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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIAT IMMEDIATE WORK

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1832

AMEMBASSY ANKARA NIAT IMMEDIATE 1832

AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1831

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1750

AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2803

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1872

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3586

USMISSION HONOLULU HONOLULU 1155

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 83 OF 89 DAMASCUS 17354

EXDIN

TOWARDS THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT.

10. FOURTH, THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS GAVE LAND TO THE ISRAELIS AND LITIGATED THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE. IS THE SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE SELF-RULE OR SELF-ADMINISTRATION? WHAT DOES THIS MEAN? SELF-ADMINISTRATION WOULD ACTUALLY MEAN MORE LAND FOR THE ISRAELIS, SINCE THE ISRAELIS WOULD BE INVOLVED IN AN INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION. WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES LIVING IN CAMPS? IS THIS THE JUST SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM THAT SOME PEOPLE ARE TALKING ABOUT?

11. FIFTH, WHENEVER THERE IS A DISPUTE, THE UN RESOLUTIONS AND ITS CHARTER ARE THE BASIS FOR ARBITRATION. IS WHAT HAS TAKEN PLACE ACCORDING TO THE UN RESOLUTIONS? SINCE 1948, THE UNITED STATES HAS VOTED FOR GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS GIVING THE RIGHT TO THE PALESTINIANS TO RETURN. WHERE IS THIS RIGHT OF RETURN BASED ON UN RESOLUTIONS IN THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS?

12. KHASSAN SAID THAT SYRIA CONSIDERED WHAT HAS TAKEN PLACE AS CREATING A NEW METHOD OF TENSION IN THE REGION AND AS IMPERILING ON THE ARAB RIGHTS AS ESTABLISHED

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BY UN RESOLUTIONS, THE CAMP DAVID ACCORD HAVE BLOCKED THE COURSE AND DO NOT LEAD TO A JUST PEACE FOR THOSE WHO BELIEVE THEY WANT A JUST PEACE. KHADHAM CONCLUDED BY ADDING THAT HE HAD NOT SPOKE OF SYRIAN HISTORY, SINCE THE SENATOR HAD VISITED SYRIA 23 YEARS AGO AND HAD A CLEAR PICTURE OF WHAT IS GOING ON.

13. AT THIS POINT, THE SENATOR SOUGHT TO CLARIFY THE SITUATION REGARDING HIS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD. KHADHAM SAID HE RECEIVED THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE UNABLE TO SEE THE SENATOR DURING HIS STAY IN DAMASCUS. HE HOPED THERE COULD BE ANOTHER VISIT IN THE FUTURE. KHADHAM SAID THAT THE SENATOR WOULD ONLY BE HERE FOR 24 HOURS AND, ACCORDING TO THE ARAB TRADITION, A VISIT SHOULD LAST THREE DAYS. SENATOR BYRD SAID THAT HE VERY MUCH WANTED TO SEE PRESIDENT ASSAD AND WAS TOLD THAT HE WOULD SEE HIM. UNFORTUNATELY, THE SENATOR SAID, HE COULD NOT STAY THREE DAYS, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD HAVE BEEN HONORED AND PRIVILEGED TO HAVE SPOKE TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ONLY THREE-QUARTERS OF AN HOUR. THE UNITED STATES HOLDS THE SYRIAN PRESIDENT IN HIGH ESTEEM AND VALUES ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH SYRIA WHICH NO GOVT WILL CONTINUE TO BE FRIENDLY.

14. SENATOR BYRD SAID THAT HE HAD COME AS PRESIDENT CARTER'S ENVIASSARY AND HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY ASKED BY PRESIDENT CARTER TO COME TO SYRIA. HE SAID HE HOPED THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD CONVEY TO PRESIDENT ASSAD THIS FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED HIM TO SEE PRESIDENT ASSAD. HE ADDED THAT HE WAS NOT ONLY COMING AS AN ENVIASSARY OF THE PRESIDENT BUT ALSO AS A SENATOR AND AS THE MAJORITY LEADER OF THE SENATE. HE POINTED OUT THAT HE CAME TO SYRIA IN THESE TWO IMPORTANT ROLES IN HOPES OF MAKING A CONTRIBUTION ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT CARTER AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE BY CARRYING BACK TO PRESIDENT CARTER WHAT PRESIDENT ASSAD HAD TO SAY. HE NOTED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT, BUT SAID HE WOULD RELAY WHAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED TO STATE IN THE MORN THAT BY

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INFO EMBASSY AMMAN 1403

AMEMBASSY ANKARA NIACI IMMEDIATE 0400

AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1400

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1401

AMEMBASSY JORDA 0904

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1023

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0907

COMMISSION USHQ NEW YORK 1154

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PRESIDENT ASSAD AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER SHOULD ACCEPT
IT IN THE SPIRIT IN WHICH IT WAS TENDERED.

15. SENATOR BYRD SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD FOR A LONG TIME BEEN CONFLICT IN THIS REGION. THERE HAVE BEEN MANY INITIATIVES WHICH HAVE SOUGHT TO MOVE FORWARD TOWARDS PEACE. HE NOTED THAT DESPITE THE STRONG TIES BETWEEN THE US AND ISRAEL, WHICH SYRIA AND OTHERS MAY HAVE UNDERSTANDABLY PERCEIVED AS A PRO-ISRAEL BIAS, THERE HAS BEEN AN EVOLUTION IN THE THINKING OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. THIS EVOLUTION IS CERTAINLY REPRESENTED BY PRESIDENT CARTER. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT THERE IS AN EROSION OF US SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, BUT THERE IS A GROWING PERCEPTION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF STRONG TIES WITH ARAB COUNTRIES. IT IS A PERCEPTION OF THE NEED FOR BALANCING OUR INTERESTS BETWEEN THE TWO -- ISRAEL AND THE SURROUNDING COUNTRIES. IF THERE IS GOING TO BE A JUST AND LASTING PEACE, IT MUST COME BY A PEACE WHICH TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE PALESTINIANS' LEGITIMATE NEEDS AND THE CONCERNS OF ALL ARAB COUNTRIES. THIS REPRESENTS A BALANCED VIEWPOINT WHICH THE UNITED STATES SEES IN ITS ECONOMIC AND SECURITY INTERESTS AND THE INTEREST OF PEACE IN THE REGION AND MOST IMPORTANT IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE IN THE WORLD.

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16. THE SENATOR ADDED THAT HIS POLICY WAS BASED ON A CLEARER REALIZATION AND PERCEPTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS REPRESENT A FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SOLUTION CAN BE ACHIEVED. PRESIDENT CARTER IS FULLY COMMITTED TO PURSUE THE COURSE OUTLINED IN THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. THESE ACCORDS ARE NOT MEANT TO DEAL WITH ALL THE DETAILS BUT TO GIVE A BROAD FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH ALL PARTIES HOPEFULLY CAN AND WILL PARTICIPATE. IT IS THE EARNEST DESIRE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE CONGRESS, AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT ALL THE CONCERNED PARTIES WILL PARTICIPATE AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY WHICH MAY NOT COME AGAIN SOON, IF IT EVER COMES AGAIN. THOSE WHO PARTICIPATE CAN INFLUENCE THE RESULT AND BRING ABOUT THE OBJECTIVES WE ALL WANT TO SEE, THAT IS, A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE SETTLEMENT AND RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. WE STRIVE FOR A SOLUTION THAT IS A JUST ONE AND MOVES AWAY FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION. THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS RECOGNIZE THAT THERE CANNOT BE A JUST AND LASTING PEACE UNTIL THERE IS A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

17. SENATOR BYRD AFFIRMED THAT THERE WAS NO DOUBT THERE WOULD BE A TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT. THIS IS NOT TO SAY IT WILL BE ARRIVED AT EASILY. IT WILL NOT COME IN TWO DAYS OR TWO WEEKS, BUT WE BELIEVE EARNESTLY THAT THERE WILL BE A TREATY. PRESIDENT CARTER WILL NOT BE SATISFIED WITH THE COMPLETION OF THAT STEP BUT RECOGNIZES IT AS A STEP WHICH WILL LEAD TO OTHER STEPS. IT WILL SET THE PRECEDENCE FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WHICH IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS CAN LEAD TO FURTHER SOLUTIONS. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE'S HOPES AND EXPECTATIONS HAVE BEEN KEENLY AROUSED BY THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FULLY SUPPORT PRESIDENT CARTER IN HIS COMMITMENT TO GO FORWARD WITH THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK, AND CONGRESS WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORTS PRESIDENT CARTER IN THIS COMMITMENT. THE SENATOR SAID THAT HE, AS MAJORITY LEADER, SUPPORTED THIS COMMITMENT WITHOUT ANY EQUIVOCATION AT ALL, AND WOULD RENDER WHATEVER ASSISTANCE HE COULD TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND LASTING PEACE BASED ON A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

18. THE SENATOR ADMITTED THAT IT WAS TRUE THAT NOT ALL THE AGGRIEVED PARTIES PARTICIPATED AT CAMP DAVID, BUT THE FRAMEWORK CREATED THERE LEFT THE INVITATION OPEN FOR THEIR PARTICIPATION. AS HE MOVE FORWARD UNDER THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK, WE EARNESTLY HOPE THAT THERE WILL BE PARTICIPATION BY JORDAN, SYRIA, THE PALESTINIANS, AND

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OTHER AFFECTED PARTIES. ONLY THROUGH PARTICIPATION
CAN ONE HOPE THAT THE COURSE OF HISTORY WILL BE
INFLUENCED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BRING THE COMPREHENSIVE
SETTLEMENT OF ALL DESIRE. CAMP DAVID WAS THE BEGINNING
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INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 4434
AMEMBASSY ANKARA NIAT IMMEDIATE 0400
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 4213
AMEMBASSY JERUSALEM 1782
AMEMBASSY JIQA 2505
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1274
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3528
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 65 OF 80 DAMASCUS 07354

EXDTS
OF A PROCESS, NOT THE END. THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS DO NOT CONDONE CONTINUED MILITARY OCCUPATION. PRESIDENT CARTER HAS RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR A HOME LAND FOR THE PALESTINIANS, AND HE STATED PUBLICLY THAT A SOLUTION TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM MUST BE BASED ON THE RELEVANT UN RESOLUTIONS. PRESIDENT CARTER WILL NOT ACCEPT NOR WILL THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OR THEIR CONGRESS ACCEPT CAMP DAVID AS A FINAL STEP OR A TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL AS A FINAL STEP.

19. SENATOR BYRD SAID THAT THERE WERE THOSE WHO BELIEVED THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT MAKE FURTHER CONCESSIONS AFTER SUCH A TREATY IS SIGNED. THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS DO NOT SUPPORT THIS VIEWPOINT. ISRAEL IS A SIGNATORY TO THESE ACCORDS WHICH ENVISION FURTHER REALISTIC CONCESSIONS ON THE PART OF THE ISRAELIS. IT IS TRUE AND IMPORTANT THAT THE ARAB COUNTRIES MUST BE UNITED AND STRONG, BUT A POLICY BASED ON STRENGTH ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH. THE TIME HAS COME TO WORK IN THAT FRAMEWORK OF THE ACCORDS UNDER WHICH WE MAY USE THE STRENGTH OF OUR CONVICTIONS AND IDEAS TO BRING ABOUT THE COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION AND MAKE POSSIBLE MOVEMENT FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION AND MOVEMENT FROM VAST EXPENDITURES ON WAR TO INVESTMENT IN PEACE FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL COUNTRIES

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21. STRAIGH HYND RECALLED THAT TWENTY-THREE YEARS AGO HE HAD VISITED REFUGEE CAMPS IN JORDAN. THEY WERE NOT IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY AT THAT TIME. TODAY, THEY SIT ON OCCUPIED TERRITORY. THE SITUATION HAS REVERSESSSED. TIME IS NOT ON OUR SIDE. IF WE DO NOT SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY AVAILABLE, THERE MAY BE FURTHER CONSOLIDATION OF THE SETTLEMENTS ON THE WEST BANK WHICH WILL RESULT IN MORE DIFFICULTIES. THE UNITED STATES PRESIDENT HAS VOICED HIS CONCERN ABOUT THESE SETTLEMENTS. THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT APPROVE OF SETTLEMENTS UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES THAT EXIST AND DOES NOT APPROVE OF

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EXCERPT
STATEMENTS REGARDING THE SETTLEMENTS. THE JOLISS
IN ALL CASES HE HAS THE OPPORTUNITY, HE CAN EXPECT
MORE OF THE SAME, AND IT WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO
REACH ANOTHER WITHDRAWAL AND AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION FOR
THESE FUTURE.

22. SENATOR BYRD SAID THERE WAS A GROWING RECOGNITION
OF THE NEED TO WORK FOR PEACE ON THE BASIS OF
RESOLUTION 242. THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS RECOGNIZE THIS.
FOR EXAMPLE, MANY ARAB COUNTRIES ARE NOW READY TO
RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL, AND ISRAEL IS
READY TO WITHDRAW FROM THE SINAI. IN THE CASE OF THE
TREATY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT, EGYPT HAS INDICATED
ITS WILLINGNESS TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL AS A STATE WHILE
ISRAEL HAS AGREED TO FULL WITHDRAWAL. THIS IS A GREAT
PRECEDENT WHICH PERMEATES THE ENTIRE BODY OF THESE
ACCORDS.

23. SENATOR BYRD APOLOGIZED FOR THE LENGTH OF HIS
STATEMENT, BUT SAID HE FELT IT WAS ONLY TO STATE
WHAT PRESIDENT CARTER ASKED HIM TO STATE AND WHAT HE
HOPE TO SAY TO PRESIDENT AGAD. THE UNITED STATES
TREASURES ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH SYRIA AND THE FRIEND-
SHIP BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. THERE IS A GREAT ADMIRATION

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FOR PRESIDENT ASSAD. PRESIDENT CARTER, SECRETARY VANCE, DR. BRZEZINSKI, AND OUR AMBASSADOR HERE IN SYRIA HAVE VOICED THAT ADMIRATION, AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FORMER THE SOUND JUDGMENT, THE GOODWILL AND THE DESIRE FOR PEACE MANIFESTED BY PRESIDENT ASSAD IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH OUR GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIALS. WE MAY DISAGREE ABOUT THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS, BUT WE HOPE SYRIA WILL CONTINUE TO EVALUATE THEM AND CONTINUE TO EVALUATE DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY OCCUR AND, INDEED, AS TIME GOES ON, WILL COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT SYRIA'S PARTICIPATION IS NOT ONLY DESIRED BUT IS NECESSARY BECAUSE IT WILL BE MOST HELPFUL IN BRINGING ABOUT THE CONCLUSION THAT SYRIA DESIRES. IF YOU DO NOT PARTICIPATE, YOU CAN NOT INFLUENCE THE CONCLUSION, AT LEAST NOT AS GREATLY AS IF YOU PARTICIPATED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THUS, WE HOPE THAT IN YOUR CONTINUING EVALUATION, IF PRESIDENT ASSAD FEELS HE CANNOT PARTICIPATE NOW, THEN AT LEAST HE WILL GIVE ENCOURAGEMENT TO THOSE WHO ARE TRYING TO WORK FOR PEACE. IN ANY EVENT, ALL MEN RECOGNIZE THAT IF PEACE IS TO COME IT MUST COME THROUGH OUR PRAYERS AND THROUGH WORKING TOGETHER AND THROUGH OUR FAITH IN THE PROCESS OF SITTING DOWN TO LISTEN AND TALK AND BY CONSIDERING OUR IDEAS AND VIEWPOINTS. THE IMPORTANT THING IS THE PEACE WE BOTH WANT. WE AGREE ON THE OBJECTIVES, BUT WE HOPE THAT BY TRYING A NEW INITIATIVE WE CAN ACHIEVE WHAT WE FAILED TO ACHIEVE BEFORE. THE SENATOR CONCLUDED THAT HE HAD SAID WHAT PRESIDENT CARTER ASKED HIM TO SAY, AND HE FIRMLY BELIEVED IT IN HIS HEART JUST AS THE AMERICAN PEOPLE BELIEVE IT. WE WILL BE MOST DISAPPOINTED IF THE PEACE WE SEEK IS NOT BROUGHT TO REALITY.

94. AMADAM THANKED SENATOR BYRD FOR HIS CLARIFICATION AND PROMISED TO RELAY IT ACCURATELY TO PRESIDENT ASSAD. THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT PROCEEDS ON THE BASIS OF A KEEN DESIRE THAT ITS POLICY EXPRESS THE WILL AND THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE SYRIAN PEOPLE. IF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT DID NOT DO THIS, ITS WORK WOULD BE OF NO VALUE. REGARDING THE POLICY OF CAMP DAVID AND THE CONSEQUENCES THEREOF, SYRIA IS AGAINST THE PROCESS AND AGAINST THE ACCORDS BECAUSE NEITHER SADAT NOR ANY OTHER INDIVIDUAL IS ENTITLED TO DECIDE ON MATTERS WHICH ARE PERTINENT TO THE ARABS AS A WHOLE. WHEN MARSHAL BETAIN SIGNED THE TREATY OF WORLD WAR II WITH HITLER, THE ALLIES CONSIDERED HIM AS A TRAITOR. THE ARABS CONSIDER SADAT IN THE SAME WAY, AS A TRAITOR, BECAUSE HE ABANDONED THE ARABS AND TOOK UNILATERAL ACTION IN MATTERS IN WHICH HE HAD NO RIGHT TO TAKE

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SUCH ACTION. WE ARE CERTAIN THAT THE PEOPLE OF EGYPT WILL HANDLE THIS MATTER AND WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH THEIR NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS.

25. KHADIM SAID LIBYA OPPOSED THE ACCORDS BECAUSE THEY CONTRADICT THE UN RESOLUTIONS AND CONSTITUTE VIOLATION OF LIBYA'S SOVEREIGNTY. WE CANNOT TAKE OUR

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27. KHADDOO AGREED THAT THE ONE WHO HAD NEGOTIATED ON BEHALF OF THE ARABS HAD NO RIGHT TO DO SO. THIS REPRESENTS NO EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARABS. IT IS OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND CONSEQUENTLY IT IS ILLEGAL AND THE WHOLE PROCESS IS ILLEGAL. HE BELIEVE IS PLACE BUT NOT ACCORDING TO THE CAMP DAVID AGREES. WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PALESTINIANS AND WHO WILL SPEAK FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE? SAQAT IS NOT CAPABLE OF DOING SO. NO ARAB GOVERNMENT CAN SUPPORT SAQAT BECAUSE OF THE REACTION IT WOULD MEET FROM ITS OWN PEOPLE. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ALL THE ARABS WHO MET AT BACHDAD TO BE WRONG, AND IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR SAQAT, WHO AGED ON HIS OWN, TO BE

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1025 1026 1027 1028 1029 1030 1031 1032 1033 1034 1035 1036 1037 1038 1039 1040 1041

OF PRESIDENT CARTER AND HAD OTHER COUNTRIES YET TO VISIT. - THE SENATOR SAID THAT FOREIGN MINISTER KHADRAH WAS AN Eloquent SPEAKER. HE SAID HE RESPECTED THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S VIEWPOINT AND HOPED THAT THE SENATOR HAD EXPRESSED. AS FOR THE EMBASSY STAFF, THE SENATOR SAID THAT EVEN THOUGH THE STAFF HAD ALLOWED ITSELF TO BE SUBJECTS OF THE CRITICISMS IN AFRICA, THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT HE DOES NOT ADMIRE THE EMBASSY STAFF. THE FACT IS, THE SENATOR SAID, HE DOES NOT LIVE IN AFRICA AND IT HAS NO BEARING ON THE PEOPLE. HE ADDED THAT HE DOES NOT LIVE IN TURKISH COUNTRY BUT HE LIVES THE TURKISH PEOPLE AND NOTED THAT HE HAD MET THE MIGHTY IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE FOR LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST TURKEY BECAUSE HE BELIEVED IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF US SECURITY AND THE SECURITY OF THE REGION. THE SENATOR THANKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER FOR HIS TIME AND SAID HE WOULD REPORT TO PRESIDENT CARTER, SECRETARY VANCE AND HIS SENATE COLLEAGUES ON THE POINTS THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD RAISED.

32. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED AND RESPECTED THE SENATOR'S VIEWPOINT AND CERTAINLY EXPECTED TO CONTINUE THE TALKS AND CONTACTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WHICH ARE USEFUL. SUCH TALKS HELP IN FURTHERING THE PEACE EFFORTS. BOTH DELEGATIONS WERE AT

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TO DIRECTOR WASH DC (AMEMBASSY BAHAMAS)

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1. I HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT THE NEWSPAPERS
AND OTHER REPORTS, WHO KNOW THE UNITED STATES
IS THE... THE FORMER MINISTER AND BOTH HE AND PRESIDENT
CARTER WERE... THE PRESIDENT... THE PRESIDENT... THE PRESIDENT...
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2. SENATOR BYRD... SAYING THAT PRESIDENT CARTER
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3. LEVY... THE PRESIDENT... THE PRESIDENT... THE PRESIDENT...
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MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

36

INFORMATION

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Memo No. 1168-78

December 15, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK MOE

FROM: Denis Clift 
SUBJECT: Talking Points for Vice President's
Lunch with President, Monday, December 18,
1978

I am forwarding at Tab I recommended talking points for inclusion in the paper being prepared for the Vice President's lunch with the President.

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THIS MEMORANDUM IS UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN ATTACHMENT IS WITHDRAWN

DECLASSIFIED
per 5/31/06 NSC Ltr.
NCS-06-081
BY BAE NARA, DATE 6/6/06



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to Dick

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

December 11, 1978

Franki Talk w/
Bob Byrd

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD MOE *RM*

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR LUNCHEON WITH THE
PRESIDENT -- MONDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1978

- I. Budget (see attached)
- II. Meeting with Governors and Mayors - Good
- III. Inflation
 - Oil Pricing
- IV. Middle East - Cool it. (N.Y.T.: Post) White Paper?
- V. PRC - Your Presentation
- VI. Iran
- VII. South American Trip (see attached)
- VIII. US-USSR Summit (see attached)
- ✓ IX. Don Fraser - ? - Beiter

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✓ - Agenda -
Jan 8th
Foreign Policy Junkies

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BRIEFING MEMORANDUM ON BUDGET ISSUES

I. BACKGROUND (See Attachment #1)

- o Since the Administration took office (FY 1976) budget outlays overall have grown by 10.3% in real terms, with defense rising 5.5% and domestic expenditures (excluding interest) rising 10.5%.
- o Under the current overall OMB mark, assuming a \$30 billion deficit and a 3% real increase in defense, domestic expenditures (excluding interest) would decrease 1.7% in real terms in FY 1980.
- o Grants-in-aid to State and local government (essentially the domestic budget excluding Social Security, SSI and Medicare) would decline under the OMB passback to the agencies by the neighborhood of \$3.5 billion and 4.5% in actual terms and by 10% in constant dollars. This would be the first actual decline in grants-in-aid since 1946. (Note that State and local governments will pay an additional \$1.5 billion in Social Security taxes in FY 1980 under the Social Security legislation enacted last year.)

II. IMPACT ON PROGRAMS

The impact on domestic programs is necessarily severe. For example, based on the OMB Passback (subject to change in the process of appeals):

- o A reduction below FY 1979 of \$2.1 billion (30%) and 223,000 jobs in adult employment programs.
- o A reduction of \$400 million (18%) in youth employment programs, resulting in loss of 100,000 full-year slots and 475,000 summer youth jobs.
- o A reduction of \$7.9 billion and 100,000 units of subsidized housing (FY 1980 outlays not substantially affected).
- o A reduction of \$1.7 billion in education.
- o A reduction of \$1 - \$1.5 billion in Social Security resulting in reductions of \$9 billion by 1984.

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- o Cancellation of over \$2 billion in commitments announced in the Urban Policy and reduction of \$150 million for mass transit operating subsidies.

Outside of the area of economic development, most areas of the domestic budget fall below FY 1979 levels. To bring domestic spending (grants-in-aid) to the FY 1979 level would require roughly \$3.5 billion in outlays above the OMB passback. To hold these programs in the aggregate harmless against inflation would require \$8 - \$9 billion. (This situation may have been somewhat improved during the process of agency appeals.)

III. ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS (See Attachment #2)

- o Revisions of the economic assumptions since announcement of the anti-inflation program in October (growth down, inflation and unemployment up) will make achievement of the budget goals more difficult. (CBO's reestimates of growth, employment and inflation have led to a private reestimate of the FY 1979 deficit at \$46 - \$50 billion, up from roughly \$38 billion).

- o Since our economic estimates, even as revised, are considerably more optimistic than those of CBO and private forecasters, we can expect our deficit to be immediately (and publicly) reestimated upward on the Hill based on economic estimates alone. Under CBO's tentative economic forecast our \$30 billion deficit would be increased by around \$7 billion, and by as much as \$9 billion when Wage Insurance payments are tailored in.

- o Moreover, CBO's current economic estimates are based on a \$50 billion budget deficit for FY 1980. The lower growth resulting from a lower deficit will somewhat worsen the picture.

IV. SOURCES OF ADDITIONAL FUNDS (See Attachment #3)

Most, if not all, of the potential offsets outlined below are being examined by OMB. While they provide opportunities to limit the program reductions required to meet the \$30 billion deficit, many present difficult questions. In addition, some may give rise to charges of budget "gimmickry".

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SUMMARY TABLE --ACHIEVABLE SAVINGS

<u>Policy Changes</u>	<u>Savings (outlays or revenues in millions)</u>
Tin Sales	\$200
Defer reductions in airline ticket taxes	\$360
Hold Federal pay raise to 5.5%	\$565
Put repayment of EDA loans "on budget" by eliminating revolving fund	\$200
Do not extend LEAA block grant	\$ 65
Withhold taxes on interest and dividends	\$1,500
Subtotal	\$2,890
<u>Accounting Changes</u>	
Reestimate interest*	\$1,500
Gold Sales	\$2,000
Budget Scrub	\$1,000
Federal Reserve Surplus Account	\$ 750
Sale of FMHA paper to Federal Financing Bank	\$ 750
Cash Management*	\$4,000
Subtotal	\$10,000
TOTAL	\$12,890
Less Accounts contained in OMB base	\$ 4,500
Net Savings	\$ 8,390

*In current OMB base at \$2.5 billion, only \$2.0 billion in cash management presently included.

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ATTACHMENT 1

BUDGET IN CURRENT DOLLARS (BILLIONS)

FY	Defense	(% Increase)	Inter'l Affairs	(% Increase)	Domestic	(% Increase)	Total	(% Increase)
1976	89.4		5.6		59.0		365.6	
1977	97.5	(9.1%)	4.8	(-14.3%)	68.4	(15.9%)	402.8	(10.2%)
1978	105.2	(7.9%)	5.9	(22.9%)	78.1	(14.2%)	450.7	(11.9%)
1979	114.5	(8.8%)	6.3	(6.8%)	81.5	(4.4%)	491.6	(9.1%)
1980	125.5	(9.6%)	8.6	(36.5%)	77.8	(-4.5%)	530.2	(7.9%)

BUDGET IN CONSTANT 1976 DOLLARS (BILLIONS)

FY	Defense	(% Increase)	Inter'l Affairs	(% Increase)	Domestic	(% Increase)	Total	(% Increase)
1976	89.4		5.6		59.0		365.6	
1977	91.5	(2.3%)	4.5	(-19.6%)	64.2	(8.8%)	377.9	(3.4%)
1978	94.4	(3.2%)	5.2	(15.6%)	68.3	(6.4%)	394.0	(-1.3%)
1979	93.5	(-1.0%)	5.1	(- 1.9%)	66.6	(- 2.5%)	401.6	(1.9%)
1980	96.2	(2.9%)	6.6	(29.4%)	59.7	(-10.4%)	406.6	(1.2%)

ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS
FOR CALENDAR 1979

	<u>October 25, 1978</u>	<u>Probable Reestimate</u>	<u>CBO</u>	<u>"Best Guess"*</u>
Real GNP (4th quarter/ 4th quarter)	2.9%	2.4%	0.9%	2.1%
Unemployment (4th quarter/ 4th quarter)	6.4%	6.3%	6.9%	6.5%
GNP deflator (4th quarter/ 4th quarter)	6.5%	7.4%	7.9%	7.4%

ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS
FOR CALENDAR 1980

	<u>October 25, 1978</u>	<u>Probable Reestimate</u>	<u>CBO</u>	<u>"Best Guess"*</u>
Real GNP (4th quarter/ 4th quarter)	3.2%	3.2%	4.0%	3.2%
Unemployment (4th quarter/ 4th quarter)	6.6%	6.3%	6.8%	6.5%
GNP deflator (4th quarter/ 4th quarter)	6.0%	6.5%	8.0%	6.6%

* Administration private forecast assuming a successful anti-inflation program.

INSERT FOR TALKER FOR VICE PRESIDENT'S LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT
MONDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1978

You may wish to take the opportunity of this luncheon, which may be the last until after the Guadeloupe summit, to make the following points to the President about your tentative plans for foreign travel and your participation in the US-USSR summit. Tentative planning for the meeting with Brezhnev calls for one and a half days of talks and events in Washington, followed by approximately 2 and a half days of talks outside of Washington -- my guess being somewhere on the Georgia coast. (S)

Brazil and Venezuela Inaugurations (see Tab A)

- I will shortly be forwarding a formal memorandum to you recommending that you approve my representing the US at the inaugurations of the new Presidents of Brazil and Venezuela this March.
- The new President of Brazil (Figueiredo) will be inaugurated on March 13. The new President of Venezuela (Herrera) will be inaugurated on March 15.
- State and the NSC have recommended that I participate in these inaugurations. Given the importance of these countries to US interests, I concur. I believe it would be of real value to have talks with both new Presidents, emphasizing your interests in the greatest possible cooperation. The visit, coming as it would a year after your visit, would also emphasize that our interest in consultations, a genuine dialogue and cooperation, is both sincere and continuing. (C)

US-USSR Summit

- I think it would be useful if I were to participate not only in the Cabinet Room talks with Brezhnev but also in at least a portion of your talks with the Soviet President on the days of his visit. With your concurrence, I will arrange my schedule to permit such participation. (S)

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REVIEW ON DECEMBER 15, 1984

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per 5/31/06 NSC 14.
NLJ - 106-081
BY BAC NARA, DATE 4/4/06



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

CONFIDENTIALMEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: U.S. Representation at the Presidential
Inaugurations of Brazil and Venezuela,
March 13-15, 1979

The back-to-back inaugurations of new Presidents in Brazil on March 13, and Venezuela on March 15, 1979, offer a unique window for the United States. These are the two most important countries in South America and the United States should be represented by high level delegations of significant stature. We recommend that Vice President Mondale be designated to head both. It is clearly feasible from a logistical standpoint, and from a political standpoint, highly desirable. The two countries symbolize major but quite different aspects of U.S. policy and interests in the area.

Interestingly, the inaugural visit next March parallels the President's visit to these same two nations in March 1978. The Carter Administration's link with the new generation of leadership in Venezuela and Brazil is highly important. We hope to use this opportunity for a meaningful and substantive discussion of major issues and to set the tone and direction of our future relationships with both.

Venezuela, under the outgoing Perez Administration, has been closely identified with the goals of the Carter Administration in Latin America. It has exerted strong leadership on human rights, on international peace-keeping, and on nuclear non-proliferation. Venezuela initiated a new proposal for conventional arms restraint in the area and a multilateral approach to Caribbean economic development. It is a leading Latin spokesman on North-South issues.

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ADS: 12/7/82 (Smith, N.S.)

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Importantly, Venezuela now ranks as the third biggest source of petroleum for the United States and plays an influential role in OPEC.

Venezuela is a vigorous, functioning democracy. The inauguration of President-elect Herrera will mark the fifth successive, peaceful transfer of power in that country. It is far from clear how broad a role the new President wants to play in foreign affairs. But the loss of Perez deprives us of a major and closely allied Latin American leader. It is important that the new government be encouraged to accept at least some of the mantle of hemispheric leadership.

Brazil, the largest, most dynamic, and most powerful country in Latin America, has emerged as an increasing presence in world affairs. Unlike Venezuela, our relationship with Brazil has gone through a period of severe testing, primarily over human rights and nuclear matters. Fortunately, last March the President was successful in setting a new direction and tone to our relationship. In Brazil, as in Venezuela, the U.S. has extensive economic, financial and trade interests. And we share in particular a stake in helping assure the security and peaceful evolution of the Hemisphere. We are hopeful that President-elect Figueiredo will preside over a process of political liberalization in Brazil, that he will be more amenable to nuclear alternatives and prepared to work with us to restore a closer, more cooperative relationship.

Recommendation

That the United States designate Vice President Mondale to head the U.S. delegations to the Presidential inaugurations in Brazil and Venezuela next March.

Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

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