

TO: The Baron Report  
FROM: Peter D. Hart  
SPECIAL REPORT: The Transitional Period of American Politics

WJH  
JMG  
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### President Carter's Job Rating

During his first year in office, President Carter tackled many of the most difficult and vexing issues confronting America. He attempted to deal with more issues in one year than most administrations would dare tackle in one term. Despite these efforts, the President is not being well received by the American public. His job performance rating has steadily declined.

The latest NBC News/AP nationwide survey, taken in mid-February prior to the tentative agreement of the coal strike, reveals the President's approval score at 34% (excellent or good)--a 21 point decline in some six months. Carter's decline is much steeper than the declines five of the last seven presidents experienced in their first year--only Truman and Ford had worse declines. Our statewide polls indicate that the American public still likes Jimmy Carter on a personal level, but even here he is no longer as popular as he was in the fall of 1977.

While there is a tendency to look at surveys as some kind of absolute measurement, I believe opinion polls can be likened to a pendulum. A coal strike settlement could have been the catalyst to improve the President's standing; the miners ended that possibility. President Carter has probably reached his low point and he should begin a comeback in the next several months. Improved prospects for the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty,

and the adoption of a long-overdue energy bill should give the President the type of tangible accomplishments that were missing from his first 12 months in office. At the same time, if his job rating remains at this low ebb for any extended period of time, then these transitory perceptions of the voters may become deeply ingrained attitudes which will make it most difficult for the President to reestablish his popularity. One can only hope that Shakespeare's line from Measure for Measure, "The best men are molded out of faults, and, for the most, become the better for being a little bad," applies to President Carter.

One final point needs to be made about the relationship between job ratings and presidential trial heats. Many people believe that because the President, despite his low job rating, defeats all Republican rivals at this point in time, he will therefore win reelection. This type of logic is faulty for two reasons: first, an incumbent is always stronger in the pre-campaign period before his opponents get the sustained coverage he regularly receives. Second, the quality of the opposition is usually determined by the incumbent's showing in the polls. For example, a strong Gerald Ford or Lyndon Johnson would never have been challenged by Ronald Reagan or Eugene McCarthy. Likewise, a strong Jimmy Carter will not be challenged by Jerry Brown. Similarly, an up-and-coming Republican may choose to bypass the 1980 election if Jimmy Carter is strong. Many of these decisions will be made 12 months from now, and the performance of Jimmy Carter in 1978 may tell us more about 1980 than anything else.

## The General Mood

For seven years Hart Research Associates has been asking the question, "Are things in the country generally going in the right direction or are they seriously off on the wrong track?" Today, we find the mood shifting toward an optimistic viewpoint. In six surveys conducted in 1978, a very small plurality believes things are headed in the right direction. This represents a definite improvement from the fall of 1977. At the same time, it should be noted that the President's job rating has not improved during this period. In fact, this is the first time we have not had a corresponding improvement for a president. Until now, these two measurements have tended to move in lockstep. This ties into a new attitude that Michael Barone, author of The Almanac of American Politics, has noted--Americans today seem to be more concerned with private matters and less concerned with government. Issues of social concern have been replaced by issues of self concern. We seem to feel that things can be okay with the country, even if the President is not doing a great job.

We are presently in a transitional period of American politics. With the Watergate scandal and the Vietnam War over, there is no cause which seems to capture the interest of the public. Americans seem to be more concerned with making their own lives work, and the present period is one of accommodation rather than confrontation. While the public seems aware of the changes and sacrifices that will be necessary to deal with our problems, few individuals seem personally ready to make those sacrifices. At present, it seems unlikely that the 1978 congressional elections will help us to define the next era in American politics.



THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: THE VICE PRESIDENT  
SUBJECT: WEEKEND CALLS

You have asked that every Senator be called this weekend on the 2nd treaty. We are prepared to make these calls but recommend this project be delayed until Monday afternoon.

Frank's staff is in the midst of strategy sessions with Senate leaders regarding the 2nd treaty. The object of these sessions is to nail down a package of 2 to 3 acceptable understandings sufficient to win the vote and to isolate target Senators for special attention. The final plan will be worked out at a leadership meeting late Monday afternoon.

Senator Cranston has suggested that we limit our contacts with Senators for the next few days. Cranston strongly believes that Senators want to be left alone right after such a tough vote. If we wait until Monday afternoon we believe we will be in a much better position to make meaningful calls.



We await your instructions.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 7, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: THE VICE PRESIDENT   
HUGH CARTER 

SUBJECT: White House Authorization Bill

The purpose of this memo is to bring you up to date on the status of the White House Authorization Bill, and advise you of our recommended strategy from here.

(1) On April 4, the bill went to the House floor under a suspension of rules (suspension status recommended by Tip O'Neill and Bill Cable), and it did not receive the two-thirds vote required for passage under suspension. However, it did receive a majority (207-188).

(2) We feel it failed because:

- (a) The Republicans ganged up against it, probably still smarting from when the Democrats ganged up on them on a similar bill in 1975.
- (b) Some voted against it because it went in under a rules suspension, thus ruling out any amendments.
- (c) Representatives Harris and Schroeder sponsored the bill on the floor and were weak. The House leadership did not help. Morris Udall was in the hospital, and Tom Steed was out of town -- both of whom pushed us hard to write a bill and whom could have helped -- especially Udall.
- (d) The pre-vote press was not good. The National Journal wrote a factual article, but slanted it so as to lead one to believe you were trying to get authorization for a big staff increase -- certainly not the case. Hugh Carter was grossly misquoted in the story. Other similar stories were published with the only really accurate story being written by UPI.

(3) What happens now?

- (a) Representative Harris will have the bill brought back to the House floor. This will probably occur in seven to ten days.
- (b) Several amendments will probably be offered. They include:
  - 1. Requirement to report all detailees annually regardless of how long they've been here (the present bill calls for them to be reported only after they've been here for 180 days cumulative in any fiscal year).
  - 2. Reduce the number of staff authorized (the present bill calls for maximum of 100 people between GS-16 and Executive Level II, and no limit on number under GS-16. We presently have 57 in the GS-16/Level II category, and made the bill read 100 for adequate flexibility for you and future presidents).
  - 3. A sunset provision at the end of each Administration.

(4) Our recommended strategy from here:

- (a) Keep as low a profile as possible, but still maintain an active role.
- (b) Be willing to accept a stricter detailee reporting requirement amendment. Oppose all other amendments that would be concessions on our part.
- (c) Insist that the leadership, and Morris Udall take an active role in getting the bill passed in its present form. Maintain a position that you have compromised all that you are willing to compromise. Tell them that it's about time they took a strong position on this issue and stopped allowing the Congress to meddle with your office. The Vice President will take the lead in calling these people with this message.
- (d) Ask Tip O'Neill to write a letter to all the Representatives in support of the bill in its present form, and encourage speech passage.

ACTION: Do you have any comments or instructions for us?

April 19, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: THE VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: OBSERVATIONS ON YOUR PRESIDENCY

The Camp David discussions were very helpful in focusing our attention on ways in which we can all better serve your goals. Below I outline some observations which I hope will be of some value in determining how we should proceed from here:

Speeches

My most basic recommendation is that you should dramatically increase the degree to which you emphasize the public education role of your presidency. In retrospect, I believe that this function has been seriously under-emphasized and that the Administration's efforts have suffered as a result.

Where you have given major speeches -- such as those at Notre Dame, Charleston, Wake Forest and ASNE -- they have served as useful basic charters which have provided the comprehensive factual and philosophical framework of a particular policy to experts and editorialists, to our allies and adversaries, and especially to the public. Each of these speeches has been enormously valuable.

I propose that you undertake a much heavier speaking schedule, not only in Washington but around the country, on issues of greatest importance to your Administration. Such a schedule will provide opportunities for comprehensive articulation of the basic philosophy and direction of your Administration. You could focus on a series of issues, spelling out to the American people where you're going, how you intend to get there, and what kinds of problems you see in the way.



I suggest you put Stu Eizenstat in charge of a small task force, which would work closely with Jody, to map out a long-term public speaking strategy. It would recommend forums for and prepare speeches on such matters as government reorganization and responsiveness, the economy, education and the environment. The series might appropriately begin with a speech on the difficulties of grappling with many of today's difficult problems, emphasizing that you became President in order to tackle tough issues such as government reorganization, health care, tax reform, illegal immigration, social security financing, Panama Canal, SALT, and others which have been festering for years but which cannot be ignored.

I have sensed a much greater disposition on your part to articulate comprehensively your positions on foreign policy than those in the domestic area. I sense you are reluctant to define your own approach and philosophy regarding domestic issues. I may be wrong, but I sense that when you feel you are being characterized as being too liberal, you react in a way designed to counteract that definition; similarly, when you are being characterized as too conservative, you react in the opposite way.

In short, I have the impression that you intensely dislike being defined or "labeled". That may have some value, but I fear it also contributes to the feeling that people don't know you, they can't feel you, they don't know where you are going. I believe that by giving more major speeches, you will not only perform your public education role but it will require those of us serving you to help define and describe the Administration's goals more effectively than we do now. Also, these speeches hopefully will become the documents on which the next election is fought.

I believe a lot of work has to be put into your speeches. If Stu mapped out a long-range schedule, we would have more lead-time to prepare them and could make better use of thoughtful outsiders. Most of your speeches tend to be descriptive and detailed demonstrations of what you know and the amount of work that went into a particular decision; but at the same time they tend to be, for many listeners, fairly heavy and incomprehensible, lacking the eloquence and persuasiveness that a Presidential address should possess. I would hope a good deal of thought could be put into how we can make these speeches more persuasive and elegant.



Public Perceptions of Your Presidential Leadership

Your critics make many charges directed at your leadership, including the following:

- You are allegedly weak, uncertain and indecisive. They point to the absence of vetoes and attempt to make your views appear to be uncertain, equivocal and subject to bending under pressure. There have been no public displays of anger. Your efforts to de-imperialize the Presidency have resulted in diminishing the awe of the office.
- That you are preoccupied with foreign affairs;
- That you live a cloistered and private life and that you don't really enjoy the company of others in informal settings;
- That you are a manager and not a leader;
- That you become overwhelmed by minutiae;
- That your staff tends to be limited, at least in terms of Washington experience, and that you are not getting sufficient advice from persons of stature and experience other than the original friends you brought from Georgia.

I find very few people ever arguing that you're not bright, honest, decent or hard-working; rather, they argue that you are ineffective.

The great potential and exciting opportunity of this public perception is that, in most instances, it is inaccurate and can be quickly remedied by simply letting the public see more clearly what those of us who work with you see daily. This argues that you should undertake the much stronger public education role outlined above. It argues for some vetoes and/or strong rhetoric. It argues for strong discipline of disloyal persons to reverse the present complete lack of fear that anyone will pay a price -- any price -- for unauthorized leaks or damaging statements. (As Strauss puts it, "There is no penalty for screwing up in this Administration.") It argues for the political engagement of your cabinet officers in an effort to serve your broadest goals. It argues for other steps that demonstrate visibly the strength of your leadership. Finally, I think we should look for proper ways for you to perform that will enable people to "look up" to your office without returning to the Nixon imperial presidency.

I believe the "indecisive" issue is due largely to leaks which purport to show uncertainty when, in fact, it is an essential part of the decision-making process to hear different views. If we can start plugging most of these leaks, I think we'll be hearing much less of this criticism.

I fear there is a good deal of validity to the argument that you spend too much time pouring over staff memos in your office, and not enough time in public giving speeches and appearing with people. As someone said, when we elect a President, we don't want a manager. We can hire them. We want a leader.

Your perceptions, philosophies and objectives for America can be explained only in the public role. I think you do too little of it. If there's one element of your Presidency that cries out for correction, in my judgment, that is it.

#### Limited Range of Advice

I know you get all kinds of advice, but I'm afraid that much of it comes in a way that is not always helpful. I think you should have informal meetings -- perhaps bi-weekly -- with some of the wise and experienced people in this town and elsewhere, people who want nothing from you and who have no axes to grind. Getting together periodically with small groups of these people -- preferably in the evening, away from the press and off the record -- could be invaluable.

I can think of people who would be candid with you in such meetings, who would not talk about them afterwards, and with whom you could try out new thoughts and ideas. Several who come to mind are Jim Rowe (Roosevelt, Johnson), Clark Clifford (Truman), David Ginsberg (Truman), Ted Sorensen (Kennedy), John Gardner (Johnson), but there are others. Nearly anyone you wanted would be very flattered to be asked and very willing to help.

Foreign Policy

I think there has been inadequate strategic political thinking in the development of our foreign policy. Most of our foreign policy initiatives do not enjoy the same kind of congressional and political appraisal when they are being developed that their domestic counterparts do. You tend to get too personally identified with foreign policy initiatives whose chances of success are slight. I can think of many such instances with which the Secretary of State is closely and personally identified, and others with which you are as well.

I have long sensed an attitude among the Foreign policy advisers that there is something suspect about looking at a foreign policy problem in the context of the political environment in which it must be fought. I couldn't disagree more profoundly with this attitude, and I think we must do everything possible to reverse it.

I don't believe, for example, that the option you finally selected on the neutron bomb issue -- which I think is a good one -- ever appeared in the options paper given you. Rather, the paper simply dealt with absolutes and it was only after a broader public debate that the option that you ultimately settled on emerged as the sensible answer.

Also, I think you get too personally and too deeply involved in too many minor foreign issues. I have talked repeatedly about the number of foreign visitors. But it is hard to think of any issue -- whether it is Belize, Cyprus or Namibia -- in which you don't become deeply immersed once you learn of it. I realize that seeing foreign visitors and working on foreign problems is important, but I think we need a better balance.

### My Role

I believe I should also make a basic re-evaluation of the ways in which I have been serving you. In reviewing the last few months, I have concluded that I have been spending too much time on routine work which parallels and often duplicates the efforts of others and which they could do just as well on their own; at the same time I have not been doing those things that others cannot do. I have in mind such things as the western trip, which produced more benefits for the Administration than I expected. It put the problems in focus and identified where we should be concentrating our efforts, which before the trip had been diffuse and uncoordinated. I have been told that there has been a substantial improvement in western attitudes towards us as a result of that trip, and especially our follow-up efforts.

I should be doing more of this kind of domestic travel and giving more comprehensive speeches articulating our policies. I should also have a heavy campaigning schedule which will enable me to play a stronger role as spokesman for our programs. I don't know if you concur with this conclusion or not, but if you do I think it would be helpful in gaining greater public understanding of and support for our goals. I don't in any way wish to de-emphasize my role with Congress or my advisory role with you, but I believe my public education role has suffered somewhat.

### The Mood of the Country

I would like to mention just one thing about the so-called "conservative" trend in the country that everyone is talking about. If you ask people whether they are conservative or liberal, there is no question but that more will identify themselves as conservatives than would have been the case several years ago. But if you ask people whether government should help provide more and better housing, education, health care, environmental protection and the rest, a very high percentage of the population still strongly supports government activity of that kind.

There is obviously great public concern about inflation and the management of government. I don't consider trying to deal with inflation or trying to improve the management of government to be illiberal undertakings. Rather, I consider them to be necessities if we are to have progressive government.

Indeed, there is broad support for progressive efforts. If we look at those issues on which we have had the greatest success so far -- in the progressive areas of housing, jobs, economic development, strip mining, educational funding, etc. -- they have all been controversial initially but they all enlisted strong and positive support in the Congress. Polls show your tax reform proposals are supported publicly by better than 2 to 1 margins.


It is my hope that your Administration will demonstrate that we can have both jobs and price stability. If we can, we will have a decisive advantage over the Republican opposition which clearly favors trying to beat inflation at the expense of jobs, a position which I consider to be insensitive.



THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

April 26, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: The Vice President   
SUBJECT: Pacific Visit -- Letters to ASEAN and  
ANZUS Leaders

During my visit to the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, I believe it would be useful if I were to convey to each leader a personal message from you underscoring the importance you attach to the visit.

The letters for your signature to President Marcos, President Suharto, and Prime Minister Kriangsak at Tab A have been drafted by State and the NSC for this purpose. I am also attaching at Tab A letters to Prime Minister Fraser and Prime Minister Muldoon.

Additionally, it is recommended that you sign letters to Prime Minister Hussein of Malaysia and Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, the other ASEAN leaders, stating the importance you attach to staying in close touch with them. These letters (at Tab B) would be pouched by State.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at Tabs A and B.



## OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

April 24, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: THE VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: 1978 LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES

The following recommendations are the product of a joint review by Stuart Eizenstat, NSC, OMB, Frank Moore and me of the 1978 Congressional Session. Representatives of Hamilton and Jody took part in this review.

We are agreed that the list transmitted to the Speaker and the Majority Leader should be longer than the 8 - 10 items requested at the Leadership Breakfast, but that your designee (Frank Moore) should privately mark the 10 items that are the toughest and most important elements of your program. By communicating privately your highest priorities as part of a longer list, we believe it will be possible to include a number of initiatives that are politically popular and likely to be passed by the Congress even without a strong push from the Administration.

Category A -- Toughest and Most Important Items on Which Action Must be Completed During the Current Congressional Session

Energy Bill  
Tax Reform/Relief Package  
Civil Service Reform  
Airline Deregulation  
Hospital Cost Containment  
Mideast Arms Sales  
Turkish Arms Embargo  
Labor Law Reform  
Department of Education  
Urban Policy: Supplemental Fiscal Assistance and Targeted Employment Tax Credit

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE

MARKING BY

A handwritten signature, possibly "C", in dark ink.

DATE

7/10/06



Category B -- Priority Items on Which Action Should be Completed During the Current Congressional Session

Other Components of Urban Policy  
Korean FMS Credits  
Elementary and Secondary Education Legislation  
Higher Education Legislation  
Postal Reform Legislation  
Wiretap Legislation  
Lobby Reform Legislation  
Ethics Legislation  
Emergency Farm Credit Bill  
CETA Extension  
Humphrey-Hawkins Bill  
New York City Seasonal Loan  
Welfare Reform Legislation  
Waterway User Fees Legislation  
International Financial Institutions Legislation  
Highway and Mass Transit Act  
Federal Elections Commission Legislation  
OCS Lease Reform  
Criminal Code Reform  
Child Welfare Reform Proposals  
Constitutional Amendment: D.C. Voting Representation  
Alaska D-2 Lands  
White House Authorization  
Child Health Assessment Proposal  
Public Broadcasting  
Civil Rights Reorganization  
Tarapur Reactor/Heavy Water for India

5706-D  
April 28, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: THE VICE PRESIDENT

When the farm bill comes over and, assuming that you have decided to sign it, I think it would be well to hold a public ceremony signing the legislation and noting the improved farm income.

I think this would be a good chance to turn around farm attitudes by getting the main farm leadership involved in that event.





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THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

May 15, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: The Vice President *WJ*  
SUBJECT: Report on Visit to the Pacific

My visit to the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand produced a number of useful results, and flagged several issues requiring further attention by the Administration.

Your letters to President Marcos, Prime Minister Kriangsak, President Suharto, Prime Minister Fraser and Prime Minister Muldoon were well received. Each leader welcomed your statement affirming that America would participate actively in the Pacific. Replies from President Marcos and Prime Minister Muldoon are at Tabs A and B. Intelligence reports subsequent to my talks with Suharto indicate that his doubts about your policies in the Pacific region have been removed. Accordingly, I believe the principal objective of this mission -- effectively affirming the United States commitment to the Pacific -- was realized.

#### The Philippines

In Manila, we took a step forward on the base negotiations by agreeing to a joint statement embodying the principles for these negotiations. These principles involve respect for Philippine sovereignty (of importance to Marcos) and full protection of command and control arrangements for U.S. facilities and personnel (essential to the United States). President Marcos and I did not get into detailed talks on the level of U.S. compensation. There are indications that Marcos is considering setting

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*Fritz -*  
*Good -*  
*Have answers*  
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*attached letters*  
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*EC-12938*  
*REC-12706 NSC H re NSC-06-035*  
*BY G NARA DATE 5/11/06*

aside the difficult compensation and criminal jurisdiction issues to concentrate on the question of base arrangements. We agreed that military-to-military talks should begin as soon as possible. En route home, CINCPAC representatives were briefed in Hawaii. Admiral Weisner will meet next week with Marcos to ensure early initiation of the talks.

Marcos was concerned about the House International Relations Committee's \$5 million cut from the foreign assistance budget for the Philippines. I told him we would do our best to restore the full amount. The Senate Committee has now approved the full \$18.1 million. I will work with Frank Moore and State to press for full restoration of the funds in Conference.

On human rights, my private talks were frank and Marcos' reaction was calm. He has the message that our relations can only suffer if he continues on a repressive course. He indicated that a partial lifting of the marshal law, with the exception of Mindanao, might soon be forthcoming. My talks with the Philippine opposition and Church leaders were valuable. I told the former that we had made the visit because we felt it would have a favorable impact on human rights, and they subsequently endorsed the visit in a meeting with the press. Cardinal Sin described his role in the Philippines as one of "critical participation." While he is deeply concerned about the future of the Philippines under Marcos, his underlying and twice-repeated message was "do not abandon us" over human rights differences; if you do, the Communists will take over. I have asked Under Secretary Newsom to draft a proposed letter for your signature to Marcos reflecting on the visit and dealing with both the base negotiations and human rights.

#### Thailand

General Kriangsak was pleased to receive your invitation to visit Washington in 1979. He accepted on the spot.

On security matters, he welcomed your statement of commitment to the region as well as your offer of a squadron of F-5 aircraft. He made no reference to insurgency problems; however, he stressed Thailand's exposed position in Indochina,

its need for more reliable arms supplies and his hope that we would make more equipment of interest to Thailand available on more favorable terms than currently provided by FMS. Without commitment on any specific item, I told him we would give careful attention to each Thai request. I will remind State and Defense of this point.

Our most pressing problem with the Thais is refugees. We must work harder and more effectively if we are to deal humanely with this tragedy of growing proportions. We must help Thailand, we must keep up pressure on other nations to accept refugees, we must expedite our own in-field processing and resettlement procedures in the United States and we must find ways to make the UN High Commissioner on Refugees a more useful and effective agent.

I have asked State to forward specific recommendations, and I will be contacting U.S. volunteer organizations to urge greater action.

#### Indonesia

I believe the visit to Jakarta has provided the foundation for a more positive US-Indonesian relationship. Suharto was pleased by your favorable decision on the A-4 Squadron; he and his staff understood the human rights linkage and the fact that we could not accept use of such aircraft in Timor. I stressed the hope that the 20,000 political detainees would be released before the current timetable of December, 1978 and December, 1979. Within 24 hours of my visit, the Indonesians officially confirmed to our Ambassador press reports that they were preparing to release an additional 5,000 before August, 1978. I have asked State to continue to press the Indonesians to agree to an International Red Cross and Catholic Relief Service presence in Timor.

While in Jakarta, I advised Suharto of your decision to make an additional 50,000 tons of PL-480 rice available. In Indonesia and in the Philippines I believe it is important that we study wider use of PL-480 Title III to stimulate greater food production. I will ask Agriculture and AID to follow up.

In Jakarta, as in Bangkok and the Philippines, I stressed U.S. interest in closer cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and our hopes for ministerial level consultations in Washington this August. There is still some reluctance in Thailand and Malaysia. I will ask State to continue to press the ASEAN nations for approval of this meeting.

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### Australia and New Zealand

Security and trade were the issues foremost on the minds of Prime Ministers Fraser and Muldoon. Both leaders worry about the Soviets in the Pacific. Both welcomed your decision, announced in Canberra, to hold a joint US-Australian ANZUS naval exercise in the Indian Ocean off western Australia.

Both Australia and New Zealand are heavily dependent on their exports of beef and agricultural products. Both are bitter and frustrated over the policies of Japan and the European Community. Both insist that the MTN talks, if they are to be successful, must have a meaningful agricultural component. I agreed on this point, and I will follow up with Bob Strauss.

On bilateral trade both leaders stated concern over pending meat import legislation, particularly the Bentsen Bill. I told them that we do not favor such legislation. I will work with Frank Moore and Bob Bergland on this problem.

Finally, in all five capitals, we reviewed domestic and international energy developments, and we identified areas for increased energy cooperation, with the emphasis on conservation and development of alternate energy sources. I will follow up with Jim Schlesinger to insure that these cooperative programs are implemented.

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MALACAÑAN PALACE

MANILA

May 3, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I am gratified that you sent Vice-President Mondale on a state visit to the Philippines as your representative to meet with me on problems of mutual concern to our two countries. As you noted, we indeed moved the celebration of both Bataan Day and Corregidor Day so that the two occasions may be observed by us during Mr. Mondale's visit. In this way, in accord with what I have referred to as the "universality of principles" in our relations, we had hoped to symbolize the desire of the Filipino people to achieve growth and progress alongside the United States on the basis of mutual trust, mutual respect and mutual benefit.

I am writing this to you out of long-held sentiments of warmth, admiration and respect for the United States. These are feelings rooted in an American-inspired education and nourished by training in a juridical system derived largely from your country. They are feelings sealed by the sacrifices personally shared with Americans who fought for the liberation of the Philippines in World War II.

Among Filipinos of my generation, positive reactions to the United States are commonplace. But what of subsequent generations? What of the millions of Filipinos for whom World War II and the beginning of independence are not even childhood remembrances? As the years pass can the same sympathy between our countries continue?

To sustain a legacy of that kind, it is not enough to dwell on the sentimentalities of the past. Here, as in the United States, people ask for evidence of the

His Excellency  
Jimmy Carter  
President of the United States  
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5.(b)  
WHITE HOUSE GUIDELINES, AUGUST 26, 1997  
BY 0 NARA, DATE 7/10/06

relevance of any relationship to contemporary needs and aspirations. As a consequence, the meaning of the U.S.-Philippine relationship is being subjected to tests, the most important of which at this time involves the status of the military bases. Everytime an incident occurs between American military personnel and a Filipino, the value of the bases is brought into question anew. To be sure, these bases can continue to serve our security interests. They will do so, however, only as long as they are accepted here and in the United States as mutually beneficial.

To be sure the principle of Philippine sovereignty over the base areas has already long since been recognized by both nations. However, in present circumstances, that is not enough. The arrangements which govern use of the bases must also reflect the principle. I will say in all candor that the protracted negotiations have yet to come to grips with this reality.

With regard to the political situation in the Philippines, I would note that when martial law was declared in 1972, it was recognized on all sides that the nation was in the throes of a political paralysis and on the verge of a complete collapse. The economy was at a standstill. Crime and corruption were rampant. The country was fragmented into a number of private armed encampments.

Under martial law, the highest priorities have been given to providing security for the Filipino against violence to his person and to expanding the livelihood of his family. Personal security and adequate sustenance are regarded widely here as the most basic of human rights. While much remains still to be done, much has already been done in the past half-decade to give meaning to these rights.

At the same time, we have not been unaware of the need to proceed with the development of political institutions to replace those which gave way in 1972. To that end, we have experimented with a revival of the ancient Barangay system of local government and we have held various national plebiscites. In early April there took place a nationwide election for the Batasang Pambansa or interim assembly. Contrary to some superficial analyses, that election was a significant step in a

return to full popular participation in government. When the Batasang Pambansa convenes shortly, it will contain elected representatives who generally support my administration and those who do not.

The political forms which emerge in this country in the years ahead are bound to reflect influences from the United States and other nations. However, we are determined that henceforth these influences shall no longer be merely skin transplants. We are determined that they shall be blended into our institutions together with what is indigenous to our traditions. We shall not be deflected from that resolve under any circumstances.

I have written you at length because it seems to me that the relationship between our two countries has entered a period of trial. Whatever the immediate difficulties, much that is constructive for the peoples of both nations can emerge from this interlude. If that is to be the case, however, it is essential that in our reactions to each other's internal affairs we reflect a perceptive understanding of the prevailing situation and, in addition, that issues between the countries be faced and resolved without delay. I assure you, Mr. President, of my full cooperation in this respect even as I am confident that I can count on yours.

Mr. Mondale and I have met in a congenial, extensive and cordial discussion of the subjects mentioned in your letter. I am satisfied that our meeting covered ample ground, and that he will accordingly report to you our perspectives and perceptions on the base negotiations, on economic matters of mutual interest to us, and on the advancement of human rights.

I am taking this opportunity to communicate to you directly my concern over another problem. This concerns the fact that the media and the bureaucracy in the United States may be unable at the present time to convey, particularly to decision makers in your country, the true situation in the Philippines. We are consequently anxious about the likelihood that our perceptions will be misapprehended not only in respect of human rights but

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also of the more delicate problem over the relationship of our two countries.

I sincerely hope, Mr. President, that Vice-President Mondale's visit and our discussions would bring to our country's relations with yours new dimensions and expectations.

Sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in dark ink, likely belonging to Ferdinand Marcos, written over a horizontal line.





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