

- 4 -

France. Prime Minister Barre and Foreign Minister Francois-Poncet called at the US Embassy residence for a very good meeting. Francois-Poncet said that he had had hard talks with Gromyko, that Gromyko had used language that he had never heard before to describe the poor state of US-Soviet relations, and that Gromyko took a very rigid stand on Afghanistan.

On Iran, Francois-Poncet said that he had had a recent talk with Gotbzadeh who gave him the impression that the Iranians are worried about the impact of sanctions by the EC Nine. Gotbzadeh suggested that the Parliament would be convened more quickly than we might think and would have two options for the US hostages: 1) freeing them (unlikely) and 2) appointment of a commission to prepare for negotiations. Gotbzadeh said "the Shah is out of the picture" but the wealth of the Shah and Iran's financial difficulty with America as a result of the hostages will have to be dealt with and "both can be dealt with quickly." The French Minister stressed he was only reporting what Gotbzadeh had said.

On the Venice Summit and the need for a political dimension to the agenda, Francois-Poncet, supported by Prime Minister Barre, said that France of course could agree to four power private talks but that France would have trouble with expanding the number and with any public reference. He stressed that this was a firm position with Giscard and he said "please do not make France the villain in this." He nonetheless agreed to further four power discussion at Vienna among the Foreign Ministers and the Summit political preparatory group.

Zambia. I started May 8 with a breakfast meeting with President Kaunda at his hotel. Kaunda had very warm words for you, for your policy toward Africa, and for your vital role in making Zimbabwe independence possible. Kaunda said that Mugabe is doing a good job, that he has to confront the potentially dangerous forces of black and white relations and tribal relations, that if he can continue to neutralize the fear of all these groups, Zimbabwe will have a chance. Understanding the limits of our ability to provide financial assistance, he asked me and Bill Miller if we could not find some way to encourage US companies to increase their investments. We said this was a suggestion that we would pursue. He also stressed Zimbabwe's need for food assistance.

On Zambia's purchase of Soviet weapons, I stressed the adverse impact that this action has on our efforts to improve relations, saying that our domestic foes argue that Africa is no more than an East-West contest.

- 5 -

Kaunda was eloquent in his response stating Zambia was a nation of principle, that Zambia which had fought so hard for its independence would not give any other nation any say over that independence and that Zambia was buying weapons from the USSR without conditions as it would buy merchandise from any other nation. He reviewed Zambia's unsuccessful efforts over the past two decades to obtain the most elemental weaponry needed for self defense from the US, from Great Britain, from other Europeans (with the exception of France because of French arms sales to South Africa). When all these efforts failed Zambians had no recourse but to turn to a nation who would sell them the modest weapons required for defense. "Even a poor man must have a spear to keep thieves out of his garden." I concluded this discussion by returning to the point that the Zambian decision to purchase Soviet arms could only impact adversely on our relations. Following the meeting, I sent a message to Zbig asking that our Ambassador in Lusaka be asked not to deliver your letter to Kaunda until I had had the opportunity to provide you with this report of my meeting. Given the central importance of this issue to Zambia, at the very least, I believe your letter should now take into account the fact of the meeting in Belgrade.

Spain. My conversation with Prime Minister Suarez focused on the role Suarez is playing with the Arab nations, in large part because of his discussions with you earlier this year. He reported on a recent meeting with Arafat, in which Arafat 1) expressed bruised feelings over lack of US gratitude for his role in the release of the first 13 hostages and 2) Arafat's view that good conditions would present themselves some two weeks after the convening of the Iranian Parliament for constructive steps relating to hostage release.

Suarez said he will meet on Friday, May 9 with Bishop Capucci, who requested the meeting to discuss release of the hostages. The Spanish Prime Minister said that Capucci had high regard for Hamilton Jordan's role.

He said the Saudis are a steady US ally but that they have asked him to make the point to us that they cannot come still closer to positions with the United States if they are to avoid tensions with other Arab states.

Other Bilaterals. Perhaps the greatest value of the meetings with Ceausecu on Romania, President Eanes and Prime Minister SaCarneiro of Portugal (held separately because of tensions between military and civilian authority in that still emerging democracy) and President Zia of Bangladesh was the very fact of the meetings with a US official, of importance to each of

- 6 -

them domestically. No noteworthy issues were raised. Ceausecu followed the Soviet line on Afghanistan. The Portuguese value their ties with your Administration and despite their domestic problems, they are confident of their future.

May 16, 1980

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM:

RICHARD MOE *Rm*

SUBJECT:

TALKING POINTS FOR LUNCHEON WITH THE  
PRESIDENT -- MONDAY, MAY 19, 1980I. Muskie Trip

- o Meeting with foreign ministers
  - Iran Sanctions
  - Afghanistan
- o Meeting with Gromyko
  - Peace Offensive

II. Iran

- o Parliamentary elections

III. Cuban Refugees

- o New policy
- o Cuban response

OlympicsPresident's Foreign TravelVI. Today's Meeting with IOBVII. Economy

- o Auto industry meeting
  - Fraser's reaction
- o Oil Import fee
- o Mexican Oil Pricing
- o Interest rates

VIII. Politics

- o Report on trips to Ohio, California, Oregon, Montana
- o This week I'll go to Ohio (AFL-CIO) and New Jersey
- o California
  - Pat Brown's endorsement
  - Should President go?
  - Should I go back?
- o Healing strategy
  - Need to reach out to Kennedy supporters after June 3, especially Doug Fraser, Mo Udall, Paul Simon, etc.
  - Need Tip, Byrd, Kirkland, Etc., to declare race is over, time to come together
  - At Ham's request, Dick and Anne Wexler are preparing strategy memo on this.

*Wilt  
Wall  
Brown*

*Calif Visit  
Brown  
Photop*

*Healing  
the Liberts*

*Alton  
Joe California*

*Oregon-Pull  
Mont*

*Bill Green*

*Fraser*

*OHIRA*

*Dumas*

~~SECRET~~

INSERT FOR VICE PRESIDENT'S LUNCHEON WITH THE PRESIDENT  
Monday, May 19, 1980

(The following issues are covered in greater detail in the foreign policy/national security developments paper forwarded to you at the residence on Sunday, May 18.)

Iran and Afghanistan - Results of the EC Nine meeting on May 17. Hal Saunders mission to Austria on May 20. Secretary Muskie will have reported to the President on his talks at 8:00 a.m. Monday morning, May 19.

Moscow Olympics - FRG's vote to boycott on May 15, the President's meeting with Lord Killanin reaffirming U.S. boycott on May 16, indications of growing numbers of boycott nations.

President's Foreign Travel - NSC has recommended that the President include Yugoslavia and Spain in addition to Italy the time of Venice Summit trip, State has additionally recommended Portugal.

Cuban Refugees - White House will be looking for evidence that Cuba is moderating its position following May 17 demonstration in front of US Interests Section.

Quebec Vote - Vote too close to call as Quebecers go to the polls to vote on future of their province.

Meeting with IOB - Following lunch, at 1:30, you and the President will meet with Farmer, Scranton and Gore to review IOB concerns.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT  
REVIEW ON MAY 16, 2000

DECLASSIFIED

HLJC-06-082  
EX 513400 NSC LETTER  
C 66/06

## OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

May 16, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK MOE

FROM: Denis Clift *DC*  
SUBJECT: Insert for Luncheon Talker

I am attaching a recommended checklist for inclusion in your memorandum to the Vice President as background for his luncheon with the President on May 19.

A number of papers relating to the points in the checklist have been sent separately to the residence.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

(THIS MEMO UNCLASSIFIED WHEN  
REMOVED FROM ATTACHMENT)

DECLASSIFIED

NGC-06-085  
PER 5/25/06 NSC LTR  
BY Q NARA, DATE 6/6/06

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

May 23, 1980

*Mushu: ME Speech*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD MOE

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR LUNCHEON WITH THE PRESIDENT --  
TUESDAY, MAY 27, 1980

- I. Iran (see attached)
  - o Sanctions
- II. PRC (see attached)
- III. Middle East (see attached)
  - o Friday meetings with Khalil and Mobarak
- IV. Islamic Conference (see attached)
- V. Economy
  - o Inflation
    - CPI down to .9%
    - Loosening of credit controls
  - o Interest rates
    - Prime should be coming down faster
  - o Recession
- VI. Budget Resolution (see attached)
  - o Should we oppose conference agreement?
    - Implications for cities, especially New York
    - Out-year implications for defense budget
    - Opportunity to draw contrast with Reagan
    - Opportunity to work with constituencies we'll need in fall
- VII. Politics
  - o Report on trips to Ohio, New Jersey
  - o This week will go to New Jersey, West Virginia
  - o California trip
  - o Reconciliation strategy
    - Saw Moe/Wexler memo and your comments (attached)
    - Assignments are being made and all will be ready June 4
    - I will have preliminary conversations with Carey and Fraser and give you a report
    - If this is to work, we must be genuinely conciliatory without conceding our real interests; attitude important
    - Dick has had initial talk with Paul Kirk re: process

*- Kennedy ant to defend Carter*  
*- John White*  
*- Start calling*

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

*- Reconciliation*

~~SECRET~~

INSERT FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S LUNCH WITH THE PRESIDENT  
TUESDAY, MAY 27, 1980

Iran

-- The President flew aboard the carrier U.S.S. Nimitz on Memorial Day to address the crew officers, men, and embarked Air Wing.

-- Bruno Kreisky, Palme and Gonzales of Spain are scheduled to wrap up their May 25-27 visit to Tehran by the time of your lunch.

Peoples Republic of China

-- You are scheduled to meet with Harold Brown's Chinese counterpart, Geng Biao (pronounced GUNg) on Wednesday at 1:30, and the President will stop by.

-- Last week the Chinese carried out their first long range ICBM launch from the mainland into the Pacific, off Fiji. This successful launch, which included a relatively sophisticated down-range surface and subsurface support, was followed by an unsuccessful launch. Nonetheless, it is a big step for the PRC.

-- The US-PRC Civil Air talks are underway, and may be successfully concluded by May 30. This will be good news, and the President may wish to announce this development himself.

Middle East

-- King Hussein will be meeting with the President June 16-17.

-- Khalil and Mubarak were in Washington late last week. Mubarak met one-on-one with the President. Khalil is reported to have said Sadat's view is that there could be no further movement in the Autonomy Talks until after the U.S. election.

Islamic Conference

-- Results of the conference were more balanced than we had earlier expected, although the U.S. was condemned for support of Israel and the rescue mission in Iran.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT  
REVIEW ON MAY 23, 2000

DECLASSIFIED

MLJC-06-085  
PER 5/25/09 NSC LTR  
BY C NARA, DATE 9/9/09

I feel very strongly that the Administration should oppose and work actively against House approval of the first budget resolution. If we fail to do so, I think we will be bitterly criticized by our Congressional supporters, key constituencies, and the national press for abandoning your budget priorities and acquiescing in a defense-laden, city-starved budget.

It is important that the Administration's position on the resolution be decided as soon as possible, so that adequate preparation for a possible floor fight can be undertaken over the weekend. I hope that Jim McIntyre, Frank Moore and I will be able to discuss our strategy on the resolution with you shortly. Before the meeting, I would like to briefly describe the reasons underlying my recommendation:

1. Merits

On the merits, there is no question in my mind that the resolution represents a repudiation of a number of your major budget priorities. First, the Defense level, \$153.7 billion, is \$3.2 billion above your recommended outlay level of \$150.5 billion (the authorization level creates even greater problems; it is \$6.8 billion above your recommended level, providing considerably room for very high authorization and appropriation bills). Further, the resolution's defense outlay level is \$800 million above the level that would have been achieved under the Holt Amendment. (It is difficult to see how Giaimo could have accepted a level well above that rejected by the House by over 100 votes, but he nonetheless did. That is one of the major reasons why so many House Democrats were unwilling to sign the Conference Report).

Second, the resolution makes no provision for your transitional assistance program, effectively ending any possibility of its being approved later in the Congress. We should not be seen as lightly acquiescing in this outcome.

Third, the resolution requires that the FY '81 revenues from the fee be used for a tax cut, which is counter to our stated purpose of not committing the fee revenues at this time.

In sum, in two of the most visible areas in which the budget battle has been fought this year, the defense and urban areas, we have lost. While there may be other parts of the resolution which are satisfactory, or even helpful, on the merits, all of them added together cannot overcome the problem of having your defense budget completely rewritten and your major urban initiative completely eliminated.

## 2. Congressional Budget Process

I certainly recognize the importance of sustaining the Congressional budget process, and of our maintaining good relations with the Budget Committee Chairmen. But at some point, the line must be drawn if we are ever to be taken seriously in the budget process. We are increasingly a minor player in the Congressional process. If we accept what the conferees have done, we may become increasingly minor players in this process. It is not simply Congress' budget -- it is the budget which governs the Nation and its priorities. It will be clear that the budget committees can do whatever they please by way of changing the Nation's priorities without incurring the Administration's objection.

Over the past several years, we have enjoyed relatively good relationships with the budget committee and their chairmen. A floor fight in the House will clearly upset Giaimo, and we will risk his displeasure in the future. But, your priorities must come ahead of Giaimo's priorities. Now, your priority must be to set Congress along the road toward a balanced budget which has reasonable defense levels and reasonable domestic levels. These defense levels are as great a threat to future budget restraint as would be the case if domestic spending rose at an exaggerated rate.

Senator Hollings will also be extremely upset if we attack the resolution for having too much defense spending. But his interests and your interests are simply not the same. Like other influential Members with whom we have engaged in major legislative battles, he will get over this one in time. If we acquiesce in what Hollings has done to the defense budget, he can ignore our views in the future.

## 3. National Politics

Acquiescing in such a high defense budget will make it much more difficult to unify the Party. The major constituency groups, including labor, oppose the compromise.

Over the next several months we must convince the liberals and minorities in the Democratic Party that your policies are very different from Reagan's. While this should be clear it is not to all too many.

Bob Beckel made this point very eloquently in the meeting we had this afternoon to discuss the budget with Jim McIntyre. Beckel pointed out that in 1976 in Texas, you won by about 130,000 votes. In doing that, you got 9 of every 10 Black votes, 8 of every 10 Hispanic votes, and 3.5 of every 10 white votes. In Bob's view, the Black and Brown voters will simply sit out this election unless they see a real difference between you and Reagan. Beckel now says that many of them do not see a large enough difference to justify their voting. Further, Beckel pointed out that the many people in Texas who are concerned about such high defense spending are simply not your voters, and never will be. In the general election, they are going to support Reagan.

In sum, we have an opportunity now to begin the process of providing substance to the disaffected liberal voters. We should not miss this opportunity by ignoring your own budget priorities.

#### 4. Key Interest Groups

The key interest groups in Washington with whom we have worked to date on the budget will be fighting the budget resolution. The groups include Labor, Mayors, Black organizations, consumers, teachers, and State and local officials. They will have a very difficult time understanding why they are fighting for our budget priorities and we are not. Few of them now expect to win, but they feel the fight is well worth the effort. If we are to call on these groups again, in the budget process, and in other legislative fights, I think we need to stick with them -- in fact, to lead them -- in this effort.

#### 5. Prospects

The prospects for defeating the resolution in the House are reasonably good. They are very good if we are involved in that effort. It will be difficult to pass the resolution. Most of the Republicans will be opposing the resolution and so far at least 40 important Democrats have indicated similar intentions.

If the resolution is defeated, it will probably be recommitted with instructions to lower the defense number and spread that money throughout key domestic programs. The chances, then, of a budget emerging which we can support is considerably improved.

(There is no realistic chance that the Senate will defeat the resolution, and I think, therefore, our efforts must be concentrated in the House.)

Whenever we have considered whether to fight the Congress on a major issue, the decision to date has never been easy. Congressional leaders do not want to engage the President in such a fight, and have always counselled against such an effort. But I think we have invariably helped ourselves, by gaining the respect of the Congress and the public, when we have done so. For a short time, relations with the Congress may not be pleasant, but that passes quickly. In the end, we benefit. I believe that will be the case here, whether we win or lose. If we launch our forces early this weekend, I believe we can win this fight.

...can have your specific  
and general assignment to...  
...May 20, 1980...  
...modifications as indicated.  
N.G.

MEMORANDUM FOR HAMILTON JORDAN

FROM: RICHARD MOE *RM*  
ANNE WEXLER

SUBJECT: POST-JUNE 3 RECONCILIATION STRATEGY

*Ham*  
*J*

We're all agreed that immediately after the June 3 primaries, it's in our interest to leave the impression that the primary contest is over and to begin reaching out to all elements of the Democratic Party to bring them together for a united effort in the fall. As you requested, this memo is designed to suggest several specific tasks the President and others might pursue to achieve these goals before the 3rd as well as immediately after.

... General -  
a) Use Rosalynn  
b) How also working uncommitted delegates

1. Declaring the Contest Over.

Almost regardless of what happens on June 3, the press is certain to declare President Carter the nominee by a fairly large margin. Our job is to reinforce that impression in the most conclusive and credible way.

It will be much more credible if respected party leaders and others without the Administration make this point than if we do it. The three people who can do this most effectively are Tip O'Neill, Bob Byrd and Lane Kirkland. We suggest the President speak with each before June 3 to lay the groundwork for a strong statement afterwards declaring the contest over and asking Democrats to work together for the election of a Democratic President and Congress.

*J*

*ek*

2. Reaching Out and Putting the Party Back Together.

This is by far the larger of the two tasks and will require a good deal of presidential and vice presidential time. The purpose, of course, is to convince the traditional constituencies of the

July 20, 1960

Page 2

Party that they have a stake in our re-election and Reagan's defeat, and to do so in a manner that reflects no retribution toward those who opposed us. This is not the time to settle scores, however deserving they may be, but rather to bind up the wounds and get everyone to work in tandem.

#### A. Labor

Getting Doug Fraser and the UAW back into the fold should be one of the highest priorities, but it also may be the most difficult. The only way to approach Doug, in my judgment, is in the context of his greatest concern: the current problems threatening the US auto industry, particularly foreign imports. Asking Doug in for a peace session without addressing these problems would not only be unfruitful, but would probably even set the relationship back further. We recommend that we use a Fraser meeting in about mid-June as a forcing mechanism for our economic team to come up with whatever we're prepared to do to help the auto industry so that when they meet the President is able to give him some good news and convince him we're serious about trying to help the industry. This meeting should probably be preceded by a meeting between Fraser and the Vice President and possibly including Ray Majerus.

} ok - then  
I'll decide  
what to do

Landon is of the view that with the exceptions of George Hardy (service employees) and Bill Wimpisinger (machinists), our problems with the AFL-CIO will not be all that serious. Nonetheless, we should make affirmative gestures to the key internationals which supported Kennedy, and Landon is soliciting Kirkland's views on how this can be best accomplished. One possibility would be to ask members of the executive council, or another group of Lane's choosing, to the White House to meet with the President. At the very least, the President should call several key union leaders to indicate our desire to work together, but it would be much better if he saw them in person. Landon will report back with Lane's recommendations.

ok

Page 3

Whatever the forum, we should ask labor to work with us on several specific projects, particularly the dissemination of Reagan's and Anderson's anti-labor and other records. They could be especially helpful in tarnishing Anderson's white-knight image early; they have already researched his appalling record and only need to be motivated to give it the visibility it deserves.

ok

#### B. Congress

There are a great many nervous congressmen and senators up for election this year, and we should try to persuade them a) it's in their interest as well as ours to get this contest over, to have a peaceful convention, and to begin working on the fall elections, and b) we genuinely want to work closely with them collectively and individually to ensure the election of Democratic majorities.

The first initiative should be with the joint leadership. We suggest that there be an expanded leadership breakfast Wednesday, June 4, including Jim Corman and Wendell Ford as chairmen of the campaign committees, you, Strauss, White, etc. Almost the entire meeting could be devoted to an exchange of campaign plans and hearing out members' concerns, both substantive and political, regarding the fall election. Such a meeting would send a clear message the morning after the June 3 primaries; it would permit us to declare the primary contest over without actually saying so.

ok - check  
carefully to  
Frank

This meeting should then be followed by separate meetings with the House and Senate campaign committees. The President needn't be present throughout, but he could set the tone of mutual cooperation and then others could explore specific ways in which the Administration can be helpful.

In addition, the Vice President could have lunch on the Hill with endangered senators, the message of which would be much the same.

June 4, 1980

Page 4

Finally, the President and the Vice President should make a number of calls to members who have supported Kennedy, and some who have been neutral nuisances, extending an olive branch, indicating our willingness to forget the past, and asking that we work together in a joint effort. Here are some people who should receive such calls:

Senate

Howard Metzenbaum  
George McGovern  
Pat Moynihan  
Alan Cranston  
Dale Bumpers  
Paul Tsongas  
Paul Sarbanes  
John Culver

House

Mo Udall  
Henry Reuss  
Les Aspin  
Paul Simon  
John Burton  
Toby Moffett  
Bill Ford  
Lou Stokes  
Bob Kastenmeier  
Pete Stark

ok - 9/11  
L. Somen

Frank should be asked to put together a more inclusive list and to make assignments.

C. Other Elected Officials

Probably the single most important governor to us in terms of the fall is Hugh Carey; we believe he has the capacity to make us or break us in New York, particularly with regard to the Liberal Party over which he has great influence through patronage. The President should call Carey a day or two after June 3 and invite him down for lunch. The Vice President should meet with him beforehand to take his temperature, and the agenda for the lunch should be carefully constructed only after conversations with Mario Cuomo, Steve Ross and others privy to Carey's thinking.

no -  
reverse  
order

The President should make olive-branch calls to Governor Brennan of Maine, Governor Brown of California, Lt. Governor Tommy O'Neill of Massachusetts, and probably even Mayor Byrne of Chicago. Jack Watson should be asked to come up with other

ok

Page 5

state and local leaders in key states who should receive similar calls. Finally the campaign should be asked for a list of state chairmen who didn't support us.

D. Minorities and Interest Groups

Each White House special assistant with responsibility for a specific group -- Martin, Torres, Moses, et al -- should be asked to give you a memo outlining the nature of our problems with that particular constituency and a plan to remedy them over the summer through briefings, presidential calls, etc. Each should give you immediately the names of two or three key leaders the President should call right after June 3. Anne will come up with a similar plan for all other groups not otherwise covered.

ok - don't  
flood me  
too many ca

E. Other Organizations and Important Liberals

A number of steps can be started now, to determine the platform issues that will be important to liberals and to Kennedy supporters. We need to evolve our platform strategy now, in any case. These steps include:

1. A Presidential phone call to Coleman Young to:

- a. get a rundown on issues likely to be contested
- b. a sense of what flexibilities might exist
- c. general advice *ok*

Do this at  
staff level,  
then--

2. A series of phone calls, meetings, or small lunches starting immediately, with lists to be provided by us, after consulting with the Vice Presidential staff, Sarah Weddington and the special assistants for people who might be particularly receptive to beginning the healing process. These meetings should be a mixture of supporters and non-supporters; reinforcement and reaching out. These should include state chairs and state legislators as well as leading liberals.

ok

Memo No. 934-80

May 23, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK MOE

FROM: Denis Clift */s/*  
SUBJECT: Vice President's Lunch with the President,  
May 27, 1980

Dick,

I am attaching an insert for incorporation in the papers you are preparing for the Vice President's lunch with the President this coming Tuesday. I would note that I have put together a much fuller reading file on these and other developments for the Vice President which John Owens will courier to International Falls Sunday evening. John, of course, stands ready to take the luncheon Talking Points with him.

THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

- Position

Comparison  
- our Goals

- Affirmation

Action & steps

- Pro-Capitalism

- Venice Summit

THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

Carter

~~Dan Jure~~

- Kelleb, Teddy <sup>OK</sup>

- Eppie

- Gov. Carey (Pat Harris)

- Pat Harris  
- HEW

~~Kennedy~~  
OK

- Foster Columbus <sup>OK</sup>

THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

Amb. Posa

Mr. Colomb

June 10<sup>th</sup>

Wants 1 ~~Receipt~~ <sup>Receipt</sup>  
✓ Pres



~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

June 3, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD MOE

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR LUNCHEON WITH THE PRESIDENT --  
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 4, 1980

I. Politics

- o Ohio, California, New Jersey
- o Reconciliation
  - Leadership breakfast
  - I'm making calls
  - Will meet tomorrow with senators up for re-election
  - Give Kennedy time to rest -- Have you called him?
- o Hugh Carey? --
- o Will go to Minnesota convention Friday/Saturday

II. Mayor Kollek's Visit (see attached) - *Yoo*

III. Middle East (see attached) - *Eppie Eum - Israel*

IV. Venice Summit/Cooperation with Allies (see attached)

V. Ramsey Clark in Tehran (see attached)

VI. Intelligence Charters (see attached)

VII. Economy

- o Inflation
- o Interest rates
- o Recession

VIII. Long-Term Potential Problems

- o Cuban refugees
  - Need to accelerate settlements; can't have them still there in fall
- ? o Draft registration
  - Can't afford to begin registration in September


~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 3, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK MOE

FROM: Denis Clift   
SUBJECT: Vice President's Luncheon with the President

I am forwarding at Tab A a recommended insert for inclusion in the paper you are preparing for the Vice President's lunch with the President on Wednesday, June 4.

~~SECRET~~

(THIS MEMO UNCLASSIFIED WHEN  
REMOVED FROM ATTACHMENT)



~~SECRET~~

INSERT FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S LUNCH WITH THE PRESIDENT  
Wednesday, June 4, 1980

Mayor Kollek's Visit

- I have asked Mayor Teddy Kollek of Jerusalem to have an informal lunch with me in the Roosevelt Room on Thursday, June 5. The Israeli press was starting to drum up a negative story to the effect that he would not be received at the White House.
- Eppi Evron has done a good job of keeping this as under control as possible, saying he simply has not heard back from the White House on the question of a meeting.
- I think it would be excellent -- and Eppi strongly agrees -- if you were to stop by the lunch to greet Mayor Kollek very briefly.

Middle East

- Reports that Sadat is moving to repair relations with the Saudis and other moderate Arabs are good, and I hope they are true.
- Israel still does not seem to have recovered from Weizman's resignation and Begin's cabinet shuffle.
- The entire situation has been complicated by the maiming of the West Bank Mayors and the likelihood of further eye-for-an-eye retaliation.

(Note: The President has directed that Secretary Muskie give the Middle East speech as soon as possible. A fresh draft is being forwarded for the President's reading Tuesday evening. Muskie's staff is looking at next Monday or next Wednesday, depending on guidance from the President.)

Venice Summit -- Cooperation with Allies

- Warren Christopher and David Aaron are in Europe consulting on the political dimension of the Venice Summit.
- The Summit offers a very important opportunity to dispel the growing public sense of disunity among the allies, and to put a better tone on the allied relationship.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT  
REVIEW ON JUNE 3, 2000

DECLASSIFIED  
NKC-06-085  
7/25/09 NSC LTR  
BY C-1000/DATE 9/9/06

Ramsey Clark in Teheran

- The SCC took up the question of the 10 Americans in Teheran. It is my understanding that there was general agreement that they should be persecuted, and that the Attorney General favors the civil penalty rather than the criminal penalty -- i.e., a substantial fine but no prison sentence. Civiletti has been asked to have a formal recommendation for your consideration by the next meeting of the SCC.
- I noted a wire story yesterday quoting the chief Soviet delegate at the Teheran conference as telling Clark:  
"We are very happy that you are at the conference (which) I am sure that you understand is not against the people of the United States of America but against the American policy."

Intelligence Oversight Legislation

- The intelligence charter has been pared down to oversight legislation, reducing the number of committees from 8 to 2 (for purposes of Executive Branch reporting) and establishing in legislation the policy of prior notice for significant intelligence activities, preserving your rights as President not to give prior notice when you deem necessary. The Senate brought this pared down oversight legislation to the floor yesterday, referring to it as the "concensus provisions."

(Note: Debate was continuing as of 6:00 p.m. -- we will have an update prior to your lunch with the President.)

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

June 10, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD MOE

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR LUNCHEON WITH THE PRESIDENT --  
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 1980

I. Auto Industry Strategy

- o Meeting with Miller
- o Conversation with Fraser

II. Economy

- o Inflation
- o Interest Rates
- o Recession
  - We were elected in '76 on jobs
  - Need to be seen as caring

III. Possible Overseas Travel

- o Am exploring feasibility of foreign trip in summer
- o Considering Greece, Tunisia, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Peru
- o Initial reaction?
- o Will try to have proposal soon

IV. Colombo Meeting

V. Meeting with Greek-Americans (see attached)

VI. Middle East -- Linowitz/Burg/Ali Talks (see attached)

VII. Afghanistan (see attached)

- o Coverage of Soviet Invasion

VIII. Politics

- o Minnesota Convention
  - Hope to get close to 50 delegates
  - Would you ~~drop a note to~~ Nick Coleman?
- o Reconciliation
  - Kennedy's behavior
  - Dick's meeting with Kirk
- o Ham's move

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

Clark - Careful

THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

→ Sp. Glomster

TC

- Agt -

- Liberalism -

- 27 Auto  
file  
etc

Think  
14.4%

- Stories in  
The Post

- Reagan: Debate



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