

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON


INFORMATION

SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS

Memo No. 1041-78

November 2, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy and Defense Issues

As you move into the last days of the campaign, prepare for a few days off and look to the months ahead, I thought it would be useful if I were to touch on some of the more important foreign policy and defense issues -- issues that will require attention by the White House - and by you - in mid-November.

Middle East

On November 2 Secretary Vance went to New York for talks with Begin. There are five or six important issues requiring attention with the Israelis:

- the need for language in the preamble linking the bilateral Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty to the broader purposes of the Camp David framework;
- the need for a security provision stating that the treaty may be reviewed by mutual agreement;
- a priority of obligations provision, to assure that Egypt will honor this treaty whatever else Egypt's treaty obligations with Arab nations may be;

[None of the above are overly difficult; as soon as there is agreement on them, the treaty will be in fairly good shape];

- the need to address details of normalization;

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per 5/31/06 NSC Ltr.
NLJCL 06-081
BY BAE NARA, DATE 6/6/06

- the need to work out acceptable language on oil fields and on the provisions of the military annex;
- the need for language covering the contingency of a UN force pullout and assurances of some sort that the US will help put together a substitute multilateral force; and
- the need for US-Israeli understandings on US assistance to Israel. This last point will be an Alphonse-Gaston exercise. Current US thinking is to avoid appearing overly eager, indicating to the Israelis that as soon as the treaty and annexes are in shape, we will be prepared to discuss assistance in a sympathetic manner.

Current estimates by the US delegation are that some seven to ten additional days of detailed work will be required in the Washington peace talks before the documents can be initialed by the delegations and forwarded to the Egyptian and Israeli governments for approval.

Begin, as you know, has suggested publicly that the signing of the treaty might be on December 9, possibly in Oslo, just before he and Sadat receive their Nobel Peace Prize. In my opinion, this scenario would put the President in a most unsatisfactory, indeed demeaning, position. President Carter has made this peace treaty possible. The signing ceremony should be orchestrated in a way that has him participate in the limelight and, in Sadat's words, as a full partner in the peace process. He should not witness the signing and then immediately be left in the dust as Begin and Sadat receive their prize.

I honestly see any Oslo scenario as unsatisfactory, almost an embarrassment. Early attention should be given to this; otherwise, the December 9 scenario will gain greater status and will be harder to reverse. My recommendation would be to put at least a week between the signing and the peace prize presentation, with the signing in the Middle East. In this scenario, the President would participate in the signing, possibly make one or two other stops in the area and then be back in Washington at the time of the peace prize presentation.

SALT

By mid-November some hard decisions will be required on tactics with Brezhnev relating to conclusion of the SALT treaty and a US-USSR summit. I see no useful purpose in another round of ministerial talks. The remaining SALT issues are not that difficult. They can be resolved at the summit. They will have to be resolved at the summit.

Our current position is that we have given the Soviets our bottom line and it is now up to them to make the next move. I am not that sanguine about the Soviets' institutional ability to understand this position in the wake of the Vance-Gromyko talks. The Soviets may believe that as there are still outstanding issues they can, as in the past, expect to hear from us. This could lead to a situation, which neither side desires, of protracted silence during which the December window opens and then closes. I recommend that the President in a message to Brezhnev re-state our bottom line position, re-state his view that it would be useful to have a summit in which a SALT treaty could be concluded based on this position - and underscore for Brezhnev the fact that should we allow the December-January timing to slip by, we may well find ourselves in a position where it will not be possible to conclude an agreement in both sides' interest until at least 1981.

This communication involves no concessions by the U.S. It would have the value of clarifying the situation and putting the burden of rejecting a December summit on Brezhnev's shoulders.

Peoples Republic of China (PRC)

We are at a point in our dealings with the PRC where we have (1) satisfactory consultations, (2) rapidly expanding bilateral contacts and (3) a clear picture of what each side will have to agree to if we are to move forward together to normalize relations. On normalization, we will have to agree to break diplomatic relations with Taiwan, end our defense treaty and withdraw our troops. The Chinese will have to agree to some language, satisfactory to us, assuring that there will be no civil war and that any settlement between the mainland and Taiwan will be a peaceful settlement. They also will have to agree to a continued economic and cultural US presence in Taiwan along the lines of that currently enjoyed by Japan.

I believe the President sees normalization as one of the old order of issues which should be satisfactorily dealt with and put behind us. If normalization is to take place before 1981, hard decisions will be required in mid-November/early December at much the same time that we are taking decisions on SALT. I certainly do not know whether the PRC can accept our "peaceful settlement and continued economic/cultural position." If the PRC can, I do not believe we would overload the 1979 agenda by moving ahead with normalization at the same time we submit a SALT treaty for ratification.

[As an aside, it would be a great mistake to normalize with the PRC in the absence of a new SALT agreement -- this would have an adverse impact on US-USSR relations for years.]

The recent Japanese-Chinese agreement is a strong pro when considering US-PRC normalization. Additionally, and of great importance, if there is a SALT II treaty and USSR summit, a sound strategic argument can be advanced that normalization with the PRC is in our strategic interests -- we are not relying solely on the word of the Soviets, we are moving at the same time to strengthen our relations with a foe of the Soviets -- we are creating a better strategic balance.

If the President decides to move ahead with normalization in 1979, I would anticipate that your role would be much as it was in the Panama Canal treaty process, with the President on center stage with Chairman Hua and with you working with the Senate and participating in a range of briefings.

If, on the other hand, the President decides not to move ahead with normalization in 1979, while at the same time conducting a US-USSR summit and signing a SALT II treaty, I believe a strong argument can be advanced for a high visibility visit by you to the PRC to dramatize that this Administration is committed at the highest levels to improving US-PRC relations and to working in earnest toward eventual normalization.

Possible Visit to Eastern Europe

Looking ahead to your 1979 calendar, you may wish to consider a visit to Romania (you have had an invitation outstanding since 1977), Hungary and Poland to build on our political-level consultations with these nations. You could logically include a stop in the Netherlands on such a trip, possibly during the Easter recess.

As you know, First Secretary Gierek of Poland is pressing the President for an invitation to the US in 1979. To me, this makes little sense. Not enough time has elapsed since the President's visit to Warsaw for another US-Polish summit. It would be far better to invite Gierek to the US in 1980 -- when there would be greater domestic impact. A visit by you to Warsaw, Bucharest and Budapest would continue political consultations -- of importance following a US-Soviet summit -- and would relieve the President of the burden of visits by Eastern European leaders in 1979.

Visit to Scandinavian Countries

Finally, I recommend that a firm decision be taken by the President approving your travel to Scandinavia in 1979. The number of substantive reasons favoring such a visit, foremost among them, a counter to Soviet pressure on Finland and Norway, continue to grow. I do not see how you could make such a visit during an election year. If you do not make such a visit during the first term, I see it as an embarrassment to the nations concerned. Accordingly, I recommend that we pin this down early on the 1979 agenda, again, with the goal of a June-July framework for the visit.

cc: David Aaron



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

November 17, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD MOE *RM*

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR LUNCHEON WITH THE PRESIDENT
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1978

M-E 24
Senators
Unlabeled?
Zbig

I. 1980 Ticket Announcement -- Thank You

II. Middle East (see attached) *- Israel*

III. SALT

IV. Inflation *Rudger*

V. Agenda Process

o Process is well underway; will meet with senior staff today and have a preliminary paper to you this week.

VI. Defeated Candidates

o Realize we can't take too many in the government, but we should try to take the best, those who can help us.

o Dick Clark and Tom McIntyre stand out. I think Dick met with Cy Vance last week; he would be good in the foreign policy area. Tom may want to go back to New Hampshire, but we should try to get him to help us in SALT area.

o Of House candidates, Ned Patison is outstanding.

o I understand Rudy Perpich called you; I will see him this week to try to see what he wants.

o Don Fraser (?)

VII. Mid-term Review of Personnel

o This is a logical time to review 2nd and 3rd level appointees. Hope we can clear out some dead wood and get in some fresh blood.

o You might ask department heads to give you a candid, private assessment of their top people; get a similar assessment from your own staff on the departments, then compare notes.

VIII. U.S.-Mexican Relations (see attached)

IX. U.S.-Phillipine Relations (see attached)

X. Schmidt's Speech (see attached)

PRC
VN
Angela
Cuba

DECLASSIFIED
per 5/31/06 NSC H.
ALJc-06-081
BAG MADE FINAL 6/6/06

INFORMATION

Memo No/ 1079-78

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

November 17, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK MOE

FROM: Denis Clift

SUBJECT: Insert for lunch with the President

At Tab I is an insert for the paper for the Vice President's luncheon with the President, Monday, November 20, 1978.

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DECLASSIFIED
per 5/31/06 NSC/hr.
NLJd-06-081
BY BSS NARA, DATE 6/6/06

INSERT FOR VICE PRESIDENT'S LUNCHEON WITH THE PRESIDENT,
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1978

Middle East

By the time of the luncheon, you and the President will have received reports on the Israeli Cabinet deliberations relating to the Israeli-Egyptian peace negotiations. You may also wish to relate the substance of your November 17 dinner conversation with Egyptian Vice President Mubarak.

US-Mexican Relations

Note with satisfaction that the President has announced he will be visiting Mexico on February 14-16, 1979. Note that the State-chaired interagency study (PRM 41) on Mexico will be discussed in a meeting of the PRC on Tuesday, November 28. Note that the President's policy of keeping the entire relationship under careful policy review is paying dividends and is essential to a successful bilateral relationship at a time when our interest in Mexico's oil and gas is increasing.

US-Philippine Relations

The President met with Senator Inouye on Friday, November 17 to receive Inouye's report on his talks with Marcos. Inouye told Marcos that the US could not commit itself to multi-year funding for the bases, but that we would commit ourselves to a best effort to obtain such funding. Inouye urged Marcos to move quickly on the bases to permit inclusion of funding in the FY80 budget request. Shortly thereafter Marcos resumed the talks. The President told Inouye that he would send a letter to Marcos saying that he wanted to move quickly to reduce tensions, a letter thanking Marcos for his efforts. You may wish to note that we have the possibility of real progress, in part, as a result of Senator Inouye's visit.

Speech by Helmut Schmidt

On November 9, Chancellor Schmidt delivered a powerful speech at Cologne's Great Synagogue on the 40th anniversary of the Nazis' destruction of synagogues throughout Germany.

It is a speech (text at Tab A) addressed not only to Jews in Germany and throughout the world, but to young Germans and the responsibility they bear today (see bottom, page 4-top page 5).

If you agree, you may wish to mention the speech to the President and provide him with the text during your luncheon.

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REV 5/31/04 NSC 68
NLS-04-681
BY BAE NARA DATE 4/6/06

INSERT FOR VICE PRESIDENT'S LUNCHEON WITH THE PRESIDENT
NOVEMBER 28, 1978

MIDDLE EAST

- By the time of your luncheon with the President, we may have Sadat's answer to our request that he accept the treaty in its present form, leaving open the problem of satisfactorily dealing with linkage.
- State and the NSC expect the Egyptians to take a firm stand on the need for improved linkage provisions in the treaty, as well as better language on other treaty provisions.
- Accordingly, the U.S. will have to decide what the next step is in our strategy (Vance has his people at work on recommendations). As it now appears, neither the Israelis nor the Egyptians have accepted our position "take the existing language, it is the best you are going to get."
- In my opinion, first priority must be given to the substance of any new U.S. compromise language. I also think it makes sense to bring the two teams back to Washington as the next operational step.

IRAN

- The month of mourning -- Moharram -- begins on Saturday, December 2.
- The situation in Iran has stabilized since the Military government came in, and the government is devoting priority attention to managing the demonstrations and anticipated violence accompanying Moharram.
- We continue to take a very firm position in support of the Shah.
- An NSC task force is giving attention to two important issues:
 - Our post-Moharram policy with the Shah - i.e., steps that we recommend to help him solve his problems, such as staffing his government with people who are more than loyal yes men.

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per 5/21/06 NSC/Hr.
NLJC-06-087
BY BNS NARA, DATE 6/6/06

- We are also looking at the crisis Iran will soon face because of a shortage of consumer goods and are considering ways - possibly in cooperation with Japan and Western Europe - of putting together a package, e.g., short term credits, that will help to alleviate this problem.

JAPAN

- Prime Minister Fukuda, beaten in the Liberal Democratic Party's preliminary election by the Party's Secretary General Masayoshi Ohira, has said he will not run for the Presidency of the Party.
- My contacts at the Japanese Embassy advise that Fukuda will stand by this decision and that Ohira will take over the Presidency on December 1. A special session of the Diet will have to be called for him to become Prime Minister. No obstacles are seen to his taking the office.
- Ohira has twice served as Foreign Minister and once as Finance Minister. He is a firm supporter of the Liberal Democratic Party's position that the US-Japanese relationship is the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy.

PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA

- The China watchers have not yet deciphered the current rumblings within the Chinese leadership to their satisfaction.
- At this point there have been no steps that would indicate a change in PRC foreign policy, although the NSC doesn't rule this out.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

Memo No. 1104-78

November 27, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK MOE

FROM: Denis Clift

SUBJECT: Insert for Paper for Vice President's
Luncheon with President

I am forwarding at Tab A talking points for inclusion in the paper being prepared for the Vice President's November 28 luncheon with the President.

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

DECLASSIFIED
per 5/31/06 NSC 1A.
NLJC-06-081
BY: BRT NARA, DATE 6/6/06



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

December 1, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD MOE *RM*

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR LUNCHEON WITH THE
PRESIDENT -- MONDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1978

I. Middle East

- Kahlil Meeting
- Trip (see attached)

II. SALT

III. Inflation

- Fred Kahn Needs Help
- Structural Problems

IV. Budget

- Defense

V. Agenda Process

- Would be helpful to get the memo back
so we can move the process forward
- Gun Control (see attached)

VI. Intelligence

VII. Iran

VIII. Namibia

IX. Nicaragua

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per 5/31/04 NSC Ltr.
NLS-04-081
BY BAC NARA, DATE 6/6/06

SECRET

21-8

*Spent more of
your time,
weekly -
or more
frequent
policy updates*

*? Gail
Can we do much
in parallel*

Put into treatment

eg - Brazil

- PCC

- Japan

- etc ASEAN

INSERT FOR TALKER FOR VICE PRESIDENT'S LUNCHEON WITH PRESIDENT
MONDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1978

Middle East - Trip by Vice President

- During our lunch two weeks ago you asked if I thought it might make sense for me to go to the Middle East to help bring the treaty negotiations to a conclusion.
- I have wanted to wait until we have had the benefit of Sadat's latest thinking, presented by Khalil last Friday.
- I think we are now at a point where a visit by me to Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia might be helpful, with a scenario along the following lines. With the December 17 deadline for the treaty looming nearer you are now in position to send messages to Sadat and Begin offering your final recommendations on the treaty and side letters aimed at producing the compromises that will have to be agreed to if we are to have a treaty. Your message should stress that this marks the culmination of your efforts, that what you are recommending is equitable, does serve the interests of all the parties, particularly with regard to assurances to Egypt concerning Article VI and a satisfactory side letter on linkage. I recommend that your message advise Sadat and Begin that you wish me to come to Cairo and Jerusalem to amplify on the points you are making and to provide a final round of political level consultation which should then permit Sadat and Begin to inform you that they are prepared to accept - and are prepared to proceed with arrangements for your visit and the signing of the treaty.
- I think my going to the area as your representative is of particular importance in the case of Sadat - a message, a meeting with Herman Eilts, will not be enough given his current frame of mind. Further, he needs the chance to be seen consulting with his full partner, the US, and while, clearly, he would prefer the meeting to be with you, a visit by me as your representative would meet his requirement.

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per 5/31/06 NSC 14r.
NLJC-66-081
BY BAE NARA, DATE 6/4/06

- Further, it would help Sadat if I were personally to go to Saudi Arabia to urge that the Saudis remain sympathetic and supportive behind the scenes, that they not abandon Sadat even though they will not be able to support him publicly. The visit to Saudi Arabia would come at an important time, given the turbulence in Iran, and I think it would be helpful if I were to impress upon the Saudis that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty serves the broader US-Saudi interests of stability in the area.
- Additionally, if I were to make this "final step" visit, with your agreement I could have in my pocket more specific offers of assistance to Israel, for example, on the airfields, and to Egypt, offers which could be made at the right tactical moment in my talks.
- Finally, while I believe neither Sadat nor Begin sees the December 17 deadline as absolutely binding, I do believe that psychologically both leaders would like to meet that deadline following through on their Camp David commitment. If I go to the area while there is still time available to us before the 17th to impress upon each the merits of your position, this may provide the final nudge needed to button up the negotiations before the 17th. If we go beyond the 17th, we are dealing with a less certain openended situation.

Agenda



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

December 8, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD MOE

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR LUNCHEON WITH THE PRESIDENT -- MONDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1978

- I. Memphis
- II. Budget (talking points arriving separately)
- III. Middle East
- IV. PRC

USSR - SALT

Inflation Meeting

Doug Fraser

Clem Watts

Agenda

Kennedy

Re - coordination
- Putting other needs

DECLASSIFIED

per 5/31/06 NSC 14r.
NLJC - 06 - 087
BY BAE NARA, DATE 6/6/06

Phantom Cuts

Fix it up

Sen. S. S. S.

Real Set at
Canv.
- Lobbying & Reconciliation
Equity / Gov + Bulke
Anti Inflation
Yann Conclusions



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

The strength of the Democratic Party rests upon its commitment to social progress and the betterment of the quality of life. In the 1976 platform, the Democratic Party outlined a program for social progress, including expanded employment opportunities and improved education, health, housing, and other social programs. ~~The problems~~

The problems which confronted this nation in 1976 have not yet been solved -- but substantial progress has been made under a Democratic President and a Democratic Congress. But the Democratic Party cannot be satisfied until each of these problems is solved.

The Administration and the Congress will face clear economic constraints in developing the fiscal year 1980 budget. When decisions are being made by the Administration and the Congress on funding priorities, we believe it is essential that all areas, domestic as well as defense, be fully scrutinized and that a special effort be made to avoid unnecessary reductions in programs that aid the poor and disadvantaged and which aid our urban areas. If errors are to be made, they would be on the side of avoiding harm to those least able to protect themselves.

In developing its budgetary priorities and in pursuing its current economic and anti-inflation programs, the Administration should continue to make every effort to avoid a recession and a rising unemployment rate in 1980 and should make every effort to comply with the Humphrey-Hawkins full employment act.

Two years after adoption of the 1976 platform, the Democratic Party reaffirms the commitment to social progress and fulfillment of human needs so clearly stated in that platform. In honoring the 1976 platform, the Democratic Party resolves to support an adequate budget to meet human needs with priority on programs of particularly crucial importance to the needy.

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5/31/06 NSC Hr.
NLJC-06-081
BY RAL NARA, DATE 6/6/06

Program	BA	Outlays:	FY '80	FY '81	FY '82
<u>Housing</u>	\$7,900		-4		
Restore to 330,000 units					
<u>Employment</u>	\$1,800				
Restore CETA to DOL levels \$100 million increase for youth	\$ 500				
<u>Elementary and Secondary Education</u>	\$ 570				
Restore vocational education to '79 levels; 10% increase for bilingual and Indian education, level funding of Title I basic program, maintain Education of Handicapped at 12% of cost of instruction, maintain Follow-through increase Headstart, fund Basic Skills					
<u>Higher Education</u>	\$ 457				
Institutional aid (Fund career education at appropriated level, fund SEOGs and DSLs, restore TRIO , increase developing institution					

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6/6/06
BM

	BA	Outlays:	FY '80	FY '81	FY '82
<u>Older Americans</u>	\$180				
Increase under Americans Act					
<u>Urban Policy</u>	\$ 150		\$130		
Restore Mass Transit Operating Aid "no-cost" counter- cyclical aid triggered at 7% unemployment	\$ 0		\$ 0		
<u>Health</u>	\$ 611				
Restore CHAP, fund Teen Pregnancy, restore IHS, restore AHEC, restore grants to disadvantaged medical students, restore health prevention and education, restore mental health, prevention increase, increase IMOS					
<u>Social Services</u>	\$ 306				
Restore ACTION, cut Food Stamp error penalty to 1/4 cost of errors	_____				
Total (minus housing)	\$4,574				
probable outlays:	\$2.5 - \$3 billion				

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 per 5/31/06 NSC 14.
 NLJ 5/1/06 - 68)
 RME 4/6/06

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON


~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

Memo No. 1155-78

December 11, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Luncheon with President,
Monday, December 11, 1978

NATO Ministerial -- Defense Budget

- Harold Brown, in his report to the President, says that last week's NATO Defense Planning Committee meeting was the most successful he has attended.
- NATO Defense Ministers reaffirmed the 3% goal for annual increase in defense spending and agreed on certain measures for follow-through on the Long Term Defense Program.
- Eleven nations signed a memorandum of understanding on a \$1.8 billion AWACS program.

Brown Meeting with Stennis

- Secretary Brown also advises the President that Senator Stennis would be supportive of the Defense supplemental budget request.
- Stennis would not commit himself to a position on SALT but said that JCS views will weigh heavily.
- Stennis will support a non-nuclear carrier, size unspecified.

Middle East

- Secretary Vance has reported to the President that he and Sadat have come close to reaching agreement on the major outstanding issues.

SECRET

REVIEW ON DECEMBER 11, 1998
CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES

DECLASSIFIED
5/31/06 N&C 1th
NLSJC-66-08
9/6/06
NARA, D.C.

- Vance believes that Sadat will accept the treaty text as it is, with interpretative notes on Articles IV and VI.
- Sadat said he wants to wind up the treaty before December 17, but that the US should be prepared to wait another month if Israel is not prepared to go along now.

Senator Byrd's Overseas Mission

- Senator Byrd returns this afternoon from a very productive mission to the Middle East.
- The most recent reporting cable on his mission -- a meeting with Syria's Foreign Minister Khaddam -- is at Tab A.
- It is my understanding that at this point no meeting has been scheduled between the President and Byrd. (Madeline Albright advises that she is working to set up a meeting for Zbig and Byrd for tomorrow.)
- You may wish to suggest that the President see Byrd sometime this week.

cc: Dick Moe

2

~~SECRET~~

TO DIRECTOR
 DTG 1250Z
 DE AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 27354Z
 O 241220Z DEC 78
 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACI IMMEDIATE 2001

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 2430
 AMEMBASSY ANKARA NIACI IMMEDIATE 2001
 AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2400
 AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1772
 AMEMBASSY JIBRA 2501
 AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1270
 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3504
 USMISSION USIN NEW YORK 1153

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 27354

EXDIS
 TO 12365: XDS-L 12-8-88 (SEELEY, TALCOTT W.) OR-M
 TAGS: OREG, REPR, SY, US
 SUBJECT: SENATOR BYRD'S MEETING WITH EMMIN KHADDAM
 (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: IN THE COURSE OF HIS TWO-
 HOUR MEETING WITH SENATOR BYRD DECEMBER 4, EMMIN
 KHADDAM REITERATED SYRIA'S POLICY IN TERMS FAMILIAR
 TO DEPARTMENT. KHADDAM CRITICIZED CAMP DAVID ACCORDS
 (CDA) ON FIVE COUNTS: (1) THE CHARACTER OF PEACE MUST
 BE COMPREHENSIVE AND CAMP DAVID DID NOT DEAL WITH PEACE
 IN THIS COMPREHENSIVE MANNER; (2) THE CDA CAME OUTSIDE
 THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN-SECDSONER GENEVA CONFERENCE
 WHICH WAS CALLED FOR IN RESOLUTION 338; (3) THE EGYPTIAN
 PRESIDENT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO SPEAK FOR THE ARABS;
 (4) THE CDA GAVE LAND TO THE ISRAELIS AND LIQUIDATED
 THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE, I.E., SELF-ADMINISTRATION IS
 SUBJECT TO ISRAELI CONTROL; AND (5) BY GOING OUTSIDE THE
 UN FRAMEWORK THE CDA ELIMINATES THE RECOGNIZED INTER-
 NATIONAL BASIS FOR ARBITRATION. WHILE KHADDAM CRITICIZED
 US AID FOR ISRAEL, HE PRAISED PRESIDENT CARTER AND SECRE-
 TARY CANE, TO WHOM HE SENT HIS AND PRESIDENT ARAK'S
 HARMONIOUS REGARDS. HE BLAMED PRESIDENT SADA FOR BEING
 RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT HAS HAPPENED. HE HAD NOTED BEFORE

(2) BATH GATES (VP)
 EMMIN KHADDAM

RECALLED
 (2) BATH GATES (VP)
 EMMIN KHADDAM

THIS TENDENCY OF PRESIDENT ASSAD AND NOW HONORABLE KHADDAM TO EXEMPT THE HIS ADMINISTRATION PERSONALLY FROM RESPONSIBILITY FOR A COURSE OF EVENTS WHICH THE SYRIANS HONESTLY BELIEVE IS DISASTROUS FOR THEM. SENATOR BYRD ARGUED FORCEFULLY THAT THE COA ARE NOT ONE STEP IN A PROCESS WHICH PRESIDENT CARTER IS PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO SEE THROUGH TO A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. HE WARNED THAT TIME IS NOT WORKING WITH US AND THAT THE ALTERNATIVE TO SEIZING THE OPPORTUNITY THAT IS OPEN TO US NOW IS FURTHER CONSOLIDATION OF ISRAEL'S HOLD ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE SENATOR POINTED OUT THAT THOSE WHO PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS ARE THE ONES WHO WILL DETERMINE THEIR OUTCOME. HE SAID THAT IF PRESIDENT ASSAD DOES NOT FEEL HE CAN ENTER NEGOTIATIONS NOW, AT LEAST WE HOPE HE WILL CONTINUE TO EVALUATE THE ONGOING PROCESS AND DEVELOPMENTS AND WILL IN TIME COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT IS IN SYRIA'S INTEREST TO ENTER THE PEACE PROCESS. KHADDAM WAS VISIBLY IMPRESSED WITH THE WAY THE SENATOR MADE HIS PRESENTATION, WARMING TO HIM AS THE MEETING PROGRESSED, BUT THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE MEETING WAS LARGELY SPOILED IN THE BEGINNING BY THE HONORABLE'S OFF-HAND AND IMPOLITE WAY OF INFORMING THE SENATOR THAT PRESIDENT ASSAD COULD NOT SEE HIM (SUBSEQUENTLY REVERSED) AND BY THE HONORABLE'S TENDENCY TO INTERRUPT THE SENATOR'S PRESENTATION. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM WELCOMED SENATOR BYRD AND HIS COLLEAGUES TO SYRIA AND ASKED ABOUT THE HEALTH OF PRESIDENT CARTER AND SECRETARY VANCE. KHADDAM SAID, UNFORTUNATELY, PRESIDENT ASSAD WAS IN LATTAKIA FOR FAMILY REASONS AND WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO MEET WITH THE SENATOR. (THERE HAD BEEN NO PRIOR INDICATION THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD NOT SEE THE SENATOR. SUBSEQUENTLY, AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE PRESIDENT WAS ARRANGED FOR LATTER IN THE WEEK, FOLLOWING SENATOR BYRD'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA.) SENATOR BYRD REPLIED THAT PRESIDENT CARTER AND SECRETARY VANCE WERE IN EXCELLENT HEALTH AND WOULD BE PLEASED TO HEAR THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER ASKED ABOUT ABOUT THEM.

3. THE SENATOR THANKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER FOR HIS SPACIOUS WELCOME, AND SAID HE WAS PLEASED TO VISIT SYRIA ALTHOUGH HE HAD VISITED 23 YEARS AGO AS A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. THE SENATOR SAID THAT HIS VISIT WAS MOTIVATED BY GOODWILL AND THE DESIRE FOR FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AS WELL AS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. KHADDAM SAID SYRIA CERTAINLY WANTS THE FRIENDSHIP TO CONTINUE

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TO EXIST BETWEEN THE SYRIAN AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS
AND EXPRESSED HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT CONTINUED CONTACTS
ARE USEFUL AND HIS DESIRE FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT IN
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

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doi:10.1017/S0022292412001917 Printed in the United Kingdom

MAIN ELEMENTS WHICH WERE THE CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT. FIRST, A JUST SOLUTION FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND, SECOND, ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE PEACE PROCESS MUST MOVE IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN RESOLUTIONS AND THE UN CHARTER.

6. KHADDAM ADDED THAT SYRIA DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ANYONE COULD IGNORE ISRAEL'S ATTITUDE AND ISRAEL'S REFUSAL TO MOVE THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS PEACE. ISRAEL REFUSES TO ABIDE BY THE UN RESOLUTIONS WHICH WERE IN PART RESPONSIBLE FOR CREATING THE STATE OF ISRAEL. ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE CONSTITUTES THE MAIN OBSTACLE. BUT, IN THE SYRIAN VIEW, THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE HAS HELPED ISRAEL IN ITS INTRANSIGENCE THROUGH ITS MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC AID, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN CONDITIONED ON ISRAEL'S CARRYING OUT THE UN RESOLUTIONS. THE US AID HAS PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE AND HAS LED TO RECENT EVENTS INVOLVING THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO JERUSALEM AND HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS.

7. KHADDAM SAID SYRIA QUESTIONED WHETHER WHAT TOOK PLACE IN CAMP DAVID CONSTITUTES A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE. SYRIA SAYS NO FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: FIRST, BECAUSE THE CHARACTER OF PEACE MUST BE COMPREHENSIVE; EGYPT AND ISRAEL ARE ONLY TWO ELEMENTS AMONG THE ELEMENTS OF THE CONFLICT. CAMP DAVID DID NOT INCLUDE ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS, AMONG WHICH ARE SYRIA, THE PLO, JORDAN, AND THE OTHER ARAB STATES.

8. SECOND, THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS CAME OUTSIDE OF THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UN RESOLUTIONS. PARAGRAPH THREE OF RESOLUTION 338 STIPULATES THAT A PEACE CONFERENCE SHOULD BE CONVENED UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF THE UNITED NATIONS, CO-CHAIRED BY THE TWO SUPERPOWERS, AND INCLUDING THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL PARTIES CONCERNED. FROM THIS, SYRIA DOES NOT HAVE MUCH TROUBLE CONCLUDING THAT THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS ARE CONTRARY TO RESOLUTION 338.

9. THIRD, NO ONE AUTHORIZED THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT TO TALK AND NEGOTIATE ON BEHALF OF THE ARAB PEOPLE AND IN THEIR NAME. AT THE END OF WORLD WAR II, A PEACE TREATY WAS SIGNED AT POISDAM. IT WAS NOT JUST THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR AND THE NAZIS WHO SIGNED, BUT ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED WERE SIGNATORIES AND ALL THE PARTIES TOOK PART IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. EVEN FRANCE, WHICH HAD BEEN CONSIDERED DEFEATED, HAD A ROLE SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE AMERICAN ROLE AND FRANCE WAS GIVEN A SECTOR OF WEST GERMANY TO CONTROL. SYRIA WAS

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THEN A SMALL STATE, NEWLY INDEPENDENT, AND TOWARDS THE
END OF THE WAR IT HAD DECLARED WAR ON GERMANY. AS SUCH,
SYRIA WAS GIVEN 15 MILITARY PLANES. IF WE GO BACK
TO WORLD WAR I AND ALL THE WARS OF HISTORY, WE WILL NOT
FIND AT ANY POINT THAT UNILATERAL ACTION FOR PEACE WAS
TAKEN APART FROM THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE WAR. PEACE,
THE UNILATERAL ACTION OF THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT IS
STUPID. HE DOES NOT REPRESENT THE ARABS AND HE DOES
NOT REPRESENT THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN THE ARAB WORLD.
THE BAGHDAD CONFERENCE REVEALED THE ARAB ATTITUDE
BY

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