

largely financed by funds drawn from Wyoming.

We are indeed second-class citizens in a second-class state. It is time these inequalities are corrected.

#### BUSINESS LEADERSHIP AND THE INDOCHINA WAR

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, one of the truly encouraging notes in the awakening public awareness and conscience over the course of the Indochina war has been the response of great segments of the business community.

While we will always owe so much to our young people who have been most alert to this tragedy, it is heartening to see the broadening base of responsible concern over the war and its terrible effect upon our entire society.

I was recently sent a copy of an "Open Letter to my Colleagues in the Securities Business" from Mr. Wheelock Whitney, a man whom I have long known as a close friend and admired as a business leader.

I think that this letter is one of the finest expressions I have seen of one man's deep, human, and perceptive thoughts on the effect of the war throughout our economy and our society.

I commend it to Senators, and ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DAIN, KALMAN & QUAIL, INC.,  
Minneapolis, Minn., May 25, 1970.

#### AN OPEN LETTER TO MY COLLEAGUES IN THE SECURITIES BUSINESS

The securities industry is in the middle of its second major crisis in the past three years—in some respects, there are similarities between the two crises.

The operational crisis of recent years forced several firms out of business; it brought forth a rash of short-term palliatives to combat the existing headaches; i.e., shorter hours, buy-ins, firms put on restrictions, etc.; and there was a loss of public confidence in the ability of our industry to deal with its problems.

Today's crisis is infinitely more serious. It is forcing many firms out of business; it is bringing forth a new set of short-term solutions; i.e., personnel cut backs, salary reductions, office closings, etc.; and the loss of public confidence in our industry is worse than any time in the past 40 years.

What was different about the first crisis was the knowledge that once we zeroed in on the root cause, our industry had the capacity to develop long-range solutions—the problems were peculiarly our own—and they were solvable. All that was needed was to modernize our operational techniques—increase our capacity—take better advantage of computers—develop more efficiencies. We have addressed ourselves to these long-range solutions and have made considerable progress.

Today's crisis is different. We find ourselves in a fight for survival, but we are unsure of our enemy. We feel almost helpless. We are acting and reacting to the serious conditions that plague us daily—but we are not confident of long term solutions. The startling reduction of market price is far more severe than the economic state of the nation could possibly justify. Therefore, our old measuring yardsticks must be thrown out the window. The end does not appear to be in sight—and we are becoming increasingly alarmed about the impact on our customers and our industry.

No wonder! We have experienced disastrous declines in stock and bond values; volume is low; many firms and individuals have left the securities business, both voluntarily and involuntarily; offices are being closed; recruiting has come to a standstill; and we are incurring operating losses in nearly every phase of our business.

While these conditions are serious enough, an even greater tragedy lies in the erosion of public confidence in our business. With the loss of approximately \$300 billion in market values, the public is stunned—they have lost confidence in our products. "Own your share of American business" is falling on deaf ears.

What has been our industry's response? What are we doing to stem the tide, to restore public confidence? What are our responsibilities and obligations to investors? How are we using the considerable energies and talents of our industry leaders?

Other than frantic attempts to reduce operating costs and to boost customer and salesman morale, we have concentrated in three areas during recent months: (1) on the recently enacted Tax Reform Bill, (2) on the development of a new commission rate schedule, (3) on an industry alternative to the Muskie Bill. I have personally participated in all three of these efforts. I believe in them. They warrant our deepest concern and involvement.

But they are not enough. They do not get to the heart of the problem. We must look beyond the immediate solutions to our severe problems and try to more closely identify the root cause that has brought us to this critical stage. We must identify the villain.

In my judgment, the true villain is the war. Not only has it put an intolerable strain on our economy, but it has created deep divisions in our society, which in turn, have caused a lack of public confidence in the ability of our country and our system to resolve the many problems we face at home and abroad. Until we, as an industry address ourselves to the true significance of this war and its impact on our way of life; until we use our efforts to bring the war to an end, our customers (25 million investors and their families) will be plagued with even more serious problems in the months ahead.

I have just returned from several industry meetings. There were no serious discussions in which I was involved, either publicly or privately, where industry leaders were debating the impact of the war on our customers and on the securities business.

There were many peripheral discussions: Are you for the administration or against it? How do you feel about Agnew? Are you for "the kids" or against them? Did the "hard hats" do right or wrong in Wall Street? Were we right to go into Cambodia or was it a mistake? Was it the students or the National Guard who should be blamed for the killings at Kent State? Whose side are you on? How patriotic are you? Do you want America to become known as "a second-rate power"?

I call those discussions peripheral—not because I don't consider them important—I do—but because I believe they beg the main issue.

The questions that need to be asked and answered are: To what extent is the war undermining our way of life in America? To what extent is the war creating doubts among our citizens about our future as a nation? To what extent is the war responsible for the erosion of public confidence in general and in the stock market in particular?

I have asked myself these questions and have come to the conclusion that the war is not only at the root of our national malaise but is the root cause of the chaotic conditions in our industry as well. One of the purposes in writing this letter to you is to find out if you have thought these issues through in your own mind—as a businessman.

On the whole, businessmen have been silent, at least publicly, on their feelings about the war. This silence can be contrasted in terms of the overt and effective public leadership business has given to the problems of minorities in our society. This silence on the war tends to confirm the mistaken belief shared by many, that a war economy is good for business. Perhaps this silence is due to the reluctance of businessmen to be aligned with "the irresponsible kids" or with politicians they don't agree with on most other issues.

Does our industry have any special responsibility within the business community? I believe we do. Our particular business, in many ways, is the most public of all businesses. What happens in our business is published daily in every corner of the globe. Without question the securities business is the most visible barometer of public opinion and public confidence—and the most sensitive.

Can it be argued that since everyone is against the war—including the administration—there is no reason to speak out, because we can add nothing to the dialogue? I don't think so. If, in fact, we were to agree that this prolonged war is severely damaging public confidence in our country, then we must raise our voices and join those who feel it is imperative to bring the war to an end at the earliest possible date. The people in our industry talk to thousands of Americans every day. We have friends and acquaintances in congress and in the administration. We owe it to the public to make our views known on the war.

This is not an attack on the Nixon administration. The President has made it clear he intends to end our involvement as quickly as possible. I am confident that he would appreciate knowing the views of thoughtful business leaders in the securities industry.

Our business is a vital part of the capitalistic society. We are at the core of the free enterprise system. What we are doing is good for our way of life in America. It is in the public interest that the securities business be preserved—but we are in danger of being destroyed.

We have persuaded the public that our products are good for them. We must stand behind our word to the 25 million shareholders who are our customers and who have put their faith in us.

And so I am writing to urge you to give this matter your most serious and thoughtful attention. If indeed you feel that my analysis misses the mark, I have no doubt you will let me know your feelings.

If, on the other hand, you agree with my contention that the war is the root cause of our problem—that a continuation of the war not only imperils our customers and our industry, but perhaps our whole way of life in America—that public confidence will not likely be restored until the war is ended—

If you agree, then I would further urge you to make your views known—to your congressman, your senators, the administration, your customers, your fellow workers, and other businessmen in your community.

The President needs your viewpoint as he faces the lonely and agonizing decisions that he must make on how to disengage our country from the war—how to restore public confidence in America—how to establish priorities—how to bring us together.

It is not too late for each one of us to act!

Most sincerely,

WHELOCK WHITNEY.

#### U.S. TROOPS IN CAMBODIA

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, Dr. Roy Coward of Arlington, Tex., authored a particularly thoughtful column published in the May 6 edition of the Fort Worth Star-Telegram. The column concerns our action in Cambodia and con-

cludes by stressing the need for a united America to encourage the North Vietnamese to negotiate in a serious manner in an attempt to bring the war in Southeast Asia to a close.

I ask unanimous consent that Dr. Coward's article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**NIXON SHOULD HAVE SUPPORT OF NATION ON  
HARD TROOPS-TO-CAMBODIA DECISION**

(By Dr. Ray Coward)

President Richard M. Nixon has made the biggest, the most difficult, and the most far-reaching decision since he entered the White House on Jan. 20, 1969.

In a nationwide telecast on April 30 the President announced to the American people, and to the world, that he had ordered American armed forces, accompanied by South Vietnamese forces, into Cambodia. The joint attack was against the headquarters controlling all Communist military operations in South Vietnam. These forces have the mission to search out and destroy Viet Cong and North Vietnamese communications and supplies as well as the sanctuaries from which they operate against the allied forces in South Vietnam.

Early reports indicate initial successes in these attacks, which are being supported by B52, eight-engined jet bombers, but it is too early to assess the ultimate results of this bold action. However, it has the distinct possibility of saving American and Allied lives, in the long run, and of shortening the war and allowing American troops to be returned to the United States.

It may also pressure the Communists toward becoming more seriously involved in negotiations for a settlement of the war in Southeast Asia. The President could still attain his goal, announced 10 days earlier, to bring another 150,000 American troops home within the next year, since he has not coupled this goal with any specific timetable.

One advantage which the President made maximum use of was the element of surprise. This is a most important element in attaining success in any military operation of any sizable dimension. This gives psychological advantage to the attacking forces and can be expected to cause disruption and confusion in the Communist forces being attacked.

One thing about this operation is certain. It has not only surprised the Communist forces, but it has caused consternation in the political arena inside the United States and abroad.

Political figures in both the Democratic and Republican parties were as surprised and shocked as were the Communists.

Some of Mr. Nixon's critics may interpret this action as the beginning of the downfall of the President's political career. However, the exact opposite may be the result.

This decision took great courage and demonstrated great strength of character, and if the operation is successful and the war is shortened, which may very well be the case, then Mr. Nixon is well on his way toward taking his place among the great Presidents of the United States. It will also enhance his role as a world leader. Further there is nothing that the Communists respect any more than power.

The Presidents who stand out in history as great leaders, such as Lincoln, Wilson, Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and others, were men who had to make difficult decisions about complex and frequently unpopular causes. They were also well known and highly regarded as world leaders. Such a President has to rise above partisan political considerations and make a decision as to what he thinks is best for our country.

The person making such an important decision travels a lonely road and spends restless days and nights in arriving at his conclusion. Once the decision is made he assumes full responsibility for all its unforeseeable consequences.

This heavy responsibility is too great for many men. One of lesser strength and character would shudder, falter, and shy away from such an awesome decision.

The U.S. Constitution places the responsibility for conducting American foreign policy on the President. Under the Constitution the President is also commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In the latter capacity he is responsible for the security of our armed forces abroad. Therefore he has wide latitude in making these decisions.

In some instances there may not be sufficient time to consult with and to obtain the approval of Congress. Also, at times, secrecy about such an important decision may better insure the safety of American forces.

President Nixon had highly competent advice on the political aspects of the Cambodia problem from his political advisers, and from his military advisers on the military operation. He carefully weighed the conflicting elements of the complex situation and alone reached the decision to order the military operation irrespective of the political consequences.

He appealed for American support of his action and frankly stated: "I have rejected all political considerations in making this decision. Whether my party gains in November is nothing compared to the lives of 400,000 brave Americans fighting for our country and for the cause for peace and freedom in Vietnam."

Several Presidents have made decisions which helped to involve the United States in the Vietnam problem. President Nixon inherited this problem when he assumed office only a little over a year ago.

Regardless of how distasteful our involvement there may be, we all should be objective enough to understand that this is not Nixon's war. It is not a Democratic party war. It is not a Republican party war nor an American party war. It should not be a partisan political issue. Where is the blame to be placed when Presidents from both major parties have been involved in these decisions?

No useful purpose will be served by arguing whether or not the United States should have become involved in a land warfare in Asia, which General Douglas MacArthur warned against. This is no time for Monday morning quarterbacking about last Saturday's game. Such fuzzy thinking evades the problem and is irrelevant to finding a proper solution.

The President, having been duly elected, carries the responsibility for decision-making on Vietnam and he deserves the understanding and support of all citizens.

A united America may influence the Communists to enter into serious negotiations and shorten the war. A divided America will cause them to stall and prolong the war. As Americans and as a nation we should stand for something, lest we stand for nothing. Let's stand behind and give our full support to our President.

**VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION  
HOSPITALS**

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, there has been much concern expressed in this body and elsewhere about the conditions of our Veterans' Administration hospitals. Indeed, I am concerned because I believe that we must do all in our power to see that these hospitals are equipped and staffed to offer the best possible medical care to our veterans. But it is encouraging, too, to hear of the good work which

does go on in the VA hospitals, and to have firsthand reports of conditions which are more than acceptable. I have such a report today in the form of a letter from the family of Michael James Desmond, who was a patient in the VA hospital at Cheyenne, Wyo., prior to his death last month. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objections, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

JUNE 9, 1970.

HON. GALE MCGEE,  
U.S. Senate,  
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MCGEE: The recent article in Life magazine concerning the Veterans Administration Hospitals in our country, prompted me to write this letter.

I am certain there are hospitals in our country that require a good cleaning or face lifting and are understaffed to the point of being inoperative. However, the Veterans Administration Hospital at Cheyenne, Wyoming stands out as a shining exception to these conditions.

Our beloved father was a patient at the Veterans Hospital in Cheyenne for four and one-half months until his death May 15 of this year. We feel the hospital gave him the best medical attention available anywhere, and did everything possible to ease his distress and suffering.

Distance from the hospital being a factor, our visits were unannounced and at various times of the day. The Veterans Hospital was always very clean and the services were performed in an excellent manner.

Above the normal care received in any hospital, Dr. R. T. Cauthorne, the nursing staff, the aides and orderlies continually showed a very pleasant, personal type attention not only to our father but to all the patients under their care.

The courtesies shown our mother by the Doctors, staff and Mr. Worthley, the Social Service Officer, were of the highest caliber. During one of her visits they allowed a small celebration for our parents 50th wedding anniversary at the hospital.

Wyoming can be proud to have such an efficient, proud, yet human Veterans Hospital in our State Veterans Administration Center.

Sincerely,

JOHN R. DESMOND,

(For the family of Michael James Desmond).

**EDITORIAL SUPPORT FOR THE  
AMENDMENT TO END THE WAR**

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, several editorials which I have seen in recent weeks speak to the issue currently before the Senate. I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the RECORD.

An editorial from the Portland, Oreg., television station KGW-TV, of June 8, 1970.

A Minneapolis, Minn., Tribune editorial of May 17, 1970.

A Lewiston, Idaho, Tribune editorial of May 17, 1970.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

**EDITORIAL**

(KGW TV-8, Portland, Oreg., June 8, 1970)

We listened carefully to the President's latest appeal for support for the extension of the Indochina war into Cambodia. We closely reviewed the supportive statements made over this station by a number of Administration officials.

Three years ago we appealed to the Demo-



tion facilities remain inadequate. And to the best of my knowledge, the Veterans' Administration still is without an overall plan to meet the exigencies of this wartime situation.

The additional \$100 million for Veterans' Administration medical care contained in the Senate version of the Independent Offices appropriations bill for fiscal year 1971 constitutes a major step in what must become a national campaign to insure that American veterans receive the best medical care this Nation can offer. Appropriating this additional \$100 million would help to eliminate a number of serious deficiencies in our Veterans' Administration health system.

First, the ratio of staff to patients in Veterans' Administration hospitals could be raised on a par with that in our community hospitals. The overall staff-to-patient ratio for Veterans' Administration hospitals is 1.5 to 1, comparing poorly to the 2.7 to 1 community hospitals. In some Veterans' Administration hospitals, a single nurse is forced to minister to anywhere from 80 to 140 patients at one time.

Second, the equipment and maintenance and repair backlogs in Veterans' Administration hospitals that total more than \$46 million according to conservative estimates could be reduced.

Third, many veterans currently are forced to wait up to 6 months for the hospital examinations and treatment they need. Additional Veterans' Administration funds would help relieve this backlog of 44,200 examinations and 8,600 treatments.

Fourth, badly needed long-term care facilities for aging and infirm veterans no longer requiring intensive hospital care could be constructed.

Fifth, funds are required for the education and training of top notch health personnel to man Veterans' Administration hospitals.

Sixth, it is considered absolutely essential that the Veterans' Administration conduct medical research if the Veterans' Administration system is to attract and retain high caliber personnel. More money would permit the initiation of new research projects.

Seventh, appropriating an additional \$100 million would provide an opportunity to eliminate some of the disgraceful physical conditions that exist in our Veterans' Administration hospitals; the leaking roofs, the infestation with rats and mice, the numerous hospitals that have no air conditioning despite their location in some of the hottest parts of the Nation. The Veterans' Administration hospitals at Perry Point and Fort Howard in Maryland, for example, are desperately in need of air conditioning.

Mr. President, since my election to the Senate, I have devoted a great deal of time and energy to the area of veterans health care and other veterans benefits. If we can ask many of our young men to risk their lives for the security and future of the Nation, we can do no less than provide them with the best care when they suffer injury or sickness in the conduct of their duty. To do less is to betray them.

It is essential that Congress appropriate this additional \$100 million for the health care of our veterans. I, for one, shall do everything in my power to see that this money is made available for those who so richly deserve it.

#### OUT OF INDOCHINA IN 18 MONTHS

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, during the course of the Senate debate on the Cooper-Church amendment, the distinguished Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) called for the adoption of a national policy of complete disengagement of all American forces from Indochina. Our withdrawal, he declared, should be "responsible and orderly, but it should be completed by the end of 1971."

As a longtime advocate of complete disengagement, I commend the Muskie article, which appeared recently in the New York Times magazine. It is "must" reading for anyone who may not yet realize that President Nixon's "Vietnamization" program is not designed to extricate the United States from Vietnam, but can only result in perpetuating the war and prolonging our participation in it.

I ask unanimous consent that this important, factual, and highly informative article be printed in the RECORD.

#### SENATOR MUSKIE ON A WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, while it is getting more and more difficult to find fresh insight into the awful tragedy of the Indochina war, the distinguished Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE) has recently made a most valuable contribution to the debate over how to extricate ourselves from our terrible dilemma.

His article published in last Sunday's New York Times magazine presents one of the clearest and most forceful arguments I have seen for the need to set a timetable for the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam.

Senator Muskie points to the "frustration fear, and sense of drift" which has enveloped this country due to our continuing and deepening involvement in the struggles of the Indochinese people. But his argument for a withdrawal schedule is based on much more than an assessment of what the war has done to the spirit and capacity of our Nation.

He argues forcefully and persuasively that nothing short of a scheduled withdrawal can break the hopeless deadlock which now grips the negotiating table. "Vietnamization," as presently revealed by the President's decision to invade Cambodia, is nothing more than "more of the same"—depending upon the assumption that President Nixon's military pressure will cause the North Vietnamese to break, even where the past administration failed. It is a policy not for getting us out, but keeping us in—and perhaps for broadening our commitment to the defense of the entire Indochinese peninsula.

Only a scheduled withdrawal of all U.S. troops can force the South Vietnamese and the other side to come to political terms and place the control of America's

destiny back in our hands. Whatever we could ever have accomplished has been done. We must now, as Senator MUSKIE argues, withdraw all of our troops in a reasonable period, contingent only on the return of our prisoners and the safety of our troops.

I join the Senator from Idaho in asking unanimous consent that Senator MUSKIE's article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### OUT OF INDOCHINA IN 18 MONTHS (By EDMUND S. MUSKIE)

WASHINGTON.—When President Nixon took office, most Americans hoped that his Administration would find the key to the Vietnam problem. We wanted to end our preoccupation with the war and get on with unfinished national business. Unfortunately, the Administration has not found the key, and the war in Indochina continues to dominate our lives. Having invaded Cambodia in an attempt to score dramatic military gains, the Administration finds itself ever more tightly bound to the war and its consequences. We cannot pry ourselves loose by force of arms, and we cannot dictate the peace.

We can, however, move to create conditions favorable to a political settlement, and that should be our objective. If we adopt that goal, we must have a clear commitment to withdraw all American forces from Indochina. The withdrawal should be responsible and orderly, but it should be completed by the end of 1971.

Such a withdrawal contrasts sharply with the Nixon Administration's policy, which calls for reductions in strength just large enough to maintain the hope of complete withdrawal—and thereby mute domestic opposition to the war—while preserving the military balance and continuing the hostilities. No matter what its aims, the net effect of the President's policy is to perpetuate the war.

We have only to look at what has happened in Indochina and at what is happening in our country to see the folly of this policy. The war has frustrated young people who question our national morality. Its consequences have frustrated their parents, who are paying for inadequate housing, overcrowded schools, poor transportation systems, inefficient medical services and a polluted environment. More and more Americans are losing faith in the capacity of our system to meet national needs.

Frustration, fear and a sense of drift have poisoned our relations with one another. Students have protested, and a few have been killed. Students and workers, both of whom want a better America, find themselves at sword's point. Black and white families, competing for limited housing, school facilities and job opportunities, are divided at a time when it is essential that they work together.

The Administration has not acted to end these divisions; it has widened them. While freedom of speech is applauded in principle, it is condemned when it is used to criticize the Administration's policies. While freedom of the press is called a virtue, all "unfavorable" press articles are described as biased. Silent majorities have been invented to oppose all those who disagree with the President. Insinuations have been made that Americans who die in Indochina are the victims of Americans who dissent.

And for what? Are hundreds of Americans and thousands of Vietnamese dying each week to stop a Communist threat to our national security, or are we fighting merely to preserve the military dictatorship in Saigon? Are we fighting in Cambodia to save Vietnam? Will

ing government lawyers for other matters like enforcing the antitrust laws against price fixing and illegal mergers, or better yet, to beefing up their fight on organized crime. Indeed there is something almost paternalistic about the attitude that the government knows best when a consumer has been wronged.

It is time that even the American Bar Association realizes that the class action is here to stay; that it makes good sense and good justice; that the courts are mature enough to handle their internal problems.

And it is time for Congress to realize that the consumer is asking merely for the opportunity to protect himself; that there is a potent and court-proved legal weapon to allow him to do this—the class action. Consumer frustration in this land deserves something better than rhetoric and shadow legislation.

When all the fat is boiled away, the real fear of the class action is that it is an effective way to achieve justice for the consumer. And one thing should now be clear: the consumer will not long endure two standards of justice, court congestion and harassment notwithstanding.

Those who charge the Tydings class ac-

#### APPOINTMENT OF DAVID K. E. BRUCE TO BE THE CHIEF OF THE UNITED STATES PEACE DELEGATION TO THE VIETNAM PEACE TALKS IN PARIS

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I am pleased that President Nixon last week announced the appointment of Mr. David K. E. Bruce to head the United States' delegation in Paris for the Vietnam peace talks.

Mr. Bruce brings to these difficult negotiations a broad knowledge and wide diplomatic experience gained in a distinguished service to his country covering several decades. During the late 1940's he served as chief of the ECA mission in France, and as U.S. Ambassador to France. Later he served as Under Secretary of State, Ambassador to Germany, and Ambassador to Great Britain.

Mr. Bruce is highly respected as a diplomat in the capitals of Europe and the wisdom, tact and judgment he has demonstrated in the many difficult negotiations he has conducted in the past will enable him to make a major contribution in arriving at a settlement of the Vietnam issue and lead toward a settlement for Southeast Asia.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a brief biographical sketch concerning Mr. Bruce, which was published in the New York Times, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### FIVE PRESIDENTS AGREED: BRUCE IS A "GIANT"

When he retired in March, 1969, after eight years as United States Ambassador to the Court of St. James's—the longest anyone had held that post—David K. E. Bruce, was America's senior Ambassador. Before the London assignment he had been Ambassador in Paris and Bonn. At the age of 72, he is the only man ever to have served in this country's three leading embassies in Western Europe.

President Nixon, who named Mr. Bruce yesterday to head the United States delegation for the Vietnam peace talks in Paris, said more than a year ago that he and his four predecessors in the White House had disagreed on many things but "agreed that David Bruce was a giant."

Mr. Bruce, it has been noted, is a man of reason, able to be polite and analytical on the most controversial subjects. When anti-American groups came to him to complain, he first poured coffee. He knows books and silver and furniture. He can talk and he is above all, kind.

David Kirkpatrick Este Bruce was born in Baltimore on Feb. 12, 1898. His father, William Cabell Bruce, had served as United States Senator from Maryland from 1923 to 1929.

Reared in Baltimore, David Bruce entered Princeton University in 1915. Two years later he left to enlist in the Army and served in the field artillery in France. He was promoted on the battlefield and was discharged a lieutenant.

After the war, Mr. Bruce served briefly as a diplomatic courier in Europe. On his return to the United States he attended the law schools of the University of Virginia and the University of Maryland. He was admitted to the Maryland bar in 1921.

Mr. Bruce entered public life in 1924 when he was elected to the Maryland House of Delegates.

In World War II he went to London as representative of the American Red Cross, then shifted to an intelligence role there in the Office of Strategic Services. He later became a colonel in charge of O.S.S. operations in Europe.

From then on, Mr. Bruce was committed to public service. In addition to the ambassadorial positions, he was assistant Secretary of Commerce, United States aid administrator in France, representative to the Coal and Steel Community and for two years, Under Secretary of State.

#### AMERICA'S OBLIGATION TO HER VETERANS

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President, the June issue of *Life* carried a shocking article on the deplorable conditions that exist in many of our Veterans' Administration hospitals as the result of insufficient resources for staff and operations. Entitled "From Vietnam to a Veterans' Administration Hospital: Assignment to Neglect," the article rightly stimulated a great deal of public concern and indignation.

In order to determine whether the *Life* story applied here in Maryland, I met personally on June 8 with the heads of veterans organizations in Maryland and then toured the major Veterans' Administration health facilities in the State. I was deeply moved and distressed by what I discovered. For some of the deplorable conditions described in the *Life* article existed here in Maryland.

Additional funds were needed everywhere to employ and train Veterans' Administration employees to inform veterans of the many rehabilitation, education, and career preparation services that are available to them. Often the great tragedy was the fact that programs existed to help veterans pick up their lives where they had left off and to successfully reenter American life, but the men did not know of them. All of the education, financial, and career benefits Congress enacts for veterans and the taxpayers support are worthless if the men for whom they are intended are not informed about them.

In the Veterans' Administration hospital at Fort Howard, which is located 15 miles from Baltimore, I found another tragic and unacceptable situation: Owing to a lack of funds, it was impossible

to provide transportation to the hospital for volunteers to work with veterans and, worst of all, for families of veterans who were without private means of transportation.

Of all the pain suffered by the men in veterans hospitals—and I saw brave men suffering from wounds and injuries that would make the strongest man weep—none cuts so deeply or is as unendurable as loneliness. As any doctor will tell you, the support and encouragement of friends and family is the strongest medicine for a sick man. Yet it was this medicine—the love and concern of relatives and community volunteers—that many of the veterans at Fort Howard were being denied because of a lack of funds for transportation of volunteers and relatives from surrounding towns, train stations, and bus depots. There is something desperately wrong when a nation which has the money to send men a quarter-of-a-million miles to the moon fails to provide resources to transport the loved ones of Fort Howard Hospital veterans the 15 miles from Baltimore.

At the Veterans' Administration hospital at Loch Raven, Md., the problem was even more basic. Given the shortage of Veterans' Administration hospital facilities throughout the Nation, Loch Raven was converted several years ago from a TB sanitarium to a general veterans hospital. But right from the beginning, the resources needed for a complete conversion have been lacking. On my visit, it became evident that not enough money was available to hire many key medical personnel. According to hospital officials, at least \$114,000 more is needed to fill the remaining health service void at Loch Raven.

And as the Senate Subcommittee on Veterans Affairs so ably chaired by the distinguished Senator from California (Mr. CRANSTON) has demonstrated, the unacceptable conditions I witnessed in Maryland can be found in virtually every State in the Union. Inadequate funding for our veterans hospitals is clearly a problem of national dimensions.

Mr. President, the sad truth is we suddenly find ourselves confronted with a grave crisis in veterans health care in this country. Much of the sudden shortage of facilities and staff is attributable to the great increase in the number of veterans requiring medical care as a result of the conflict in Southeast Asia.

To date, more than 275,000 American boys have been wounded in action. Roughly half of them must be immediately hospitalized for their wounds and most of these at some point will need Veterans' Administration hospital or outpatient care. In the past year alone more than 50,000 Vietnam veterans were admitted to Veterans' Administration hospitals. Last year, the level of outpatient visits required reached 500,000.

Our wounded veterans, according to reports, are receiving excellent care while in overseas hospitals in Vietnam and elsewhere. But this level of excellence is not being maintained when they are shipped home to Veterans' Administration facilities in the States. Despite the 5-year time span since our increased military involvement in Southeast Asia began to cause heavy casualties Veterans' Administra-



we have to step up the fighting in Laos to save Cambodia? Where will we have to fight next to save Laos?

We are told that "Vietnamization" is the way to withdraw from Indochina but that it cannot succeed unless we destroy the enemy's sanctuaries in adjacent neutral territory. If this is so, Vietnamization is not a viable policy for withdrawal, for the Cambodian sanctuaries are only part of the vast network of hiding places available to the North Vietnamese and their local Communist counterparts. The clearing of the sanctuaries therefore means military activity not just in Cambodia, but in Laos and the demilitarized zone as well. Such a campaign would violate our international commitments in the area and vastly expand the war. American troops would have to be called up, not sent home.

Though President Nixon's Vietnamization strategy risks a greatly widened war as a precondition for peace, the Administration has struggled to justify it and the Cambodian operation as ways to achieve our disengagement in Southeast Asia. The absence of any logical connection between the means and the end is reflected in the gross exaggerations and shifting explanations that have accompanied each step of the Cambodian incursion.

The President told us on April 30, for instance, that his Cambodian target was "the key control center" of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong for South Vietnam. In his June 3 progress report he made no reference to this point, and for good reason. Press articles and statements from our military men disclose that the headquarters could not be found, let alone attacked.

The President also said on April 30 that the North Vietnamese were "concentrating [their] main forces in [the Cambodian sanctuaries] . . . for massive attacks on our forces and those of South Vietnam." Yet in the very next paragraph of that speech he said that North Vietnamese troops had left their Cambodian sanctuaries and were "encircling" Phnom Penh. How is it that their movement away from our forces toward a distant objective could constitute an "immediate threat" to the Americans and South Vietnamese?

The President said that the Communist thrusts into the interior of Cambodia would make that country "a vast enemy staging area and a springboard for attacks." But look at the map of the situation in Cambodia before and after our invasion. We have not been able to drive all of the enemy forces out of their sanctuaries, and they have—despite the American attacks—taken control of a large land mass. When our forces vacate the sanctuaries, the Communists will return to them, too, in great numbers. The weeks since our incursion into Cambodia have seen an increase, not a decrease, in Communist control of Cambodian territory.

The President says that the vast amount of ammunition and the great number of weapons we have captured will mean fewer American deaths in South Vietnam. I wish this were true, but the statistics are not reassuring. Administration officials say that at most we have captured 40 to 50 percent of the Communist stockpile in Cambodia. According to these same sources, this amounts to supplies for about six months. In other words, the enemy still possesses sufficient material for at least the next six months, and has six months to replenish its stocks. Moreover, if what we captured in a limited area in Cambodia can be described as "vast," then what the North Vietnamese have stockpiled in South Vietnam, Laos and North Vietnam can only be imagined as enormous.

Administration officials repeatedly disclaim any new U.S. commitment to the Cambodian regime of Lon Nol. But what have we seen? In his April 30 speech, the President pledged "small arms and other equipment" for the Cambodians. More recently, we have been told that our Government has agreed

to pay for several thousand Thai volunteers and Thai aircraft to help Lon Nol. Now we've been informed that several thousand Cambodian mercenaries trained by U.S. special Forces in Vietnam have been airlifted to Cambodia. Is this not a new commitment?

The President said he moved into Cambodia to show the Soviet Union, China and North Vietnam that we are not a "pitiful, helpless giant," but his strategy has not worked. Both Moscow and Peking have agreed to step up their assistance to North Vietnam, and Peking has begun to exert more, not less, influence in Indochina. North Vietnam has increased the level of its military activity in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. All of northeast Cambodia and southern Laos are now under virtual North Vietnamese control. When the President removed the limitations on U.S. military operations and invaded the Cambodian sanctuaries, North Vietnam ended its self-restraint elsewhere.

On June 3 the President said, "We have insured the continuance and success of our withdrawal program," adding that 50,000 troops would be withdrawn by Oct. 15. He may not have realized that he was addressing the same people who heard him promise on April 20 that he would reduce American forces in Vietnam by 150,000 men by June, 1971—an average reduction of 12,500 a month. If that rate were maintained, we'd be withdrawing 75,000 rather than 50,000 troops between April 20 and Oct. 15. Apparently, the "successful" Cambodian invasion has slowed our withdrawal.

The decision to invade Cambodia was not one President Nixon inherited; it was a new action that broadened the war. This adventure, therefore, gives us a much clearer understanding of the President's Vietnamization policy.

What is Vietnamization? The President says it is "a plan in which the United States would withdraw all of its combat forces if Vietnamese forces were trained and able to take over the fighting." He has added that the timing of the plan would depend on "the level of enemy activity, the progress in the Paris peace talks and, of course, other matters—the problems particularly with regard to the rate of training of the Vietnamese forces."

All of this suggests that the President's plan is for the reduction of U.S. forces, not for their full withdrawal. The conclusion to be drawn from his withdrawal announcements is that 284,000 American troops would still be in Vietnam by the middle of next year. He has said nothing about reductions after June, 1971, except that they are contingent upon Hanoi's restraint. South Vietnamese military progress or a breakthrough in Paris. This leaves our future subject to the initiatives of Hanoi and Saigon, and it raises doubts about whether the President contemplates any significant reductions after June, 1971.

Mr. Nixon further describes Vietnamization as the road to a negotiated settlement, but a look at the situation in Paris makes it difficult to believe that negotiations are the top priority for the Administration. Our delegation in Paris has not been headed by an Ambassador vested with the authority of the President for more than seven months, and there have been no announcements of new approaches or proposals at the talks for an even longer period.

Even if the highest priority were established for a negotiated settlement, however, Vietnamization does not seem likely to move us toward it. It is an essentially military strategy that cannot deal effectively with the political nature of the struggle.

The North Vietnamese and Vietcong, though they have suffered through 25 years of war, show no signs of being near the breaking point. They can still control the level of combat—nothing in the Nixon plan prevents them from continuing to do so—

and they will probably not give up the fight or make major concessions at the negotiating table as long as that is true.

Then there are the Saigon forces, upon whom Vietnamization really depends. While they have improved over the years, their basic weaknesses persist. They still avoid night patrols; their officer corps, most of whose members are still chosen on the basis of social status, is widely regarded as incompetent, and the gross desertion rate runs as high as 10,000 a month. While some South Vietnamese units are reported to have performed well in Cambodia, they required extensive American support.

Behind the South Vietnamese military, of course, is the Thieu-Ky regime, which neither deserves nor receives much popular support. Though we contend that 90 per cent of the population of the hamlets is "pacified," roughly half the hamlets are still subject to significant Vietcong influence. Even at this stage of the war, the Saigon Government has no meaningful control over half of its country. Anyone who speaks out against the regime is jailed and hounded, while we stand silently by.

And despite the opposition of the Government to such talk, there persists among several South Vietnamese groups support for a peaceful settlement. In the 1967 elections, which brought President Thieu to power, 60 per cent of those who voted cast ballots for candidates who espoused some form of accommodation for peace.

In these circumstances, Mr. Nixon apparently hopes to confront Hanoi with the choice of accepting a political settlement or seeing an American military force remain in South Vietnam, propping up the Thieu-Ky regime indefinitely. If this is his strategy, he must convince Hanoi that the American people will permit him to keep 150,000 or even 200,000 American soldiers in Vietnam for the foreseeable future. On that basis, he expects Hanoi to negotiate.

Hanoi will not negotiate unless it has no other choice, and obviously that is not the case now. Moreover, the Saigon leaders, given our assurance that we will remain if there is no settlement, will be in no mood to compromise. And without Hanoi and Saigon, after all, there will be no negotiations.

What, then, are the probable consequences of the Vietnamization policy? When we have drawn our forces down to about a quarter of a million men, Hanoi will have greater freedom to step up the level of hostilities, inflicting heavy casualties on South Vietnamese units and keeping American casualties at high levels. The President clearly recognizes that Hanoi will have the military capacity to do this; that is why in every one of his statements on the fighting he has warned Hanoi that if it expands the conflict as American forces are withdrawing, he will act decisively. He clearly hopes to deter Hanoi, but his threats may have no effect.

Faced with the choice of negotiating with an intransigent South Vietnamese regime, permitting us to remain indefinitely in Vietnam or increasing the level of fighting, Hanoi is likely to choose the third course and step up the fighting, as it has in the past.

If this sequence occurs, the President will face another unpalatable choice: accepting the higher casualties, withdrawing all U.S. forces "precipitously" under pressure or escalating. He has told us that he would escalate, and—remembering his deeds as well as his words—we must take this assertion seriously. He has also said that this escalation would not be incremental but "strong and decisive." This presumably means a massive bombing campaign against North Vietnam coupled with an effort to close Haiphong harbor.

Here is the gravest danger in the President's policy. It will lead us not to the withdrawal of all American forces and an end to the fighting but to greater escalation. And if

we have learned anything from our experience in Indochina it is that escalation leads not to less conflict and involvement but to more.

To raise such doubts about the wisdom of the President's policy is not to have a lack of concern for the welfare of our troops or to question their ability. It is, rather, to adopt the philosophy of Lord Chatham, who said in 1777, in discussing the American Revolution: "I love and honor the English troops; I know their virtues and their valor; I know they can achieve anything except impossibilities; and I know that the conquest of English America is an impossibility."

If the conquest of the Indochinese Communists is also an impossibility, what alternatives do we have? I believe that the answer lies in what the Congress has been doing and trying to do this last year. While the President has been committing himself more and more to Vietnamization, Congress has been seeking ways to prevent further escalation and to go beyond the President's troop-reduction policy to one of full withdrawal.

Among the major attempts to prevent further escalation were the amendment passed last year to prohibit spending for U.S. combat operations in Laos and in Thailand and the Cooper-Church Amendment, designed to prohibit the use of U.S. funds to support the war in Cambodia after June 30, the President's deadline for the Cambodian operation.

A second group of measures under discussion concerns prohibitions on the resumption of our bombings in North Vietnam and limitations on the President's authority to commit U.S. forces to combat after a certain date. A related effort is designed to insure that all of our forces will be out of Vietnam by a specific date unless the President comes to Congress, justifies a continuation of the fighting and obtains further approval. Part of this campaign is the McGovern-Hatfield Amendment, which provides for the cut-off of funds for offensive operations by Dec. 31, 1970, and the total elimination of funds for military activities in Indochina by June 30, 1971.

Another approach is the resolution I have offered to move us toward peace in Indochina. It would commit the Senate to a policy aimed at a cease-fire, complete withdrawal by a specified deadline, a political settlement and the reconstruction of the area. The resolution calls upon the President to present to Congress a plan for the full withdrawal of U.S. personnel during the 18 months after the adoption of the resolution. It also directs the appropriate committees of the Senate to submit the necessary implementing legislation.

Neither the President nor Congress should act alone in finding our way out of Indochina. Congress has the constitutional responsibility to authorize and appropriate funds; the President is Commander-in-Chief. They therefore share policymaking responsibilities.

I am convinced that a withdrawal timetable makes sense; given the choices we face, it is the only way to bring peace.

My proposal is a very simple one: The United States should develop a fixed timetable for the withdrawal of all its forces from Indochina. We should stick to that timetable, subject only to Hanoi's willingness to release all American prisoners of war and to its acceptance of measures to insure the safety of the withdrawing Americans. While I believe that all American forces should be out of Indochina in 18 months, we should be prepared to shorten this time if Hanoi agrees to a cease-fire.

One common criticism of fixed withdrawal programs, of course, is that they would lead to a "bloodbath" in South Vietnam. But that objection, like others the President has raised, has more emotional than factual va-

lidity. In the first place, the war itself is a bloodbath. The possibility of persecution after a withdrawal must be balanced against the certainty that thousands will be slaughtered if the war continues. At any rate, no settlement, political or military—and certainly nothing in our present policy—can provide a guarantee against a bloodbath. (Even if the President were to achieve his goal of a settlement based on free elections, the Communists could win power at the polls, then do as they pleased.) And in formulating our withdrawal plan, we must, of course, accept the responsibility for evacuating and resettling those who wish to leave Vietnam.

Just as a bloodbath is only a possibility, it is by no means certain that the Communists would force their way into power in South Vietnam if all U.S. forces were withdrawn in 18 months. The military situation could be inconclusive for some time.

On the political side, one can only speculate about the problems that would be created for any government by the multiplicity of forces that would be buffeting South Vietnam without the dominating appeal of a Ho Chi Minh. The resulting uncertainties could generate the political pressures that lead to accommodation rather than the battlefield pressures that produced a Hue.

Because we are often told that our withdrawal would leave the South Vietnamese at a military disadvantage, many Americans have an image of a small people in South Vietnam left at the mercy of a giant Communist neighbor. We are easily convinced that we would be leaving a "Belgium" to fight a "Russia," while the real analogy in terms of economic and military potential is that we would be leaving a "Germany" to fight a "France." The total populations of South Vietnam and North Vietnam are approximately equal. The total number of South Vietnamese under arms is two or three times greater than the combined strength of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese. The military aid we have given to the South Vietnamese is far more extensive and sophisticated than that supplied to North Vietnam by the Soviet Union and China. The South Vietnamese are fighting at home to defend their families and villages; the enemy soldiers must travel for months over tortuous trails to fight in a strange land.

If we withdraw in 18 months, we will have had American soldiers in South Vietnam for seven years, killing the best enemy troops and training South Vietnamese. After all of this, the South Vietnamese should be able to hold their own. If they can't no nation can accuse us of failing to meet our commitments.

In his Nov. 3 speech, the President used two other arguments against a fixed withdrawal timetable. He said that it would give Hanoi no incentive to negotiate seriously in Paris. But, by his own admission, the negotiations are at a virtual standstill and there seems to be no prospect for improvement. He also argued that Hanoi could simply wait until U.S. withdrawals had reduced our forces to the point of vulnerability in South Vietnam, then attack. But is it not perfectly clear that Hanoi could wait for this moment even if the withdrawal timetable were not fixed and announced.

In short, I find the arguments advanced by the President and others against the fixed withdrawal timetable totally unpersuasive, and the advantages of a clear-cut withdrawal announcement are considerable.

Perhaps the most important advantage is that control of our conduct will be put in our hands, not those of the North and South Vietnamese. The President's Vietnamization policy explicitly links American withdrawals to progress in Paris, the level of fighting in Indochina and the improvement in South Vietnamese capability. The first two factors are controlled by Hanoi and the third by Saigon. With a fixed timetable we would be

saying to both sides that American interests, both foreign and domestic, compel our withdrawal. The Vietnamese would, at long last, be required to adjust to American interests rather than the reverse.

Only by announcing our willingness to withdraw on a fixed schedule can we hope to create a climate in which meaningful negotiations will be possible. On the things we most care about—the return of our men held as prisoners of war (some of them, incidentally, held longer than any soldiers in our history) and the safety of our troops as we withdraw—there is every likelihood of reaching an understanding with Hanoi once we indicate our willingness to set a firm date for our withdrawal. Hanoi has hinted that it might be prepared to negotiate on these issues. By contrast, the President's indeterminate schedule, which would keep a large U.S. force in Vietnam indefinitely, might force Hanoi to move against the remaining Americans, triggering a new round of escalation. It offers no prospect for the early return of our men held in North Vietnam, to whom our obligation is surely very great.

Prospects for a broader political settlement in Vietnam will also improve if we commit ourselves to a fixed withdrawal schedule. Without an American deadline, the generals who control the South Vietnamese Government will not consider a sharing of power, even with neutralists. Until they know that their weakness can no longer keep us in Vietnam, the generals will not be prepared to broaden the Government. Any truly representative government in South Vietnam would make a serious effort to negotiate with North Vietnam. And once they know we are leaving, the Hanoi leaders might also be ready for serious negotiations.

America is a very powerful nation. It is in a position now to make decisions that can help lay the foundation for a political settlement in Southeast Asia and prepare the way for the reconstruction of that area. Then, perhaps, we can turn our attention to meeting our commitments to our own people for "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."

History must judge the wisdom of our involvement in Vietnam and the wisdom of our method for ending that involvement. We have no control over the former, but we do have an opportunity to determine the way in which we end the war and set the stage for future development in Southeast Asia.

#### JAMES SUMNER JULIAN

Mr. TYDINGS. Mr. President. On May 14, 1970, the lifelong dream of James Sumner Julian came true. It was on this date that his sixth child received a B.A. from DePauw University.

With the help of a normal schoolteacher in Danville, Ind., James Julian received a high school education. He desired to continue on to DePauw, but was financially unable to do so. He vowed at the time that all of his children would graduate from DePauw—quite an ambitious dream for a railway mail clerk.

Five of his children did graduate from DePauw. The sixth, James Julian began at Depauw in 1920, but transferred to the University of Chicago where the subject matter was better suited to his needs. He obtained a medical degree from Howard University, taught at Howard, and later practiced medicine in Baltimore, Md.

On May 14, 1970, Dr. James Julian was awarded a B.A. from DePauw, conferred by university president, Dr. William Kerstetter. At this time the Julians established a memorial fund of over



by the end of next year is specifically recognized in the language of the amendment as a reflection of the President's own statements. Unless the President wishes to deviate from this withdrawal policy, there are compelling reasons why he should welcome a congressional reaffirmation of it.

The President has, to be sure, opposed past efforts to set a date for the windup of the Vietnamese affair. He has feared that the fixing of a date would take pressure off the North Vietnamese to negotiate an end of the war. But if Congress fixes a date which the President could postpone or even eliminate with the consent of Congress, when the time came, the North Vietnamese would, as the Foreign Relations staff memorandum notes, have no assurance that mere stalling would redound to their advantage.

In any event, it seems to us that the advantages of having a congressional withdrawal policy on the books greatly outweigh any disadvantages that might be encountered at the negotiating table. Such legislation would put the President under pressure to carry out the evacuation at the earliest feasible date. It would put our military leaders—and our diplomats, as well—on notice that the national policy is irreversible. Saigon also would have a clearer understanding of what the score is and would be able to adjust its policies accordingly. So long as there is hope that the President may change his mind under pressure the Thieu government is more likely to avoid the hard decisions that are essential to a future for South Vietnam without American manpower for its defense.

Behind all the arguments for and against this amendment is the even more vital fact that the Senate is making a bid to get back into the policy-making arena in regard to war and peace. We think the President should welcome that effort as a bed-rock imperative

American democracy. If the present amendment is not satisfactory to the administration in all particulars, amendments can always be suggested. But it would be tragically shortsighted for the administration to take an arbitrary stand against congressional action designed to underscore and give congressional support for the President's own policy. Orderly termination of the war as soon as feasible ought to be the joint policy of the two political branches, and it is doubtful that there will be a better opportunity than the present to make it so.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, the debate we begin today marks a singular moment in the history of the Senate.

As so often when decisions in this Chamber are most grave, the issue itself is most clear. The Hatfield-McGovern amendment represents, as many of my distinguished colleagues have pointed out, a reassertion of congressional authority in the fateful choices of war and peace—a reassertion so plainly required by the Constitution and so long overdue.

But beyond the momentous question of the balance of powers in our Government, the purpose of this amendment is still more simple and fundamental.

My colleagues and I rise today to stop at last the killing and maiming of Americans in Vietnam.

The historic merit of this amendment, Mr. President, is the unmistakable message it would carry from the Congress to the Nation and the world.

To the American people, unanimous in their yearning for peace, it would affirm that the years of illusion and misdirection and terrible sacrifice in this war are finally coming to an end.

It would express that large measure

of the public will, particularly among our young, for a rapid and total withdrawal of U.S. forces.

Moreover, it is a special strength of the present amendment that it has been expanded to meet also the deep and legitimate concern of many Americans that withdrawal could mean the exposure of our dwindling forces to enemy attack. There can be no real argument that this legislation somehow ties the President's hands in defending our men in Vietnam. On the contrary, by providing the President explicit authority to defend our forces as he judges necessary to secure our withdrawal, this amendment would bring our men home safely and honorably as well as soon.

I should point out in particular, Mr. President, that the amendment also provides full authority to the President to do all he can to secure the release of our prisoners of war in North and South Vietnam. The barbaric treatment of those men and the anguish of their loved ones here at home is an enormous tragedy of this war. The Hatfield-McGovern amendment recognizes the constant obligation of the Congress as well as the Executive to work toward the liberation of our men as rapidly as possible.

Yet this act of Congress would speak not only to the hopes of America. Its message would be equally clear to friend and foe in Vietnam.

To South Vietnam, whose responsibilities we have borne too long, we would be serving fair notice that finally—after the hollow rhetoric of two administrations—Asian boys are indeed going to have to fight Asian wars.

The lessons of the last 16 years are vivid. Nations—much as men—are stiffed by patronage and strengthened by challenge. If the Army of Vietnam is to be truly effective, if the democratic elements of the country are ever to pull themselves together, if an independent nation is in fact to be built in South Vietnam, the best incentive we can provide is the sure knowledge that the time has come for them to shoulder the primary responsibility of their own defense.

To Hanoi, this amendment also conveys a challenge and an incentive which might well be decisive in reaching a negotiated settlement.

For months, the North Vietnamese and their supporters have been telling us that the first imperative of successful negotiations, and the key to departure of their own troops from South Vietnam, would be a specific commitment to the withdrawal of U.S. forces. This amendment calls that hand for all the world to see.

Nor can Hanoi find ready advantage in this amendment for their own position on the ground. To lie and wait insures them nothing when the President, with consent of the Congress, can adjust our withdrawal to meet any contingency. And how confidently can Hanoi ignore a settlement now when the notice of our withdrawal is likely to galvanize the non-Communist forces of South Vietnam as never before? The shrewd men in Hanoi could well conclude that the price of a settlement today would be less than what they might pay for the risky months of waiting.

The administration has often argued that uncertainty is the greatest strength of its policy—and that this amendment will eliminate that tactic.

Indeed it will, Mr. President, and that is perhaps the ultimate virtue of the amendment. For the cost of calculated obscurity in our Vietnam policy has been far too high.

A Hanoi uncertain of our objectives has been intransigent at the conference table and unrelenting on the battlefields.

A Saigon uncertain of our policy has been slow to gather the strength, as it must, to stand on its own feet.

And most important, an America uncertain of our course has been as tragically and dangerously divided as at any moment since the Civil War.

President Nixon has told us again and again that the heart of the matter is not whether we end this war, but how we end it.

And that is true. We have a clear choice of paths to follow.

We can continue the equivocation which passes for diplomacy, the improvisation which passes for a plan, the bluff and lashing out—as in Cambodia—which passes for strength and manly purpose.

Or we can make good on the pledge for peace we all avow. We can undertake a truly national policy to end this war.

That alone will speed the return of our men held prisoners.

That alone will flush out an elusive enemy.

That alone will insure our accomplishments in Vietnam.

That alone will redeem the pledge made by President Nixon in his campaign to bring America together.

So what we are about in this legislation, Mr. President is nothing less than a test of the long-professed commitment of the Congress and Executive alike.

We face the choice squarely. The Senate can share with the President the awesome burden of making peace with Vietnam and ourselves. Or we can spurn once more our constitutional obligation.

No more fateful choice has confronted the Members of this body.

#### AMENDMENT NO. 814

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to call up my amendment No. 814.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment will be stated.

The assistant legislative clerk read the proposed amendment, as follows:

On page 14, between lines 18 and 19, insert the following:

Sec. 206. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, beginning with the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1971, no funds appropriated to or for the use of the Department of Defense for any fiscal year may be expended for carrying out research or study projects involving foreign affairs, foreign areas, or related matters except to the extent that the total amount expended for such purposes in such fiscal year does not exceed an amount equal to the total amount expended by the Department of State in the immediately preceding fiscal year for research and study projects (involving foreign affairs, foreign areas, or related matters) which were conducted for the Department of State by persons or organizations outside such Department. The total amount expended by the Department of State in any fiscal year

for such projects shall include amounts transferred to the Department of State from other departments and agencies for the purpose of having such projects carried out under the direction of the Department of State.

(b) The head of any department or agency of the Federal Government shall, in response to any request made to him in writing by a committee of the Congress, promptly submit to such committee a copy of any report, study, or investigation requested by such committee if the report, study, or investigation was financed in whole or in part with Federal funds and was made by a person outside the Federal Government, except that this requirement shall not apply in the case of any report, study, or investigation with respect to which the President exercises the right of executive privilege.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, it is a simple amendment and I hope that the managers of the bill will accept it. The amendment would:

First, Limit the Defense Department's spending for research by outside organizations on foreign affairs matters to not more than the amount appropriated, or transferred by other agencies, to the Department of State in the preceding fiscal year for such research; and

Second, Insure that congressional committees are given access to Government-financed research studies carried out by private individuals or organizations unless "executive privilege" is invoked.

In the last fiscal year the Department of Defense spent \$9 million for outside research on foreign affairs matters, 72 times the \$125,000 appropriated to the Department of State for its entire external research program, including contracts, consultants, and conferences.

In its report on the Defense authorization bill last year, the Senate Armed Services Committee wisely urged that \$4 million of Defense funds for research on foreign affairs matters be transferred to other Government agencies, particularly the Department of State. In doing so the committee stated that:

Defense Department activities in these two categories ("foreign military security environments" and "policy planning studies") have grown up to fill a void caused by lack of information in this area available from agencies which may be more directly responsible.

But the Defense Department's response to the committee's directive was to transfer only \$483,000 of its \$9 million budget to the State Department in fiscal 1970. And that came about only last June, as the fiscal year was ending, in an obvious attempt to show that it had not ignored the Committee's request entirely.

The situation is little better this fiscal year. The Defense Department's budget request for foreign affairs research is \$9.9 million. And the State Department's request for external research is \$350,000—of which only \$241,000 is slated for contract research. The Armed Services Committee is to be commended for recommending a 30-percent reduction in the Defense request—to \$6.8 million. But this cut will still leave a situation where the military is spending nearly 20 times as much on foreign affairs research as the agency assigned the primary responsibility for conduct of the Nation's foreign policy.

For the information of the Senate let me list a few of the titles of foreign affairs research projects carried out by the Defense Department in fiscal year 1970 which are proposed for continued funding in fiscal year 1971. Unfortunately the amounts planned for fiscal year 1971 are classified but I can assure the Senate that they are substantial:

FISCAL YEAR 1970—TITLE AND AMOUNTS  
Strategic Analysis of North Africa, Middle East, and South Asia, \$139,000.  
U.S., U.S.S.R., CPR Strategic Interactions and Response Patterns, \$325,000.  
Soviet Military Policy, \$255,000.  
European Security Issues, \$76,000.  
Asian Security Issues, \$312,000.  
Dimensions of International Conflict for Long Term Prediction, \$200,000.  
World Event/Interaction Survey for Short Term Conflict Prediction, \$112,000.  
Forecasting International Defense Alliances and Alignments, \$100,000.  
Asian Regional Arrangements, and so forth, \$325,000.  
Base Studies, and so forth, \$400,000.

My amendment would limit the Department of Defense's spending for foreign affairs research, such as these projects, to not more than that spent by the Department of State in the last fiscal year for external research of this nature, including its own funds and any funds transferred to State by the Department of Defense or other Government agencies. It would not only encourage Defense to transfer additional research funds to the State Department, as the committee has urged, but it would also give the State Department leverage for obtaining additional allocations during the budgetmaking process. In explaining the committee's 30-percent reduction in this activity to the Senate, Senator MCINTYRE stressed the need for transferring responsibility for this research to State. He said:

It is the Committee's expectation that its action this year will underscore the need for additional such steps both within the State and Defense Department themselves and at the Bureau of the Budget.

My amendment will help to carry out the committee's intent.

Although the amount of money involved here is dwarfed by the size of other authorizations in this bill, the principle involved is important. Over the years the Department of Defense has moved into this and many other areas which are the proper responsibility of the State Department solely because it, and not the State Department, could get the money from the Congress. This amendment will help restore the proper relationship between the responsibilities of the two Departments and insure that requests for financing this type of research will be given closer scrutiny than has been the case in the past.

The second part of the amendment would require Government agencies to make available to congressional committees, upon request, any study or report prepared outside the Government which was financed in whole or in part by the sponsoring agency. The purpose is to in-

sure that the Congress is given access to research studies performed by the so-called think tanks, the universities, or individuals whose work is paid for by the taxpayers. The amendment recognizes the right of the President to withhold "privileged" information from the Congress, and it also specifies that the mandate applies only to work performed outside the Government.

This amendment is the outgrowth of many efforts by the Committee on Foreign Relations to obtain a study prepared by the Institute for Defense Analysis relating to the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident. It is my understanding that the study contains a review of what happened in the Gulf of Tonkin, how communications were handled, and in general how decisions were made. The purpose of the study, I was informed, was to determine what lessons could be learned for future crisis situations. I think that my colleagues will agree that there is much that all of us can learn from that incident and its aftermath. The committee has attempted a number of times to obtain this study from the Department of Defense, but has been refused each time.

The Institute for Defense Analysis receives virtually all its funds from the Department of Defense. In the 1970 fiscal year this organization received \$10,130,000 from the Department of Defense and the Department proposes to give them \$10,650,000 in 1971.

I believe that the Congress, which imposes the taxes on the public to finance this organization, and which authorizes and appropriates the money for it, should have the right to see how that money is being spent. The issue here is far more important than this one study—it is a question of whether the Congress has the power to obtain information, prepared outside the Government with tax money, for which no claim of executive privilege has been made.

The Senate is beginning to reassert its Constitutional prerogatives and to restore the proper balance to our political system. Passage of this amendment will be one small, but positive, step in that direction.

Mr. President, I recognize that these practices have grown up over the past several years during a period of wartime. I sincerely hope that we are beginning to wind down the war and that before too long we will return to a period of more normal civilian control and participation—especially participation by Congress—in decisions involving our national security.

I hope that this amendment will be accepted by the distinguished Senator from New Hampshire. He has been very cooperative on this matter, last year, and this year.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, in discussing the amendment offered by my good friend, the Senator from Arkansas, I would like first to address myself to that part of amendment No. 814 which is labeled section 206(a).

Mr. President, I have listened with interest to the remarks of my distinguished colleague from Arkansas (Mr. Fulbright). I must admit in all candor that I share his commitment to an increased





United States  
of America

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## Senate

### AMENDMENT TO END THE WAR

Mr. MONDALE: Mr. President, the debate we begin today marks a singular moment in the history of the Senate.

As so often when decisions in this Chamber are most grave, the issue itself is most clear. The Hatfield-McGovern amendment represents, as many of my distinguished colleagues have pointed out, a reassertion of congressional authority in the fateful choices of war and peace—a reassertion so plainly required by the Constitution and so long overdue.

But beyond the momentous question of the balance of powers in our Government, the purpose of this amendment is still more simple and fundamental.

My colleagues and I rise today to stop at last the killing and maiming of Americans in Vietnam.

The historic merit of this amendment, Mr. President, is the unmistakable message it would carry from the Congress to the Nation and the world.

To the American people, unanimous in their yearning for peace, it would affirm that the years of illusion and misdirection and terrible sacrifice in this war are finally coming to an end.

It would express that large measure of the public will, particularly among our young, for a rapid and total withdrawal of U.S. forces.

Moreover, it is a special strength of the present amendment that it has been expanded to meet also the deep and legitimate concern of many Americans that withdrawal could mean the exposure of our dwindling forces to enemy attack. There can be no real argument that this legislation somehow ties the President's hands in defending our men in Vietnam. On the contrary, by providing the President explicit authority to defend our forces as he judges necessary to secure our withdrawal, this amendment would bring our men home safely and honorably as well as soon.

I should point out in particular, Mr. President, that the amendment also provides full authority to the President to do all he can to secure the release of our prisoners of war in North and South

Vietnam. The barbaric treatment of those men and the anguish of their loved ones here at home is an enormous tragedy of this war. The Hatfield-McGovern amendment recognizes the constant obligation of the Congress as well as the Executive to work toward the liberation of our men as rapidly as possible.

Yet this act of Congress would speak not only to the hopes of America. Its message would be equally clear to friend and foe in Vietnam.

To South Vietnam, whose responsibilities we have borne too long, we would be serving fair notice that finally—after the hollow rhetoric of two administrations—Asian boys are indeed going to have to fight Asian wars.

The lessons of the last 16 years are vivid. Nations—much as men—are stifled by patronage and strengthened by challenge. If the Army of Vietnam is to be truly effective, if the democratic elements of the country are ever to pull themselves together, if an independent nation is in fact to be built in South Vietnam, the best incentive we can provide is the sure knowledge that the time has come for them to shoulder the primary responsibility of their own defense.

To Hanoi, this amendment also conveys a challenge and an incentive which might well be decisive in reaching a negotiated settlement.

For months, the North Vietnamese and their supporters have been telling us that the first imperative of successful negotiations, and the key to departure of their own troops from South Vietnam, would be a specific commitment to the withdrawal of U.S. forces. This amendment calls that hand for all the world to see.

Nor can Hanoi find ready advantage in this amendment for their own position on the ground. To lie and wait insures them nothing when the President, with consent of the Congress, can adjust our withdrawal to meet any contingency. And how confidently can Hanoi ignore a settlement now when the notice of our withdrawal is likely to galvanize the non-Communist forces of South Vietnam as never before? The shrewd men in Hanoi could well conclude that the price of a settlement today would be less than what they might pay for the risky months of waiting.

The administration has often argued that uncertainty is the greatest strength of its policy—and that this amendment will eliminate that tactic.

Indeed it will, Mr. President, and that is perhaps the ultimate virtue of the amendment. For the cost of calculated obscurity in our Vietnam policy has been far too high.

A Hanoi uncertain of our objectives has been intransigent at the conference table and unremitting on the battlefields.

A Saigon uncertain of our policy has been slow to gather the strength, as it must, to stand on its own feet.

And most important, an America uncertain of our course has been as tragically and dangerously divided as at any moment since the Civil War.

President Nixon has told us again and again that the heart of the matter is not whether we end this war, but how we end it.

And that is true. We have a clear choice of paths to follow.

We can continue the equivocation which passes for diplomacy, the improvisation which passes for a plan, the bluff and lashing out—as in Cambodia—which passes for strength and manly purpose.

Or we can make good on the pledge for peace we all avow. We can undertake a truly national policy to end this war.

That alone will speed the return of our men held prisoners.

That alone will flush out an elusive enemy.

That alone will insure our accomplishments in Vietnam.

That alone will redeem the pledge made by President Nixon in his campaign to bring America together.

So what we are about in this legislation, Mr. President is nothing less than a test of the long-professed commitment of the Congress and Executive alike.

We face the choice squarely. The Senate can share with the President the awesome burden of making peace with Vietnam and ourselves. Or we can spurn once more our constitutional obligation.

No more fateful choice has confronted the Members of this body.



United States  
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## Senate

### WAR WITHOUT END

CONGRESS MUST DRAW THE LINE

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. MONDALE. As I listened to the President's message last night and as I have listened to the excellent speech of the Senator from Idaho, which I wholeheartedly endorse, I wondered what the status of the so-called Nixon doctrine or Guam doctrine is in the light of our intervention in Cambodia. Would the Senator help place that in perspective?

Mr. CHURCH. I would say to the Senator that, as I have understood the Guam doctrine, the President intended hereafter that other Asian governments should assume the primary responsibility for their own defense and that American troops would not be employed again for that purpose.

On the particular facts of this case, it is possible to make a distinction. Of course, it is always possible to distinguish one case from another. But this action clearly is contrary to the spirit of the Guam doctrine. Moreover, it directly contradicts the Vietnamization policy, for it looks in the direction of a reduced American involvement toward bringing our troops home, while this action looks in the direction of a new front and, with it, all the risks of a widening war.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, as a matter of fact, the Senator's excellent speech confirmed my feelings following the President's message of last night that, among other things, this new effort is an admission that Vietnamization is not working.

I do not recall the President ever having conditioned his withdrawal policy, which I have supported and which I think all of us have supported, on the ground that it would work only if the sanctuaries were removed from Cambodia, Laos, or any other place. Thus, it would seem to me that this new policy, announced last night, is an admission that U.S. troops are needed, in any escalating way, to do something that had to be done because of the fact that Vietnamization forces are unable to take care of their own problems and defend themselves. Would that be correct?

Mr. CHURCH. I find it hard to argue with that proposition. Eleven days ago, the President told us that Vietnamization was working, that he was confident it would prove successful, and that 150,000 more American troops would come out in the coming year. All of that was premised upon these same sanctuaries which have existed for 5 years. No new, sudden, dramatic change of this situation has occurred in South Vietnam.

I think that if the President was right in his expression of confidence 11 days ago, then the South Vietnamese troops, that he believes to be adequate for the defense of the entire country, certainly should have been adequate to deal with a few sanctuaries along the Cambodian border.

Mr. MONDALE. I believe that this is perhaps the most tragic mistake our new President has made. We are expanding the war. This is a major escalation. I think it will widen the war. It will cause it to last longer. The number of American boys killed and seriously injured will rise.

I deeply hope that the President will change his policy immediately.

I intend to join with any of my colleagues in any reasonable step to use the power of Congress to prevent governmental authority on appropriations to be used to pursue this policy.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, once the Cambodian boundary has been breached, it takes no exercise of the imagination to forecast that pressures will soon develop for sending a full-scale American military mission into that country which, in turn, will generate a whole new set of American obligations to defend the new Cambodian regime. It is this very sequence of events that led us ever deeper into the morass in Vietnam. We travel down that tragic trail again in Cambodia.

The overriding concern for us in Southeast Asia should be the military situation in South Vietnam, where our troops are already so heavily committed. Here, our position has not been altered by the recent overthrow of Sihanouk. For years now, the Vietcong and North Vietnamese have been utilizing border bases in Cambodia. But this administration, like its predecessors, had accepted that very condition. President Nixon himself had premised his policy of "Vietnamization"

on acceptance of that condition. By extending aid to South Vietnamese troops invading Cambodia, the President has opened up a new war front in Indochina and, thereby, has placed in the gravest jeopardy his declared policy of deescalating American participation in the war.

The time has come for the Congress to draw the line against an expanded American involvement in this widening war.

Mr. President, we do have responsibilities that extend beyond acquiescence to the President of the United States when it comes to broadening the perimeter of this war.

The war power was vested by the Constitution of the United States in Congress.

The power of the purse belongs to Congress.

It is within our means, therefore, to establish the outer limits of American participation in this widening war.

Too much blood has been lost—too much patience gone unrewarded—while the war continues to poison our whole society. Whether by a negotiated compromise or by a phased, orderly but complete American withdrawal, it is time to put an end to it. If the executive branch will not take the initiative, then the Congress and the people must—the longer the bankrupt policy of Vietnamization continues, the closer it brings us to that which it purports to avoid: disaster and defeat.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator from Idaho yield?

Mr. CHURCH. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I commend the distinguished Senator from Idaho for expressing very frankly the views which he holds on Vietnam and which he has held consistently down through the years.

What the Senator from Idaho and other Senators who have spoken today, on both sides of the aisle, are indicating is an uneasiness which affects all of us, regardless of party. All of us—and I am sure the President as well—are aware of the tremendous stakes involved and the potential danger inherent in the situation which now confronts the Nation.

I only hope that out of this will come a better degree of understanding among



all of us in recognition of the fact that this war has cost us approximately 325,000 casualties, that we have spent more than \$100 billion, that because of this war our problems at home have become exacerbated, that because of this war the divisions among our people have increased and that because of this war the difficulties which we will have to face up to—whether we like it or not—throughout the Nation, have either been aborted, decreased, or forgotten altogether.

Thus, I hope that this debate will remain on a respectable basis—and a respected basis, as well—that it will be carried on responsibly, and that what the Senate has to say, regardless of one's personal feelings in the matter, will indicate to the administration that there is concern, that there is uneasiness, that there is worry about the situation which has developed, which we think affects all of us, including the President, the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and the American people as a whole.

I commend the distinguished Senator from Idaho for his remarks today.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for sufficient time to yield to the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I congratulate the distinguished Senator from Idaho on his speech and associate myself with his words and those of the majority leader.

I, also, do not agree with the words and actions of President Nixon. However, having made them, I only hope that the actions will be successful. Personally, I do not think they will be. In fact, I believe that this enlargement of the war can result not only in a geographic enlargement, but also in an increase in the level of violence and certainly in the number of our men killed.

We also have to bear in mind that there is an indefinite source of manpower available to the North Vietnamese. We may be successful in securing the areas into which we are entering. We may drain off some more North Vietnamese manpower. But whenever they run out of manpower, there is an almost inexhaustible source of Chinese manpower more than anxious to enter into the fray.

I hope that will not happen.

Mr. President, yesterday on the floor I suggested that the matter be taken up at the Security Council. Events have moved rapidly since then. However, I still believe that this is a matter that could be taken up there.

Perhaps our actions would be criticized in that forum. Nevertheless, I think the net result would be to share the burdens in that part of the world with other nations and perhaps be able to more properly remove ourselves from Indochina, sharing the responsibility a bit more equitably.

I had heard to my regret that there are those who would like to form a Democratic coalition to oppose the President in this matter and that the Democratic National Committee might move in this regard.

I think that would be a dreadful mistake.

This matter is beyond partisan consideration. There are just as many Republicans as Democrats who are opposed to the President and just as many Democrats as Republicans who are in favor.

I know that last night I received a phone call in the middle of the night from a friend of 30 years standing, a conservative Republican in Colorado. He wanted to know what he could do as a good Republican to divert us from the course of disaster which he saw ahead.

I think that if our Democratic leadership or party were to move in a partisan direction, they would be making a great mistake. The opposition or support for this move is far beyond politics. I would hope that we would bear this in mind.

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I fully concur with the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island.

The reason that I have joined with the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. COOPER) in offering certain amendments to be considered in the Committee on Foreign Relations was to dramatize the bipartisan character of our dissent.

It is only on that basis that the Senate would consider such amendments, for in a matter of war and peace there is no party aisle that divides the Senate.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excellent editorial published in the New York Times which states that the President is rejecting his own Nixon doctrine.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### MILITARY HALLUCINATION—AGAIN

The assurances that the American-backed South Vietnamese drive into Cambodia is a limited, one-strike operation, an integral part of American operations in Vietnam and designed only to protect American and "free world" forces there, have a familiar and wholly unconvincing ring.

This is the same kind of reassuring rhetoric Americans have heard from their leaders at every stage of this country's long, misguided plunge into the Southeast Asian morass. Time and bitter experience have exhausted credulity of the American people and Congress. Presidential assurances can no longer be accepted in an area where actions, as Mr. Nixon's aides have observed in another context, speak louder than words.

The President's action in sanctioning the South Vietnamese invasion of Cambodian territory, with American advisers and air and other support, goes far beyond the Cambodian policy followed by Mr. Nixon's predecessors, even at times when the predicament of allied forces in Vietnam was far more perilous than anyone would claim it is today.

This latest and largest in a series of allied intrusions onto Cambodian soil which have occurred regularly since the change of government in Phnompenh has far-reaching and serious implications even if the immediate objectives are limited, as the Administration avows.

If reports from Phnompenh that the attack was launched without consultation with the Cambodian Government are true, the strike is a clear breach of Cambodian neu-

trality, the Geneva Accords and the principles of international law which the Administration has repeatedly cited in connection with the long-known and equally illegal Communist Vietnamese presence on Cambodian soil.

The allied drive into the Parrot's Beak will almost certainly provoke some reaction from Hanoi, and perhaps from Peking, with consequences throughout Southeast Asia that cannot be predicted but which could be fateful. At the very least, new threats to Phnompenh and fresh appeals for further American assistance can be expected.

Whatever he may plead to the contrary, President Nixon has rejected his own Nixon Doctrine in Southeast Asia, escalating a war from which he had promised to disengage. This is not the "new" Nixon who campaigned on a platform pledged to peace. It is more like the old Nixon who as Vice President in 1954 said the United States would have to send troops into Indochina if there were no other way to prevent its fall to the Communists, then on the verge of defeating the French.

Fortunately, now as then, Mr. Nixon's tough approach had produced strong opposition in both houses of Congress, even among some former staunch supporters of his Vietnamization policy. If the President does not promptly pull back from this dangerous adventure, Congress will have to assert its constitutional powers of restraint in the name of a people who have been asked once too often to swallow the military hallucination of victory through escalation.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, on one other point. I do not recall this ever happening in my 5½ years of service in the Senate, but every hour, telegrams are pouring into my office from my State.

They are not inspired. They are obviously from deeply concerned Minnesotans from all parts of the State expressing outrage, concern, and heartache over the President's new policy.

At this point, the ratio of those favoring the President's policy as against it, is running 89 to 1 against the President.

I ask unanimous consent to have these telegrams printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the telegrams were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

EDINA, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,  
Washington, D.C.:

We deplore Nixon's involvement in Cambodia.

Mr. and Mrs. WILLIAM F. TURNER.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,  
Washington, D.C.:

Demand that Congress stop the President's move in Cambodia immediately.

Mr. and Mrs. GORDON PETERSON.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,  
Washington, D.C.:

Urge strongest opposition to Cambodia action earth needs, demands peace.

Mr. and Mrs. JAMES KEANE.

EDINA, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,  
Washington, D.C.:

Please can you intervene negatively in the President's decision to become militarily involved in Cambodia? I am asking this as a United States citizen, a Minnesota taxpayer who has always supported you, an active voter, but most of all as a mother of a United States Marine.

Mrs. PATRICIA DE REMER.

DULUTH, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,  
Washington, D.C.:

We oppose any involvement in Cambodia. Fight for further deescalation in Vietnam. Try harder!

Mr. and Mrs. DAVID GIBBENS.

DULUTH, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,  
Washington, D.C.:

Stop our intervention in Cambodia. Bring our sons home now.

Mr. and Mrs. WILBUR FREED.

ST. PAUL, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,  
Washington, D.C.:

Cambodian involvement tragic mistake, urge immediate withdrawal all US troops from Southeast Asia.

DONALD S. LEHMAN, M.D.

DULUTH, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,  
Washington, D.C.:

I'm against any escalation of aid to Cambodia.

Mrs. ROBERT BRIDGES.

DULUTH, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,  
Washington, D.C.:

Let not Cambodia be another Vietnam. Cannot sacrifice sons lives for something don't believe in.

Mrs. CAROL FRANKLIN.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,  
Washington, D.C.:

Please help stop this latest involvement in Cambodia.

Mr. and Mrs. ROY E. MULLIN.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,  
Washington, D.C.:

Don't let Nixon send our Air Force or our advisors into Cambodia.

NANCY BRASKET.

WINONA, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,  
Washington, D.C.:

Do not support President Nixon's Cambodia escalation.

Mrs. HARRY BARNES.

Mrs. KENNETH KNOLL.

DULUTH, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,  
Washington, D.C.:

We strongly oppose involvement in Cambodia. Pray you will do all to help prevent this.

BEN and JEANNE OVERMAN.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,  
Washington, D.C.:

We strongly oppose and resent the extension of the war into Cambodia. We want to get out of Southeast Asia now.

Professor and Mrs. LEONARD PARKER.

NORTHFIELD, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,  
Washington, D.C.:

We do not wish U.S. soldiers fighting in Cambodia. Next will be Red China.

Mr. and Mrs. C. S. CARLSON.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,  
Washington, D.C.:

We support all action necessary to prevent intervention in Cambodia and expansion of Indochina War.

Mr. and Mrs. DAVID L. JOHNSON.





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