

VIETNAM

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1967

VIETNAM

of summer," said Luther R. Jones of Madison, who helped his father, M. L., start the weekly Coal Valley News in 1924.

"About that time I changed political parties, from Republican to Democrat," he recalled. "I have been a Democrat ever since." Jones, who will be 75 June 10, is a member of the State Civil Service Commission. He was appointed by Gov. Barron in 1961 and reappointed by Gov. Smith in 1964.

He was elected to the House of Delegates from Boone County in 1916. He enlisted in the Army during World War I and attained the rank of sergeant.

In 1933, Jones was the first state senator elected from the 7th District comprising Boone, Lincoln and Logan counties. He is a former mayor of Madison.

He was stricken last Christmas and was hospitalized for several weeks. He came out of Marmet Hospital March 16 on crutches, but now he walks with the help of a cane.

"The Marmet Hospital is due a lot of credit for my improvement," Jones said of special medical treatment and extended nursing care.

He was transferred to Marmet from Charleston Memorial Hospital, where he spent 12 days under surgical and other medical treatment.

The combined hospital bills amounted to \$2,420.31, of which medicare paid \$2,011.08.

"If we had had to pay the total hospital bill, we would have been in very bad financial condition," Jones said. "My wife is now figuring up doctor bills as they come in. Medicare will help us take care of them."

He said of Mrs. Jones, "She really takes good care of me."

Their two sons—Luther and Ferris—live in Madison. Another son, Vester, is a federal employee in China Lake, Calif.

Persons in the Charleston area who have received medicare benefits include Mrs. Eva Shepherd of 405½ Jacob St. and Mrs. Fanny Burnette of 233 Sixth Ave., South Charleston.

Mrs. Burnette, a 75-year-old widow, suffered a broken wrist last year.

"I wore a cast, but I missed only one week of work," she recalled.

Medicare covered her hospital bill after she paid the \$40 deductible. Other medical expenses came to \$132.52 of which medicare paid \$88.32.

Mrs. Shepherd, a widow, has a heart condition. She receives medical care and nursing services at home through the Kanawha-Charleston Home Health Agency.

She is uncertain of her age, but thinks she is 100. She says she remembers when her family moved to Roncerverte from Danville, Va., after the Civil War.

"I'm not tired of living and I'm not looking for a man," Mrs. Shepherd said. "I just want to live in my own home and take care of myself until I die."

COATTAILS

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an editorial from this morning's Baltimore Sun, which comments on the significance of Michigan's special election be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

COATTAILS

In a special legislative election, Republican Anthony Licata defeated Democrat James P. Hoffa, son of the Teamsters boss, in what is traditionally a Democratic district in Detroit. Voters in the area have consistently voted Democratic in both legislative and congressional elections. The only Republican who has scored consistently in the area is Gov. George Romney.

In a sense Romney scored again in this election. He campaigned hard for

Licata, who is a moderate like himself. After Vice President Humphrey and Senator Robert Kennedy urged a Democratic victory in the race, Romney emphasized that his own coattails were at the disposal of the Republican. Thus he reminds Republicans outside of Michigan again, as he did in 1966, that he not only can get votes for himself, but for his fellow Republicans. Party functionaries consider this important in a presidential candidate, which Romney is.

The Republican victory has narrower, more immediate political implications. Romney's tax reform plans have passed the State Senate. In a closely divided State House, Licata's support of the Romney proposals will be helpful.

THE NEEDS OF THE CHILDREN OF VIETNAM

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, modern warfare, however limited in purpose, necessarily affects combatants and non-combatants alike. Nowhere in recent times has the validity of this unhappy fact been more evident than in South Vietnam. Thousands of children have been left homeless and without parents in the crisis now gripping their country.

It is my privilege, Mr. President, to invite the attention of the Senate to a person-to-person, voluntary effort to relieve the terror and tragedy which has befallen the children in Vietnam.

Beginning last fall a nonsectarian, nongovernmental effort was organized by Lt. William Van Doren II, of Edina, Minn., who is stationed in Vietnam, and his fiancée, Susan Gardner, who is a student at Macalester College, in St. Paul, Minn. Together they forged a link between the children of Can Tho and Macalester College.

While Lieutenant Van Doren and other U.S. servicemen worked with the children, Susan and her cochairman, Carol O'Connor, of Cleveland, Ohio, another Macalester College student, organized the effort to provide the money and supplies which were needed to meet the needs of the children. Other student members of the Macalester committee are Sue Kuyper, Huong Norton, and Andy Sarvis.

To date, through the work and co-operation of students, faculty and members of the community over \$3,000 has been raised, and large quantities of supplies have been collected.

Mr. President, Can Tho is a city of about 85,000 people on one of the mouths of the Mekong River, at the broader end of an area still considered the strongest remaining Vietcong-controlled portion of South Vietnam. Can Tho is the capital, and the largest city of the province. Owing to its size and location, it has become a vast refugee center. Can Tho has two orphanages jointly operated by the Sisters of Charity.

The efforts of Lieutenant Van Doren and his friends at Macalester symbolize, I believe, the identification of our own free people with the orphans of Vietnam whose parents have been lost in the fight for that nation's liberty.

Mr. President, the best hope of every nation rests with its children. I am, therefore, highly encouraged and deeply proud of the interest and deep personal concern for the children of Can Tho

manifested in recent weeks by members of the Macalester community. I ask unanimous consent that three articles describing this effort be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Mac Weekly, Apr. 14, 1967]

FUND DRIVE BEGINS APRIL 17—MAC WEEK TO AID ORPHANS

(By Sue Kuyper)

Political Emphasis Week, Sno-Week, Fine Arts Week, International Week—all have become established traditions on the Mac campus. This year another week to be added; appropriately enough, it is to be called MAC week. Mac Aids the Children, formally known as the "Mac-Mekong Project for the Children of Can Tho," will begin on Monday, April 17.

Can Tho, Macite Huong Norton's home town, lies at one of the mouths of the Mekong River on the Ca Mau peninsula in South Vietnam. Can Tho, the largest city and capital of Phong Dinh province, has become an area with a steadily increasing refugee and orphan population. Over two hundred orphans (there are as many as 110,000 in South Vietnam today) have found aid at an orphanage in Can Tho, built by the French and run since 1963 by the Sisters of Charity. Aid to this orphanage is the goal of MAC week.

The Can Tho Children's Relief Fund was begun under Lieutenant Will Van Doren, a former Macite currently stationed in Vietnam, under whose initiative the various military, missionary, and orphanage officials decided to consolidate their efforts. The Relief Fund is represented at Mac by Susan Gardner, a Mac senior. Susan, as chairman of the student committee to aid the children of Can Tho, has launched MAC week in an effort to raise the one thousand dollars which Lieutenant Van Doren says is needed to properly staff and equip the orphanage.

MAC week will consist of the efforts of at least fourteen groups on campus to sponsor fund raising events. The week is sponsored by President Rice, Minnesota Governor Harold Le Vander, Senators McCarthy and Mondale, and Congressional Representative Karth. Faculty adviser is Al Currier, and the student committee consists of Susan Gardner, Carol Lee O'Connor, Sue Kuyper, Huong Norton, and Andy Sarvis.

Events of the week will include: Monday: Mulford Q. Sibley at NoExit, 9 p.m. Mr. Sibley will be available for informal conversation on all subjects relating to Vietnam.

Tuesday: Summit House will have a bake sale at noon in the lower union.

Tuesday-Thursday: Bigelow Hall's Women's Association of Slaves will be available to do ironing, mending, and similar tasks for the fellows.

Wednesday: Dayton Hall's "Activity on the Mall." A note of mystery here because it is not quite certain what it is exactly that Dayton will be doing on the mall.

Friday: Kurios House will present a program on the orphanage site, photos and talks by Susan Gardner and Huong Norton. Proceeds from refreshments will go to the orphanage.

Other organizations participating either by way of donations or activities still in the planning stage include Community Council, Doty Hall, International Club, the junior class, Kirk Hall, Dupre Hall, YGOP, and Wallace Hall.

ENGAGED COUPLE "ADOPT" 340 VIET ORPHANS
(By Carol Roloff)

Sue Gardner and Bill Van Doren are engaged, and they have 340 children.

But their children are Vietnamese war orphans, whom they've taken under their "wings"—she at Macalester college, and he in Vietnam.

It all started when Susan Gardner, a Macalester senior from Milwaukee, Wis., was dressing for her role as a French cabaret girl at a SPAN (Student Project for Amity Among Nations) benefit night at Macalester college. "I decided to do something about my Miss Four Point (straight-A average) image," Sue said. She dressed in black tights, used lots of eye makeup, and wore a black lace dress.

That night, William (Bill) Van Doren II, a former Macite home on leave from army language training, paid to talk to her during the whole event.

Sue is now heading a drive to get money and materials for an orphanage in Can Tho, Vietnam, where Van Doren, now her fiancé, is stationed. Sue had "always loved kids," as had Van Doren. "The night before he left for Vietnam, he called me from San Francisco, and said, 'When I get there, I want to do something for the civilians.'"

Then she quoted his Dec. 23, 1966, letter when he'd been in Vietnam about a month and had just discovered the orphanage: "I know that I'll need your help, for there just isn't enough stuff to be had in Can Tho and I can't get any from Saigon. So that means that in a little while you will receive an impossible list of things to send to the children. Somehow, you will succeed."

Sue's involvement with the orphans really began in January. Sue said, "and it's mushroomed since then." Its culmination is the week of April 17-23 at Macalester, when college groups and organizations will aid Sue's drive for money and materials.

Orphan work began for 2d Lt. Van Doren, son of Mr. and Mrs. William O. Van Doren, 4700 Phlox Lane, Edina, when he arrived in Can Tho last December as a member of an advisory group of the fourth army corps.

Can Tho is a city of about 85,000 people on one of the mouths of the Mekong river, at the broader end of an area still considered the strongest remaining Viet Cong-controlled portion of South Vietnam. Can Tho is the capital of, and largest city in, the province, which is estimated 60 per cent loyal to the Saigon government.

Because of its size and location, it became a refugee center.

"South Vietnam has officially registered 80,000 orphans," Sue said. "But unofficial estimates range from 110,000 and upward. So you can understand that the orphanage is swamped."

"Somehow, Bill just gravitated to the city's two orphanages," Sue continued. The orphanages are jointly run by a Roman Catholic order, the Sisters of Charity. The larger building houses some 200 "full-time" orphans, many of whom are racially mixed. The smaller building services 140 day residents, "part-time" orphans, whose parents are refugees.

Van Doren began spending his lunch hours, off-duty hours, and week ends at the orphanage. "He plays the piano and organ for them, and plays with them. Sort of a glorified baby-sitter, I guess. Mainly, he administers tender loving care," Sue said.

Other Americans were interested in the orphans, too—an army doctor, Capt. James Errico of Suffern, N.Y.; a French-Canadian sergeant, Sgt. Philiber (Papa) Paquette of the U.S. Army; a Protestant chaplain, Lt. Col. James Miller; a Roman Catholic chaplain, Father Lukoczewski; an AID doctor, Dr. Herbert Krohn; and a Protestant missionary couple who had been in the Mekong delta since 1959, the Rev. and Mrs. Richard Pendell.

"Bill got them together and said, 'If we pool our efforts, we can do a lot more,'" Sue said. "So they formed the Can Tho Children's Relief fund, a non-profit, nondenominational charitable organization." All mem-

bers devote free time—apart from other duties—to the orphans.

The group is set up with a bank account in San Francisco, so only committee members can withdraw money for the fund. Its mailing address is to Van Doren's or Lt. Col. Miller's APO box, only.

"This way supplies and money can be strictly controlled," Sue said. "They feared that if supplies or money were channeled through Saigon, they'd never see them."

Immediate goal of the committee (and of the Macalester week) is \$1,000, to build an addition to the orphanage, so more children can be taken off the streets.

"And they need evaporated milk," Sue said. "Children are actually dying from starvation. And they need used baby bottles, a clothes dryer for the rainy season, and other utensils."

Besides having pathetically inadequate housing for the orphans, the staff is overworked. The sisters can do little teaching, since their time must be spent in helping the children survive. As one of Van Doren's letters said: "We hope that, in time, the younger people, the children of Vietnam, can be educated. They are the hope of Vietnam."

"You can't imagine how a country is prostituted by war. These people are backward, true, but proud of their race and history. Now an estimated 350,000 Viets have been killed so far, mostly men. Can you imagine what that does to the women? Then what about all the orphans? There is not enough money for keep, education, or anything else for them. What will happen to them? Especially the unfortunate ones that are half American, Korean, Australian, or what have you? Their plight is worst of all."

Since the committee's founding, Sue has been their American representative. Cochairman with her in the Macalester activities is Carol O'Connor, Cleveland, Ohio, who has been doing photographic promotion of the orphanage.

Since Sue began working on the orphan project, her academic life has been altered.

"I used to do nothing political, or active—just study," she said. "But I think orphans are more important than maintaining my grade point average." But she admits that she'll probably make her grade point average.

"This orphan work has brought out something in me that I never thought I had," she said. She has forced herself to speak in public ("I never turn down a speaking engagement") and has learned to handle many business matters.

The unpopularity of the war has brought her into some pretty sticky situations, she said. "But these children are hurt by both sides. These children don't know who hurt them—just that they were hit when a mine went off, or they were shot by a soldier, or burned. People may be against the war, but they're not against children."

"I think a lot of the soldiers there really wonder if they're doing any lasting good," she said. "Perhaps that's why they work so hard at the orphanage. When they leave Vietnam, they can feel that something has been accomplished."

She quoted a letter from her fiancé—"I'm caught between the misery and the beauty of this planet's people. It is pathetic—yet still majestic—how they resemble each other—the farmer in the North Carolina hills, or Vietnam rice paddies, or African bush. All are similar in so many ways. All are wretched, wonderful, tragic, magnificent people. That's why I love them, for there's a little bit of me in each of them and little bit of each of them in me."

Sue's French major has served her in good stead, for the nuns write to her in French, telling her what they need. "Bill always has to go through Papa Paquette," she said.

When Van Doren returns from Vietnam, the couple will adopt at least one mixed-race

child from Vietnam. "Bill's scouting for the right one now," Sue said. The couple plan to marry in July in Hawaii.

Highlight of the Macalester college week will be a benefit performance for the orphans April 21 of the Uppa Trio Plus One at No Exit, the non-alcoholic night club on campus.

Sens. Eugene McCarthy and Walter Mondale have to be honorary sponsors of the orphan work in the U.S. Vice President Humphrey, and Gov. LeVander have not yet responded to their invitations to be honorary sponsors.

Checks for the orphan's fund can be made to: Can Tho Children's Relief fund. Donations of articles may be sent or brought unpackaged, to the chaplain's office at Macalester college.

ON BEHALF OF THE ORPHANS—MACALESTER COLLEGE STUDENTS WORK AND ENTERTAIN TO AID ORPHANS IN VIETNAM

The campus of Macalester College, St. Paul, recently was the scene of a piano-playing marathon, a "slave market" in which coeds did laundry and mending, a car wash, auctioned dinners by faculty members and other like events. It was all part of student-led drive for funds to aid South Vietnam orphans at Can Tho.

The idea originated with a former Macalester student, Lt. William Van Doren II of Edina, now serving in Vietnam. He wrote his fiancée—Susan Gardner, Macalester senior from Milwaukee, Wis.—and asked her to organize an on-campus drive. She got the entire campus into the act, including all seven Macalester dormitories. The original drive was to have been for one week, with a goal of \$1,000, but it went so well that it will be continued to the end of the term, May 29. The drive is now open to everyone. Interested persons may make contributions payable to Can Tho Children's Relief Fund, Chaplain's Office, Macalester College, St. Paul, Minn.

Van Doren's initial idea was to raise enough money to build an addition to the orphanage at Can Tho, but the increased amount will permit a larger addition with more furnishings and equipment. The faculty raised \$300, including \$36 from auctioning a Persian dinner for four couples at the home of Prof. Yahya Armajani and \$16 from auctioning a dinner at the home of Dr. Harvey M. Rice, Macalester president.

Van Doren wrote from Vietnam: "I would like to extend our heartfelt thanks to the Macalester College community for your compassion and generosity. You have made it possible to assist the orphans far beyond what could otherwise have been done on their behalf... We know of no other college community in the country that has been so united in any cause so worthy."

FREE WORLD ASSISTANCE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. FULBRIGHT, Mr. President, the Department of State publishes what are known as Information Notes. One of these, dated April 1967, is entitled "Free World Assistance for South Vietnam." It begins with a quotation from the Secretary of State, as follows:

A large majority of the governments of the free world are sympathetic to our efforts in Southeast Asia and would be alarmed were they to fail.

The "Information Note" then proceeds, in its words, to "document the impressive scope of the genuinely international aid program."

I was interested in the so-called documentation which referred to "more than



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No. 91

THE UNITED NATIONS AND A CEASE-FIRE IN VIETNAM

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, last Friday, following the United Nations action in the Middle East crisis, my colleague from Minnesota [Mr. MONDALE] wrote to Ambassador Arthur Goldberg. In his letter Senator MONDALE noted the cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in reducing tensions. He urged that Ambassador Goldberg take advantage of the present mood and renew our efforts with the Soviet Union in the United Nations to bring about a cease-fire in Vietnam. I ask unanimous consent that Senator MONDALE's letter be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JUNE 9, 1967.

HON. ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG,
U.S. Representative to the United Nations,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Please accept my warmest congratulations and gratitude for the manner in which you have carried out a most difficult assignment in the U.N. deliberations on the crisis in the Middle East. All Americans are justifiably proud of the clear and forceful way in which you have represented our country during these trying days.

One hopeful sign has emerged from this tragic military confrontation. With world peace at stake in a live war, the United States and the Soviet Union have been able to cooperate in the United Nations and between themselves to reduce tensions and diminish the danger.

The result is a U.N. resolution to end hostilities that does not limit the basis for future negotiations. It is only a beginning, but it is that. Although the future may be difficult, it is at least possible now.

This success was made both possible and necessary by the grave danger of world conflict. We all have a fresh awareness of the catastrophe of all-out war and a new appreciation of the urgent need to work diligently to avoid it. What might have happened in the Middle East might happen anywhere, and the world is now intensely aware of that fact.

This new climate, it seems to me, provides us with a unique opportunity to renew our efforts with the Soviet Union in the United Nations to bring about a cease-fire in Vietnam as well. If we could agree on a similar unlimited resolution to end the fighting in Southeast Asia in the name of world peace, the contribution to the safety of the world would be enormous.

I therefore urge you to use every means at your disposal to take advantage of the present mood. The details of the two situations differ, I know. The chances of success may be remote. But the opportunity must not be lost, for we are all newly aware that the overriding consideration is the necessity to avert world catastrophe.

With warmest regards.

Sincerely,

WALTER F. MONDALE.



United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 90th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

Vol. 113

WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 30, 1967

No. 140

UNITED NATIONS CONSIDERATION OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, a number of Senators have suggested during the past few days that the United Nations should take up the question of the war in Vietnam as soon as possible after this coming Sunday's elections. I commend this initiative, and I wish to join it today.

Early in June, I wrote to Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg to express my hope that the climate created by a successful cease-fire effort in the Middle East could lead to a similar resolution for Vietnam. As a result of the current discussion of possible U.N. involvement in the Vietnam crisis, I have written again to Ambassador Goldberg to suggest that U.N. discussions might help create a climate in which a means could be found to allow this new South Vietnamese Government to develop without the tragic environment of war.

I know that there are great problems to be solved if productive discussions on Vietnam are to take place in the United Nations. But our private initiatives remain unproductive, and the danger of international catastrophe has increased since June. I believe we ought to make another attempt in the United Nations.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of my letter to Ambassador Goldberg dated today be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, D.C., August 30, 1967.
HON. ARTHUR GOLDBERG,
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG: Early in June, at the time of the successful United Nations resolution to end hostilities in the Middle

East, I wrote to you to urge your effort to bring about a U.N. cease-fire in Vietnam as well. I appreciated your kind response and assurance that you would remain alert to any possibilities which might develop.

During the past week, a number of my colleagues in the Senate have urged that the United Nations take up the question of the war in Vietnam as soon as possible after the new South Vietnamese government takes office. While I recognize the many difficulties that such consideration would face in the Security Council or the General Assembly, I do want to repeat my own feeling that this conflict deserves attention in the highest available forum.

Even inconclusive debate in the body which represents the world's hope for peace through law would add something, I believe, to consideration of this vital question. But I remain hopeful that a formal hearing before an independent forum might create a climate in which a means could be found to allow this new South Vietnamese government to develop without the terrible and tragic environment of pitched battle.

I also understand the risk that weeks or months of mutual recrimination might worsen the cleavage that presently exists. But I believe we must be prepared to take that risk, since private initiatives continue to be unproductive in results.

I suggested in my previous letter that the overriding consideration is the necessity to avert world catastrophe. I also indicated my belief that an agreement to end the fighting in Southeast Asia in the name of world peace would be an enormous contribution to the safety of the world. The danger has increased since then, and so, therefore, has the potential contribution of U.N. consideration to world safety.

With warmest regards,
Sincerely,

WALTER F. MONDALE.



United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 90th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

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WASHINGTON, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1967

No. 142

SHARING THE BURDEN IN VIETNAM

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I am extremely disappointed by yesterday's television statements of the new South Vietnamese president about the conduct of the war in Vietnam. I do not believe he understands the concern many of us have about the new government and the war effort in that country.

General Thieu said yesterday that he thought a proper division of the missions of the effort in Vietnam would be for the United States to bear the brunt of the heavy fighting and for the South Vietnamese to carry on the pacification effort.

My own view is that it should be the other way around—and the sooner the better. It is time for the South Vietnamese to begin showing us that they are interested in becoming an independent nation. Unless they will fight hard, there is little we can do to help the new government to develop.

The fact is that the United States is now fighting most of the war in Vietnam. American troops bear the brunt of the fighting and the casualties, as the weekly listings show so graphically. American planes carry the entire load of attack on supply routes and industrial centers in North Vietnam.

Many Americans have severe doubts about our involvement in Vietnam. Many of the doubts have stemmed in part, I believe, from the minor role of South Vietnamese forces in this major military effort. Many of the questions that have been raised focus on a single concern. How can a South Vietnamese Government mean anything if the South Vietnamese cannot be persuaded to carry on the aggressive military action which their preservation requires?

Mr. President, South Vietnam has just had elections, and more are scheduled. I have looked forward to these elections and the development of a workable South Vietnamese Government.

I believe it is time now to test whether the South Vietnamese commitment is as sincere as the American commitment, which speaks for itself in the dedication of lives, material, and money.

The best interests of both nations require that the South Vietnamese take over more of the military and political initiative of the war. General Thieu should be as much interested in this as any of us.

N.D. Ill., Eastern Division, #67 C 612 et seq.) I am one of several Attorneys General representing states which have filed treble damage suits against substantially the same defendants. In fact, Michigan, along with West Virginia, Massachusetts, Texas, and Wisconsin, now has pending in the Chicago court motion for leave to intervene in the Department's civil suits against the library book publishers, for the purpose of objecting to entry of consent judgments in the form presented to the court, and to protect the interest of the public as represented in the treble damage actions pending on behalf of our states' taxpayers. Michigan is particularly interested in protecting the work product of the Department's suit, since it was in substantial part developed by Senator Philip A. Hart, of Michigan, in hearings of the Antitrust Committee of the Senate, and made available to the federal grand jury.

The result of the conspiracy or conspiracies involved consisted of substituting library editions for trade editions sold to libraries and schools, and by this and other means eliminating previous trade discounts ranging from ten to forty percent. (Some of us who have been investigating this feel that the average loss of discount approximates 33 1/3 %, but we cannot state from our present knowledge how close this comes to the actual damages resulting therefrom.)

The practices which are the subject of your prosecutions and of your civil action significantly affect a substantial portion of school districts and public libraries in states throughout the nation. As you know, under Title II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, more than one hundred million dollars of federal money is made available to the states each year for improving school libraries, and this is only one source of funds allegedly overcharged by the conspiracy which is the subject of the litigation. Substantially all of these, and other public funds such as federal library funds, are affected by the conspiratorial diminution or elimination of trade discounts to public schools and libraries. The effectiveness of at least two major federal programs was, therefore, diminished.

In addition to the five states and numerous local municipalities which have already filed treble damage suits based on the above alleged conspiracy, other states contemplate filing similar actions. Therefore, I feel that the federal government has a significant interest in seeing that as many public agencies as possible, including the states, recover overcharges to their taxpayers resulting from the conspiratorial practices referred to. I therefore urge you to give all appropriate aid to any interested state to achieve this end.

It is appropriate in this connection that I call your attention to a resolution adopted by the National Association of Attorneys General, of which I am currently president, at its annual meeting on August 30, 1967, relative to the increasing public need for more effective antitrust enforcement by the states, and the necessity of developing better cooperation between the Department of Justice and the states as well as among the states. I write this letter as Attorney General of the State of Michigan rather than as President of the Association, of course, but forward for your attention a copy of the resolution referred to as germane to the subject being discussed.

Specifically, I request that you consider the following actions:

1. Insist on including in the consent decrees an "asphalt clause" which would protect the interests of the public money purchasers injured by the conspiracies.
2. Conducting in the Department of Justice a seminar or symposium for attorneys representing the Attorneys General of the several states and other units of govern-

ment to give them the benefit of the know how and work product of these employees of the Department of Justice who have worked on this matter.

We realize that the filing of these cases was preceded by a grand jury investigation and that the transcript of grand jury proceedings or any part of it cannot be revealed without a court order. However, except for this, the know how and work product of your attorneys and economists can be made available and it seems to us it should. Especially with costs of government and taxes rising to a point of national emergency, we can see no reason why legal and economic work already completed by federal employees should be needlessly duplicated by state employees, which will be the case if the federal work product is not made available to the states. It is in the common interest of the federal and state governments to avoid such waste.

Your earnest consideration of these proposals will be greatly appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

FRANK J. KELLEY,
Attorney General of Michigan.

A PERSPECTIVE ON VIETNAM

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, recently I was asked to appear at an issues conference of the Young Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota. The issue, not surprisingly, was Vietnam.

In preparing for that session, I tried to come to grips with the dissent over the war. I wanted to describe my own position with regard to Vietnam policy as well as I could, and I wanted to try to put the war into a broader perspective of America's responsibilities abroad and at home. I also wanted to speak to Minnesota's young Democrats about political power and political parties and their responsibilities toward both.

My remarks offered a number of conclusions:

First. The differences in position among responsible people who discuss Vietnam policy are smaller in fact than they are made to seem through the polarization of views that is taking place.

Second. The courses open to us in Vietnam have implications far beyond Saigon, Hanoi, and Washington.

Third. The debate over Vietnam is drawing our attention from some other vital concerns of America—world hunger and development problems, the need for an effective international organization that will keep us from destroying ourselves, the crisis of missing opportunity for millions of Americans, the appalling ignorance in which we deal with our domestic problems.

Fourth. We badly need the idealism and devotion of our young people if we are to keep growing in America, and our growth is always likely to be less than we want—often accompanied by failure and disappointment.

Mr. President, this was a partisan group and I gave a partisan speech. But there was nothing partisan in my attempt to discuss Vietnam; one discusses that issue only as an American.

I desire to share these remarks with Senators, so I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

YOUNG DEMOCRATIC-FARMER-LABOR ISSUES CONFERENCE ON VIETNAM

(Remarks of Senator WALTER F. MONDALE, Macalester College, St. Paul, Minn., November 11, 1967)

Student political activity—your participation in the Young Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party and this kind of issues conference—really matters, because there is a critical relevance between your activity as a student in politics and the opportunity for involvement in American political life.

My own case is not unusual. In Minnesota, young men and young women who believe in their principles and are willing to exert themselves in the political structure are quickly accepted and given access to the corridors of power in American government. This is exciting.

But more than that, it ought to be sobering. As students you cannot, any more than I, be flippant in your view of American problems. Nor can you be irresponsible in your outlook, or permit others to assume responsibilities that you are unwilling to assume.

We cannot avoid debate; we cannot avoid controversy; we cannot avoid dissent. As Americans we must choose which courses we will take. As Democrats we have the additional problem of determining the best strategy, because that is a part of politics as well.

It is impossible to deal with the issue of Vietnam in a few words, and especially not in slogans. It is enormously complex. It involves analysis of many factors and many features. But I have tried to set down, as best I can, where I stand on Vietnam, why I stand there, and why I think you should stand there, too.

Some disagree with me—there is another Senator from Minnesota who takes a different view, and I respect him as a sincere and effective public servant. In our party and in our state we have generally been right on the great issues that face mankind, whether justice, or opportunity, or human rights, or foreign aid, or free trade, or the responsibility of this nation to improve the possibilities for a stable and peaceful world. Our party has gone beyond that, and its public leaders have put meat on those bare bones. Searching for new insights, eager to seize new leadership opportunities, impatient with mediocrity—we have shaped this party to the highest standard in the nation on issues, ethics, and the competence and dedication of its officeholders.

We have often disagreed. In fact, we have a party composed of such conviction that it is becoming increasingly difficult to hold it together. When we finished last year's battle, we had proved that we really believe that there are more important things than winning. And only this year, you Young Democrats have told the National Young Democrats to chuck it and some of you have organized to defeat the incumbent President and Vice President of the United States. That includes Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota—whom I believe to be one of America's greatest citizens.

It may be that factionalism is the price of superiority. And yet the unique function of a political party is to translate ideas into political power and to legislate that power into administrative reality. You can't do that when you are out of office. We are out of office in Minnesota, and some of you, reluctantly, and some eagerly, would have us out of office in Washington.

I just can't believe that makes sense. Nor can I join those who would withdraw from Vietnam or pursue other policies that amount to the same thing.

It would be wonderful to see that great issue more clearly, to speak out more eloquently, to couple my deep distress over the Vietnam tragedy with a plea or demand for a single dramatic act that would bring it to

an end. But there is no way to wave a magic wand and have the issue disappear. There is no way to talk it, or shout it, or march it out of existence.

I am all too conscious that my position is not a popular one here. But there are two kinds of crusaders in this debate, and I just can't join either kind.

Just as I cannot subscribe to a domino theory or a monolithic communism theory, I cannot subscribe either to a demon theory or a dupe theory. Furthermore, I fear the passion which assigns broad significance to narrow distinction. As a young Democrat I watched another crusade—over loyalty. Like that one, though more intensely because there are two kinds of crusaders this time, I feel that this debate is on the verge of running away with us—of taking on a life of its own and sweeping us before it.

As I try to tell you what I think about Vietnam, I also want to try to put that struggle into a larger perspective. Our involvement in Vietnam is only one of our problems, and some of our others are at least as important to America and to those of us—to those of you—who must lead it. For whether we lead well or badly, it is tomorrow that we shape with whatever we do today.

First of all, I am terribly concerned about our involvement in Vietnam. I don't like the killing and destruction, the slowness of political improvement, and the colossal inflation.

Nor does anybody else. That is the first important consideration I must suggest to you. You may have to judge our policy in Vietnam as mistaken. You may have to call it ineffective. But it is not morbid, and character assassination only limits the possibility of sensible discussion.

Next, there can be little doubt that we have made some mistakes in Vietnam. I happen to think that two of them have been our gradual Americanization of the military effort and our decision to bomb beyond supply routes that directly affect our own forces. We have made errors before in domestic and international affairs, however. But the history of our involvement and the errors we have made in Vietnam have become an obsession for far too many.

Of course we need to be concerned about how we got there, what our commitments were, what better alternatives there might have been. But even if we could agree on answers to those questions, they are not worth our most serious consideration.

We must examine our presence in Vietnam in other terms than the past. Even if it be assumed that we could have done something else, something better, let us look at our present involvement and consider what we might do now.

Vietnam will end sometime. What will begin?

Some of our mistakes in Vietnam were made while we fought in Korea. What mistakes are we making elsewhere in the world as we fight in Vietnam?

We have half a million men in Vietnam today, fighting a live war. A newly elected government is threatened by the National Liberation Front, which desires to take control of South Vietnam. It is also threatened by a North Vietnamese government which is bringing troops and supplies to the South. The troops are North Vietnamese. The supplies are not.

The United States is carrying the brunt of the military struggle against both the NLF and the North Vietnamese. The United States alone is carrying on an aerial war intended to diminish the movement of troops and supplies to the South.

The South Vietnamese government has not been very successful in mobilizing an effective military effort, although there have been some very fine South Vietnamese forces involved in the fighting and I think they should be pushed far harder. The South Vietnamese government has also not been very

successful in mobilizing popular public support in the areas under their control.

A massive U.S. presence has economic effects, as well as military and political effects. Remembering that we have made mistakes, seeking some improvement, what can we do? The questions of policy affect South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Asia, and the rest of our world.

One of the major dissenting groups in this country suggests the kind of escalation of military effort that will bring the North Vietnamese and NLF to their knees in some sort of abject surrender. The Administration does not seek such unlimited escalation, so this is a dissenting view.

The policy suggestions of these dissenters are dangerous, I believe. For the Chinese and the Russians cannot accept such an end to the war, and broadening it beyond Vietnam is unthinkable. Yet there are Americans who strongly favor this approach—a policy that seems to me to be an attempt to end the war in Vietnam by starting World War III.

A second major dissenting group calls just as vocally for immediate and unilateral withdrawal of our military presence in Vietnam. It goes without saying that this implies withdrawal of our economic and political presence as well. As Edwin Reischauer says in his new book, *Beyond Vietnam*, such a step, though more debatable than escalation, is not much more attractive. He considers it to be a minor disadvantage that all of Vietnam would probably fall under the control of the Viet Cong and eventually the North Vietnamese. He considers it insignificant that the United States would lose face and even suggests that we might be better off in our relations with other nations if we were not so powerful and prestigious.

But Reischauer, whose years of study and experience in Asia provide some reason for us to take him seriously, says that there could be disastrous political and psychological consequences of withdrawal. It would, he says, "send a massive psychological tremor through all of these countries (of South and Southeast Asia), further threatening their stability and perhaps sharply shifting their present international orientation."

In addition, he says, it increases the likelihood of "wars of national liberation" in the less developed countries in the world. He points out: that these unstable nations of Asia, almost uniformly, are fearful that they too might be visited by guerrilla warfare or wars of national liberation; that they continue to be concerned about what the enormous nation of China may have in mind so close to their borders; that if we were to withdraw from South Vietnam the Viet Cong and the NLF, at this point, when the stakes are this high, would be successful in causing us to withdraw; that the "high risk" politicians in the Communist world would have proved their case and the now nearly forgotten theory that communism is the "Wave of the Future" would be revived; and the prudent politicians in the Communist apparatus would lose much of their influence because they would be proved wrong.

Reischauer points out that there is something to the domino theory, though not in the simple mechanical sense in which it is typically put. In the countries closest to Vietnam, he says, there is some strong approval of our Vietnam policy and "a considerable degree of quiet support, masked either by discreet silence or by an official stance of mild condemnation."

These nations, because of internal instability or apprehension about China's intentions or the loyalties of substantial Chinese populations within their own borders, "would feel much less secure if the United States, after having committed itself to the fight, were forced to admit defeat at the hands of Communist insurgents."

In addition, Reischauer points out, the seekers for Communist control in underdeveloped countries throughout the world

would see this as proof that "wars of national liberation" are irresistible. Reischauer suggests that "it would be far better proof than Ho Chi Minh's victory over the French in North Vietnam, or the Communist triumph in China, or the sweep of Communism in the wake of the Soviet army in North Korea and East Europe, cause in none of these cases was the military power of the United States directly involved."

Successful Communist insurgency, Reischauer says, would depend mostly on conditions within these countries, "but a clearcut defeat of the United States in the Vietnam war would certainly be one external factor that could have a seriously adverse influence on this situation."

Reischauer also maintains that shifting American military power elsewhere, as some have suggested, would have doubtful consequences. We would be spreading military power "into areas where the Vietnam war had just shown that our type of military power was relatively ineffective."

He questions whether less developed countries would still want close alliances with us after having seen that we could not guarantee "security from the threats that menace them most—namely, internal subversion and guerrilla warfare." A new defense line might simply pave the way for more disasters like Vietnam, he says, and rejection by Asian nations of such an approach "would probably further reduce our ability to play a helpful role in Asia, even in fields other than the military."

Reischauer sums up:

"The net results of our withdrawal from the war in Vietnam, however skillfully we might try to conceal the withdrawal, would probably be an increase in instability in much of Asia and a decrease in the influence of the United States and in our ability to contribute to the healthy growth of Asia. These adverse consequences might be felt in much of Asia for years to come."

Besides changing the political climate of Asia for the worse, Reischauer speculates that withdrawal from an American commitment for whatever reasons—political, strategic or moral—could encourage doubts in such nations as Japan and our European Allies about the reliability of commitments there, and might even encourage nuclear proliferation. What is involved here, he says, is not the loss of face, but the loss of faith.

Nuclear proliferation happens to be very much a central concern of peace in our world community. We hope and pray that the recently submitted draft treaty to the proliferation of nuclear power will receive the support of nations which are now not a part of the nuclear community. If our commitments that we have made in Vietnam over and over again—despite what may have been the wisdom of those commitments—prove to be commitments that we are willing to forget, how can these nations, India and the rest, believe us when we say we will protect them from nuclear attacks?

Furthermore, Reischauer suggests, the effect at home might be even worse. Along with those who would take renewed strength from a moral stand and those who would see it as a strategic cutting of losses, there might come a kind of racist isolationism that could damage our relationship everywhere in the world. I quote him when he says "in our eagerness to (save American lives and stop the carnage in Vietnam) we might help produce such instability in Asia and such impotence in ourselves that the development of a stable, prosperous and peaceful Asia might be delayed for decades."

Now all of this is speculation, as Reischauer admits, but it is the kind of speculation that looks to the future rather than the past. And it recognizes, it seems to me, two vital points.

First, our involvement in Vietnam is not a matter strictly between us, Saigon, the NLF, and Hanoi. What we do makes a difference elsewhere. Any major action must be considered in terms of possible consequences—both those which are obvious and those which are not.

Second, there are other considerations in addition to history and morality which may be important to the policy of a nation involved in a tremendously complex network of relationships throughout the world. Just as we cannot think only of our pride and our prestige in discussing the war in Vietnam, we cannot think only of our errors and our guilt.

No doubt this is one reason for the gap between the real differences and the imagined differences in position on Vietnam among public figures in America. A few weeks ago, in the *Sunday New York Times Magazine*, one of the analysts reported that the emotional gap in Vietnam seemed to be far broader than the factual gap in differences of point of view. I think there is indeed an emotion gap, one that stems from assigning broad significance to narrow distinctions.

For example, one universal point of view ties the Senate critics of Vietnam to the Administration. No U.S. Senator, to my knowledge, has publicly advocated immediate unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam. When pressed, every Senate critic of our policy in Vietnam accepts the fact that our presence will be required for the foreseeable future.

There is no great joy among Administration critics over this fact of life, but they all know what precipitous action would mean in Vietnam, Asia, and the world. They know that the United States cannot act without considering all of these consequences. They know we cannot undo the past and the present, that there are no magic wands.

Their suggestions are limited to lesser steps which they believe can be taken with consequence. But the passionate reader of their recommendations otherwise, with far too little serious analysis of differing positions and far too much wish—fulfillment. Let me use myself as an example.

I consider myself a supporter of the Administration policy, but I feel free to criticize, and I have done so when I felt our policy was wrong.

I've said publicly that I think we were wrong to go beyond bombing supply lines, railroads, and infiltration routes, and targets of that nature. I believe that we should stay away from targets which raise the risk of striking Russian shipping or that needlessly endanger civilian lives. Moreover, I would gladly suspend bombing, if a reasonable opportunity for meaningful talks arose.

I have said publicly that negotiations must include all parties, including the NLF.

I have said publicly that the United Nations, any other international group, any single nation, or any individual, should be used to bring about negotiations. I supported Senator Mansfield's Resolution introduced a few days ago, which 57 Senators signed, asking that this matter be brought before the Security Council and, hopefully, that there be a reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

I have said publicly that the war should be fought as much as possible by the South Vietnamese—that it is the responsibility of the new government to improve its army and reduce the manifest corruption in the military, political and business structures in South Vietnam.

I have called publicly for more emphasis on real achievement and pacification and more concern about the really sad and pathetic effects of the war in the villages and in the refugees.

All of these statements, I believe, fall within the limits of support of the Administration in Vietnam. They fall there because they recognize the reality and the necessity of continued U.S. presence there. And they support the Administration's goals of a negotiated political solution to that tragic conflict.

Where, then, does the dramatic difference lie between my position and the positions of those considered critics of Administration policy? There appears to be one hard distinction.

Some of these critics—not all of them—are calling for an unconditional and complete end to the bombing of North Vietnam. That difference appears to be judged by substantial numbers of protestors as a major difference of policy. Particularly in light of the restrictions I would impose on North Vietnamese air strikes, my opinion is that this is a narrow distinction to loom so large.

Unconditional cessation of bombing might speed talks. It might also increase the flow of supplies to the South, increase American and South Vietnamese casualties, and weaken our defensive position to the point where the chances of negotiating would be substantially reduced. I think we must be willing to take a chance to get to the bargaining table, but I would like to see a hint of better accommodation by the North Vietnamese before I take that chance. It is instructive to read the article written by Wilfred Burchett, who has traditionally been used by the Hanoi government to disclose its position, about ten days ago. He pointed out that even if we cease bombing at this time, Hanoi is not interested—I think he put it—even in *contacts*, let alone *talks*, until the bombing of North Vietnam stops finally and completely. The only steps that would lead to *talks*—not *negotiations*—would be for us to stop bombing North Vietnam, cease all military activity, and withdraw our troops from South Vietnam. Then they would begin *talks*, Burchett suggests. Negotiations might follow.

I don't know for sure whether stopping the bombing is better than continuing, and neither does anyone else. But as I said, I would like to see a stronger hint on the part of the North Vietnamese and the NLF that they will negotiate.

That desire for negotiation does not separate supporters of the Administration from opponents of the Administration, except in the eyes of those who seek to oversimplify the debate. There is a group that is not in favor of negotiations now or any time, but they are the dissenters who believe in complete military victory.

Those who would discuss the war must be certain to make the real distinctions. They must be careful not to magnify differences or create them where they do not exist.

There is much more than Vietnam policy involved in this debate. I am concerned about the climate I see, that polarizes gradual differences in views on Vietnam and focuses on that subject to the exclusion of all other problems. Tom Wicker described it recently in the *New York Times* as an "agony" that has overtaken the nation. "Perhaps," he said, "it was summed up in a picture widely printed in the European press—the contorted face of the young American pacifist screaming with hatred, the veins of a passionate contempt outlined in his neck, his fists clutched under a policeman's riot mask. In what manner could a pacifism so fierce and so despising differ from the violence and cruelty of men in iron helmets?"

Wicker went on to say that perhaps if the war in Vietnam hadn't existed, it might have had to be invented. "Something," he said, "was needed to symbolize, and thus to give focus and energy to, a profound but voiceless

discontent with the land of the free and the home of the brave—to a deep sense that something was wrong, some failure was distorting and perverting the idea of America."

As Wicker went on to say, this is nothing new in America, this disillusionment over contradiction. Righting the wrongs of past and present, whatever they are, is fundamental to the development and leadership of our nation. But as Wicker said, "there is something repugnant in it, too, in the intolerance and ferocity of disaffections, as if human failure were evil, as if a sort of inquisition were needed to scourge the money changers from the American temple."

We have failed in Vietnam, as we have often failed in one way or another to achieve the ideals we have set for ourselves. Such failures have troubled us from the beginning—they troubled Jefferson and Lincoln and Bryan and Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy and Johnson. Our present failures go beyond Vietnam, and the danger is that in the dissent over Vietnam we will lose sight of their magnitude.

Vietnam is such an obsessive, emotional struggle that it is making us incapable of preserving ourselves in the corridors of power. I cannot see a world with only one issue and one position that can be taken on that.

Despite my deep frustration over Vietnam, my despair over the destruction of war, my concern for the dying—all the dying, I feel deeply that in all of its tragedy, our present course is the best that we have to pursue. And I cannot bring myself to magnify my reservations to the point where they would be seen—incorrectly, but probably enthusiastically—as a fundamental objection to our policy in Vietnam.

I would ask you, instead, to devote some of your attention to our other problems, where you are desperately needed, where the fragile coalition for progress is in danger of breaking down in the face of the Vietnam debate.

There are not enough of us in Congress who want to increase economic assistance to poorer countries of this world. That is our first failure of effort, the growing gap between the rich and the poor nations of this world. It is not just growing, it is exploding. And our response has been a shrug.

One of the most frustrating things a liberal can do is to try to come to grips with this issue, to mount the kind of lobby that will reconcile and implement the great ideas which have been advanced to deal with this problem.

I don't have to tell you that nearly two-thirds of the people of this world are incredibly poor—and that the population burst is making them poorer. I don't have to tell you that millions of people are continuously so hungry that they are stunted in body and mind, that well over 10,000 human beings will die today from hunger. Unless we can turn the corner on the hunger explosion, Vietnam will look like a tea party.

Meanwhile, the percentage of our Gross National Product devoted to foreign economic aid has dropped from two and one-half per cent in 1949 to six-tenths of one per cent last year. Before we are through this year we will probably have dropped it to four-tenths of one per cent, far below the average one per cent effort which experts feel the developed nations must make if there is to be steady international development. This was to be the Decade of Development; it is going to be, I fear, the Decade of Disappointment.

We promised the underdeveloped nations of the world that we would permit them to trade with us. But we have fallen miserably short of that promise, too. And today powerful Senators are proposing protectionist legislation that rivals the Smoot-Hawley tariffs of the 1920's in its restrictiveness.

Beyond that, we are stripping the underdeveloped nations of their skilled talents—their doctors and engineers and that thin

vener of professional leadership that is absolutely indispensable to them if they are to have any chance for growth.

There is, however, one area of trade where we have willingly entered into development efforts, along with every other developed country in the world. We have welcomed the underdeveloped nations of the world to the international arms race.

Since 1962 this nation has increased its grants and sales of arms to developing countries from \$404.8 million in that year to \$866.5 million in 1967, and almost all of the increase has been in sales, which are now more than six times as great as in 1962. The crush of the world's annual arms burden now approaches \$175 billion. And in this country we are threatened by an imminent anti-ballistic missile race that could cost \$50 billion by itself, to say nothing of what it will bring in reaction investment in other nations.

Some of us in the Congress have not only been concerned about these universally dangerous signs, but have worked on them. We've voted to try to change the trend. We've tried to recruit active participants for the attempt to help developing nations stand on their own feet and grow toward peace and stability. Developing an impetus for international development is as fundamental an issue as any of us face.

A second great failure, at least as important at the first, is our inability to develop the kind of workable international institution which can keep the peace. You know the history of the League of Nations, one of the truly tragic stories in American history. We are coming very close to repeating it in the United Nations.

We must do far more to strengthen that institution, to contribute our resources and our faith to it, to call upon this organization to deal with the broad, fundamental issues which this world faces. Without an international institution that has some potential for keeping the peace, the chances of preventing Armageddon are dim indeed.

Nor are all our problems confined to international affairs. We face domestic problems of fantastic proportions for which we have yet to develop solutions or even to allocate the necessary resources. This despite the fact that we are in the 81st month of the longest, most vibrant period of economic growth in this nation's history, war or no war.

We now have a Gross National Product nearing \$800 billion. All of India with 500 million people has only \$43 billion; all of South Asia only about \$50 billion. Last year the economy of the United States grew by \$10 billion more than the full economies of all the nations of Africa produced, excluding South Africa.

Yet we still deserve Gunnar Myrdal's judgment in *Challenge to Affluence* that "There is an ugly smell rising from the basement of the stately American mansion." That smell is in the air. It mingles with the bitter odors of gunpowder and charred ruins in American cities across the land.

We are now dimly perceiving the fact that our domestic mistakes of the past have reaped racial bitterness, human frustration and failure, and the alienation of millions of American citizens who are trapped in American ghettos. Like the solution to the Vietnam crisis, a solution to the urban crisis defies simple identification.

Racial patterns of living are more deeply entrenched than ever before, and they are nationwide. As the chief author of the federal Fair Housing bill, I find nothing more difficult, nothing more frustrating than trying to raise this issue—which for the first time involves Northerners, not just Southerners—and call upon this nation to declare the principle that we are going to live together and not separately. Until we do so the chances of solving the maladies of this country are very bleak indeed.

I am proud as a Democrat, and I think you should be proud as Young Democrats that

this week the first Negro was elected mayor of a major city in this country—and he bears our party label. And we can be proud of the election of Andrew Hatcher too. But there is a darker side of those elections that none of us can ignore.

In Cleveland only one out of four white Democrats voted for Stokes. The other three jumped over the Republicans. In Gary, Indiana, only 17 per cent of white voters voted for Mr. Hatcher. Those ought to be sobering statistics.

There is not only a question of substance. We have a profound moral issue in this country, the question of whether we really believe in each other as people regardless of color. It is fundamental and basic and far from resolved.

Millions of Americans have educational systems hardly worthy of the word.

Insensitive law enforcement officers, inadequate public services, and an apathetic American public have created a new generation of bitterness and cynicism and hate, with leaders who see violence as an accepted method of settling grievances.

What has been our response? Too often there has been too little sympathy and too little help, and too much inclination toward suppression; a reverse violence which could make this nation even more divided.

Now, we must insist upon order, but I don't believe you can have order unless you have justice. And the objective of a liberal, objective of a decent American, must be the accomplishment of both objectives.

Yet this is a country where the poverty program is being virtually dismantled. We will be fortunate to save the structure of these programs, and we are almost certain to see only minimal increases in funding. A profoundly wealthy country, after it has made promise after promise of greater opportunity, after it has gone through one explosion after another, after the injustices have been laid out for all of us to see, may yet turn its back on the poverty program.

We have salvaged only \$10 million for rent supplements, \$13.5 million for the Teacher Corps, and about half of what the President asked for Model Cities.

Our effort to create an emergency public jobs program lost in the Senate by 54 to 28. A program to fight rats in American cities was laughed down in the House of Representatives. Though we now know that children are starving in Mississippi, a remedy has been stifled in the House Agriculture Committee.

It's not that we lack money. A supersonic transport made it through the Congress, \$142 million and sonic booms and all. We found \$4.5 billion for space and \$4.7 billion for public works. Yet we could not find the resources for more than the most modest beginning attack on the problem of American cities. And that, it seems to me, is as important as any issue facing our nation—or indeed, our world.

Finally, while it may seem strange to say it, one of our biggest problems, in my opinion, is that we know so little about American society, just as we know so little about Vietnam and Asia.

When our cities exploded, public officials were astonished. Why would New Haven and Detroit—model communities under creative, sophisticated leadership—explode? Where had we failed? What could be done about it?

This past summer doctors found children, thousands of them, starving in America just as they do in India. No one in the federal government knew it was happening.

We still don't know what to do to educate the children of blighted areas. Some say the only way is full integration; others call for massive and expensive compensatory education.

But the frightening thing to me is that after generation after generation has denied charity in this country, the American educational establishment has yet to agree on

what is needed to achieve something as minimal and fundamental as giving children a fair chance.

Because we do not have the knowledge we need, some of us believe that the structure at the national and local levels must be changed to bring sophisticated social scientists to the highest executive and legislative levels. We must undertake the development of social indicators that will keep us informed of human progress and failure. We must search for answers deliberately and institutionally in the pursuit of full opportunity. Otherwise change will smother us and despair will be our watchword.

Even if we could simply stop the war right now—and I don't believe we can—we would not be assured of the resources we must have.

Even in present circumstances we could have commenced significant new efforts with only the most marginal kinds of sacrifice. As I have said, we found money this year for the SST, space programs, and expanded arms credit sales to poor nations. But we barely saved new and beginning innovative programs for the cities.

There is no perfect correlation between attitudes toward the war in Vietnam and attitudes toward social programs. Some of those who have made the argument that we can't afford both guns and social programs have always voted against those same social programs. What is basic in dealing with problems at home and abroad is not the question of resources going to Vietnam, although that clearly complicates it. There is a fundamental problem of the will to see it through, to design programs and appropriate funds to alleviate human problems at home and abroad.

To do that will require your effort, your involvement in this political party, your success at the polls.

Our need is not to burn flags or draft cards, or to convert decent human beings into demons and seek to destroy them. Hating is easy and self-righteousness is satisfying, but this course destroys more than it builds. It steers people from the forces of progress, further weights the balance in favor of the reactionary, insensitive, and selfish, who already have the upper hand.

If we are to generate full opportunity for all Americans, we will need resources in unprecedented proportions.

This will require a political coalition that can obtain greatly expanded support in Congress and at all levels of government. Where will the moral, intellectual and material resources be found to remake our America? What hope is there that we can accomplish this goal of full opportunity?

I think it rests with you. Much has been said about the Generation Gap. I personally believe there is a difference in your generation—deeper commitment to more honest, personal, moral and intellectual standards. If my appraisal is correct, I hope you never grow up—never adjust to the apathetic compromises that deprive the nation of the committed idealism that we must have.

Our party cannot continue to translate ideas into power and action unless there is a continuing infusion of creative and inspired and selfless young leadership—prodding and pushing us, but prodding and pushing themselves toward leadership in party and government that ultimately achieves a society that fulfills the larger purposes of a humane and compassionate people.

We have been torn by a bitter fight here in Minnesota. We could be torn by an equally bitter fight over Vietnam. I fully respect and honor those who disagree with me on Vietnam, but my plea here today is that we see, despite this disagreement, that there is a larger objective. It could be shattered and paralyzed if we let our differences destroy the effectiveness of our party, if our great movement toward human improvement is further divided, split and shattered.

The party and its ultimate success are the only hope for millions of people in this country and in the world who hope for opportunity. This is our cause and this must be our effort, despite our mistakes. We can't succeed without you.

You are here on the specific issue of Vietnam. And you must deal with it as best you can. I must. But I would ask that you consider two things:

First, make your decisions about Vietnam with full knowledge of the present and as much insight into the future possibilities as you can generate. Do not be deaf to the multitude of voices. See the distinctions as they are, not as you'd like them to be.

Second, pass your judgments as citizens of the world. Place Vietnam in the context of the unfinished work before us—the battle against starvation, the fight to build workable international institutions, the struggle to avert hatred and violence in our own society, the absolute demand that we plan for the kind of world and nation we want. Knowing what must be done, which party do you want to place in power? For you can't get out of the world; and it's not a pastoral sympathy. And 1968 will make a difference to America and the world.

Tom Wicker concluded his New York Times article by saying:

"From reality man reaches toward promise, falls, and in an agony of failure finds his greatness by reaching again."

The fundamental requirement for trying in agony to reach and succeed next time is young leadership, unwilling to compromise where compromise is dishonest, working with energy and understanding, infusing our party and government with the idealism that we need. Not withdrawing from the process because of inevitable disappointment, but in those disappointments and in the agony of the failure of our society, reaching and trying again.

Those of us in public life certainly cannot argue that we've even approached perfection. But I think it makes an awful lot of difference whether you are willing to try; whether dreams are still important enough to make a special effort. It is an attitude, it is a commitment, it is a willingness to be involved that's at stake here.

I see precious little chance that it is going to come from the other political party. If it comes at all, it will almost invariably come from our own. That's why what we do with this institution, what you do as young Democrats is not, as some would say, irrelevant to the power structure of this country. It is fundamental and it is important.

Recently I received a letter from a student in California about a speech that I had given on the generation gap. He wrote specifically about what he considered to be my thesis—that if you disagree with the system, then fight it, or reform it, from within.

"Although I am a devoted follower of the New Left (he said), I do take issue with their surprising naivete on the political system and how to change it. I heartily agree with your example of recent California gubernatorial contest and how the apathy of the New Left in that race may hold potentially tragic results. Indeed the tragic result has partially taken effect.

"You are almost totally correct in your insights into the thoughts and goals of my generation in to your impression that many of us regard national politics as being largely irrelevant."

Then he suggests some reasons, some compelling ones, for this attitude.

"One of the reasons," he suggested, "is the ancient theory that you can't legislate against hate which much of today's young activists at least subconsciously believe. I take issue with this, for there is no better argument against that statement than the record of legislation in America. I believe that we can legislate against evil and I further

believe that one must, for I am completely assured that if one does not fight evil at the top, then its pressures will permeate our existence.

"A handful of young radicals ignoring the structure will not produce the results that we want, but it will leave that much more room for the enemy to run free, crowding the hills with billboards, clouding the air with pollution and ravaging our forest with the exploitation of packaging.

"A political system must be radically changed. But it must be internal. Obviously we can't exist without government as of yet. Nor, can we of the new left muster enough people to totally ignore the system.

"We shall show ourselves shortly around Washington. Rest assured that we make our pressures strongly felt. I myself hope to be in the front lines."

My message to you as young Democrats is that I hope you know what this young man knows. I hope you too will be in the front lines, in Washington and in St. Paul.

Maybe one of you will have to push me out to get there someday. I won't like it if that happens, but I'll have to take it. And I say better one of you within the Young Democrats than one of them.

For they'll be after me, too, and they'll be doing it inside the system, inside one of the best organized and politically powerful state Republican parties in the nation. Is that what you want? That could be what you get, if you abandon the party as a vehicle for a change in government and policy.

I hope you've thought about it carefully and deeply.

KOREA AND VIETNAM

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, Mr. Y. J. Rhee, of Uniondale, N.Y., sent me a copy of an informative letter he wrote on November 1 to Under Secretary of State Katzenbach. In the letter Mr. Rhee makes a number of interesting comments in rebuttal to Secretary Katzenbach's analogy, in a recent speech, between the Korean war and the war in Vietnam. I ask unanimous consent that the letter be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

UNIONDALE, LONG ISLAND, N.Y.,

November 1, 1967.

HON. NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH,
Under Secretary of State, U.S. Department
of State, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: As a Korean-born American citizen, I was intrigued by your unsubstantiated analogy between the Korean War and the Vietnamese War, which you presented in your recent speech at Fairfield University, Fairfield, Connecticut.

I should like to cite several significant differences between these two wars. First of all, Korea had been a nation-state for many centuries until Japan annexed her in 1909. Vietnam, on the other hand, is a geography which has never developed into nationhood. In Korea, the North Korean troops commenced an unprovoked attack on June 25, 1950 against the government which was established under the supervision of the United Nations. The United Nations General Assembly recognized the government in Seoul as the only lawful government on the peninsula. As you are aware, none of the South Vietnamese governments have enjoyed similar recognition by the United Nations.

Secondly, the aggression from the north in Korea was an external attack, whereas, the hostilities in Vietnam are largely guerrilla type operations by the South Vietnamese against the South Vietnamese government. In other words, a military victory over the aggressors was possible in Korea, but in Vietnam the ultimate victory must be a political

one, for which the United States military power can not determine its final outcome.

Thirdly, you stated that there were criticisms against the Korean government led by Dr. Syngman Rhee that it was not really representative. I regret to inform you that your information and knowledge of the Korean government before the Korean War are totally inaccurate. The pre-Korean War government under Syngman Rhee was truly representative. In fact, Rhee's Minister of Agriculture was a communist. The election which was supervised by the United Nations Commission on Korea was completely honest and a group of powerful opposition parties were in operation. Of course, during and after the War, Syngman Rhee used the American-equipped and American-advised forces of organized violence to crush his political enemies. In the end, as you are well aware, Koreans now have a war lord government which rules the country with American tanks and guns.

Lastly, your statement in connection with the complaints that the Koreans were not doing enough for themselves during the Korean War is callous. Please allow me to cite my own personal account of how much sacrifice Koreans made to repel the aggressors in cooperation with fighting men from eighteen member nations of the United Nations. I have two brothers; all three of us actively served throughout the War. My younger brother then was in tenth grade and I was in the second year of college. Like many friends of mine, we did not claim student deferments but chose to fight. When I graduated from a boys' high school in Seoul in 1949, I was one of the one hundred fifty graduates and all of us advanced to colleges. At the end of the War, I found more than a half of my high school classmates were killed in action and many more were maimed. I am familiar with your military service during the World War II and subsequent captivity in Germany. I am proud to say that my brothers and my friends served during the Korean War with the same dedication as you did for the United States.

In conclusion, I do not believe that your strained analogy of the two wars would serve any purpose in defending the dubious Vietnam policy of the Johnson Administration.

With highest esteem,
Sincerely yours,

Y. J. RHEE.

ERVIN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION BILL DRAWS FIRE FROM ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXPERT

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, some weeks ago the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on legislation introduced by Senator ERVIN to define the ground rules for the calling of a constitutional convention under article V of our Constitution. It was my privilege to testify on this significant proposal.

Two thought-provoking commentaries on the Ervin bill have since come to my attention. The first is an editorial from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the second an article by Prof. Charles L. Black, Jr., Luce professor of jurisprudence at Yale Law School. Both commentaries are sharply critical of the Ervin proposal, although Professor Black feels it should be "sunk without a trace" while the Post-Dispatch calls it a "tentative basis for hearings," feeling "it is better for Congress to decide the issue now rather than wait for an emergency."

These critiques of S. 2307 bear a striking similarity, however, in arguing force-

fully that the bill completely omits the people from the convention process and substitutes State legislatures at every step of the proposal and ratification process. For example, State legislatures, not the U.S. Congress or the courts, would be the final arbiter of the validity of a State call for a constitutional convention. The Governor, the only representative at the State level of all of the people of a State, would not have a chance to veto such a convention call. State legislatures could appoint convention delegates if they so wished, bypassing the right of the people to elect those delegates.

Each State would have but a single vote in a constitutional convention, thus contravening the principle of proportional representation. As a result a convention could be submitted to State legislatures for ratification even though delegates representing 85 or 90 percent of the people in the United States objected. Finally, although Congress could decide to have any proposed amendments ratified by individual State conventions, S. 2307 would give the State legislatures the authority to set the rules of procedure for these conventions.

Mr. President, we have been told for some time now in connection with State calls for a constitutional convention on reapportionment that we should let the people decide. Senator ERVIN's bill as it is presently drafted, would let the State legislatures decide, thus bypassing the checks and balances of our Federal system. Every constitutional traditionalist should be seriously concerned about such a possibility.

I ask unanimous consent that Professor Black's article and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch editorial be inserted in the RECORD at this point:

There being no objection, the article and editorial were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

LATEST MOVE IN THE "CONVENTION" GAME
(By Professor Charles L. Black, Jr., Luce Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School, New Haven, Conn.)

S. 2307, introduced by Senator ERVIN on August 17, is scheduled soon for hearings. The bill is compounded of futility, multiple unconstitutionality, and reckless foolishness. Its introduction is the latest move in the "Constitutional Convention" game; some background is necessary, if you have not been following the earlier innings.

Article V of the Constitution provides that amendments may go through in two ways. First (and this is the procedure invariably followed up to now) Congress may, by two-thirds majorities in each House, submit an Amendment to the state legislatures, or (at Congress' own election) to conventions in the states, three-fourths of whom must ratify. Secondly, it is provided that "Congress . . . on the Application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States . . . shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments . . ." which are then to be submitted to one of the same ratification procedures (again at Congress' election) as are those originating in Congress.

In recent decades, a good many of the state legislatures have decided—if "decision" is the right name for the mindless, discussionless whooping-through which has characterized some of their proceedings—that this language empowers them to force the calling, not of a "Convention for proposing Amendments," in the sense of a convention to consider national problems and to fashion such

proposals as the convention thinks ought to be made, but rather of a "convention" to vote aye or nay on a text actually proposed by the legislatures themselves. The only authority behind this reading of the text of Article V is the self-serving authority of twentieth-century state legislatures.

Between them and their goal stands Congress, with its power to decide upon the validity of their "applications," and to set such rules for representation at the "convention" as to Congress may seem to be in the national interest. S. 2307 seeks, in brief, to disarm Congress in advance, and to put the country entirely at the mercy of the state legislatures, by setting up a well-greased "standard operating procedure" for dealing with these applications, so that it would be impossible for the contemporaneous and focussed judgment of Congress to act on them as issues arise.

It is hard to strike a balance between the futility and the over-all foolishness of this proposal. I think I will start with the futility.

The measure is utterly futile because it tries to do what neither the Ninetieth nor any other Congress can do—to bind future Congresses to exercise their discretion and responsibility in a certain way. After specifying what the state applications are to contain—and in doing so resolving, probably wrongly, several crucial constitutional questions—S. 2307 reaches its bottleneck:

"If either House of the Congress determines, upon a consideration of any such report or of a concurrent resolution agreed to by the other House of the Congress, that there are in effect applications made by two-thirds or more of the States for the calling of a constitutional convention upon the same subject, it shall be the duty of that House to agree to a concurrent resolution calling for the convening of a Federal constitutional convention upon that subject."

It is entirely clear that this Congress cannot bind its successors either by its attempted resolution of the thorny constitution problems entailed in the decision whether state applications are valid, or by its policy judgments (embodied in the rest of the bill) as to the sort of "convention" to be called, when and if one is to be called. No Senator or Representative in any subsequent Congress could warrantably think himself estopped to reconsider all these problems from the ground up—indeed, he would be under a plain duty to do so, and to cast his vote in accordance with his own and not his predecessors' conscience. The bill is therefore a *brutum fulmen*. Yet it is introduced for an effect—the effect of producing a momentum, an appearance of consensus. It is therefore worth talking about more fully, for it is important not only that it not pass, but also that it not make a good showing.

As to the foolishness, the most conspicuous unwisdom, as I have implied, is over-all. The entire conception of a "standard operating procedure," in respect of the discharge of this critically important Congressional function, never up to now invoked, and sure to be very rarely invoked, if at all, in future, is absurd. The amendment of the Constitution is hardly a thing to be reduced as nearly to the automatic as may be. Calling a Constitutional Convention is the last thing one would wish to see routinized.

More detailed comment on S. 2307 may usefully focus on particular sections.

Section 3(b) performs an astonishing initial act of abdication:

"Questions concerning the State legislative procedure and the validity of the adoption of a State resolution cognizable under this Act shall be determinable by the State legislature and its decisions thereon shall be binding on all others, including State and Federal courts, and the Congress of the United States."

Neither on this nor on any other matter, as I have pointed out, can the Ninetieth Congress effectively abdicate for its successors, and the provision therefore classifies

easily under the futility heading, but it also would seem to be unconstitutional, in that it at least seeks to withdraw from Congress and the courts such responsibility as they might constitutionally have to determine whether the state applications are valid, and it is foolish, for it leaves to local interest to determine the "validity" of an attempt to exercise of a function of vital concern to the nation.

Sections 3(c) and 13(b), which may conveniently be grouped together, provide that the state governors shall have no voice either in the state legislative decision to apply for a "convention" or in the ratification by the state legislature of such proposals as come out of the "convention." Except on the (rather questionable) assumption that Congress has power to fix the law on these matters, these provisions are nullities. On that assumption, the provisions embody strange policy choices indeed. The amendment process is the most solemn one in our government; in it we discern ultimate power. Why should Congress elect positively to ordain that each state is to take two crucial steps in that process without a safeguard—submission to the governor for possible veto—which would be necessary in the case of a bill regulating the working-hours of intrastate dog-catchers? The answer is simple, and not creditable to the draftsmen of the bill. Governors are elected statewide; no gerrymandering or other finagling can prevent their being responsible to the whole people of the state. Something roughly—though only very roughly—like the democratic principle would be introduced if the governor had to approve. Governors, too, are likely to be people of relatively high intelligence and prestige. Their actions are visible. What is wanted, obviously, is to make the Constitution of the United States amendable by the all-but-anonymous sole action of the membership of the state legislatures, with no check of any kind. Do the state legislatures, as we know them, really deserve such confidence?

I have already pointed out the futility of Section 6(a), where the attempt is made to make it the "duty" of the Houses of Congress to call a convention of a prescribed form, whatever the current judgment of Congress may be as to the obligation resting on Congress, or as to the wise manner of constituting such a convention. One other thing needs to be mentioned about this section: it provides for issuance of a convention call by "concurrent" resolution, eliminating the step of submission to the President and possible veto. Now if anything is absolutely clear, on the face of a constitutional text (Article I, § 7) not calling for interpretation, it is that "every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and the House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill." The excuse, presumably, for this bypassing of the President would be the 1798 case of *Hollingsworth v. Virginia*, where (in an opinion which can be seen, by anyone who cares to look at the report, to be inadequately reasoned), the Court held that a constitutional amendment, originating in Congress, and passed by the same two-thirds as is needed to override a veto, need not go to the President. Whatever reason can be given for this decision obviously has no application to the calling of a convention by simple majorities in both Houses: there is not the shakiest ground for holding such a measure unamenable to Presidential veto, under the plain language of Article I, § 7. It is astounding—or, I should rather say, it is to be astounding—that people who



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