



MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

Memo No. 418-77  
May 24, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THRU: Denis Clift   
FROM: Jay Katzen   
SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Vorster: Congressional Briefing, May 25

Attached at Tab A is a list of Senators and Representatives who have been invited to your briefing on your meeting with Vorster, May 25, at 9:00 a.m. in the Cabinet Room. I suggest the following talking points:

General

- At the request of President Carter, I conveyed to Prime Minister Vorster the belief of this Administration in the need for majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia and a progressive transformation of South African society to the same end. There is need for progress on all three questions.
- I told Vorster, in our frank and candid talks, of the fundamental transformation of American society, of an enduring commitment to our principles, and our inability to accept or defend governments that reject basic principles of full and equal human rights.
- Our objective -- the unprecedented one of conveying this message to South Africa from the highest level -- was accomplished. I don't know whether our talks will lead to change in South Africa, but I did make it clear to Vorster that without evident progress toward full political participation and an end to discrimination, the press of international

events would require us to take actions based on our policy, which would be to the detriment of the constructive relations we would prefer to have with South Africa.

- There is some movement on Rhodesia and Namibia.

### Rhodesia

- We worked out the following statement, which does represent some useful progress, but the significance of this progress will depend on future developments:
  - "Prime Minister Vorster agreed to support British-American efforts to get the directly interested parties to agree to an independence constitution and the necessary transitional arrangements including the holding of elections in which all can take part equally so that Zimbabwe can achieve independence during 1978, and peace. Likewise, every effort will be made to bring about a de-escalation of violence and it is believed that the negotiating process will be the best way to achieve this end."
- I conveyed our support for the Owen Mission, and for constitutional guarantees.
- One of Vorster's key concerns was the Zimbabwe Development Fund. I told Vorster, and discussed it again with British Foreign Secretary Owen, that instead of the Fund being aimed at buying out the white settlers in Rhodesia, we want to reorient the Fund to a development fund. That will make it essentially a "buy-in" fund, which will help build a strong economy, and will encourage the continued participation of the white population in an independent Zimbabwe. It is clear that the Fund will be a very important ingredient in a Rhodesian settlement, and it is an area on which we're going to need your help.

## Namibia

- I made it clear that we support the efforts of the contact group, in their work to implement UN Security Council resolution 385.
- In some respects, previous talks by the contact group with Vorster were encouraging.
  - They had agreed to free nationwide elections for a constituent assembly to develop a national constitution for an independent Namibia.
  - They agreed that all Namibians inside and outside the country could participate, including SWAPO.
  - They agreed on UN involvement.
- But important questions remain to be resolved:
  - The nature of the central administering authority. Vorster seems to want Turnhalle all over again, but he may cave.
  - Political prisoners, proposal for jurors.
  - South African withdrawal.
- The contact group will return to Capetown by the end of May to continue talks.

## South Africa

- Our prospects are much less bright. Vorster is determined to press ahead on homelands. He may limit some discriminatory measures, but does not define apartheid as discrimination, and rejects full and equal participation.
- But the message now is clear to them.
- They know we want progress on all three questions.
- They know, too, that we will not rescue them, and that we believe their system encourages Soviet influence.

- Hopefully, our presentation will lead to a reassessment and changes, which can enable us to be supportive.
- If it does not, our paths will diverge and our policies will conflict.
- In what I believe to be an important statement, Owen supported our policy publicly, following our talks in London May 23.

#### NEXT STEPS

##### Rhodesia

- Owen is working on "constitutional principles," which he expects to have ready by June 20, after the Commonwealth Conference, and prior to his travelling to Africa in July.
- Ambassador Low is our representative on the consultative group.

##### Namibia

- The contact group is going to Capetown.
- Key is Vorster's shaping of the central administrative authority.
- Probable UN Security Council pressures for Chapter VII in June.

##### South Africa

- We are studying possible measures to effect in the likely event that change does not come. To do otherwise -- not to act -- would give rise to questions about our credibility among the Africans, Vorster, Smith, and the British.

May 24, 1977

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Q: Mr. President, in recent weeks there has been considerable activity by your Administration in the field of African policy -- Vice President Mondale has met with the South African Prime Minister, Ambassador Young has just completed an extended tour of African nations. Despite this activity, it is not clear what direction you are taking and what the results, if any, have been from these overseas missions -- would you comment?

A: I think it is helpful to view the recent overseas missions of the Vice President and Ambassador Young in the context of the remarks I delivered at Notre Dame University earlier this week. We are committed to a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Southern Africa. The time has come for the principle of majority rule to be the basis for political order. To be peaceful, change must come promptly. We are working with our friends in Europe and with the concerned African states to shape a congenial international framework for the progressive transformation of Southern African society -- a framework that will help to protect that region from unwarranted outside interference.

I believe we can take encouragement from the Vice President's talks with Prime Minister Vorster and from Andy Young's meetings in Africa. At the highest political level we have conveyed this nation's enduring commitment to human rights and full political participation to the South African

Prime Minister. There is now a clear understanding of our policy toward Africa. With regard to Rhodesia, I believe there has been some progress. Prime Minister Vorster agreed to a public statement supporting British-American efforts under the lead of British Foreign Secretary Owen to produce a constitution, elections and independence for Zimbabwe in 1978. It is my understanding that Mr. Vorster will use his influence positively in the process of bringing the parties together on the necessary steps.

Concerning Namibia, there is the possibility of progress. Prime Minister Vorster has agreed to nationwide elections, in which all can participate, for a constitutional convention. The South Africans can accept UN participation to ensure a fair election. The outstanding issue is over the kind of administrative authority that will handle the interim civil functions. It must be impartial but we are not dogmatic about its form.

The Prime Minister has agreed to meet again in Capetown before the end of this month with representatives of the United States and four other nations to consider in detail this and other outstanding questions -- release of prisoners, withdrawal of troops -- relating to the transition to independence and truly representative government for the people of Namibia.

These represent positive if fragile trends. The problems are complex, much remains to be done, and progress must be realized as soon as possible if the peaceful transformation of that region is to occur. I will continue to be working closely with the Vice President, Secretary Vance and Ambassador Young to ensure that this nation -- working with our friends abroad -- seizes every opportunity available to encourage and facilitate genuine progress in Southern Africa. If we are to succeed, a conscientious, dedicated and constructive effort will be required by all involved.

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

Q: In terms of real results, is it really realistic to consider Vice President Mondale's talks with Vorster anything other than a failure?

A: I think the Vice President's talks with the South African Prime Minister were very worthwhile. The meeting in Vienna permitted the Vice President to convey my policy toward Southern Africa to the South African Prime Minister on the three major issues of Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. There should no longer be any confusion as to the importance we attach to progress on all three issues -- and the fact that we are not willing to trade off progress on one or two of these issues for lack of progress on the third. This important step has been accomplished. Moreover, I believe we made progress on Rhodesia and opened the way toward progress on Namibia. Much depends on what happens next, but I believe that we have moved forward.

Q: Would you be more specific about the progress you think has been achieved on the subject of Rhodesia?

A: The most important element from the Vienna talks is the statement agreed to by the South African Prime Minister in which: "Prime Minister Vorster agreed to support British-American efforts to get the directly interested



parties to agree to an independence constitution and the necessary transitional arrangements including the holding of elections in which all can take part equally so that Zimbabwe can achieve independence during 1978, and peace. Likewise, every effort will be made to bring about a de-escalation of violence and it is believed that the negotiating process will be the best way to achieve this end." This represents progress in getting the South Africans to lend their efforts to the negotiating process.

Q: What do our allies, the British, for example, think about this new African policy? Aren't they worried?

A: We are working closely with Great Britain on Rhodesia, Vice President Mondale met last Sunday and Monday with Prime Minister Callaghan and Foreign Secretary Owen, and following those meetings the Foreign Secretary gave public endorsement to the position taken by the Vice President. These are difficult issues. The British and other nations have considerable investment in Southern Africa, but are agreed on our policy and we will be working closely with the British on next steps relating to Rhodesia including the development of draft constitutional principles.

Q: Mr. President, with your insistence on progress on all three issues, what is your real objective -- the South African Foreign Minister has suggested that you seek the destruction of the Republic of South Africa, is this true?

A: I look forward, hopefully, to a constructive relationship with South Africa. When I speak of the need for a progressive transformation of South African society, I am reflecting this nation's enduring commitment to human rights and the need for full political participation. As I have said publicly before, and as I said in my United Nations address, human rights are of fundamental importance and cannot be considered an internal matter by any nation or society. We believe these issues require early attention in South Africa. At the same time, we are not trying to provide a road map to the South Africans. They must decide on the specific steps required to bring about the progressive transformation required in South Africa. I believe that the real threat to that country lies in continued denial of basic rights; granting of such rights will strengthen the country not destroy it.



THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

To VP  
cc Vance, 3619  
JC.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

May 24, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: The Vice President *uf*

SUBJECT: Recommended Actions Resulting from My  
European Trip

The following highlights the key points to emerge from my talks with South African Prime Minister Vorster and my meetings in Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia and London.

Southern Africa

My talks on Southern Africa really came in two parts -- those I held with Vorster and those with Prime Minister Callaghan.

The talks with Vorster went as well as could be expected. I based my presentation on the list of objectives attached at Tab A. I believe I succeeded in conveying clearly to him your new policy: that the character of our future relations will be decided by whether there is a progressive transformation of South African society as well as progress on Rhodesia and Namibia. I hope he understands that this policy will be enduring because it expresses our values and is rooted in the changes that have taken place in our own society.

It is particularly important that our message and the discussion on apartheid, about which he was quite unyielding, did not seem in any way to provoke a negative reaction on Rhodesia or Namibia. In fact, I believe our position on these issues was strengthened by the straight talk on apartheid and our assumption that Vorster's policies are more of a plus than a minus for the Communists.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.3.3(1)(+)  
per 4/27/06 NSC H/1 re NLJC-06-015  
BY Ca DATE 5/8/06

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

The British are very nervous about our new policy. Though Owen endorsed it strongly and publicly, almost all the British press (which is 90% Tory) was negative.

The main point of my visit to Chequers was for Callaghan to express his concern at the consequences for Great Britain of our Southern African policies. He stressed the vulnerability of the British economy, and the consequent difficulty South Africa had always posed for the Labour party.

The Prime Minister emphasized he was not proud of the fact, but he had to look to their interests, rather than their principles. He has ordered a study of the extent of British dependence on South Africa and will share it with us. He wants to consult closely on the options for putting pressure on the Vorster government.

I believe that four years from now we will be gratified that we staked out our position clearly and early. But, if there is no progress in Southern Africa, I also believe we will come under significant pressure to back off. Whatever the future holds, we should anticipate strains in our relationship with the British as this process goes forward, and we will have to make an extra effort to stay together on this issue.

#### Rhodesia

The main point of progress in my talks with Vorster on Rhodesia was his agreement to the following public language:

"Prime Minister Vorster agreed to support British-American efforts to get the directly interested parties to agree to an independence constitution and the necessary transitional arrangements including the holding of elections in which all can take part equally so that Zimbabwe can achieve independence during 1978, and peace. Likewise every effort will be made to bring about a de-escalation of violence and it is believed that the negotiating process will be the best way to achieve this end."

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

*Should we  
designate one  
person - low  
level to  
participate?*

The next step is to put forward a draft constitution, or at the minimum, the principles on which such a constitution can be drafted. I believe the statement we negotiated with Vorster will be helpful in putting pressure on Smith. I believe he has clearly made the decision to push in the right direction. But Vorster needs something, as he put it, "to sell to Smith."

The British are working on a rather relaxed schedule. They tried to avoid being pinned down on an exact time when they would produce some draft constitutional principles. Owen finally committed himself to have a list of proposed principles provided to us by the end of June.

However, he plans to go to Southern Africa in July to sell these principles. This may leave little time for us to assure ourselves that what the British develop, we can live with.

I suggest we pursue the development of principles aggressively with the British. We must particularly be on guard against efforts on their part to build in special privileges for whites which we could find it hard to accept.

On the Zimbabwe Development Fund, the British accept that it will not be a "buy-out." However, they believe it essential to be able to assure white civil servants in Rhodesia that their pensions are valid. Otherwise, they will flee the country and the administration would collapse. Owen suggested that within the Zimbabwe Fund the role of each participant might be somewhat different. I believe he has in mind that the British, along with some of the Europeans, might underwrite the Rhodesian pensions. I believe we should study Great Britain's experience with earlier problems such as this -- e.g., in Kenya and Tanzania -- and that we should work closely with the British to develop the most effective and acceptable role for each participant in the fund.

#### Namibia

I believe that Namibia is the key to prompt progress in all of Southern Africa. It is the focus of UN efforts to develop proposed sanctions and, if there is no progress,

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

these could be put forward in the UN Security Council as early as June. If we can make progress on Namibia, it will set a positive tone for the rest of the issues we face in Southern Africa. If we do not, we may face sanctions on South Africa that could lead to a deteriorating situation in which any progress on any subject may prove difficult.

I am encouraged by the fact that much of what is necessary to create an independent Namibia, in accordance with UN resolution 385, is almost in place. The South Africans are committed to national elections, in which all can participate (including SWAPO), for a constitutional conference to define an independent Namibia, the South Africans are willing to have the UN become involved to insure the elections are fair and internationally acceptable.

The key issue is the character of the interim administration. Vorster feels strongly it should be based on the Turnhalle Conference. Everyone else rejects that and wants a system that is impartial as to the kind of permanent government that is to be created.

Vorster said that he was personally committed to a Turnhalle-type interim authority and would resign rather than abandon it. He has already downgraded Turnhalle from a permanent to an interim government. The trick will be to find some compromise in which Vorster can say he is implementing Turnhalle and the rest of the world can feel confident that the interim administration does not prejudice the structure of the permanent government. The tradeoff is between the scope and power of the interim government and the extent to which it looks like Turnhalle.

*Any  
recommendations?*

I proposed that Vorster agree to turn over Namibian political prisoners to Namibia, and in the event of a difference of opinion whether a particular prisoner was political or criminal, that a body of international jurors review the case and make a determination. Vorster said that he would give this proposal favorable consideration. He made the point that SWAPO detainees in Zambia and elsewhere would also have to be released; if so, he would release those held in South Africa. I said this was basically a fair position but that South Africa should set the example by releasing its prisoners first. Following our talks, I asked Andy Young to raise the need for release of prisoners with Kaunda.

*Report results  
to me*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Further down the road, there is a serious question as to when and how South Africa will pull their forces out of Namibia. We thought that the Five Nation Contact Group had gotten an agreement from the South Africans to get their forces out by the time of independence, a plan which would be implemented subsequently. This could become a crucial issue, but we have time to work on it.

*Do we  
still think  
this?*

The interim administrative authority is far more urgent. The Five Nation Contact Group will meet on Thursday in New York, and we have proposed to Vorster that it meet in Capetown before the end of the month to discuss South African ideas about the interim authority. I believe it would be worthwhile for you to write to Vorster reflecting on the Vienna meeting in a positive way and emphasizing the importance of a constructive response to the Five on the interim authority's structure and function.

If you agree with this approach, I will work with Zbigniew Brzezinski and Cy Vance to have such a letter prepared.

*do so -  
may include  
all our points  
in the ltr.*

#### South Africa

On South Africa, we created the most positive possible atmosphere for Vorster and his colleagues to hear and appreciate our message. I stressed repeatedly that we would welcome any progress, but Vorster came to defend the rightness of his cause. I must say, however, that this defense was perfunctory and, in the end, he simply said that it was "all right if we kicked him in the pants," he was used to it; but asked that we not "kick him in the teeth." I understand this to mean that we could put pressure on South Africa but we should avoid attacking him personally.

I cannot see whether there will be any progress in South Africa. My guess is that Vorster will seek to compromise on Rhodesia and Namibia, and petty apartheid to keep the wolf from the door. This, at least, is how he acted in Vienna. Paradoxically, our insistence on progress in all three areas appears to have given increased leverage, at least on Rhodesia and Namibia.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

But the prospects for South Africa are not bright and we must be prepared for further tragedy, possibly on the anniversary of the Soweto riots, June 16. It is quite likely that we will come in for some criticism should renewed demonstrations take place.

On the other hand, we will probably have to consider, in the near future, sending a warning shot across Vorster's bow on apartheid. We will need to do this to demonstrate our seriousness, both to Vorster and our public opinion. I understand the State Department will be developing some possible proposals.

After Andy Young's return, I believe that Cy Vance should put a team together to produce an assessment of where we are headed in Southern Africa, together with a set of policy options. I have prepared a memorandum to that effect to Cy Vance (at Tab B). The options paper should probably be considered by the NSC. *ok*

#### Portugal

President Eanes and Prime Minister Soares are moving ahead as best they can to strengthen Portugal's fragile democracy. But the revolution has left the country in serious economic difficulties, and U.S. assistance is essential. The US Treasury loan negotiated by the last administration has proven so complicated it cannot be used by the Portuguese. I recommend that State and Treasury follow up to amend the loan so that it is usable immediately. This will help to bridge the gap in Portugal's foreign exchange position prior to the availability of the multilateral loan later this year. In this regard, the United States should press all of the potential consortium loan participants to make a firm commitment at the next meeting of the consortium countries in June. *follow up*

Azores Base Negotiations. The Portuguese also indicated that they want to move ahead rapidly with a new Azores Base Agreement. They wish to avoid getting caught up in a dispute with the Azoreans over the terms of the agreement. Accordingly, they would like to negotiate realistic terms quickly through diplomatic channels, and then hold a brief, formal negotiation with the Azoreans participating to conclude the new agreement formally. I recommend that the Department of State, in coordination with the other agencies involved develop a proposed figure for your approval and then move ahead quickly with the Government of Portugal to reach the recommended terms of a new agreement for your consideration. *I agree*



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

US-Portuguese Labor Cooperation. It is clear that Portugal will not regain full stability unless it is possible to break the grip the communists have on Portugal's unions. The Portuguese were receptive to the idea of having more exchange visits allowing moderate labor leaders from Portugal to visit the United States to gain a better understanding of the structure and operations of U.S. unions. I recommend that State, Labor and AID develop recommendations, on a priority basis, for exchanges, assistance and programs, that would help the moderate unions in Portugal to increase their strength and effectiveness. ok

Spain. I was pleased to learn that you had telephoned King Juan Carlos on the day after my visit to Madrid. I do not believe any other immediate actions are required as a result of the visit. We must await the June 15 Spanish parliamentary elections and the Spanish actions to establish a parliament following those elections. In my talks with King Juan Carlos he referred to the US-Spanish Friendship Agreement -- which governs our military base rights -- noting that he believes that we can expect one or more of Spain's political parties to call for changes to the agreement or for removal of the bases, and that the U.S. and Spanish governments should cooperate closely and be prepared to deal effectively with any such challenge to the agreement. I believe State and Defense should give attention to this contingency to ensure that we are not caught flatfooted should a challenge to the bases emerge as a result of the June elections. I suggest that you consider a visit to King Juan Carlos (his preference) or invite him to the United States later this year or next, by which time the Spanish democratic process should have developed considerably.

Austria. No actions are required as a result of my meetings with Chancellor Kreisky in Vienna. He clearly is pleased and flattered by the attention your Administration is giving to Austria.

Yugoslavia. On the eve of his 85th birthday, President Tito appeared in remarkable good health. On several occasions during the visit, Yugoslav officials made clear their satisfaction with the change in U.S. Administrations and your explicit statements of support for Yugoslavia's independence and political unity, and your respect for Yugoslavia's role in the non-aligned movement.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Tito was very pleased that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has approved the license for the Krsko nuclear power plant. He took it as a symbol of the possibilities for further US-Yugoslav cooperation. I think we have already gone some distance to dispel a legacy of mistrust and suspicion from the last Administration.

I raised the question of CSCE and our plan to treat the Belgrade meeting in a constructive manner. Tito was quick to pre-empt any thought that Yugoslavia's human rights record should be criticized.

The Yugoslavs raised with me their desire to have both countries continue our bilateral scientific exchange programs. It has been funded by counterpart funds which are scheduled to run out in 1978,

Tito is pessimistic about both the Middle East and Africa. He believes the Israeli elections mark a real setback to hopes for a settlement; at the same time, he concurs that if there is to be a settlement we must move this year. The Yugoslavs said that the PLO has informed them that it will agree to recognize Israel's right to exist as soon as the timing is right tactically in the settlement process.

*now is  
the time*

Tito was also pessimistic about the Horn of Africa, noting that his government was working now to encourage a peaceful resolution of the Ethiopia/Eritrea dispute, but that he thought there would be hostilities. Tito raised the question of US-Yugoslav military cooperation. This is significant because he has been reluctant on this issue in the past. He thought that this issue had been mishandled by the former Administration. He wants the cooperation to be low key and was particularly annoyed at the publicity given last year to certain Yugoslav requests -- e.g., the TOW missile.

As you know, Admiral Holloway has just concluded a visit to Yugoslavia in which he was presented with a fresh list of military items of interest to the Yugoslav Armed Forces. The fact that Tito raised it means that it is a political matter with the Yugoslavs. I recommend that you approve a priority interdepartmental study on the issue of military equipment for Yugoslavia. I don't know

*ok - I  
agree that  
an early  
decision on this  
is  
important*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

if we can meet the Yugoslav requests without compromising either U.S. technology or security, but I don't think Tito would raise it if they were just fronting for Soviet intelligence. Moreover, I think it is in our strategic political interests to develop ties with the Yugoslavs in the military field to the extent possible.

cc: Secretary Vance  
Dr. Brzezinski

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

OBJECTIVES

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958  
per 4/27/06 NSC/HR = NLJC-06-015  
BY 6 NARA DATE 5/8/06

The purpose of this meeting is to inform the SAG of the desired objective of American foreign policy with regard to its actions in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa.

ON RHODESIA

1. South Africa support for the Owen mission--in public and private.
2. Press Smith to negotiate a settlement providing majority rule through elections in 1978.
3. Publicly accept a deadline of 1978 for the full independence of Zimbabwe.
4. Agree to work with any fairly and freely chosen government of Zimbabwe.
5. Restrain Smith's incursions into Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia.

ON NAMIBIA

Consistent with our support for UNSC Res. 385:

1. A responsible and impartial interim administration, acceptable to the parties, that does not prejudice the structure of the permanent government and, for example, does not resemble Turnhalle.
2. Election laws acceptable to UN providing fair equal participation by all Namibians in national election.
3. Release of all political prisoners (e.g. Toivo).
4. Suspension of legislation resisting full participation in the political process--e.g., the Terrorism Act, restrictions on assembly and speech, etc.
5. Agreement to a plan for a phased withdrawal of the instruments of authority of the SAG by the time of independence in consultation with those mainly involved.
6. Public agreement in principle to such a withdrawal.

ON SOUTH AFRICA

1. A progressive transformation of South African society:
2. The establishment of a new course toward full and equal political participation by all South Africans.
3. Proper initiation of a genuine dialogue about this process with leaders truly representative of all of South Africa's population.

~~SECRET~~

4. The repeal of all laws and restrictions which discriminate or inhibit full political participation or interferes with human rights.

OVERALL

1. An understanding by Vorster and the SAG that their future relations with the U.S. will be determined by whether or not there is evident and early progress of the kind described in the preceding three sections. Given such progress, the SAG will have our support and our relations will improve. Without it, our relations will inevitably deteriorate.
2. The U.S. government will not defend a SAG which discriminates and denies full political participation and human rights of her people.

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

*Stu*  
*Case*  
*Completed*  
*Adoption*

CONFIDENTIAL/XGDSINFORMATIONMemo No. 426-77  
June 6, 1977

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Answers to President's Questions on  
Recommendations from European Trip

Page 3, Rhodesia, "Should we designate one person, low-level, to participate" in drafting of constitution?"

It is the State/NSC view, with which I agree, that the drafting of the constitution is Great Britain's formal responsibility, and that the United States should not get formally involved -- Rhodesia still being a British colony. We are making arrangements with the British whereby they will keep us abreast of their thinking and informed of their drafting. This will give us a chance to comment whenever we think we have to.

Page 4, Namibia, "Any recommendation" on compromise formula for interim authority?

The Five Nation Contact Group has developed alternative, compromise formulas which it will have available to discuss with Vorster during the next meeting in Capetown on June 8. Ambassador McHenry has already departed for that meeting.

CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS

CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS

Page 4, Namibia, Andy Young asked to raise release of prisoners with Kaunda - "report results to me."

Andy Young did not have the opportunity to raise this issue in his meeting with Kaunda. The Department of State has since sent instructions to our Embassies in Zambia and Tanzania directing that the issue of release of prisoners be raised. We have not yet had responses from the Embassies.

Page 5, Namibia, We thought the Five Nation Contact Group had South African agreement to get their forces out by the time of independence, "Do we still think this?"

In terms of the talks with Vorster, the question of the timetable for South African departure from Namibia is up in the air. The Contact Group will be raising the withdrawal timetable with Vorster during the June 8 meeting.

Page 5, Namibia, Recommended letter to Vorster on Namibia: Do so, may include all our points in the letter."

On May 27, you forwarded a letter to the President for his signature to Prime Minister Vorster emphasizing the importance we attach to the Prime Minister's giving the Contact Group his detailed thinking on the details of the interim authority, and again emphasizing the importance we attach to progress on Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. The President signed the letter to Vorster on May 27.

Page 6, South Africa, The President "OK'd" your recommendation that Secretary Vance put together a team to develop updated policy options on Southern Africa.

This is underway. Tony Lake has put together an interdepartmental team to develop policy options.

A paper with the issues to be addressed has been distributed; the team had its first meeting on June 2.

Page 6, Portugal, the President said to "follow-up" on your recommendation that State and Treasury amend our current loan to Portugal.

The Treasury representative who visited Lisbon at the Vice President's request shortly after the latter's departure discussed this matter at length with Portuguese officials who estimated that approximately \$72 million in additional credits would provide the needed cushion. Acknowledging the disadvantages of seeking an extension of the short-term \$300 million in gold-secured credit made available in February from Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund, the Portuguese decided to pursue the possibility of seeking additional agricultural commodity import credits. We received their formal request for specific commodity amounts on May 27 and Agriculture's Commodity Credit Corporation will send a special representative to Lisbon between June 11 and 22 to present the most favorable possible U.S. response.



CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS

Page 6, Portugal, On the Azores Base negotiations, the President stated "I agree" in response to your recommendation that we develop an economic/military assistance figure to propose to the Portuguese.

We have developed a figure of \$120 million for the ten-year life of the agreement to be divided equally between economic and military assistance. We have told the Portuguese we are ready to meet on this subject; they, in turn, have asked us to wait a few days.

Page 8, Yugoslavia, the President "OK'd" your recommendation that there be an interdepartmental study on military equipment for Yugoslavia.

On May 31, Zbig issued a Presidential directive to State and Defense calling for the preparation of a study on a priority basis. State and Defense are currently at work on the study.


CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTONINFORMATION~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE-XGDS



Memo No. 1106-77

June 13, 1977

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift 

SUBJECT: South African Reaction to Your Talks  
with Vorster

- 
- the South Africans were very favorably impressed with you personally;
  - however, you seemed to have been very poorly briefed, by your advisors, South Africa's enemies, and that your delegation seemed so young that it appeared that the Americans were sending their boys to talk with the men;
  - you seemed unwilling to have a genuine give and take, with U.S. minds made up that anything Afrikaner was bad;
  -  was shocked that you would ask about the whereabouts and well-being of Winnie Mandela, wife of convicted communist leader, Nelson Mandela;
  - on the Rhodesian public statement, Vorster had accepted the U.S. language, but the South Africans had been shocked by your unwillingness to accept the language on de-escalation of violence;

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/XGDS

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958 Sect. 3.3 (b) (1)

per 4/27/06 NSC H/Re N/JS-06-015

BY CA MADA DATE 4/8/06

- on Namibia, South Africa could not and would not turn its back on promises to the Turnhalle delegates (this has already been overtaken by the Contact Group's second round of talks);



- on U.S. public opinion, South Africa is not understood by the Carter Administration; however, South Africa has millions of friends in the U.S. who will not sit by and let South Africa be pushed into the arms of the communists.

MEMORANDUM

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON


INFORMATION



~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE-XGDS

Memo No. 1106-77

June 13, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: Denis Clift   
SUBJECT: South African Reaction to Your Talks  
with Vorster

- 
- the South Africans were very favorably impressed with you personally;
  - however, you seemed to have been very poorly briefed, by your advisors, South Africa's enemies, and that your delegation seemed so young that it appeared that the Americans were sending their boys to talk with the men;
  - you seemed unwilling to have a genuine give and take, with U.S. minds made up that anything Afrikaner was bad;
  -  was shocked that you would ask about the whereabouts and well-being of Winnie Mandela, wife of convicted communist leader, Nelson Mandela;
  - on the Rhodesian public statement, Vorster had accepted the U.S. language, but the South Africans had been shocked by your unwillingness to accept the language on de-escalation of violence;

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/XGDS

SANITIZED

E.O. 12958 Sect 3.3(b)(1)

per 4/27/06 NSC/tr r2 NLJC-06-015  
12 5/18/06

- on Namibia, South Africa could not and would not turn its back on promises to the Turnhalle delegates (this has already been overtaken by the Contact Group's second round of talks);



- on U.S. public opinion, South Africa is not understood by the Carter Administration; however, South Africa has millions of friends in the U.S. who will not sit by and let South Africa be pushed into the arms of the communists.

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTONACTION

Memo No. 1063-77

June 3, 1977

*No further  
action necessary*

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THRU: Denis Clift *[Signature]*

FROM: Jay Katzen

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Vorster: Follow-up with  
African Diplomatic Representative

As you know, Ivory Coast Ambassador Ahoua is the dean of the African Diplomatic Corps in Washington. You had hoped to discuss your meeting with Vorster with Ahoua prior to your travel, but Ahoua was out of town. I suggest that as a "final" tying-up of the Vorster mission, you telephone Ahoua, to inform him and, through him, the African representatives in Washington, of the results of the Vienna meeting.

Should you agree, suggested talking points are attached at Tab A. They follow the line of your May 20 press briefing in Vienna and your briefing for Congressmen, May 25.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you telephone Ambassador Ahoua.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

OTHER - I'd prefer that he come to my office *X*

## Suggested Talking Points for Your Conversation with Ivory Coast Ambassador Ahoua

### General

- At the request of President Carter, I conveyed to Prime Minister Vorster our belief in the need for majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia and a progressive transformation of South African society to the same end. There is need for progress on all three questions.
- I told Vorster, in our frank and candid talks, of the fundamental transformation of American society, of an enduring commitment to our principles, and our inability to accept or defend governments that reject basic principles of full and equal human rights.
- Our objective -- the unprecedented one of conveying this message to South Africa from the highest level -- was accomplished. I don't know whether our talks will lead to change in South Africa, but I did make it clear to Vorster that without evident progress toward full political participation and an end to discrimination, the press of international events would require us to take actions based on our policy, which would be to the detriment of the constructive relations we would prefer to have with South Africa.
- There is some movement on Rhodesia and Namibia.

### Rhodesia

- We worked out the following statement, which does represent some useful progress, but the significance of this progress will depend on future developments:
  - "Prime Minister Vorster agreed to support British-American efforts to get the directly interested parties to agree to an independence constitution and the necessary transitional arrangements including the holding of elections in which all can take part equally so that Zimbabwe can achieve independence during 1978, and peace. Likewise, every effort will be made to bring about a de-escalation of violence and it is believed that the negotiating process will be the best way to achieve this end."

- I conveyed our support for the Owen Mission, and for constitutional guarantees.

#### Namibia

- I made it clear that we support the efforts of the contact group, in their work to implement UN Security Council resolution 385.
- In some respects, previous talks by the contact group with Vorster were encouraging.
  - They had agreed to free nationwide elections for a constituent assembly to develop a national constitution for an independent Namibia.
  - They agreed that all Namibians inside and outside the country could participate, including SWAPO.
  - They agreed on UN involvement.
- But important questions remain to be resolved:
  - The nature of the central administering authority. Vorster seems to want Turnhalle all over again, but he may cave.
  - Political prisoners, proposal for jurors.
  - South African withdrawal.
- The contact group will return to Capetown June 8-10 to continue talks.

#### South Africa

- Our prospects are much less bright. Vorster is determined to press ahead on homelands. He may limit some discriminatory measures, but does not define apartheid as discrimination, and rejects full and equal participation.
- But the message now is clear to them.
- They know we want progress on all three questions.
- They know, too, that we will not rescue them, and that we believe their system encourages Soviet influence.



- Hopefully, our presentation will lead to a reassessment and changes, which can enable us to be supportive.
- If it does not, our paths will diverge and our policies will conflict.



# MINNESOTA HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Copyright in the Walter F. Mondale Papers belongs to the Minnesota Historical Society and its content may not be copied without the copyright holder's express written permission. Users may print, download, link to, or email content, however, for individual use.

To request permission for commercial or educational use, please contact the Minnesota Historical Society.



[www.mnhs.org](http://www.mnhs.org)