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before close of business Thursday. Senator Helms plans to move Friday morning with a resolution forcing the Administration's hand. I would hope that if this has not been resolved by the time of the breakfast that the President would again review the key factors, bearing in mind that the UK Governor has arrived, the colony has been returned to legality, and UK sanctions lifted. I continue to see this as a foreign policy victory for the President.

MIDDLE EAST - AID FOR EGYPT

Following up on Ambassador Evron's meetings with you and with officials at the Department of State, you may wish to report the key points Evron made on aid for Egypt:

- Israeli Ambassador should have been consulted before the Administration's draft position was provided to the Senate, given the fact that leaks were a certainty and that the resulting stories could only be inflammatory in the Israeli press;
- Evron had been instructed by Begin to take a tough line on the aid for Egypt question;
- It is essential to preserve the qualitative difference in weapons between Israel, Egypt and the other Arab nations (why not F-5Gs or F-Xs instead of F-16s);
- The US should help Egypt to reassess its military needs now that there is peace with Israel.

In reply you noted the importance of not giving our draft figures to the Israeli Cabinet this Sunday, and you stressed the very difficult budgetary situation we face.

AFGHANISTAN

Warren Christopher will review developments in Afghanistan. State is concerned that the US media and public will very quickly make the Soviet presence in Afghanistan a major, contentious subject of discussion.

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RELIEF SUPPLIES INTO KAMPUCHEA

At the December 10 SCC on Thailand/Kampuchea you instructed the agencies to provide a status report on the relief supply situation. That report is attached at Tab A, together with the most recent situation report on the relief efforts.

PRESIDENT'S DEFENSE BUDGET

Secretary Brown will wish to report on his consultations with the Senate Arms Committee regarding the President's FY81 defense budget.

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\* Dick Moose and his African Bureau experts are concerned that the implications of requesting facilities at Mombasa and Berbera have not been carefully thought through. Dick has asked his Deputy, Bill Harrop, to make the papers at Tab B available to you (they are internal State documents).

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### Delivery of Relief Supplies into Kampuchea

Relief supplies are delivered into Kampuchea through the seaport of Kampong Som, up the Mekong to the river-port of Phnom Penh and to the airport at Phnom Penh.

As of December 7, approximately 24,000 metric tons of food have been delivered to Kampuchea: 20,000 by sea, 2,500 up the Mekong river, and 1,500 by airlift. Another 15,000 metric tons are underway or being loaded. 3,250 metric tons of other food (beans, oil and sugar) are also in the pipeline.

### Distribution

While supplies are increasing significantly, distribution remains a problem. Although precise figures are not yet available, UNICEF/ICRC estimate that 80 to 90% of the food delivered into Kampuchea remains stockpiled in warehouses, mostly in Kampong Som.

### Supplies Along the Border

As of December 4, 17,446 metric tons of food have been distributed along the Thai-Kampuchean border. The current daily distribution along the border is 350 metric tons. Some 600-700,000 people are estimated to be huddled along the border.

### Food Moving from the Border to the Interior

We do not have hard information on the movement of food from the Thai-Kampuchean border to the interior. Refugee interviews suggest that substantial amounts are being carried back to dependents and relatives in the interior by an "ant army" of villagers and smugglers. Some of these supplies have been interdicted by Vietnamese troops, but most appear to be getting through. At best we can say that a sizeable number of Khmers in the interior are getting grossly inadequate amounts of food from the border feeding operation and that perhaps a total of one million people benefit from this operation to varying degrees.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Operations Center

Kampuchea Working Group

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Situation on Khmer relief as of 1200 hours EST December 12, 1979.

1. (C) Warehouse Bottlenecks - We are becoming increasingly concerned with the slowness at which supplies are moved from Kampong Som and Phnom Penh. Various sources indicate that 80 - 90 percent of all aid received remains in warehouses. There is only sufficient warehouse space in Kampong Som to hold 45,000 metric tons of relief goods. This space will be exceeded in the immediate future with the expected arrival of two cargo ships.
2. (U) White House Statement - The White House in a December 6 statement denounced the Vietnamese and Heng Samrin authorities for deliberately blocking and obstructing the flow of aid. The statement further proclaimed that "relief supplies are piling up in Phnom Penh and other points of initial delivery because local and Vietnamese authorities continually change or delay agreed arrangements for distribution. Taxes and tariffs are collected on the delivery of relief supplies -- in effect imposing a surcharge on human survival. We continue to receive reports that relief supplies are diverted or stockpiled for the use of military forces and that what distribution does take place is skewed to favor officials and supporters of the Heng Samrin regime. There is even interference with the attempts of the Kampuchean people to feed themselves. For example, refugees have reported the mining of rice fields to prevent a harvest. In the face of widespread human anguish, this delay and diversion of humanitarian efforts is unconscionable."
3. (U) Hanoi's Reply - On December 8, Hanoi in an English language radio broadcast flatly rejected the White House statement and condemned "the distortion of the real situation in Kampuchea and the slander of Viet Nam." The broadcast went on to say that Viet Nam, the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries were the first to send a claimed "hundreds of thousands of tons of food and hundreds of tons of medicines as aid to the Kampuchean people."
4. (LOU) Independent Evaluations - The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), although limited in its

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mobility within Kampuchea, tells us that it has at the present time found no evidence to support the allegations of aid diversion. A Church World Service (CWS) representative who visited Phnom Penh ascribed delays "for the moment" to transportation and communications difficulties, as well as inexperience of the Heng Samrin authorities, but acknowledged that by the end of the year if supplies still are not getting through other explanations must be sought.

5. (U) Relief Deliveries - As of December 7, there have been 20,250 metric tons of rice delivered to Kampong Som and 2,510 metric tons of rice delivered to Phnom Penh, the only entry points open to Western international relief assistance. Together with rice being loaded or now underway, a total of 37,000 metric tons of rice has either been delivered or is in the pipeline. 3,250 metric tons of other foods (beans, oils and sugar) are also on their way. While precise figures are not yet available, analysis of the data we have indicates that roughly 100 metric tons of medical supplies have been taken into Kampong Som and Phnom Penh. An additional 17,446 metric tons of food are reported to have been distributed along the Thai Khmer border as of December 4.

6. (U) C-5A Transport of UNICEF Cranes - UNICEF was unsuccessful in its attempts to arrange timely flight clearance for two C-5A Galaxy cargo aircraft (carrying nine 6 1/2 ton truck-mounted cranes and nine trucks) to deliver the cargo directly to Phnom Penh. It was delivered instead on December 7 and 8 to Singapore for onward shipment by sea.

7. (U) ICRC Appeal for Medical Teams - In anticipation of a possible shift of some 380,000 refugees from the border encampments of Nong Samet and Mak Mun to the interior Thai holding center of Khao I Dang, the ICRC appealed to national Red Cross societies for medical teams. A total of 150 teams are planned for recruitment and possible deployment in three phases by January 1. The requirements for the first phase have now been met by 29 national teams, 14 of which have already arrived in Thailand.



8. (C) Refugees Driven from Kampuchea - Thai military authorities responsible for the sector north of Ta Phraya said that the December 4 Vietnamese attack against the Son Sann-Dien Del resistance bases north of Ta Phraya drove some 30,000 Khmer villagers into Thailand. The refugee leaders, saying they wanted to return to Kampuchea, report-

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edly declined transport to the Khao I Dang holding center. To forestall the creation of a defacto refugee camp, the Thai, while supplying food, have refused to let the refugees build shelters.

9. (C) Life in Kampuchea - Refugees who arrived on the Thai/Khmer border in early December describe Kampuchea as a nation without economic life beyond smuggling, bribery and a meager dole. Many items are available on the black markets for gold: Thai cigarettes, ICRC antibiotics and Oxfam labeled wheat flour. According to the reports, jobs with the Heng Samrin Government require bribes; truck drivers exchange rides for gold, and Vietnamese soldiers take Thai cigarettes to close their eyes at checkpoints. The thrust of refugee reporting is that, except in Phnom Penh, no refugee has yet seen significant rice distributions. Rumors circulate that rice is being secretly sent to Viet Nam. Agricultural activity within Kampuchea, according to the refugees, is affected by a sense of hopelessness since already hungry farmers believe that they will not be allowed to keep whatever they plant. Vietnamese are said to be claiming that the harvest must be stored for next year's seed.

  
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Thomas J. Barnes  
Kampuchea Working Group  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Robert Steven  
Senior Watch Officer

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

December 13, 1979

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TO: P - Mr. Newsom  
FROM: AF - William C. Harrop *IA*  
SUBJECT: US Facilities at Mombasa and Berbera

Attached are cables for action to Nairobi and Mogadishu on the question of facilities at Mombasa and Berbera. One requests our Ambassadors' views on the reaction they would anticipate from their host governments to a US request for facilities at Mombasa and Berbera and the likely quid pro quo they would demand. The other requests both Ambassadors to open immediate discussions at the appropriately high level for facilities at Mombasa and Berbera.

We believe we should seek our Ambassadors' advice before issuing instructions. We need to have a clearer idea of the quid pro quo the Kenyans and Somalis would ask of us. Quite obviously, the most serious obstacles to any US military facility at Mombasa or Berbera are our own real budgetary limitations on providing military assistance to Kenya or Somalia. We don't have the budget resources at present to offer either country additional military aid; the facilities at Berbera would require important infrastructure investment to be useful to us, and these funds are also not budgeted.

In addition, Somalia presents a particular problem. The continuation of the Ogaden hostilities and the Somali/Ethiopian conflict have implications for the War Powers Act, which we believe requires Congressional sanction prior to the dispatching of US units to a War Zone.

Under these circumstances, to enter into talks with either Kenya or Somalia before we have begun the necessary consultations with Congress to obtain that support which is essential to any increased FMS or Grant funds to Kenya or Somalia would expose us to the possibility of being unable to muster the budgetary assets and the Congressional support those facilities require. Such a failure could be politically damaging in Somalia and embarrassing in Kenya. We need to have better assurances than we have at present that we can deliver the budgetary assets required to support our request.

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There are other reasons why we believe it unwise to establish US military facilities at Mombasa or at Berbera. In Somalia the establishment of US facilities at Berbera would identify us with Somalia at a time when the Somalis continue to support the Ogaden insurgents. Somalia would most surely view any US facility at Berbera as US military and political support for its Ogaden policy -- a support which would provide Siad's government with whatever military support it requires in carrying out its goals in the region. In short, we might find that we could only maintain a US facility at Berbera by providing even greater military assets to Siad which could lead to our direct military involvement in the Horn. Should we ultimately conclude that the price was too high, we could only disengage by paying a political price -- i.e., a US retreat -- which was unacceptable to our interests elsewhere in the region or in the world.

Kenya poses special problems. While Kenya already provides ready US military access for both ships and aircraft, the extent of US military access to Kenya is nevertheless a sensitive subject. Kenya wishes to preserve its non-aligned credentials with other developing and African nations. Any attempt to formalize our present military access would undoubtedly involve unequivocal quid pro quos, including a security guarantee and increased military and economic assistance. Since we already have ready access to Kenyan facilities -- access which can be increased over our present use -- we believe it unnecessary (and not cost-effective) to seek any special "facilities" in Kenya. Moreover, a more formal military relationship with the US which resulted in Kenya's being viewed as a US surrogate through which US military power is projected in the region would be politically costly to Kenya and to our political position in Africa. It could be potentially destabilizing in Kenya itself -- possibly by encouraging greater Soviet activism in Kenya.

In our view, there are alternatives to establishing US facilities at Berbera or Mombasa. These include greater use of our access to Kenyan ports and airfields, while at the same time making more extensive use of Djibouti. We believe that increased use of Djibouti can be obtained if we provide greater economic assistance, but at a political and economic cost appreciably lower than will be required in Somalia.

Attachments:

Telegram A to Mogadishu and Nairobi  
Telegram B to Mogadishu and Nairobi

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### Increased US Military Use of Somali Facilities:

On several occasions the Somali Government has encouraged us to increase our access to Somali facilities. Such access might include bunkering arrangements at Berbera and operating maritime patrol aircraft (P-3) flights in and out of Somali air fields. At the present time our P-3 landing rights in the region are confined to Djibouti and to Kenya.

While we believe that we can increase our US naval ship visits to Somali ports without difficulty, a reliance on Somali facilities for US military use -- such as bunkering or P-3 flights -- would have an inevitable impact on our current policy.

Over the medium term any US military use of Somali facilities would be perceived by others in the region, particularly Ethiopia, as tantamount to a US military relationship with Somalia. Although the Somalis might permit our military access without immediately requiring a quid pro quo, they would eventually seek such a quid. It is certain that they would ask for military aid as the price for any "facilities" to the US Navy, since in their view their granting of special rights would render them vulner-

able (or so they would argue) to Soviet or Ethiopian military action. To withhold such military assistance would lead to the denial of access and a deterioration of our present relationship -- a relationship which, while it falls short of Siad's wishes, is satisfactory to US interests. To request or receive bunkering or P-3 rights in Somalia while we continue to withhold military assistance would give the Somalis a bargaining chip with us but would not provide the Navy with the assured, certain, or dependable use of Somali facilities which it is seeking. Since we could only assure dependable access to these facilities once military assistance was granted, then it would be unrealistic to seek such facilities until the political environment in the Horn permitted a US arms relationship with Somalia. At present, that environment doesn't exist.

US military support for Somalia while Siad continues to back insurgency in the Ogaden would have adverse implications for our relations with Kenya. (The recent failure of the Saudi effort to mediate a Somali-Kenyan conciliation demonstrates how implacable is Somali irredentism and how deeply-seated are Kenyan apprehensions.) In Ethiopia, should Siad escalate WSLF activities in the Ogaden, he would eventually risk Ethiopian reprisals. An ongoing US military support role which then failed to provide Siad with the additional defensive capacity to resist Ethiopian military action would be politically costly for us, specifically, in

-- a perceived backdown in the face of the Soviet/Cuban presence in Ethiopia;

-- a failure to demonstrate to Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arabs our concern for their security fears in the Arabian Peninsula; and

-- an international perception of weakening US firmness and resolve in the face of Soviet backed Ethiopian military activity.

In short, we might find that we could only maintain our Somali policy by providing even greater military assets to Siad which could lead to our direct involvement in the Horn; or that we could only disengage from such a military relationship by paying a political price which was unacceptable to our interests elsewhere in the region or the world.

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Overview

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## The Horn of Africa

Today the most difficult problems in the Horn lie in the long standing conflicts in the Ogaden and Eritrea. Both are threatening to Ethiopia's interests and the position of its leaders, help sustain the Soviet and Cuban presence in Ethiopia, and breed continuing uncertainty and instability in the region.

So long as these conflicts go unresolved, Ethiopia's and Somalia's military requests will continue, the Horn will continue to be subject to Cuban and Soviet influence, arousing moderate Arab security concerns, and posing the question as to whether the US can or should play an active role in countering the Soviet and Cuban presence.

### US Policy:

Our policy goal in the Horn has been to promote an environment in which territorial and ethnic conflicts can be resolved and the nations of the Horn can get on with the task of economic and social development. We also seek to limit and, eventually, to reduce Soviet/Cuban influence in the area.

To these ends we have indicated our willingness to support political solutions to the conflicts in Eritrea and the Ogaden acceptable to both sides. Since none of the belligerents has shown a willingness to do other than pursue its unilateral objectives by military means, and since those, like the OAU mediators or the US who seek political solutions lack any effective leverage with the belligerents, the conflicts continue.

In this situation, we have maintained our policy of refusing to provide arms to either Somalia or Ethiopia while continuing our attempts with our economic and diplomatic resources to improve as best we can our relations with both nations.

Our biggest success has been in staying out of a situation in which we could expect to accomplish little. Meanwhile we have had limited success in improving relations with Somalia; but very little in Ethiopia.

### Somalia:

While on the surface there is the appearance of improve-

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ment in our relations with Somalia -- a reestablishment of our AID mission; the exchange of military attaches; US naval visits to Somali ports; and an expanded presence -- we shouldn't exaggerate our own or Western diplomatic success with the government of President Siad. Our success was considerably eased by

-- Somali hostility to the Soviet Union following on Soviet support for Ethiopia (which led to the Soviet expulsion from Somalia in November 1977);

-- Egyptian military and Saudi financial support for Somalia; and

-- Siad's lack of any alternative to his dependence upon the resources of the moderate Arabs and, to a lesser extent, the West.

On the hard issues, the Ogaden question and the related question of a US military relationship with Somalia, problems remain. The Ogaden question in particular lies at the root of Somalia's difficulties with its neighbors and sets limits to the nature of our help, especially as regards arms.

Our objectives in Somalia are identical to our objectives in the Horn -- to contain ethnic or territorial conflict, to neutralize or remove Soviet influence and to advance economic and social development in a pro-Western political environment. We have not been successful in reducing conflict. In the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, Somalia continues its political and material support for the WSLF guerrillas. WSLF forces, supplied and in some instances controlled by the Somali National Army, maintain their ability to move through much of the countryside, while the Ethiopian forces reinforced by Cubans control the major villages and towns. Such material support for the insurgents not only demonstrates to Ethiopia and others Somalia's continuing pursuit of its territorial claims by force of arms but also is a clear indication of the aggressive policy Siad would pursue even more vigorously once he was persuaded he had the political or military support to gain his objectives. (Such a conclusion is implicit in Siad's recent comment to Ambassador Petterson in Mogadishu that only through military pressure in the Ogaden and Eritrea can the Mengistu regime be forced to accept a negotiated settlement in these two areas.)

The problems a Somali arms relationship pose for the US are evident:

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-- Whatever our difficulties with Ethiopia, we have nothing to gain in associating ourselves with Somali irredentism. There are reasons of principle as well as of common sense in this judgment:

-- First of all, we are committed to support the territorial integrity of existing African states. This is an OAU principle and we support it; its loss would have disastrous negative effects in Africa. (No OAU nation has ever backed Siad in his territorial ambitions. This was true during the 1977-78 Ogaden war and is true today.)

-- Secondly, given the Soviet military commitment to Ethiopia (almost \$2 billion) the military resources required to sustain such an aggressive policy would be enormous, (i.e. open ended) the human costs intolerable, and the results probably indecisive, with any victory achieved so precarious that its maintenance would require the same vast arms outlays which presently exist in the Horn.

-- Such a policy would thus perpetuate instability in the Horn and help to ensure continued Ethiopian dependence upon Soviet and Cuban assistance.

-- Inasmuch as Siad appears to have no alternative to his present reliance upon the moderate Arabs and the West, US failure to provide Somalia with arms will not in itself bring about a change in Somalia's current political orientation.

-- Although Siad has given us written assurances that he would not use force against his neighbors and would not use any US-provided military equipment except for legitimate defensive purposes, his continued involvement in the Ogaden nullifies those assurances.

In the meantime, Siad has received military equipment from Egypt, from Western European suppliers, e.g., from Italy and, we believe, from France. (A recent CIA report claims that in northern Somalia the Somali National Army is now "superior in manpower and equipment to what it possessed at the peak of the Ogaden war.") Despite the relative adequacy of his military resupply from other sources, he continues to plead that US military support is essential if Somalia is not to be overrun by Ethiopian reprisals, or if Siad himself is not to be overthrown by pro-Soviet military elements in Somalia.

We discount these fears. Soviet support for Ethiopia enabled the Ethiopians to turn the tide of battle in 1977-78 in the Ogaden. As a result:

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-- hostility to the Soviet Union is still pervasive in Somalia and within the military;

-- We also believe that for the Soviets to again play an influential role in Somalia would require them to provide the Siad regime or its successor with military or economic advantages which seem politically impossible given their commitment to Ethiopia.

Despite our arms embargo, we continue to monitor Somali activities in the Ogaden in the hope that our continued refusal to provide Somalia with military aid might ultimately bring about a change in policy. Some observers plead that such a change is politically difficult for him, if not impossible. They may be right. Siad effectively restrained Somali involvement in the Ogaden from 1969 until 1976, but with the mobilization of some 55,000 WSLF troops in the Ogaden the situation is quite different today.

The argument that Siad cannot wholly abandon his current Ogaden policy only reinforces the need for refusing to enter into a military relationship with him. If Siad is unable to reduce or eliminate support for the WSLF as the price for US military aid, then the likelihood that he would do so once he possessed US defensive supplies is virtually nil. Whether Siad is a prisoner to his Ogaden policy or its principal advocate is irrelevant: continued Somali support for the WSLF takes precedence over all other Somali foreign policy objectives at present, including the possibility of US military aid. That being the case, US military support could only increase the likelihood that Siad would adopt a higher risk military policy in the Ogaden and one with which the US would be directly associated.

US military support for Somalia while Siad continues to back insurgency in the Ogaden would have adverse implications for our relations with Kenya. (The recent failure of the Saudi effort to mediate a Somali-Kenyan conciliation demonstrates how implacable is Somali irredentism and how deeply-seated are Kenyan apprehensions.) In Ethiopia, should Siad escalate WSLF activities in the Ogaden, he would eventually risk Ethiopian reprisals. An ongoing US military support role which then failed to provide Siad with the additional defensive capacity to resist Ethiopian military action would be politically costly for us, specifically, in

-- a perceived backdown in the face of the Soviet/Cuban presence in Ethiopia;

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-- a failure to demonstrate to Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arabs our concern for their security fears in the Arabian Peninsula; and

-- an international perception of weakening US firmness and resolve in the face of Soviet backed Ethiopian military activity.

In short, we might find that we could only maintain our Somali policy by providing even greater military assets to Siad which could lead to our direct involvement in the Horn; or that we could only disengage from such a military relationship by paying a political price which was unacceptable to our interests elsewhere in the region or the world.

If these are the risks we run in associating ourselves in a military relationship with Somalia, there are also certain risks inherent in our present policy of military non-involvement. So long as the Eritrean and Ogaden conflicts continue indecisively and Soviet military and political support for Ethiopia fails to tip the balance in Mengistu's favor, there appears to be little risk to our present policy. Yet the conflicts in Eritrea and the Ogaden cannot continue indefinitely. Sooner or later military or political solutions will be found. If those solutions are ultimately achieved through Soviet and Cuban political and military resources, then by its own inactivity the US will have largely excluded itself from any meaningful role in the political aftermath, both in Ethiopia and in Somalia. The Soviets will have become the dominant foreign military and political force in the Horn.

An additional but lesser risk is contained in our failure through arms support to bolster Siad domestically. Should Siad fall victim to a military coup, then it is possible that his replacement, whatever his political orientation, would be better able to repair his ties to the USSR than Siad.

At present, however, the Ogaden and Eritrean conflicts continue indecisively with no military or political solution in sight. Siad's position also appears strong. For these reasons, the risks in our present inactivity appear acceptable, particularly in contrast to the risks involved in a policy of military support for Siad.

#### Ethiopia:

Our relations with the PMGSE are plagued by suspicion

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and mistrust, much of it the inevitable result of our suspension of military assistance to Ethiopia in 1977 at a time when the Mengistu regime was faced with expanding insurgencies in Eritrea and the Ogaden, as well as a host of local insurrections. The Mengistu regime appears to be persuaded that the US has pursued a policy of deliberate hostility toward the Ethiopian revolution. It has regarded as fairly conclusive evidence of our hostility to the new revolutionary government our:

-- human rights demarches;

-- our improved relations with Somalia (including US naval visits);

-- our provision of increased FMS and SSA assistance to the Sudan; and

-- our attempts to persuade the PMGSE to compensate US property owners for assets nationalized in 1975;

Ethiopian antagonism was most recently expressed in its refusal of our invitation to send a member of the Dirg to Washington to discuss the full range of bilateral issues, including the compensation problem.

The positive developments in our relations over the past year are few

-- a US Ambassador has been in residence now for one year in Addis Ababa;

-- without publicity the PMGSE presented the Embassy with a certificate of appreciation for our humanitarian assistance to drought victims;

-- Boeing has concluded the sale of two planes for Ethiopian Airlines and is embarking on negotiations for the sale of two more;

-- The PMGSE failed to react publicly and hostilely to our invocation of the Hickenlooper amendment.

While over the near term, we have little reason to expect any reduction in Ethiopian dependence upon the Soviet Union for military and economic support, we believe it important

-- that we continue to maintain our presence in Addis;

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-- that we not be seen as endorsing the military goals of the Eritrean or the Ogaden insurgents; and

-- that to the extent possible, we maintain a dialogue with the Dirg.

We have been required by the Hickenlooper Amendment to suspend our economic development programs in Ethiopia. We intend to continue that humanitarian assistance which serves the needs of the Ethiopian people. We believe that over the longer term

-- Ethiopian national interests will again assert themselves;

-- the disadvantages of too great a dependence upon the Soviet Union will become more evident; and

-- that we can again play a positive role in Ethiopia.

Until that time we are willing to wait out the current climate of hostility and suspicion among senior PMGSE policy makers. In the absence of any prospect for an immediate improvement in relations, the most difficult test we face in this period will be that of our own patience, of maintaining a relatively inactive policy line.

#### Eritrea:

The situation in Eritrea is no nearer a resolution than it was six months ago. After significant military successes throughout most of Eritrea in the autumn of 1978, the Ethiopian military campaign bogged down in the mountainous regions in the northeast corner of Eritrea.

Soviet supplied military equipment -- tanks, artillery and aircraft -- have proven to be ineffective in such terrain. Ethiopian military morale is reported to be on the decline.

The Eritrean guerrillas, previously split by political and ethnic differences, have improved the coordination of their efforts. Their morale is improving. Support from other Arab states -- Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia -- continues.

The best judgment is that the conflict will continue indecisively. This protracted insurgency causes political stresses in Addis Ababa, strains Ethiopian relations with

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the Soviet Union and Cuba, and has encouraged Siad to maintain his military pressure in the Ogaden in the belief that Ethiopia cannot win a two-front war and will inevitably be forced to agree to a political solution, perhaps under Soviet pressure.

Djibouti:

In Djibouti, recent Afar terrorist attacks, backed by Ethiopia, illustrate the precariousness of the balance President Gouled must maintain if the political status quo is to continue. Thus he must

-- pursue a neutralist position vis-a-vis the Somali/Ethiopian problem; and

-- introduce some greater Afar representation in the government.

Continued instability, inspired either by the Mengistu government in Addis through their Afar connections, or by the Somalis in Mogadiscio through their Issa connections, could create public disorders and a civil breakdown. This could force France to withdraw its 4,500 troops who are the only guarantors of Djibouti's security. (These troops are essential for Djibouti's stability and we should continue to emphasize to the French the need for their retention.)

Gouled's ability to grant us military privileges in Djibouti is thus limited by a political environment over which he exercises only limited control. He can best provide us with access to Djibouti facilities in a situation, like the present one, in which we tacitly acknowledge by restraint in our requests Djibouti's "neutrality". President Gouled's strength in the region is precarious. He cannot identify himself so fully with US military activities in the region that Djibouti is viewed by its neighbors as a US surrogate through which US power is projected in the western Indian Ocean.

Our support for Djibouti would thus be most prudently confined to economic and humanitarian assistance.

Current and Future Problems:

C-130 Sales:

The current embargo of military sales to Somalia has obliged us to deny the Somalis any items currently on the munitions list. We recently approved an Italian request to sell Italian-made helicopters using US components for use by

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the Somali police force. Although we disapproved a companion Italian request to sell G-222 transport aircraft to the Somali army, the Munitions Control Board recently withdrew from the munitions list the GE engine from the G-222 and we now see no objections to the sale.

The G-222 is similar to the Lockheed C-130, however, which remains on the munitions list. Lockheed is interested in selling C-130s to Somalia but has been informed that the State Department would not approve its sale. (Lockheed is currently planning to send a sales team to Somalia to sell the L-100, a commercial version of the C-130.)

Approval of the C-130 would be a breach in our "no military sales" policy and would surely result in increasing pressure from the Somalis for additional military equipment items. So long as we decline military sales to Somalia on grounds of principle, our position is strong. Once we yield the principle, however, we will have eroded our justification for further refusals. It is worth noting that both the Egyptians and the Saudis have resigned themselves to our present arms embargo policy and are no longer pressing us to sell to the Somalis.

#### Increased US Military Use of Somali Facilities:

On several occasions the Somali Government has encouraged us to increase our access to Somali facilities. Such access might include bunkering arrangements at Berbera and operating maritime patrol aircraft (P-3) flights in and out of Somali air fields. At the present time our P-3 landing rights in the region are confined to Djibouti and to Kenya.

While we believe that we can increase our US naval ship visits to Somali ports without difficulty, a reliance on Somali facilities for US military use -- such as bunkering or P-3 flights -- would have an inevitable impact on our current policy.

Over the medium term any US military use of Somali facilities would be perceived by others in the region, particularly Ethiopia, as tantamount to a US military relationship with Somalia. Although the Somalis might permit our military access without immediately requiring a quid pro quo, they would eventually seek such a quid. It is certain that they would ask for military aid as the price for any "facilities" to the US Navy, since in their view their granting of special rights would render them vulner-

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able (or so they would argue) to Soviet or Ethiopian military action. To withhold such military assistance would lead to the denial of access and a deterioration of our present relationship -- a relationship which, while it falls short of Siad's wishes, is satisfactory to US interests. To request or receive bunkering or P-3 rights in Somalia while we continue to withhold military assistance would give the Somalis a bargaining chip with us but would not provide the Navy with the assured, certain, or dependable use of Somali facilities which it is seeking. Since we could only assure dependable access to these facilities once military assistance was granted, then it would be unrealistic to seek such facilities until the political environment in the Horn permitted a US arms relationship with Somalia. At present, that environment doesn't exist.

Conclusions:

While our current policy in the Horn of Africa doesn't appear to require any modification at present, nevertheless there are certain measures that we should continue to pursue. They include

-- pointing out to the French the importance of their military presence in Djibouti;

-- monitoring closely Siad's domestic situation and the strength of clan opposition;

-- emphasizing to Saudi Arabia the importance of providing additional economic support for Somalia to strengthen the domestic economy and concentrate Somali energies on economic and social development.

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WASHINGTON


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INFORMATION

Memo No. 1986-79

December 20, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift   
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Breakfast,  
Friday, December 21, 1979, 7:30 a.m.

Other Iranian Developments

Following up on conversations between Hamilton Jordan and Warren Christopher, State is proceeding with plans to brief the announced Democratic and Republican Presidential candidates on the Iran situation.

At Secretary General Waldheim's request, we are delaying our move in the UN for Chapter 7 sanctions for a few days. It is my understanding that the President has asked Vance personally to present the U.S. case to the UN Security Council when we do make our move. In the meantime we are getting some help from the allies on cessation of military shipments and new credits to Iran. We have informed Prime Minister Cossiga that we are revoking the license for Italian military equipment for Iran. Cossiga has indicated relief as our action takes him off the hook.

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Review 12/20/99  
Derivative Classification

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DECLASSIFIED

NKTC-06-077  
per 6/7/06 NSC/LR  
DATE 6/29/06

We will announce on Friday that the nuclear aircraft carrier USS Nimitz will relieve the older less capable Midway in the Arabian Sea.

Greece/Turkey/Cyprus

Secretary Vance will be prepared to discuss possible steps to improve US-Greek relations. As you know, it is my view that the Cyprus negotiations do not hold promise in this regard. I believe we should concentrate on Greek reintegration into NATO - of very great importance to Prime Minister Caramanlis. Vance has just met with the Greek Foreign Minister and with SACEUR Bernie Rogers. I think it would be helpful to have a read-out on Rogers' views.

Vance Meeting with Gromyko

Vance's staff advises that the Secretary of State is planning to meet with Foreign Minister Gromyko in mid-January in Geneva. This will clearly have to be carefully coordinated with the President's overall SALT strategy. It would not serve the Administration if the Secretary were to have talks with Gromyko which resulted in nothing and which led the media to compare his talks with Kissinger's unsuccessful talks with Gromyko at the beginning of 1976.

Aid for Israel

If the occasion presents itself, you may wish to argue that we should do more than straightline the \$1.785 billion for Israel. Ed Sanders believes that, at the very least, we should have a \$250 million increase. He would prefer a \$500 million increase. He argues its justification in terms of three main points:

- (1) It is an economic necessity for Israel, as Israel is facing financial factors beyond its control, such as the increase in costs of weapons, the Sinai pullout and the turnover of the oil fields;
- (2) An increase would help the autonomy negotiations. Ed believes, based on recent discussions with the Israelis, that policy makers are focusing almost solely on the financial crisis. An increase would enable them to deal with the autonomy issue as well;

- (3) At this time of the Iran crisis, it is important to demonstrate in the Middle East that we stand behind our friends.

Personnel

CSCE - State advises that Governor Scranton has asked for another month to consider the CSCE post.

SALT III - General Seignious has recommended Bill Colby as the negotiator (substantively this might make sense, however, I should think it would pose problems politically).





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