advise a President and, in practice for the first time I think in American history, I had that access.

As a matter of fact, when we first began, the President said, "You're invited to every meeting that I'm scheduled," and I could pick and choose, and did throughout those four years, all meetings at any time.

When Walter Heller came to town to shape our economic policies that worked so well, I was in there with Walter as he was explaining why high inflation was good for us and so on.

We had an institution which was called the weekly luncheon where once a week we would have a private luncheon to discuss any matters that he wished to discuss or I wished to discuss. What we said or discussed was confidential and will remain so, but what I was trying to achieve is not.

Sometimes he said the Presidency -the President is a lonely man and the Presidency
is a lonely job. In one sense, that's true, but
in terms of pressure, in terms of the paper that
comes into that job, in terms of the number of
groups that come in to see him, Congress and from
all sources of the country, it is the lease lonely
job imaginable. What the President needs is

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not more and more information -- although, that is often helpful -- he needs a few people who can help him appraise him and evaluate him.

He needs people that he can sit down and discuss problems with, confidentially, and get the help he needs in finally deciding what he wishes to do.

He needs to hear voices that speak, not only special interest groups or a particular parochial interest, but from a national perspective.

He has no limit to the number of people who want to talk to him, but that does not assure him of the confidentiality he needs to speak freely.

He also has no limits to the number of people who censor themselves even within an earshot, even though what a President needs is blunt and direct and often critical advice, and that's a phenomenon I'll never understand.

I've known some friends of mine that would come into my office in the White House and say, "I'm going to go in and see the President for a few minutes and I'm going to tell that man -- I'm going to tell him bluntly the mistakes he's making and he's going to get it raw from me."

I said, "That's wonderful, let's go in, he needs the advice."

And you get into the Oval Office and he'll say, "Hello, Mr. President, how is Rosalynn and Amy? You're doing a wonderful job." Hawks would become Doves, Conservatives would become Liberals. I didn't recognize half of my friends when they got in there. There's a cleansing process that is unbelievable and that does not help a President.

President is to let him know exactly what you think, speak to him directly and as candidly as possible.

And I found that a Vice President is uniquely suited to meeting these needs. When a Vice President advises the President, he does not have to speak for any department goal or constituency or any cause. He can be a source of independent judgment. He does not need to censor himself.

He can speak frankly and he can sit down and discuss a matter with the President in a way in which the President wishes to do so, and that's what we did throughout these last four years on virtually every important matter.

Although I have not agreed with

every decision the President made, not once in four years was I surprised by what the Administration did, for I took part in everyone of his major decisions.

President's agenda. That may seem like a small matter, but there are dreadful limits to a President's time, to a budget, to the Congress' ability to deal with matters, to the number of foreign governments that he can deal with personally, interest groups and the rest. There is a limited ability that the President can have, any President, to sort through these demands; a limit to the government's and the bureaucracy's ability to focus on them, and a limit to the public's ability to

Major ideas take time to gather
momentum in a democracy. One of the first things
you learn in the White House is how both impressive
and strong the Presidency is on the one hand and
yet how incredibly weak it is if the American
people do not accept and support and understand
what it is the President wishes to do, and the only
way that a President can lead is with a set of
priorities that are coherent and understandable

wade through them.

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and consistent and which the institutions and the American people can follow. Without that, inertia always wins. Our system is built up in a way to check and to balance and slow down and deter, unless the American people have decided the mood, and thus the agenda and priority setting is crucial, and I helped work with the President on that goal.

Throughout our term I worked with the Congress to achieve our legislative goals, and in the process I really learned the meaning of the separation of powers, those words I learned at the law school.

When I was a Senator I used to look
down Pennsylvania Avenue and say, "How is it that
all the power is found in the White House?" and
then I sat in the White House and I looked down
in the other direction toward the Capitol and say,
"How is it that all of the power is in the Congress?"

between co-equal branches of government and the

Executive and Legislative relations is absolutely
crucial to any effective governmental policy; and
this need that the President has for help in
legislative assistance I think is much greater now

than it has been for several years, for two
reasons. And it has changed a great deal since
I first went to the Senate. The power is more
widely dispersed today in the Congress than it
used to be. Individual members are much more
independent from central Congressional leadership
than in the past, and thus tend to be more
responsive to a local constituent's response, a
constituent's demands than to a general national
direction.

Secondly, without any doubt, the President's influence in Congress has declined. This, I hope, can be a topic of another discussion, but for some 15 years now Presidential leadership has been ravaged by the public reaction to Vietnam, by the appalling information that came out in what we call Watergate, but the abuses of intelligence agencies some years ago, and the reaction has been not to try to just correct those problems, but in many ways to impede and undermine the authority of a President that this nation needs to deal effectively with our problems at home and abroad.

And that reduction in Presidential influence is found most clearly in the questioning

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that the Congress always raises against the President, the President, any President, who will need help in Congressional relations.

In the last four years the measures we tried to pass were not simple. They were some of the most complex and controversial in American history. Whether it was the Comprehensive Energy Program or the national gas pricing and distribution conflict that had been deadlocked for some 30 years, arms control measures and the rest.

One of the classic examples was the Panama Canal Treaties, a very complex measure. we proposed the Panama Canal Treaties, the first poll that came out said that 80 percent of the American people supported us. Our opponents raised questions about security and foreign policy, and the benefits of the Panama Treaties were very intangible, measured mostly in terms of the grief that we had avoided, and yet they were absolutely crucial.

As a matter of fact, some four or five Presidents of both political parties for 15 years had tried and failed to pass Panama Canal Treaty legislation. In the end we passed it by a narrow vote in the House and by a single vote in the

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United States Senate, and I involved myself every step of the way meeting with Senators and with members of the Congress coordinating the work of our legislative staff, mapping our strategies with leaders and presiding over the Senate during the crucial moments of our deliberations.

There is one unique aspect of the institution of the Vice Presidency that is often overlooked, and that is he is the only officer of the Federal Government to belong to two branches of government, the only officer who breaches the separation of power, being a member of both the Legislative and the Executive branches of government.

That helped me because I knew the Senate. I knew its rules and its methods, its moods and most of its members and was able to help adopt and ratify those treaties.

With the President's encouragement, I also acted as one of the President's principal spokesmen, here and abroad. A President's public education resposibility may be the most important responsibility he has and, when properly conducted, the most significant power that a President possesses.

Teddy Roosevelt called it "Occupying the Bully Pulpit." It goes to the very heart of

his capacity to lead and to gain the trust and support that he must have, and any President needs all the help he can get.

I worked to extend the President's reach to the public. I estimated that I have traveled nearly 600,000 miles during the four years in my Presidency. I visited nearly every state; visited editorial boards, had interviews, everything I could do to support our policies.

I would talk often on specific issues like the Salt II Accord that we had to pull down because of the invasion of Afghanistan; would go on the road for a week, sometimes longer, and go to foreign policy rooms and the rest to argue the case for something that was essential.

Secondly, a President needs political support, and all during these four years I campaigned for members of the Congress and Senate and others all over this nation.

In 1980 I campaigned in the greatest number of primaries and caucuses our party has ever held. If you can believe it, I even ended up in a town that not even Hubert Humphrey had ever been in, and I'll never forget ending up in the famous town of Mingo Junction, Ohio. I'm

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sure most of you have been there, and the mayor got up and said, "We're very pleased to have the Vice President here with us today. We haven't had an important person here" -- and there was a long pause -- "as a matter of fact, we have never had an important person here before." We lost Mingo Junction.

I talked with civic and political leaders around the nation and thousands and thousands of Americans, and this, too, I hope will be another topic of discussion sometime, and that is that campaigns I think are thought by most Americans to be a time when a politician tells the American people what he intends to do and thinks.

The only campaigns that are worth anything are those in which the politician listens carefully and tries to learn and respond to the needs of the people of this country, and it was in the process of that kind of political support for the President that I was able to gain information, suggestions, advice and insight which I would bring to the President whenever I returned from those trips.

Of all of the areas in which I served, one of the most important to me was in the field

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of intelligence, national security and foreign policy. The President agreed that, in addition to my domestic role, I would be helpful in these areas. I had several diplomatic missions abroad, starting with two days after the inaugural when I visited the heads of the government of the United Kingdom, Belgium, including NATO, Common Market Headquarters, Germany, France, Italy and Japan, and in preparing for this speech I listed the number of countries that I have visited with diplomatic missions in the last four years, a sum of 26 nations covering virtually every part of the world.

I spoke to the United Nations

Conference on Indochinese Refugees as well in

Geneva and the Conference on Disarmament at the

General Assembly in New York. I received literally
hundreds of foreign leaders over the past four years
from all over the world in the office in the

White House.

I worked closely with the President's personnel, security officials throughout the government. I was a member of a small group which met weekly, the so-called Friday Morning Foreign Policy Breakfast, which became a little noted but extremely important regular meeting with the

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President at which most of the crucial foreign policy decisions were made.

In addition, I spent hundreds of hours over the last years in informal meetings, phone conversations and the rest, with the range of officers who make and implement foreign policy.

These experiences were very, very helpful to me in permitting me to serve the President and for several different reasons.

First, I was privy to all the information bearing on the decisions that had to be made.

Secondly, because the public perception of the role the President permitted me to play, I was able to bring about decisions within our own government bearing upon relations with other nations.

You might say, "Well, what's so impressive about getting your own government to decide anything?" If any of you join government, you will find it is the toughest job of all and to pull different agencies together, to get differing points of view resolved, to get decisions made, to move on, is often the most difficult of all tasks, and particularly when the issues are tough.

Let me give you one example. In the

summer of '79 you all recall the world viewed one of the most tragic human situations that has been seen in recent history. Thousands and thousands of Indochinese were expelled cruelly and barbarically out to sea in unsafe boats, overcrowded, inadequate food, and we estimated at one time nearly one-half of them lost their lives before they could reach any other destination.

These refugees were subjected to piracy, which I thought was a thing of the past, but which wasn't. They were literally overwhelming nations as well, Thailand, Malaysia, moving into the Philippines, down through Indonesia, all the way into Australia and even some to New Zealand; an absolutely tragic, overwhelming crises for the civilized world.

We had coming up a U.N. Conference on Refugees in Geneva. It was not at all clear that the conference was going to do anything but talk. The Vietnamese had built a backfire against the success of the conference and the hope for a successful conference depended on our own government doing certain things that could enhance our leadership and, because of that, permit us to lead at that conference.

I was asked by the President to go
to Geneva to represent us there, and in the process
I discovered there were several crucial decisions
that we had to make in terms of funding, in terms of
constructing facilities, in terms of coordinating
our program with other countries, and, in my
opinion, in terms of taking the Seventh Fleet and
actually ordering them to go out and pick up these
people from the ocean before they drowned.

We were able to get our government to make those decisions. We went to Geneva and, because of those decisions, were able to get the international community to move effectively, quickly, to put unbearable pressure on the Vietnamese to stop them and now, as you know, there has been a dramatic change and cessation of that problem.

There have been many, many other examples. When I visited China on behalf of the President a year and a half ago, we had normalized relations but was basically a non-relationship because we had not done those specific -- taking those specific steps in economics and trade and security and so on which should characterize the mature relationships between the United States and other major powers.

We were able to make those decisions before we went to China, and I think, not bragging, to say that as a result of that mission the relationships between the United States and the People's Republic of China was enormously enhanced and we're on a fine and solid basis today.

The same is true of a mission that we took to Nigeria where we had several outstanding, unresolved, long-delayed issues between our two nations that advocated the relations between the United States and that great country, the richest and most powerful Black nation on earth.

We were able to resolve those differences and we entered into a range of agreements that are fundamental in nature.

I hope to point out these things because

I hope that future Vice Presidents will be assigned

this essential role. There are so many things

that deserve and expect high level, policy sensitive

attention of a personal nature.

A President simply doesn't have the time to do as much as the situation warrants and, if he tried, he could do nothing else. And this is one role particularly where a Vice President could be of enormous help.

The appendix is part of the body
which once served as a useful function but
atrophied because of the passage of time the need
for it disappeared. What I have been trying to
stress this afternoon is that the Vice Presidency
is virtually the mere image, the opposite and
converse of the appendix.

Evolution, the growth and ferment of American political institution has transformed the Vice Presidency from a vestigial role to a viable and vital one.

For generations the Presidency's unique qualities have all been dormant. The changes over the Presidency meant that those policies for the first time are being invigorated.

Over the years the more intimidating the President's powers became the less likely he grew to hear frank talk, and that is what the confidentiality of the Vice President's unique relationship can provide. The more the nation demanded a President personally to do, the less time he had to sort through and order those priorities, and that's what a Vice President's special freedom from line responsibility can help him accomplish.

The more bureaucratic and street-wise the President's own Executive branch became, the less able he was to coax decisions from it. And that is what the President's inherent distance from inner bureaural allegiance can help him attempt.

The more complex the Congress became, the less sure the President grew that his legislative program would be acted on and that is where the Vice President's constitutional double identity can be mobilized.

The more dense and intricate the issues facing Americans became, the less easy it was for the President alone to educate and lead the nation, and that is where the Vice President's electoral mandate from all the people can be put to use. The more complex and diverse our political life became, the less possible it was for the President to sense the texture that mayors and governors feel and listen to the music that members of Congress hear in their district, and that is what a Vice President's experience can help the President learn.

The more the American Presidency was drawn into the life and course of other nations, the less time there was to devote his calendar and

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presence to each reason; and that is where the

Vice President's unparalleled ability to be deputized

for foreign missions can extend his reach.

I began this lecture talking about my advice to President Carter. In a sense, the whole matter came full circle. This fall, when I met with Vice President-elect Bush and told him what I thought he should do as Vice President, I said to him then and I thought there was something in the relationship between President Carter and I that was more than personal; and, though in the end everything depended on the relationship of confidence and trust, I believed there was institutionally less to be learned about what we had done and I offered some of those lessons to Mr. Bush in the form of advice, and I must say the first few weeks of this Administration I believe Mr. Bush and President Reagan are showing every sign of understanding the potential of the Vice President's office and I commend them both.

The advice I gave to Mr. Bush is what
I would give to any future Vice Presidents. One:
Advise the President confidentially. The only
reasons to state publicly what you have told the
President is to take credit for his success and try

1 to escape blame for failure. Two: Either way there is no quicker 2 way to undermine your relationship with the President 3 and lose your effectiveness. A President should 4 and won't tolerate it. 5 Secondly, don't wear a President down. 6 He should be bright enough to catch your meaning 7 the first time. Give your advice once and give 8 it well. You have a right to be heard, not obeyed. 9 A President must decide when the debates must end, 10 this nation must move on, and you must be a part - 11 of that decision-making process. 12 Third, as a spokesman for the 13 Administration, stay on the facts. 14 A President does not want and the public does not respect a 15 Vice President who does nothing but deliver fullsome 16 praise of a President. He should want and the 17 people respect sound factual reasoned arguments 18 on his behalf. 19 This office that I have held is 20 important enough not to be demeaned by its occupant 21 delivering obsequious flattery. 22 Fourth, understand your role as a 23 spokesman, it's important, but always understand 24 that you probably can't support every idea that comes

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out of an Administration. A wise President who values his Vice President will not make the mistake of forcing the Vice President to speak for something with which he fundamentally disagrees.

Fifth, avoid line authority assignments.

If such an assignment is important, it will then

cut across the responsibilities of one or two

cabinet officers or others and embroil you in a

bureaucratic fight that would be disastrous.

If it is meaningless or trivial, it will undermine

your reputation and squander your time as most

Vice Presidents have found.

I can give several examples of duties that were offered that I turned down. One day the President announced that I was in charge of Africa. I declined. There were sighs of relief all through Africa and it wouldn't work, in my opinion, because, first of all, the personnel, the skills, the experience required to handle that were clearly beyond anything that a Vice President could assemble or would want to assemble.

Secondly, the skills in the State
Department and elsewhere are superb and there is
absolutely no reason why a Vice President could
not work cooperatively with the existing agencies

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where he can be helpful in achieving these results and that's what we did.

Secondly, one day it was suggested that I was going to be the Chief of Staff of the White House. I turned it down on the spot. If I had taken on that assignment, it would have consumed vast amounts of my time with staff work and distracted me from important work.

Sixth, the Vice President should remember the importance of personal compatibility. He should try to complement the President's skills; and, finally, and perhaps in a real sense the most important of all roles, be ready to assume the Presidency. We all know the story of President Truman succeeding on Roosevelt's death with no knowledge of the Manhattan Project, which for a long time had been under way.

President Carter did not want me to need three or four months of on-the-job training in the Presidency, if the need arose. As he said so often, he wanted me to be ready the same moment the nation would need me to be ready.

Political sciencists have studied the Vice Presidency and have suggested a number of ways of changing it. Some propose that a

Presidential candidate be required to name his running mate before he enters the first primary.

Others say he should leave substantial time open at the convention and the delegates themselves independently nominate the Vice President. It's been suggested that the Vice President be given statutory or constitutional additional authority, from running the White House Budget Office, cabinet agency, and even this last year's suggestion of some kind of co-Presidency.

Others have suggested that the office be eliminated entirely. I don't want to dwell on these specific suggestions, but let me make just two points in closing.

First, I believe that any change in
the Presidency which would weaken, diminish, delude
or divide the Presidency is a grave, grave mistake.
To say that the increased problems the President
faces requires a new mandate division of labor in
the White House, in my opinion, gets the wrong
way around. The more a President must do, the
stronger his office must be. There can be no
doubt of who is boss and who is running the Executive
branch of the government, and the purpose of a
Vice President is to add to his strength, not to

sap it.

Secondly, I don't believe statutory or constituional changes are the appropriate way to keep the institution of the Vice Presidency from returning to its centuries of hibernation.

Instead, I think it's about the -- I think it's the force of evolution, the marvelous, resilient, adaptive energy of our free political system that is the more appropriate engine of change. There is much in our modern government that's not part of our original Constitution. The political parties, the primary process, judicial determination, even the Presidential news conference, all of these have evolved along with the nation.

And so have the enormous range of responsibilities that fall on a President's shoulders. In our century, as the President's powers have grown, so has his responsibility for the prosperity of our economy, stature of our country overseas, the health of the democracy abroad, peace to the world.

In recent years the American President found himself in the focus of rising expectation, the target of unmounting demands.

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John Steinbeck put it this way: "We

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give the Presidents more work than a man can do, more responsibility than a man should take, more pressure than a man can bear. We abuse him often and rarely praise him. We wear him out, use him up, eat him up, and with all this Americans have a love for the President that goes beyond loyalty or party or nationality. He is ours and we exercise the right to destroy him."

Just as the demands in the Presidents have risen, so the President and I thought could the office of Vice President be used to help the medium and in making this role we established a new tradition. I hope and I believe that we have broken new and significant institutional ground that has and will serve our nation well.

Now, you may be wondering, now that I have sketched all the ground that has been broken, the duties that I have performed and the success that we have achieved, how is it then that we lost the election? I have the answer but I am out of time.

(Applause.)

## REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 35 pages of typewritten material constitutes a complete and true transcript of the proceedings held at the place and at the time and date noted.

Leonard G. Jenks Court Reporter.

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