goods or technology if he determines that the principal effect of the export of such goods or technology would be to help meet basic human needs."

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-4-

In order to impose such controls, the President must:

1. Consider six statutory "factors" as follows:
  - (i) the probability that such controls will achieve the intended foreign policy purpose, in light of other factors, including the availability from other countries of the goods or technology proposed for such controls;
  - (ii) the compatibility of the proposed controls with the foreign policy objectives of the United States, including the effort to counter international terrorism, and with overall United States policy toward the country which is the proposed object of the controls;
  - (iii) the reaction of other countries to the imposition or expansion of such export controls by the United States;
  - (iv) the likely effects of the proposed controls on the export performance of the United States, on the competitive position of the United States in the international economy, on the international reputation of the United States as a supplier of goods and technology, and on individual United States companies and their employees and communities, including the effects of the controls on existing contracts;
  - (v) the ability of the United States to enforce the proposed controls effectively; and
  - (vi) the foreign policy consequences of not imposing controls.

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2. Determine that reasonable efforts have been made to achieve the purposes of the controls through negotiations or other means;
3. Consult with the Congress "in every possible instance;"
4. "Immediately" notify the Congress and include with such notification a report specifying the President's conclusions with respect to each of the above six "factors", as well as the nature and results of any alternative means attempted or the reasons for imposing the control without attempting any such alternative means. (If the controls prohibit or curtail the sale of agricultural commodities, the Congress may, within 30 days of receipt of the report, adopt a concurrent resolution negating such controls);
5. Determine that adequate evidence has been presented demonstrating that the absence of such controls would prove detrimental to the foreign policy of the U.S. when placing controls on goods or technology determined to be available from sources outside the U.S. in significant quantities and comparable in quality to those produced in the U.S.; and
6. Take all feasible steps to initiate and conclude negotiations with appropriate foreign governments in order to secure their cooperation in controlling the export of goods or technology comparable to those items upon which the U.S. has imposed controls.

In addition to the above, the Secretary of Commerce must consult with affected U.S. industries as considered appropriate by the Secretary. At a minimum, the subject of such consultations must include factors (i) and (iv) under II (b) 1. above;

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III. Embargo on Specific End User or Entity

This option would embargo the sale of all or certain items to a specific entity, such as the police, military or government, rather than restricting sales to the entire country.

The same considerations delineated under option II are applicable.

IV. Denial of All Pending and Future Sales of Items Currently Under Foreign Policy Export Control

- (a) Applications for validated licenses received prior to October 1, 1979 could be denied under the authority of the EAA of 1969, as amended, without the actions enumerated under option II (b).
- (b) Foreign policy controls that were in place prior to October 1, 1979 may be continued through December 31, 1979 without taking the actions enumerated under option II (b). (In the case of Iran the only controls in place prior to October 1, 1979 are on sales of crime control and detection equipment.) (SECRET)
- (c) Munitions List items could be denied under this option in the same manner as set forth under item (a) of option II.

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### Additional Considerations

1. All foreign policy controls expire on December 31, 1979 or one year after imposition, whichever is later, unless extended after taking the actions required under EAA of 1979. When extending controls, the same actions enumerated under option II (b) must be taken, except for consideration of the reaction of other countries, consultation with industry, attempts to achieve the purposes of the controls through negotiations or alternative means, consultation with Congress, and determination of foreign availability.
2. Crime control and detection instruments and equipment remain under foreign policy control to all but NATO countries, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, unless the President determines that additional countries should be exempt from such control. Therefore, these controls are presently in effect for Iran. (SECRET)
3. Before deciding on the scope of any foreign policy controls, it is necessary to consider the extent to which U.S. goods and technology used by foreign companies and U.S. foreign subsidiaries should be subject to controls. This is an important point bearing on our relations with third countries.
4. It is also necessary to consider whether the controls would apply to all items produced by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms even if those items do not contain U.S. origin goods or technology.
5. Any form of export control or embargo has a myriad of commercial and economic ramifications which are often broader than the purpose of the controls. Any controls imposed should allow sufficient flexibility to permit the Commerce Department to alleviate any unintended commercial or economic consequences without appearing to lessen U.S. resolve.

CLASSIFIED BY STANLEY J. MARCUSS  
DECLASSIFY ON NOVEMBER 13, 1985

U.S. Firms Which Had Personnel in Iran  
as of November 3, 1979

Starrett

Fluor

Continental Telephone

Sedco

GTE

Citibank

Exxon

Stanwick International

Panam

Bank of America

Morrison-Knudsen

Manufacturers Hanover

General Dynamics

Houston Construction

Bell Helicopter

American Bell International

Other Major U.S. Exporters to Iran

Boeing

Cargill

Continental Grain

I. 9 Nov 79

PRC INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS  
UNITED STATES

B.1

FANG YI MEETS U.S. PHYSICS JOURNALIST

OW081529 Beijing XINHUA in English 1529 GMT 8 Nov 79 OW

[Text] Beijing, November 8 (XINHUA)--Vice-Premier Fang Yi met here this afternoon with Dr. Gloria B. Lubkin, senior editor of the United States journal, PHYSICS TODAY. The journal is a well-known magazine in academic circles.

Vice-Premier Fang answered questions raised by Dr. Lubkin about China's scientific and technological development. Qian Sanqiang, vice-president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, was present. Dr. Lubkin arrived in Beijing on November 5 for a visit at the invitation of the Academy of Sciences of China.

KANG SHIEN MEETS U.S. WESTINGHOUSE DELEGATION

OW071550 Beijing XINHUA in English 1509 GMT 7 Nov 79 OW

[Text] Beijing, November 7 (XINHUA)--Vice-Premier Kang Shien today welcomed a visiting delegation from the Westinghouse Electric Corporation in the United States, and told them that a wide scope existed for cooperation between China and the corporation since a large number of old enterprises in China would undergo technical transformation. The delegation is led by Mr. D.D. Danforth, vice-chairman of the board of directors of the corporation.

He said that during their China tour, his delegation would deliver 20 technical reports to their Chinese counterparts on up-to-date technology and managerial experience.

Present at the meeting were Wang Ziyi, vice-minister of the First Ministry of Machine-Building, and Xiao Fangzhou, vice-chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade.

NANJING'S CHU JIANG ATTENDS ST. LOUIS SISTER CITY CEREMONY

OW021922 Beijing XINHUA in English 1905 GMT 2 Nov 79 OW

[Text] Nanjing, November 2 (XINHUA)--The Chinese city of Nanjing and the U.S. city of St. Louis became sister cities at a ceremony held here this afternoon.

At the ceremony, Chu Jiang, chairman of the Nanjing Municipal Revolutionary Committee, and James F. Conway, mayor of St. Louis, signed the protocol linking the two cities together as sister cities.

The purpose of linking the two cities, the protocol states, is to help promote friendship and mutual understanding between the people of the two countries and to further consolidate Sino-U.S. relations.

The protocol stipulates that extensive exchanges and cooperation will take place between the two cities based on the principle of mutual benefits and equality. These exchanges and cooperation occur in the fields of the economy, culture, education, sports, science and technology, city management and municipal construction.

The friendship delegation led by Mr. Conway arrived in Nanjing from Shanghai by train yesterday evening. They were entertained at a banquet hosted by the city revolutionary committee following their arrival.

## XINHUA CITES U.S. CONGRESSMEN, OFFICIALS ON MILITARY SPENDING

OWO30801 Beijing XINHUA in English 0707 GMT 3 Nov 79 OW

[Text] Washington, November 2 (XINHUA)--Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat-Georgia) today called for at least a five per cent annual increase in the defense budget for fiscal 1981 through 1985 to "keep pace with an unparalleled Soviet military buildup and an increasingly aggressive Soviet intervention policy". He said that he cannot support ratification of the SALT II treaty in the absence of a firm, public commitment by the administration.

Addressing the Senate this morning, he said that since 1970 the Soviet Union has invested a total of 104 billion dollars more than the United States in military equipment and facilities, and 40 billion dollars more in research and development. "Soviet foreign policy, invigorated by this relentless military buildup and uncertain American response to it, is seeking to gain a strangle-hold over the economic foundations of Western prosperity and military power. This is the common denominator of Soviet activities in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Afghanistan, elsewhere in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia," he said.

It was disclosed here that Soviet military buildup has been going on steadily since the mid-1960's and it is spending 11 to 15 per cent of its GNP on military expenditures, which is one-fifth or two-fifths more than the U.S. military spending. Soviet annual increases have remained at about five per cent for the past 15 years.

The U.S. Senate has called for a three per cent increase in military spending over last year after accounting for inflation and proposed an arms budget of 141.2 billion dollars in appropriations with 130.6 billion in actual expenditures. On October 31, House and Senate conferees agreed after months of debate on the Senate figure on the appropriations but cut 700 million dollars from the actual spending.

During the debate over the past few months many White House and Pentagon officials and congressmen favored increases in military spending and a "stronger U.S. military establishment" out of growing concern about mounting Soviet military threat.

Secretary of Defence Harold Brown said recently, "The gap between the U.S. and Soviet defense expenditures cannot continue to expand without a dangerous tilt in the relevant balance of power and a weakening of the overall U.S. deterrent."

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff David C. Jones stressed that he is more worried about U.S. security today than when he became chairman more than a year ago. Because of the "continued military buildup by the Soviet Union," he said, "there is a need for us to do more."

Senator Henry Jackson warned the Senate that Moscow's growing power could "mean an increasingly aggressive Soviet international policy."

## BRIEFS

SHIP REPLICA TO U.S.--Shanghai, November 4--The Chinese container ship "Linjiang" carrying prefabricated parts of a slightly modified replica of a famous Suzhou building left Shanghai today for Hong Kong. The replica of the three-room Dian Chun Yi (study for late spring) in a renowned Suzhou garden is bound ultimately for the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art. Today's voyage by the "Linjiang" is the first of her scheduled monthly sailings between Shanghai and Hong Kong. [Beijing XINHUA in English 1241 GMT 4 Nov 79 OW]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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October 30, 1979

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI *JB*

SUBJECT: A People-to-People Strategy for  
the Caribbean Basin (U)

In order to undertake the kind of comprehensive people-to-people (PTP) approach which you envisage for Central America and the Caribbean, I asked State to prepare a country-by-country inventory of extra-governmental US programs to the Caribbean basin. It will be easier to expand and mobilize these programs than to start from ground zero. (S)

Three key people-to-people programs work in this area: the Partners of the Americas program (which connects US States with Latin American countries and provinces, like Pernambuco), the Sister Cities program (which is worldwide), and the new Committee For The Caribbean (a non-profit, non-governmental organization created to promote Caribbean economic development through private enterprise). This Committee is hosting an important conference on the Caribbean in Miami November 28th; you have been invited by Maurice Ferre, Governor Graham, and Dante Fascell to explain US policies regarding the Caribbean and Central America in a keynote address. A number of heads of state and important political leaders will be in attendance. (S)

These three private groups' efforts need to be coordinated and reinforced, if they are to achieve the goal you have in mind. This could be done by appointing a high-level Commission, which would serve as an umbrella over the three US organizations noted above and any others that have a presence or could have an impact in the Caribbean or Central America. The head of such a Commission should be a prominent person, such as Mayor Ferre, who knows both the region and US groups interested in the region. Members of the Commission could include leaders from the three organizations noted above and representatives from churches, labor, etc. (S)

The November 28 Miami Conference would provide a unique opportunity to announce and launch such a commission;

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members of the Commission could make contacts at the Conference, which would make follow-up activities easier. This Commission could be assisted by different government agencies, with a full-time government official in the State Department being charged with these back-up services. (S)

I believe your presence at this November Conference would be key to mobilizing this effort. We could also use your speech as an action-forcing mechanism to get other relevant policy decisions related to the Caribbean basin, so that you could announce them as well. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you speak at the Miami Conference on November 28. (C)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. That you approve the setting up of a broad-based Commission on the Caribbean Basin, subject to answering outstanding questions satisfactorily. (C)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

3. That I contact Mayor Ferre as possible Chairman. (C)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON


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INFORMATION

Memo No. 1500-79

November 29, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift   
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast,  
Friday, November 30, 1979, 7:30 a.m.

THE VICE PRESIDENT

Indochinese Refugees

While the debate in Washington continues on the selection of the new Refugee Coordinator, the situation in Kampuchea is increasingly bleak - with reports that little if any food is getting to the starving Kampuchians, that the Vietnamese are taking the emergency food supplies for themselves, and that they are playing a grim game distributing sacks of rice during the day while the international agencies watch and then reclaiming them at night.

*Seems* Abramowitz recommends a stepped up international campaign against Moscow and Hanoi (paper clip, Tab I).

It is my understanding that Graham Hovey of The New York Times may shortly file a story to the effect that the Administration is all but paralyzed by events in Iran and is mishandling the refugee effort in Indochina. This would indicate that all the more urgency should be attached to early selection of a replacement for Dick Clark.

US Policy in Southeast Asia

On a related, important point, the President has sent you and Secretary Vance his reactions to the cable which Leonard Woodcock filed last week on US policy in Southeast Asia (Tab II).

Chile

The Department of State will announce a tougher policy toward Chile at noon, Friday, November 30 resulting from the Letelier case:

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Classified by Multiple Sources  
Review 11/29/99

DECLASSIFIED

NEJC-06-077  
per 6/7/06 NSC 11x  
6/29/06

- reduction of size of U.S. Mission,
- termination of FMS pipeline,
- drawdown of MilGroup,
- Ex-Im cutoff, and
- elimination of OPIC guarantees.

#### Iran

Tomorrow's breakfast provides a useful forum for review of sensitive options. I think it important that we are prepared as well as possible with language covering the Shah's departure and our position relating thereto. On a related subject, it is my understanding that the suit against the Shah does not ask the court to enjoin him from leaving.

#### Saudi Arabia

Secretary Vance can be expected to follow up on his Evening Report to the President reviewing the attention being given to the future of the 35,000 Americans in Saudi Arabia, our consultations with the Saudis and the shaping of appropriate U.S. policy.

#### Royal Ulster Constabulary

It is my understanding that the President has indicated to Vance that he is prepared to follow through with the current pending sale of small arms and ammunition to the RUC for use in Northern Ireland - with a statement to the British at the same time that this will be the last U.S. sale. I personally believe that the Administration was much better positioned with the line that we had the issue under review and that we would not make any sales pending that review. Given the emotions swirling around Northern Ireland on both sides of the Atlantic, we risk a real break in support for the President's leadership at this time of crisis in Iran if Irish Americans learn of and are incensed by announcement that the US is selling arms to the British for use in Northern Ireland.

#### Personnel

CSCE - it is my understanding that we have not heard back from Governor Scranton.

VOA - it is my understanding that Mrs. Aaron and Mary Bitterman remain the prime VOA candidates. In this regard, and in response to a recent question you posed to Zbig, David Aaron and Zbig have sent you the paper at Tab III.

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ACTION RP-10  
INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-10 IO-14 ADS-00 SR-04 FA-05  
CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAF-00 INRE-00  
PM-06 H-01 INR-10 L-03 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 AID-05  
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O 270529Z NOV 79  
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6034  
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY  
USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY ICNDCN PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY RANGOON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY  
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY  
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY

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EO 12065: GDS 11/25/85 (ABRAMOWITZ, MORTON I.) OR-M  
TAGS: SREF, PINS, EAID, CB, VM  
SUBJ: TRIBULATIONS OF KAMPUCHEA

1. (C) SUMMARY: INTERVIEWS OF KHMER REFUGEES WHO  
ARRIVED IN PAST FEW DAYS FROM EASTERN, CENTRAL AND  
WESTERN KAMPUCHEA PAINT A GRIM PICTURE OF SPREADING  
STARVATION THROUGHOUT KAMPUCHEA. THERE IS LITTLE  
EVIDENCE THAT FOOD IS REACHING THE ORDINARY PEOPLE.

WHETHER FROM "SOCIALIST" OR UNICEF/ICRC SOURCES. ON THE  
CONTRARY, THE VIETNAMESE APPEAR TO BE PURSUING A POLICY  
OF FOOD DENIAL TO MOST OF THE POPULATION EXCEPT THOSE  
WHO WORK DIRECTLY FOR THE HENG SAMRIN ADMINISTRATION.  
THERE APPEARS TO BE NO LARGE CONCENTRATIONS OF KHMER

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Per 6/7/06 NSC 14  
DATE 6/29/06

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WITHIN KAMPUCHEA, EXCEPT ALONG THE THAI-KHMER BORDER AND AROUND PHNOM PENH. VIETNAMESE HAVE TIGHTENED THEIR CONTROLS AND REPORTEDLY AT LEAST IN A NUMBER OF AREAS ARE MINING RIPENING RICE PADDIES AND KILLING KHMER WHO SEEK TO GATHER THE HARVEST. RECENT REFUGEES REPORT LITTLE POL POT ACTIVITY IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL KAMPUCHEA BUT CLAIM LARGE NUMBERS KHMER SEREI (ANTI-VIETNAMESE, ANTI-POL POT FORCES) ARE RESISTING VIETNAMESE IN THOSE REGIONS. WHILE THESE DISCUSSIONS ARE NOT CONCLUSIVE, THEY POINT OUT THAT THE SITUATION THROUGHOUT KAMPUCHEA IS ALMOST UNIFORMLY DIRE, THAT DEATH FROM STARVATION IS WIDESPREAD, AND THAT THE VIETS SEEM PREPARED TO DEVASTATE BROAD SEGMENTS OF THE KHMER RACE TO REALIZE THEIR POLITICAL GOALS IN KAMPUCHEA.

END SUMMARY.

2. (BEGIN IOU) FOLLOWING DESCRIPTION OF CONDITIONS IN KAMPUCHEA IS BASED ON EXTENSIVE INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED WEEK OF NOVEMBER 19-25 IN MANY REFUGEE ENCLAVES NORTH OF ARANYAPRATHET, ON THE THAI-KHMER BORDER. REFUGEES ARRIVED

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IN THAILAND WITHIN THE PAST FEW DAYS HAD LEFT THEIR PROVINCES ONLY A FEW DAYS BEFORE ARRIVAL ON THE BORDER. THEY CAME FROM BATTAMBANG, KOMPONG CHHNANG, KOMPONG CHAM, PREY VENG, KOMPONG SPEU, PURSAT PROVINCES AND PHNOM PENH, PASSING THROUGH SVAY RIENG, KOMPONG THOM, SIEM REAP PROVINCES, ENROUTE, IN OTHER WORDS, THE MAJOR PORTION OF KAMPUCHEA, THE MOST POPULATED AREA AND BY FAR THE BROADEST GEOGRAPHICAL SPREAD AVAILABLE TO US EXCEPT IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE KHMER ROUGE TAKEOVER IN 1975. THERE REFUGEES ARE ANTI-POL POT, ANTI-VIETNAMESE AND ANTI-COMMUNIST, WHICH COULD COLOR THEIR REMARKS, BUT KHMER REFUGEES HAVE BEEN REMARKABLY ACCURATE FOR THE PAST FOUR YEARS IN THEIR ACCOUNTS OF CONDITIONS IN KAMPUCHEA, DESPITE THEIR POLITICAL PREDILECTIONS.

3. FOOD: THE REFUGEES DESCRIBED A HIGHLY CONSISTENT PATTERN OF STARVATION. THERE IS SIMPLY LITTLE FOOD LEFT IN KAMPUCHEA UNDER HENG SAMRIN. THERE IS A GENERAL MOVEMENT OF THE POPULATION FROM EAST TO WEST TO THE THAI BORDER, DRIVEN PRINCIPALLY BY THE THREAT OF STARVATION. A TEACHER, WHO ARRIVED FROM BATTAMBANG NOV 23, SAID THAT MANY PEOPLE WERE TOO SICK AND WEAK AND WITHOUT RICE TO HAVE THE STRENGTH TO MOVE TO THE BORDER. HE RECALLED THAT "PEOPLE ARE DYING ON THE ROAD AND IN THE VILLAGES, SLEEPING BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO FOOD, AND DYING QUIETLY OF STARVATION." A PEASANT WHO ARRIVED FROM THPONG DISTRICT, KOMPONG SPEU, CLAIMED THAT 30-40 PERSONS A DAY DIE IN HIS DISTRICT. A FORMER WORLD VISION MEDIC FROM PURSAT SAID THAT MARASMUS WAS WIDESPREAD IN PURSAT. HE SAID THAT DEATHS OCCUR DAILY AND PREDICTED

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THAT 2-3 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION WOULD DIE DAILY  
WITHIN A MONTH. HE SAID THAT PEOPLE WERE COMMITTING  
SUICIDE IN PURSAT IN DESPERATION OVER LACK OF FOOD.  
STORY WAS THE SAME IN ALL THE PROVINCES FROM WHICH  
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ACTION RP-10

INFO CCT-01 EUR-12 EA-10 IO-14 ADS-00 SR-04 HA-05  
CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00  
PM-06 H-01 INR-10 L-03 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 AID-05  
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FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6035

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY ECNN PRICRITY

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MCSCCW PRICRITY

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY RANGCCN PRIORITY

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THESE REFUGEES COME. THERE IS NO FOOD AND THE POPU-  
LATION IS SAID TO BE LAPSING INTO SLEEP TO DIE.

4. THERE APPEAR TO BE NO LARGE CONCENTRATIONS OF KHMER  
EXCEPT ALONG THE THAI-KHMER BORDER AND IN A BELT AROUND  
PHNOM PENH. MOST OF THE REFUGEES ESTIMATE THE POPULATION  
AROUND THE LARGER TOWNS, SUCH AS BATTAMBANG, KOMPONG  
CHHNANG, SIEM REAP AS 10,000 OR FEWER. ESTIMATES

OF THE POPULATION OF SISOPHON VARY WIDELY, BUT MOST  
REFUGEES GUESS THAT THE TOWN HAS ABOUT 10,000 CURRENTLY,  
WITH A CONSTANT CHANGEOVER AS PEOPLE MOVE FROM EASTERN  
KAMPUCHEA THROUGH SISOPHON TO THE THAI BORDER. THE  
VIETNAMESE CONTINUE TO RESTRICT RESIDENCE TO  
VIETNAMESE CADRES OR TROOPS AND THOSE WHO WORK FOR

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THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME. AS THE POPULATION MOUNTS IN AND AROUND THE TOWNS, THE VIETNAMESE ATTEMPT TO PUSH THEM BACK INTO THE COUNTRYSIDE.

5. THESE REFUGEES REPORT THAT THE SITUATION IS WORSE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE THAN IN THE TOWNS. SMALL RATIONS ARE PROVIDED GOVERNMENT CADRES, WORKERS, TEACHERS, ETC., RANGING IN THESE REPORTS FROM ONE AND A HALF TO FOUR MILK TINS OF RED CORN OR SOMETIMES RICE EVERY 10-15 DAYS OR PER MONTH PER FAMILY. SINGLE GOVERNMENT WORKERS RECEIVE A HALF TIN EVERY TWO WEEKS OR MONTH. SOME RICE IS AVAILABLE FROM THE VIETNAMESE FOR GOLD. ONE REFUGEE ESTIMATED THAT PERHAPS TEN PERCENT OF THE POPULATION STILL HAD SOME GOLD AND WAS ABLE TO BUY SOME RATIONS. OTHERS ARE LEFT TO SCAVENGE. THIS IS DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS, HOWEVER. REFUGEES FROM PREY VENG, KOMPONG SPEU, KOMPONG CHHNANG, PURSAT, AND BATTAMBANG VOLUNTEERED THAT THE VIETNAMESE HAVE EMPLACED MINES IN THE RIPENING PADDY FIELDS TO PREVENT THE PEOPLE FROM

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GATHERING FOOD. SEVERAL REPORTED SEEING PEOPLE KILLED BY VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS AS THEY ATTEMPTED TO TAKE GRAIN FROM THE FIELDS. THE HENG SAMRIN TEACHER FROM BATTAMBANG CLAIMED THAT 2 OR 3 PERSONS A DAY WERE KILLED BY PAVN

TROOPS AS EXAMPLES TO OTHERS TO STAY OUT OF THE RIPENING RICE FIELDS. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE WITNESSED SUCH KILLINGS.

6. UNICEF/ICRC RELIEF OPERATIONS: SOME OF THE KHMER FROM PHNOM PENH AND THE SURROUNDING PROVINCES HAD HEARD THAT UNICEF AND THE ICRC WERE PROVIDING RICE. ALL DENIED THAT THEY OR ANYONE THAT THEY KNEW HAD RECEIVED A GRAIN. CONCERNING THE UNICEF/ICRC DISTRIBUTIONS, A FORMER STUDENT WHO LEFT PHNOM PENH NOV 19 SAID, "PEOPLE ONLY HEARD THE NEWS, BUT WERE VERY SURPRISED THEY GOT NOTHING, EVEN WHEN THEY ASKED FOR IT." A FORMER MONK, SELECTED BY HENG SAMRIN AUTHORITIES TO BE KOMPONG TRALACH DISTRICT SECURITY CHIEF IN KOMPONG CHHNANG PROVINCE, SAID, TYPICALLY, THAT HE HAD HEARD OF THE UNICEF/ICRC OPERATIONS, BUT SAW NOTHING. HE CHARGED THAT THE VIETNAMESE ARE DELIBERATELY TRYING TO STARVE THE PEOPLE. "LIKE POL POT THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO MASSACRE THE PEOPLE, ONLY WITH A DIFFERENT WEAPON, STARVATION INSTEAD OF A BAMBOO POLE," HE ASSERTED. VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAVE RICE, WHICH THEY CLAIM COMES FROM VIETNAM. EVERYONE, HOWEVER, THE MONK ADDED, CAN TELL THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE POOR QUALITY RICE FROM VIETNAM AND THE GOOD RICE WHICH COMES FROM INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES. PAVN'S RICE IS THE LATTER, HE ALLEGED. A MEDIC CLAIMED THAT THE VIETNAMESE DISTRIBUTE THE RICE IN THE DAYTIME FOR THEIR INTERNATIONAL

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