



WASHINGTON

October 9, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD MOE *RM*

RE: TALKING POINTS FOR TUESDAY MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

1. Reaction to Agenda Memo (*Attached*)
2. Final Week Legislation
  - Energy
  - Taxes
  - Humphrey-Hawkins ✓
  - Department of Education ✓
3. Middle East
  - Lebanon
  - Timing of Treaty
  - Jordanian Questions
4. Salt
  - ACDA
  - Timing
5. Cyprus
6. Inflation
7. Public Works *Interest rates - Milw. (?)*
8. Southern Africa
9. Bob Wagner

DECLASSIFIED  
per 5/31/04 NISC Ltr.  
NLJC-06-081  
BY *BAC* NARA, DATE *6/6/06*

*Bill Hyland*

*Catostomus Heald*

*Tuning  
Zeno*

*Breyner Unist*

*Internal*

*M-E talk  
Travels  
AF*



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

September 29, 1978

*Black Caucus  
Minnesota*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD MOE *RME*

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR LUNCHEON WITH THE  
PRESIDENT -- MONDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1978

I. Middle East

- West Bank Settlements
- Peace Treaty Negotiations

*How to handle before Election  
Answers to Hussein?*

II. Gas Bill -- House ?

III. Public Works —

*Emphasize — Evening  
Speeches*

XX IV. SALT -- Gromyko Meeting

~~V. Papacy (see attached)~~

- ~~Funeral~~ -- WFM?
- ~~Investiture~~ JC?

X VI. Tax Bill — ?

X VII. Inflation

VIII. Veto

IX. Meeting with Lee Kuan Yew (see attached)

X Intelligence Charters (see attached)

*Tues: Bay &  
Huddleston*

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
per 5/31/06 NSC 14.  
NLJC-06-081  
BY BAs NARA, DATE 6/6/06

## OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT


WASHINGTON

INFORMATION~~SECRET~~

Memo No. 959-78

October 9, 1978

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Meeting with President, Tuesday,  
October 10, 1978

Middle East

Lebanon: The ceasefire continued to hold on Monday, October 9. Lebanese President Sarkis has announced that he will visit Saudi Arabia as the first stop in a tour of Arab capitals. It is anticipated that the Sarkis-Assad talks will resume following this tour.

Dayan Talks: The President meets with Moshe Dayan (and Vance has recommended that Weizman also be invited to the meeting) at 4:45 p.m., Tuesday, October 10.

The meeting precedes the October 12 opening of the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations at Blair House. It will be important to receive an Israeli commitment to a dedicated negotiating effort on all fronts in these negotiations. Over the weekend Dayan was very casual on T.V. about the West Bank, saying Israel could live with the status quo but that it would be willing to go along with the self-governing authority if that is what the Palestinians want.

Africa

The President has called a meeting for 1:00 p.m., October 10 to review African developments. Ian Smith continues his U.S. visit (tentative schedule at Tab A) with meetings in Washington -- Foreign Policy, Washington Star, various Senators, a luncheon and a reception.

Secretary Vance is still scheduled to depart for Africa on the evening of October 12.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

per 5/31/06 NSC 14r.  
NLJC-06-081  
BY BAE NARA DATE 6/6/06

FRG

In the important Hesse election, Chancellor Schmidt's Social Democratic Party and Genscher's Free Democratic Party won, defeating the opposition Christian Democratic Union. This was a crucial test for the SDP/FDP and avoids a threat to the Schmidt/Genscher coalition.

0645 Arrive New York City via SA 207

0755 Depart JFK Airport for Washington via commercial carrier

0914 Arrive at Dulles Airport. Met by officials from Rhodesian Information Office. Entire group staying at Crystal City Marriott Motel

1030 (?) Wreath laying at Tomb of Unknown Soldier (pending decision by Department of the Army)

after-noon Depart for Boston, VA, Headquarters of American Security Council. Overnight. (Boston is about one-hour's drive south of Culpepper on road to Charlottesville.)

Sunday, October 8

0900 Return to Washington

1130 Interview on Meet the Press

after-noon free

1800 Dinner hosted by Heritage Foundation at Crystal City Marriott

Monday, October 9

0800 Breakfast with 27 Senators on Capitol Hill

1100 Press conference on Hill

lunch Editorial board, Washington Post

1600 (?) Meeting with Secretary of State Vance (subject to confirmation)

evening Mr. Towsey, head of Rhodesian Information Office, hosts reception at International Club

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DECLASSIFIED  
PR 5/31/06 NSC 142  
NLSC-06-081  
BY BAE NARA DATE 6/6/06

morning Hill

1230 Lunch hosted by Heritage Foundation (possibly  
at American Foreign Service Club)

after-noon (?) Meeting with Washington Star

1800 Reception at International Club hosted by  
American African Affairs Association

Wednesday, October 11

morning (?) Good Morning America interview

late (?) Meeting with members of International Relations  
morning Committee on Capitol Hill

lunch Speak to National Press Club

1700 Session with American Conservative Union Forum

Thursday, October 12

Open

Friday, October 13

morning Depart Washington for New York

lunch Newsweek editorial staff

1615 Meeting with Council on Foreign Relations

evening Reception hosted by American Rhodesian Association

Saturday, October 14

Possible trip to Los Angeles, CA, otherwise  
return to Rhodesia

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

17B  
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

October 20, 1978

Mr. Vice President:

As I was finishing the attached, I was advised that there would be no Monday lunch with the President. You may wish, nonetheless, to draw on these talking points during one of your next discussions with the President.

  
A. Denis Clift

DECLASSIFIED  
DATE 5/31/06 BY NSC/ltc  
NSC-06-087  
BY BAC NARA, DATE 6/6/06

mc

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY


INFORMATION

SECRET ATTACHMENT

Memo No. 1011-78

October 20, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift   
SUBJECT: Luncheon Talking Points,  
Monday, October 23, 1978

I am forwarding at Tab I talking points that you may wish to draw on during your luncheon with the President on October 23.

EYES ONLY

SECRET ATTACHMENT

DECLASSIFIED

per 5/31/06 NSC Ltr.  
NLSC-06-081  
BY BAC NARA DATE 6/6/06



TALKING POINTS FOR LUNCHEON WITH THE PRESIDENT, MONDAY,  
OCTOBER 23

MIDDLE EAST AND SALT

[I will have the latest cable traffic for you on Monday morning dealing with Middle East events subsequent to the Israeli delegation's return to Israel for instructions.]

I will also provide you with any reporting cables on Vance's talks in Moscow.]

ELF

Seafarer Project:

- During my campaign trip to Michigan last Thursday, I took a number of questions regarding the Administration's position on the Seafarer ELF Submarine Communications System -- many of the questioners felt that the Administration is reneging on a campaign promise -- I responded (approved press guidance at Tab A) along the lines of our current Q & A - i.e. that you have requested funds for further R&D of an austere system, but that you have not yet made up your mind on a site for the system.

[Note: DOD/NSC advise that Michigan's upper peninsula is particularly well suited for Seafarer for geological reasons - the underlying rock shield - with similar conditions not to be found, for example, in the western desert.]

MEXICO

- I noted in one of Zbig's information items last week that David Aaron will be in Mexico later this week.
- While he will be focusing on Cuban matters, I think you might wish to give him a message for Lopez Portillo, designed to continue your close, positive contact with the Mexican President.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

DECLASSIFIED  
per 5/31/06 NSC 160  
NLJE-06-081  
BY BAT NARA, DATE 6/6/06

- Improved relations with Mexico and this contact for dialogue at the political level have incredible potential for advancing America's real interests.
- I think you should have Jim Schlesinger and Cy report directly to you on the steps they are planning in resuming the natural gas negotiations. If we handle these negotiations correctly and conclude a deal, it will be of great importance.
- If, on the other hand, we try to club the Mexicans around and drive too hard a bargain, they may back off a deal. And, knowing their national character, this could close the door for years to come.

[Note: See CIA Assessment of Mexican Oil and Gas Reserves, Production and Constraints at Tab B.]

#### US-GREEK RELATIONS

##### Christopher Mission:

- You may wish to invite Warren Christopher to the White House to report directly on the results of his talks with Prime Minister Caramanlis. Based on his reporting telegrams (Tab C), Caramanlis was in a positive and forward-looking frame of mind.
- It would be helpful to have a high-level policy review of how best to proceed with Greece following Warren's mission, with a view to smoothing the way for Greece's reentry into NATO and to improving our bilateral relations.
- An official visit by Caramanlis to the U.S. with full honors -- perhaps in 1980 -- would have an extremely positive impact on the Greek-American community.

#### SOUTHERN AFRICA - SMITH VISIT

- I understand that David Newsom's talks with Ian Smith last Friday were useful; that Smith confirmed his willingness to go to an all-parties meeting without preconditions.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

- On a related issue, our Ambassador to Zambia, Steve Low, was scheduled to meet at 10:00 this morning with Arthur Krim in New York to discuss the most helpful line that Krim might take with Joshua Nkomo.

CRITICISM OF DEFENSE POLICIES

- I have noted that the Republican National Committee (Tab D) has suggested that you have "Conceded manifest strategic military superiority to the Soviets effective early in the 1980s."
- This sort of allegation should be swept away with an early and effective answer. You might ask Harold Brown to give an early speech on the subject.

DE INFO  
STU189  
DE BUCHHEIT (012) 000013  
V9 001 9097 OCT 78 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO AMEMBASSY BOSCHU IMMEDIATE 0007

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0177

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 0121

EXDIA HANDLE AS NOCIS  
BOSCHU FOR SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT FOR TARNOFF  
REFI, PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR BRZEZINSKI, FROM CHRISTOPHER  
E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: DVIP (CHRISTOPHER, WARREN), REFID, PGDV, GR, HS  
SUBJ: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER KARAMANLIS

1. I HAD A TWO-HOUR MEETING WITH KARAMANLIS IN HIS OFFICE  
LAST NIGHT AFTER WHICH HE RETIRED TO HIS APARTMENT FOR A  
SMALL DINNER WHERE CONVERSATION CONTINUED FOR TWO MORE HOURS.  
HE WAS RELAXED, QUITE INFORMAL, PHILOSOPHICAL AT TIMES, AND  
ALL IN ALL IT WAS AN UNUSUAL DISPLAY OF FRIENDSHIP FOR THE  
UNITED STATES. AT THE OUTSET I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S  
LETTER WHICH HE RECEIVED AND READ WITH MUCH APPRECIATION.  
MCCLELLAN AND NIMETZ ACCOMPANIED ME THROUGHOUT AND WE WILL  
BE REPORTING MORE FULLY LATER, BUT THE FOLLOWING ARE THE  
HIGH POINTS.

- ON CYPRUS, KARAMANLIS STRESSED THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO  
MOVE. HE WELCOMES U.S. TAKING A LEADING ROLE BEHIND  
THE SCENES, SAYING HE RECOGNIZES THAT THE UN DOES NOT  
HAVE MUCH ENTHUSIASM FOR ITS MEDIATING ROLE. HE  
AGREES WITH US THAT KYPRIANOU'S PROPOSED BASIS FOR  
RESTARTING THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS IS TOO GENERAL AND  
HE APPLAUDS OUR EFFORT TO DEVELOP A MORE COMPLETE AND  
SPECIFIC FRAMEWORK. AT THE RIGHT TIME HE WILL, AGAIN  
BE COOPERATIVE WITH KYPRIANOU. HE IS SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE  
INVOLVEMENT OF THE EC OR MANY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES  
(TOO MANY CROSS CURRENTS) BUT HAS NO PROBLEM WITH  
US JOINING IN (ANYWAY ALL THEY HAVE A DUTY). AS USUAL,  
HE THINKS THE TURKS HOLD THE KEY.

- ON GREEK REINTERPRETATION INTO NATO, HE ARRIVED AT A  
BAD MOMENT. NEWSPAPERS WERE HEADLINING THAT

\* \* \* \* \* WHO'S COMMENT \* \* \* \* \*

ZR, AAO, IDO, VP, SA  
FOREIGN AFF, DTC, WHT, FATH, WGT

DECLASSIFIED  
PAGE 01

10013043/181847 010120/0497 OCT 78

\*\*\*\*\*

~~SECRET~~

\*\*\*\*\*

DECLASSIFIED

PER 5/31/04 NSC 14r.  
NLJC-06-081  
BY BAE NARA, DATE 4/6/06

TURKEY WOULD "REJECT" GREEK REINTEGRATION BY TAKING  
EXCEPTION TO A POSITIVE REPORT OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.  
I ASSURED KARAMANLIS THAT THE SETBACK IS TEMPORARY AND  
THAT HE WOULD INTENSIFY OUR EFFORTS TO EXPEDITE A  
SOLUTION WHEN THE ISSUE IS REFERRED TO NATO POLITICAL  
LEVEL. KARAMANLIS SAID HE HAD PREPARED HIS FLOOR  
TO RETURN TO NATO BUT WOULD NOT "BEG" OR "PAY A PRICE" TO  
GET IN. IF THERE ARE OBSTACLES OR PROCEDURAL COMPLICA-  
TIONS, WE WILL JUST STAY OUT, HE SAID.

-- ON MILITARY BALANCE, HE EXTENSIVELY PRESSED THE U.S.  
COMMITMENT TO MAINTAIN THE BALANCE OF MILITARY FORCES  
IN THE REGION. I THINK I MADE SOME HEADWAY IN EXPLAINING  
THAT BOTH THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS HAD  
IN MIND A BROAD CONCEPT OF OVERALL BALANCE, INCLUDING  
WARSAW PACT VS. NATO, AS WELL AS THE BALANCE AMONG THE  
COUNTRIES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. PRESSED ON HOW  
WE WOULD PRESERVE THE BALANCE BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY,  
I SAID WE WOULD AVOID INTRODUCING PROVOCATIVE NEW  
MILITARY TECHNOLOGY INTO ONE COUNTRY BUT NOT THE  
OTHER, AND I ALLUDED TO THE ANNUAL REVIEW OF  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE BUT POINTED OUT THAT MAINTENANCE  
OF BALANCE DOES NOT IMPLY A DOLLAR-FOR-DOLLAR EQUIVALENCE  
IN ANY GIVEN YEAR.

-- ON GREECE'S SECURITY, HE CAME DOWN HARDEST. WHEN I  
REPEATED THE STANDARD FORMULATION (UNEQUIVOCAL OPPOSITION  
TO MILITARY SOLUTIONS), HE IMPOSED ME TO PONDER WAYS  
TO SPELL THE STEPS HE WOULD TAKE IN THE EVENT GREEK  
SECURITY IS CHALLENGED. TURKISH AGGRESSION IS THEIR  
OBSESSION. HE ASKED ME TO TELL THE PRESIDENT THAT IF  
GREECE'S SECURITY COULD BE INSURED, ALL OTHER BILATERAL  
PROBLEMS WOULD DISSOLVE.

-- ON THE U.S. ROLE, HE BECAME QUITE PHILOSOPHICAL AND  
SAID HE RECOGNIZED OUR DILEMMA WHEN TWO OF OUR FRIENDS  
(GREECE AND TURKEY) ARE ADVERSARIES. HOW SHOULD THE  
U.S. CARRY OUT THE PROVERB THAT "MY FRIEND'S ENEMY IS  
MY ENEMY TOO." HE ASKED RHETORICALLY. WELL, HE SAID, WE  
(THE U.S.) SHOULD DECIDE WHO IS RIGHT, BUT THAT IS NOT  
EASY EITHER. HE SAID OUR MEETINGS COULD MARK THE  
BEGINNING OF A NEW AND IMPROVED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  
U.S. AND GREECE. HE THEN PAUSED, ALMOST VISELY  
SCANNING A MAP OF EUROPE, AND SAID HE IS THE BEST FRIEND  
OF THE UNITED STATES AMONG ALL THE LEADERS OF EUROPE.  
MCCLUSKEY

BT

RECALLED

PSN132988

PAGE 42

OF 42

10R1003/10154/

8101003000 OCT 78

\*\*\*\*\*

SECRET

\*\*\*\*\*

R

OP THMED /ROUTINE  
ST0211  
DE RUMHAT 891227/1 003000Z  
O R 200840Z OCT 78  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9178

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA 8787  
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 8238  
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4653

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 1 OF 3 ATHENS 9122

EXDIS

E.O. 13526 GDS

TAGS: OVIP (CHRISTOPHER, WARREN), PEPR, GP, US

SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S VISIT: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER  
KARAMANLIS

1. SUMMARY: DEPUTY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER MET WITH PRIME  
MINISTER KARAMANLIS THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 19 FOR A LITTLE  
OVER TWO HOURS. THEY HAD AN EXTENSIVE AND CANDID  
DISCUSSION ON OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AS THEY ARE AFFECTED  
BY GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS, ESPECIALLY MAINTENANCE OF THE  
MILITARY BALANCE; GREEK REINTEGRATION INTO  
NATO AND CYPRUS. THE DISCUSSION WAS CONDUCTED IN A RELAXED  
AND FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE. KARAMANLIS DESCRIBED SECURITY AS  
THE CENTRAL PROBLEM FOR GREECE IN ITS RELATIONS WITH  
TURKEY AND ASKED WHETHER THE U. S. OR NATO COULD GUARANTEE  
GREECE'S SECURITY. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WAS  
POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO NEGOTIATE GREECE'S  
RETURN TO NATO WITH TURKEY AND INDICATED THAT IF GREECE  
HAS TO PAY A PRICE TO RETURN TO NATO HE WOULD HAVE TO  
WITHDRAW HIS REQUEST. ON CYPRUS HE GAVE HIS BLESSING  
TO THE INITIATIVE HE HAD UNDERTAKEN BUT EXPRESSED  
RESERVATIONS OVER WHAT HE CONSIDERED TO BE A LACK OF  
SPECIFICITY IN THE ELEMENTS OF THE APPROACH. END SUMMARY.

2. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE AMBASSADOR,  
COUNSELOR NIMETZ, SURVSE DEPUTY DIRECTOR DILLERY AND  
BARRIS (NOTETAKER). FOREIGN MINISTER PALLIS, AMBASSADOR  
MOLYVIATIS (WHO INTERPRETED), AMBASSADOR ALEXANDRAKIS,  
AND GREEK NOTETAKER ZAHARAKIS WERE PRESENT ON THE GREEK

\* \* \* \* \* WASHO COMMENT \* \* \* \* \*

AAR, IND, VP  
ECRUTG, HUNT, HENRY

PSN1033161

RECALLED  
PAGE 01

TOP:200713133Z

DTG:200840Z OCT 78

\*\*\*\*\* ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ \*\*\*\*\*5 COPY

DECLASSIFIED  
per 5/31/04 NSC 1tr.  
NLSC-04-081  
BY PAF NARA, DATE 6/6/04

SIDE. THE DISCUSSION WAS QUITE OPEN AND CANDID AND THE EXCHANGER LIVELY. THE PRIME MINISTER INVITED THE DEPUTY SECRETARY TO OPEN THE DISCUSSION. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY FIRST HANDED HIM A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CARTER WHICH THE LATTER READ BUT MADE NO SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT. CHRISTOPHER THEN EXPLAINED THAT THE PURPOSE OF HIS MISSION WAS TO TRY TO FIND WAYS TO BROADEN AND DEEPEN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. HE COMMENDED THE PRIME MINISTER FOR THE STATESMANLIKE MANNER IN WHICH HE HANDLED THE EMBARGO QUESTION AND POINTED OUT THAT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN HIS AUGUST 1 LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER HAD HAD AN IMPACT ON THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE LEGISLATION. HE THEN WENT ON TO DISCUSS THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE REGION; GREEK REINTEGRATION INTO NATO AND CYPRUS. KARAMANLIS THEN COMMENTED AT LENGTH ON THIS PRESENTATION. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM WHICH GREECE FACES TODAY IS ITS SECURITY WITH REGARD TO TURKEY. HE MAINTAINED THAT, AS HE HAD FEARED EARLIER, FOLLOWING THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO THE TURKS HAD BECOME MORE INTRANSIGENT NOT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO CYPRUS AND GREEK-TURKISH BILATERAL ISSUES, BUT NOW ALSO WITH RESPECT TO NATO AS WELL. THIS INITIAL EXCHANGE OF STATEMENTS WAS FOLLOWED BY A FURTHER EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE TWO. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS DISCUSSED.

3. THE MILITARY BALANCE. CHRISTOPHER NOTED THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE WAS THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF OUR POLICY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND THAT WE WOULD UNEQUIVOCALLY OPPOSE THE USE OF FORCE TO SETTLE DISPUTES IN THE AREA. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF THE MILITARY BALANCE SHOULD BE SEEN IN BOTH ITS BROADER NATO-WARSAW PACT CONTEXT AS WELL AS THE NARROWER GREEK-TURKISH CONTEXT AND THAT THE LATTER SHOULD NOT BE EVALUATED ON A DOLLAR-FOR-DOLLAR OR SHIP-FOR-SHIP BASIS. RESPONDING TO THIS KARAMANLIS ASKED WHAT PRACTICAL STEPS DID THE U.S. INTEND TO TAKE TO IMPLEMENT THE TWO PRINCIPLES IN THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE LAW REGARDING THE MAINTENANCE OF THE MILITARY BALANCE AND THE PROTECTION OF PEACE. HE ASKED IF

BT

PSN433161 RECALLED PAGE 32 OF 32 1591203/131337 DTG1200440Z OCT 78

\*\*\*\*\*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~\*\*\*\*\*

DD IMMED /ROUTINE  
STU251  
DE RUMAT #912272 203405Z  
O R 220849Z OCT 78  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8170

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA 8788  
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 8039  
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4654

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 3 ATHENS 9122

EXDIS

THE USG COULD MAKE ITS INTENTIONS MORE SPECIFIC AND CLEARER IN THIS RESPECT. HE SAID HE RECOGNIZED THE BROADER ASPECT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF MILITARY BALANCE AND SAID THIS WAS WHY GREECE WANTED TO RETURN TO NATO. HOWEVER, AS LONG AS THE DISPUTES WITH TURKEY CONTINUED, GREECE HAD TO INSIST ON MAINTENANCE OF THE MILITARY BALANCE WITH TURKEY. HE SAID HE WAS DOING ALL HE COULD TO SETTLE GREECE'S DIFFERENCES WITH TURKEY AND ONCE THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED PRESERVATION OF THE MILITARY BALANCE WOULD NO LONGER BE IMPORTANT. MOREOVER, ONCE THE GREEK PEOPLE WERE CONFIDENT ABOUT THEIR SECURITY HE COULD EXPECT A NEW CLIMATE IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. IN A SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGE CHRISTOPHER POINTED OUT AS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW WE WOULD SEE THAT THE BALANCE WOULD NOT BE UPSET WAS TO ENSURE THAT NO NEW INPUT OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY EQUIPMENT WOULD BE INTRODUCED IN ONE OF THE COUNTRIES WITHOUT THE SAME BEING PROVIDED TO THE OTHER. HE ALSO NOTED THAT MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY WOULD REQUIRE AN ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE BALANCE BY U.S. DEFENSE EXPERTS AS WELL AS CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW. KARAMANLIS AGREED THAT BOTH QUANTITY AND QUALITY MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ASSESSING THE BALANCE. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE REASON HE HAD ASKED FOR ASSURANCES THE BALANCE WOULD BE PRESERVED WAS TO RID THE GREEK PEOPLE OF THE FEELING THEY ARE THREATENED.

4. NATO REINTEGRATION. CHRISTOPHER PLEDGED OUR CONTINUED FULL SUPPORT FOR GREEK REINTEGRATION INTO NATO. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ALTHOUGH THERE MIGHT BE

PSN2033165 RECALLED  
PAGE 01 TOR1243/13135Z DTG120849Z OCT 78

\*\*\*\*\*~~CONFIDENTIAL~~\*\*\*\*\* COPY



DIFFICULTIES WITH TURKEY IN THIS RESPECT, THE GOC SHOULD ALLOW THE FULL PROCESS OF NATO MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATION TO RUN ITS COURSE. KARAMANLIS RESPONDED ON THIS SUBJECT THAT HE SAW THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" AS A BRIDGE TO GREECE'S EVENTUAL FULL RETURN TO THE MILITARY STRUCTURE. HE HAD WORKED FOR TWO YEARS TO CONVINCE THE GREEK PEOPLE OF THE DESIRABILITY OF THIS ACTION AND IT WAS IRONIC THAT AS THEY HAD BEGUN TO ACCEPT IT DIFFICULTIES WERE BEING RAISED IN NATO ABOUT IT. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR GREECE TO AGREE TO PAY A PRICE IN ORDER TO RETURN TO THE ALLIANCE. THE U.S. AND GENERAL HAIG, HE ADDED, HAD RECOGNIZED THIS. BUT NOW TURKEY WAS CREATING DIFFICULTIES, CONFIRMING KARAMANLIS IN HIS VIEW THAT THE TURKS HAD BECOME MORE INTRANSIGENT SINCE THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO. IF TURKISH OBJECTIONS WERE NOT OVERCOME, HE WOULD AT SOME POINT BE FORCED TO WITHDRAW HIS REQUEST FOR REINTEGRATION WHICH WOULD MEAN A SERIOUS CRISIS. HE SAID HE DID NOT MEAN THIS AS A THREAT OR AS PRESSURE, BUT WAS ONLY MAKING A STATEMENT OF FACT. CHRISTOPHER RESPONDED TO THIS SAYING THAT IT WAS OUR HOPE AND EXPECTATION THAT THESE DIFFICULTIES WERE ONLY TEMPORARY AND THAT THE MATTER NOW NEEDED TO BE RAISED TO THE POLITICAL LEVEL. KARAMANLIS STATED HE HAD NO INTENTION, NOR RIGHT, TO NEGOTIATE OR BARGAIN FOR GREECE'S RETURN TO NATO WITH TURKEY. TO DO SO WOULD CREATE A MAJOR POLITICAL AND MORAL CRISIS FOR HIM. CHRISTOPHER AGREED THAT GREECE'S REENTRY SHOULD NOT BE USED TO TRY TO SOLVE OTHER PROBLEMS. THE PRIME MINISTER REPLIED HE WAS HAPPY TO TAKE NOTE OF THIS. THE GREEK PROPOSAL WAS TO REENTER WITH THE SAME STATUS AS OF THE TIME THEY LEFT. IF THERE ARE ISSUES TO BE SETTLED, THEY CAN BE DISCUSSED AFTER REENTRY BUT GREECE COULD NOT NEGOTIATE BEFORE. CHRISTOPHER CLARIFIED THAT THE WORLD KEEPS MOVING AND HE WAS NOT SAYING THAT GREECE SHOULD RETURN UNDER EXACTLY THE SAME STATUS.

BT

RECALLED

PSN:W33165

PAGE 02

OF 02

FOR:293/13:35Z

DTG:200849Z OCT 78

\*\*\*\*\* ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ \*\*\*\*\* COPY

OP IMMED /ROUTINE  
STU311  
DE RUQMAT 89122/3 2031005  
O R 200849Z OCT 78  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8180

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA 8780  
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 8040  
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4655

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 3 OF 3 ATHENS 0122

EXDIS

5. CYPRUS. ALTHOUGH CYPRUS WAS NOT THE PURPOSE OF HIS VISIT, CHRISTOPHER BRIEFED THE PRIME MINISTER IN GENERAL TERMS ON RECENT U.S. CONTACTS WITH BOTH CYPRIOT PARTIES AND THE UNITED NATIONS AIMED AT A RESUMPTION OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE GOC WOULD CONTINUE TO PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE. RESPONDING, KARAMANLIS DESCRIBED CYPRUS AS THE INITIAL SOURCE OF ALL THE PROBLEMS THEY HAD BEEN TALKING ABOUT. HE SAID TURKEY SHOWS NO UNDERSTANDING AND HAD FAILED, FOLLOWING THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO, TO MAKE REASONABLE PROPOSALS THAT COULD LEAD TO A SETTLEMENT. HE SAID PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU HAD BRIEFED HIM ON HIS TALKS WITH PRESIDENT CARTER AND THE APPROACH TO WHICH THE DEPUTY SECRETARY HAD ALLUDED. HE SAID HIS PERSONAL REACTION WAS THAT WHEREAS WHAT WE WERE DOING MAY HELP TO ACHIEVE RESUMPTION OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, THE PROPOSED ELEMENTS WERE TOO GENERAL AND VAGUE TO BE HELPFUL IN ARRIVING AT A SOLUTION. HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED SOMETHING MORE CONCRETE AND MORE SPECIFIC AND HAD SO TOLD KYPRIANOU AND ADVISED HIM TO PRESENT MORE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. DESPITE HIS RESERVATIONS, HOWEVER, HE AGREED WITH KYPRIANOU, WHO HAD ACCEPTED THIS APPROACH, AND HOPED THAT IT WOULD LEAD TO A RESUMPTION OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS IN GOOD FAITH. HE REITERATED THAT IT WAS HIS POLICY TO SUPPORT THE GOC, WHICH HAD PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY IN THE MATTER, AND IF THE DIALOGUE IS RESUMED WOULD DO ALL HE COULD TO HELP. CHRISTOPHER THEN NOTED THAT TURKEY HAD NOT HAD TIME, SINCE THE LIFTING

PSN1433171 RECALLED  
PAGE 01 TOP:293/131372 DTG:200849Z OCT 78

\*\*\*\*\*~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~\*\*\*\*\* COPY

OF THE EMBASSY, TO REVEAL ITS INTENTIONS NOR HAD WE APPROACHED THEM AS YET IN OTHER THAN A GENERAL WAY. KARAHANLIS COMMENTED THAT THE TIMING FOR AN INITIATIVE WAS RIGHT. IF THERE IS NO MOVEMENT SOON, THE GDC WILL HAVE TO GO TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL. NOTING KARAHANLIS' POSITIVE RESPONSE, CHRISTOPHER INDICATED THAT WE WOULD BE SHOWING THE GDC SOMETHING IN THIS RESPECT WITHIN A FEW DAYS WHICH WOULD INCLUDE MORE SPECIFIC ELEMENTS.

6. KARAHANLIS SAID HE HAD HAD INFORMATION THAT SOME WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES OR THE EC-9 (HE WAS NOT SURE EXACTLY WHO) WOULD BE BROUGHT INTO THIS EFFORT. HE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE A MISTAKE TO GET TOO MANY COUNTRIES INVOLVED. CHRISTOPHER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE HAVE DISCUSSED OUR THOUGHTS WITH THE UK, CANADA, THE FRG AND FRANCE. THE FIRST TWO MIGHT PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE BUT THE LATTER TWO WOULD REMAIN ON THE SIDELINES AND PERHAPS ONLY OFFER ADVICE, BUT AS FAR AS HE WAS AWARE THERE WAS NO EC-9 INITIATIVE AFOOT.

7. BROADENING RELATIONS. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY CONCLUDED HIS INITIAL STATEMENT AT THE OPENING OF THE MEETING WITH A REFERENCE TO THE DISCUSSIONS HE HOPED TO HAVE OCTOBER 28 WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S COLLEAGUES ON U.S.-GREEK COOPERATION IN NON-POLITICAL/ SECURITY AREAS. KARAHANLIS DID NOT COMMENT AT THIS POINT. EARLIER, HOWEVER, IN WELCOMING THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION THAT THE PURPOSE OF HIS MISSION WAS TO STRENGTHEN AND DEVELOP OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

8. KARAHANLIS CONCLUDED THE ENTIRE CONVERSATION BY ASKING THE RHETORICAL QUESTION, CAN THE U.S. OR NATO GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF GREECE? IF THIS WERE POSSIBLE I WOULD GIVE UP EVERY OTHER REQUEST, HE SAID. THAT, HE ADDED, IS THE CENTRAL ISSUE. HE WAS NOT ASKING FOR AN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION NOW, BUT POINTED OUT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KNOW THE ANSWER. HOWEVER, HE DID ASK EXACTLY HOW THE U.S. INTENDED TO OPPOSE THE USE OF FORCE TO SETTLE DISPUTES. CHRISTOPHER REPLIED THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO BE MORE SPECIFIC THAN WHAT WE HAVE SAID BEFORE. HOWEVER, HE COULD ASSURE THE PRIME MINISTER THAT WE WOULD NOT BE IDLE IN SUCH AN EVENT.

9. WE ARE SENDING RELEVANT EXCERPTS OF THIS REPORT TO USNMN SHAPE, USDELMC AND USDDCOSOUTH (OMITTING CYPRUS SECTION).  
MCCLUSKEY

RECALLED  
PAGE 42  
PEN#033171  
TOP:223/131377  
DIO12000492 OCT 78

\*\*\*\*\* O N T I D E N T I A L \*\*\*\*\* COPY

CHOICES" IN A CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIETS.

A REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE NATIONAL SECURITY PANEL HEADED BY FORMER DEPUTY DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT ELLSWORTH SAID IN A STATEMENT THAT IF CARTER'S POLICIES CONTINUE UNCHANGED, HE WILL HAVE "CONCEDED MANIFEST STRATEGIC MILITARY SUPERIORITY TO THE SOVIETS EFFECTIVE EARLY IN THE 1980S."

CARTER'S CANCELLATION OF THE B-1 BOMBER, DELAY OF MX MISSILE DEVELOPMENT, NAVY SHIPBUILDING CUTBACKS AND DEFERRAL OF NEUTRON WARHEAD PRODUCTION EACH WERE "MADE UNILATERALLY WITH LITTLE OR NO ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN A QUID PRO QUO OR COMPARABLE SOVIET REDUCTION OF ARMS," THE STATEMENT SAID.

THE SOVIETS MADE NO CONCESSIONS ON THEIR BACKFIRE BOMBER TO CORRESPOND TO THE B-1 DECISION, IT SAID. AND, IT ADDED, THEY CONTINUE TO DEPLOY THEIR SS-20 MID-RANGE MISSILE DESPITE THE MX SLOWDOWN; EXPAND THEIR NAVY DESPITE CUTBACKS IN U.S. SHIPBUILDING PLANS; AND FAIL TO RESTRAIN DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE DESPITE POSTPONEMENT OF A FINAL NEUTRON WEAPON DECISION.

"REPUBLICANS DEPLORE THE COURSE OF UNILATERAL ARMS REDUCTION WHICH THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION HAS TAKEN AND FIND IT OUT OF STEP WITH PREVIOUS U.S. POLICIES UNDER PRESIDENTS OF BOTH PARTIES," THE STATEMENT SAID.

IT SAID GERALD FORD WOULD HAVE PRESSED AHEAD WITH WEAPONS CARTER HAS STOPPED OR SLOWED, AND THAT IF PRESENT POLICIES ARE PURSUED FURTHER "ANY DIRECT CONFRONTATION IN AN ERA OF APPARENT SOVIET MILITARY SUPERIORITY WOULD FACE AMERICA WITH STARK CHOICES."

UPI 10-19 08:43 AED

B123

R

NAMIBIA (TOPS)

ZB.AAR.IND.LX

(PRETORIA) -- SOUTH AFRICA'S PRIME MINISTER BOTHA (BOH'-TAH) ANNOUNCED A PLAN TODAY UNDER WHICH HIS COUNTRY WILL PROCEED WITH ITS OWN ELECTIONS IN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA.

AT THE SAME TIME, BOTHA SAID, SOUTH AFRICA WILL RESUME FULL-SCALE NEGOTIATIONS FOR UNITED NATIONS-SUPERVISED ELECTIONS NEXT YEAR IN THE TERRITORY, WHICH ALSO IS KNOWN AS NAMIBIA (NAM-MIH'-BEE-UH).

BOTHA ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT APPROVED BY HIS GOVERNMENT AND WESTERN FOREIGN MINISTERS, INCLUDING SECRETARY OF STATE VANCE.

VANCE HAD SPENT THREE DAYS IN SECRET NEGOTIATIONS ON SOUTH-WEST AFRICA'S TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE AND BLACK-MAJORITY RULE.

BOTHA STOPPED SHORT OF FULL ACCEPTANCE OF THE U-N PLAN. BUT HE SAID HE'LL USE HIS "BEST EFFORTS" TO PERSUADE LOCAL LEADERS ELECTED IN DECEMBER TO GO AHEAD WITH THE LATER ELECTIONS.

AP-WX-1019 0750STT

# Space Business Daily

203

SPACE PUBLICATIONS, INC.  
638-0500/638-1577

NORMAN L. BAKER — President & Editor-In-Chief  
KENNETH J. SILVERSTONE — Managing Editor

Published five times a week by Space Publications, Inc., at 1341 G St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005

Subscription rates: \$490.00 for one year, \$255.00 for six months, \$140.00 for three months

Space Publications, Inc. All rights reserved. Reproduction is strictly prohibited.

20th Year, Vol. 100, No. 31

Page 211

## GOP SAYS CARTER CONCEDING MILITARY SUPREMACY TO SOVIETS

### *Attacks Unilateral Arms Reductions*

A special report by the Republican National Committee charges today that the Carter Administration's defense policies have conceded "manifest military supremacy to the Soviets effective early in the 1980's."

The report, prepared by the committee's Advisory Council on National Security and International Affairs, says it deplores "the course of unilateral arms reduction" which has been undertaken "and find it out of step with previous U.S. policies under Presidents of both parties who sought to maintain U.S. strength even as prudent steps toward mutual arms controls were pursued."

The council, chaired by former U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency director Dr. Fred Ikle, says it shares the Administration's hopes for successful arms control agreements but rejects President Carter's belief "that without such agreements our one-sided restraint will be matched by equal Soviet restraint."

The report is extremely critical of Carter's unilateral arms reductions. Cited is the cancellation of the B-1 bomber and deferral of the production of the MX ICBM program.

The council says the cancellation of the B-1 bomber and the deferral of the MX "have irreversibly weakened our position in the SALT II negotiations." It points out that the Ford Administration would have retained the B-1.

The Administration is accused of "misleadingly" announcing that the cruise missile is the nation's alternate system when it "has not demonstrated that it can substitute for the powerful and flexible B-1." Further, the cruise missile's development has also been "substantially slowed" and no cruise missile carrier has been designated for the post B-52 era," the report declares.

### **No Program To Deal With Threat**

"Carter has initiated no program to deal with the increasing vulnerability of U.S. land-based ICBM's. In fact, in his statement of Sept. 28, he displayed confusion and uncertainty over steps to correct our growing vulnerability," the GOP council charges. It says this lack of action continues despite Defense Secretary Brown's acknowledgment that the U.S. ICBMs will be vulnerable to Soviet attack sometime in the early 1980's, certainly by 1985, with or without a SALT agreement.

The report explains that President Ford's defense plans called for an initial operational capability for the MX of 1983, while Carter has deferred full-scale development, delaying the IOC date to 1987 and full operational capability until around 1990.

**MORE**



The Carter decision to defer the production of the neutron enhanced radiation weapons "pending some undefined reciprocal act of arms control on the part of the Soviet Union seriously undermined our allied bargaining position in the ongoing reduction talks in Europe." The action has deprived the NATO forces a valuable deterrent against Warsaw Pact tank forces, the report concludes, while the Soviets have been left unrestrained in their buildup with weapons such as the SS-20 missile and the Backfire bomber.

The Administration's efforts toward negotiating limitations on naval deployment, such as in the Indian Ocean, is putting the U.S. at a disadvantage in competing with the Soviet naval buildup, the council says. It also charges that Carter's actions indicate a reduced role for the Navy, giving up maritime superiority to the Soviets and accepting a 400-ship defensive fleet.

#### **Critical Of US-USSR FMS Restraint Talks**

The report is critical of the present negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union to reduce arms sales. These negotiations "have the potential for contributing further to the weakening of the West. The U.S. position is hampered here as well by the confusion of Carter's arms policies. The Administration has placed its own negotiations at a disadvantage by its use of erroneous data on foreign military sales. It is noted that the Administration's figures include the cost of parts, training, life-cycle costs, and construction, while the figures used for the Soviet sales include only the costs of weapons hardware, "thus placing those figures unrealistically low relative to the U.S. figures."

Also coming under attack as part of the "adverse arms control implications of Carter Administration policies," is the advocacy of "an unverifiable total moratorium" on nuclear tests. "This approach reflects the same naive view of Soviet capabilities and intentions that underlie the Administration's other defense policy decisions." While the U.S. would openly comply with such a treaty, the report explains, the American people would have to accept on faith Soviet compliance.

#### **Carter Has 'Severely Cut' Defense**

The GOP council stresses that President Carter's FY 1979 defense budget of \$126 billion must be compared with Ford's \$134.4 billion budget. Further, the Carter budget "constitutes only a 1.85 percent real increase" and "falls far short of his pledge for a 3 percent real growth from year to year and permits the Russians to widen the gap."

Cited was Soviet defense spending that exceeds that of the U.S. by 25 to 40 percent; that is growing in real terms at a rate of 4 to 5 percent per annum, as compared to less than 3 percent for the U.S.; and a defense spending rate that constitutes at least 11 to 20 percent of the Soviet GNP, as compared to 4 to 5 percent of the GNP for the U.S. Also, the dollar costs of Soviet strategic nuclear force efforts is 2.5 times that of the U.S., while the Soviet Union "has the avowed goal of technological superiority over the United States."

#### **The Danger Of Carter's Defense Veto**

The Carter veto of the Defense procurement authorization bill, "unprecedented in recent American history, presents a dangerously confused image to the American public and to our allies and adversaries abroad," the GOP report explains.

Further, "it represents a misreading of the will of the American people and the Congress."

The council noted that every Administration defense program cancellation, cutback, or deferral was made unilaterally, "with little or no attempt to obtain a quid-pro-quo or comparable Soviet reduction of arms."

Cited is the Soviet refusal to make any concessions regarding the Backfire bomber,

full-scale production of the MX missile"; the lack of a slow-down in the impressive growth of the Soviet Navy, "despite Carter's highly visible cut backs in U.S. Navy shipbuilding plans"; and the lack of Soviet restraint in conventional and nuclear arms deployments, "despite Carter's deferral of production of enhanced radiation weapons."

"Difficult though it is to believe that the U.S. would permit present trends in strategic and theatre capabilities to continue without any counterprograms, that is exactly what our defense and arms control policies under President Carter amount to," the Republican report concludes.

"It may be too early to pronounce the Carter defense and arms control policies a failure. With a major effort the Administration could begin to recover much lost ground with a reasonable and progressive Five-Year Defense Program, to be set before the nation in January."

### **PRESIDENT CONTINUES TO WAFFLE ON NEUTRON WARHEAD**

The Administration let it be known yesterday that President Carter has taken action to "preserve the option to produce a neutron weapon," but the move only underscores the fact that the President continues to refuse to build a weapon that is sought by the U.S. military and a number of NATO nations.

What the President has done is to okay the expenditure of FY '79 funds to produce some components of the enhanced radiation weapon (ERW) and to order production of the new W70-Mod 3 warhead for the Lance missile and the eight-inch W79 artillery shell -- two weapons designed to carry the ERW, popularly known as the "neutron bomb." (See Defense/Space Daily, Oct. 5.)

However, the new warheads will not be armed with the ERW system, but with regular fissionable material providing a high blast effect. It will reportedly take a couple of years to produce the new Lance warhead and the artillery shell at a cost of \$150-\$250 million for the Lance and \$500 to \$750 million for the shell.

If the President decides later to order production of the ERW weapon, it would reportedly take several months -- involving adding to the warheads the components which have been ordered into production along with some other components which the President had not yet ordered.

The ERW, which has a relatively small blast but an intense radiation level, is designed for use against a massed Soviet tank attack, being able to kill tank crews and supporting troops without destroying the population and buildings of the West European country where the attack would be made.

The President's decision was reported yesterday by Defense Secretary Brown to the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Brussels.

### **FRENCH REPORT WARNS OF THREAT OF WARSAW PACT SURPRISE ATTACK**

A report based on French military intelligence and prepared for the parliamentary debate on France's 1979 defense budget warns that the threat of a Warsaw Pact surprise attack is growing.

Deputy Jacques Cressard reports that the Soviet Union has achieved nuclear and naval equality with NATO forces and has a 3-to-1 superiority in airborne and land forces as a result of the West's slackened defense effort.

Cressard's report calls for the production of the neutron enhanced warhead weapons as a means for balancing the Soviet superiority. It says the NATO's supreme recourse in the event of attack is the use of tactical nuclear arms. Cressard said the Soviet Union may now feel that the balance of forces in Europe have tipped decisively in its favor.



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

November 7, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD MOE *Rm*  
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR LUNCHEON WITH THE PRESIDENT -- WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 1978

I. Election Results

- There will be about 80 new Representatives and 15 new senators. We should have a sophisticated program of briefings, receptions, etc., to get them off on the right foot.

II. Middle East (see attached)

III. SALT (see attached)

IV. Economy

- Inflation Program
- Dollar

V. My Plans to be Gone

- Hope you'll take some time off, too.

VI. Iran (see attached)

VII. US-Polish Relations (see attached)

VIII. Feed Grain Set-Aside (memo coming)

IX. 1979 Agenda

- Process is now underway; we should have recommendations for you by early December.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
per 5/31/06 NSC 1h.  
NLTSC LOG-081  
BY: BAE NARA DATE 6/4/06

*Child Nutrition  
Feed Grain*

*Thank J*

*Sanchez*

*Gov.  
Inflation  
\$\$\$*

*+2-7 weeks  
Get Home*



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON


INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/XGDS

Memo No. 1053-78

November 7, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift   
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy and National Security  
Issues for Lunch with President,  
Wednesday, November 8, 1978

US-Polish Relations

Immediately following your lunch with the President, you will meet with Polish Deputy Chairman Jagielski (yaGHElskee) who is here for a meeting of the US-Polish Trade Commission, involving talks with his US counterpart, Secretary Kreps. Jagielski is number two to Gierek.

You may wish to suggest that the President drop by for a minute to greet him, have a photo taken, and ask him to convey his best wishes to First Secretary Gierek.

Iran

You and the President will have received the November 8 situation reports on developments in Iran.

The President, as you know, has directed that we indicate our strong support for the Shah. CIA is intensifying its efforts to this end.

Of interest, the signals we are receiving from the Soviets would indicate that they believe their interests would best be served by the Shah staying in power.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED  
Per 5/31/06 NSC 1h.  
NLJC-06-081  
BY: BAC NARA.D 6/06/06

### Other Issues

I am attaching the paper I prepared for you a few days ago reviewing important issues relating to the Middle East, SALT, and the PRC, as well as possibilities for your travel in 1979. You may wish to draw on some of the points contained therein.

It is my understanding at this point that the President's foreign travel plans focus on the trip to the Middle East and a possible visit to Mexico.



# MINNESOTA HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Copyright in the Walter F. Mondale Papers belongs to the Minnesota Historical Society and its content may not be copied without the copyright holder's express written permission. Users may print, download, link to, or email content, however, for individual use.

To request permission for commercial or educational use, please contact the Minnesota Historical Society.



[www.mnhs.org](http://www.mnhs.org)