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~~S E C R E T~~

\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

TO HELP ME HAVE ADEQUATE ANSWERS AT HAND. ON THE  
JERUSALEM ISSUE AS A WHOLE, BEGIN EXPRESSED HIS RESENT-  
MENT AT ALL THE ANTI-ISRAELI ACTIVITY THAT HAS FOLLOWED  
AS A RESULT OF THE COHEN LAW. HE SAID HE REGRETTED THE  
MOVE OF EMBASSIES FROM JERUSALEM (THE DAY BEFORE HE  
BT

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PAGE 03

OF 03

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DTG:032319Z SEP 80

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~~S E C R E T~~

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OP IMMED  
DE RUEHGG #9408/02 2472336  
O 032319Z SEP 80 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2230  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 03 CAIRO 19408

NODIS  
CHEROKEE  
FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM  
AMB. LYNOWITZ  
HAD SAID, "WHAT DO WE CARE?". INTERESTINGLY, HE DID  
NOT ACCUSE THE U.S. OF BEING TO BLAME FOR THIS. HE  
WOULD GIVE NO REAL GROUND ON THIS ISSUE, HOWEVER, SINCE  
HE FELT THAT ISRAEL IS FULLY JUSTIFIED, BUT HE ASSURED  
ME THAT ISRAEL RECOGNIZES THAT OTHERS HAVE RELIGIOUS  
INTERESTS IN THE CITY AND THAT ISRAEL WILL PROTECT  
THESE.

7. AT AN EARLIER MEETING, AGRICULTURE MINISTER SHARON  
HAD CONFIRMED, AND REPEATED IT WHEN I PRESSED HIM, THAT  
ONLY FOUR MORE SETTLEMENTS WILL BE ANNOUNCED BY THIS  
GOVERNMENT. I ASKED BEGIN IF THAT IS TRUE AND, IF SO,  
COULD I CONVEY IT TO SADAT FROM HIM. BEGIN SAID THAT  
IT IS TRUE, BUT THAT HE WOULD NOT "PAY A PRICE" TO SADAT  
IN THIS WAY. HE SAID I SHOULD REMEMBER WHAT SHARON HAD  
SAID, HE IS THE MINISTER IN CHARGE OF SETTLEMENTS,  
AND TAKE THAT AS AN ACCURATE, AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT.  
(LATER IN THE EVENING, AFTER OUR MEETING, KUBERSKY  
CAME TO MY HOTEL AND, I ASSUME AT BEGIN'S DIRECTION,  
MADE IT QUITE CLEAR TO ME THAT I COULD USE THE SHARON  
STATEMENT WITH SADAT.) I ASKED BEGIN WHAT TO SAY WHEN  
SADAT ASKED ABOUT THE ANTICIPATED MOVE OF BEGIN'S OFFICE  
TO EAST JERUSALEM. BEGIN GAVE ME HIS SPEECH ON THE  
FREEDOM OF LEADERS TO PUT THEIR OFFICES WHERE THEY  
WISHED IN THEIR CAPITALS. HE SAID I SHOULD NOT PRESS  
HIM ON THIS. I SAID THAT SADAT WILL PRESS ME AND I NEED  
AN ANSWER. BEGIN SAID, "TELL HIM YOU MENTIONED IT TO  
ME." I PRESSED AND ASKED IF I COULD TELL SADAT THAT HE,  
BEGIN, UNDERSTOOD THE GRAVITY OF THE ACT. BEGIN SAID  
THAT I "SHOULD NOT USE SUCH WORDS." FINALLY, HE AGREED

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I COULD TELL SADAT THAT BEGIN UNDERSTANDS THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED, THAT SOME IN HIS CABINET OPPOSED THE MOVE, AND THAT THEIR VIEWS WOULD BE CONSIDERED.

8. TURNING THEN TO THE ISSUE OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, I AGAIN REMINDED BEGIN OF THE EXTREMELY GRAVE CONSEQUENCES WHICH WOULD FLOW FROM AN ISRAELI MOVE TO ANNEX THE AREA. I TOLD HIM IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, OF ISRAEL'S COMMITMENTS AND COULD BRING OUR TWO COUNTRIES INTO CONFRONTATION. I SAID SADAT CERTAINLY WOULD ASK ME WHAT ISRAEL INTENDS ON THIS. BEGIN SAID HE DID NOT SEE WHAT ALL THE FUSS WAS ABOUT. HE DOES NOT TAKE ALL THE KNESSET MANEUVERING SERIOUSLY AND, IN ANY CASE, NOTHING COULD BE DONE THERE UNTIL NOVEMBER. BEGIN SAID THAT SECRETARY MUSKIE, AND EVEN PRESIDENT CARTER, HAD AT TIMES SAID ISRAEL SHOULD NOT LEAVE THE GOLAN HEIGHTS. I SAID THIS IS NOT THE ISSUE; THE ISSUE IS THE FORMAL ANNEXATION OF THE AREA. COULD I TAKE IT THAT HE, BEGIN, DID NOT AND WOULD NOT SUPPORT A MOVE TO ANNEX THE GOLAN? BEGIN WOULD NOT DIRECTLY SAY THAT HE WAS OPPOSED, BUT HE INDICATED IT WAS NOT A REAL PROBLEM. WHEN I RAISED THE ISSUE OF HOW ISRAEL TREATS THE PALESTINIANS, I HEARD A LECTURE ON THE DANGER THEY PRESENT TO ISRAEL. I SAID THERE ARE A NUMBER OF THINGS WHICH COULD BE DONE WHICH DO NOT AFFECT SECURITY, SUCH AS THOSE I HAD HEARD ABOUT FROM BURG -- REUNIFICATION OF FAMILIES, FOR EXAMPLE. I TOLD BEGIN THAT I HAD GIVEN BURG A LIST OF 14 STEPS THAT COULD BE TAKEN. WHAT COULD I SAY TO SADAT? I ASKED IF I COULD SAY THAT BEGIN UNDERSTOOD THE PROFOUND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ACTIONS IN THIS AREA AND THE NEED TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM. BEGIN SAID I COULD AND ADDED THAT I SHOULD LET SADAT KNOW THAT ISRAEL MEANS THE PALESTINIANS NO HARM AND, MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE, WANTS TO LIVE IN PEACE WITH THEM.

9. BY THIS TIME, AFTER ALMOST TWO HOURS, WE HAD EXHAUSTED THE MAIN ISSUES ON OUR AGENDA AND I TURNED THE CONVERSATION TO GAZA. I ASKED WHAT BEGIN THOUGHT OF THE "GAZA FIRST" OPTION WHICH HAS BEEN RAISED AT TIMES BY SADAT. BEGIN PREFACED HIS REMARKS BY STATING THAT I SHOULD NOT REPEAT HIS RESPONSE TO SADAT. HE SAID THAT SADAT ALWAYS MENTIONED "GAZA FIRST" IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT SPANNING BOTH THE WEST BANK AND GAZA BUT TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN GAZA FIRST. THIS DID NOT REALLY INTEREST HIM. I ASKED WHAT HIS VIEW WOULD BE OF AN AGREEMENT FOR GAZA FIRST, TO BE IMPLEMENTED WHILE TALKS CONTINUED ON THE WEST BANK. BEGIN IMPLIED THAT HE LIKED THE IDEA AND WOULD BE WILLING TO SUBMIT IT TO

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~~SECRET~~

\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

THE CABINET, AND HE THOUGHT THE CABINET WOULD AGREE, THOUGH BURG WOULD OPPOSE. I OFFERED TO RAISE IT WITH SADAT AND LET HIM KNOW THROUGH SAM LEWIS. BEGIN SAID SUCH AN APPROACH COULD "SHOW THE WAY" AND BE A "PRECEDENT" FOR THE WEST BANKERS. IT MAY NOT AMOUNT TO MUCH IN THE END, BUT I WAS SURPRISED BY THIS COMMENT BECAUSE  
BT

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PAGE 03

OF 03

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OP IMMED  
DE RUEHEG #9408/03 2472344  
O 032319Z SEP 80 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2231  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

SECRET SECTION 03 OF 03 CAIRO 19408

NODIS  
CHEROKEE

FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM  
AMB. LINDWITZ  
IN THE PAST IT WAS PRECISELY THE "PRECEDENT" ELEMENT  
WHICH HAS TURNED BEGIN AWAY FROM THE "GAZA FIRST" IDEA.

10. BEGIN THEN TURNED OUR CONVERSATION TO YOU. HE  
SPOKE WARMLY OF YOUR FRIENDSHIP AND SAID HE LOOKED FOR-  
WARD TO YOUR NEXT MEETING. HE SAID THAT, FOR HIS PART,  
HE NEVER WORRIED ABOUT THE POLLS. ONE WEEK HE WAS 20  
PERCENT AND THE NEXT OVER 60. BEGIN SAID THEY MEAN  
VERY LITTLE. SPEAKING OF HIS OWN ELECTORAL FATE, HE  
SAID HE FELT PERES WAS TRYING TO "PUT ON THE MANTLE"  
TOO SOON. IF THERE ARE GOING TO BE EARLY ELECTIONS  
IN ISRAEL, THEY WILL BE IN MAY. MEANWHILE, RABIN AND  
PERES ARE HAVING THEIR FIGHT PREMATURELY. THE REST OF  
OUR MEETING WAS A RATHER RANDOM DISCUSSION OF EVENTS  
AND TRENDS IN THE REGION. WE PARTED WARMLY AND HAD A  
BRIEF EXCHANGE WITH THE PRESS OUTSIDE BEGIN'S OFFICE  
IN WHICH I TOOK AN ONLY SLIGHTLY MORE OPTIMISTIC  
POSITION THAN THE RATHER GLOOMY ONE I TOOK WITH THE  
PRESS THE DAY BEFORE.

11. SUGGEST DEPARTMENT PASS TO EMBASSY TEL AVIV AND  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM. ATHERTON  
BT

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PAGE 01

OF 01

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED (WITH  
~~SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT~~)

September 5, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK MOE

FROM: Denis Clift

SUBJECT: Lunch with the President, September 8, 1980

I am forwarding (at Tab 1) a recommended insert for the Vice President's use in his lunch with the President, Monday, September 8.

UNCLASSIFIED (WITH  
~~SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT~~)

## OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

September 16, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD MOE

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR LUNCHEON WITH THE PRESIDENT SEPTEMBER 17, 1980

I. Report on trips

- o New York City
- o Scranton/Wilkes-Barre

II. This Week Will Go to Kansas City, Memphis, Arkansas, MichiganIII. Campaign

- o Stridency
- o Need to make more news from White House
  - Should have more events like PFC signings today
  - Should ask Stu and Zbig to inventory possibilities
- o Hope you'll go up to meet with House and Senate caucuses
  - We need to make case on our legislative record
  - We need to get them energized for us, speaking out
- o You should give major speech on difficulties USSR is having
  - Afghanistan, Poland, etc.
  - We tend to think we're the only ones with problems abroad
  - Good chance to show our policies are sound and effective

IV. Economy

- o Unemployment
- o Interest rates
- o Inflation
- o Polls show many people think economy is improving
  - We need to build on this belief, particularly in October after last figures are out.

V. Soviet Soldier in Kabul (see attached)

- o Would be disastrous to return him

VI. US/PRC Relations (see attached)VII. Iran/Hostages (see attached)VIII. Intelligence/Kansas City Speech (see attached)IX. Middle East

Jack English

will



Not all

SECRET ATTACHMENT

Bob O'Keefe

V. Carr

NYE

Sr. Citizens

Stu

Estimates are

crucial cars steel

Teg Bill

gon

can

Jesse

Gairts

Medium

before election



~~SECRET~~

INSERT FOR VICE PRESIDENT'S LUNCHEON WITH THE PRESIDENT  
Wednesday, September 17, 1980

Soviet Soldier/US Embassy Kabul

- The State Department seems to be doing a good job thus far of handling the Soviet soldier's presence at our Embassy in Kabul.
- It is vital that we take every precaution to guard against the soldier's falling back into Soviet hands unless we are 100 percent certain that it is his voluntary wish to return.
- American public opinion was outraged literally for years when the Nixon Administration allowed Soviets to board a Coast Guard cutter and snatch back the Lithuanian seaman Simas Kudirka.
- As long as the Soviet soldier remains in our Embassy, we will be on firm ground. State should not rush into a shaky agreement with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees operation -- itself a shaky operation -- which might risk having the Soviet soldier fall back onto Soviet hands.

US-PRC Relations

- Your meeting this afternoon with Vice Premier Bo marks an important milestone in US-PRC relations and the benefits that are accruing from normalization.
- The signing ceremony for the four agreements on civil aviation, maritime relations, textiles and consular relations will dramatize the soundness of your China policy.
- Despite the changes in the Chinese leadership, they seem determined -- as evidenced by the positive nature of Bo's visit here and Perry's visit to China -- to strengthen our bilateral relationship.

Iran - Hostages - Khomeini Statement

- I have received a number of press questions since Khomeini's statement of last Friday asking for reactions to his specific conditions, and I have of course avoided any specific response.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT  
REVIEW ON SEPTEMBER 16, 2000

DECLASSIFIED

NLC-06-082  
REV 30/06 NSC LITTE  
PV - C = G/G/06



~~SECRET~~

- Zbig has provided me with current papers on our blocked assets and claims positions.

(The President may wish to discuss in some detail his current thinking on the unfolding hostage scenario in coming weeks.)

- The press is determined, if at all possible, to drive a wedge between Administration officials; it is vital that we continue to take the same line as the scenario continues to unfold.

Intelligence - Kansas City Star Speech

- I will be giving an address to Kansas City Star tomorrow stressing the actions your Administration has taken in support of freedom of the press, and reviewing your record of strengthening and reforming the intelligence community.

~~SECRET~~



## OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

September 16, 1980

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD MOE *RM*  
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR LUNCHEON WITH THE  
PRESIDENT -- SEPTEMBER 17, 1980

I. Report on Trips

- o New York City
- o Scranton/Wilkes-Barre

II. This Week Will Go to Kansas City, Memphis, Arkansas, MichiganIII. Campaign

- o Stridency
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(S)  
~~SECRET~~

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CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT  
REVIEW ON SEPTEMBER 16, 2000

DECLASSIFIED

ML/C-06 086  
BY 8/25/00 NSE LESTER  
BY Q NARA DATE 6/9/00

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

Campaign

Flint  
mess up

- Debates ✓
- Monuments ✓  
(Pavilion)
- Farms ✓
- Jews ✓
- ~~Anderson~~
- ~~Auto~~
- BEAC.

Economics = Fed

Horstages  
my Pal → News (Gaby)  
- Full Euro

THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

Al Shanker

Jack Janitz

will announce  
a very limited  
campaign

# SECRET

THIS IS A COVER SHEET

The information in this document  
is classified and as such will be  
treated according to OSD Security  
Instructions. Writing on this  
cover sheet is prohibited.

# SECRET





## OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

September 25, 1980

*Auto*  
*Israel*  
*MDA*  
*Oct 6**Economics*

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD MOE *RM*

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR LUNCHEON WITH THE  
PRESIDENT -- FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1980

- I. Iran/Iraq (see attached)
  - o Important for you to remain presidential
- II. Report on Trips to Rochester, NY; LaCrosse, MN; Rhode Island; Massachusetts; Maine; Connecticut
- III. Next Week Will Go to New Jersey; Illinois; Texas; California; Oregon; Washington
- IV. Debates
  - o Am inclined to accept 3-way Vice Presidential debate if you accept
  - o Am also inclined to try to move it back a week to protect next week's schedule and allow time for preparation
  - o Any thoughts?
- V. Campaign Issues
  - o Anderson as spoiler -- when to take gloves off?
  - o Moral Majority et al -- great potential but must handle carefully
  - o Reagan as threat to peace
    - We should try to handle more subtly
    - Best case: contrast his careless rhetoric with your example of prudent, cautious leadership
  - o Glad you're doing series of positive radio addresses
    - Our troops need more reason to be for us
    - You should leave attacks on Reagan to me and others
- VI. Speeches on International Issues (see attached)
- VII. Greece/Turkey/Cyprus (see attached)
- VIII. Meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister (see attached)
- IX. Economy
  - o Unemployment
  - o Interest Rates
  - o Inflation

~~SECRET~~

INSERT FOR VICE PRESIDENT'S LUNCHEON WITH THE PRESIDENT  
Friday, September 26, 1980

Iran-Iraq

- Your statement of September 24 set the right tone by informing the American people, and foreign audiences, of the U.S. attitude toward the fighting and in providing reassurances on the international oil situation.

Upcoming Speeches on International Issues

- On Tuesday, September 30, I will be flying up to Philadelphia, accompanied by Graham Claytor, to board the SARATOGA as she prepares to arrive for her Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) overhaul. My remarks will focus on the beneficial impact to Philadelphia's shipyard, the community, and the importance of the overhaul to our defense readiness.
- On October 2 I will be in San Diego and plan to address the international energy challenge, and the effectiveness of your energy policy, particularly in light of the Iran-Iraqi conflict.

Greece/Turkey/Cyprus

(If you agree, you may wish to suggest to the President that he personally urge General Rogers and Secretary Muskie to do everything they can to accelerate the pace of the Greek reintegration into NATO. We have had the strongest possible signals that this has got to succeed soon if it is not to be engulfed by the Greek political process. Turkey's General Evren has indicated to the Greeks that the military coup is not an obstacle to the reintegration process.)

Meeting with Japan's Foreign Minister

- On Monday I met with Foreign Minister Ito who personally asked me to convey the gratitude of his government for your travel to Japan earlier this year on the occasion of the Ohira memorial service.
- My meeting with the Foreign Minister came at the end of his round of talks in Washington. I stressed, at the political level, the very real damage to US-Japanese relations that we may expect if Japan does not work hard to help us during the current phase of crisis in our own auto industry.

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT  
REVIEW ON SEPTEMBER 25, 2000

DECLASSIFIED

NLC-06-082  
RSC NSA LETTER 5/31/04  
BY C NARA DATE 06/06/04



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

September 26, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: BILL SMITH

RE: Reestablishment of A President's Science Advisory  
Committee

Background:

The President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) was established by Eisenhower and lasted until it was abolished by Nixon. It was chaired by the President's Science Advisor, contained variously 12-25 members, and gave non-partisan advice to the President on Science policy, legislative initiatives, research priorities and defense and environmental issues.

Nixon abolished it because he didn't like its advice against the ABM, B-1 and other Nixon favorites. Nixon also abolished the President's Science Advisor at the same time.

Ford appointed a Science Advisor but not a committee.

Because Carter promised, in 1976, to reduce the number of Federal Agencies, in lieu of reestablishment of the Committee, he appointed Frank Press Science Advisor, gave him a beefed up staff and also made him head of a new Office of Science and Technology.

Reestablishment of PSAC

You heard the reasons in favor of reestablishment of a committee in Boston. I think you should recommend its reestablishment, and that you make the announcement at a politically advantageous event in the next week or so.

There are two downsides to this:

1) Frank Press is likely to oppose it -- it dilutes his power and as you know he wants the whole show. I have not consulted him, or his office on this issue. If a committee is to be reestablished the President should decide it and Press should not be given an opportunity to end run it. If the President wants to consult, or wants you to consult Press or wants his independent advice, and Press mounts a counter campaign, we are less likely to accomplish anything in time to help in Massachusetts.

2) Reestablishment of PSAC now could be seen as a blatant political act. I say, so what?

m

What if Carter asked  
Japanese to ~~meet~~ ~~meet~~ ~~meet~~  
say, Sept 20<sup>th</sup> — to  
discuss funding of  
the JTC?  
+

② will keep  
25% tougher  
track

Ho-  
③ - Watch Japanese  
Spent


OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

UNCLASSIFIED  
(WITH ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT)

October 23, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift   
SUBJECT: Lunch with the President, October 23, 1980

I am forwarding recommended talking points for your use with the President at lunch today.

UNCLASSIFIED  
(WITH ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT)

~~SECRET~~

TALKING POINTS FOR VICE PRESIDENT'S LUNCH WITH THE PRESIDENT  
October 23, 1980

Muskie Statement

- Eppie Evron has given me his analysis of Ed Koch's concerns -- i.e., Muskie's Security Council abstention vote -- and what will be needed to remedy this.
- Eppie believes that Koch will come around to support us if Muskie issues a strong statement reaffirming that the United States will veto fundamentally flawed and unbalanced resolutions.
- Working with Moses and the NSC staff I have developed a statement (Tab A), Zbig has a copy, the only new language is the last sentence. I strongly recommend that you have Ed Muskie include this statement as soon as possible in his public remarks.

Israel-Golan Heights

- As you know, it is possible that the Begin cabinet may take positive action on a bill calling for annexation of the Golan Heights -- and such action this Sunday would then start the bill on an approval process through the Knesset.
- A message is being proposed by State and the NSC from you to Begin. I think it is important that you send such a message, in friendship, emphasizing the damage that a Golan bill would do to our relations, emphasizing that you have come too far in the peace process to have such a bill derail that process.
- At the same time, I think it important that we work behind the scenes with Begin, and that State and the NSC not get carried away with hypothetical criticism of Israel on this issue at this point.

Saudi Arabia F-15 Study

- The New York Times yesterday carried the story that the Pentagon has a study underway on the Saudi request for offensive equipment for their F-15s.
- This story, if unanswered, will have a disasterous effect on the Jewish community confirming its worst fears and suspicions.

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CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT  
REVIEW ON OCTOBER 23, 2000

DECLASSIFIED

MLJ C-06 OPG  
JED 5/25/00 NSC LTR  
BY Ch NARA, DATE 6/19/00



~~SECRET~~

- I have been in touch with Harold Brown, and he has forwarded a proposed statement that he would issue on this subject (Tab B).
- The statement goes part way, but is not politically sensitive enough. I strongly recommend that you call Harold and tell him that you have asked Al Moses to come to the Pentagon this afternoon to get together with him and work out an agreed statement.

~~SECRET~~

I appeared before the UN Security Council on August 20 to seek to put an end to efforts by some to misuse and abuse the UN Security Council on Arab-Israeli issues. Prior to my appearance there had been a succession of resolutions before the Council and the Emergency Session of the General Assembly that neither aided the Camp David process nor offered a single alternative with the slightest chance of success. In my view, those resolutions failed the critical test of reason, of balance, of accounting for the concerns of both sides and of genuinely serving the objective of peace.

As I stated on August 20, and repeat again today, our government is absolutely and firmly committed to the success of the process begun at Camp David and its ultimate goal of a just and lasting peace throughout the region. Our view is that resolutions in various bodies of the United Nations, harmful to the Israeli peace process, must stop.

The statement I made on August 20 remains the bedrock of our policy in the region. I repeat now what I said then and what the Administration has said elsewhere: we will veto any resolution that would impose Chapter VII sanctions against Israel; we will veto any effort to change Resolution 242; we will oppose and, in the Security Council, veto any effort to deny Israel its rightful place in the United Nations. And if the United Nations is again misused and abused on Arab-Israeli issues, with fundamentally flawed and unbalanced resolutions, we will oppose them and, in the Security Council, veto them.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS STATEMENT ON THE DOD STUDY OF F-15 ASSOCIATED  
EQUIPMENT FOR SAUDI ARABIA

REFERENCE: NY Times Article by R. Halloran (p.17), 22 Oct 80

During their June 1980 meeting in Geneva, Secretary Brown and Prince Sultan, Saudi Minister of Defense and Aviation, agreed that no decisions were imminent on F-15 associated equipment in which the Saudi Arabian Government has expressed an interest, that the matter would remain under examination by the U.S. Government, and that any future decisions regarding them would be preceded by full consultations with the Congress. In this context, the Department of Defense is conducting a technical examination in order to develop the fullest information possible. It will not arrive at any specific positions or recommendations, being intended to provide background for possible future policy determinations. As Secretary Muskie stated in his July 16 letter to Senate Majority Leader Byrd, the Administration has not departed from the assurances given to the Congress by Secretary Brown in 1978, the Saudi request is not a matter pending decision within the U.S. Government, and no decision on this issue will be made without full prior consultations with the Congress.



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