

THE VICE PRESIDENT

Meeting with the President
November 14, 1980, 9:00 a.m.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT


Memo No. 1246-80

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

November 13, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President, Friday,
November 14, 1980, 9:00 a.m.

Hostages in Iran

Excerpts from the President's November 12 press conference, including his comments on the hostage crisis, and a response to a question regarding your future is at Tab 1.

The President yesterday received Warren Christopher's report on his Algerian mission. The President then advised the press that the next step is up to Iran.

Privately Christopher has reported that the three-man Algerian team is dedicated to bringing about the release of the hostages; the team is capable; and the team was extremely positive about the US response.

The text of the US response is at Tab 2. The President has instructed that this be treated as an extremely sensitive document; it has been distributed on a strictly need to know basis, with the distribution extremely limited.

Meetings with Foreign Leaders

Following the election, a number of changes have occurred in the President's schedule. He and Prime Minister Begin met on November 13 (see following item).

The President is still scheduled to meet with Helmut Schmidt on Thursday, November 20.

The President additionally has a meeting scheduled with Costa Rican President Carazo on December 1 or 2.

At this point plans for a Japanese summit meeting and plans for a three-way Carter-Begin-Sadat summit prior to January 20 have also been cancelled.

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CLASSIFIED BY A. DENIS CLIFT
REVIEW ON NOVEMBER 20, 2010

DECLASSIFIED
per 9/12/06 NSC 14.
NLJC-06-087
BY 307 NARA, DATE 9/25/06

Meeting with Begin

The papers for the President's meeting with Prime Minister Begin are at Tab 3. As you will see, given the current status of the Administration, they are somewhat general in tone. At the time of preparing this memorandum, it was not clear whether the President had advised Begin of his most recent Saudi F-15 decision and, if so, the reactions of the Israeli Prime Minister.

As you know Begin indicated upon his arrival in the United States that he would welcome a meeting with President-elect Reagan. However, the President-elect has indicated that such a meeting would not be appropriate.

Saudi F-15 Decision

Following your instructions last Friday I sent the message at Tab 4 from you to the President requesting that any decision on the Saudi F-15s be delayed until your return to Washington on Friday, November 14. Separately, Al Moses urged the President to delay a decision. Nonetheless, the President, as reflected in the papers at Tab 4, did approve delivery of the first F-15s to Saudi Arabia in the first quarter of FY 81 in Saudi Arabia, instead of the third quarter of 81 in the United States.

As you know, from the defense/foreign policy viewpoint, Muskie, Brown, Christopher and Brzezinski recommended that the President approve early delivery, and Muskie and Christopher separately indicated their belief that early delivery would not violate the President's recent commitments on the F-15 issue.

CSCE -- Madrid Review Conference

Max Kampelman stood his ground throughout the entire preparatory sessions for the Madrid conference which opened for three minutes yesterday and then adjourned as the delegations continued to try to reach agreement on procedures. The Soviets continue to press for a specific cutoff date for debates on human rights, Afghanistan, and other issues troublesome to them, while we continue to insist that the delegations give these issues a full and thorough review.

Polish Crisis

Following two weeks of increasing tension, Poland's Supreme Court resolved the dispute between the government and the new Solidarity Free Trade Union concerning the registration of the Union and the inclusion in its statutes of a reference

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to the leading role of the party. On November 10, the Court overturned a lower court decision amending Solidarity's statutes, approved them in a form agreeable to the Union and appended to them a protocol containing the first seven points of the Gdansk Strike Agreement of August 31, one of which gives recognition to the leading role of the party. This compromise has the blessing of the government, whose lawyer sided with the Union before the Supreme Court, and presumably the Soviets. Following the decision, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa met with Cardinal Wyszynski and then called off the strike threatened for November 12. Reflecting the decrease in tensions, the government immediately rescinded restrictions imposed the day before on western journalists -- restrictions which were probably an over reaction in the first place.

The Soviets appear content at this point to allow the Polish Government to take the lead in dealing with the new Polish unions. If force were to be used, it seems clear that the Soviets would direct the Polish military to act at least in the first instance.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

Excerpts From President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Matters

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 12 — Following are excerpts from a White House transcript of President Carter's news conference yesterday at the White House:

The Christopher Mission

Q. Mr. President, we want to know about the Christopher mission. What can you tell us about this?

A. Well, Mr. Christopher reported a successful mission to me. He went there to relate to the Algerians our basic response to the Iranian proposals. The Algerians accepted the outline of response and have already relayed to the Iranians the response. So Christopher believes it was a successful mission.

Status of Hostage Crisis

Q. Have you heard anything back from the Iranians? A. No. Q. Do you think after the Christopher mission you're any closer to a resolution of the hostage crisis?

A. It's up to the Iranians. I think it would certainly be to their advantage and to ours to resolve this issue without any further delay. I think our answers are adequate and I believe that the Iranian proposal was a basis for a resolution of the differences.

Reagan Soviet Strategy

Q. Mr. President, do you have any comment on the wisdom and the likely success of President-elect Reagan's strategy of dealing with the Soviet Union based on linkage?

A. Well, as I said, I think, the day after the election to a group of reporters, I'll be very constructive and very helpful to Governor Reagan in his new effort or different effort to control nuclear weapons.

Meeting With Reagan

Q. Will you be meeting with Mr. Reagan soon?

A. Yes. I intend to meet with him maybe sometime next week. Whenever

is convenient for him. I have not quite so heavy a schedule these days as I have had in the past.

Position on Arms Control

Q. Mr. President, after all you said on the campaign trail about Governor Reagan's views on arms control, the possibility of an arms race, the likelihood, his advocacy of an arms race, how can you in good conscience now say that you would support that?

A. Well, I think my approach is best and I would much prefer that SALT II be ratified or at least amended minimally by the United States Senate and then ratified and then let the Soviets reject or accept the minimal amendments, but Governor Reagan will be President next January and after he is President and assumes the responsibility for negotiating arms control limitations on behalf of our nation. But I will abandon my own approach and support his, as long as I can do it in good conscience. The fact is that we need to limit and control nuclear arms between ourselves and the Soviet Union. We need to keep adequate flexibility for our own country, reduce substantially the Soviet arsenals, have a system of monitoring using our own technical means, the compliance with the treaty, all those things are built into SALT II, and if Governor Reagan can find an alternative means to reach the same goals, I will be supportive.

The other part is on nonproliferation. I think our nation must continue to be the world leader in preventing the proliferation of nuclear explosives among nations that don't presently have them and I will give every support to that proposition, hopefully support of Governor Reagan's commitment to the same goal.

Meeting With Begin

Q. Can you make progress on Palestinian autonomy tomorrow in your talks to Mr. Begin? What do you hope to accomplish?

A. I don't really know until I talk to him. The basic responsibility is now and has been and will be in the future on the shoulders of the parties directly involved. The two national leaders, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, obviously must continue their efforts. My independent report from both of them is that they are determined to do so. There is another negotiating session scheduled later this year between Sol Linowitz representing me and the representatives of President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin. I presume that will go forward. I'll urge them to do so. That was supposed to be a pre-summit conference.

If that session is constructive, there would be a possibility — unlikely possibility — that a summit would take place prior to inauguration. I doubt that that would be the case.

Action Till Inauguration

Q. Mr. President, Mr. Meese apparently gave you — or presented your Administration — with a list of things that Governor Reagan does not want done between now and inauguration. Could you tell us in your own words what it is that you want to see accomplished between now and his inauguration and what you're willing to pass on right now and leave to his administration?

A. Obviously, we'll try to accommodate Governor Reagan as much as we can, but the ultimate judgment about what I do and what I don't do will have to be made by me unilaterally. We'll have a meeting tomorrow morning with the Democratic Congressional leadership — a routine meeting that's been scheduled for a long time to go down the list of agenda items to see which other ones that have a chance for adequate support to pass and which ones are high enough priority to pass. I

don't want to start making a list because I'm afraid if I fail to name something, people might think I deliberately excluded it, but obviously the Alaska lands bill, the appropriations bill to reconciliation legislation, the second budget resolution, those kinds of things are highly valuable to the nation and also have a good chance to pass and I think have an adequate degree of bipartisan support.

The youth employment bill, to me, is very important. The super fund is another item on which there might be a bipartisan agreement. That still has to be explored, but obviously executive decisions would have to be made by me until the day I go out of office and then the next day would be made by Governor Reagan.

On longterm things — national health insurance, welfare reform — these are obviously matters that would have to wait for the subsequent administration, or I'll just have to make a judgment on individual items, what to pursue and what not to pursue.

Reagan Budget Cuts

Q. Mr. President, the Reagan transition people say they've identified 6 percent of the Federal budget that they say amounts to waste and fillout and so forth that can be — could conceivably be eliminated. Does that surprise you that they've been able to identify such a large percentage of —

A. You ask — you made one predication that they said they had identified that and your second predication was that they had identified that. They're not necessarily the same. It's easy — it's easy to say that you can eliminate 6 percent, but you can't eliminate 6 percent of veteran's benefits, retirement benefits, disability benefits, you can't eliminate 6 percent of Social Security payments, you can't eliminate 6 percent of the commitment of our nation to defense capability. It's easier to say 6 percent, but there's some parts in there that can't be cut. But if you talk about 6 percent of the total, you're talking

about 35 to 40 percent of things that can be cut, and that's an extraordinary reduction in items like Headstart or food stamps or special programs for the elderly like Meals on Wheels.

Now then, when you leave out defense and entitlement programs, you've really got only about 25 or 30 percent left. So I would doubt the accuracy of that figure. I notice that the second budget resolution from the House committee does encompass a 2 percent reduction. I think that's within the realm of feasibility. Whether it's practical, I don't know. But I think a 6 percent across the board cut would be very, very excessive.

Carter's Own Future

Q. Mr. President, could you be any more specific about your own plans for the future?

A. Yes, I'd be glad to. I'm going to go out of office on Inauguration Day. I intend to go to Plains that day, and I'll be living in Plains for the foreseeable future, certainly for a number of months, maybe longer. I'll set up a transition office in Georgia, likely in Atlanta, and as you know, the transition time runs either for six months or some of the transition funds can be expended after the end of the fiscal year, which is the 30th of September.

And then following that, I'll be living the life of a former President under routine budgetary funding. I'll probably do some writing. I intend to play a fairly low profile role during the foreseeable months ahead.

Mistakes in Campaign

Q. Looking back, do you see any obvious mistakes of the last two months which have led to the events of now?

A. Well, I obviously didn't get enough votes. No, I don't think I want to comment on the reasons for the election defeat. I think that's a counterproductive effort when you lost like I did to try to justify it.

Eventually, I think, history will

judge me and my own Administration. There are obviously a lot of very difficult issues which we addressed. One of the, I guess anomalies, is that the things on which I worked hardest were the ones that were politically counterproductive. My most serious political challenge ever was the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty. I think it was necessary, it was important, it was a chore, a job that other Presidents had passed on to their successors. I decided to address it. We did it successfully by the narrowest of margins. It was obviously a costly political thing to do.

And I think some of our policies on the Third World nations opening up Africa or maybe the China decision, even the Mideast thing caused me very serious political problems with certain constituency groups. But dealing with the energy problem, there's no way to make friends or get votes that way. I'm not saying this in a complaining sense, but I think the issues that we addressed finally, most of them that were most difficult were not politically advantageous. So I believe that it will just have to be a long historical analysis of what we did well and didn't do well.

Encouragement of Mondale

Q. Why did you encourage Fritz Mondale to start laying the groundwork for 1984?

A. I don't want to encourage or discourage him. I could not possibly think higher of Fritz Mondale than I do. No President has ever been blessed as I have with a better Vice President. Fritz and I are actually almost as close as brothers. We share the intimacies, the responsibilities officially, politically. Our families are close. We've never had a serious disagreement although Fritz has been absolutely free to disagree with me on policy and put his views forward strongly. As far as I know, our staffs have never had a disagreement that was serious. So I have the highest regard for Fritz, but as far as trying to influence what he does in the future — I will not do that.

Position paper, Iran

Le Département d'Etat des Etats-Unis présente ses compliments au Ministère des Affaires étrangères de la République algérienne démocratique et populaire et a l'honneur de lui demander que la position du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis dont l'exposé est ci-inclus soit communiquée au Gouvernement de la République islamique d'Iran en réponse à la résolution adoptée le 2 novembre 1980 par l'Assemblée islamique consultative de l'Iran.

Pièce jointe:

Déclaration de position

Département d'Etat

Washington, le 8 novembre 1980

The Department of State of the United States presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria and has the honor to request that the enclosed position of the Government of the United States be communicated to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in response to the resolution adopted on November 2, 1980, by the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran.

Enclosure

Position paper.

Department of State,

Washington, November 8, 1980.

POSITION DU
GOUVERNEMENT DES ETATS-UNIS

Le gouvernement des Etats-Unis a reçu la Résolution adoptée le 2 novembre 1980 par l'Assemblée consultative islamique d'Iran et l'a soigneusement examinée.

Les Etats-Unis acceptent en principe la Résolution comme base pour mettre fin à la crise et proposent ci-après une série d'ordres et déclarations présidentiels en réponse à la Résolution. Chacun des ordres et déclarations présidentiels sera rendu public et entrera en vigueur dès que les 52 otages auront quitté l'Iran sains et saufs.

1. Les Etats-Unis sont prêts à remettre au gouvernement algérien une copie d'une déclaration formelle signée par le Président des Etats-Unis par laquelle les Etats-Unis définissent leur politique qui est de s'abstenir de toute ingérence directe ou indirecte, politique ou militaire, dans les affaires internes de l'Iran.

2. a. Les Etats-Unis sont prêts à remettre au gouvernement algérien une copie d'un ordre présidentiel dûment signé débloquent tous les capitaux et biens de l'Iran qui relèvent de la juridiction des Etats-Unis, qu'ils se trouvent aux Etats-Unis ou ailleurs, en vue de permettre aux parties d'avancer rapidement vers une reprise des relations financières normales qu'elles existaient avant le 14 novembre 1979.

b. Aux termes d'un ordre présidentiel concomitant, la Federal Reserve Bank mettra à la disposition du gouvernement de l'Iran tous les capitaux, biens et propriétés iraniens détenus par la banque qui se montent à environ \$2,5 milliards.

c. Aux termes d'un autre ordre présidentiel concomitant, toutes les restrictions juridiques américaines seront levées en ce qui concerne les quelque \$3 milliards supplémentaires en dépôt dans des banques américaines en Europe.

d. Afin d'annuler tous ordres et saisies judiciaires relatifs aux capitaux et biens de l'Iran relevant de la juridiction américaine, les Etats-Unis sont prêts à remettre au gouvernement algérien une copie d'une déclaration présidentielle dûment signée engageant les Etats-Unis à se joindre au gouvernement iranien en vue d'élaborer une procédure de règlement des revendications qui mènera, aussi rapidement que possible, à l'annulation desdits ordres et saisies.

3. a. Les Etats-Unis sont prêts à remettre au gouvernement algérien une copie d'un ordre présidentiel dûment signé abrogeant toutes les sanctions économiques et financières et toutes les interdictions juridiques imposées depuis la prise des otages qui portent sur les exportations, les importations et les transactions iraniennes, en vue de permettre au commerce entre les deux pays de reprendre sur la base des conditions qui existaient avant le 14 novembre 1979.

b. Les Etats-Unis sont prêts à remettre au gouvernement algérien une copie d'une déclaration présidentielle dûment signée engageant les Etats-Unis à retirer toutes les revendications contre l'Iran qui sont en instance devant la Cour internationale de Justice et de s'abstenir de poursuivre toute autre demande

de dommages-intérêts au titre de tout préjudice subi à la suite de la prise et de la détention de l'ambassade américaine et des otages à Téhéran.

c. De plus, comme il est indiqué à l'alinéa b du paragraphe 2, les Etats-Unis sont prêts à s'engager à se joindre au gouvernement iranien pour l'élaboration d'une procédure de règlement des revendications qui mènera à l'annulation et à la résiliation de toutes les revendications présentées à l'encontre de l'Iran par le gouvernement des Etats-Unis et ses ressortissants, y compris les firmes américaines.

4. a. Les Etats-Unis sont prêts à remettre au gouvernement algérien une copie d'un ordre présidentiel dûment signé interdisant le transfert hors des Etats-Unis de toute propriété appartenant à ou provenant de la succession de l'ex-Chah.

b. Aux termes du même ordre, une réglementation sera instituée selon laquelle toute personne ayant des informations relatives à de telles propriétés sera tenue d'en faire part au gouvernement des Etats-Unis pour transmission au gouvernement iranien.

c. Cet ordre chargera également l'Attorney General des Etats-Unis de faire savoir aux tribunaux américains compétents que la position du gouvernement des Etats-Unis est la suivante:

i. Aucune revendication du gouvernement de l'Iran sur les biens de l'ex-Chah, ne devrait être considérée comme étant légalement interdite, que ce soit en vertu des principes

de l'immunité souveraine ou de la doctrine de l'acte discrétionnaire.

ii. Tout décret et jugement du gouvernement iranien relatif à ces propriétés peuvent s'appliquer dans les tribunaux des Etats-Unis conformément au droit américain.

5. a. Les Etats-Unis estiment que la présente réponse à la décision du Majlis iranien mène à son terme l'avant-dernière étape dans la solution du problème des otages. La dernière étape qui, selon les Etats-Unis, devrait se situer dans les quelques jours à venir, consisterait à organiser la libération de tous les otages par les bons offices du gouvernement algérien en même temps que les Etats-Unis prendraient toutes les mesures précisées plus haut.

b. En vue de réaliser cette dernière étape, les Etats-Unis remettront au gouvernement algérien des copies des déclarations et ordres présidentiels susmentionnés qui entreront en vigueur dès que tous les otages auront quitté l'Iran sains et saufs. Lorsque le gouvernement algérien aura confirmé qu'ils ont quitté l'Iran sains et saufs, le gouvernement des Etats-Unis rendra publics lesdits ordres et déclarations présidentiels.

POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE UNITED STATES

The Government of the United States has received and has carefully reviewed the Resolution adopted on November 2, 1980, by the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran.

The United States accepts in principle the Resolution as the basis for ending the crisis, and hereby proposes the following series of Presidential orders and declarations in response to the Resolution. Each of the Presidential orders and declarations is to be made public and become effective upon safe departure from Iran of the 52 hostages.

1. The United States is prepared to deliver to the Government of Algeria a copy of a formal declaration signed by the President of the United States, in which the United States states its policy which is to refrain from interfering, either directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in the internal affairs of Iran.

2. (a) The United States is prepared to deliver to the Government of Algeria a copy of a signed Presidential order unblocking all of the

capital and assets of Iran within the jurisdiction of the United States, whether located in the U.S. or other countries, in order to allow the parties to move expeditiously toward a resumption of normal financial relations as they existed before November 14, 1979.

(b) An accompanying Presidential order will direct the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to make available to the Government of Iran all Iranian capital, assets, and properties held by the bank, amounting to approximately \$2.5 billion.

(c) An additional accompanying Presidential order will also remove all U.S. legal restrictions from an additional sum of approximately \$3 billion on deposit with U.S. banks in Europe.

(d) In order to bring about the cancellation of all judicial orders and attachments relating to the capital and assets of Iran within U.S. jurisdiction, the United States is prepared to deliver to the Government of Algeria a copy of a signed Presidential declaration committing the United States to join with the Government of Iran in a claims settlement procedure which will lead to the cancellation of such orders and attachments as rapidly as possible.

3. (a) The United States is prepared to deliver to the Government of Algeria a copy of a signed Presidential order revoking all economic and financial sanctions and all legal prohibitions imposed since the seizure of the hostages against exports to, imports from, and transactions with Iran in order to allow trade between the two countries to be resumed on the basis of conditions prior to November 14, 1979.

(b) The United States is prepared to deliver to the Government of Algeria a copy of a signed Presidential declaration committing the United States to withdraw all claims pending against Iran in the International Court of Justice and to refrain from pursuing any other claims for financial damages on account of injuries or harm emanating from the seizure and detention of the U.S. Embassy and the hostages in Tehran.

(c) In addition, as indicated in Paragraph 2(d) above, the United States is prepared to commit itself to join with the Government of Iran in a claims settlement procedure which will

lead to the cancellation and annulment of all claims asserted by the Government of the United States and U.S. nationals, including U.S. companies, against Iran.

4. (a) The United States is prepared to deliver to the Government of Algeria a copy of a signed Presidential order prohibiting the transfer out of the United States of any properties owned by or derived from the estate of the former Shah.

(b) The same order will direct the promulgation of a regulation requiring all persons with knowledge of such properties to report such information to the United States Government in order that it may be furnished to the Government of Iran.

(c) The order will also direct the Attorney General of the United States to give notice to all appropriate U.S. courts that it is the position of the United States Government (i) that no claim of the Government of Iran to the property of the former Shah should be considered legally barred either by principles of sovereign immunity or the act of state doctrine,

and (ii) that all decrees and judgments of the Government of Iran relating to such property may be enforced in the courts of the United States in accordance with U.S. law.

5. (a) The United States believes that this response to the decision of the Iranian Majlis represents the completion of the penultimate stage in resolving the hostage issue. The final step, which the United States believes should be taken in the next several days, would be to arrange, through the good offices of the Government of Algeria, release of all hostages concurrent with the United States taking all the specific steps noted above.

(b) To implement this final step, the United States will deposit with the Government of Algeria copies of the Presidential declarations and orders noted above, to be effective upon the safe departure of all the hostages from Iran. When their safe departure is confirmed by the Government of Algeria, the Government of the United States will publicly release the Presidential orders and declarations.

PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATIONS AND ORDERS

TAB

1. Non-Intervention

- Presidential declaration. 1

2. Iranian Assets

- Presidential order unblocking
all Iranian assets. 2
- Presidential order directing payment
by the Federal Reserve Bank. 3
- Presidential order revoking attachments
on Iranian assets held by the Federal
Reserve Bank (not to be shown to the
Algerians). 3A
- Presidential order authorizing placement
of Federal Reserve funds in third country
financial institution. 4
- Presidential order unblocking Iranian
deposits in U.S. banks overseas. 5
- Presidential declaration on claims
settlement. 6

3. Cancelling Sanctions and U.S. Claims

- Presidential order revoking prohibitions
against trade with Iran. 7
- Presidential declaration on non-
prosecution of claims. 8

4. The Shah's Assets

- Presidential order (a) freezing the Shah's
assets, (b) requiring reporting, and (c)
directing the Attorney General. 9

5. Effective Date

- Presidential declaration (not to be
shown to the Algerians). 10

DECLARATIONS ET DECRETS PRESIDENTIELS

TAB

1. Non-Intervention

- Déclaration présidentielle. 1

2. Avoirs iraniens

- Décret présidentiel débloquant tous les avoirs iraniens. 2
- Décret présidentiel ordonnant paiement par la Federal Reserve Bank. 3
- Décret présidentiel autorisant le placement de fonds de la Federal Reserve dans une institution financière d'un pays tiers. 4
- Décret présidentiel débloquant les dépôts iraniens dans des banques américaines à l'étranger. 5
- Déclaration présidentielle relative au règlement de contentieux. 6

3. Annulation de sanctions et d'actions en justice des Etats-Unis

- Décret présidentiel révoquant les interdictions frappant les échanges commerciaux avec l'Iran 7
- Déclaration présidentielle relative à l'abandon de poursuite d'actions en justice 8

4. Avoirs du Chah

- Décret présidentiel a) gelant les avoirs du Chah, b) exigeant communication de rapports et c) donnant des instructions à l'Attorney General. 9

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DECLARATION OFFICIELLE
DU PRESIDENT DES ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE

NON-INTERVENTION EN IRAN

Le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique déclare par les présentes que la politique des Etats-Unis est d'accepter la Révolution iranienne et la liberté de choix du peuple d'Iran; d'accepter le Gouvernement de la République islamique d'Iran tel qu'il est actuellement constitué et de ne pas intervenir, directement ou indirectement, politiquement ou militairement, dans les affaires intérieures de l'Iran.

Cette Déclaration de politique peut être rendue publique au moment où le Gouvernement d'Algérie certifie au Gouvernement des Etats-Unis que tous les employés de l'Ambassade des Etats-Unis en Iran ainsi que tous les autres ressortissants américains étant détenus comme otages en Iran ont quitté l'Iran sains et saufs.

Jimmy Carter

Le 8 novembre 1980

THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

FORMAL DECLARATION OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NON-INTERVENTION IN IRAN

The Government of the United States of America hereby declares that it is the policy of the United States to accept the Iranian Revolution and the freedom of choice of the people of Iran; to accept the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran as presently constituted; and not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or militarily, in Iran's internal affairs.

This Declaration of policy may be made public at such time as the Government of Algeria certifies to the United States Government that all employees of the United States Embassy in Iran and all other U.S. nationals being held hostage in Iran have safely departed from Iran.


Jimmy Carter

November 8, 1980

AUTORISATION DE TRANSFERER CERTAINSBIENS DU GOUVERNEMENT IRANIEN

En vertu des pouvoirs qui me sont conférés, en qualité de Président, par la Constitution et les lois des Etats-Unis, y compris la Section 203 de l'International Emergency Powers Act [Loi sur les pouvoirs économiques en cas d'état d'urgence international] (50 U.S.C. 1702), la Section 301 du Titre 3 du Code des Etats-Unis, la Section 1732 du Titre 22 du Code des Etats-Unis et la Section 301 du National Emergencies Act [Loi relative aux états d'urgence nationaux] (50 U.S.C. 1631), étant donné la menace persistante inhabituelle et extraordinaire pour la sécurité nationale, pour la politique étrangère et pour l'économie des Etats-Unis, sur laquelle j'ai fondé mes déclarations d'état d'urgence national dans le Décret présidentiel 12170, rendu le 14 novembre 1979, et dans le Décret présidentiel 12211, rendu le 17 avril 1980, et afin d'entreprendre le processus de normalisation des relations entre les Etats-Unis et l'Iran, il est ordonné par les présentes qu'à compter de la date d'entrée en vigueur du présent Décret:

1-101. tous les capitaux et avoirs du Gouvernement de l'Iran, ses administrations [instrumentalities] ou les personnes morales qu'il contrôle, qui relèvent de la juridiction des Etats-Unis ou qui sont en la possession de personnes relevant de la juridiction des Etats-Unis, soient par les présentes débloqués en ce sens que de tels capitaux et biens seraient

autorisés à être détenus ou transférés comme l'ordonneraient le Gouvernement de l'Iran, ses administrations ou les personnes morales qu'il contrôle, après l'entrée en vigueur du présent Décret;

1-102. le Secrétaire du Trésor soit délégué et autorisé à exercer toutes les fonctions conférées au Président par l'International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) aux fins d'exécution du présent Décret;

1-103. le présent Décret entre en vigueur au moment où le gouvernement de l'Algérie certifiera au Gouvernement des Etats-Unis que tous les employés de l'ambassade des Etats-Unis en Iran et tous les autres ressortissants américains détenus comme otages ont quitté l'Iran sains et saufs.

Jimmy Carter

THE WHITE HOUSE

le 3 novembre 1980

EXECUTIVE ORDER


AUTHORIZATION TO TRANSFER CERTAIN
IRANIAN GOVERNMENT PROPERTY

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including Section 203 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702), Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, Section 1732 of Title 22 of the United States Code, and Section 301 of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1631), in view of the continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United States upon which I based my declarations of national emergency in Executive Order 12170, issued November 14, 1979, and in Executive Order 12211, issued April 17, 1980, and to begin the process of normalization of relations between the United States and Iran, it is hereby ordered that as of the effective date of this Order:

1-101. All capital and assets of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities or controlled entities, which are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or which are in the possession of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States are hereby unblocked in that such capital and assets are authorized to be held or transferred as directed after the effective date by the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities or controlled entities.

1-102. The Secretary of the Treasury is delegated and authorized to exercise all functions vested in the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to carry out the purposes of this Order.

1-103. This Order shall become effective at such time as the Government of Algeria certifies to the United States Government that all employees of the United States Embassy in Iran and all other U.S. nationals being held hostage in Iran have safely departed from Iran.


Jimmy Carter

THE WHITE HOUSE

November 8, 1980.



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