

Convention for the Purpose of Standardizing Reports by the Governing Body of the International Labor Office on the Working of Conventions. Submitted to the Senate 1962.

Provides for certain administrative modifications of the operations of the ILO Governing Body.

While it is uncertain whether the U.S. will remain a member of the ILO, the Department favors ratification of this and the three preceding ILO conventions on their merits (should the U.S. withdraw, it may remain bound by ILO conventions).

4. Implementing Legislation Required.

Trademark Registration Treaty. Submitted to the Senate 1975.

Establishes a central trademarks registry, thereby easing trademark registration procedures abroad. Agreement has not been reached on appropriate implementing legislation, which must be approved before ratification.

5. Treaties Withdrawn or to be Withdrawn.

Tax Convention with Israel. Submitted to the Senate 1965.

This convention has been superseded by the pending convention sent to the Senate in 1976; President Ford withdrew it on February 11, 1976, and its withdrawal should be noted on the Senate's list.

Tax Convention with Thailand. Submitted to the Senate 1965.

The U.S. wishes to withdraw this treaty, and it is believed that Thailand also wishes to withdraw it. Consultations with Thailand are planned to decide on appropriate action.

March 26, 1977

Memorandum for the Vice President

From: Gail

Subject: Lunch with the President

-- Suggest you raise the problem of the EPG

. EPG has been responsible for the timing of the final decision papers to the President on both the farm bill and the minimum wage

. in both cases the decision papers were not circulated among senior staff for review until 12-24 hours before the paper was due to hit the President's desk. In each case, the President had less than 48 hours for review of the issue before a decision was required.

. the need for a decision on these issues has been known for some time. EPG ought to be able to put its option papers together a week in advance on critical issues, so that there is time for senior staffing on these sensitive issues.

. the alternative has been to force the President to make these decisions literally under the gun, often with the only proposed middle ground solutions (i.e. minimum wage) put together overnight with little or no chance to find out whether they will fly.

-- Report on Status of Presidential Agenda


. Nearly all of the reports have now been received from the Departments and Agencies on the major decisions and announcements that are coming up in their areas.

. Later today or early tomorrow, you would like to sit down with Ham, Jody, Stu, Jack, Frank, et. al. to go over the material and get their input on strategy.

. A document will be ready for the President by the end of the week. Depending on the President's reaction, it might be a subject for discussion at the Cabinet meeting the following Monday.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~INFORMATIONMemo No. 734-77  
March 26, 1977

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Monday Luncheon with the President, March 28, 1971.

Africa

1. I have been doing considerable reading on the current situation in Southern Africa, following our discussion last week.
2. I will plan to have recommendations to you by the middle of this week on the steps we might most effectively take to begin a realistic dialogue with Prime Minister Vorster, with a view to progress on Namibia and Rhodesia.

Somalia

1. Developments in the Horn of Africa seem to have taken a recent turn against Soviet interest.
2. The Soviets have been trying to ingratiate themselves with Ethiopia as well as Somalia, and the Somalis have become irritated.
3. Cy Vance informed you of an approach late last week by the Somali Ambassador for US economic and military aid.
4. I personally have been watching this situation develop for more than a month, and I have told Cy that I think we should move quickly and positively with Somalia to provide some form of aid.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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NLSC-06-078  
B03 NARA DATE 6/18/04

5. This, coupled with Saudi Arabia's offer of assistance, might be what is needed to begin the process of ousting the Soviets from Berbera and Somalia.
6. It is also of interest to note that Fidel Castro in his newly proclaimed "super African Diplomat" role was singularly unsuccessful in his efforts to resolve Ethiopia and Somalia's differences.

U.S.-Australia Relations/Diego Garcia

1. Foreign Minister Peacock's visit had a useful purpose, as we were able to dispell Australia's feeling of neglect -- assuring Peacock that we want the same closer consultations and cooperation with Australia as with all our friends and allies.
2. I told Peacock that we would not consider unilateral military withdrawal from the Indian Ocean. He welcomed this. His Government under Prime Minister Fraser is a hard-line government on Soviet military expansionism -- a government that welcomes close military cooperation with us in the Indian Ocean.
3. In this connection I noted in Deputy Defense Secretary Duncan's weekly report to you this week that it has been arranged for some 35 US and British reporters to visit the Navy support facilities at Diego Garcia. This will generate considerable press play, given the coverage also to be expected on Cy Vance's Indian Ocean discussions with the Soviets.
4. I mentioned to Zbig that it will be important to advise the Australians in advance of this press visit, and to follow through on our promise of close consultations.

MEMORANDUM


OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

SECRET  
ATTACHMENT

INFORMATION

Memo No. 760-77  
March 31, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK MOE

FROM: Denis Clift   
SUBJECT: Vice President's April 4 Lunch  
with the President

I am attaching recommended talking points for inclusion  
in the overall memorandum you are preparing for the  
Vice President.

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ATTACHMENT

DECLASSIFIED  
per 6/6/04 14r.NSC  
NSC 106-078  
B.B. DATE 6/17/04

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March 31, 1977

(Clift Submission for Vice President's Lunch with the President, Monday, April 4, 1977)

4)

Middle East/Sadat

1. Sadat places high priority on his need for U.S. arms -- this was a principal focus of his statements in a recent "Sixty Minutes" interview. While not turning off the tap on defensive weapons, I think it is important not to encourage him on offensive weapons.
2. The two other issues of principal interest to him would seem to be the question of borders and the Palestinian role.
3. I think his visit, and your explanation on borders -- including our use of the more precise term "security arrangements following basic Israeli withdrawal" should have a useful effect.
4. I will have the opportunity at his return dinner tomorrow night to continue to impress upon him your position on these key issues.

Israeli Developments

1. The May 17 elections look tight for Rabin and his Labor Party. However, it is my impression that the Intelligence Community believes that he still has a good chance to be running the next government.

5)

Southern Africa

1. I have been devoting considerable attention to the question of a possible meeting with Prime Minister Vorster and the approach that we might take with him on apartheid, Rhodesia and Namibia.
2. I have broken this down into a detailed set of options and I am drafting a decision paper for your consideration this week.

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per 6/6/06 1th. NSC  
NEJC-06-078  
BAR 6/19/06

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3. As a first step, I will be going over it with Cy Vance, Zbig Brzezinski and Andy Young to ensure that we give you our best recommendations on the pros, cons and substance of such a mission, its timing and the site for talks with Vorster.
4. A very good argument can be made, for example, for holding such talks in Europe rather than South Africa.

6) Intelligence

1. Stan Turner and I met again last Friday with some of the key staffers working on the overall question of intelligence structure and coordination of legislation with the Congress.
2. I know that you would like to schedule a meeting with Senator Inouye and members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence at some point in the near future.
3. That meeting might provide a good occasion for a statement to the press by you or me on the direction that the Administration is taking on this entire issue of intelligence, charters for the intelligence agencies and related matters.
4. I think that the meeting and the statement together -- as well as related consultations with the House -- might reduce some of the pressure from the Congress for premature action on intelligence legislation before you have completed your review.

~~SECRET~~





OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO: The Vice President  
FROM: Dick  
RE: Talking Points Monday Lunch Agenda

- 1). Southern Africa - Your memorandum for the President is attached.

\* The paper I gave you on Friday outlines an action plan which I think would be supportive of your overall African policy.

\* It would have us press Prime Minister Vorster not only on the need for his support for early majority rule in Namibia and Rhodesia, but also have actions on his part leading to progressive transformation of South African society.

\* It is not at all certain that he will give us a positive response -- we should know more with David Owen's visit this week -- but it is essential that the South Africans have a clear understanding of our policy.

\* As soon as Owen has returned and our Ambassador has delivered your message to the Prime Minister, we should have the information required for a final decision on the date and site for the meeting.

- 2). Intelligence - (Attached is a first draft of a memorandum for the President providing an interim report on intelligence developments, together with a suggested public statement that might be issued at the time of the President's meeting with Senator Inouye and the Senate Select Committee -- this draft has been cleared by Fritz Schwarz.)

\* By the end of this week, I am planning to have an interim report for you on the steps the Executive Branch is taking on a number of important intelligence issues including electronic surveillance, structure of the intelligence organization within the Executive, and consultations with the Congress particularly on the question of charter legislation.

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per 6/6/06 L.H. NSC  
NLJC-06-078  
BY BAE NARA, DATE 6/19/06



(Intelligence - continued)

\* Following your review of this report, I think we will be at a point where you may wish to schedule a meeting with Senator Inouye and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence -- and to have related consultations with appropriate members of the House

\* Stan Turner and I think it is important to get the Congress in basic agreement on the procedures and the timing for executive and legislative action on the U.S. intelligence community. We want to ensure that you have had the chance to review the recommendations on intelligence structure and mission (the formal NSC study is due this June) before the Congress attempts to move ahead with legislation.

3). John Chisholm

4). Lock and Dam 26

\* Decision now approaching --

Adams scheduled to testify before Senate Public Works Committee later this month (April 20)

Agencies and OMB now assessing their positions.

\* Basis of your interest in decision -

L&D 26 important issue in Midwest

Senate work in developing legislation to meet agricultural, environmental and other economic concerns.

\* Role you would like to play -

providing the President with substantive and political perspective of affected states

trying to help achieve solution that meets all legitimate concerns.

\* Key issues if they arise -

Is the project cost effective according to today's standards?

Benefit cost ratio at 6 3/8% equals 2.4:1 based on October 1976 price levels.

(Lock and Dam 26 - continued)

\*Is the project justified economically?

March 1977 DOT study said no immediate economic need based on fact that, while agricultural shipments had increased 1972-6 faster than expected, movement of coal and oil had fallen below expectations.

With new energy policy massive demand will be created for movement of coal in place of industrial energy supplies now transported by oil and gas pipelines.

\* Is project justified from engineering viewpoint?

Key question is whether L&D 26 can be safely dewatered to permit repair without the massive expense involved in building coffer dams.

dewatering has been tried at L&D 26 dating as far back as 1953. It has never been successful.

serious safety problems in dewatering one of two parallel locks while continuing to move traffic through the other

\* Can adequate safeguards be designed to guard against "foot in the door" toward future expansion of waterway system"

March 1977 DOT Report found that single 1200 foot lock should not generate any pressure to expand capacity on other segments of the river system.

Added safeguards could include:

repeal existing authorization for 12 foot channel study and include prohibition on 12 foot channel

prohibit any expansion of upstream capacity pending environmental and inter-modal transportation plan for basin area.

- \* Will there be adverse impact on railroads?

March 1977 DOT report found that construction of a single 1200 foot lock would not appear to have a significant impact on railroad revenues.

TO: Vice President  
FROM: Dick  
RE: Possible Monday Lunch Topics

☒ Overseas Mission

☒ Intelligence

☐ Wiretapping

☐ European Summit

☒ What to do while President is gone

☐ Energy PR and Hill strategies

☒ Confidentiality of leadership breakfasts

☐ El-ection Reform

☐ Lock and Dam 26

☒ Welfare Reform/Tax Reform scheduling decision

*- Senate Men, Bi-Partisan*

~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION

Memo No. 792-77  
April 8, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK MOE

FROM: Denis Clift 191  
SUBJECT: Insert for Talker

I am forwarding my insert for your Monday luncheon talker, as we discussed yesterday. I am also including two attachments.

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per 6/6/06 14-NSC  
NLSJ-02-078  
BY BAR NARA, DATE 4/19/06

TOP SECRET

(Insert for Talker, Vice President's Luncheon with the President, Monday, April 11, 1977)

1) Southern Africa *Initial.*

~~(A copy of your memorandum for the President is at Tab A -- he may very well have taken a decision by the time of your luncheon.)~~

1. The paper I gave you on Friday outlines an action plan which I think would be supportive of your overall African policy.
2. It would have us press Prime Minister Vorster not only on the need for his support for early majority rule in Namibia and Rhodesia, but also have actions on his part leading to progressive transformation of South African society.
3. It is not at all certain that he will give us a positive response -- we should know more with David Owen's visit this week -- but it is essential that the South Africans have a clear understanding of our policy.
4. As soon as Owen has returned and our Ambassador has delivered your message to the Prime Minister, we should have the information required for a final decision on the date and site for the meeting.

2) Intelligence *(Initial is*

~~(For your background information, the paper at Tab B is a first draft of a memorandum for the President providing an interim report on intelligence developments, together with a suggested public statement that might be issued at the time of the President's meeting with Senator Inouye and the Senate Select Committee -- this draft has been cleared by Fritz Schwarz.)~~

1. By the end of this week, I am planning to have an interim report for you on the steps the Executive Branch is taking on a number of important intelligence issues including electronic surveillance, structure of the intelligence organization within the Executive, and consultations with the Congress particularly on the question of charter legislation.

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per 6/6/06 17r.NSC  
NSC 66-078  
BY BIR NARA, DATE 6/18/06

~~TOP SECRET~~

2. Following your review of this report, I think we will be at a point where you may wish to schedule a meeting with Senator Inouye and the Senate Select Committee on intelligence -- and to have related consultations with appropriate members of the House.
3. Stan Turner and I think it is important to get the Congress in basic agreement on the procedures and the timing for executive and legislative action on the US intelligence community. We want to ensure that you have had the chance to review the recommendations on intelligence structure and mission (the formal NSC study is due this June) before the Congress attempts to move ahead with legislation.

3) John Chisholm

~~TOP SECRET~~



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON~~TOP SECRET~~ACTIONMemo No. 357-77  
April 8, 1977

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: The Vice President  
SUBJECT: My Meeting with Vorster

For the past two weeks I have been working with Cy Vance, Andy Young, Zbig, David Aaron and others to develop a plan for a meeting between me and Vorster that would have the maximum positive impact in support of our strategy on Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. This has involved developing an overall diplomatic approach to fulfill the objectives set out in your Presidential Directive -- majority-led moderate governments and a progressive end to apartheid, brought about peacefully. This effort also involves meshing with the on-going actions of the British on Southern Rhodesia and the UN on Namibia.

U.S. Strategy

Our objective is to have legitimate elections held in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia which will transfer power to majority governments. At the same time, we want to encourage the end of apartheid in South Africa over the longer term.

We reject the former administration's strategy which focused exclusively on solving the Southern Rhodesian and Namibian problems with the sole objective of keeping the Soviets out. This led the South Africans -- the key actors in the area -- to believe that we cared little about apartheid and that any solution that kept the Russians at bay would be acceptable. Thus, they have been working on "internal" solutions in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia which would preserve white control -- and in our view result in prolonged civil war.

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PER 6/6/06 LFR.NSC  
NLJC-06-078  
BY BJR NARA, DATE 6/19/06

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The purpose of my meeting with Vorster would be to convey a different message.

- We are concerned at the growing possibility of a transcontinental race war in Southern Africa that would radicalize black Africans, open the door to Soviet and Cuban penetration, and bring untold suffering and profound economic dislocation. There could be adverse political consequences in many other countries, including our own. A positive relationship between the United States and South Africa would be impossible under such circumstances. Thus, our relations are at a watershed.
- The solution is to move promptly toward majority rule in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia with individual rights for all. There must also be a progressive transformation of South African society, involving the elimination of institutionalized racism and leading to rule by the majority of all the governed, with full and equal political participation by all and guaranteed rights for minorities. We cannot accept "internal" solutions in Southern Rhodesia and Namibia.
- In pressing Vorster for positive South African actions on Southern Rhodesia and Namibia, I would make clear that progress on these urgent issues as well as on apartheid would provide both time and a constructive atmosphere for US support for difficult adjustments that lie ahead for South Africa.

In sum, our strategy also will place priority on Southern Rhodesia and Namibia through action by South Africa. But our inducement will be to be as helpful as possible in the transformation process in South Africa rather than letting the Vorster government believe we will bail them out regardless of their policy on Southern Rhodesia, Namibia and apartheid.

This will be the first time such a message will have been delivered to South Africa. We must be extremely modest about how much good it will do, particularly in the short run. But it is a message that will profoundly change the nature of our relationship and, if played properly, should have a constructive impact on their future decisions.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

### Our Tactics

Where and when I deliver this message should be determined by several ongoing developments in Southern Africa.

UK Foreign Secretary Owen will be travelling there April 10-15, to meet with Vorster, Smith and others to find a solution on Southern Rhodesia. The holding of elections prior to independence in Southern Rhodesia is a principle accepted by all parties, but a framework for them is necessary. Ideally, an election or referendum would be supervised by an outside authority, following a negotiated political agreement and an end to guerrilla warfare. An election framework also would have to be acceptable to the Patriotic Front, and have the support of the "front line" states -- Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana and Mozambique. All the nationalist groups have rejected Smith's suggestion that an election determine simply the black leader with whom he is to negotiate. Smith and the Patriotic Front have rejected Muzorewa's call for a referendum to select a leader to whom Smith would immediately transfer power. The Kissinger/Richard plan for continuing the Geneva Conference to set up an interim government to hold elections within two years technically is still on the table, but politically it is dead.

Owen will be advancing a formula which would involve a British-chaired constitutional conference to create the permanent government for Southern Rhodesia. The conference would begin in June, with or without Smith, leading to elections and a proclamation of independence by the British Parliament in March, 1978 at the earliest, September, 1978 at the latest. Owen will also explore the possibility of reviving the Kissinger/Richard plan.

I believe we should use the possibility of my visit to South Africa as an inducement for Vorster to respond positively to Owen's efforts. Regardless of how firm my private message, publicly my visit will lend prestige and legitimacy to Vorster's government. We should be able to show it produced results in terms of Vorster's and Smith's acceptance of a resumed Geneva conference, or participation in a constitutional conference. A positive South African response to the Allied (five nations) demarche on Namibia might also provide a peg for my visit -- though the prospects appear less promising.

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But if either can be accomplished (we will be hearing from Owen and our Ambassador in Capetown), I would propose going to South Africa either in the last week of this month or right after you return from the Summit in London. I would stop off in Nigeria and Tanzania but not turn the visit into a repeat of the Podgorny visit.

If the South Africans are not responsive, it would still be important to meet with Vorster, but not in South Africa. Instead, I would suggest meeting in Vienna in May. This would make him come half way to meet me and avoid legitimizing his policies. It would lower public expectations of concrete results and could be combined with return visits to Portugal and Spain to show our support for the reemerging democracies there.

#### Next Steps

I believe it would be desirable for you to inform Callaghan of our plans concerning a meeting with Vorster. Owen might be able to use it to good effect in his talks with Vorster and Smith and in any event Owen should know what we have in mind. (A proposed letter is attached at Tab A.)

Second, we should have the U.S. Ambassador in South Africa follow up Owen's visit with a call on Vorster, carrying a personal message from you. This message would indicate our willingness to have me go to South Africa if concrete progress is being made along the lines Owen will be proposing, or to meet elsewhere for an exchange of views (draft at Tab B). In this connection, our Ambassador could get a better idea of what Vorster has in mind for such a meeting.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you approve this approach to a meeting with Vorster, and sign the letter to Callaghan at Tab A.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

April 8, 1977

His Excellency James Callaghan  
Prime Minister of the  
United Kingdom  
London

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Secretary Vance has given me a good report on his discussions in London, and I greatly value the closeness of our consultations on Southern Africa.

We appreciate having the opportunity to consider the brief that David Owen has prepared for his visit to Southern Africa, and I have asked Cy Vance to forward separately our suggestions, as soon as we receive the approved Owen proposals. I wanted to let you know personally that we are giving serious thought to a suggestion from Prime Minister Vorster that a U.S. emissary meet with him for a full and candid exchange on the range of issues requiring progress. Should prospects look favorable as a result of Owen's trip, I would ask Vice President Mondale to meet with Vorster in South Africa. Alternatively, they could meet in Europe. We will probably wish to do this shortly after David Owen returns from his visit.

I thought you and Owen would find it helpful to know this now. It might strengthen Owen's hand in his talks with Vorster to be aware of our current thinking on a

DECLASSIFIED

per 6/6/06 14. NSC  
NLS-06-078

by BNS NARA, DATE 6/19/06

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meeting with the South African Prime Minister and to let Vorster know that the U.S. and Great Britain are staying in very close touch and cooperating fully on Southern Africa.

With my best regards,

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

April 8, 1977

His Excellency  
Balthazar Johannes Vorster  
The Prime Minister of South Africa  
Capetown

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

As you know, at my meeting with Foreign Minister Botha March 23, I stated my willingness to send an emissary to discuss with you the situation in Southern Africa.

Prime Minister Callaghan has now told me of the results of David Owen's visit to Africa last week. I am hopeful that progress on Southern Rhodesia may be advanced as a result of his trip, and I want you to know of our complete support for the British objectives.

I also believe strongly that the formula presented to you on April 7 by five Western Ambassadors, regarding the future of Namibia, offers the best framework for resolving that question in a manner acceptable internationally and internally.

In view of these developments, I am convinced that it could be mutually profitable to have a full and candid exchange of views concerning Southern Rhodesia, Namibia, and the future political evolution of South Africa. This meeting would be especially important since our Government has taken fundamental decisions concerning our policy toward Southern Africa, and we believe

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per 6/6/06 LT-NSC  
NLC-06-078  
BY BME NARA, DATE 6/19/06

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that the United States' relationship with South Africa is reaching a watershed.

I therefore have asked Vice President Mondale to meet with you for this purpose, and Ambassador Bowdler to discuss with you the timing and the place for the meeting. Foreign Minister Botha told me that the South African Government would be preparing for us your assessment of the situation in Southern Africa, which would be helpful in our preparations.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

*Cecil: Energy Funds?*  
*Stinson*

*X* *Jama*  
*Yuv*  
*Clark*

*X* *Mich.*  
*Griffen*  
*Dutos*  
*Phil Hart*  
*Sleeping*  
*Dunes*

MEMORANDUM TO: The Vice President  
FROM: Dick  
RE: Talking Points for Lunch with President  
DATE: April 15, 1977

*Andy Young*  
*Cuba*

1. Spring Budget Review and Zero Based Budgeting

\* Spring Budget Review -- like clear sense of what role you (the President) would like me to play (Jim McIntyre is under the impression that the President would like the Vice President to sit in, in his place, on some of the final review sessions).

--in developing the materials for that session, it would be helpful if OMB would include notation of how specific program decisions underlying general recommendations to the Agencies relate, where appropriate, to Carter policies expressed during the campaign and the early months of the Administration. Purpose is to help assure that Carter and not Ford assumptions are built into the process early, rather than having to try to deal with discrepancies either at the stage that decisions reach Bert Lance or you.

\* Zero Based Budgeting -- I have arranged for a detailed briefing midweek, and would like to know if you have any thoughts on how I could be most useful.

2. Presidential Agenda

*How are we doing?*

\*The Cabinet Members had until Friday to complete their reports. I will have the document to you in the next couple of days.

\*Agenda might be most helpful as target dates are established for any items that are added from now on to ensure that major initiatives are spaced in a way that allows you sufficient time for each of the really big items.

*XX* *x Continue Effort?*

DECLASSIFIED  
per 6/6/06 JH-NSC  
NWC-06-078  
BY BAE NARA DATE 6/19/04

*-Japanese oil?*

3. Lock and Dam 26

\*I have an interest in this decision, which is coming up within the next week.

\*I have devoted a great deal of attention to the issue in the Senate, and know that it is of personal concern to you.

\*I believe that there is mounting evidence of the need for replacement, rather than repair, of the existing facility at Alton, Illinois including the following:

.the major push for coal conversion will place major demands on both the railroads and the waterway as oil and gas supplies now moved by pipeline are replaced by coal.

.no one has been able to demonstrate that repair is a viable or cost-effective option, despite years of controversy and hundreds and thousands of dollars in studies. The answer among opponents of replacement has always been more study.

.even at the new 6 3/8% discount rate, the project still comes in with a 2.4:1 cost benefit ration using 1976 dollars.

.statutory remedies have been proposed to meet the critical environmental objections, including prohibition of 12 foot channel.

.DOT's March study found that construction of one 1200 foot lock, as proposed by Stevenson, Long, McClellan, Eagleton, Humphrey, Clark, Culver and others, would not generate pressure for expansion of the river system, nor would it have any significant impact on revenues to the railroads.

*Unk*  
XY 4. Farm Bill — *Budget =*

\*I am very concerned about the need to try to avoid a situation where you are forced to veto a farm bill. Even if the bill is outrageous, it would be very difficult to ever erase the sting among our supporters in the Midwest.

\*Both the Talmadge Committee and the House Subcommittee have come up with very expensive proposals.

(Farm Bill Continued)

\*Have any signals been given to Foley and others on the Full Committee of the House, of what the Administration can live with, and where we would have to draw the line? (So far as I know, no signals have been given)

\*How do you view the best solution to this problem?

\*NOTE: Tuesday is a key date. Bergland will be meeting with House Democrats and they will be trying to find out whether anything other than the Administration's bill would be subject to veto, or whether there is any room for fall-back.

5. District Task Force Talking Points

*Let's do by Dec. memo to Pres.*

\*Purpose of the task force is to develop a comprehensive plan for improving the relationship between the Federal government and the District.

\*Task Force should be small working group with Executive Branch "ex-officio" representatives proposing issues for discussion and receiving proposals of Congress and District government without committing themselves to any recommendations. This gives Executive Branch representatives maximum flexibility to make objective recommendations to President.

\*Proposed membership includes Democratic Chairman from both Houses and ranking Republican along with District Delegate. Also included are District Mayor and Council Chairman. Other influential Congressmen such as Representative Natcher and Senator Leahy will give input on the matters of particular concern to them. This approach keeps actual working group small, a necessary element if task force is to work efficiently and expeditiously.

\*I will convene first meeting and propose short term issues for discussion with goal of recommendations on these issues being submitted to President in time to be included in FY'79 proposals. Short-term issues would include Federal payment formula, changes in local planning and land use procedures, and voting representation. Long-term issues will be discussed after resolution of short-term issues.

\*I will oversee Executive branch working group, submit proposed agenda to task force, and work with Executive Branch group to formulate recommendations to President for decision.

6. Portugal -- Prime Minister Soares Visit

\*Your meeting with Prime Minister Soares should have a positive political impact on his position in Portugal.

\*I think the evolution of the democratic process under his leadership continues to be encouraging.

\*Following the overthrow of the earlier regime in 1974 and the dismantling of the African colonies, Portugal has had enormous economic and political problems to deal with.

\*I have been concerned over the FRG's resistance to the economic consortium proposal. The FRG views it as ad hoc, and prefers using the IMF. However, I understand there has been progress on an accommodation and that you will be able to propose a loan to Soares which should be acceptable to him. (NOTE: The Germans have suggested a sequence of bilateral arrangements until the IMF arrangements can be made -- with a total of some \$800 million to be loaned over 15 months. The President should have received a decision paper on this from Brzezinski by the time of your Monday luncheon.)

7. Southern Africa

\*Your message to Ambassador Bowdler should really help us have a clearer picture of what Vorster has in mind for a meeting with a U.S. emissary.

\*It has been intriguing over the last few days to see the number of nibbles we have been getting from the South Africans -- Mulder and Botha -- on the question of an emissary.

*X Tumbler Election - May 17th*  
\*Admittedly without our consent, the British have been very keen to bring us deeper into the Rhodesian situation. While we have gone as far as to tell the British that we support Owen's trip to Africa, and that we would co-sponsor a constitutional conference, Owen has hinted to the nationalists and to others with whom he has spoken that the U.S. might be prepared to do more.

\*Owen even has been hazy to the press about a possible U.S. military role in Rhodesia, saying to them in Capetown that while a UK military role is out of the question, he doubted US Congressional support for an American military role, that nevertheless was "one of the difficult questions to be worked out."

*His own cabinet*  
\*Owen has a limited franchise from his own cabinet and, despite his own wishes, has not received its approval to state that a constitutional conference will go ahead even if Smith does not agree to participate. In some ways, Owen has more support from



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