



Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

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THE U.S. POSITION PAPER, THE PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATION AT TAB 6 (ESTABLISHMENT OF CLAIMS PROGRAM) WOULD BE AMENDED SO THAT THE DECLARATION WOULD READ AS FOLLOWS (THE POSITION PAPER ITSELF WOULD NOT BE CHANGED).

BEGIN TEXT: ESTABLISHMENT OF CLAIMS PROGRAM. ①

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HEREBY DECLARES THAT, IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE 52 UNITED STATES NATIONALS NOW BEING HELD HOSTAGE IN IRAN HAVE SAFELY DEPARTED FROM IRAN, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WILL JOIN WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN IN ESTABLISHING A COMMISSION TO ESTABLISH A CLAIMS PROGRAM UNDER WHICH ALL U.S. CLAIMS AGAINST IRAN WILL BE CANCELLED BY THREE METHODS: (I) INDIVIDUAL CLAIMS MAY BE CANCELLED THROUGH AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL CREDITOR AND THE SPECIFIC DEBITOR; (II) A CATEGORY OR CATEGORIES OF CLAIMS MAY BE SETTLED BY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS; AND (III) CLAIMS NOT CANCELLED BY ONE OF THE OTHER OF THE TWO PREVIOUS METHODS SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO ARBITRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH RECOGNIZED PROCEDURES FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION.

THIS DECLARATION SHALL BECOME EFFECTIVE AT THE SAME TIME AS THE GOVERNMENT OF ALGERIA CERTIFIES TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THAT ALL EMPLOYEES OF THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN IRAN AND ALL OTHER U.S. NATIONALS BEING HELD HOSTAGE IN IRAN HAVE SAFELY DEPARTED FROM IRAN. END TEXT.

B. ALGERIANS QUESTIONED NECESSITY OF FINAL SENTENCE IN PARAGRAPH 1-101 OF ORDER AT TAB 7 (REVOCATION OF PRO- ②

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RESTRICTIONS AGAINST TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING IRAN), WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE EFFECT OF CANCELLING LICENSES WHICH ARE STILL VALID. SINCE ALL SUCH LICENSES HAVE ~~ALREADY EXPIRED~~, WE PROPOSE TO SUGGEST DELETION OF THIS ~~REVENUE~~ LANGUAGE. IF PRESSED, WE MAY WISH TO SUGGEST SUBSTITUTION OF NEW SENTENCE TO READ AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN QUOTE: THE DURATION OF ANY EXPORT LICENSE ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE OR THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE LESS THAN ONE YEAR PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 4, 1979, SHALL EXTEND FOR TWO YEARS FROM THE DATE OF ISSUE. END QUOTE. IN SEPTTEL TO NEA-CONSTABLE, WE HAVE SOUGHT DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS ON EFFECT OF SUCH A SENTENCE.

C. TO CLARIFY THE INTENT OF PARAGRAPH 3(C) OF POSITION PAPER, THE LAST FOUR LINES OF THAT PARAGRAPH SHOULD BE AMENDED TO READ: BEGIN QUOTE....LEAD TO THE CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF ALL CLAIMS ASSERTED BY U.S. NATIONALS, INCLUDING U.S. COMPANIES, AND BY AGENCIES, INSTRUMENTALITIES, AND CONTROLLED ENTITIES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. END QUOTE.

D. TO MAKE PARAGRAPH 4(B) OF THE POSITION PAPER MORE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE PRESENT TEXT OF THE ORDER AT TAB 9 (RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFER OF PROPERTY OF THE FORMER SHAH) THAT PARAGRAPH WOULD BE AMENDED TO READ: QUOTE: THE SAME ORDER WILL REQUIRE THE COMPILATION AND DELIVERY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN, OF ALL INFORMATION WHICH IS IN THE POSSESSION OF U.S. NATIONALS OR IN THE FINANCIAL RECORDS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND WHICH MAY SERVE TO IDENTIFY ANY PROPERTIES OF THE FORMER SHAH IN THE UNITED STATES. END QUOTE.

J. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR BRIEFING THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY MUSKIE ON THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE. ALTHOUGH OUR TEAM HERE FEELS QUITE CONFIDENT THAT THE CHANGES ARE TECHNICAL, AND DO NOT INVOLVE SUBSTANTIVE ALTERATIONS.

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4. FYI: WE HAVE LEFT OPEN WITH THE ALGERIANS OVERNIGHT NOW TO HANDLE THE COPIES OF THE SIGNED PRESIDENTIAL ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS. I AM OPPOSED TO THE TRANSMISSION OF THESE SIGNED COPIES TO TEBRAM FOR OBVIOUS REASONS. MY PREFERENCE IS TO BRING THE SIGNED COPIES BACK TO WASHINGTON NOW THAT THE ALGERIANS HAVE SEEN THEM, AND THE ALGERIANS MAY PREFER THAT, TOO. IF THE ALGERIANS WANT TO RETAIN THESE DOCUMENTS, I WOULD PROPOSE TO LEAVE ONLY THE FRENCH VERSIONS WHICH DO NOT CONTAIN THE PRESIDENT'S SIGNATURES. ~~ALTHE~~

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Israeli
Prime Minister Begin
Thursday, November 13, 1980
11:00 a.m.

At Tab A is Ed Muskie's memo on this meeting. Its key judgment is that there is little value in holding a tripartite summit in the remaining weeks of your Administration, because there is no likelihood of achieving the Israelis concessions that would be needed for a positive outcome. (Sadat, for his part, has been guarded in his comments, but they add up to a preference for postponing a summit). Sol generally supports this judgment, but still sees the problem of keeping Camp David alive. Sol will be seeing Begin Wednesday evening, and will report to you if there is any reason to change this judgment. (S)

The Egyptians have now decided to go forward with the trilateral negotiating session on November 17th, in order not to be accused by Israel of another "postponement", but do not see it as a serious negotiating session. The Israelis have indicated that they see little value in trying to improve on the Memorandum of Understanding prior to the Inauguration. (C)

Given these factors, it appears the best we can hope for would be to press for some continuing work on the Memorandum of Understanding, while impressing upon the parties -- especially the Israelis -- the importance that the Camp David process not be lost sight of during the pre- and post-Inaugural transition period and the run-up to the Israeli elections. In particular, I am not sanguine that the U.S. would be able effectively to move forward with our strategy for southwest Asia if the peace process is effectively on "hold" until the end of 1981. (S)

In addition to the issues contained in Ed's briefing papers, Begin could raise three other subjects:

- acceleration of F-15 deliveries to Saudi Arabia;
- aid level for Israel; and

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-- U.S. sale of an Air Combat Maneuver System (ACMS) to Israel. This is a sophisticated system for pilot training, which the Israelis propose to use across territory embracing the West Bank, for the period after the Sinai is returned to Egypt. We have urged that an Air Force Survey team visit Israel, before we grant a license, to see whether geographic alternatives are available. The Israelis are unhappy with this approach, seeing it to be a "condition" of the sale. If Begin raises the issue, I believe we should stick with this procedural approach. (S)

It would also be useful to impress upon Begin the risks of escalation in Lebanon. (S)

Participants: Joining you with Begin will be Ed Muskie, Sol Linowitz, myself, David Aaron, Sam Lewis, Al Moses, Hal Saunders, and Robert Hunter. On the Israeli side, we do not yet have a list of participants. (U)

Press Plan: Announced, photo opportunity at the beginning. (If you wish, you might want to walk Begin out to the press for a farewell statement, to stress U.S.-Israeli ties and the importance of the peace process. If you do this, you will be asked about whether there is to be a summit before January 20.) (U)

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11/12/80

President's Meeting with Prime Minister
Begin, 11:00, Thursday, November 13, 1980

Israeli Participants

Prime Minister Begin
Ambassador Ephraim Evron
Yehiel Kadishai, Director, PM's Bureau
Yehuda Avner, Adviser to the PM
Reuven Hecht, Adviser to the PM
General Ephraim Poran, Military Secretary
Dan Pattir, Public Affairs Adviser
Jacob Nehushtan, Israel Embassy
Eitan Bentsur, Israel Embassy

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

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SUBJECT: An Air Combat Maneuvering System for Israel

THE ISSUE: The Israelis have decided to purchase from General Dynamics an Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumented (ACMI) System, and have informed us that they wish to install six system substations in the West Bank. We have told the Israelis we are disposed to approve the system but believe it should be located inside the Green Line, and have offered a U.S. survey team to examine the possibility of siting inside the Green Line. It is possible Prime Minister Begin may raise this question with you to press for unconditional approval of the ACMI system.

BACKGROUND: The ACMI system is designed to give combat pilots a chance to develop the skills (and learn by the mistakes) they would normally get only in combat.

In October 1979, when we first made our concerns known to Minister of Defense Weizman about installing parts of the ACMI system in the West Bank, he said that Israel planned to install the system in the Negev Desert. In mid-1980, we reiterated to Deputy Defense Minister Zippori the problems we would have with approving the system for installation on the West Bank. Subsequently, the Israelis informed us that they planned to install six system substations on the West Bank, within existing Israeli military installations there.

The Israelis argue that they have no alternative but to locate the system on the West Bank. They maintain that current training activities in the Negev and the presence of commercial air routes in the Negev and off-shore rule out these areas as alternate locations for the ACMI.

While the West Bank may be a more attractive location for the ACMI than other sites within the Green Line, we are not convinced location of the system inside the Green Line is impossible. Moreover, we believe that approval of West Bank installations now would permit Israel to create a fait accompli of U.S. support for Israeli claims that West Bank air space is necessary

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for Israeli Air Force training. Finally, we have to assume that installation of the stations would result in a significant increase in the number of Israeli training flights over the West Bank, which would be a constant reminder of Israel's presence there at a time when, if the autonomy negotiations succeed, that area should be under a regime of self-government.*

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

-- We recognize the importance for Israel of having the best possible training for its military personnel. We also recognize the great sacrifices which Israel has made and will be making by giving up valuable training space in the Sinai.

-- We are in full agreement with Israel about the value of an ACMI system for training purposes. The sale of the system itself is not an issue with us. Our concerns have been solely with location.

-- We continue to believe the system can and should be installed inside the Green Line. We propose that a U.S. survey team examine the possibility of siting inside the Green Line, and assist Israel in determining the most effective siting there.

-- Our intent is not to set preconditions for approval of the export license, nor are we taking a position which would in any way prejudice the outcome of the autonomy talks. Since we feel Israel ought to have the system, we believe it is important to have a U.S. technical team discuss the feasibility of siting within the Green Line with Israeli technical experts.

*DIA predicts a "dramatic increase in the use of West Bank airspace by Israeli high performance aircraft" -- perhaps 30 or more sorties per day.

November 12, 1980

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

November 11, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Edmund S. Muskie *ESM*

Subject: Your Meeting with Prime Minister Begin, November 13, 1980

Prime Minister Begin is coming to the United States, for the second time this year, to speak at a dinner in New York on November 11 commemorating the 100th anniversary of the birth of his mentor Zev Jabotinsky, founder of the Revisionist Movement of Zionism. Your invitation to Begin to come to Washington during his visit to the United States was extended by Ambassador Linowitz when he was in Israel at the end of August.

This meeting will provide an opportunity for you to step back and reflect with Begin on what the two of you have achieved together over the past four years and to impress upon him the importance of sustaining the peace process in 1981 and beyond. From everything we have heard, Begin has decided not to call for elections before the mandatory date of November 17, 1981, apparently in the hope that his government can in the meantime recoup its popularity. This means that electoral considerations will come increasingly to influence--and to constrain--Israel's ability to move forward seriously with the autonomy negotiations. Meaningful negotiations will become very difficult beyond the early part of next year. After that we will have to wait until the Israeli elections are past and a new Israeli Government has been formed. That could take us into early 1982.

There is serious question whether the autonomy negotiations can be left in suspension that long without considerable damage to the integrity and future

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prospects of the Camp David process. This is a point that merits careful consideration, particularly since Begin may want to know if you are still considering hosting a summit. I have taken advantage of having both Roy Atherton and Sam Lewis in Washington to discuss with them the merits of a summit in late December or early January. It is their joint view that such a meeting in that time frame would not serve to move the process forward. They are confident, however, that the concept of autonomy as the guiding principle of a transitional period in the West Bank and Gaza will survive a period of relative inactivity. This is obviously another major achievement of the Camp David process, in addition to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

It is my judgment that there is nothing to be gained from a Middle East summit prior to January 20. Neither party is enthusiastic about the idea, although both would probably come if invited. The consensus is, however, that there is simply no likelihood of achieving the kind of Israeli concessions that might lead to a constructive outcome.

I believe you should encourage Begin to continue to explore the key issues which have emerged during the negotiations thus far. We cannot expect much in the way of results very soon, since Begin may believe he has already gone slightly further than is politically wise. Nevertheless, it will be important to use your meeting with Begin to impress upon him the need to take a broader view of autonomy, to get him to ponder the dangers of allowing the negotiations to drag on unsuccessfully and to urge him to renew and reaffirm his commitment to the work that he, President Sadat and you set in train at Camp David just over two years ago.

We hope you can also take up with Begin the Golan annexation issue. The prospect of a summit might provide us some leverage on this, but this alone is insufficient reason for holding one. Our other primary pressure point, the danger of undermining Resolution 242 as the agreed basis for negotiations, remains valid and should be emphasized. Begin is under strong pressure from certain members of his coalition and from right wing groups to support the annexation bills now before the

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Knesset, and he will probably have to take a position in the coming weeks. Sam Lewis has conveyed our views about this and I recently sent the Prime Minister an oral message, but it would be very useful if you could underscore to him that annexation could seriously undercut the achievements you and he have made to date and irreparably damage the prospects for further progress.

We also recommend that you urge Begin not to supply Iran with military items so long as the hostages are held. Begin is likely to raise the subject since he is under heavy pressure from advisers who see an important strategic asset for Israel in reestablishment of Israeli links with Iran. We believe Begin will accede to your wishes--at least for the time being--if you take a strong stand that to proceed with any shipments could undermine the delicate negotiations now underway for the hostage release. However, Begin will be looking for a more detailed rationale of why we are advising against this step in order to have ammunition with his own Cabinet. The main point to make is that if the line is not held firmly by all parties on sanctions, it could give the Iranians illusions that they might over time find ways of meeting the most critical of their military needs without releasing the hostages.

Begin's Perceptions

Begin can be expected to argue that the Iran-Iraq war, the Syrian-Soviet Friendship Treaty and the continuing Soviet presence in Afghanistan validate Israel's view that the Palestinian issue is not the region's main problem. The thrust of his overall presentation is likely to be that, while we should proceed with the Camp David process, we must move cautiously and that given the other events in the area and the deep divisions among the Arabs we have ample time.

Begin will also express concern that while the United States has resumed its "strategic dialogue" with Israel (Assistant Secretary of Defense McGiffert has invited the Israeli Deputy Defense Minister here for early December), we do not presently envisage an operational role for Israel in the protection of Western interests in the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. He

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will try to engage you in a broader discussion of ways in which the U.S.-Israel "alliance" can be given more concrete meaning.

On the autonomy negotiations, as you know, Begin is deeply entrenched behind his basic premise that Israel can only grant limited autonomy to the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. He believes the two interruptions of negotiations this year were Sadat's fault, that on neither settlements nor the Jerusalem issue was Israel violating anything agreed to at Camp David. He is convinced that Sadat is asking him to agree to steps which could quite likely open the way to establishment of a Palestinian state. Begin remains adamant that Israel's position on Jerusalem must not be affected by an autonomy agreement, and he has made clear that he would prefer the Jerusalem issue not to come up at all.

Objectives and General Points to Make

-- After discussing with Begin what the two of you have accomplished over the past four years, to impress strongly on him the importance of making some visible progress in the period ahead.

-- To bring Begin to understand that Israel will need to broaden its concept of autonomy if the negotiations are to reach a successful conclusion.

-- To inform him, if he asks, that you do not plan to convoke a summit.

-- To impress upon Begin very strongly that passage of a bill annexing Golan could undermine Resolution 242 and thus foreclose any reasonable prospect for further progress in the peace negotiations, and to persuade Begin to stand forthrightly against annexation.

-- And to urge him not to supply Iran with military items so long as our people remain captive there. Israel would be breaking with international sanctions at a very delicate time.

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Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Current Status of Autonomy Negotiations
- Tab 2 - Syrian-Soviet Friendship Treaty
- Tab 3 - Iraq-Iran War Update
- Tab 4 - Iraqi Nuclear Effort and U.S. Policy

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

Status of the Autonomy Negotiations

The last trilateral autonomy negotiations took place in Washington on October 14 and 15. Previously, the negotiations had been suspended by the Egyptians in response to the Jerusalem law. The October meeting was the result of Ambassador Linowitz' early September trip to Israel and Egypt, at which time he obtained the agreement of both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat to resume the negotiations and to begin preparations for a tripartite summit.

The October meetings produced no significant substantive progress. Much of the time was spent in trying to find a way to permit the Israelis to characterize the meetings as a continuation of the autonomy negotiations as such, while permitting the Egyptians to assert that the meetings were merely preparatory for a future summit.

However, during September and October Ambassador Linowitz' staff was working bilaterally with both the Egyptians and Israelis on the preparation of a "Memorandum of Understanding." In early September, Ambassador Linowitz had left with both Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat a U.S. draft, and both sides prepared counter-drafts of their own in response. These counter-drafts -- particularly Israel's -- demonstrated a serious effort (the first) to address in a constructive way some of the most problematic issues, such as land and water.

In order to take advantage of this opening, and to keep the negotiations moving forward, Ambassador Jim Leonard travelled to both Israel and Egypt this past week with a revised U.S. draft, which incorporated some of the Israeli and Egyptian comments and suggestions on the previous draft and some new language of our own designed to further bridge some of the substantive differences. As of today, he has finished initial talks in both Israel and Egypt and is returning to Israel for some follow-up talks. The next step in this evolutionary process will be another U.S. draft.

In sum, the "Memorandum of Understanding" exercise appears to present the best opportunity at this time for making progress on the substantive issues in the negotiations. Such a

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Memorandum, if agreed upon, would not be a complete and final agreement on autonomy. Rather, it would be an interim document which would establish principles and parameters for subsequent negotiations, which in turn would seek to work out the details necessary for an operational "full autonomy" consistent with Camp David and Israel's vital needs. Hopefully, such a Memorandum would attract the participation of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza or, if it did not, at least buy us, Israel and Egypt the time needed to complete the negotiations on our own.

The next trilateral meeting is presently scheduled for November 17, in either Egypt or Israel. This date was agreed during the October meetings. The Egyptians, however, have now raised the possibility of either postponing or suspending this meeting, and we are still attempting to resolve this matter.

November 10, 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

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Evaluation of Soviet-Syrian Friendship Treaty

Syria's signature of a Friendship Treaty with the USSR has generated considerable Israeli concern. The Israelis are particularly troubled by suspicions that the Treaty has a secret annex spelling out a greater Soviet role in Syria's defense. Begin has no hard intelligence, but suspects that a secret agreement provides for the entry of Soviet military units into Syria, either at Syria's invitation or Moscow's own initiative. Such intervention, in Begin's view, could pose a serious strategic threat for Israel, the U.S., and NATO. Begin is less concerned about the possibility of an enhanced Syrian-Soviet arms relationship or a qualitative change in their political relationship.

The Syrian Treaty, similar to the Friendship and Cooperation pacts Moscow has signed with 10 other Third World countries, is a significant development because it:

- strengthens Syria's attachment to the USSR, and
- provides Moscow with new assurance of an influential role in any comprehensive Middle East settlement plan.

We have no evidence of any secret mutual defense annex to the Soviet-Syrian Friendship Treaty. The Treaty does, however, create a new umbrella framework for the already existing and substantial Syrian-Soviet economic and military-supply relationships. It also binds both parties to a long-range, general commitment to cooperate and coordinate policies on matters of mutual interest.

The security provisions in the Treaty text obligate both parties to consult and cooperate in response to threats to the peace and the security of the signatories. Thus, the security commitments

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are vague and stop well short of an explicit Soviet guarantee to defend Syria or to prop up the Assad regime against domestic opposition. However, in calling for the continued development of Syria's defense capacity, the Treaty language is almost identical with the military cooperation clauses of the Treaty signed with Afghanistan. We have no hard evidence of new military supply agreements. However, we do assume that one was negotiated similar to previous agreements which since 1975 have amounted to \$4.7 billion. The most recent agreement reportedly provides Syria a limited number of MIG-27s, additional T-72 tanks and an advanced air defense system. In return, the Syrians may have acquiesced to a Soviet demand for greater access to Syrian air and naval facilities.

The Treaty provision on political consultation is significant in that it singles out cooperation on Middle East issues for special mention. Moscow probably hopes to use this provision to constrain Syria both strategically and politically, while increasing Soviet influence over Syria's policies in Lebanon, the Arab states, the non-aligned and the West. The provision also gives Moscow a formal basis to demand that Syria consult with the USSR before initiating political or military moves which could adversely affect Soviet interests.

The Soviets undoubtedly see the Treaty as a significant political success. The Treaty demonstrates that the USSR can conduct successful diplomacy with at least one Islamic state, despite the invasion and continued occupation of Afghanistan. Moscow probably hopes that the Treaty provides a durable basis for Soviet-Syrian relations which could survive Assad's fall from power. The Soviets attach primary importance to the Treaty as a sign of Syrian willingness to ensure Soviet participation in any future peace settlement including Syria, and as a symbol of Syrian willingness to support Soviet strategic goals in the region. Thus, the Treaty enhances Soviet long-term interests in the Middle East and influence in the eastern Mediterranean. At the same time we have no evidence that the treaty signals Syria's or the USSR's abandonment of support for a negotiated, comprehensive peace settlement.

November 7, 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

CONFIDENTIAL

Iraq-Iran Conflict

Military Aspects

The war has bogged down and neither side appears to be planning dramatic new moves. The Iraqis seem to have miscalculated, believing initially that the revolution had so crippled the Iranian military, particularly the air force, that Iraqi forces would have little trouble in seizing their objectives. However, the effectiveness of comparatively stubborn Iranian resistance has been magnified by slow Iraqi tactics and rigid command practices. In taking most of the port of Khorramshahr, the Iraqis found the price in casualties stiff. The house to house fighting favored even comparatively poorly trained Iranian revolutionary guard defenders.

The Iraqi army seems to be digging into positions all along its line from Dezful in central Iran to Abadan in the south. Abadan, where Iran's main oil refinery has been severely damaged by bombing and shelling, is effectively cut off from outside reinforcement but the Iraqis show no signs of wanting to make an all-out attack. Both sides have turned to increasing use of air and artillery bombardment as a substitute for ground attacks. In short, the Iraqi strategy would seem to indicate that they think they have taken enough to eventually force the Iranians to the bargaining table. The Iranians, on the other hand, seem prepared to fight on and have sent reinforcement to the Dezful sector.

Neither side has appeared yet to be severely hampered by shortages of spare parts or expendables, although the Iranian sortie rate has diminished slowly from the early days of the war. The Iranians appear to have succeeded in obtaining limited military resupply from various sources, including North Korea, Syria and Libya. Iraq, with its Gulf ports closed, has relied heavily on traffic through the Jordanian port of Aqaba. Very little of this traffic has been military, however, and Iraq seems to be functioning largely from prepositioned spares and supplies.

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There are indications that the Soviets are delaying or ceasing military deliveries to Iraq. Jordan has apparently provided no military supplies to Iraq, and King Hussein is not inclined to send Jordanian forces into the war.

Both sides have hit at the other's oil installations. The Iraqis have stopped operations at most oil installations, either because of damage or to avoid damage, but there is no apparent fuel shortage in Iraq. Iranian facilities have also been damaged, but limited exports continue, primarily from Levan Island, and refining operations in Iran continue at Tehran, Shiraz and Isfahan.

Diplomatic Activity

We have been working quietly with the Security Council in its efforts to bring about a cessation of hostilities. We believe the UN should remain the focus of efforts to find formulas for ending the conflict. The Security Council's support for the sending of an envoy or envoys of the Secretary General to Baghdad and Tehran is a welcome step forward. We continue to believe, however, that the Council must begin grappling with substance and working toward a new resolution in order to establish a framework for guiding the two sides to start negotiations. We are now working with the Western allies in New York to get a new substantive resolution established in the Security Council. The new resolution would follow up on Security Council Resolution 479 of September 28. Although we support supplementary efforts by other international groups. Islamic conference mediation efforts have not borne fruit, and the NAM initiative has so far been equally unsuccessful. Iran refuses to negotiate with Iraq until its troops have withdrawn from its territory. Iraq claims withdrawal cannot be accomplished until Iran agrees to its territorial demands. Iran continues to call for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, while Iraq demands compliance with the principle of "noninterference."

Iranian and Iraqi Political Situation

The war appears to have won Iran's Khomeini regime increased domestic political support. Iran's leadership also seems to have a growing awareness of the damage from international diplomatic isolation and commercial boycotts,

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resulting from the hostage issue, to its ability to fight the war on the battlefield and in international fora. There has been no significant opposition to the regime's war effort in Iraq. Each side appears to be far from its goal of removing the other's regime due to a lack of organized political opposition or alternative to the current leadership.

We are working for an end to the fighting between the two nations, in the UN and elsewhere. We hope that a way can be found to bring both parties to end the conflict and to negotiate their differences. We believe this conflict can and must be resolved through respect for cardinal principles of international law--that territory must not be seized by force of arms and that disputes should be settled by peaceful means. We oppose the dismemberment of Iran. The cohesion and stability of Iran is in the interest of the region as a whole. We believe that neither side should seek to interfere in the affairs of the other.

We continue to work to keep the conflict from spreading beyond Iran and Iraq. To this end we are helping our non-belligerent friends in the area who are threatened by this conflict. We are also urging all other nations--in the region and beyond--to avoid involvement and to work to stop the fighting.

We have pledged to do what is necessary to protect free shipping in the Strait of Hormuz from any interference. All nations have a profound interest in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf.

November 7, 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

Iraqi Nuclear Effort

The Israelis are very concerned about Iraq's nuclear programs -- and the assistance given by France and Italy in acquiring nuclear technology and equipment that could provide nuclear weapons capability. Some Israelis have even threatened preemptive action against Iraqi facilities. Last summer Prime Minister Begin appealed to the President through Ambassador Lewis about French exports of highly enriched (weapon-grade) uranium fuel to Iraq. Since that time we have had some discussions with the Israelis on this issue.

Iraq is an NPT party and had IAEA safeguards on its nuclear facilities. We have no hard evidence that Iraq intends to develop nuclear weapons. However, parts of their program including the development of reprocessing capability exceed their peaceful requirements, particularly as Iraq has no power reactors. We believe that the Iraqi nuclear program is planned to give them an option to develop nuclear explosives.

France has supplied Iraq with a large research reactor called OSIRAK, a smaller reactor called ISIS and ancillary facilities, and has contracted for approximately 80 kilograms of HEU, roughly a two year supply for OSIRAK. The French have shipped about 12 kg of this fuel to Iraq (about 25 or 30 kg are needed for a simple weapon). The Italians are supplying several installations, including facilities capable of reprocessing spent fuel to obtain small quantities of plutonium and irradiated enriched uranium. They also are providing training for Iraqi scientists in basic technologies of reprocessing and separation of plutonium. They may also shortly begin a feasibility study which could ultimately lead to Iraqi acquisition of a natural uranium fueled reactor, which has significant proliferation risks.

We have had extensive discussions (1) with France to get them to minimize stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in Iraq and to move to less sensitive fuel as soon as it is available, and (2) with Italy to get them to avoid further cooperation in sensitive areas like reprocessing.

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The French have informed us on a very confidential basis of steps they are taking to reduce the proliferation risks of their assistance to Iraq. These include French presence at the reactor, prompt irradiation of fuel upon arrival in Iraq, and limiting the amount of HEU in Iraq. However, as a result of the recent hostilities, the Iraqi military has taken over control of Iraq's nuclear research center, and French technicians apparently do not have access to the fuel and Iraq has suspended IAEA inspections. The French have assured us that they would consult with us before shipping any more HEU to Iraq.

Our dialogue with the Italians is on three levels - a political dialogue in which our concerns have been firmly and repeatedly registered; an informal technical dialogue with the Italian Atomic Energy Commission on the precise nature of Italian-Iraqi cooperation; and a dialogue concerning technical characteristics that might enhance proliferation resistance with the government-controlled firm handling the reactor feasibility study.

Thus far, the results of our dialogue are ambiguous. You received assurances from then Prime Minister Cossiga that Italy is strongly committed to non-proliferation, and will avoid transferring sensitive technologies not in line with the various supplier group understandings. We are attempting now to reaffirm these assurances from PM Forlani. On the technical front, we now have a clearer understanding of the nature of Italian assistance to Iraq. However, we still have some questions regarding the extent of the Italian commitment.

We have told the Israelis on a very confidential basis about our discussions with the French and the Italians. The Israelis are very skeptical of French intentions, and of the efficacy of French efforts to avoid misuse of the HEU and reactor. (However, we believe that the proliferation risks associated with the French assistance as described to us are manageable.) The Israelis are also aware of the longer-term and higher-risk aspects of Italy's cooperation in the reprocessing area. In our view, Italian assistance potentially represents a more serious proliferation risk but it may still be some years in the future before it could be realized.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The "hold"
is concerned
with bomb
loads & offensive
capability - not
delivery schedules
J

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT, CAMP DAVID
VIA THE SITUATION ROOM
FROM: The Vice President
SUBJECT: Pending Saudi F-15 Decision

It is my understanding that recommendations are being made that you move quickly on the issue of the Saudi Arabian F-15s. I feel very strongly about this issue. We made important promises and undertook very serious commitments during the campaign which I believe must be honored in the decision making process.

I attach importance to being present and participating in the decision on this issue and would greatly appreciate your delaying a decision on this subject until I return to Washington on Friday, November 14.

Best regards, Fritz.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFIED BY THE VICE PRESIDENT
REVIEW ON NOVEMBER 7, 1986

DECLASSIFIED

per 9/12/06 NSC /tr.
NLIC-06-087
BY BAE 9/25/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

November 11, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

ZB

Attached is a copy of your message to the President on the pending Saudi F-15 decision, with the President's comment: "The 'hold' is concerned with bomb racks and offensive capability -- not delivery schedules."

Attachment

SECRET

Review November 11, 1986

DECLASSIFIED

per 9/12/06 NSC Hrv.
NLJC-06-087
BY *BRZ* NARA, DATE 9/25/06

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 11, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The President has approved the acceleration of F-15 deliveries to Saudi Arabia described in your memo of November 5.

The President also approved Secretary Muskie's recommendation that consultations with the Congressional leadership and the Israelis be carried out.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

~~SECRET~~

Review November 11, 1986

DECLASSIFIED
per 9/12/06 NSC Htr.
NISC-06-087
BY BTS NARA DATE 9/25/06

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 11, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has approved the acceleration of F-15 deliveries to Saudi Arabia as described in Secretary Brown's memorandum of November 5.

Attached is a copy of your memorandum to the President of November 6 on which the President has approved your recommendation for consultations with the Congressional leadership and the Israelis.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

~~SECRET~~

Review November 11, 1986

DECLASSIFIED
per 9/12/06 NSC 1tr.
NLC JC-06-087
BY: BAF NARA DATE 9/25/06

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 6, 1980

*I called
H. Brown*
L

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From:

Edmund S. Muskie *ESM*

Subject:

Acceleration of F-15 Deliveries to
Saudi Arabia

I have seen Harold Brown's memorandum to you recommending that we provide early delivery of and training for the F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia. I concur in Harold's proposal believing that this step will provide us with significant security and political advantages.

Last summer we discussed with Congressional staff an earlier proposal to compress the delivery of F-15 aircraft. We encountered only limited objection in the reactions from staff and Members, and believe Harold's current proposal is manageable, particularly in light of the more serious security problems in the region since then. I understand that Harold wants to propose to the Saudis only the accelerated delivery at this time, holding the possibility of compressed delivery for a later time should we need it. I also concur in this approach.

I believe, however, that it is prudent in terms of our continuing and important arms relationship with Saudi Arabia that we inform the Congressional leadership (Byrd, Baker, the Speaker and Rhodes, specifically) of our decision to accelerate the F-15 delivery prior to rather than after we have informed the Saudis.

I also believe that we must inform the Israelis of our decision after we have conveyed it through General Jones to the Saudis.

Recommendation

That you approve Harold's recommendation with the modifications regarding consultations with the Congressional leadership and Israelis, as noted above.

Approve

☒

Disapprove

☐

RDS-3 11/6/00

DECLASSIFIED
per 9/12/06 NSC Hvr
NLJ-06-087
BY *AS* NARA DATE 9/25/06



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