

TRENT JAMES L
79 BANGKOK 48469

11/29/79 104759 PRINTER: WK

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MONITORS AND TAKE IT UP AT NIGHT. A PRACTICE HE SAID HE
WITNESSED IN PHNOM PENH'S SUBURBS. WE ALSO HEAR
FREQUENTLY THAT PAVN CONFISCATES RICE DISTRIBUTED ON
THE THAI BORDER, SOMETIMES GIVING RED CORN IN RETURN.

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ACTION RF-10

INFO CCT-01 EUR-12 EA-10 IC-14 ADS-00 SR-04 HA-05
CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00
FM-06 H-01 INR-10 L-03 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 AID-05
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FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6036

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY

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CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

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7. THE HENG SAMRIN ADMINISTRATION: IF THE LIFE OF THE
PEOPLE WERE NOT SO MISERABLE, HENG SAMRIN WOULD BE
IRRELEVANT, BUT, ONE REFUGEE SAID, SINCE HENG SAMRIN CAME
THE PEOPLE GET POORER AND POORER. HENG SAMRIN DISTRIBUTED
LEAFLETS IN JANUARY SAYING THAT "SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS,
AND MONASTERIES WILL BE OPENED, A MONETARY SYSTEM
WILL BE RE-ESTABLISHED, THE COMMUNAL KITCHENS ABOLISHED.

BUT AFTER TWO OR THREE MONTHS, WE NOTICED THAT NONE OF
THESE THINGS WAS HAPPENING AND THAT THE VIETNAMESE WERE
IN CONTROL, A REFUGEE RECOUNTED. THE ONLY THING THAT
THE HENG SAMRIN ADMINISTRATION DOES IS ORGANIZE US FOR
WORK ON HATED COLLECTIVE FARMS, ONE REFUGEE SAID. OTHER
SERVICES ARE MINIMALLY PROVIDED. A FORMER HENG SAMRIN

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TEACHER FROM SISOPHON SAID THAT ONLY 2 OF 14 SCHOOLS SLATED FOR OPENING IN SISOPHON HAVE OPENED AND ONLY ONE THIRD OF THE EXPECTED 350 PUPILS GO TO CLASSES. THE REMAINDER HAVE TO SCAVENGE FOR FOOD AND FISH. THE REFUGEES REPORTED THAT HOSPITALS HAD BEEN OPENED IN THE PROVINCE TOWNS, BUT THERE IS NO MEDICINE EXCEPT FOR THE VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS AND THOSE WITH GOLD. ALTERNATIVELY, YOU CAN BUY SERUM FOR INNOCULATIONS IN THE BLACK MARKET AND THE MEDIC IN THE HOSPITAL WILL INJECT IT FOR YOU. THE SISOPHON TEACHER SAID THAT ONLY ONE OF THE TOWN'S MANY MONASTERIES HAS BEEN OPENED, MANNED BY A SINGLE MONK. THE HATED COLLECTIVE FARMS HAVE BEEN RE-ESTABLISHED. WHILE SOME BLACK MARKET ACTIVITIES AND TRADING ARE PERMITTED, THE PAVN SOLDIERS OFTEN GOAD THE HENG SAMRIN SOLDIERS INTO ARRESTING PEDDLERS AND SMUGGLERS. THE ULTIMATE CHARGE, AGAINST HENG SAMRIN, HOWEVER, IS THAT HIS ADMINISTRATION IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE FOOD FOR SURVIVAL AND IS, THEREFORE, RESPONSIBLE FOR THE STARVATION OF THE KHMER RACE. AS A CONSEQUENCE, DEFECTIONS FROM HENG SAMRIN APPEAR TO BE WIDESPREAD.

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8. VIETNAMESE BEHAVIOR: THE PAVN SOLDIERS SMILED SWEETLY WHEN THEY ARRIVED IN BATTAMBANG AND TOLD THE PEOPLE, "YOU ARE FREE NOW. WE HAVE HELPED SAVE YOU IN THE PAST AND ARE NOW DOING SO AGAIN." THE TEACHER FROM BATTAMBANG RECALLED. VIETNAMESE ARE NOW FEARED, THOUGHT TO BE ATTEMPTING TO EXTERMINATE THE KHMER RACE AND TURN KAMPUCHEA INTO ANOTHER CHAMPA (FORMER DWELLERS OF WHAT IS NOW VIETNAM WHO ARE ALMOST EXTINCT AS A RACE). PAVN SOLDIERS BEHAVE WELL ENOUGH IN THE TOWNS, BUT THE REFUGEES REPORTED THAT OUT IN THE COUNTRYSIDE VIETNAMESE SOLDIERS SYSTEMATICALLY ROB AT GUNPOINT KHMER IN THEIR VILLAGES OF GOLD, WATCHES, WHATEVER REMAINING POSSESSIONS A KHMER MAY HAVE. THEY ALSO CONTROL EVERY FACET OF THE HENG SAMRIN ADMINISTRATION DOWN TO THE DISTRICT LEVEL. A FORMER HENG SAMRIN MILITIAMAN FROM KOMPONG CHAM SAID THAT THE LEADER OF HIS 25-MAN UNIT WAS A VIETNAMESE SOLDIER. REFUGEES ALSO REPORTED FREQUENT TROUBLE BETWEEN THE PAVN AND HENG SAMRIN SOLDIERS.

9. THE SECURITY EQUATION: REFUGEES REPORT PAVN UNITS "EVERYWHERE EXCEPT IN THE JUNGLES," ALTHOUGH THE FORMER HENG SAMRIN MILITIAMAN FROM KOMPONG CHAM SAID THAT PAVN HAD IN THE PAST COUPLE OF MONTHS MOVED TO WESTERN KAMPUCHEA TO FIGHT. REFUGEES FROM PREY CHHOR DISTRICT, KOMPONG CHAM; CHUNG DUC DISTRICT (SIC), PREY VENG; KOMPONG TRALACH DISTRICT, KOMPONG CHHANG; AND THEPONG DISTRICT KOMPONG SPEU AND BATTAMBANG TOWN CLAIMED THAT THERE WERE NO POL POT SOLDIERS OPERATING IN THEIR AREAS. (OTHER REFUGEES FROM BATTAMBANG PROVINCE SAID THAT POL POT

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GUERRILLAS AND SPIES WERE EVERYWHERE AND STILL EXECUTED
THOSE WHO COLLABORATE WITH THE VIETNAMESE. DESPITE
THIS ABSENCE OF POL POT SOLDIERS. REFUGEES CLAIMED THAT

FIGHTING CONTINUES. THE FORMER MONK/DISTRICT SECURITY
CHIEF FROM KOMPONG CHHNANG CLAIMED THAT EVERYBODY TRIES
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ACTION RP-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-10 IC-14 ADS-00 SR-04 HA-05
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FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6037

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY

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TO KILL THE VIETNAMESE.

10. REFUGEES ALL CLAIMED LARGE CONTINGENTS OF KHMER
SEREI AND KHMER SEREIKA (ANTICOMMUNIST, ANTI-VIETNAMESE
RESISTANCE) FORCES WERE IN THE JUNGLES AND FOREST OF
CENTRAL AND EASTERN KAMPUCHEA. THE MONK CLAIMED THERE
WERE 1800 RESISTANCE FIGHTERS IN HIS DISTRICT, OF WHOM
300 HAD WEAPONS. HE SAID HE CAME TO CAMP 007 TO ESTABLISH
LIAISON FOR SUPPLY AND PLANS TO RETURN TO KOMPONG
CHHNANG TO FIGHT. FORMER HENG SAMRIN MILITIAMAN
FROM KOMPONG CHAM CLAIMED THERE ARE 1500 KHMER SEREI
FIGHTERS IN THE JUNGLES OF HIS PROVINCE, ALMOST ALL FORMER
HENG SAMRIN SOLDIERS. PEASANT FROM PREY VENG CLAIMED
THERE ARE 1500 FORMER HENG SAMRIN SOLDIERS IN PREY VENG'S

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11/29/79 104802

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JUNGLE RESISTING THE NEW REGIME. WEAPONS ARE LIMITED. BRIGHT, YOUNG PEASANT FROM KOMPONG SPEU CLAIMED THERE ARE 8,000 (SIC) KHMER SEREI IN HIS NATIVE KOMPONG SPEU PROVINCE. ALL NOTED THAT AMMUNITION AND WEAPONS WERE IN SHORT SUPPLY AND FOOD A CRUCIAL PROBLEM. THEY CLAIMED THAT THE PEOPLE SUPPORTED THEM AND EARLIER PROVIDED FOOD, BUT NOW THE PEOPLE HAVE NOTHING AND THEREFORE CAN SHARE NOTHING. (END LOU)

11. (C) COMMENT: WHILE WE ARE NOT YET PREPARED TO CONCLUDE FROM THESE INITIAL REPORTS FROM EASTERN AND CENTRAL KAMPUCHEA THAT NO FOOD IS REACHING THE COUNTRYSIDE EITHER FROM "SOCIALIST" SOURCES OR FROM UNICEF/ICRC OPERATIONS, THESE REPORTS DASH HOPES THAT FOOD WOULD QUICKLY REACH THE POPULATION AT LEAST IN AREAS UNDER VIETNAMESE/HENG SAMRIN CONTROL. IT APPEARS THAT CONDITIONS ARE AS GRIM IN THE EAST AND CENTRAL REGIONS AS THEY ARE IN THE WEST. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS ARE FAILING TO PREVENT MASSIVE STARVATION OR THE EXTENSIVE MOVEMENT

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OF KHMER FROM ALL OVER KAMPUCHEA TO THE THAI BORDER.

12. (C) THESE REPORTS, ESPECIALLY THE CLAIM THAT THE VIETS ARE MINING RICE FIELDS AND KILLING KHMER TO PREVENT THEIR GATHERING GRAIN, CORROBORATE OTHER EVIDENCE THAT THE VIETNAMESE ARE PURSUING A POLICY OF FOOD DENIAL NOT JUST TO AREAS UNDER POL POT INFLUENCE, BUT TO AT LEAST A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE KHMER POPULATION AT LARGE. HANOI WOULD APPEAR TO BE ATTEMPTING TO CREATE A KHMER FACADE BEHIND WHICH THEY ARE ALLOWING TO PERISH LARGE NUMBERS OF KHMER REGARDLESS OF THEIR POLITICAL AFFILIATION OR LACK THEREOF. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS POLICY ARE DIRE FOR THE KHMER RACE, ALL THE MORE REPREHENSIBLE SINCE FOOD IS IN FACT AVAILABLE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL SOURCES, IF THE VIETNAMESE/HENG SAMRIN WOULD PERMIT ITS DELIVERY WITHIN KAMPUCHEA.

13. (C) REPORTS OF NO KNOWN POL POT ACTIVITY IN MOST OF EASTERN AND CENTRAL PROVINCES, ARE SOMEWHAT SURPRISING, SINCE WE HAVE HAD INDICATIONS OF CONTINUING VIETNAMESE CASUALTIES FROM THOSE AREAS. WE REGARD THE NUMBERS OF KHMER SEREI FORCES REPORTED BY THE REFUGEES IN THE EASTERN AND CENTRAL PROVINCES AS SERIOUSLY INFLATED BUT COULD HELP EXPLAIN THE CONTINUED MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THOSE AREAS AND ALSO PARTLY EXPLAIN THE RATIONALE FOR VIETNAMESE APPARENT DENIAL OF FOOD THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

ABRAMOWITZ

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Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BANGKO 48470 270630Z
ACTION SS-15

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INFO OCT-01 EA-10 10-14 ADS-00 HA-05 RP-10 SR-04
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INR-10 NSAE-00 INRE-00 /082 W

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FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6038
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

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EA FOR HOLBROOKE, C FOR NIMETZ, WHITE HOUSE FOR OWEN

EO 12065: GDS 11/26/85 (ABRAMOWITZ, MORTON I.) OR-M
TAGS: SREF, CB, TH
SUBJ: THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

REF: BANGKOK 48469

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I WOULD LIKE TO BRING TO ATTENTION OF ADDRESSEES
REFTEL, WHICH IS OUR ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION INSIDE
CAMBODIA AT THE PRESENT TIME BASED ON INTERVIEWS OF KHMER
REFUGEES AT THE BORDER. THE PICTURE IT PAINTS NOT
SURPRISINGLY IS VERY GRIM INDEED. WHILE REFUGEE SOURCES
MUST OF COURSE ALWAYS BE HANDLED WITH CAUTION, I THINK
THE RECORD OF REPORTS FROM CAMBODIAN REFUGEES SINCE THE
ADVENT OF THE POL POT REGIME HAVE BEEN ON THE MARK, AND
WE MAY NOT HAVE PAID SUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO THEM. MORE-
OVER, THE REPORT WAS COMPILED BY DESAIX ANDERSON WHO FOR
THE PAST TWO YEARS HAS DEVOTED A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF
TIME INTERVIEWING REFUGEES OF ALL SORTS. EQUALLY AS
IMPORTANT, ANDERSON IS A MAN OF REAL INTELLECTUAL HONESTY.

3. THE SIMPLE FACT IS THAT FOR A NUMBER OF MONTHS LARGE
NUMBERS OF CAMBODIANS HAVE BEEN WITHOUT FOOD. THE INTER-
NATIONAL EFFORT TO BRING THEM FOOD HAS BEEN MINISCULE.
REPORTS OF 200,000 TONS DELIVERED BY SOCIALIST COUNTRIES
TO CAMBODIA RING HOLLOW AND EVEN IF THEY ARE TRUE, LARGE
NUMBERS OF KHMER DID NOT BENEFIT. THE INTERNATIONAL
EFFORT TO DATE NOTWITHSTANDING, NO ONE SHOULD BE MISLED
BY CLAIMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELIEF AGENCIES. WHAT
THEY ARE DOING IS VERY NECESSARY AND TO BE APPLAUDED BUT
IT HAS NOT PREVENTED HALF A MILLION REFUGEES ON THE THAI
BORDER AND MANY MORE ON THE WAY. THEIR EFFORTS ARE
SPEEDING UP AND THEY ARE DOING THEIR BEST TO GET FOOD
IN. BUT IT IS CLEAR THAT WHILE THERE ARE REAL LOGISTICAL
CONSTRAINTS, DISTRIBUTION IS THE PRINCIPAL STUMBLING
BLOCK AND THAT POLITICS IS A MAJOR ELEMENT IN THAT
DISTRIBUTION. WHEN CONFRONTED WITH OUR ASSESSMENT BASED
ON THOSE REFUGEE INTERVIEWS, FRANCIS AMAR, FORMER ICRC
DELEGATE HERE NOW WORKING WITH JEAN HOCHE, ADMITTED THAT
A GOOD PORTION OF RELIEF SUPPLIES WERE NOT BEING
DISTRIBUTED WITHIN CAMBODIA EVEN THOUGH INCREASING
SUPPLIES ARE BEING SHIPPED IN. GIVEN ITS OWN WEAKNESSES
AND THE CONTROL OF THE VIETNAMESE, THE PHNOM PENH GOVERN-
MENT CANNOT PERMIT VASTLY EXPANDED INTERNATIONAL
PRESENCE. MOREOVER, THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE
BOTH FROM OUR REFUGEE REPORTS AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE TO
INDICATE THAT THE DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD IS A MAJOR WEAPON
OF WAR AND POLITICAL CONTROL. SO FAR FOOD SEEMS TO BE
GOING ONLY TO AREAS UNDER CLEAR PHNOM PENH CONTROL LEAVING
LARGE NUMBERS OF KHMER UNTOUCHED.

4. WHAT TO DO? I AM BEREFT OF ANY BRIGHT IDEAS. THE

INTERNATIONAL RELIEF AGENCIES ARE DOING WHAT THEY CAN TO
INCREASE THE SUPPLY OF FOOD. EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE
MADE TO INCREASE THE AIRLIFT TO PHNOM PENH, TO OPEN UP
PROVINCIAL AIRPORTS AND TO EXPAND THE CARGO UNLOADING
CAPABILITIES OF KAMPONG SONG. BUT ALL THAT WILL NOT
ASSURE ADEQUATE DISTRIBUTION WITHIN CAMBODIA. I HAVE
PONDERED OVER NOTIONS OF AIRDROP BUT IT STRIKES ME AS
DELUSORY SINCE THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT REFUGEE
CONCENTRATIONS. THE PROBLEM IS COUNTRYWIDE, AND THERE IS
A MAJOR VIETNAMESE ANTI-AIR CAPABILITY. I FALL BACK
ON TWO NOTIONS:

-- ONE, WE MUST STEP UP THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN
AGAINST MOSCOW AND HANOI FOR PERMITTING THIS SCENE TO
CONTINUE. IN THE PAST FEW YEARS HANOI FOR THE FIRST TIME
HAS LOST MOST OF ITS DIPLOMATIC AND INTERNATIONAL
SUPPORT. WE MUST MAXIMIZE THEIR ISOLATION ON HUMANI-
TARIAN GROUNDS MUCH AS WE DID ON BOAT REFUGEES.

-- SECOND, AND IT WILL BE ENORMOUSLY DIFFICULT FOR
THAILAND, WE MUST ENCOURAGE PEOPLE TO COME TO THE THAI
BORDER. WE ARE DOING THIS ALREADY; THE PRESENCE OF
FOOD ON THE THAI BORDER IS ALREADY GETTING WELL KNOWN
ALL OVER CAMBODIA. VOA BROADCASTS WILL FURTHER
CONTRIBUTE TO IT. WE ARE SETTING OURSELVES UP FOR
A VERY DIFFICULT, LONG TERM PROBLEM, BUT UNLESS SOMEONE
CAN SHOW ME A BETTER WAY OF GETTING FOOD INTO CAMBODIA
AND DISTRIBUTING IT, I SEE NO OTHER WAY TO GO.
ABRAMOWITZ

*all being
pushed
forward
sharply
I agree*

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DECLASSIFIED

NLTG-06-077

per 6/7/06 NSC-17

62 MARA DATE 6/29/06

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 26, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia (U)

The President has read Ambassador Woodcock's cable of November 23 on U.S. policy in Indochina and Southeast Asia. In reading the cable, the President made the following comments which should define U.S. policy in the area:

-- The President reaffirmed that our objectives in the area are to create an independent Kampuchea that is not threatening to its neighbors; to prevent Laos from falling further under Vietnamese and Soviet sway; to protect Thailand and other ASEAN states; and to show Vietnam that its increasing dependence on Moscow will hurt badly over time and should be abandoned. The President added our humanitarian efforts as another objective. (S)

-- The President explicitly expressed his disagreement with the conclusion reached in Manila that we must avoid appearing as travelling the same path in Indochina as Beijing. (S)

-- In response to Ambassador Woodcock's comment that there is no consensus on the degree of SRV influence in these areas (Kampuchea and Laos) that we can accept, the President expressed his determination that SRV interests in Laos and Kampuchea should be kept at a minimum. (S)

-- The President confirmed his view that in most respects our goals in Indochina and in Southeast Asia as a whole are much more compatible with those of China under its present leadership than with those of Vietnam. The President added, however, that Pol Pot is a major obstacle. (S)

-- Finally, the President expressed his agreement with Ambassador Woodcock's view that the U.S. should stop trying to promote a political solution whose time has not yet come, and limit ourselves to the more modest effort of trying to define with greater clarity the basic tenets of our policy,

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Derivative Classified by Leonard Woodcock
Review 11/23/99
Reason: RDS 3

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ALTC-06-277
per 6/7/06 NSC JFC
DATE 6/29/06

which at a minimum should include support for Thailand, humanitarian aid to the Kampuchean people and refusal to consider any political steps vis-a-vis Phnom Penh or Hanoi as long as SRV troops occupy Kampuchea. The President specifically noted that this approach "sounds good." (S)

We should ensure that U.S. policies and future initiatives are guided by the President's comments above. A copy of the Ambassador's cable with the President's comments is attached. (S)



Zbigniew Brzezinski

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DE RUMJPG #8473/2 3271035
P R 232936Z NOV 79
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 218

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 14989
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 41
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 258
AMEMBASSY MANILA 889
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 591
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5427
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1114

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BEIJING 8473

EXDIS
BANGKOK FOR AMBASSADORS ABRAMOWITZ AND WOODCOCK

7. WHAT WE FIND MISSING FROM THE RECENT ROUND OF EXCHANGES IS ANY RECOGNITION THAT EVEN IF OUR INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES ARE NOT IDENTICAL WITH THOSE OF BEIJING, IN MOST RESPECTS OUR GOALS IN INDOCHINA, NO INDEED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AS A WHOLE, ARE MUCH MORE COMPATIBLE WITH THOSE OF CHINA UNDER ITS PRESENT LEADERSHIP THAT WITH THOSE OF VIETNAM. WHILE BEIJING HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO USE FORCE, IT IS NOT BENT ON THE DESTRUCTION OF THE HANOI REGIME OR ON THE IMPOSITION OF CHINESE PUPPET GOVERNMENTS IN THE REGION. IN CONTRAST, VIETNAM SEEMS BENT ON ESTABLISHING DOMINATION IN BOTH LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA TO A DEGREE THAT CAN ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH FORCEFUL OCCUPATION OF THESE COUNTRIES. WHILE SERIOUS CHINESE ERRORS, SUCH AS ITS LAST DITCH AND ULTIMATELY INEFFECTIVE SUPPORT FOR AN INTOLERABLY BRUTAL AND ANTI-VIETNAMESE POL POT REGIME HELPED LAUNCH HANOI ON THIS COURSE, THIS SHOULD NOT OBSCURE THE FACT THAT IT IS VIETNAM'S CURRENT EFFORTS TO DOMINATE INDOCHINA THAT ARE AT THE ROOT OF CURRENT INSTABILITIES IN THE AREA RATHER THAN SPECIFIC CHINESE ACTIONS (ALTHOUGH THESE ARE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS).

8. WE WOULD ALSO STRONGLY ENDORSE THE POINT MADE BY

True. Pol Pot's being so obnoxious is a major obstacle

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NLJC-06-077
per 6/7/06 NLJC Ltr
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ROGER SULLIVAN THAT WHEREAS OUR INTERESTS VIS-A-VIS VIETNAM ARE BASICALLY REGIONAL IN CHARACTER, OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA IS OF MUCH BROADER SIGNIFICANCE. THIS DOES NOT MEAN, OF COURSE, THAT OUR POLICIES AND THOSE OF CHINA OVERLAP IN EVERY RESPECT. ON THE CONTRARY, IN INDOCHINA THEY DIVERGE IN TWO IMPORTANT RESPECTS: FIRST, OUR OWN DIFFERENCES WITH VIETNAM ARE LESS SEVERE THAN THOSE OF CHINA; AND SECONDLY, CHINA'S SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE AREA ARE GREATER THAN OUR OWN. IN SHORT, WE CAN TOLERATE WHAT BEIJING CANNOT TOLERATE. HOWEVER, RECOGNITION OF THESE DIFFERENCES, AND AWARENESS OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN RESERVATIONS ABOUT CHINA, SHOULD NOT DISTORT OUR PERCEPTIONS OF CHINESE GOALS IN THE AREA, WHICH WERE NICELY SUMMED UP IN REF EIS SUMMARY OF THE COM MEETING.

9. IN GENERAL, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT A NEW AND MORE STABLE BALANCE OF POWER CAN BE ARRIVED AT IN THE INDOCHINA REGION AS LONG AS CHINA'S AND VIETNAMESE GOALS REMAIN AS INCOMPATIBLE AS THEY ARE. THUS, WE AGREE WITH BOB MILLER THAT IN OUR APPROACH TO KAMPUCHEA IT IS THE STABILITY AND INTEGRITY OF THAILAND THAT SHOULD BE OUR PRIMARY CONCERN. BUT WE COME TO A SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT CONCLUSION SINCE WE DOUBT THAT ANY POLITICAL SOLUTION IN KAMPUCHEA THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO HANOI UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH PRESERVING THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THAILAND OR BE TOLERABLE TO THE CHINESE. SECONDLY, WE AGREE WITH ROGER SULLIVAN'S BASIC POINT THAT WE SHOULD NOT LIGHTLY CONSIDER SPLITTING WITH CHINA OVER POLICY TOWARD AN AREA AS CRUCIAL TO CHINA AS IS SOUTHEAST ASIA.

10. WE DO NOT HAVE A SOLUTION TO OFFER TO THESE DILEMMAS. PERHAPS WE SHOULD BORROW A CARD FROM THE JAPANESE, CUT OUR ACTIVIST IMPULSES, STOP TRYING TO PROMOTE POLITICAL SOLUTIONS WHOSE TIME HAS NOT YET COME, AND LIMIT OURSELVES TO THE MORE MODEST EFFORT OF TRYING TO DEFINE WITH GREATER CLARITY THE BASIC TENETS OF OUR POLICY, WHICH AS A MINIMUM SHOULD INCLUDE SUPPORT FOR THAILAND, HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE KAMPUCHEAN PEOPLE, AND REFUSAL TO CONSIDER ANY POLITICAL STEPS VIS-A-VIS PHNOM PENH OR HANOI AS LONG AS DRV TROOPS OCCUPY KAMPUCHEA. FROM OUR PARTICULAR PERSPECTIVE HERE, THIS HARDLY SEEMS THE TIME TO UNDERTAKE EFFORTS TO CONVINCE THE VIETNAMESE OF OUR GOOD INTENTIONS.

Sounds good

11. PERHAPS THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD A MORE COHERENT

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POLICY WOULD BE TO START ASKING THE QUESTIONS DIFFERENTLY. IT IS NOT REALLY A QUESTION OF WHETHER WE ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT SRV DOMINATION IN KAMPUCHEA AND LAOS BUT RATHER WHETHER CHINA AND THAILAND ARE. IN ESSENCE, OUR DISTURBING CONCLUSION IS THE SAME AS THAT OF MORT ABRAMOWITZ, I.E., THAT WE HAVE LITTLE HOPE OF ACCOMPLISHING WHAT WE WANT IN INDOCHINA IN THE SHORT RUN. (AT THE SAME TIME, NEITHER CAN OUR ADVERSARIES ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS). THE BEST WE MAY BE ABLE TO DO UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IS TO TRY TO KEEP OUR POLICY REALISTICALLY GROUNDED ON OUR CAPABILITIES AND TO AVOID THE SELF-DELUSION THAT COULD RESULT FROM DEFINING OUR GOALS IN TERMS WELL BEYOND OUR REACH.

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 217

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 1498

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 40

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 265

AMEMBASSY MANILA 888

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 590

AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5426

AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1113

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BEIJING 8475

EXDIS

BANGKOK FOR AMBASSADORS ABRAMOWITZ AND WOODCOCK

E.O. 12065: ROSS 11/23/99 (WOODCOCK, LEONARD) ORM

TAGS: PEPR, TH, US

SUBJECT: DILEMMA POSED BY KAMPUCHEA

REF: A) STATE 289925, B) STATE 292057, C) 293370,

D) STATE 295111, E) MANILA 21721, F) STATE 298371

1. S -ENTIRE TEXT).

2. WE HAVE BEEN BOTH ENLIGHTENED AND DISCOURAGED BY THE RECENT GO-AROUND OF CABLES ON THIS SUBJECT, INCLUDING THE REPORT OF THE RECENT ASEAN COM MEETING IN MANILA (REF E). OUR MAIN CONCLUSION, RELUCTANTLY ARRIVED AT, IS THAT WE LACK A COHERENT POLICY FOR DEALING WITH THE ISSUES WE ARE CONFRONTED WITH IN INDOCHINA. IN LARGE MEASURE THIS IS BECAUSE WE LACK THE MEANS TO ACHIEVE OUR STATED POLICY GOALS; AND YET, BECAUSE OF THE UNATTRACTIVENESS OF REALISTICALLY OBTAINABLE OBJECTIVES, WE SEEM UNPREPARED TO DEFINE OUR GOALS IN TERMS OF OUR CAPABILITIES.

3. ABOVE ALL, WE SEEM TO LACK ANY CONSENSUS ON THE NATURE OF OUR INTERESTS IN KAMPUCHEA, ANY EXTENSION IN INDOCHINA AS A WHOLE. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THEREFORE, WE HAVE DIFFICULTY AGREEING ON OUR OBJECTIVES IN THAT REGION. VICE PRESIDENT MONGALE TOLD DENG XIAOPING IN AUGUST

*****HHSR COMMENT*****

Z9, AARON, GATES, DEN, VP
 EOB: PLATT, OKS, BREM, COCH

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NLJC-06-077

per 67706 NSC/Hr
 6/29/06

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THAT WE AND CHINA SHARE THE SAME OBJECTIVES IN INDOCHINA, E.I.E.: TO CREATE AN INDEPENDENT KAMPUCHEA THAT IS NOT THREATENING TO ITS NEIGHBORS, TO PREVENT LAOS FROM FALLING FURTHER UNDER VIETNAM AND SOVIET SWAY, TO PROTECT THAILAND AND OTHER ASEAN STATES AND TO SHOW VIETNAM THAT ITS INCREASING DEPENDENCE UPON MOSCOW WILL HURT BADLY OVER TIME AND SHOULD BE ABANDONED.

*These are still
our goals +
humanitarian efforts*

4. UNFORTUNATELY, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF PROTECTING THAILAND AND OTHER ASEAN STATES WE LACK THE MEANS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE GOALS. MOREOVER, THE COM MEETING IN MANILA REACHED THE VERY DIFFERENT CONCLUSION THAT WE MUST AVOID APPEARING AS TRAVELING THE SAME PATH AS BEIJING. WE CAN HARDLY EXPECT A COHERENT POLICY TO EMERGE IF ON THE ONE HAND WE ARE ASSURING CHINA WE SHARE COMMON OBJECTIVES IN INDOCHINA WHILE ON THE OTHER AND WE CONTEMPLATE EMBARKING ON AN EFFORT TO PERSUADE THE VIETNAMESE THAT WE AND ASEAN DO NOT SHARE CHINESE OBJECTIVES.

*← I do not agree
with this conclusion*

5. THE HARD REALITY IS THAT THE ONLY IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE WE SEEM TO HAVE ANY HOPE OF REALIZING IS THAT OF PROVIDING MORE FOOD TO THE STARVING KAMPUCHEAN PEOPLE. EVEN IN THIS WORTHWHILE EFFORT, OUR ACTIONS INVOLVE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES WHICH MAY OR MAY NOT ACCORD WITH OUR POLICY PREFERENCES. IN OTHER RESPECTS, WE SENSE CONSIDERABLE POLICY CONFUSION. WE SPEAK OF "LEGITIMATE SRV INTERESTS IN KAMPUCHEA AND LAOS BUT HAVE NOT DEFINED WHAT THESE ARE. THERE IS NO CONSENSUS ON THE DEGREE OF SRV INFLUENCE IN THESE AREAS THAT WE CAN ACCEPT, OR APPARENTLY EVEN ON WHETHER HANOI'S BRUTAL MEANS HAVE DESTROYED ANY CLAIM TO LEGITIMACY FOR ITS ENDS. WE TALK OF PRESSING HANOI TO ACCEPT A POLITICAL SOLUTION WHEN THE REALITY IS THAT HANOI WILL EITHER IMPOSE A POLITICAL SOLUTION OF ITS OWN OR WILL FAIL BECAUSE OF SCOUNDRELS LIKE POL POT, WHOM WE HAVE WRITTEN OUT OF OUR POLICY.

*SRV interests in
LAOS & Kam should
be kept at a
minimum*

6. THE ABOVE IS NOT MEANT TO SUGGEST THAT WE ARE MORE CLEAR SIGHTED THAN OUR COLLEAGUES. IT IS MERELY MEANT TO HIGHLIGHT THE DANGER OF LETTING THE UNATTRACTIVENESS OF THE AVAILABLE OPTIONS LEAD US INTO WELL MEANING BUT MISGUIDED POLICY PATHS THAT IGNORE THE FUNDAMENTAL INCOMPATIBILITIES BETWEEN VIETNAMESE AND CHINESE GOALS AT THIS TIME. NOR DOES IT APPEAR LIKELY THAT WE WILL SEE POLICY SHIFTS IN EITHER BEIJING OR HANOI IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE THAT WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR THE EMERGENCE OF A MODUS VIVENDI IN THE AREA. ACCORDINGLY,

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WE AGREE THAT THERE ARE NO QUICK-FIXES ON THE HORIZON.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr Vice President -

This is another
reason the "Voice"
appointment is so
important



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WASHINGTON

November 27, 1979

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 

SUBJECT: Broadcasts to Muslims - What Are We
Doing to Counter the USSR? (U)

The brief answer to your question is: Not much. (U)

Most relevant specifics are as follows:

The Voice of America dropped Persian-language broadcasting in 1958 and only resumed it in April of this year, when a half-hour each evening in shortwave was inaugurated over transmitters in England, Greece and Germany. In response to the current crisis, the Voice added another half hour in the morning last Wednesday (21 November). Evidence of listenership in Iran is scanty but there is some; it takes time to build up a dependable audience. (U)

Voice of America has long included in its programs beamed to the Soviet Union broadcasts in Uzbek, its only Soviet Muslim language. I urged VOA last summer to start broadcasts in Azerbaijani (with audience in both the USSR and Iran) but these have been delayed because of lack of funds. VOA broadcasts to Muslim audiences in Arabic, Urdu, Bengali and Indonesian and to African Muslims in Hausa and Swahili. (C)

Radio Liberty has long had broadcasts in all seven major Muslim languages of the USSR but these are weak in impact because of limitations both of staff and information to broadcast. Even more serious is the lack of powerful transmitters--RL broadcasts go out of Germany and Spain and the signals become very attenuated by the time ("second or third hop" in shortwave parlance) they reach their target areas. It is surprising that we have as much spotty evidence of listening as we do. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review: Nov. 26, 1985

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NWTC-06-027
 per 6/7/06 NSS/H
 DATE 6/29/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

There is no U.S. clandestine broadcasting to Muslims similar to the stations the Soviets sponsor for Iran (one) and Turkey (two) and some of the irresponsible Arabic-language broadcasts in which the Soviets may have a hand--our information about sponsorship is unclear. (C)

For more than two years I have been urging Radio Liberty to develop plans for increasing broadcasts to Soviet Muslims and they have done a good job of projecting staff increases, news and programming offices in the Middle East and methods of increasing transmitter strength. The task of recruiting personnel for such broadcasts and building up programming sources is obviously much more difficult than it is for East European languages. Very little has materialized yet from any of these plans because of the severe budgetary limitations we have imposed upon both RL and the VOA. In fact, if planning ceilings OMB is currently following are adhered to, both networks will have to defer all expansion plans during FY 1981 and cut existing programming services. Considering the small amounts of money involved, I feel this is a mistake which we should and can remedy. I am planning to take up this issue at an SCC next week. (C)

In sum, the way matters stand, the Soviets are far ahead of us in this field. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON


~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD~~

INFORMATION

Memo No. 1520-79

December 5, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast,
Friday, December 7, 1979

IRAN

Secretary Vance's mission to Bonn, Paris, London, Rome and Brussels should have been announced by the time of the breakfast, with departure December 9 and return December 14, for consultations on Iran. Iran, will, of course, be the initial point of discussion at the breakfast.

NATO/TNF

Immediately following the breakfast, you, Secretary Vance and Zbig will meet with Prime Minister Nordli, and you will then take Nordli to meet with the President at 9:45 a.m.

Prime Minister van Agt of the Netherlands is scheduled to meet with the President later in the morning. Foreign Minister Olsen of Denmark is also in Washington and he is meeting with Senator Biden on Friday. I am separately providing you with the NSC papers prepared for your meeting with Prime Minister Nordli.

RHODESIA/ZIMBABWE

With a ceasefire now agreed in principle, the British are pressing ahead seeking agreement on a ceasefire in detail. If one is achieved, possibly by the weekend, they can be expected to send their Governor to Salisbury, return the colony to legality, lift sanctions and look to us to lift sanctions.

~~TOP SECRET/EXDIS/CODEWORD~~
Classified by Source
RDS-2 12/4/99

Page 1 of 3

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DATE 6/29/06

At present there is somewhat of a split at the middle levels of government on the position the U.S. should take, with some maintaining that even if a ceasefire in detail is reached, the President should do no more than announce that he will lift sanctions (date unstated) and then continue to monitor the peace process before actually doing so. I have discussed this with Tony Lake. He and I are agreed that if a ceasefire in detail is reached and if the British return the colony to legality and lift sanctions, the President should lift sanctions and with justified pride claim victory for U.S. foreign policy. Tony and I also believe that the President should lift sanctions if the British attain no more than the ceasefire in principle and proceed to send their Governor, declare a return to legality and lift their sanctions.

The President should not find himself in a position where an honest foreign policy triumph eludes him, and the formal British declaration of return to legality is key to determining that triumph.

If the President does decide to lift sanctions, following the British lead - and in keeping with the above scenarios - I recommend that careful thought be given to the President's tactics with Prime Minister Thatcher. I believe he will want to praise her and Carrington - and that we should work this out behind the scenes in a way that has the Prime Minister praising the President in turn.

PRC: US-PRC CIVIL AIR

The Chinese have indicated that they are prepared to begin negotiations on December 10. However, as indicated at Tab A, State is currently taking the position that it will not be able to talk in earnest with the PRC at least until March. This strikes me and Mike Oksenberg as rather odd given the pressure we have been putting on the Chinese to begin negotiations. You may wish to ask Vance to look into this.

SAUDI ARABIA

I am attaching at Tab B State's analysis of the impact of the Mosque takeover in Saudi Arabia. I recommend it to you. It indicates rough sledding for the Saudis and underlines the need to stay in the closest possible touch with them.

FOREIGN POLICY BUDGET

At a time when U.S. leadership around the world is being questioned, State's efforts to include or increase certain foreign assistance programs are being strongly challenged by OMB. Tony Lake has provided me with the State paper at Tab C indicating the severity of the OMB cuts and the foreign policy damage to be expected from such cuts. I do not think you need to read the paper in detail (Lake sees it as a sensitive internal State document); however, I do think you should ask Vance how his foreign assistance budget process is faring given the sensitive period the U.S. has entered into and given our foreign policy interests abroad.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 30, 1979

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR Dennis Clift

FROM: EA - Roger W. Sullivan *RS*

SUBJECT: U.S. - PRC Civair Negotiations

Considering the Vice President's personal interest in U.S. - PRC aviation ties, I thought you might appreciate an update on the issue now that we have had some movement.

The American Institute in Taiwan initialed ad referendum a new informal arrangement with its Taiwan counterpart, CCNAA November 16. We do not anticipate any problems with the agreement, and it should be signed soon. It maintains and modestly expands air services between the U.S. and Taiwan.

The PRC has responded rapidly to the news and has offered to begin civair negotiations in Beijing as early as December 10. We are considering two dates -- in mid December or early January. Because of other commitments, our negotiators will only have a few days available for the first round of discussions and will not be able to pick up the negotiations again until March at the earliest.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS 11/30/85 Roger W. Sullivan

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per 6/7/06 NSC 1/r
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<u>RANK</u>	<u>PROGRAM</u>	<u>OUTLAYS</u>
1. ESF - Turkey	100	100
<p>OMB reduced the Turkey level by \$100 million -- to an amount (\$100 million) that is \$75 million below the FY 1979 level and \$100 million below the FY 1980 level. No MAP is included in the FY 1981 budget for Turkey. We consider restoration of this \$100 million essential to the successful outcome of the current base negotiations.</p>		
2. FMS - Thailand (15), Jordan (50), Sudan (20), Indonesia (15), Malaysia (10), Liberia (.2), Colombia (5.3), Peru (4), Ecuador (4)	123.5	12.3

These programs were cut \$165 million. Restoration of the Southeast Asian programs is essential given the security situation. The Sudan funding would enable us to meet the President's commitment to Nimeiri. The funding for Latin America meets pressing requirements there and enables us to comply with the President's directive to increase FMS financing available to the region. The Jordan addback is essential to encourage that country's participation in the Middle East peace process.

3. PL 480 Title I Reserve	80	80
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To maintain a reserve sufficient in size to meet emergency requirements without having to request supplemental appropriations. A large reserve would also minimize reprogramming when grain prices increase. This is the same amount proposed by IDCA and would meet the President's 6 million ton commitment.

4. ESF - Southern Africa (30), Sudan (13), Jordan (30), Eastern Caribbean (10), Nicaragua (25)	108	108
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These programs were cut \$153 million. The proposed restoration in Sudan enables us to meet the President's commitment to Nimeiri. The addback in Jordan restores half the non-Maqarin related program, considered essential by NEA. The Eastern Caribbean programs are needed to match our stated interest in the region. The Nicaraguan program required the additional funding to meet identified needs only partially met by the Central American supplemental, to strengthen moderate elements in that country. The Southern Africa program is necessary to carry out US economic and political objectives in this region.

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<u>RANK</u>	<u>PROGRAM</u>	<u>OUTLAYS</u>
5. ESF Contingency Fund	50	50
<p>Necessary to demonstrate US support in sufficient time to influence political outcomes in a country experiencing sudden political change accompanied by severe economic problems. The fund would also permit rapid US response to natural disasters, crop failures, social upheavals and balance of payments problems. The fund should substantially reduce the need for supplemental appropriations.</p>		
6. AID - Dominican Republic (10.4), Guyana (3.4), LAC Regional (1.0), Zaire (3.8), Philippines (8.2), Liberia (3.2), Somalia (2.5), Malawi (1.7), Lesotho (4.9), Swaziland (1.5), India (18), Bangladesh (14.2), and ASEAN Regional (2.9)	78	13
<p>To bring the levels for Zaire, the Philippines, Liberia, Somalia, ASEAN Regional, Guyana, and the Southern African countries (Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland) close to FY 1980 C.P. levels and bring the AID program 4% above the FY 1980 C.P. Also includes a small increment for priority programs in renewable energy and increases for India and Bangladesh, Central America and the Caribbean.</p>		
7. IMET - ASEAN programs (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines .185); Middle East and South Asia (Lebanon, Tunisia, India, Bangladesh, Yemen .849); Africa (Sudan, Liberia, Kenya, Ghana, Senegal .925); Portugal (.4); Latin America (Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico .132)	2.5	2.5

All bureaus and DOD believe this is one of our most important programs despite the relatively small amounts involved. The \$2.5 million would allow us to meet most of our pressing needs.

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<u>RANK</u>	<u>PROGRAM</u>	<u>OUTLAYS</u>
8. IBRD - Selected Capital Increase	150	15
<p>Assuming an FY 1980 appropriation of \$400 million, we will be \$625 million in arrears on the Selected Capital Increase. This addback would probably not be sufficient to maintain the US veto of Charter Amendments. This \$15 million increase in outlays will translate into an additional \$750 million in IBRD lending as each dollar in outlays translate into \$50 in Bank lending.</p>		
9. FMS - Morocco (10), Oman (5), Lebanon (5), Sudan (20)	40	4
<p>FMS - The Moroccan program has taken on added significance in the light of the decision to expand our arms supply relationship with that nation. NEA considers the Omani and Lebanese addbacks essential to our efforts to promote peace in the Middle East. The Sudanese increment would enable the Nimeiri Government to begin to fund an air defense package.</p>		
10. IO/P - UNICEF	8	4
<p>Our request was for \$50 million; OMB reduced this to \$37 million. An additional \$8 million is needed to reward UNICEF's outstanding performance record, particularly the recent effort in Kampuchea.</p>		
11. PL 480 - Indonesia (50), Portugal (40), Nicaragua (5.3), Peru (10), Bolivia (1.6), Sudan (6), Honduras (.2), Egypt (16)	129	129

To continue at FY 1980 levels PL 480 programs in Egypt and Portugal. Provide Indonesia a \$50 million program, a reduced level from FY 1980 (\$100 million). The increase for Sudan (\$6 million) is required as part of an assistance package to meet the President's commitment to Nimeiri. Additions (\$17 million) to the amount of PL 480 approved for Nicaragua, Peru, Bolivia, and Honduras are needed to meet significant economic problems in these countries.

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-4-

<u>RANK</u>		<u>PROGRAM</u>	<u>OUTLAYS</u>
12.	ESF - Lebanon (10), Portugal (3), Jordan (10), Southern Africa (10), Eastern Caribbean (5), Dominican Republic (15)	53	53
<p>The Lebanese program, eliminated by OMB, is important to the Middle East peace process. Other addbacks would fund all but \$20 million of the Jordan package and provide Portugal a small technical assistance loan in addition to the Azores' related program; both increments are considered vital. The Southern African and Caribbean programs would be completely funded, the latter needed not only to promote stability, but also to overcome the effects of Hurricane David.</p>			
13.	IMET - Latin America (LA Regional, Ecuador, Peru, Panama)	.473	.473
<p>This small addback would meet our original budget request in all regions and is strongly supported by all the regional bureaus and DOD.</p>			
14.	AID to Enhancement Level - Kenya (10), Zaire (25) , Peru (124), Bolivia (5.4), Ecuador (4), Dominican Republic (5.4), Bangladesh (14.2) , India (30), Sri Lanka (114), Thailand (10) (5/8)	100	10
<p>Would provide an increase over FY 1980 levels for poorer countries demonstrating commitment to equitable development and human rights (India, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Gambia, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic). Also would provide \$20 million for new initiatives in energy.</p>			
15.	FMS - Central America (15), Tunisia (10), Jordan (20), Senegal (4.5), Gabon (1.3)	50.8	5.0

The addbacks in Central America would favorably influence the armed forces and strengthen the moderate elements in the face of leftist challenges, and would reflect real progress in increasing Latin America's share of the global FMS program. The African programs are considered important by the bureau because of those nations' cooperation in giving us access to facilities when we have needed them. NEA believes that the situation in the area requires the Tunisian and Jordanian programs to be funded at these levels.

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<u>RANK</u>	<u>PROGRAM</u>	<u>OUTLAYS</u>
16. FMS - Egypt	125	12.5

Although final decisions on the size of the program have not been made by the President, this amount would fully fund our request. DOD would rank this increment at the top of its addback list, citing it as essential to a meaningful program.

17. IBRD - Selected Capital Increase	325	33
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Would ensure maintenance of US veto and completion of US subscription to SCI before seeking Congressional approval of General Capital Increase.

18. PL 480 Title II Contingency Language (to maintain tonnage level)	100	50
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Title II appropriations language would be modified to allow borrowing of up to \$100 million from the Commodity Credit Corporation. This borrowing would permit the maintenance of the legislated minimum Title II tonnage, without supplemental appropriation, should commodity on freight costs raise substantially.

19. IO/P - UNDP, S&T Fund, OAS	16	8
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OMB provided only \$140 million for both UNDP and a US contribution to the Science and Technology Fund. Our request was \$140 million for UNDP and \$25 million for the Fund. IO believes that the US contribution to the Fund should be no less than \$15 million. OMB reduced our recommended OAS level from \$20.5 million to \$17.5 million (the FY 1980 C.P. level). IO has requested an additional \$1 million.

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON


~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION

Memo No. 1558-79

December 13, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast,
Friday, December 14, 1979,
7:30 a.m.

IRAN

As a result of the Thursday SCC the agencies are working on approaches to Oman, Somalia and others on the question of facilities. The discussion thus far, as I understand it, has barely skimmed the magnitude of decisions the President must take. These facilities will be extremely important for us. At the same time, they will involve large amounts of money -- e.g., some \$400 million to put Masirah into shape as a up-to-date airfield, plus millions in assistance for Oman. It is my understanding that OMB has not yet been brought into the picture and OMB can be expected, on the basis of firm standing instructions from the President, to remind him that he should not be spending such money if he is to achieve his budgetary goals. You may wish to ask Secretary Brown to discuss the facilities question during the course of the breakfast.*

It is my understanding that the NATO leaders with whom Vance has consulted have been somewhat forthcoming on the question of economic actions against Iran. However, they are being cautious. Warren Christopher should be asked to report on the results of these consultations.

ZIMBABWE

As of Thursday afternoon, the President had instructed State and White House staff to consult with members of the Congress on sanctions and those consultations are still going forward. The NSC was hopeful that they could be concluded in time to permit the President to announce that he was lifting sanctions

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified by A. Denis Clift
Review 12/13/99

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per 6/7/06 NSC/H
6/29/06



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