

COON RAPIDS, MINN.
Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Strongly urge no involvement in Cambodia. An immediate withdrawal from Vietnam will not support President.

Mr. and Mrs. JAMES JAGELSKI.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.
Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
We deplore the presidential action involving Americans in Cambodia. We strongly urge you to protest on our behalf.

Dr. and Mrs. MARVIN L. STEIN.

WINONA, MINN.
Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Please voice vehement protest in further involvement in Southeast Asia.

Mr. and Mrs. HERMAN WEISMAN.

ST. PAUL, MINN.
Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Urge you exert every effort and influence to end Asian and Middle East involvement.

Mr. JOHN W. PETERS.

ST. PAUL, MINN.
Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
We consider Cambodia further involvement in the Asian war and we protest.

Mr. and Mrs. MAX SCHNITZER.

ST. PAUL, MINN.
Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
I am against sending American men or material into Cambodia.

Mrs. BELLE SINGHER.

ST. PAUL, MINN.
Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Urge in strongest terms you fight insane new military commitment in Cambodia.

EUGENE OGAN.

ST. PAUL, MINN.
Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
As mother of 18-year-old boy I'll send mine to Sweden rather than slaughter.

Mr. and Mrs. DICK YAGER.

ST. PAUL, MINN.
Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Stop the generals in Cambodia.

RICHARD C. GREENE.

ST. PAUL, MINN.
Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
We oppose our commitment in Cambodia.

Mr. and Mrs. H. C. POWELL.

ST. PAUL, MINN.
Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
We are completely opposed to President's extending war into Cambodia. Please do something immediately.

Mr. and Mrs. ROBERT BREMER.

DULUTH, MINN.
Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Believe Cambodia involvement counter to national interest strongly urge Senate curb the executive and military.

Mr. and Mrs. JOHN POOLEY.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.
Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Was shocked by the President's decision to

aid Cambodia. Cannot support decision for another war.

Mr. and Mrs. JAMES S. LEE.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.
Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
We urge your opposition to the President's decision to enter America into war in Cambodia.

Mr. and Mrs. RICHARD WEATHERMAN.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.
Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
We support all action necessary to prevent intervention in Cambodia and expansion of Indochina war.

Mr. and Mrs. ROBERT A. WINDSOR.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.
Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Urge you do all in your power to prevent Nixon's widening war in Southeast Asia.

Mr. and Mrs. DON YELLOTT.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
We strongly object to the Cambodian action resulting in deeper involvement in Southeast Asia.

Mr. and Mrs. LEW HOKKANEN.

ONEIDA.
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.
Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
I urge you to vigorously work to cut off all financial support for the new American military involvement in Cambodia regardless of the rhetoric about aiding the Vietnamization program. This new escalation can only result in more deaths. The President has contemptuously rejected the advice of the Congress by this action, and you have no alternative but to use your constitutional power over funds to balance the excessive power of the executive and military.

I greatly appreciate your efforts to date in this regards sincerely.

EARL CRAIG,
New Democratic Coalition.

TRAVERSE CITY, MICH.
Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Stop slaughter of Americans, and Southeast Asians. Get United States out of Cambodia-Vietnam now.

ROBERT G. LONG.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.
Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
I have sent the following telegram to President Nixon quote please keep all U.S. military personnel weapons and vehicles out of Cambodia and Laos. Your people will not believe reasons for becoming involved there. Please give the needs of America first priority unquote.

MAX O. SCHULTZE.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.
Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Demand U.S. troops be withdrawn from Cambodia. Senate action requested to restrain presidential power.

Sister MARY KAY BUSKIN.

ST. PAUL, MINN.
Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
We consider Cambodia further involvement in the Asian war and we protest.

Mr. and Mrs. MAX SCHNITZER.

DULUTH, MINN.

Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Strongly oppose our involvement in Cambodia. Urge you to do whatever you can in your power to cease the U.S. aid and involvement.

BEVERLY and ERWIN GOLDFINE.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
We are absolutely opposed to Nixon's sending troops and aid to Cambodia. Trust Senate can block such.

Dr. and Mrs. ROBERT HARLOW.

PARISBAULT, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Strongly urge you to use all possible influence to resist any commitment whatsoever in Cambodia. We must concentrate all effort to disengage Vietnam and avoid any further disasters in Asia.

R. C. BLIES.

MOORHEAD, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Extremely upset over President's decision to extend war. Please help; feel this war is wrong.

Mrs. ARVID BENSON.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Please do what you can to reverse Nixon's Cambodia decision.

MARY HARLOW.

DULUTH, MINN.

Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
You, as representative of the people of the United States, must assert yourself in our behalf in this Southeast Asian crisis.

DOROTHY B. FOCHS.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Do all you can to prevent Nixon's expansion of the war work to make illegal what he has done.

JAMES MACDONALD.

BEVERLY HILLS, CALIF.

Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
125,000 mothers say no to Cambodia. We support any action to re-establish constitutional right of Congress to declare war.

DONNA REED OWEN,
DOROTHY B. JONES,
BARBARA AVEDON,

Co-Chairmen, Another Mother for Peace.

ST. PAUL, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Request you take immediate Senatorial action blocking unconstitutional, unlicensed imprudent action announced today.

JOHN and MARY JEAN DEROSIER.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
We will not tolerate neither money nor arms nor advisers nor troops in Cambodia.

Mr. and Mrs. DANIEL E. WEINBERG.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Urge you to oppose in all possible ways any commitment in Cambodia.

Mr. and Mrs. WILLIAM D. MUNRO.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
As a Republican I strongly protest the involvement of Americans in Cambodia.

THEODORE F. RYAN.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Hon. WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Stop the President's move to send U.S. forces to Cambodia.

Mr. and Mrs. RAY CHISHOLM.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Applaud your challenge of the President on ABM urge your challenge of him on Cambodian intervention.

ELDON MASON.

AUSTIN, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
We must stop involvement in Cambodia.

ELIZABETH HOLMES.

ST. PAUL, MINN.

Hon. WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
We protest our additional involvement in Cambodia.

Mr. and Mrs. RICHARD J. NOVAK.

DULUTH, MINN.

Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
We strongly oppose U.S. involvement in Cambodia please help bring our boys home.

Mr. and Mrs. RONALD J. WURSEN.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Pressure President, military abandon mad Asiatic nightmare before country completely bankrupt morally, financially.

Mrs. ROBERT A. GRAY.

ST. PAUL, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Congress must act immediately to halt Cambodian intervention stop no more Vietnams.

MARTHA ROSEN.

ST. PAUL, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
We deeply protest any further involvement in Asian war.

Mr. and Mrs. NORMAN ROSE.

ST. PAUL, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Urge you exert every effort and influence to end Asian and Middle East involvement.

Mrs. JOHN W. PETERSON.

DULUTH, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
No expansion of war in Southeast Asia or military aid to Cambodia.

Mr. and Mrs. THOMAS VECCHI.

DULUTH, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
America wants formal commitment. Pro or con. Please have vote.

L. and S. CHRISTIANSON.

NORTHFIELD, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:
Deeply disturbed by President's decision on

Cambodia. Implore you to oppose U.S. military involvement there.

CARL and DOROTHY HOLMGREN.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

Cambodian adventure shocking betrayal.
American democratic process demand withdrawal on moral legal humanitarian grounds.

Mr. and Mrs. FRED PTASHNE.

DULUTH, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

Our family strongly opposes enlarging the war in Asia. Please do something.

NORMAN SUNDQUIST FAMILY.

DULUTH, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

I strongly oppose any involvement in Cambodia.

Mrs. YALE DAVIS.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

Having heard the address by the President I want you to know as one of your constituency that I support in essence the President's decision. I hope you will support him.

Sincerely,

JOHN I. OWEN.

DULUTH, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

Strongly opposed extension of military involvement in Indo-China. Urgently request immediate and total withdrawal of all US troops. United Nations, not the U.S. should police the world. Priorities at home make this imperative. Since we are so deeply committed to ABM and MIRV programs it is criminal to disperse American lives in foreign wars. We demand Congressional action prerequisite to continuance or extension of involvement in Southeast Asia. Press for UN action in Southeast Asia.

DULUTH DFL WOMEN.

HAGER CITY, WIS.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

Get Vietnam war stopped. No military help for Cambodia.

MARY GWEN OWEN SWANSON.

St. PAUL, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

The Asian war must be stopped. Not escalated. The Senate must say no to Cambodia.

Mrs. JANET KAMPS.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

While we cannot speak for the silent majority, we have no interest in maintaining a powerful image, saving face, or any of the other irrationalizations that have been used as justification for the continuation and extension of this war. The President's action in sending troops into Cambodia is reprehensible. We applaud your antiwar stand and trust that you will do everything possible to stop the President from pursuing this course of action.

SUE DEVRIES.

PEGGY NEWTON.

JANICE THYER.

JANET KINNEY.

St. PAUL, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

Please support the President on Cambodia.

Dr. and Mrs. RALPH R. GRAMS.

MOUND, MINN.

Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

Nixon's action is a blatantly illegal executive usurpation of war making power. Our duly elected officials in Congress must prevent this destruction of our constitutional system.

PAT and FRED FREVERT.

EDINA, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

President Nixon does not hear voice of silent majority who wish hope and pray to end Vietnam and its involvements we now have extension of this war so "we will not be humiliated we will not be defeated" wise men have swallowed pride and admitted defeat before and probably will again isn't there anything you as our elected representative can do or should the silent majority find out whether only voice heard is that of the striker anarchist rioter.

RICHARD B. BARNES.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

We want our boys not our prestige no to Nixon.

The RICHARD SWANSON FAMILY.
CANDY McDONALD.

St. PAUL, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

Stop the President and the Generals.
HOWARD AND MARY ANN HUELSTER.

St. PAUL, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

Violently opposed to entering Cambodia please stop President and end this war.

Dr. and Mrs. ERNEST M. HAMMES, Jr.

St. PAUL, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

Our absolute support in opposing Nixon's foreign policy position in the expansion of war in Indochina.

JOHN E. HARRIS.

BESSIE HARRIS.

KAREN.

JOHN.

PALO ALTO, CALIF.

Honorable WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

Preserve Senates integrity and national honor keep us out of Cambodia Minnesota voter at Stanford.

ROBERT I. FINK.

St. PAUL, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

For God's sake stop Nixon's Indochina war now. We support all your efforts to restore sanity to U.S. foreign and domestic policy. The Administration's lack of reason, morality and responsibility warrants censure or if necessary impeachment.

Mr. and Mrs. PAUL S. HIGGINS.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

Get out of Cambodia as well as Vietnam.
Col. and Mrs. NAT WISSER.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

We voters strongly urge you to continue your fight against Cambodian involvement.
Dr. and Mrs. F. E. FLYNN MICHAEL.

ST. PAUL, MINN.
Senator WALTER MONDALE
Washington, D.C.

Can't we ever learn from our mistakes?
Censure him.

Mr. and Mrs. RUSSELL HOBBS,
Precinct Chairman, Falcon Heights Four.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.
Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.

We are appalled at the action of President Nixon of involving U.S. forces in Cambodia. This action is not only in direct contradiction to Senate, congressional and public view, but also to Nixon's own stated policy of disengagement from S.E. Asia.

We encourage your support of Senate moves for immediate disengagement of U.S. forces from Cambodia.

Bruce Hanson, Leroy Curwick, Kay Curwick, Tim Callaghan, Donald Kulst, Ron Bennett, Kathryn Bennett, Jon Zbasnik, Paul Tamm, Tie Hutchinson, Lie Toth, Lanny Schmidt, Leroy Clauenna, Douglas Stone, Robert Carr, Howard Hickman, Richard Minday, Edward Conway, Departments of Metallurgical, Mineral, and Chemical Engineering, University of Minnesota at Minneapolis.

EDINA, MINN.,
May 1, 1970.
Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

We disagree completely with Nixon's speech of this date.

Dr. and Mrs. EDWARD G. HUSTAD.

MANKATO, MINN.,
May 1, 1970.
Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

Please do all in your power to stop expansion of war in Cambodia and to end American involvement in Viet Nam. The President's speech and announced military plans are a profound threat to democracy in the United States and to world peace.

JANE and JOHN FOSTER.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.,
May 1, 1970.

Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.

We adamantly oppose any U.S. involvement in Cambodia. Support any action you take to prevent same.

Respectfully,

Mr. and Mrs. STEVE WIETING.

ST. PAUL, MINN.,
May 1, 1970.
Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

I oppose the President's decision to enter Cambodia. Congress must end the war now.

Mrs. DONALD HAARSTICK.

ST. PAUL, MINN.,
MAY 1, 1970.
Senator WALTER MONDALE:
Washington, D.C.:

We deplore the capitulation of President Nixon to the military industrial complex in their latest venture into Cambodia. We hope the Senate will demonstrate more wisdom.

Judge and Mrs. HYAM SEGELL.

ST. PAUL, MINN.,
May 1, 1970.
Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

There is a fourth option withdrawal from all Indochina and to hell with "our humiliation."

C. STEVENSON.

MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.,
May 1, 1970.
Senator WALTER MONDALE,
Washington, D.C.:

Congratulations. Tonight we are very proud of our President. An American first and a politician second. A man with the courage to tell his countrymen, and the world, that the time has arrived when Americans will stand and be counted.

Mr. and Mrs. L. A. ELSTAD.



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Senate

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, nothing can describe the despair and disappointment I felt at the President's decision to move U.S. troops into Cambodia and by the incredible—if only temporary—renewed bombing of North Vietnam.

Never have I had such a reaction from my own constituents—an overwhelming vote of fear and reaction against this escalation of the war.

All the wounds which have been inflicted upon our society—not to mention our young men—by a decade of war in Vietnam have been torn even wider by the start of the Indochina war. Already young men and young women have died in disturbances reflecting the shock and dismay which young and old alike have felt since our move into Cambodia.

On the evening following the President's announcement, I set forth my own views on Cambodia and on the war in Vietnam in an address to the national convention of the ADA. I ask unanimous consent that this speech be reprinted at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY SENATOR WALTER F. MONDALE

I had been trying to decide what my topic—our keynote—should be. The President's speech last night settled the question for all of us.

There is only one. The war which was in Vietnam and which was—if slowly—being wound down, is now in Indochina and is now being massively escalated.

The war which has cost:
Some 50,000 American lives;
Almost 275,000 American wounded;
Unknown millions of Vietnamese casualties;

Some 100 billion dollars worth of our resources; and

A decade of agony and strife at home . . . has now become an even deeper and wider war.

"Vietnamization" has now been fully revealed for a tragic hoax.

Many of us feared that Vietnamization was largely a device to buy time and pre-empt dissent while propping up the corrupt regime of Thieu and Ky. But many of us also felt that the President, if for no other reason than politics, was committed to "winding down" the war in Vietnam.

It is now clear that the President has not abandoned the disastrous objective of the last tragic decade. It is military victory that he seeks—the perpetuation of whatever anti-communist government can be found,—however corrupt, unpopular, or undemocratic, and however little they will fight to defend themselves, by whatever military means are necessary. It is a policy which seeks to preserve an American bridgehead on the Mainland of Southeast Asia.

This is the old policy. It is a policy which has been shown to be unattainable, irrational, unpopular at home and abroad, and contrary to American interests.

The invasion of the Cambodian sanctuaries is in direct contradiction of the President's own Guam Doctrine, in which he said that we must cease acting as policeman and cannon fodder for the Asian nations. It is in direct contradiction of the interpretation of "Vietnamization" which the President has given to the American people. It is, in fact, absolute proof of the total failure of the "Vietnamization" doctrine.

We cannot have it both ways. We cannot have both disengagement and escalation. We cannot hold to a goal of peace, disengagement, and a "political solution" while expanding the war and seeking the total destruction of the enemy.

The rationale is the same one we heard 10 years and 50,000 lives ago: "A little more effort and the tide will be turned." We have heard it often since—a few thousand more troops, a little more bombing and the war will be over.

Now we are told that a six to eight week foray into Cambodia will wipe out the major communist sanctuaries and staging areas which they have held for at least the last five years.

But why weren't we told 6 months ago that "Vietnamization" would require the invasion of these territories which have been held by the communists for so many years?

Why weren't we told a week ago when the President reported sufficient success to announce the pull out of 150,000 more troops in the year ahead?

What do we expect the Vietcong, the North Vietnamese—and the Chinese and the Soviets, for that matter—to do while we destroy their major supply and staging areas?

What will we do in 2 months when, if all goes exactly as planned, we will have pushed them out of the Parrot's Beak, the Fish Hook, and the other areas? Do we stay there . . . indefinitely . . . or do we return to South Vietnam and expect them to stay wherever we may have been lucky enough to have pushed them?

How about the next line of communist sanctuaries—just beyond the reach of American forces? All of Asia behind the enemy line is a "sanctuary." When and where do we stop? And when do they decide to attack our own sanctuaries—at Thailand, for example?

The President's reason for this escalation must be rejected. There is no way to make a "defensive maneuver" out of a full scale offensive into a neutral nation, with the advice and consent neither of that nation nor of Congress.

There is no way to make this escalation into a means of "hastening our withdrawal" or "furthering a political settlement."

The oldest myth of them all again rears its destructive head: the notion of a monolithic world-wide communist conspiracy unalterably committed to the conquest of the world—a conspiracy which must be stopped at whatever cost—"so that the sons and brothers of our soldiers fighting now can live in peace and security!"

One of the tragic ironies of the war, of course, is that the Administration still clings at the same time to the hope that we can achieve our ends without a total military commitment . . . that we can ultimately gain from a conference table what we failed to gain on the battlefield.

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But this recent action has virtually guaranteed the death of the Paris peace talks—which have been in a coma anyway for nearly a year due, in part, to our failure to even appoint a top-level negotiator.

We are now back where we were two years ago—hoping that somehow the other side will cave in and let us off the hook.

I supported and will continue to support the President's objective of withdrawal, even though I thought it should have been much faster, and even though I never trusted his disavowal of a military solution.

But I now see a longer war and a wider war. I see many more deaths. I think we should know by this time the patience, resolve, and manpower of the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. And I see us now sinking further and further into a wider, more disastrous, more unwinnable, and even more unjustifiable war.

And what of the Soviets and the Chinese? They, too, have a vital stake in the eventual outcome of the Indochina war. They, too, have pride. And they, too, have a resolve that their course is right and that there can be no surrender.

I assure you that there are many—I hope a majority—in the Senate who are terribly distressed by this new development.

Once again, the President has ignored the Congress, breaking his promise to seek our advice before such a major change in policy.

He has gone against the clear will of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

He has surely violated the spirit of the Congressional Amendment which passed the Senate last December by a vote of 73-17 prohibiting the use of American troops in Laos. I am sorry that Cambodia was not in that amendment. It would surely have been simple to have added Cambodia to that safeguard, but the chances of our Administration pursuing a ground war in Cambodia were so remote, so bizarre, that no one thought to put Cambodia into the legislation.

And the President is, I am completely convinced, going against the clear will of the American people. My own telegrams Friday morning—sent out only hours after the President's speech—ran 85-1 against the President.

In fact, there seems to be much indication that the President went against the advice of many of his own top civilian advisors.

I feel so strongly and so deeply . . . as do you and so many others throughout the country . . . that we must do everything we can to reverse the policy. Our only hope is to reassert the Constitutional Authority of Congress—answerable to the American people—over our foreign policy and the waging of war.

I am fully convinced that the Congress of the United States has the obligation and the authority to stop this disaster. And I hope and pray we have the will and the votes. I hope the Senate and the Congress will amend both this year's military sales bill and the military authorization bill to prohibit the use of these funds for the support of American ground or air action in Cambodia and to prohibit the sale, loan, or gift of American aid, directly or indirectly, bound for Cambodia. If we can avert a disaster on the Supreme Court, we can and must avert an even greater one in Indochina.

We must go beyond that and demand the same for Laos and a much prompter total withdrawal from Vietnam.

Then, let us look at our real international interests:

The Middle East is reaching a state of intolerable tension. Europe is once again restive, seeking to end the cold war stand-off

of NATO versus the Warsaw Pact. Most important, negotiations have finally begun on ways to halt the insane arms race before the American and Soviet generals plunge the world again into a new state of instability and nuclear terror—a race so costly that talk of social reform will be the merest hypocrisy.

Here is where our true international interests lie. Here is where we can advance the causes of peace and freedom which we espouse. But each of these issues will be seriously—perhaps disastrously—jeopardized by an escalation of the Vietnam conflict and Great Power antagonisms which this is bound to produce.

The President has called the Indochina war a challenge to our manhood, our pride. Time and again his message alluded to this concept.

"We will not be humiliated," he said. "We will not be defeated." He warned us not to act "like a pitiful helpless giant . . ." He warned us against our first defeat in our proud 190 years.

But I would like to ask the President how he defines manhood. What is the mature expression of manly pride?

I believe our present policy is an expression of the pride of the weak, based on arrogance and self-decay. I want our country to demonstrate the pride of the strong, based on humility and candor. It may be true we have not suffered a defeat in our proud 190 years, but does that raise doubts about our country or about this awful war?

Does that observation prove that our Nation lacks the capacity to persevere when necessary or does it underline the immorality and indefensibility of a slaughter which kills our young and numbs our conscience on behalf of a cause which can't be explained?

I am deeply disturbed at the thought of a generation which may lose all confidence in the ability of a democracy to respond with justice, reason, and humanity. But what can we expect of a generation which is asked to kill and be killed in a war which cannot be explained? Can a fractured, disheartened and demoralized America possibly be a price worth paying for a few more years of an Americanized government in Saigon, and in Phnom Penh.

Perhaps the greatest crime of this war is that we have forced young men and women to choose between these two instincts. The great majority of the young will never feel a bullet or a piece of shrapnel. But nearly all will be called upon to disavow either their conscience, or their country.

The President said "we will not be humiliated." But we already are.

I believe the highest and noblest expression of civilized manhood is to admit error when one is wrong. The same must be true of Nations.

If we did, it would indeed be "our finest hour."—It would be the President's final hour.

We could deal with our real problems: in the Middle East, in Vienna, in the Ghettoes, in Indian Reservations, in migrant camps, in our schools and hospitals and churches. We could save our oceans, lakes and streams, and our air. We could reclaim our streets and assault crime without sacrificing justice. We might reclaim our young, increasing numbers of whom have tragically rejected the institutions and the processes of freedom. This Nation might even reclaim its soul.

We could, Mr. President, be proud men, proud women, and proud Americans again.

crops in some inaccessible areas of South Vietnam and in areas where few South Vietnamese civilians are located. Furthermore, in some areas enemy soldiers have taken over crops and land belonging to South Vietnamese civilians.

To counter this means of providing food supplies to the enemy, our forces have engaged in selected crop destruction. By destroying the fields planted or controlled by the enemy, we have made it more difficult for them to provide food for their soldiers. In turn, these forces have been reduced in number and are therefore less effective in killing Americans and our allies in this war-ravaged country.

Mr. President, this program of destroying selected crops in certain areas of South Vietnam has been carefully controlled and even at the height of the war did not result in the destruction of more than 1 percent of the annual food production of Vietnam.

Thus, when one compares that statistic with the success of our crop destruction program in handicapping enemy forces, it is easy to see how unwise it would be to discontinue this effort. The interrogation of enemy prisoners reveals that food shortages are among the most critical problems facing the North Vietnamese. These same prisoners attest to the effectiveness of the crop destruction program as it applies to the overall food shortage among enemy soldiers.

Mr. President, the same two reasons I gave yesterday to the initial herbicide amendment offered by my colleagues apply to this amendment. While I recognize their good intentions in offering this latest amendment, it must be stated again that its passage would indirectly cost American lives in this war. Further, the use of antiplant herbicides on enemy crops is not causing any harmful effects to the ecology of South Vietnam according to studies we have made.

For these reasons, Mr. President, I urge the Members of the Senate to reject this amendment.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator from South Carolina.

I yield myself the remainder of my time.

Mr. President, I certainly hope that the Members of the Senate understand that this is essentially the same question we voted on yesterday, which was rejected by a vote of almost 3 to 1—that is, yesterday's vote included the item at issue now.

Second, there is no vast, extensive use of this matter; but where it has been used most effectively, it has driven them to use more of their people for the growing of food and crops, thus taking them away from other support of the military and taking them away from the actual fighting.

As I have said, we have decided this matter primarily on the ground that we are over there trying to defend this vast area of that country from the Communists, and our boys need every reasonable thing, every possible thing we can supply them to protect themselves. This is jungle warfare at its worst. I think we have enough restrictions now on them as policy. Let us not tie their hands mili-

tarly with respect to every conceivable item, small as this is.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. RIBICOFF). The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has 1 minute remaining.

Mr. GOODELL. Mr. President, with 1 minute remaining, let me simply emphasize that this amendment is quite different from the amendment of yesterday, with all due deference to the Senator from Mississippi. The amendment yesterday was a broad-based amendment that would deny the use of defoliants for any purpose, and many arguments were raised, I believe sincerely, that there was some kind of military significance to defoliating areas where the enemy might be ambushing. That is not involved in this amendment. This amendment is against the use of chemicals for the denial of food. It is the use of chemicals to deny the enemy food—the spraying of crops.

I would say to the Senator from New Hampshire that we have later evidence than 1967, a 1970 report of the Defense Department, which says that it is anathema to the people of South Vietnam.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, has all time for debate expired?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time for debate has expired.

The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, the war in Vietnam has been a series of mistakes and an unquestioned tragedy. In passing this amendment, we have an opportunity to halt one of our most mistaken policies and prevent prolonged destruction among the Vietnamese people far beyond the end of the war.

The American people by nature recoil from the horrors of war. The Vietnam war especially has forced us to question ends and means. Though we have not yet been able to withdraw from bloodshed, we are increasingly questioning such techniques as massive bombing, napalm, and search and destroy missions. One can hope that public consideration of such destruction will help us exert world leadership away from the use of force and violence.

But for some time the United States has had a revulsion and a very clear policy against employment of other weapons of certain types. Since World War I and the days of poison gas in the trenches, we have had a policy against the tactical use of weapons which affect total populations, poison slowly, contaminate land, and destroy organic life chains.

Public concern for these issues has been reflected in controversies involving biological warfare research, nausea and tear gas deployment, nerve gas, and tactical nuclear weapons.

But it is clear now that we have unthinkingly employed destructive materials in Vietnam which deliver all of these catastrophic effects: Anticrop

chemicals. Senator NELSON has explained the poison content of these herbicides, especially cacodylic acid. The possibilities of poison buildup in animals and man have been shown in the case of DDT in the United States.

The long-term obliteration of vegetation and botanical cycles is an obvious contamination of the land. The destruction of interdependent plant and animal chains is truly appalling, and will plague the people of Vietnam for years after the war. The research finding that the defoliant chemical 2,4,5-T causes fetal deformities in animals should arouse humanitarian protest against all herbicides, just as we have always opposed biological warfare and tactical nuclear weapons.

The destruction of food crops is a seriously mistaken policy. The Senator from Wisconsin has shown that, in guerrilla warfare, this tactic affects the civil populace primarily and has little impact on the guerrilla enemy. By 1967, the war had already caused the loss of over 600,000 acres of rice land, and created thousands of helpless refugees. The loss of another half million acres due to chemical attack is a civil disaster which cannot but hinder pacification and reduce support for the United States.

It is clear that the administration's delay in submitting the Geneva protocol against chemical and biological warfare to the Senate until August 19, after promising prompt action in November 1969, has become an international embarrassment to the United States; 9 months after the U.N. General Assembly voted 80 to 3 against us, to prohibit use of chemicals under the Geneva Treaty, we still exist under the cloud of herbicide use in Southeast Asia.

Congress has the obligation to act to stop this mistaken policy.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. RIBICOFF). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, we request the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, what is the question before the Senate?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from New York (Mr. GOODELL) and the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. NELSON). The yeas and nays have been ordered.

Mr. STENNIS. As I understand, Senators who favor the amendment will vote "yea," and those who are opposed will vote "nay."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. KENNEDY. I announce that the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON), the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. DODD), the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT), the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. GORE), the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS), the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from

Hawaii (Mr. INOUE), the Senator from Minnesota (Mr. McCARTHY), the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA), and the Senator from Georgia (Mr. RUSSELL) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL) and the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. HARRIS) would each vote "yea."

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. FONG), the Senator from California (Mr. MURPHY), the Senator from Ohio (Mr. SAXBE), and the Senator from Alaska (Mr. STEVENS) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.

The Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACKWOOD) is absent on official business.

The Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER) and the Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS) are detained on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) and the Senator from California (Mr. MURPHY) would each vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 33, nays 48, as follows:

[No. 274 Leg.]

YEAS—33

| | | |
|--------------|-----------|----------------|
| Bayh | Hughes | Pastore |
| Burdick | Javits | Percy |
| Byrd, W. Va. | Kennedy | Proxmire |
| Case | Magnuson | Randolph |
| Church | Mansfield | Ribicoff |
| Cooper | McGovern | Smith, Ill. |
| Cranston | Metcalf | Symington |
| Eagleton | Mondale | Tydings |
| Goodell | Moss | Williams, N.J. |
| Hart | Muskie | Yarborough |
| Hatfield | Nelson | Young, Ohio |

NAYS—48

| | | |
|-----------|---------------|----------------|
| Alken | Eastland | McIntyre |
| Allen | Ellender | Miller |
| Allott | Ervin | Pearson |
| Anderson | Fannin | Pell |
| Baker | Griffin | Prouty |
| Bellmon | Gurney | Schweiker |
| Bennett | Hansen | Scott |
| Bible | Holland | Smith, Maine |
| Boggs | Hollings | Sparkman |
| Brooke | Hruska | Spong |
| Byrd, Va. | Jackson | Stennis |
| Cook | Jordan, N.C. | Talmadge |
| Cotton | Jordan, Idaho | Thurmond |
| Curtis | Long | Tower |
| Dole | McClellan | Williams, Del. |
| Dominick | McGee | Young, N. Dak. |

NOT VOTING—19

| | | |
|-----------|----------|----------|
| Cannon | Harris | Murphy |
| Dodd | Hartke | Packwood |
| Fong | Inouye | Russell |
| Fulbright | Mathias | Saxbe |
| Goldwater | McCarthy | Stevens |
| Gore | Montoya | |
| Gravel | Mundt | |

So the Goodell-Nelson amendment (No. 863) was rejected.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Hackney, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the enrolled bill (H.R. 15351) to authorize additional funds for the operation of the

Franklin Delano Roosevelt Memorial Commission, and it was signed by the Acting President pro tempore.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to the consideration of amendment No. 860 which the clerk will state.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. The Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) proposes an amendment as follows:

AMENDMENT No. 860

On page 26, immediately after line 4, insert the following:

"(d) On and after the date of enactment of this Act, no chemical or biological warfare agent shall be disposed of within or outside the United States unless such agent has been detoxified or made harmless to man and his environment."

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is a time limitation of 1 hour on the amendment, 30 minutes to the side.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on my amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time on the amendment?

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we have quiet?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order.

The Senator from Illinois is recognized.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, on Sunday, August 16, 1970, two private tugboats under Navy contract towed the hulk of a World War II Liberty ship, the *Lebaron Russell Briggs*, out to sea from a North Carolina port. Destination for the tugs and the old Liberty ship was a point in the Atlantic Ocean, 282 miles east of Cape Kennedy.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the Senate is not in order. This is not a parliamentary body as it is now. Will the Chair protect Senators who wish to hear?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order. Senators will be seated.

Mr. PERCY. I thank the distinguished Senator.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois is recognized.

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, at that point the Liberty ship was to be scuttled in order to dispose of 12,540 concrete-encased nerve gas rockets she was carrying. Some of the rockets contained the powerful and long-lasting VX nerve gas, others the more soluble GB nerve gas. The rockets had been secured in concrete in 1967 and 1968, but now the concrete cases were deteriorating and the Army decided they better be dumped at sea.

The decision had caused a national protest. The Army was unable to convince the public that there were no dangers in transporting the concrete "coffins" by rail across the South or that the gas would not be released into the sea, endangering marine life.

The mayor of Macon, Ga., had vowed that the train would not go through his city. The Environmental Defense Fund and the Governor of Florida had gone to

the courts for a permanent injunction against the dumping at sea. The government of the Bahamas, only 165 miles to the southwest of the dumping site, had protested strongly.

In the end, the mayor of Macon relented, the legal action failed, and the government of the Bahamas fell silent again. The concrete "coffins" were loaded aboard trains and moved slowly through the South to an Army military ocean terminal on the appropriately named Cape Fear River at Sunny Point, N.C. There the old Liberty ship was loaded with its deadly cargo.

There has been much consternation because the dumping was allowed to take place despite widely expressed public objection. However, it seemed as though the Army had no alternative. The nerve gas rockets could not be removed from their concrete cases and detoxified. Dumping at sea was a safer solution than burying on land. Because of deterioration, no time could be lost in developing a new method to deal with them. To Secretary Laird the issue was clear. He said that it would never happen again.

The fact of the matter was this: the "live" nerve gas rockets should never have been put in concrete without being detoxified first. This is now agreed by all concerned, and the Army has abandoned that procedure. Chemical weapons are now detoxified, and biological weapons sterilized, in entirely different ways. Live chemical and biological weapons will no longer be transported for disposal.

The committee bill recognizes the problem by including disposal, for the first time, in the HEW safeguards program on chemical and biological weapons. Only transportation and testing had been covered in Public Law 91-121, which was approved on November 19, 1969.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that section 409(b) be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the section was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SECTION 409(b) None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or any other Act may be used for the transportation of any lethal chemical or any biological warfare agent to or from any military installation in the United States, or the open air testing of any such agent within the United States until the following procedures have been implemented:

(1) the Secretary of Defense (hereafter referred to in this section as the "Secretary") has determined that the transportation or testing proposed to be made is necessary in the interests of national security;

(2) the Secretary has brought particulars of the proposed transportation or testing to the attention of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, who in turn may direct the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service and other qualified persons to review such particulars with respect to any hazards to public health and safety which such transportation or testing may pose and to recommend what precautionary measures are necessary to protect the public health and safety;

(3) the Secretary has implemented any precautionary measures recommended in accordance with paragraph (2) above (including, where practicable, the detoxification of



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Senate

ASSESSMENT OF PRESENT SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, last December 15 President Nixon made a brief report to the Nation on the situation in Vietnam. He referred in that speech to what he termed a "firsthand, candid and completely independent" report on the situation in South Vietnam by Sir Robert Thompson, the celebrated British expert on guerrilla warfare and architect of the victory over Communist insurgents in Malaya.

Sir Robert, the President announced had been "cautiously optimistic" after a 5-week trip to South Vietnam, and had reported "a winning position has been achieved." The President told us that this favorable assessment was "in line" with other reports and his own thinking. However, he did not reveal Sir Robert's report beyond this brief characterization.

These Presidential remarks are particularly notable now, a year later, because Sir Robert Thompson has gone again to South Vietnam on an official mission for several weeks and again reported to the President. But his findings today have not been reported by the administration in any way to the American people, let alone in a Presidential address.

For, according to the New York Times, Sir Robert reported this time a disturbing failure to eliminate the Vietcong apparatus in South Vietnam. Such a failure undermines all other aspects of pacification and certainly belies continuing administration optimism about political realities in South Vietnam.

In a subsequent radio interview with NBC in London, Sir Robert faulted this press account as over-emphasizing "one detail" of his report, but he nonetheless publicly acknowledged that the threat of Vietcong subversion was not yet "sufficiently reduced."

We must ask, I think, what is "sufficient" after all these years, the billions of dollars, the tens of thousands of American lives.

I should add that these reports bear out an earlier account in the New York Times of October 19 that the Saigon regime was massively infiltrated by Communist agents.

That, of course, is what this war has always been about. Not arms caches in Cambodia, or bombing targets in the North, or strident speeches in Washington. But who is to rule South Vietnam. Who has the political stamina to survive the military stalemate.

That is the question our men have died for—and still die for.

The whole elaborate, much-celebrated structure of "Vietnamization" rests on the political balance. In plainest terms, so long as the Vietcong apparatus remains intact, and so long as the two sides refuse a negotiated settlement, the promise of an honorable peace in Vietnam is a cruel hoax.

The American people are entitled to know in full what Sir Robert Thompson has reported to the President from both his trips.

We are entitled to know the findings of the President's Vietnam Special Studies Group, which the President, in his report to Congress last February, characterized as the main forum for determining "the factual situation" in Vietnam.

A White House spokesman has refused to comment on the Thompson report, calling it a "classified matter." The most powerful rebuttal to that position was given by President Nixon himself in his foreign policy message of February 18. He wrote about informing the public on Vietnam:

We cannot try to fool the enemy, who know what is actually happening.

Nor must we fool ourselves. The American people must have the full truth. We cannot afford a loss of confidence in our judgment and in leadership.

This is indeed an issue of basic confidence. The administration must show it has not been misleading the American people in the continued spending of lives and money. It must show it is not the captive of the facile illusions that blinded its predecessor.

Most of all, Americans must know the truth about Vietnam to prepare us for whatever trials may lie ahead. For if Communist victories are to be the outcome, we face either the challenge of accepting reality or the madness of some attempt to reverse it. In any event, the sacrifice we have made obligates our Government to tell us the truth, the whole truth, and to tell us now.

All this relates, Mr. President, to yet another striking report, a column by Stewart Alsop in Newsweek of December 7. Mr. Alsop exposes the ominous deterioration of the morale and discipline of our army in Vietnam. There may be disagreement over the reasons for this unprecedented alienation of our men from their commanders. But it is clear that we cannot go on asking our soldiers to fight and die on false pretenses about what has truly been gained in Vietnam.

Mindful of these enormous stakes, I have written President Nixon to request that he make public the Thompson reports and other official assessments of the situation in South Vietnam.

I ask unanimous consent that the letter to the President and the relevant articles from the New York Times and Newsweek be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the items were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

DECEMBER 11, 1970.

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am very concerned over the series of reports about Sir Robert Thompson's recent trip on your behalf to South Vietnam. Certain press stories indicated that he returned with the judgment that efforts have still failed to eliminate the threat posed by the Vietcong apparatus throughout the country.

In a subsequent interview with NBC in London, Sir Robert did criticize these press accounts as having "picked on one detail" of his report. And he called the tenor of his latest findings "encouraging and even optimistic." Yet in that same interview he publicly acknowledged that the Vietcong apparatus was not yet "sufficiently reduced," and that Vietcong subversive strength within South Vietnam was a threat which could still "overturn" the Saigon regime.

All this comes in the wake of an equally disturbing press report in October that the CIA finds the Saigon government massively infiltrated with Communist agents.

These reports raise serious questions about the whole structure of pacification and Vietnamization policies. If the future withdrawal of U.S. forces are to depend upon the real stamina of the South Vietnamese regime, the continued strength of the Vietcong infrastructure—whatever the marginal damage it has suffered—certainly casts doubt on any

promise to bring all our men home in the near future, except through a genuine compromise settlement.

Moreover, so long as this potential for Communist victories in South Vietnam remains obscure to the American people, and so long as the Administration remains publicly committed to quite an opposite outcome, the stage could be set, as in the past, for some dramatic U.S. military action to try to retrieve the situation. I fear that would not only be futile, but also disastrous for the peace of our own society.

I therefore request you, Mr. President, to make public in full both the reports of Sir Robert Thompson and other official assessments of the situation in South Vietnam, including those of the Vietnam Special Studies Group, which you cited for searching and factual analysis in your Message to the Congress on Foreign Relations last February.

As you said in that Message with regard to informing the public on Vietnam:

"We cannot try to fool the enemy, who knows what is actually happening."

"Nor must we fool ourselves. The American people must have the full truth. We cannot afford a loss of confidence in our judgment and in our leadership."

Telling the plain truth about what lies ahead in Vietnam is surely the best insurance, Mr. President, against the divisiveness and recrimination we all want to avoid in trying to end this war.

Sincerely,

WALTER F. MONDALE.

[From the New York Times, Dec. 3, 1970]

EXPERT NOW GLOOMY IN REPORT TO NIXON
ON VIETCONG POWER
(By Tad Szulc)

WASHINGTON, Dec. 2.—Sir Robert Thompson, the British expert on guerrilla warfare, has told President Nixon that the United States and allied intelligence and police efforts have failed to destroy the Communist subversive apparatus in South Vietnam.

His report, submitted in writing to the President at an unpublished White House meeting on Oct. 13, appears to be in marked contrast with the relatively optimistic views on the security situation in South Vietnam that Sir Robert offered Mr. Nixon last December.

Sir Robert's findings—outlined to the New York Times today by Administration officials familiar with the report—were based on a new five-week secret mission he undertook in South Vietnam at President Nixon's request during September and October before coming to Washington to deliver his report.

The previous mission for Mr. Nixon, which also lasted five weeks, was completed last Dec. 3, when he met with the President.

In his policy speech on Vietnam on Dec. 15, Mr. Nixon told of the Thompson mission, described his findings as "cautiously optimistic," and quoted him as reporting that, "I was very impressed by the improvement in the military and political situation in Vietnam as compared with all previous visits and especially in the security situation, both in Saigon and the rural areas."

Sir Robert's recent mission, however, as well as the existence of his October report has been kept secret, reportedly because his new conclusions seem to question the validity of the pacification and Vietnamization programs, including Operation Phoenix which has been described as a code name for a secret Central Intelligence Agency operation that led to the alleged massacre at My Lai March 16, 1968.

On Oct. 14, the day after he conferred with President Nixon, Sir Robert discussed the Vietnam situation at a meeting of high level military officers and Defense Department and intelligence officials, paraphrasing in replies to questions the key points contained in his report to the President.

The main theme of Sir Robert's findings was that despite some successes in pacification, particularly in the performance by newly elected officials in South Vietnamese villages, there has been a general failure in police and intelligence efforts aimed at eliminating Vietcong apparatus in the country.

The Thompson report was said to have emphasized that success in other aspects of pacification cannot solve the basic political problem in Vietnam after the withdrawal of the bulk of American forces so long as the Vietcong apparatus remains virtually intact.

Despite continuing Administration optimism over pacification, as expressed in public statements, there are officials here with extensive experience in Vietnam who privately not only share Sir Robert's new conclusions but also argue that the South Vietnamese political and security situation is so fragile as to pose a critical threat to the Saigon Government even in the presence of "residual" American combat forces.

FOLLOWS EARLIER ASSESSMENT

Sir Robert's report followed an earlier assessment given to President Nixon by the Central Intelligence Agency that more than 30,000 Communist agents had been infiltrated into the Saigon Government, including the office of President Nguyen Van Thieu.

When The New York Times published on Oct. 19 an article based on the C.I.A. report, White House officials said that it exaggerated the extent of the infiltration and was "overly pessimistic." These comments were made, however, five days after the submission of the Thompson report declaring the allied antisubversive program to be "inadequate."

The responsibility for eradicating the underground Vietcong apparatus is vested in an agency known as Civil Operations and Rural Operations Support, or CORDS, an arm of the United States military command in Saigon. CORDS works in cooperation with the South Vietnamese military intelligence and national police.

The American agency's main antisubversive instrument is the highly controversial Operation Phoenix, composed of South Vietnamese police and military and intelligence agents, United States civilian and military personnel and operatives of the Central Intelligence Agency, who play a key role in the whole operation.

Sir Robert was said to have reported, however, that the three-year-old Operation Phoenix and related activities were not doing "their job" and had failed to break up the enemy's main effort in South Vietnam.

Other intelligence sources said that Operation Phoenix itself was infiltrated by Vietcong agents.

Officials familiar with Sir Robert's conclusions said that he was much less optimistic over the world wide aspects of the Vietnam situation than he was last year. Asked at the Pentagon meeting when the United States could leave Viet-tensified Communist shelling installations appeared to bear "not right away."

CIA SAYS ENEMY SPIES HOLD VITAL POSTS IN SAIGON

(By Neil Sheehan)

WASHINGTON, Oct. 18.—The Central Intelligence Agency has told President Nixon that the Vietnamese Communists have infiltrated more than 80,000 agents into the South Vietnamese Government in an apparatus that has been virtually impossible to destroy.

Because of this, the C.I.A. reported, as United States troop withdrawals proceed, a resurgence of Communist strength in South Vietnam can be expected.

The report to Mr. Nixon said that the secret Communist agents had included an aide to President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam, a former province chief and high officials of the police and of military intelligence.

CONFIRMATION BY OFFICIALS

While the study is not addressed specifically to the question of the President's war policy, officials of the United States Government who have read it say that it does raise questions about a key aspect of this policy—Vietnamization, or gradually giving the South Vietnamese the main burden of defending themselves against the Vietcong and North Vietnamese and thus allowing American troop withdrawals.

High White House officials confirmed the existence of the report. They contended, however, that it exaggerated the extent of infiltration and they rejected the analysis as inaccurate and "overly pessimistic."

They said that the President had read a summary of its contents and that he is understood to believe that the analysis is unwarranted because of the generally optimistic reports he has been receiving from other sources about the progress of pacification, the improved military performance of the South Vietnamese and the effects of the Cambodian incursion.

NO IMPLICATION OF FALL

The Central Intelligence Agency's analysis does not assert or imply that the South Vietnamese Government is likely to fall in the next few months, the officials who have read it said. Nor does the study discount the likelihood that the South Vietnamese Army will perform well in battle for some time to come, as occurred in Cambodia.

What the study does imply, the officials said, is that the South Vietnamese Government has little chance of enduring over the long run because of the great extent of Communist penetration.

In terms of troop withdrawals the President has so far committed himself only to reducing American men in South Vietnam to 284,000 by next May. He has indicated, however, that he hopes to make further withdrawals as his Vietnamization program continues. The President has also repeatedly stated, as did high White House officials in commenting on the C.I.A. analysis, that the Vietnamization program is going well.

Details of the top-secret study were made available to The New York Times by the Government officials who read it. The study was made last May, the officials said, and has been circulated in the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department. Information received since May—especially after the two-month attack on Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia that ended June 30—has continued to confirm the C.I.A.'s findings, the officials said.

The study was apparently based on new information about the nature and size of the Communist spy organization in South Vietnam as well as on a fresh analysis of captured documents and interrogations of prisoners and defectors during the last two to three years.

In its analysis, the Central Intelligence Agency says that early last year after a number of setbacks on the battlefield, the Communists decided to shift their long-range strategy from intense military activity to political erosion, against the day when American troop strength would no longer be a serious threat because of withdrawals.

The enemy is confident that this strategy will succeed, the analysis pointed out. It offered no contradiction.

To carry out the new strategy, the report asserts, the Communists stepped up their infiltration of secret agents into various branches of the South Vietnamese Government.

MOST NATIVES OF SOUTH

The study estimates that the enemy has infiltrated more than 30,000 agents—most of them natives of the southern part of divided Vietnam—into the armed forces, the police force and the South Vietnamese intelligence organizations charged with eradicating the Vietcong guerrillas and their North Vietnamese allies. (High White House officials said that the study gave a total of about 20,000 agents, but the officials who had read it said they were certain the figure was 30,000.)

The number of such agents is said to be growing, with a goal of 50,000. If this goal is reached, the spy organization would be 5 per cent of the South Vietnamese military and police forces. The C.I.A. study doubts, however, that the Communists achieved their goal by the end of 1969, the target date.

While the enemy operatives range from very effective to very poor, the study says, the network derives its power from the fact that the United States and the South Vietnamese Government have nothing remotely comparable.

The study describes the workings of three Communist political-action and intelligence organizations, one of which has proven so impervious to Government countermeasures that none of its important agents have been arrested. The C.I.A. refers to the relatively few arrests to tell how Communist agents have reached into army headquarters, into President Thieu's office and even into the negotiating team at the Paris peace talks.

APATHY A POSSIBLE REASON

In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency reports the failure of hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese policemen and soldiers to report contacts by Vietcong agents. The report adds that the enemy network could not exist without the tacit complicity—whether from fear, sympathy or apathy—of the majority of South Vietnamese soldiers and policemen.

The C.I.A. cited such feelings as evidence that the Saigon Government could not command the deep loyalty of the men on whom it depends to defend itself.

Although the South Vietnamese Government is infiltrated from bottom to top, the study says, the United States and Saigon have had little success not only in penetrating the Communist organization but also in keeping agents alive in areas the Communists control.

The study offers the following assessment of the advantages of the enemy's virtual monopoly on subversion:

There is a permanent imbalance in tactical military intelligence. The enemy is usually forewarned of allied moves and the United States and South Vietnam are usually ignorant of Communist ones.

Because most Government-held areas are nominally, rather than firmly, controlled, the enemy is able to recruit selectively and to decide freely who should be assassinated for maximum political effect.

The enemy has excellent security and can thwart Government efforts to infiltrate its organization and territory. Government agents are exposed in advance and programs such as Phoenix—an effort begun in 1967 to uncover and destroy the Vietcong apparatus in the countryside—are undermined. Officials noted that the study provided the most plausible explanation yet for the continuing failure of Phoenix, a program considered vital to Vietnamization.

Penetration of non-Communist political parties and religious groups allows the Communists to take advantage of, and worsen, the chronic political weakness of the South Vietnamese Government.

The Communists can survive despite great allied military pressure. Thus, as American troop withdrawals proceed, a resurgence of Communist strength can be expected. In cutting toward its goal of 284,000 men, the United States expects to have 344,000 soldiers in Vietnam by the end of 1970—a reduction of 205,000 in two years.

Discussing the make-up of the enemy apparatus, the C.I.A. report says that the three Communist organizations that control the estimated total of 30,000 agents receive their orders from Hanoi, through the Central Office for South Vietnam, the Communist command for the South. The destruction of its headquarters was a goal of the American drive into Cambodia, but it is still operating in the jungles.

According to the C.I.A., the full-time operatives are to be distinguished from the many more tens of thousands of part-time agents and Vietcong sympathizers in South Vietnam.

The largest segment of about 20,000 full-time operatives is run by the Military Propagating Section, whose primary aim is to undermine the morale and effectiveness of the South Vietnamese armed forces and police, according to the study.

Many of these operatives are South Vietnamese officers and noncommissioned officers. They try to recruit other soldiers to the Communist cause, foment dissent within units, perform covert assassinations, encourage desertions and defections and arrange accommodations in which Government military units, to avoid casualties, tacitly agree not to attack Communist forces. Such accommodations are a widespread practice that American military advisers have not been able to end.

NETWORK OF COURTIERS

This group of 20,000 agents is supported by a large network of couriers and keepers of safe-houses, where agents can take refuge. Most keepers of these refuges are the wives or relatives of South Vietnamese soldiers and policemen, the study continues.

A second group—about 7,000 agents—is run by the Vietcong Military Intelligence Section, the study says. These agents are said to be spotted throughout all levels of the police, armed forces and civilian administration, principally for espionage. The study notes that the mission of some of the high-level agents is to try to manipulate Government policy. The Military Intelligence Section also intercepts South Vietnamese Army and police radio communications.

South Vietnamese counterintelligence has had its greatest success against these military intelligence agents, but the study cautions that the success has been a limited one. A widely publicized roundup last year probably apprehended less than half of the high-level agents working solely in the Saigon area, the study says.

The third and possibly most dangerous network of agents reported by the Central Intelligence Agency is an estimated total of 3,000 members of the Vietcong security service who permeate the South Vietnamese police intelligence service, the army intelligence and military security service, and the Central Intelligence Office, the South Vietnamese counterpart of the C.I.A. Other agents from the secret service are reported to be active throughout the non-Communist political parties and religious groups.

The Vietcong security service is reportedly a type of political and secret police with the main mission of combating infiltration or disloyalty in the Communist party, the armed forces and the population in Communist-dominated regions in the South.

The service also reportedly operates large networks of civilian informants in Government areas, draws up blacklists in the event a Communist-influenced government takes power in South Vietnam, and selects and kills those people on the blacklists whose deaths might have an immediate psychological and political impact.

The chief mission of its 3,000 agents in the South Vietnamese structure is to keep the Communists informed of how much the Government knows about them and to block any penetration by Government.

The Vietcong security service is so efficient that none of its important agents have been apprehended, the study says.

The analysis makes the point that although sufficient data are available to estimate the

size of the clandestine apparatus and how it works, both the United States and the South Vietnamese Government have not been able to obtain the kind of precise information needed to identify and arrest thousands of individual agents and destroy the network.

The South Vietnamese Government has been making greater efforts in recent months to apprehend agents, the officials who read the report said, but has not achieved meaningful progress because the penetration by the enemy is already so great.

To illustrate the omniscience of the subversive apparatus, the study gives some examples from among the relatively small number of agents who have been apprehended.

One was Huynh Van Trong, President Thieu's special assistant for political affairs. As such he was privy to the innermost workings of the South Vietnamese Government as well as to secret communications between Mr. Thieu and President Nixon. He had also participated in the Paris peace talks and had been sent on a sensitive political mission to the United States.

Another agent was a National Assembly deputy and two more were army majors who had served in the section of the police force whose mission is to prevent Communist infiltration. A fourth agent was the former assistant chief of the counterintelligence branch of the army security service. One agent was the chief medical officer of the national police, another was a former province chief and another was the former deputy police chief of Hue, the old imperial capital. The chief of the principal army communications center in Dalat was also reportedly discovered to be acting for the Vietcong.

Some agents at the bottom have turned up in deceptively useful posts. One was the chauffeur for the commanding general of the army corps that encompasses the northernmost provinces of the country. A second agent was the main servant in another general's house.

In tracing the enemy's decision to shift to a strategy emphasizing political erosion, the study said that it had been made by the North Vietnamese Politburo. In addition to ordering a reduction in fighting, the Politburo called for a cut in infiltration from North Vietnam, the Central Intelligence Agency said. Infiltration declined from about 250,000 men in 1968 to approximately 120,000 in 1969, with the rate this year reportedly running down half the 1969 total.

AMNESTY PROGRAM USED

The Communists also shifted thousands of trained personnel from their military forces into the three political bureaucracies that penetrate the South Vietnamese Government and sent large numbers of political leaders into government territory, the study says.

These new agents enter the South Vietnamese structure by several routes, one of the most common of which is the Government's Amnesty program for Communist defectors. Some Communist documents refer to the infiltration process as "the transformation of party cadres into innocent people."

There is evidence that at least several thousand false defectors entered through more than half the provinces of South Vietnam in 1969, the study says. Officials said they could not estimate what percentage of the 47,203 Vietcong defectors reported by the Saigon Government last year were actually Vietcong agents.

The study asserts that large numbers of what the Communists call "legalized cadres" are now quietly living and working in supposedly pacified districts. A legalized cadre is an agent who has acquired legitimate status in South Vietnamese society.

As an example of such cover activities, all members of a village council in an ostensibly pacified district recently were discovered to be Vietcong agents.

Although the study does not do so directly, it raises questions about the optimistic reports on pacification that Mr. Nixon has been receiving. Its implication, some officials who have read it said, is that the Communists have decided—to some extent at least—not to oppose allied pacification efforts frontally but to concentrate on infiltrating the pacifiers.

Concluding by discussing the lack of meaningful political commitment to the Saigon Government by the majority of South Vietnamese soldiers, the study remarks that during an 18-month period only 348 soldiers reported that they had been approached by the Vietcong. During this time, the Central Intelligence Agency says, it is known that the Vietcong made hundreds of thousands of approaches to military personnel.

COMMENT BY OFFICIALS

When first asked about the study yesterday, the White House declined to acknowledge its existence. Today high White House officials did so but contended that the study had been "essentially a one-man product," that it did "not represent the formal position of the C.I.A." and that it had not involved a combined analytical effort by all American intelligence services.

Under questioning, they explained that what they meant was that the analysis had been done "on a narrow basis" in the Central Intelligence Agency, but with raw material furnished by all the intelligence agencies. They also said that the analysis had been coordinated within the C.I.A., then with the rest of the intelligence agencies "on a limited basis" and lastly distributed under a Central Intelligence Agency stamp as an institutional report.

A spokesman for the agency had no comment on the study.

VIETNAM: OUT PASTER

(By Stewart Alsop)

WASHINGTON.—Obedient to his Pavlovian impulses, Senator Fulbright charged last week that the air raids on North Vietnam and the prisoner-rescue operation signaled "an expansion of the war." The chances are that the precise opposite is true. For there is a growing feeling among the Administration's policymakers that it might be a good idea to accelerate the rate of withdrawal from Vietnam very sharply.

There are two good reasons why this would be a good idea. One is that discipline and morale in the American Army in Vietnam are deteriorating very seriously. The other is that the Army has accomplished the basic mission for which it was sent to Vietnam.

As to the first point, an item of evidence is the addition to the verb "to frag" to the enlisted man's vocabulary in Vietnam. The word means to use a fragmentation grenade to cool the ardor of any officer or NCO too eager to make contact with the enemy. No doubt the number of men who have been fragged is small, but the word itself tells the story.

Much other evidence tells the same story. Like the recent article in Life about an infantry company whose West Point commander had to plead with his men to go on patrol—when a commander has to plead with his men, instead of ordering them, his outfit has gone plumb to hell. That the whole Army in Vietnam is in danger of going plumb to hell is further attested by a small flood of letters from Vietnam stimulated by a couple of recent pieces in this space.

VOID CONTACT

A sergeant, for example, writes that "leaders of small combat units like myself" are under fierce pressure from their men to do everything possible to "avoid contact with the enemy." Other letters bear witness to the bitterness of the combat soldiers who feel—with reason—that the system discriminates against them. "I am a combat infantryman, a draftee, a loser," one man wrote. "The few times we go to the rear we are treated like scum by the clerks and jerks . . . I would rather shoot my commanding officer than the enemy."

There are certain obvious reasons for the deterioration of discipline and morale. A retreat is the most difficult of military movements, partly because no one wants to be the last man killed in a war. "No one wants to be a casualty for no reason at all," writes an enlisted man, "especially when the decision to terminate the fighting over here has already been taken."

Any army, moreover, reflects the home front, and the home front has lost stomach for the war. The war was hardly mentioned in the recent campaign, and no brass bands greet the returning veteran. The Army re-

fects the home front in another way too. Recent witnesses before a House committee testified that between 60 per cent and 80 per cent of the enlisted men have tried the powerful Vietnam marijuana. The drug culture, in other words, has invaded the Army. A pot-smoking army can hardly be expected to be a first-class fighting force.

DREAFFUL SYSTEM

There is also a less obvious reason for the deterioration—the Army's dreadful system of recruitment. Under the system, the Army entices men to enlist by promising them, almost in so many words, that they will not have to fight in Vietnam. A man who enlists before he is drafted is permitted to choose his own "MOS" or military occupational specialty. Not surprisingly, only 2.5 per cent choose the infantry.

This dreadful system has now caught up with the Army in Vietnam. The combat forces in Vietnam three or four years ago were highly professional, and very impressive. Now, as a result of the system, the combat forces are manned by bitter draftees. Almost nine out of ten (88 per cent) of the infantry riflemen are draftees.

The result is inevitable—the draftees get killed in disproportionate numbers. They make up less than a third of the men in Vietnam. But according to a study by Andrew Glass for the National Journal, confirmed by the Pentagon manpower experts as accurate, they get killed at nearly double the rate of the non-draftee enlisted men.

Is it any wonder that the draftees are bitter? Is it, in fact, any wonder that they do as little fighting as possible? And is it any wonder that those who know the score are beginning to think about pulling this non-fighting army out of Vietnam in a hurry?

Present plans call for withdrawing to the level of about 280,000 men by May, with gradual withdrawals thereafter to around 50,000 men in the fall of 1972. This "residual force" will be manned wholly by non-draftees. Its job will be to ensure continued air and firepower superiority to the South Vietnamese, thus protecting to the extent possible the huge American investment of blood and treasure in Vietnam.

This rate of withdrawal could certainly be accelerated. According to those who should know, the draw-down to the residual-force level could be completed, in an orderly fashion, by the fall of next year, perhaps by late summer. The chief argument against such an acceleration is that it would undercut our bargaining power in Paris. But surely it ought to be obvious by this time that the Communist side has not—and never has had—the slightest intention of negotiating a compromise settlement our side could conceivably accept.

There are risks, of course, in an accelerated withdrawal, but the greatest risk of all is inherent in the constant deterioration of discipline and morale in our Army in Vietnam. There is also another reason why the withdrawal could and should be accelerated.

OBJECT ACHIEVED

The object of our long agency in Vietnam has been to prevent the Communists from seizing power by force in South Vietnam. No one can predict what might happen five or ten years from now. But for the immediately foreseeable future, according to sensible men who know what they are talking about, that object has been achieved.

The Communists can still make a lot of trouble, of course. But even after an accelerated withdrawal, they simply do not have the forces or the political support to make good on their promise to rename Saigon Ho Chi Minh City—not unless we Americans are asinine enough to throw away our whole huge investment in Vietnam by withdrawing, in a fit of pique, all our support for the people who have fought on our side.

Back in 1966, Sen. George Aiken proposed that we make a "unilateral declaration of military victory," and withdraw our forces from Vietnam. In the sense that the basic American objective in Vietnam has now been achieved, that "victory" has at last been won. So it is time to take those bitter draftees in our crumbling Army out of Vietnam—and the sooner the better.



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