



THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 10, 1977

~~SECRET~~  
Fritz  
Read notes -  
J.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: The Vice President *W*

SUBJECT: Objectives During Visit to Europe for  
Talks with Vorster and European Leaders

We are in the final preparatory stage for my forthcoming visit in your behalf to Portugal, Spain, Austria, Yugoslavia and the United Kingdom.

As currently scheduled, I will depart for Lisbon this Saturday for meetings with President Eanes and Prime Minister Soares on May 16; talks with King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Suarez in Madrid on May 17; and with Chancellor Kreisky in Vienna on May 18.

The talks with South African Prime Minister Vorster are set for Vienna on May 19 and 20. I will then travel to Belgrade on the afternoon of May 20 for meetings on May 20-21 with President Tito and members of the Yugoslav leadership; then to London on May 22 to debrief Prime Minister Callaghan and Foreign Secretary Owen on the Vorster meetings.

There are three basic elements to the visit, each of priority importance to your foreign policy objectives. My purpose will be:

- to demonstrate in Portugal and Spain the United States' support for their return to democracy;
- to convey to Prime Minister Vorster your policy toward Southern Africa including the United States' views on the role South Africa must play in current efforts to resolve the Rhodesian and Namibian problems, and on the approach South Africa must take within its society if our relations are not to suffer;

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6  
PER 7/23/99 USC RE MC-98-249  
BY *[signature]* MARS. DATE 3/22/06

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

- to emphasize to President Tito the importance your Administration places on Yugoslavia's independence, political unity and territorial integrity.

I do not plan to become a negotiator on contentious issues in any of my meetings, but I do anticipate an in-depth discussion with Vorster. The following paragraphs summarize principal issues I expect to be raised during the visit, review the approach I plan to take, and request your guidance.

Southern Africa -- Talks with Vorster. The principal purpose of the meeting with Vorster is to convey authoritatively to the South Africans our new policy on southern Africa: that we seek a progressive transformation of South African society as well as a constructive South African role on Rhodesia and Namibia. Our relations are at a watershed; their future depends on South African actions on all three questions.

A secondary objective will be to seek from Vorster a number of specific assurances -- particularly on Rhodesia and Namibia. Whether or not Vorster gives such assurances, our meeting will make clear to South Africa -- and equally important to the rest of Africa -- exactly where we stand.

I would plan to begin our meeting with a private session to set the agenda and to establish the following general framework for our discussion of Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa.

- South African actions are pivotal for the future of all southern Africa.
- We are gravely concerned about the implications of a gathering racial war in the region: for the destruction that it would bring to all the peoples of the region, for the ensuing growth in the Soviet influence in Africa, and for the divisive impact this could have on the United States and its allies and friends.
- We have been going through a transition in our own society of which we are justly proud. We will not turn our back on this experience in our foreign policy. This makes it inconceivable that we could support governments pursuing contrary principles, or remain politically neutral in a struggle for basic human justice.

~~SECRET~~

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- 3 -

- It is imperative therefore that the South African government understand clearly the fundamental character of our position. We all have a stake in progress. We would welcome positive South African actions that can lead to an improvement in our relations and a supportive American response. But we are at a watershed, and a lack of progress will inevitably affect our relations for the worse.

Approve ✓ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

On Rhodesia, I will review where we stand on the new negotiating effort and press him:

- to use his influence with Smith in support of a reasonable agreement on a settlement, including elections and a transfer to majority rule.
- to not just take the position that South Africa will enforce what Smith will agree to, but that Vorster will make a public commitment to acknowledge an internationally recognized Zimbabwe during 1978, and follow through.

Approve ✓ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

On Namibia, I will reinforce the Contact Group's efforts by urging flexibility and cooperation in working toward a solution, based on UNSC Resolution 385, which is internationally acceptable. Specifically, I will ask that:

- He not establish a central administration authority that would be the unacceptable Turnhalle interim government by another name.
- He lend his fullest cooperation in facilitating an agreement with the UN Secretary General on the holding of elections for a constituent assembly in which all interested parties are consulted and can participate fully, and on other problems impeding an internationally acceptable solution.

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On South Africa, the toughest issue, I want to make clear that the strength of our support for a progressive transformation of South African society is not tactical, not conditioned on the help they give us on Namibia and Rhodesia. (I will put the point to Vorster more delicately -- that we look for progress on three issues.) I would like your endorsement of this approach as our fundamental strategy -- recognizing if the South Africans change course on apartheid, we will do all we can to help them over the tough times ahead.

*Fritz - Listen a lot but make our position clear - you have plenty of time with him -*

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

In elaborating our approach, I will explain that while it is not our role to define the specific actions South Africa should take, Vorster should understand:

- our deep and abiding commitment to racial justice, reinforced by our recent experience. He should not misjudge or underestimate the depth of America's dedication to human rights. *ok*
- our consequent inability to accept the apartheid system in South Africa. *Get from Andy degree of flexibility & minimum acceptable progress year by year*
- our conviction that there must be full and equal political participation and economic opportunity and justice accorded to all South African people. Otherwise there will be no peace.
- our judgment that the system South Africa defends is encouraging the growth of Communist influence in South Africa and our determination not to let our antipathy to communism draw us into actions contrary to our basic values. Moreover, the best way to beat communism is to move toward social justice.
- that these circumstances underline the need for a new direction in South African policy.
- that if such a new and positive course can be charted, South Africa will have our support and understanding. The press of international events makes such action urgent.
- that without such a change, the United States, more in sorrow than in anger, will pursue the course (both bilaterally and in the UN) dictated by its principles, values and sense of justice.

*Possibility of S Africa working with other nations to help poor LDC's in Africa - if they don't remain pariahs*

-- the choice is South Africa's.

Approve   L   Disapprove           

Public Handling:

Our general approach will be to keep expectations for concrete achievements realistically low. I plan to make clear that it fits in with our overall policy to support majority rule and the progressive transformation of South African society. I will make clear our willingness to work with the South Africans to this end should they choose to accompany us on this road.

Prior to the meeting, I plan to explain to the press in general terms the purpose of the meeting. The statement I propose to use is at Tab B. This is designed to counteract suspicions over the purpose of the talks without prejudging the outcome.

If Vorster is receptive to our approach, at the end of the session, I would brief the press. The most favorable outcome I can foresee is outlined in the statement at Tab C. This will have to be scaled downward to reflect unachieved objectives.

If the meeting fails to elicit a favorable Vorster response, I plan a statement consistent with our overall objective of making America's new policy clear to the world. This will:

- show the Africans our determination to work change in South Africa as well as Rhodesia and Namibia and thereby give added credibility to our overall Africa policy;
- increase the pressure on Vorster.

I believe this is essential despite whatever risk there may be of making Vorster even less disposed to cooperate on Rhodesia and Namibia.

Approve            Disapprove           

*ok, but sequential progress should be continued. let Vorster see what they will do & how long it will take. Measure this against Andy's expectations. Don't set our expectations so high as to elicit cooperation. He must get credit for what he does, & not appear afraid of us.*

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6

Portugal. The visit to Lisbon will permit us to bolster Portugal's still-fragile democratic institutions through a clear, public demonstration of U.S. support. I will emphasize U.S. satisfaction with Prime Minister Soares' strong stand on human rights. Consolidation of Portugal's democratic gains will depend in large part on Portugal's efforts toward economic recovery. I will stress your commitment to arranging a multilateral lending program to provide \$700-\$800 million in balance of payments aid between now and the end of FY 78 -- there will be a key meeting of the consortium countries on the day of my talks in Lisbon. I will state the importance we attach, as NATO allies, to our defense relationship, noting that we will continue to work with other NATO countries to equip a new 4,800-man air-transportable Portuguese brigade for NATO. I will say that we look forward to full renewal of our Azores Base rights and that we are prepared to discuss the Azores agreement whenever it is convenient for the Portuguese Government.

On facilitating resettlement of Portuguese in the United States, I will state that while it is unlikely that the Congress will pass legislation exempting Portugal from normal immigration requirements, Portuguese immigration to the United States, now 10,000-12,000 a year, could be increased somewhat within the 20,000 per year limitation if the Portuguese could persuade private, usually church-affiliated voluntary agencies specializing in resettlement assistance to help find appropriate jobs in the U.S. They should be encouraged to seek these employment opportunities outside the economically depressed centers of traditional Portuguese immigration such as New England and the Newark area (southern California's Portuguese-American concentration is economically better off). The resettlement problem is one for which Portuguese self-help offers the best chance of solution. Such activities could increase immigration by 2,000-3,000 annually.

Recognizing the current grip that the Portuguese Communists have on the unions, I will say that we are ready to cooperate in the strengthening of Portugal's democratic unions through one or more AID programs.

With your agreement, I will take the position as outlined above on US-Portuguese economic, political and security interests in my talks with President Eanes and Prime Minister Soares.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ ✓ \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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7

Spain. In Madrid, I will note the encouraging progress toward democracy which has been achieved, and U.S. support for efforts by King Juan Carlos, the government and the genuinely democratic forces to lay the groundwork for an open and pluralistic society -- with the first Parliamentary elections on June 15. (While commending this process, I will make clear that we are not attempting to pick Spain's leaders.)

*European  
nations ready  
for Spain to  
join NATO after  
elections can  
be demonstrated  
& Constitution  
adopted -*

I will state our belief that Spain has the right to a more active role in European affairs and that we will support Spain's entry into NATO when the Spanish are ready for that step. Following up on discussions with Prime Minister Suarez in Washington, I will state Secretary Brown's readiness to consider more US-Spanish military exchanges, contributing to our mutual defense interests and exposing Spanish officers to the role of the military in U.S. society.

Taking into account Spain's commitment to nuclear power as a primary energy source, I will state that we want to assure dependable supplies of fuel and equipment while taking the necessary steps to avoid nuclear weapons proliferation. I will encourage Spain to accede to the NPT and I will confirm that Spain will be welcome to join the nuclear fuel cycle evaluation effort. On trade, I will describe our support -- and the progress at the London summit -- for freer world trade and the resolution of trade problems through multilateral trade negotiations (MTN).

Bearing in mind Spain's traditionally friendly ties with Arab countries, I will review your commitment and your efforts to promote a Middle East settlement. I will recommend that Spain encourage Arab moderation and flexibility, and that Spain help to reduce Israel's fear of isolation by establishing diplomatic relations, as other European states have done. With your agreement, I will base my discussions with King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Suarez on these agenda items.

Approve ✓ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

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- 8 -

Austria. Chancellor Kreisky clearly welcomes my visit to Vienna in your behalf as it will further highlight Austria's international role as an "active neutral" nation and Kreisky's role personally as an international statesman. I will take the occasion of my talks with the Chancellor to review a number of international issues of current importance, issues on which Kreisky and the Austrians can be helpful, including: the approach the U.S. plans to take in the Belgrade CSCE meeting on security and cooperation in Europe; our dedication to the pursuit of human rights as a fundamental tenet of US foreign policy and our appreciation for Kreisky's strong stand on this issue; the encouragement we take from the democratic evolution in Portugal and Spain and our hope that Kreisky will speak out in favor of these positive developments; our policy toward Yugoslavia in the context of East-West relations; and our assessment of developments relating to Greece/Turkey/Cyprus and the Middle East. I will emphasize our very great appreciation for talks with Vorster. With your agreement, I will base my conversations with the Austrian Chancellor on this agenda of international issues.

Approve

✓

Disapprove

Yugoslavia. I believe the Yugoslavs are looking forward to this visit because of the early restoration of high-level US-Yugoslav contacts it will bring. My primary objective in Yugoslavia will be to convince President Tito and leading members of his government of your support for Yugoslavia's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. I will state that the US respects Yugoslavia's place in the non-aligned movement. At the same time, we believe Yugoslavia must respect our interests in multilateral as well as bilateral relations if our relationship is to prosper.

By the time of my visit, we hope to have negotiated a satisfactory solution to the most contentious issue in our bilateral relations -- that of the impasse of an export license for the Westinghouse-supplied nuclear reactor destined for Yugoslavia. We hope the Yugoslavs will give us the assurances we require on reprocessing and disposition of fuel. I will state that we will want to assure dependable supplies of fuel and equipment while taking necessary steps to avoid nuclear weapons proliferation, and I will confirm that Yugoslavia will be welcome to join the nuclear fuel cycle evaluation effort.

~~SECRET~~

*Let Tito know  
this is a multinational  
concern - we are not  
singling out Yugoslavia for special  
stringency.*



The Yugoslavs have indicated their belief that we are not forceful enough in prosecuting Yugoslav emigre terrorists. Prior to my departure, I will discuss this issue with Attorney General Bell so as to be able to assure Tito that we are determined to prevent and punish terrorists; that we are giving high priority to the bombing of Yugoslavia's Embassy last June and that we will vigorously prosecute those who have committed terrorist activities. In this connection, I will note with satisfaction that the TWA hijacking case has been successfully prosecuted.

Prior to my arrival in Belgrade, Admiral Holloway will have just concluded a visit to Yugoslavia for talks in the framework of our limited military cooperation and exchanges with the Yugoslavs. While stating your priority policy of reducing the level of international arms sales, I will inform the Yugoslavs that we are prepared to continue US-Yugoslav military exchanges and consultations, and to consider some of Yugoslavia's proposals for military equipment purchases.

*old - I don't  
know whether  
Tito is a  
naest - He  
may be -*

Of importance, the visit to Belgrade should give me the opportunity to talk to some of the government's upcoming leaders, people we can expect to have increased dealings with in coming years.

I will plan to focus my discussions on international issues on the Belgrade CSCE meeting, the Middle East, and our African policy. I believe that if I am candid with Tito about the nature of my talks with Vorster, this may well produce a positive ripple effect in terms of Yugoslav consultations with other members of the non-aligned movement on our African policy. With your agreement I will base the agenda for my talks with Tito on the issues outlined above.

Approve ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_


I am attaching at Tab A proposed letters for your signature to President Eanes, King Juan Carlos, Chancellor Kreisky, Prime Minister Vorster and President Tito. With your approval I will plan to present the letters during my talks with each of these leaders.

Approve ✓

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

\* \* \* \* \*

- Tab A - Letters for your signature
- Tab B - Draft Arrival Statement, Vienna
- Tab C - Draft Statement following Talks with Vorster
- Tab D - Trip Schedule
- Tab E - Trip Manifest



STATEMENT TO PRESS ON ARRIVAL IN VIENNA

I am pleased to be in Vienna where I have come for a double purpose: to confer with Chancellor Kreisky on matters of mutual interest and to review developments in southern Africa with Prime Minister Vorster.

(Paragraphs on Austrian aspect of visit to be added)

The talks with the South African Prime Minister will give us an opportunity to discuss a wide range of southern African issues. The SAG has a crucial role to play in dealing with these issues.


We will discuss how best to support the new initiative for resumption of negotiations on Southern Rhodesia on which Secretary Vance and Foreign Secretary Owen have been conferring, and additional steps needed to promote a successful outcome of these negotiations.

Another topic involves the urgency of moving forward to implement Namibian independence within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 385. Late last month representatives of Canada, France, FRG, UK and US met in Cape Town with the SAG to consider ways and means to accomplish this. By virtue of its position in Namibia the SAG has a special responsibility to work with the United

Nations in finding a solution which allows all the people of Namibia to decide freely the nature of their independence government.

I will also be speaking with Prime Minister Vorster about developments in South Africa. I will explain to Prime Minister Vorster why the new administration as a matter of national policy attaches so much importance to respect for human rights and why we regard it as a key element in determining the nature of our relationship with other countries.





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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12058, Sec. 3.6  
PER 7/23/99 NAL RE NLC-98-249  
DATE 3/22/06

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*Fritz -  
Read notes -  
J.C.*



SECRET

- 2 -

- to emphasize to President Tito the importance your Administration places on Yugoslavia's independence, political unity and territorial integrity.

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- our consequent inability to accept the apartheid system in South Africa. *Get from Andy degree of flexibility & minimum acceptable progress year by year*
- our conviction that there must be full and equal political participation and economic opportunity and justice accorded to all South African people. Otherwise there will be no peace.
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- that if such a new and positive course can be charted, South Africa will have our support and understanding. The press of international events makes such action urgent.
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Public Handling:

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*European nations ready for Spain in 1982 to offer elections from democracy & Constitution adopted -*

I will state our belief that Spain has the right to a more active role in European affairs and that we will support Spain's entry into NATO when the Spanish are ready for that step. Following up on discussions with Prime Minister Suarez in Washington, I will state Secretary Brown's readiness to consider more US-Spanish military exchanges, contributing to our mutual defense interests and exposing Spanish officers to the role of the military in U.S. society.

Taking into account Spain's commitment to nuclear power as a primary energy source, I will state that we want to assure dependable supplies of fuel and equipment while taking the necessary steps to avoid nuclear weapons proliferation. I will encourage Spain to accede to the NPT and I will confirm that Spain will be welcome to join the nuclear fuel cycle evaluation effort. On trade, I will describe our support -- and the progress at the London summit -- for freer world trade and the resolution of trade problems through multilateral trade negotiations (MTN).

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singling out Yugoslavia for special  
stringency.*

The Yugoslavs have indicated their belief that we are not forceful enough in prosecuting Yugoslav emigre terrorists. Prior to my departure, I will discuss this issue with Attorney General Bell so as to be able to assure Tito that we are determined to prevent and punish terrorists; that we are giving high priority to the bombing of Yugoslavia's Embassy last June and that we will vigorously prosecute those who have committed terrorist activities. In this connection, I will note with satisfaction that the TWA hijacking case has been successfully prosecuted.

Prior to my arrival in Belgrade, Admiral Holloway will have just concluded a visit to Yugoslavia for talks in the framework of our limited military cooperation and exchanges with the Yugoslavs. While stating your priority policy of reducing the level of international arms sales, I will inform the Yugoslavs that we are prepared to continue US-Yugoslav military exchanges and consultations, and to consider some of Yugoslavia's proposals for military equipment purchases.

Of importance, the visit to Belgrade should give me the opportunity to talk to some of the government's upcoming leaders, people we can expect to have increased dealings with in coming years.

I will plan to focus my discussions on international issues on the Belgrade CSCE meeting, the Middle East, and our African policy. I believe that if I am candid with Tito about the nature of my talks with Vorster, this may well produce a positive ripple effect in terms of Yugoslav consultations with other members of the non-aligned movement on our African policy. With your agreement I will base the agenda for my talks with Tito on the issues outlined above.

Approve ☒ Disapprove ☐

I am attaching at Tab A proposed letters for your signature to President Eanes, King Juan Carlos, Chancellor Kreisky, Prime Minister Vorster and President Tito. With your approval I will plan to present the letters during my talks with each of these leaders.

Approve ☒ Disapprove ☐

\* \* \* \* \*

- Tab A - Letters for your signature
- Tab B - Draft Arrival Statement, Vienna
- Tab C - Draft Statement following Talks with Vorster
- Tab D - Trip Schedule
- Tab E - Trip Manifest

STATEMENT AT CONCLUSION OF TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER  
VORSTER

(NOTE: This statement is based on the most favorable outcome one can expect. It will have to be adjusted according to the results of the talks.)

Prime Minister Vorster and I have had a frank and useful exchange of views centering on:

-- support of the new initiative to achieve a settlement of the Rhodesian problem based on majority rule;

-- ways to bring Namibia to independence in a manner which genuinely reflects the will of all the Namibian people; and

-- the need for basic change in South Africa in the direction of full exercise of human rights, equal opportunity, and meaningful participation by all people in the political and economic life of the country.

On Rhodesia, we reviewed carefully British Foreign Secretary Owen's plans for consultations on a constitution for an independent Zimbabwe. We discussed the various difficult issues which might arise in the preparation of that document and the transition to independence requiring flexibility on the part of Zimbabwe nationalist leaders and Mr. Ian Smith. Prime Minister Vorster agreed to use South Africa's influence with Mr. Smith in support of

*letter not  
imply  
indemnification*

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PER 7/23/99 NBL RE NVC-18-249  
BY [signature] DATE 3/22/06

moderation and compromise in reaching an agreement on a settlement within 1978.

I reviewed with the South African Prime Minister all aspects of the initiative taken by the five powers (Canada, France, F.R.G., U.K. and U.S.) to bring about a settlement of the Namibian question consistent with U.N. Security Council Resolution 385. We discussed the role of the United Nations in the transition process to insure unimpeded participation of all Namibians in determining the nature of their independence constitution. Prime Minister Vorster pledged his cooperation in seeing that satisfactory arrangements are made to facilitate this process. We also discussed other aspects of Resolution 385 which are essential elements of an internationally acceptable formula. Mr. Vorster gave me to understand that his government would cooperate in the achievement of these aspects.

With respect to South Africa itself, I explained to Prime Minister Vorster why the United States thinks it is in the long term interest of South Africa to <sup>(continue)</sup> (make) a progressive transformation of its society in the direction of full political rights for all its people. I told him that this is not a demand but the counsel of a friend and that we would not presume to prescribe formulas. This is for the South African people to work out among themselves

through constructive dialogue between leaders of the different population groups. If South Africa moves away resolutely and quickly from racial discrimination and towards full political participation, further domestic unrest can be averted, the dangers of region conflict avoided, and South Africa's proper place in the international community restored. On the other hand, if the South African Government cannot make fundamental changes to meet the aspirations of its citizens of all races, then he must realize that inevitably our relations must be affected.

Fritz. Reading this  
last part from the viewpoint  
of a Southern governor, I could  
not accept it. It's best to  
assume better intentions than Vorster  
probably has and also to give  
them a way not to acknowledge  
past mistakes. This is important  
J

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SUBJECT: ANNOUNCEMENT BY PRESIDENT OF VICE PRESIDENT  
MONDAL'S VISIT TO EUROPE

1. I LEAVE FOR LONDON LATER THIS WEEK FOR SUMMIT TALKS OF THE VERY GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO THIS NATION'S INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS. THESE TALKS ARE CENTRAL TO THE PRIORITY STEPS I AM TAKING IN THE FIRST YEAR OF MY ADMINISTRATION WITH OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES TO ENSURE THE GREATEST POSSIBLE UNDERSTANDING, COOPERATION AND PROGRESS IN OUR COMMON INTERESTS.

2. I AM VERY PLEASED TO ANNOUNCE TODAY THAT I AM ASKING VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE TO UNDERTAKE AN IMPORTANT OVERSEAS MISSION IN MY BEHALF LATER THIS MONTH.

3. THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL BE TRAVELLING TO PORTUGAL, SPAIN, AUSTRIA, YUGOSLAVIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM ON A MISSION THAT WILL ENABLE THIS ADMINISTRATION TO PURSUE AS EFFECTIVELY AS POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES THAT ARE ALSO CENTRAL TO THE GOALS OF MY ADMINISTRATION. IN LISBON AND MADRID, THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL CONTINUE THE IMPORTANT CONSULTATIONS WE HAVE BEGUN WITH THE PORTUGUESE AND SPANISH GOVERNMENTS. I BELIEVE I SPEAK FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHEN I SAY HOW VERY DEEPLY ENCOURAGED WE ARE BY THE RETURN TO DEMOCRACY IN PORTUGAL AND BY THE STEPS SPAIN IS TAKING TO BUILD A TRUE AND JUST DEMOCRACY. WE VALUE THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE CONSULTATIONS WITH THESE GOVERNMENTS AT THIS IMPORTANT TIME IN THEIR HISTORIES --

\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

SCHECTER, CLIFT

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CONSULTATIONS WHICH WILL ENABLE US TO BUILD ON OUR CO-OPERATION IN ALL FIELDS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

4. THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO VIENNA, AUSTRIA WILL HAVE TWO PRIME OBJECTIVES. WE VIEW AUSTRIA AS A GOOD FRIEND OF THE UNITED STATES. I HAVE THE HIGHEST RESPECT FOR THE AUSTRIAN CANCELLOR, BRUND KREISKY, WHOM I REGARD AS AN IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL STATESMAN AND I HAVE ASKED THE VICE PRESIDENT TO MEET WITH THE CHANCELLOR AND OTHER LEADERS OF THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT NOT ONLY FOR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS, BUT ALSO SO THAT WE MAY HAVE THE BENEFIT OF THEIR VIEWS ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL ISSUES.

5. A FEW WEEKS AGO I MENTIONED THAT I HAD ASKED THE VICE PRESIDENT TO PLAY A KEY ROLE, IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH SECRETARY VANCE AND AMBASSADOR YOUNG, IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY TOWARD AFRICA. IN KEEPING WITH THAT ROLE THE VICE PRESIDENT WILL MEET WITH PRIME MINISTER VORSTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA WHILE HE IS IN VIENNA. PRIME MINISTER VORSTER, LIKE OURSELVES, HAS AN INTEREST IN MEETING TO DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. WE HAVE BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON FOREIGN SECRETARY OWEN'S EFFORTS TO MAKE PROGRESS ON RHODESIA. SEPARATELY WE HAVE BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE BRITISH AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS ON THE ISSUE OF NAMIBIA. THE TALKS IN VIENNA WILL ENABLE THE VICE PRESIDENT, IN MY BEHALF, TO DISCUSS THESE COMPLEX ISSUES WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIME MINISTER AND TO STATE OUR VIEWS ON THE CRUCIAL ROLE WHICH CAN BE PLAYED BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT IN BRINGING THE NEEDED CHANGES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

6. IN THIS REGARD WE ARE VERY GRATEFUL TO PRIME MINISTER KREISKY FOR THE HOSPITALITY BEING GIVEN BY THE AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT.

7. THE VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA FOR TALKS WITH PRESIDENT TITO AND MEMBERS OF THE YUGOSLAV LEADERSHIP

WILL MARK THE FIRST HIGH-LEVEL U.S.-YUGOSLAV CONSULTATIONS UNDER MY ADMINISTRATION. THE U.S. PLACES IMPORTANCE ON YUGOSLAVIA'S INDEPENDENCE, POLITICAL UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND WE RECOGNIZE YUGOSLAVIA'S AND PRESIDENT TITO'S VITAL ROLE IN PROVIDING LEADERSHIP TO THE NON-ALIGNED

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WORLD. I BELIEVE THESE EARLY CONSULTATIONS WITH PRESIDENT  
TITO WILL BE OF GREAT VALUE.

8. FINALLY, I HAVE ASKED THE VICE PRESIDENT TO INCLUDE  
A STOP IN THE U.K. TO CONTINUE THE CLOSE CONSULTATIONS  
WE ARE CONDUCTING WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON DEVELOP-  
MENTS RELATED TO SOUTHERN AFRICA.

VANCE

BT

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