

July 19, 1979

Bilateral Talks with Vietnam on Refugees

- Q. Are you having any bilateral talks with the Vietnamese in an effort to get them to moderate their policies?
- A. Yes, we have talked directly with the Vietnamese about the refugee problem.

July 19, 1979

Effect of Restored Relations with Vietnam

- Q. Wouldn't you have more leverage over the Vietnamese if you restored diplomatic relations?
- A. Other countries with diplomatic relations have urged the Vietnamese to moderate their policies, with no visible effect. Our lack of diplomatic relations with the Vietnamese has not prevented us from communicating our position to them on this issue. We have told the Vietnamese that normalization is not possible under present circumstances.

July 19, 1979

Plan for Direct Departures from Vietnam

- Q. Why hasn't the United States been more supportive of the agreement on direct departures from Vietnam negotiated with Hanoi by Deputy UN High Commissioner for Refugees Dale De Haan?
- A. The United States has consistently supported programs of family reunification, and we have been discussing such a program with the Vietnamese for several years. We have also cooperated with the UNHCR by providing Mr. De Haan with lists of persons thought to be in Vietnam whose relatives in the United States have successfully filed immigration petitions for them. We are prepared to have U.S. consular officers serve as part of the UNHCR office in Vietnam to expedite family reunification cases for the United States.

But we note that to date, the Vietnamese have not allowed many people to leave in this manner. Moreover since the program was announced early this year, the number of refugees leaving Vietnam by sea has jumped astronomically, increasing the burden on the countries of first asylum. Thus the effect has been contrary to a stated objective of the plan, and the plan is clearly inadequate to deal with the problem. As matters of first priority, the United States continues to emphasize both the importance of assisting the refugees at sea or in camps in Southeast Asia, and the need for new practices in Vietnam so that people do not feel compelled to flee.

July 19, 1979

Cutting-Off Aid to Vietnam

- Q. Is it true that the U.S. is asking countries and international organizations to cut off aid to Vietnam and to give it to refugee assistance instead?
- A. This Administration has never provided nor promised direct economic assistance to Vietnam. We do not support assistance to Vietnam by international organizations. In response to the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, as well as its policies toward its own people, we have urged the international community to reconsider its developmental assistance. So long as Vietnam diverts its own scarce economic resources to the invasion and military occupation of a neighbor, Kampuchea, the international community should not pick up Vietnam's economic burdens, in effect underwriting Hanoi's military actions.

The massive outpouring of refugees from Vietnam has added to concerns over Kampuchea in generating international reconsideration of assistance policies. Some reports suggest that Vietnam is getting more than \$100 million each month from selling exit permits to the refugees. Thus, it is not unusual that countries would redirect money now going to Vietnam so as to assist, instead, Vietnamese refugees in camps in Southeast Asia.

BILATERAL PAPERS





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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SCHEDULE

## Geneva Meeting on Indochinese Refugees

### SCHEDULE

#### Friday, July 20

- 9:00 a.m. Delegation meeting at the Hotel.
- 10:00 a.m. Brief remarks by United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim to open the meeting
- 10:15 a.m. Brief remarks by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Paul Hartling
- 10:30 a.m. Statements (approximately ten minutes each) by  
(approx.) attending governments in the following order:  
Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam, Ireland, UK, France,  
Philippines, Italy, Singapore, FRG, Indonesia,  
Belgium and Canada.
- 1:00 p.m. Morning session ends
- 3:00 p.m. Afternoon session opens.  
Speakers, in order, are: Thailand, Denmark, PRC,  
Israel, Netherlands, Australia, Sweden, Austria,  
Norway, Nigeria, Costa Rica, Spain, Brazil,  
USSR (pending), Switzerland (pending), and EEC
- 3:00 p.m.- Briefings at the U.S. Mission for Congressional  
6:00 p.m. Members of the delegation by Deputy High Commissioner  
for Refugees Dale de Haan, Under Secretary General  
of the League of Red Cross Societies Enso  
Bighinatti and Delegate General for North America  
of the International Committee of the Red Cross  
Melchoir Borsinger
- 6:30 p.m.- Vice President Mondale's reception for the U.S.  
8:30 p.m. delegation at the International Hotel

#### Saturday, July 21

- 10:00 a.m. Morning session opens. Speakers, in order, are  
U.S., New Zealand, Finland, USSR (pending),  
Luxembourg, Holy See, Argentina, No. 8 still open,  
Pakistan, Greece, and perhaps Hong Kong.

SCOPE PAPER

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### SCOPE PAPER

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July 16, 1979

The UN-Sponsored Meeting on  
Indochinese Refugees at Geneva  
July 20-21

I. Setting

The massive refugee exodus from Indochina, particularly since May and June when the monthly outflow exceeded 60,000, has reached such staggering dimensions as to pose major political and security problems for Southeast Asia as well as a humanitarian problem of massive proportions. The current abilities of countries of permanent resettlement fall far short of keeping even with the overflow. There are now almost 400,000 Indochinese refugees in the first-asylum countries of Southeast Asia. (Thailand - 180,000; Malaysia 75,000; Hong Kong and Macau 71,000; Indonesia - 60,000; and the Philippines - 5,000.)

The majority of refugees flee by boat from Vietnam, which has embarked on a policy to rid the nation of those elements of society -- particularly the ethnic Chinese -- which the regime deems undesirable from a security or economic perspective. We believe substantial numbers of the refugees drown before reaching shore. Potentially, Vietnam could expel more than 1.5 million more people in addition to almost 750,000 million people who have already left since the collapse of South Vietnam.

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The ASEAN countries of first asylum see the refugees as an increasingly serious security threat as well as a drain on their economies. The Malaysians, in particular, view the influx of tens of thousands of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam as a potentially explosive element in their delicate racial balance. Hong Kong and Indonesia are in serious trouble with tens of thousands of refugees arriving by boat each month and very few being resettled elsewhere. Thailand, which has received a quarter of a million refugees from Laos and Kampuchea (some have been in camps for four years), is faced with the exodus of scores of thousands from Kampuchea, fleeing from famine and fighting. The Thai feel that world attention has focused on the "boat cases" and that its refugee problems have not received proper attention.

As the refugee outflow reached such massive levels in recent months, the Vietnamese intent to expel additional hundreds of thousands became clear, and the international response was weak, all of the ASEAN joined in hardline statements and actions reversing the humanitarian approach of providing first asylum which had prevailed -- despite the difficulties -- until spring of this year.

Their serious concern and a tough line on refugees was coupled with growing fear that Vietnamese troops along the Thai border with Kampuchea might attack. Some governments (e.g., Singapore) charged that the increasing Soviet military presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans and its full support for Vietnam could mean that the USSR, working with Vietnam, actually had long-term designs on much of Southeast Asia. The basic confidence, cohesion and strength of ASEAN were weakening under the pressure, while tens of thousands of refugees were dying at sea and in Kampuchea.

At the Tokyo Summit the United States agreed to double its intake of refugees and Japan agreed to pay 50 per cent of the UNHCR Indochina budget (up from 25%

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of a much lower budget.) Since Tokyo, however, the Japanese have told us privately that this commitment was predicated on a refugee camp population of 300,000. They may be hedging on the open ended commitment made in Tokyo and we will want to make certain that their support of the UNHCR is not being based on any ceiling. Following Tokyo, Secretary Vance, Foreign Minister Sonoda and the Foreign Ministers of Australia, New Zealand and Ireland (representing the EC) met with the five ASEAN Foreign Ministers on Bali to reassure them of the strength and solidarity of outside support and responsiveness to the refugee and security problems they faced.

The Geneva refugee meeting, which Waldheim had called in response to Mrs. Thatcher's original call and endorsements by other governments, was discussed and ASEAN agreed - grudgingly -- that it should be focused primarily on concrete measures to alleviate the refugee problem, with a major political debate on Vietnam's actions to be held elsewhere, perhaps in the Security Council as proposed by the United States. There were also signs from ASEAN that the burgeoning international response had reassured them and if it were to be followed by further positive action at Geneva, they could resume their past practice of according first asylum to refugees. There have been some faint, unconfirmed signs that Vietnam is considering revising its policies by controlling the refugee outflow, but we judge any fundamental change will only follow further concerted international pressure.

Thus the Geneva meeting itself, which will be attended by 72 countries (including all major participants in the refugee crisis except Kampuchea and possibly Laos), should be seen as part of a process -- an additional major step in a series of international actions which began at Tokyo and will continue after the Geneva meeting. Our hope is that these actions will provide immediate relief for the refugees and ASEAN countries alike, while maximizing chances for a long-term solution which will depend upon larger multi-year resettlement programs by

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other countries to match our own efforts, reaffirmation of first asylum, the establishment of regional processing centers, much greater funding for the UNHCR, and a major change in Vietnam's policies which force mass departure.

Your particular role will be to provide a clear signal of strong United States determination to see the problem resolved, by insuring the active involvement of the UNHCR, by doing more ourselves and getting others to do more to assist refugees. At the same time, it is important to be understanding of the special problems of our ASEAN friends in their time of crisis, and to oblige Vietnam to heed the pressure of world opinion. These will be the themes of the speech, as well as your bilateral talks with Waldheim, ASEAN, Japan and China. The remainder of the delegation will lobby hard in the corridors to press the same themes, stressing a number of specific proposals for action by the United States and others.

## II. Objectives

Our objectives in Geneva will be:

-- To obtain commitments from current resettlement countries to at least double their present intake (as President Carter did in Tokyo last month) and to get other countries which to date have accepted no or only a nominal number to resettle significant numbers.

-- To call for major increases by all countries in their financial contributions to the UNHCR Indochina program, which will have 1980 costs escalating threefold from current levels and to pin down the Japanese on their commitment to fund 50% of all UNHCR Indochina refugee programs.

-- To obtain assurances from Vietnam that it will move to reduce the outflow and put refugee exodus on a more regularized and humane basis.

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-- To obtain the agreement of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Hong Kong that they will provide first-asylum.

-- To obtain ASEAN agreement to the immediate establishment of refugee reprocessing centers in South-east Asia that will accommodate at least 250,000 refugees.

-- To obtain commitments from all maritime countries to rescue and resettle refugees in distress on the high seas.

-- To generate support for an international fund to help developing nations, particularly those in Latin America, which want to resettle refugees but do not have the financial resources to do so alone.

-- To lay the groundwork for follow-on actions by the Geneva participants, including organization of working groups on specific issues (e.g., RPCs, UNHCR financing and operations.)

### III. Key issues and strategy

In pursuing the objectives outlined above, we will want to build on the sense of urgency that generated the Geneva meeting and the example provided by statements and decisions of participants at the Tokyo Summit. The key issues will be discussed between Dick Clark and the major Western participants, and the ASEAN countries, at a two-day pre-conference meeting in Geneva July 18-19.

#### A. Pledging Increased Offers of Permanent Resettlement and Funding the UNHCR Indochina Program.

We will want to obtain pledges of increased resettlement and funding from the industrialized countries and others to spread the burden more equitably and meet the demands of current refugee outflow. In addition to the United States, France and Canada have already announced increased quotas for resettlement. Other industrialized countries take far fewer: Germany, for example, has

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resettled less than 4000 Indochinese refugees to date. Many will be prepared to increase these numbers: we may have a clearer idea of the extent of new resettlement opportunities after Dick Clark's July 18 preparatory meeting in Geneva. We should aim for an overall target figure of at least 250,000 annually, i.e., a genuine redoubling of current intake as called for by the High Commissioner for Refugees. The developing nations will be reluctant to commit themselves to significant resettlement numbers. Other countries will probably be willing to increase contributions to UNHCR somewhat, but will weigh this against the domestic economic difficulties imposed by high energy prices and recessionary prospects.

B. Encourage First Asylum Countries to Renew Generous First Asylum Policies

The key ASEAN countries (Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia) are reviewing their declarations of refusing refugees but it is unlikely that they will publicly endorse unqualified first asylum at Geneva. We should push them - but not hard - for public statements and try to obtain private assurances.

At best we would like to obtain a full restoration of first-asylum policies by the ASEAN states or, more likely, an unannounced but agreed easing of restrictions against first asylum. The ASEAN states want to be assured that they will not be left with a residue of refugees which must be absorbed internally. As an indication of this, they want an immediate decrease in their refugee camp population and a future outtake rate greater than the intake.

C. Refugee Processing Centers (RPCs)

The ASEAN states want to immediately relieve the tremendous political and economic pressures brought on by the friction between the refugees and the local population, particularly in Malaysia and Thailand. The ASEAN nations view the RPCs as a potentially helpful

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measure but wish assurances that all refugees will be removed and that all expenses will be borne by the international community. They also want to see RPCs established elsewhere so, for political reasons, the entire burden does not seem to fall upon ASEAN.

The RPCs, to be located in isolated areas (usually islands) of Southeast Asia, are UNHCR sponsored holding camps where refugees awaiting permanent resettlement may stay for as long as several years. In a meeting in Jakarta in May an arrangement was worked out with the ASEAN states where all refugees in RPCs would require specific guarantees of onward permanent resettlement. The time period for onward resettlement was left open, with the understanding that it would be "a reasonable period of time." We have been advised by the ASEAN countries that the establishment of large RPC's plus increases in permanent resettlement offers could encourage them to offer first asylum once again.

The USG should encourage ASEAN states and the PRC to allow the urgent development of RPCs in Southeast Asia capable of holding at least 150,000 people.

We made a demarche to Indonesia on July 14 to provide a large RPC before the Geneva meetings. President Suharto, who has "not disagreed" to this idea, is presently considering our request, and we look for a decision soon, possibly before you leave Geneva. Home Minister Ghazali Shafie, the Malaysian representative who promoted the RPC concept at the first Geneva meeting, will propose that RPCs be established not only in Southeast Asia, but also on United States territory and in Vietnam as well. We have told ASEAN that serious financial and legal problems make it difficult to establish an RPC on US territory.

#### D. International Fund for Refugee Resettlement

We want to spread our resettlement burden more evenly around the world, particularly in developing nations, and to reduce our overall resettlement costs.

A number of developing nations, particularly in Latin America, have room to absorb Indochinese refugees but lack the capital to maintain and train them. The Fund, capitalized at \$67 million annually over three years with an annual US contribution of \$20 million, would pay for transportation, vocational and language training, and maintenance costs of refugees (many of them being Indochinese) in developing nations. The Fund would support a search group which would aggressively seek to link development projects with resettlement to provide development benefits to the receiving nation as well. Bob McNamara has indicated the World Bank, working closely with the UNHCR, would consider capital development projects involving refugees that met IBRD criteria. There are indications that at the Geneva meetings Malaysia may propose the establishment of such a Fund to resettle Indochinese "boat cases" refugees only which is not adequate.

The Western Nations may support this idea in principle but draw back if large financial contributions are expected. They will have to be strongly encouraged, in our bilateral meetings. Waldheim will support the idea but wants to make sure that contributions to the Fund do not cut into UNHCR care and maintenance pledges.

#### E. Modification of Vietnamese Policy of Expelling

We must point out clearly that Vietnam is the source of the problem and must change its policies which are designed to provoke the mass exodus of politically unacceptable ethnic and economic groups. Despite the widespread revulsion towards Vietnamese refugee policies, the Conference needs to focus on concrete actions by the world community.

The UN is attempting to carefully orchestrate this meeting to focus attention toward the humanitarian aspects of the Indochina refugee problem and avoid debate on political issues. Waldheim will make a strong appeal on this point at the outset of the meeting. He plans to

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gavel down those who do not conform. However, the frustration of the Western and ASEAN nations with Vietnam's deliberate policy of expelling a large segment of its population and Chinese determination to score political points, will make it difficult to keep the debate non-inflammatory and could disrupt the Conference. We have a policy of maintaining long-term political pressure on Hanoi, and want to follow the Geneva Conference with a Security Council and/or General Assembly debate.

You should tell the Chinese that we do not think too much political rhetoric is desirable at Geneva, but we should continue the pressure in other fora.

The Vietnamese may repeat their invitation to put the refugee outflow on a more humane and orderly basis by having resettlement countries accept directly large numbers of refugees. They will also emphasize that they are making new efforts to control the "illegal" refugee outflow, for which they are not responsible.

Vietnam will try to enlist sympathy for its position that it is the victim of an international campaign mounted by the United States and China who are really responsible for the refugee issue, that those fleeing are "malcontents" unable to adjust to the new socialist society, and that the UNHCR-SRV Seven Point agreement demonstrates Vietnamese willingness to cooperate in solving the problem.

*F. Rescue at Sea*

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UNITED NATIONS MEETING OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES

BACKGROUND PAPER

United Nations Potential for Increased Assistance Related to  
Indo-Chinese Refugee Problems

The potential of the UN system for increased assistance in dealing with the Indo-Chinese refugee problem may be considered under two categories: (1) direct assistance to refugee programs of first asylum and (2) long term assistance to countries granting resettlement to help deal with the added expense and effort incurred and as an inducement to cooperation.

Besides UNHCR, the UN bodies most able to assist first asylum refugees are the FAO (through the World Food Program), UNICEF and WHO. Each could increase (in WHO's case initiate) its activity among Indo-Chinese refugees by a considerable amount with its present resources. The type of dramatic increase that might be called for should the refugee flow continue to increase, however, would require action by the governing bodies and increased contributions from donors. Given the will, these procedures could be completed rapidly. The United Nations Volunteers are another source of valuable, relatively low cost assistance. Their contribution would be modest in the near term, but there is considerable potential for expansion.

Relatively long term assistance to developing countries accepting refugees for resettlement would properly be handled largely by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) which would in turn designate and fund appropriate executing agencies. It might be possible to establish a special fund or funds for refugees or for developing countries that accept refugees for resettlement. Without additional funding of some sort, possibilities for assistance are limited. All but \$9 million of UNDP funds for the present development cycle (ending in 1981)

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are committed. Beginning in 1982, it might be possible to specify a larger sum for refugee related projects. The UN Fund for Population Activities has become involved with internal migration projects and may be able to adapt these activities to immigration activities. UNESCO could provide education services to refugees.

From an overall viewpoint, our analysis yields the following conclusions:

-- The potential of the UN system to assist refugee receiving countries is considerable and could be a major inducement to developing countries.

-- Additional contributions by donor governments to the voluntary agencies would be necessary for this potential to be realized sufficiently.

-- Direct large-scale capital assistance would be required to supplement the efforts of the UN development and welfare agencies. These funds would have to be sought from the IFI's.

-- A UNGA resolution calling on UN bodies to adjust their priorities to favor refugee receiving countries would be highly desirable and probably an essential prerequisite to a satisfactory response from these bodies. (The politics of the UNGA probably would require that such a resolution apply to receiving countries regardless of the origin of the refugees concerned.)

-- Direct care and protection of refugees would remain with those agencies traditionally active in this field-- UNHCR, ICEM, various NGO's. New relief and welfare assistance from other bodies would be supplementary only and would need to be coordinated with or directed through the existing establishment.

If it should be decided to adopt a policy of seeking greater UN system activity along the lines discussed above, a major effort would be required. Securing passage of a favorable resolution by the current session of ECOSOC after the Geneva meeting probably would be a useful first objective, followed in the fall by a General Assembly resolution, and, finally, a vigorous follow-up in the governing bodies of the various agencies, especially the key ones of UNDP, FAO, UNICEF and WHO.

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