INSERT FOR VICE PRESIDENT'S LUNCHEON WITH PRESIDENT Monday, February 26, 1979

Canada

- -- I was pleased to learn that you and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau will be having dinner in New York this Saturday, March 3.
- -- This should be helpful to Trudeau, and it eliminates, for the time being, any requirement for a more formal trip by you to Canada.
- -- On Thursday, February 22, Trudeau's Ambassador to the U.S., Peter Towe, addressed a joint session of the Minnesota Legislature.
- -- You may wish to express your appreciation to Trudeau for his Ambassador's remarks supporting SALT negotiations.
- Towe, noting that I was also in Minnesota to give a speech on SALT, stated that Canada, while not a participant in the negotiations, is kept closely informed by the U.S., that the negotiations are of the utmost importance and that Canada, as a friend and ally, hopes the SALT negotiations will soon be successfully negotiated.
- -- His remarks were cleared in Ottawa, and Canada now joins the Guadeloupe participants in supporting SALT.

Great Britain

- -- I met with Kingman Brewster the other day. He is fully enjoying his assignment as your Ambassador to the Court of St. James.
- -- He is not optimistic about Jim Callaghan's prospects, noting not only his labor troubles, but also the fact that his fragile parliamentary coalition may soon disintegrate. (Brewster notes that after a referendum in Scotland in the next few weeks, the Scotlish Nationalist Party may decide to withdraw its support from Callaghan.)

I will have updated situation reports on Iran, Vietnam/PRC/USSR, and Camp David prior to your luncheon.

Classified by A. Denis Clift Review 2/23/85

DECLASSIFIED

NG C - OG - O83

PERSIDENOG INSCLETIES

BY C NARA, DATE G/8/0G

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

Memo No. 175-79

February 23, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK MOE

FROM:

Denis Clift

SUBJECT:

Insert for Vice President's Luncheon

with President, Monday, February 26, 1979

I am forwarding at Tab A a recommended insert for the talking points being prepared for the Vice President's lunch with the President next Monday.

DECLASSIFIED

NC/C-CG-083

PEL 5/20/04 NSC LETTEL

BY NARA, DATE G/18/04

old 1 o David FICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON March 3, 1979 MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT DICK MOE KM FROM: RE: Monday Lunch Talking Points - March 5, 1979 in Talks (see attached) SALT - Brezhnev Speech III. Yemens (see attached) Trudeau Lunch V. Foreign Aid Supplemental (see attached) VI. Vietnam/PRC/USSR VII. California Trip Very successful dinner--please call Lew Wasserman to thank him Counter-Dinner -- Meeting with Labor Leaders / Constitutional Convention hurt Brown Meeting with Teachers No reduction in paperwork-we should order a survey VIII. Reaction to Reorganization (?) Murels IX.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

SECRET

March 3, 1979

Memo No. 1056-79

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

VIA:

Dick Moe

FROM:

Denis Clift

SUBJECT:

Lunch with the President, Monday, March 5,

1979 (U)

Middle East

(Following on the weekend's discussions with Prime Minister Begin, the status of these talks and of the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations will be an important topic of conversation.)

- -- Over the weekend, Zbig indicated that Herman Eilts is planning to retire this May as U.S. Ambassador to Egypt in order to accept a position at Boston University.
- -- It is my understanding that Atherton is being considered as a possible successor.

Herman has done an outstanding job; we'll miss him. While Roy would obviously be an excellent successor, I think you will wish to give careful attention to the re-shuffling of your Middle East team. Atherton plays an extremely important role at present in his Ambassador-at-Large capacity. We don't want to weaken your team at the same time that we send a new Ambassador to Cairo.

-- I think you should talk to Cy and ask how he sees the new Middle East line-up.

Yemens

- -- Cease fire over the weekend was welcome news.
- -- I think your actions with the Saudis and the YAR had a positive impact.

 DECLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT REVIEW ON March 3, 1999 NCIC-CG-C83

RY - TOCICG MOSE LETTEL

BY NARA, DATE GINIOG

I think it is important that the SCC keeps close watch on this situation.

Supplemental

(I do not know if Cy Vance discussed the proposed \$200 million supplemental package that State has developed with interagency assistance for consideration by the President. You may wish to note to the President the importance of this package, not only for Turkey (\$100 million in security supporting assistance and \$30 million MAP is proposed for Turkey), but also for a number of other countries in need of help and who are tending to question U.S. leader-ship.

You may wish to note that one of the themes you heard during your visit to Los Angeles was that of frustration and concern over the Administration's inability to provide leadership abroad and to influence events in a manner advancing U.S. interests.)

SALT

-- Brezhnev's speech was a good one, as positive as we have seen in some time.

Canada

(You may wish to ask the President how his Sunday lunch with Trudeau went, what issues were foremost on Trudeau's mind, and what issues require follow-up by the Administration to advance US-Canadian interests.)

SECRET

YAR/PDRY CONFLICT

Notes from Vice President's Lunch with President.

- -- Have Harold Brown and Cy Vance consult with Zbig and Vice President to see what we can do to assist YAR.
- -- Issue condemnation of PDRY have Stan Turner and Agency condemn PDRY actions.
- -- Tell the Saudis we will replace their losses in equipment, etc.
- -- Have our allies and friends condemn PDRY at the UN the YAR should take the lead, and the Saudis should help.
- -- Issue strong demarche to USSR.

Current guidance is no U.S. people in YAR.

We should consider question of organized US units being sent to Saudi Arabia to make it possible for Saudis to sent men to YAR.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

PERSONOLULA NELLETTER BY NARA, DATE CARIDE

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON

March 14, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM:

RICHARD MOE

SUBJECT:

TALKING POINTS FOR LUNCHEON WITH THE PRESIDENT -- WEDNESDAY, MARCH 14, 1979

I. Reception Last Night

- o Great feeling; you made us all very proud
- e Rep. Bob Edgar organized the congressional turnout on his own. He started the effort the day before when it looked like failure. You might want to call and thank him.

II. How to Capitalize on Your Achievement

- Get in a group of 25-30 Jewish leaders tomorrow for private briefing.
- Address joint session tomorrow; evening would be preferable to afternoon. Alternatively, a TV address to the nation.
- Treaty signing. We should be sure to take maximum advantage of the opportunity by including Hill people, prominent Jewish leaders, etc.

III. Iran -- this mornings SCC meeting

IV. Time to Shift our Focus to Two Pressing Domestic Problems:

- Inflation/Economy -- danger signs; this morning's EPG Meeting.
- o Energy -- we appear to have no policy.

V. Saratoga Memo

VI. 8th Circuit Judgeship (?)

• I told Griffin Bell he should go with a woman over my former law partner.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT March 19, MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDEN FROM: RICHARD MOE SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR LUNCHEON WITH THE PRESIDENT -- TUESDAY, MARCH 20, 1979 Camp David Session Inflation Middle East Zbig's mission Signing ceremony _ Luise III. SALT IV. Iran Phodosian Floations. My South American Trip (decision memo coming) VI. Ethnic Coordinator I understand Anne Wexler has recommended the appointment of a high-level coordinator in the White House. We're missing a good bet here. It's badly needed. VIII. First Circuit/Archibald Cox If ever an instance to make an exception on age, this is it. Would be a widely acclaimed appointment.
I'm afraid EMK will go public on it and it's simply not worth it. IX. Special Prosecutor I see Justice is looking at names.

It makes sense: when it's demonstrated that there's nothing there, it will be more credibly received.

Otherwise the Safires of the press will always be able to claim there's a cover-up. I fear this is a building issue, and we'd do well to get in front of it. Evenue Henry First Job & France



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

March 30, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM:

RICHARD MOE

SUBJECT:

TALKING POINTS FOR LUNCHEON WITH THE PRESIDENT -- MONDAY, APRIL 2, 1979

Energy

II.

Middle East (see attached) III.

SALT - 7 IV.

VI. Archie Cox

VII. 7 Bullhorns Near White House

e.g., Wexler ethnic memo

· not their intent to gang up, but rather to avoid coming at you from all directions.

Ethnic Adviser IX:

> Pleased you've agreed to name one; now we have to find the best person

X. Cyprus (see attached) -

South American Visit (see attached)



INSERT FOR VICE PRESIDENT'S LUNCHEON WITH PRESIDENT Monday, April 2, 1979

Middle East

(I recommend you continue the discussion begun at the Friday foreign policy breakfast on a US negotiator for the Middle East -- and that you again emphasize to the President the importance of not allowing State to force the pace on PLO/Palestinian contacts. I believe this is an issue which should be addressed by the new negotiator in close consultation with you and the President.)

Greece, Turkey, Cyprus

- -- Note that the Greek-American community is getting very restless (Tab A), that the President's triumph in the Middle East is encouraging the community to believe that he should exercise personal diplomacy to resolve the Cyprus problem.
- -- Note that you are meeting with Sarbanes and Brademas after the lunch to review developments, that there is a glimmer of hope in terms of Waldheim possibly reconvening intercommunal talks, but that Kyprianou's stance makes progress a remote possibility.
- -- Say that State is somewhat more optimistic on progress about Greek reentry into NATO.

South American Trip

If you have not yet signed forward your memorandum to the President, you may wish to give it to him at the luncheon noting:

- -- Figueiredo's and Herrera's prompt acceptance of his invitations to them;
- -- The fact that both want cooperation with the US and and that both look forward to a mission by Frank Press to expand cooperation in science and technology;
- -- Note that this is of particular importance in Venezuela where more advanced technology will be required if Venezuela is to exploit the Orinoco tarsands and heavy oil belt, and
- -- Call attention to Herrera's genuinely supportive statement about efforts by Venezuela to meet US oil requirements.

Classified by A. Denis Clift Review 3/30/85 DECLASSIFIED

NC/C - OG - OB 3

FLY + PX/OG NSC LETTES

EV C NARA, DATE 6/8/09



WU INFOMASTER

METRON STL CGO

021555A075 1703EST
ZCZC 1 CHICAGO IL
ZIP
THE HONORABLE JIMMY CARTER
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20500

BT

DEAR PRESIDENT CARTER:

WE WERE ELATED WITH YOUR DIPLOMATIC TRIUMPH IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE ARE GRATEFUL FOR WHAT IT PORTENDS FOR THE PEOPLE IN THAT AREA. WE ARE THANKFUL THAT IT ENHANCES THE CAUSE OF PEACE IN THE WORLD, AND WE ARE APPRECIATIVE OF YOUR PERSONAL EFFORTS, SACRIFICES, AND ANGUISH THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ENTAILED.

WE ARE ALSO PROUD THAT THE PRESTIGE OF OUR COUNTRY AND THE PRESIDENCY HAS BEEN ELEVATED AND STRENGTHENED.

MINDFUL OF YOUR FREQUENTLY EXPRESSED COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS.

AND WITH THE MIDDLE EAST TRIUMPH A POSITIVE MOMENTUM FOR DIFFUSING OTHER AREAS OF CONFLICT, WE RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THAT ATTENTION BE FOCUSED ON THE CONTINUING CYPRUS TRAGEDY. AMERICANS OF GREEK DESCENT HAVE DISPLAYED UNTIL NOW A REMARKABLE DEGREE OF PATIENCE AND RESTRAINT IN ANTICIPATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROMISED PROGRESS IN THAT DISTURBED AREA. SINCE NO SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS HAS BEEN FORTHCOMING, IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S RECENT TRIUMPH CONTAINS THE PRESUPPOSITIONS FOR POSITIVE MOVEMENT TO RESTORE THE INTEGRITY OF CYPRUS.

THUS, ALONG WITH OUR CONGRATULATIONS FOR YOUR MIDDLE EAST TRIUMPH, WE SUBMIT THIS REMINDER OF YET ANOTHER HUMAN PROBLEM THAT AMERICAN PRESTIGE AND DETERMINATION CAN DO MUCH TO RESOLVE.

WE THANK YOU FOR YOUR EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THIS MATTER. PLEASE, LET US KNOW HOW WE CAN HELP.

ANDREW A. ATHENS
NATIONAL CHAIRMAN
UNITED HELLENIC AMERICAN CONGRESS
12900 S. METRON DRIVE
CHICAGO, IL 60633

NNNNEND

ACCEPTED 00001

1 - PC

DR S KEMIJI 1034 MILLER DR DAVIS CA 95516

Western union Mailgram 2

(

MAR 28 1979

4-063300E096 03/27/79 ICS IPMRNOZ CSP MANA 9163221923 MGM TDRN SACRAMENTO CA 100 03-27 07139 EST

CHRISTO SPIRCU MINORITY LEADER LEGISLATURE CONCORD NEW HAMPSHIRE 03301

AS FELLOW GREEK AMERICAN REQUEST YOUR COURTESY TO COVERNOR BROWN KNOWN FOR HIS PRO-CREEK AND CYPRICTE FEELINGS IN CONTRAST WITH CARTER'S PRO-TURKISH ACTIONS -WILLTARY AND ECONOMIC ALD. REMEMBER THE 200,000 GREEK CYPRICTES REFUGES STILL EXIST AFTER 5 YEARS AND 2,000 MIA'S THAT TURKEY REFUSES TO GIVE ACCOUNT

DR STEVE KEMIJI
CHAIRMAN
CREEK AMBRICAN COMMITTEE FOR JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CYPRUS
1034 MILLER DR
DAVIS CA 95516

1916 EST

MGMCOMP MOM



Celen

NUMBER / MANA 021

OFFICE

Cambridge Mass

3/27

FILING TIME

9:16

TO: Rep Chris Spirou

ADDRESS: State House

CITY - STATE & ZIP CODE:

Concord N.H. 03301

You are cordially invited to attend a luncheon and round table discussion with many congressman, senators and prominent Greek-American leaders. To be held on Wednesday April fourth 1979, at twelve noon at the National Democratic Club . Thirty Ivy Street next to the Rayburn Building Washington D.C. The purpose of the luncheon is to discuss many vital issues concerning Greece and Cypressand to set a stradgy for the Hellenes to follow. Please R.S.V.P. to Miss Christine Katsulis at Cambridge Mass.

617-864-9500

SIGNED:

Charles Maliotis - Andrew A. Athens

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

SECRET

ACTION

Memo No. 294-79

March 30, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK MOE

FROM:

Denis Clift 5

SUBJECT:

Insert for Luncheon Talker

I am forwarding at Tab I an insert for the Vice President's luncheon talker with the President on Monday, April 2.

SECRET Classified by Source Review 3/30/85

DECLASSIFIED

PER STROTON NS LETTER



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

- April 6, 1979

Thanks twening In AD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM:

RICHARD MOE

M-E

SUBJECT:

TALKING POINTS FOR LUNCHEON WITH THE PRESIDENT -- MONDAY, APRIL 9, 1979

I. Energy

o Reaction

o Should mount major offensive for tax; set up

White House task force

II. Inflation

III. Scandinavian Trip

o Ambassadors' lunch

o Believe we're in good shape; should be good trip

o Kekkonen

IV. Middle East

V. SALT/Brezhnev (see attached)

VI. ACTION 4

VII. Cox (?)

VIII. Saratoga

o House committee failed to act; not home free yet

IX. Cyprus -- Greek-American Concern (see attached)

X. Meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda (see attached)

Inlelizar

SECRET

INSERT FOR VICE PRESIDENT'S LUNCHEON WITH THE PRESIDENT April 9, 1979

JAPAN

Meeting with Foreign Minister Sonoda

- -- Sonoda expressed very strong support for your speech on energy, saying all countries concerned are appreciative. I told him that public support by Japan would be helpful.
- -- Sonoda expressed strong support for your leadership saying that countries around the world are reassured by the re-emergence of American leadership, after the period of doubt which resulted from our experience in Vietnam.
- I told Sonoda that we would appreciate Japan's continuing its close ties with the Bazargan government, and its financial support for Turkey. Sonoda said Japan would do so. Of interest, he proposed on a highly confidential basis that the US, Japan, West Germany and "two others" get together to discuss our approaches to the Middle East in the mid and long term, to coordinate our approaches and then to proceed independently based on this coordination.
- -- He noted that our defenses over China had led to the second World War. He said we should work as wisely and cooperatively as possible to help China toward modernization, that we should consult at the government level and then allow our private sectors to take over in such important fields with the PRC as transportation, resources (uranium and oil) and key industries such as the power industry.
- -- Sonoda emphasized the importance Japan attaches to Ohira's visit and your visit, the importance that both be successful. I noted the growing ground swell of anti Japanese sentiment in the United States, the fact that it was becoming a political issue and our desire to avoid any friction.

USSR-Brezhnev

-- I asked Sonoda what his information was on Brezhnev's health. Without hesitating, he said that his government's

SECRET CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT REVIEW ON APRIL 6, 1985

DECLASSIFIED

NUC - CG - CB3

RC2 5/30/06 NSCLETER

NARA, DATE \$16/06.

information is that his life is in danger. He said his hunch is that whoever the successor, the Soviet policy line will be tougher.

Cyprus/Greek-American Concern

- -- In recent days I have been meeting with a number of Greek-Americans (Chris Spiron, Sarbanes, Brademas, and others). They are not looking for a fight with the Administration, but they are worried that one is coming if we do not get some gesture from the Turks on Cyprus.
- -- As the 1980 election year approaches, an increasing number of voices in the Greek-American community are asking what have Carter/Mondale done? Shouldn't we line up behind a new candidate?
- I have been working with Warren Christopher on this. Waldheim has just concluded talks with the Greeks and Turkish Cypriots. Warren plans to meet with him this week to see if we cannot set up another round of intercommunal talks in late April.
- -- The Greek Cypriots are dragging their feet. They will have to be pushed. The Turks and Turkish-Cypriots will have to produce a positive gesture on the reopening of Famagusta.
- -- The Greek-American leadership is urging us to take an initiative. They say that even if it fails, the political heat will lessen.
- -- Waldheim and Cy will have recommendations on Cyprus later this week or early next.

* * * * *

Note: You may wish to refer to Edwin Reischauer's letter to you on Ohira (Tab A) during the course of the lunch.

SECRET



ROOM 318 1737 CAMBRIDGE STREET CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138 PHONE (617) 495-3220

December 11, 1973

The Honorable Walter F. Mondale Vice President of the United States The White House Washington, D.C.

Dear Fritz:

Raru and I have followed all that you and Joan have been doing these past two years with great interest and also with a bit of reflected pride, but, knowing how overwhelming your jobs are, we have avoided bothering you. I don't think we even sent an initial note of congratulation. But a situation has arisen, that induces me to write you as a way to draw not only your attention but that of the President to what I feel is a great opportunity to try to tackle one of our major world problems.

The problem I refer to is the growing strain in our economic relations with Japan, which has given rise to some rather serious grassroots political reactions in this country and equally serious Irritations in Japan. Economic frictions of this sort appear to be cyclical but with each cycle become more severe because of the growing relative size of the Japanese economy. They are not easy to avoid because the Japanese economy is gradually establishing itself as being more efficient than ours, and it is quite differently geared. It shows a greater and steadier drive for growth, and, at times of economic recession, when we and the Europeans are likely to cut production to maintain profits, the Japanese economy does its best to maintain full production. To do this it is likely to export a greater percentage of its product than usual, thus compounding the problems for us. The reasons for this different gearings of our respective economies lie deep in Japanese psychology and social organization and will not change quickly.

So far I have not been much impressed with our efforts to ameliorate the situation. We seem to concentrate too much on little side issues that cannot have a very great overall effect and do so with far too much publicity, producing a lot of political heat for the modest gains achieved. The usual temporary solution to these crises, as it probably will be again this time, is the application by the Japanese of so-called "voluntary restraints" on exports, but this normally comes only after the political damage has been done and a great deal of ill will has built up on both sides.

As things are now going, we may not be in a much better position than we are now when the next cycle comes around, say in four or five years. But by that time we are likely to have a more protectionist congress than now and the Japanese economy will be relatively still larger, making things worse. In fact they may get entirely out of hand. I can imagine an economic blow up starting with an American-Japanese crisis which could start the whole trading world on a downward spiral, paralleling the dismal 1920s that were the prelude to world catastrophe.

There are several related problems. One is that Japan has been reluctant to pull its weight in world economic and political affairs, both in the problems within the group of advanced trading nations and in North-South relations with the so-called developing world, which may in the long run prove the most dangerous problems of all. On the Japanese side also, because of their very vulnerable position, they have good reason to desire some deeper commitments from us. They need guarantees on the availability of necessary supplies from us. Our stupid soybean embargo of 1973 is still remembered. As a stable democracy and major American partner, they also deserve to be clearly placed in a category in our strategic commitments parallel to Western Europe and far ahead of such unstable and undemocratic countries as the Philippines and South Korea, where, except in very special circumstances, the American public may well not support our military commitment if it were put to the test.

What is necessary, I feel, is to work out more fundamental and lasting agreements with the Japanese on the very threatening economic problems that loom between us and also on these other matters of concern. On the economic side, we would want them to play a much more active role in North-South relations and in smoothing out our recurrent trade problems. They would have to take much more positive steps than they have so far to open up their markets to industrial goods and thus help balance trade a little more in this way. Beyond that it will probably be necessary to have a system of automatic limitations on trade imbalances and also on sudden spurts of export growth in specific fields in order to avoid intolerable domestic political strains. This of course is not just a Japanese-American problem but a growing world-wide problem, but a good place to start may be in American-Japanese trade relations. My specific suggestions may not be the right ones -- I don't pretend to be an economist -but as a historian and a longtime observer of Japanese-American relations I am sure that something quite fundamental should be done now while we still have the time.

All this may be obvious enough and I present it merely as an introduction to my main point. What I really am writing about is the opportunity we now have to work effectively on these problems. This opportunity is the emergence of Ohira as the Japanese prime minister. I am afraid that it may not be fully realized in Washington what an opportunity he presents or how to go about taking advantage of it.

It may sound immodest, but I feel I can write about this with some confidence, because I suspect that no one in our government knows Ohira as well as I do. I had very close dealings with him during my five and a half years as ambassador (he was Foreign Minister for two of those years), and we established a very close relationship. The fact that we were born the same year may have helped and also that he is a Christian, which he mentioned to me 17 years ago, though I have seen it in print for the first time either in English or Japanese only in recent weeks. I found him always completely reliable, very wise, and extremely competent in getting things done in the quiet, behind-the-scenes Japanese way. In a couple of matters I particularly remember, both of which involved very large and somewhat touchy national interests, he simply told me that he understood what I was saying and that he would arrange matters but wanted me to say nothing more to anybody, and in both cases the problems were solved very satisfactorily from the American point of view and in a remarkably short period of time with no undesirable publicity.

From these and other experiences I have developed a complete trust in his reliability, his good sense, his friendship for the United States, and his skill as a politician in the Japanese style. The problem is that he has a very Japanese personality and style of operation that makes it difficult for Americans to get to know him and appreciate him. But behind his sleepy-looking, non-commital exterior is a man of outstanding integrity and extraordinary ability. I believe he is the most astute and capable politician and the man of greatest intellectual depth and breadth to have achieved the prime ministership in recent years. The only prime minister at all comparable was Ikeda, and it is possible that some of Ikeda's statesmanlike qualities were inspired by Ohira, who was his close associate. In Ohira we may well have the first Japanese prime minister who has the statesmanship and the political skills and daring to be able to deal with the big problems that our two countries are now jointly facing, and I feel it would be a tragedy not to try to take advantage of this situation.

The way to go about it, I feel, is for the President to try to establish close personal relations with Ohira, but in a very quiet, unostentatious way. If this can be done, the two of them might then mull over together the broad problems, allowing plenty of time for Ohira to come up with his own way of approaching them. It will not be easy to get the Japanese government and people to take the leadership in world economic matters and to take the steps that are needed of them, and Ohira will require a good bit of time and space for tactical maneuver, but I think he can understand the requirements of the situation and that he has the skills to meet them, though he would have to work on his own schedule and in his own quiet way. Open negotiation and haggling over details would only make his task harder. It is for this reason that an approach to these problems at the Presidential level but in a very informal manner would seem the best way to take advantage of the high quality of the man we are lucky enough to find at the helm in Japan. And, incidentally, The Honorable Walter F. Mondale December 11, 1978

my own reading of the situation is that Ohira is likely to last there quite a bit longer than his three immediate predecessors have, who averaged only two years each.

I am reluctant to presume on our personal relationship to make demands on your time in this way, but the matter seemed to me of sufficiently great importance to justify doing so. Haru joins me in sending our best wishes to you and Joan and our hopes that you will both be able to keep up your fine work of which we are all so proud.

Sincerely,

Edwin O. Reischauer

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON, D.C.

FOR:

DICK MOE

Denis Clift

I am forwarding a recommended insert for the Vice President's luncheon with the President on Monday, April 9.

SECRET UNCLASSIFIED WHEN REMOVED FROM ATTACHMENTS

DECLASSIFIED

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

April 22, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Richard Moe

SUBJECT:

Monday Lunch Talking Points, April 23, 1979

I. Visit to Northern Europe (see attached).

MFN-Zun USSK/PRC.
- strong support in Nordic countries

III. Monetary Policy

- pressuring the Fed

IV. Energy

- excess profits tax

CONFIDENTIAL Classified by Source Review 4/22/99

Report on Visit to Nordic Countries and the Netherlands

-- Nordic Countries, Netherlands - fundamental, strong support for Carter Administration foreign policy - SALT, detente, Middle East, Southern Africa, human rights.

-- NATO Commitment

- -- Tactical nuclear force consultations.
- -- Fundamental unity on need for western defense, need for US leadership in that defense.
- -- Total support for SALT II, Carter-Brezhnev summit and follow-on SALT III.
- -- 3-Mile Reactor Concern satisfaction with our invitation to experts and willingness to share information (no hysteria in conversations).
- military build-up, operations for public use_5____
 - -- Plea (not demand) for help on Loftleidir, which is failing as result of "open skies."
 - -- Norway Expressed desire to keep lead in fending off Soviet pressure on Svalbard and northern flank full confidence of US backing and current consultative arrangements.
 - -- Denmark (as in Norway) Staunch in support for NATO; US leadership, favor prepositioning despite Soviet pressure -- at same time maintaining longstanding position on no nuclear weapons or foreign troops in peacetime; deep concern over 3-mile.
 - -- <u>Sweden</u> Political importance of restoration of relations following Vietnam. Concern over our arms transfer/export control regulations -- offer to send Lucy Benson.
 - -- Finland Support for SALT, detente, Africa -- deep concern on Middle East -- need to balance between West and USSR.
 - -- Importance of Nordic Council as a forum for Finland's participation in West.
 - -- Netherlands unanimous opposition to E.R.W., desire for NATO/ N.P.G. membership, national debate on more nuclear weapons, government understanding on need for T.N.F. modernization/ together with strong arms control component.

NL/C-06-083 PAST30/04 NSC LOTEL



Minnesota Historical Society

Copyright in the Walter F. Mondale Papers belongs to the Minnesota Historical Society and its content may not be copied without the copyright holder's express written permission. Users may print, download, link to, or email content, however, for individual use.

To request permission for commercial or educational use, please contact the Minnesota Historical Society.

