VICE PRESIDENT WALTER F. MONDALE LECTURE FEBRUARY 17, 1981

PRESIDENT McGrath; Ambassador Cleveland; Dean Stein; Touth
TRUSTEES, FACULTY, ALUMNI, STUDENTS, AND FRIENDS.

I AM HONORED TO SPEAK TO YOU TODAY. I WANT FIRST

OF ALL TO THANK THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, AND MACALESTER

COLLEGE, AND THE COLLEGE OF ST. THOMAS FOR SPONSORING THIS

SERIES OF LECTURES. YOU NEVER FINISH SOMETHING UNTIL YOU'VE

PUT IT INTO-WORDS. AND I AM DEEPLY GRATEFUL TO HAVE THIS

CHANCE TO PUT INTO WORDS MY EXPERIENCE OF THESE PAST FOUR YEARS.

THE FOCUS OF MY LECTURE IS ON THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
AND VICE PRESIDENCY. I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU THE EXPERIENCE
I HAD IN THE PAST FOUR YEARS AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THIS
MAGNIFICENT COUNTRY.

I DO NOT WANT TO CATALOGUE WHAT WE DID IN OFFICE -- OR TO PROCLAIM OR DENY RESPONSIBILITY FOR OUR RECORD. INSTEAD, I WANT TO SHED WHAT LIGHT I CAN ON THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY AND VICE PRESIDENCY; THE UNIQUE APPROACH WE TOOK TO THE TASK OF MAKING THE VICE PRESIDENCY MORE EFFECTIVE; AND FINALLY MY OBSERVATIONS ON THE FUTURE.

MY LECTURE AT MACALESTER NEXT TUESDAY WILL BUILD ON THIS BACKGROUND AND ADDRESS THE CRITICAL INTERNATIONAL QUESTION OF HOW WE MAINTAIN OUR NATIONAL STRENGTH AND USE IT EFFECTIVELY TO PROMOTE THE CAUSE OF PEACE. THE THIRD LECTURE, AT THE COLLEGE OF ST. THOMAS ON MARCH 2, WILL BE ON THE APPROPRIATE APPLICATION OF OUR PROGRESSIVE VALUES TO THE DOMESTIC AGENDA THAT WE FACE.

JOKES

ANY DISCUSSION OF THE VICE PRESIDENCY MUST BEGIN BY ANSWERING THE ONE QUESTION WHICH I KNOW IS ON ALL OF YOUR MINDS: HOW MANY VICE PRESIDENTS HAVE THERE BEEN? LET ME SETTLE THAT ONCE AND FOR ALL.

THERE HAVE BEEN THIRTY-NINE PRESIDENTS -- ACTUALLY
THIRTY-EIGHT INDIVIDUALS, WITH GROVER CLEVELAND COUNTED
TWICE, SINCE HIS TWO TERMS WERE NOT CONSECUTIVE. OF THOSE
PRESIDENTS THIRTY-FIVE HAD VICE PRESIDENTS -- BECAUSE FOUR
OF THESE MEN SUCCEEDED TO THE PRESIDENCY, WERE NOT
SUBSEQUENTLY ELECTED IN THEIR OWN RIGHT, AND NEVER HAD
VICE PRESIDENTS. SINCE EIGHT OF THE THIRTY-FIVE HAD TWO
VICE PRESIDENTS, AND SINCE ONE HAD THREE VICE PRESIDENTS,
THERE HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN FORTY-FIVE PRESIDENTIAL/VICE
PRESIDENTIAL TEAMS. HOWEVER, ONLY FORTY-TWO INDIVIDUALS
HAVE HELD THE OFFICE OF VICE PRESIDENT, BUT TWO OF THE
FORTY-TWO EACH SERVED UNDER TWO DIFFERENT PRESIDENTS.

I AM GLAD YOU HAVE GIVEN ME A CHANCE TO CLEAR THAT UP.

HAVING DEMONSTRATED THAT CAPACITY FOR QUALITY RESEARCH AND OBJECTIVE NARRATIVE, I WOULD LIKE TO ANSWER THE NEXT QUESTION ON ALL OF YOUR MINDS: How is one selected to run for Vice President? Today, for the first time, because we are out of office, I am free to unveil my secret strategy. In Early June of 1976, it was clear that Carter would get the nomination. Several names began to be discussed in the press as possible running manes: Senator John Glenn, Senator Ed Muskie, Senator Frank Church, and others. I decided it was critical to get the competition to go to Georgia first.

FIRST, SENATOR MUSKIE WENT TO PLAINS -- AND UPON ARRIVAL SAID HE WAS DYING TO SEE THE PEANUT TREES.

THEN JOHN GLENN ARRIVED, SIDLED UP TO ROSALYNN, AND SAID HIS FAVORITE FOOD WAS GREEN-EYED PEAS.

FRANK CHURCH CALLED GOVERNOR CARTER AND SAID THAT HE FELT CLOSE TO THE SOUTH, AND THAT A RELATIVE OF HIS HAD SERVED THERE DURING THE CIVIL WAR: GENERAL SHERMAN.

WHEN I ARRIVED, CARTER CAME RUNNING UP TO THE CAR AND SAID, "KEEP YOUR MOUTH SHUT, AND THE JOB IS YOURS."

Before I go any further, let me say again how much I owe to this state of Minnesota. Whatever I achieved in public life stems from the values I learned here, and the support you gave me. I hope that through twenty years of public service I have earned the trust you put in me. But I believe I have an oustanding debt to the marvelous schools of this state. For without the caring and gifted Minnesota education I was privileged to receive, in both public and private schools, I could never have learned the values or acquired the tools I did to pursue the life I've led. So it is in trying to give something back—and esepcially to the young people, who are privileged as I was to attend these schools—that I am pleased to give these lectures.

Long ago, when I was a young man and Hubert Humphrey was running for Mayor of Minneaplis, he showed me a way to give something back to this country that has given so much to each of us. He persuaded me to get into politics. And I have never regretted that decision. Thirty years later, when I was considering the Vice Presidency, he told me to make a run for it. Do, it, Hubert told me, you'll never regret it.

I DID IT, AND I'LL NEVER REGRET THAT DECISION EITHER.

IT HAS BEEN THE HIGHEST HONOR OF MY LIFE TO SERVE AS VICE

PRESIDENT. AND FOR THIS, I WILL FOREVER BE GRATEFUL TO THE

AMERICAN PEOPLE.

THE MEMO IN-CONTEXT

IN JUNE OF 1976 I BEGAN TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION,
THEN HYPOTHETICAL, OF HOW I WOULD REACT IF GOVERNOR CARTER
DID WANT TO CONSIDER ME AS HIS VICE PRESIDENTIAL RUNNING
MATE. I READ HIS BOOK, WHY NOT THE BEST. I ASKED MY
STAFF TO ANALYZE HIS POSITIONS ON FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC
POLICY. AND I TALKED PRIVATELY WITH HUBERT HUMPHREY, TOGET HIS ADVICE.

I APPROACHED THE CONVERSATION WITH HUBERT WITH SOME APPREHENSION. AS CLOSE AS I WAS TO HIM, I WASN'T AT ALL SURE WHAT HE WOULD SAY. HIS FOUR YEARS AS VICE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN DIFFICULT. HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE IMPACT OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM HAD BEEN WIDELY DISCUSSED. NEVERTHELESS, HUBERT'S ADVICE WAS STRAIGHTFORWARD. HE SAID,

"FRITZ, MY FOUR YEARS AS VICE PRESIDENT WERE THE MOST EXCITING FOUR YEARS OF MY LIFE. I LEARNED MORE ABOUT THIS COUNTRY AND THE WORLD AND OUR GOVERNMENT THAN I COULD IN ANY OTHER WAY. IF YOU HAVE CHANCE, DON'T HESITATE FOR ONE MINUTE."

CHARLES KIRBO, AND THEN AN INVITATION FOR JOAN AND ME TO VISIT THE CARTERS IN PLAINS. I WAS EXCITED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY.

AT THE SAME TIME, I WAS HAPPY AS A SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA. IN HAD RISEN TO A POSITION OF SOME INFLUENCE IN THE SENATE, AND I WANTED ABOVE ALL TO BE CERTAIN THAT I WAS NOT GIVING UP A SERIOUS ROLE FOR A CEREMONIAL POSITION.

I WAS VERY PLEASED WITH WHAT I LEARNED SOON AFTER I

GOVERNOR CARTER TOLD ME HIS VIEW OF THE VICE PRESIDENCY.

HE SAID HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE OFFICE HAD OFTEN BEEN

WASTED IN THE PAST. HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS SHOCKED BY READING

HISTORY AFTER HISTORY DOCUMENTING HOW ILL-PREPARED WERE THE

VICE PRESIDENTS WHO WERE FORCED TO TAKE OVER THE PRESIDENCY.

FURTHER, HE EXPLAINED THAT IN HIS JUDGMENT THE PRESIDENT'S

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY WAS SO FORMIDABLE THAT THE VICE

PRESIDENT COULD BE NO THREAT TO THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT.

HE SAID HE WANTED A VICE PRESIDENT WHO WOULD HAVE A SUBSTANTIVE

ROLE, MAJOR FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC INVOLVEMENT, AND WHO WOULD

BE FULLY PREPARED IMMEDIATELY TO ASSUME THE PRESIDENCY, IF

IT WERE NECESSARY.

OVER THE NEXT DAY, JOAN AND I BEGAN TO GET ACQUAINTED WITH THE CARTERS. WE DISCUSSED OUR SMALL TOWN ORIGINS, OUR RELIGIOUS BACKGROUNDS OUR EXPERIENCES IN STATE GOVERNMENT, AND OUR VIEWS ON IMPORTANT DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN ISSUES.

IT ALL SOUNDED VERY GOOD TO ME. BUT IN THE SUBSEQUENT TWO WEEKS, I WAS REMINDED FREQUENTLY IT WAS NOT MY CHOICE TO MAKE. IT WAS CARTER'S. AND FINALLY AT 8:30 IN THE MORNING, THE FOURTH DAY OF THE CONVENTION, HE CALLED AND INVITED ME TO RUN WITH HIM. I THOUGHT THE WHOLE THING THROUGH FROM BEGINNING TO END ALL OVER AGAIN. THAT TOOK ABOUT FOUR SECONDS. I ACCEPTED.

THROUGHOUT THE CAMPAIGN, WE RARELY TOUCHED AGAIN ON THOSE CRITICAL QUESTIONS OF WHAT KIND OF ROLE I WOULD HAVE IF WE WERE ELECTED. WE WERE MUCH TOO PREOCCUPIED WITH THE CAMPAIGN. BUT AFTER THE ELECTION AND A SHORT VACATION, I FOCUSED INTENSELY ON MY VIEW OF WHAT THE OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT SHOULD BE. I SPOKE AGAIN WITH HUBERT. I MET AT LENGTH WITH ROCKEFELLER. I READ THE LITERATURE THAT WAS AVAILABLE. I MET THE STAFFS OF FORMER VICE PRESIDENTS TO SOLICIT THEIR ADVICE. AND FINALLY, I ASKED A MEMBER OF MY STAFF TO PREPARE A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE OFFICE.

IN EARLY DECEMBER OF 1976, I SENT A MEMO TO PRESIDENT-ELECT CARTER OUTLINING THE ROLE I THOUGHT WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE. I HAVE RE-READ THAT MEMO MANY TIMES IN THINKING THROUGH THIS LECTURE. LET ME SUMMARIZE IT FOR YOU BRIEFLY.

Boars of an Institut Cha

AGENERAL ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT. AS I SAID THEN, AND I STILL BELIEVE TODAY, BEING THE ONLY OTHER PUBLIC OFFIC AL ELECTED NATIONWIDE, NOT AFFECTED BY THE SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS OR INSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS OF EITHER THE CONGRESS OR THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, AND BEING ABLE TO LOOK AT THE GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE, PUT ME IN A UNIQUE POSITION TO ADVISE THE PRESIDENT.

I WENT ON TO OUTLINE WHAT A VICE PRESIDENT REQUIRED IN ORDER TO BE THAT GENERAL ADVISER:

HE MUST HAVE ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL, INCLUDING THE SAME BRIEFINGS THE PRESIDENT SEES EACH DAY.

- -- HE MUST HAVE ACCESS TO ALL OTHER KEY PAPERS FLOWING TO AND FROM THE PRESIDENT.
- -- HE MUST HAVE A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MEMBERS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WHICH REQUIRES THEM TO RESPOND TO REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION AND HELP.
 - -- HE MUST PARTICIPATE IN ALL KEY POLICY GROUPS.
 - -- HE MUST HAVE A SEASONED, INDEPENDENT STAFF OF HIS OWN.
- -- HE MUST ENJOY A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF.
- -- HE MUST HAVE ACCESS TO THE PRESIDENT WHENEVER NECESSARY.

BEYOND THIS ROLE, I OUTLINED GENERAL FUNCTIONS, INCLUDING TROUBLE-SHOOTING, ON DOMESTIC ISSUES, FOREIGN REPRESENTATION, ASSISTING WITH CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, AND POLITICAL ACTION. FINALLY, I INDICATED MY INTENTION TO DEVOTE TIME AND ATTENTION TO MY SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP TO THE PEOPLE OF MINNESOTA AND ALSO INDICATED JOAN'S DESIRE TO PLAY A STRONG PART IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S SUPPORT FOR THE ARTS AND HUMANITIES.

THE PRESIDENT ELECT INDICATED COMPLETE AGREEMENT. IN ADDITION TO WHAT I HAD ASKED FOR, HE TOLD ME HE WANTED MY OFFICE TO BE DOWN THE HALL FROM THE OVAL OFFICE IN THE WEST WING OF THE WHITE HOUSE -- THE FIRST TIME IN AMERICAN HISTORY THAT THIS WOULD HAPPEN. PRESIDENT CARTER WAS DETERMINED TO HAVE A SUCCESSFUL PRESIDENCY. AND I WAS DETERMINED TO AVOID

A MEANINGLESS VICE PRESIDENCY.

FROM THAT COMMON PURPOSE, WE BUILT A SOLID RELATIONSHIP
IN SUBSEQUENT MONTHS AND YEARS. WE COULD HAVE HAD NO
RELATIONSHIP AT ALL, OF COURSE, IF WE HAD NOT ALSO GOTTEN
ALONG WELL, AND LIKED EACH OTHER, AND BECOME, AS WE REMAIN
TODAY, EACH OTHER'S FRIEND. BUT THE ORIGIN AND BASIS OF OUR
RELATIONSHIP WAS PROFESSIONAL -- AND BECAUSE OF THAT IT WAS
SOUND AND STRONG. WE UNDERSTOOD EACH OTHER'S NEEDS. WE
RESPECTED EACH OTHER'S OPINIONS. WE KEPT EACH OTHER'S
CONFIDENCE. OUR RELATIONSHIP IN THE WHITE HOUSE HELD UP
UNDER THE SEARING PRESSURE OF THAT PLACE BECAUSE WE ENTERED
OUR OFFICES UNDERSTANDING -- PERHAPS FOR THE FIRST TIME
IN THE HISTORY OF THOSE OFFICES -- THAT EACH OF US COULD DO
A BETTER JOB IF WE MAINTAINED THE TRUST OF THE OTHER.
AND FOR FOUR YEARS, THAT TRUST ENDURED.

Puping

THE PERCEPTION BY OTHERS THAT I WAS CLOSE TO THE PRESIDENT, THAT I ENJOYED HIS CONFIDENCE, THAT HE HAD TRUST IN ME -- THIS UNDERSTANDING BY OTHERS MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR ME TO SPEAK FOR THE PRESIDENT WITH AUTHORITY AND TO ACT ON MY OWN WITH INFLUENCE. WHETHER I WAS WORKING WITH HIS STAFF, WITH THE CABINET, WITH THE BUREAUCRACY, WITH THE CONGRESS, OR WITH FOREIGN LEADERS AND OTHERS, I COULD MAKE MYSELF HEARD AND GET THINGS DONE BECAUSE OF MY STANDING WITH THE PRESIDENT.

THE EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE I BROUGHT TO THE VICE

PRESIDENCY WERE MY OWN. IT WAS MY STANDING WITH THE PRESIDENT

THAT ENABLED ME TO DRAW UPON THEM IN EACH OF MY PRINCIPAL

ROLES.

ADVISER Helet me agreed to,

PERHAPS MY MOST IMPORTANT ROLE WAS SERVING AS A GENERAL

ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT.

AN ADVISER MUST BE READY TO ADVISE -- AND HELPING ME

BE READY WAS A FULL AND CAPABLE STAFF, WHICH INTEGRATED

ITS WORK WITH THE WORK OF THE PRESIDENT'S STAFF. PRESIDENT

CARTER AND I DIRECTED OUR STAFFS TO WORK AS A TEAM, AND

IN FACT THEY DID.

AN ADVISER MUST, ALSO HAVE A GRASP OF THE BACKGROUND AND DETAILS OF ALL ISSUES -- AND FOR FOUR YEARS I HAD ACCESS TO ALL PAPERS, CLASSIFIED AND OTHERWISE, THAT THE PRESIDENT SAW. AN ADVISER MUST PARTICIPATE IN THE MEETINGS WHERE RECOMMENDATIONS ARE FORMED -- AND THROUGHOUT OUR TERM PRESIDENT CARTER INVITED ME TO EVERY MEETING ON HIS SCHEDULE.

AN ADVISER MUST BE ABLE TO EXPRESS HIS OPINIONS TO THE PRESIDENT -- AND IN PRACTICE I HAD ACCESS TO PRESIDENT CARTER ANY TIME. I SAW HIM AT OUR WEEKLY LUNCHES -- AN HOUR WE SET ASIDE EVERY WEEK FOR FOUR YEARS TO DISCUSS ANY MATTER THAT CONCERNED EITHER OF US. OR, MORE SIMPLY, I SAW HIM BY WALKING DOWN THE HALL FROM MY OFFICE TO THE OVAL OFFICE -- OFTEN MANY TIMES A DAY. OFTEN HE WOULD CALL ME IN.

WHAT WE DISCUSSED WAS CONFIDENTIAL -- AND IT MUST REMAIN SO. BUT WHAT I WAS TRYING TO ACHIEVE IS NOT. THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS THE BEST INFORMATION IN THE WORLD AT HIS DISPOSAL -- BUT HE ALSO NEEDS SOUND APPRAISAL OF IT.

WE HAS MEMBERS OF HIS CABINET AND OF THE CONGRESS AND MANY OTHERS EAGER TO ADVISE HIM -- BUT HE ALSO NEEDS TO HEAR VOICES THAT SPEAK FROM A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE. HE HAS NO LIMIT TO THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO WANT TO TALK TO HIM -- BUT THAT DOES NOT ASSURE HIM THE CONFIDENTIALITY HE NEEDS TO SPEAK FREELY. HE ALSO HAS NO LIMIT TO THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO CENSOR THEMSELVES WITHIN HIS EARSHOT, EVEN THOUGH WHAT HE TRULY NEEDS IS BLUNT, DIRECT, AND SOMETIMES UNPLEASANT ADVICE. (ADD HERE)

I FOUND THAT THE VICE PRESIDENCY WAS UNIQUELY SUITED

TO MEETING THESE NEEDS. WHEN A VICE PRESIDENT ADVISES

THE PRESIDENT, HE DOES NOT HAVE TO SPEAK FOR ANY DEPARTMENT

GOAL OR ANY CONSTITUENCY OR ANY CAUSE. HE CAN STRIVE FOR

BEING A SOURCE OF INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT. HE DOES NOT

NEED TO CENSOR HIMSELF. HE CAN SPEAK FRANKLY. AND HE

POSES NO THREAT TO THE PRIVACY OF THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS.

FOR HE AND THE PRESIDENT CAN DISCUSS MATTERS CONFIDENTIALLY.

AND WE DID -- EVERY IMPORTANT MATTER. THOUGH I MAY

NOT HAVE AGREED WITH EVERY DECISION THE PRESIDENT MADE,

NOT ONCE IN FOUR YEARS WAS I SURPRISED BY WHAT OUR ADMINISTRATION

DID -- FOR I TOOK PART IN EVERY ONE OF HIS MAJOR DECISIONS.

SETTING THE AGENDA

I ALSO HELPED DETERMINE THE PRESIDENT'S AGENDA.

AFTER WE WERE ELECTED, PRESIDENT-ELECT CARTER ASKED

ME TO PRESENT TO THE FIRST CABINET MEETING AN AGENDA FOR

OUR FIRST FEW MONTHS. I DID SO, AND THEREAFTER I KEPT

TRACK OF THE ESSENTIAL BUSINESS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

BUT IN OUR HASTE TO ENACT LONG OVERDUE AND IMPORTANT

LEGISLATION, WE MADE THE MISTAKE OF OVERLOADING CONGRESS.

BY SEPTEMBER, 1977, I BELIEVE WE HAD SENT SOME 60 TO 70

PRIORITY MEASURES TO THE HILL.

BUT NOT ONLY DID WE OVERLOAD CONGRESS, WE DISPERSED

THE ENERGIES OF OUR OWN AGENCIES. WE DIVIDED THE ATTENTION

OF THE ADMINISTRATION. WE BLURRED THE FOCUS OF OUR GOVERNMENT.

SO THAT FALL, TO CONCENTRATE OUR ATTENTION ON PRIORITY MATTERS,

WE GAVE NEW EMPHASIS TO THE AGENDA PROJECT.

I WELCOMED THE TASK OF SHAPING RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT. I COULD WORK EASILY WITH CABINET MEMBERS AND OTHERS IN ORDERING THE PRIORITIES FOR THEIR DEPARTMENTS AND OTHER AGENCIES. AND WITHOUT AGENCY BIAS I COULD WORK WITH TOP WHITE HOUSE STAFF TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT HOW TO RANK THESE PRIORITIES. AND SO EACH YEAR, I INVITED CABINET MEMBERS AND OTHERS TO SUBMIT THEIR LISTS OF PRIORITIES, AND THEN I RECOMMENDED TO THE PRESIDENT HOW THEY SHOULD BE RANKED. AFTER STUDYING THE FLOOR SCHEDULE FOR BOTH HOUSES OF CONGRESS AND THE COMMITTEES' SCHEDULES, WE LIMITED OURSELVES TO 10 OR 15 TOP PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVES A YEAR. WE PLANNED THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE -- WHEN HE SHOULD MAKE MAJOR SPEECHES, TAKE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN TRIPS, RECEIVE FOREIGN VISITORS. BY THE END OF OUR FIRST YEAR, THE PRESIDENT HAD IMPOSED FIRM CONTROL ON THE PRESIDENTIAL AGENDA, AND FOCUSED THE GOVERNMENT ON A SET OF KEY GOALS.

Homen some white

FEW KEY PURPOSES. THERE ARE MANY DEMANDS ON A PRESIDENT —
TO SPEAK, TO TRAVEL, TO CAMPAIGN FOR OTHERS, TO SUBMIT

LEGISLATION. THERE ARE MANY DEMANDS FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION —
FROM THE DEPARTMENTS, THE CONGRESS, FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS,
INTEREST GROUPS, AND PRIVATE CITIZENS. THERE IS A LIMIT TO
A PRESIDENT'S ABILITY TO SORT THROUGH THESE DEMANDS, A LIMIT
TO THE BUREAUCRACY'S ABILITY TO FOCUS ON THEM, A LIMIT TO
THE CONGRESS'S ABILITY TO ENACT THEM AND A LIMIT TO THE
PUBLIC'S ABILITY TO WADE THROUGH THEM. MAJOR IDEAS TAKE
TIME TO GATHER MOMENTUM IN A DEMOCRACY. WHAT MATTERS AS
MUCH AS THE DECISIONS A GOVERNMENT MAKES IS HOW IT CHOOSES
THE ISSUES IT INTENDS TO DECIDE.

WORKING IN THE CONGRESS

THROUGHOUT OUR TERM, I WORKED WITH THE CONGRESS TO ACHIEVE OUR LEGISLATIVE GOALS.

WHEN I WAS IN THE SENATE, I WOULD LOOK LONGINGLY DOWN PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE AT THE POWER I THOUGHT RESIDED AT THE OTHER END, IN THE WHITE HOUSE. FROM THE WHITE HOUSE, I LOOKED LONGINGLY IN THE OTHER DIRECTION, FOR BY THEN IT SEEMED THAT THE POWER LAY AT THE OTHER END.

THE FACT IS, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT HAVE CHANGED DRAMATICALLY SINCE THE DAY I FIRST ARRIVED ON CAPITOL HILL IN 1964. FIRST, TODAY POWER IS MORE WIDELY DISPERSED THROUGHOUT THE CONGRESS THAN IT USED TO BE.



INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS, MORE INDEPENDENT FROM CENTRAL CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP THAN IN THE PAST, ARE MORE RESPONSIVE TO THEIR OWN POLITICAL NEEDS. SECOND, THE PRESIDENT'S INFLUENCE IN THE CONGRESS HAS DECLINED. BACK THEN, BEFORE VIETNAM, BEFORE WATERGATE, BEFORE WE LEARNED OF THE INTELLIGENCE ABUSES, A PRESIDENT'S POWERS WERE RARELY QUESTIONED; TODAY, IN THE TRAIL OF THOSE EVENTS, A PRESIDENT'S POWERS ARE ALWAYS OPEN TO QUESTION. THE RESULT OF THESE TWIN DEVELOPMENTS IS THAT YOU MUST BUILD A NEW COALITION FOR EVEN THE SIMPLEST MEASURES.

AND IN THE LAST FOUR YEARS, THE MEASURES WE TRIED TO PASS WERE NOT SIMPLE; THEY WERE SOME OF THE MOST COMPLEX AND CONTROVERSIAL PIECES OF LEGISLATION OF A MEMORY -- A COMPREHENSIVE ENERGY PROGRAM FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER; THE RESOLUTION OF A NATURAL GAS PRICING AND DISTRIBUTION DILEMMA THAT HAD PLAGUED OUR COUNTRY FOR 30 YEARS; THE MOST COMPLEX AND IMPORTANT ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT EVER SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE, TO NAME ONLY A FEW. FEW MEASURES BETTER ILLUSTRATE THE PROBLEMS OF WORKING WITH THE MODERN CONGRESS THAN THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES.

THEY INVOLVED THREE COMPLEX PARTS: ONE, A TREATY REQUIRING SENATE RATIFICATION TO TRANSFER OWNERSHIP OF THE CANAL ZONE; TWO, A TREATY TO GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF THE ZONE; AND THREE, A BILL TO IMPLEMENT THE TREATIES TO BE PASSED BY BOTH THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE.

THE TREATIES WERE OPPOSED BY MOST OF THE AMERICAN

PEOPLE; ACCORDING TO A NEWSWEEK POLL, ONLY 8% OF THE PUBLIC SUPPORTED THEM AT THE OUTSET. THEY RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR SECURITY AND OUR FOREIGN POLICY. MANY BENEFITS THEY WOULD YIELD THE UNITED STATES WERE INTANGIBLE -- MEASURED IN GRIEF AVOIDED.

AND YET THEY WERE ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL, IF WE WERE GOING.

TO END OUR DAYS AS A COLONIAL POWER AND EARN THE GOOD WILL

AND RESPECT OF OUR NEAREST NEIGHBORS. FOUR ADMINISTRATIONS,

REPUBLICAN AS WELL AS DEMOCRATIC, HAD STRIVED FOR THIS GOAL

FOR 15 YEARS. Fould

In the end, we passed the implementing legislation in the House by a narrow vote, and we won ratification in the Senate of the central treaty by a single vote. I involved myself every step of the way -- meeting with Senators and members of the House, helping to coordinate the work of our Congressional Liaison staff, mapping out strategy with the leaders, and presiding during crucial moments of Senate deliberations.

BUT PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, I HELPED TO INTERPRET
THE CONGRESS TO THE WHITE HOUSE, AND THE WHITE HOUSE TO THE
CONGRESS. FOR I WAS THE ONLY OFFICER OF THE GOVERNMENT WHOM
THE CONSTITUTION PERMITS TO STRADDLE THE EXECUTIVE AND

aftert

SENATE. I KNEW ITS RULES AND METHODS, ITS MOODS AND MOST OF ITS MEMBERS. ON A ONE-TO-ONE BASIS, I HELPED MAKE THE CASE FOR THE TREATIES.

SPOKESMAN

WITH THE PRESIDENT'S ENCOURAGEMENT, I ALSO ACTED AS ONE OF HIS PRINCIPAL SPOKESMEN HERE AND ABROAD.

A PRESIDENT'S PUBLIC EDUCATION RESPONSIBILITY MAY BE
THE MOST IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITY HE HAS. IT GOES TO THE
VERY HEART OF HIS CAPACITY TO LEAD -- TO THE TRUST AND
SUPPORT HE MUST HAVE. TO EXPLAIN HIS IDEAS AND PROMOTE HIS
POLICIES, THEREFORE, HE NEEDS ALL THE HELP HE CAN GET.

I WORKED TO EXTEND THE PRESIDENT'S REACH TO THE PUBLIC.

I TRAVELED SOME 600,000 MILES DURING MY VICE PRESIDENCY.

I VISITED NEARLY EVERY STATE. AND IN VIRTUALLY EVERY SPEECH

I MADE I TRIED TO ENCOURAGE SUPPORT FOR OUR POLICIES.

IN THE SUMMER OF 1979, FOR EXAMPLE, I MADE A WEEK-LONG CROSS-COUNTRY TOUR OF THE COUNTRY TO SPEAK IN BEHALF OF SALT II. BEFORE THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCILS OF LOS ANGELES AND PORTLAND AND PHILADELPHIA, IN NASHVILLE, BEFORE THE BUSINESS LEADERS OF STOUX FALLS AND OMAHA, I ARGUE THE FACTS OF THAT PROPOSED AGREEMENT AND TOOK OUR CASE DIRECTLY TO THE PUBLIC.

Me

SECONDLY, A PRESIDENT ALSO NEEDS POLITICAL SUPPORT, AND IN THE FALL OF 1978 I CAMPAIGNED FOR CONGRESSIONAL AND OTHER CANDIDATES ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. IN 1980, I CAMPAIGNED THROUGHOUT THE NATION IN THE GREATEST NUMBER OF PRIMARIES AND CAUCUSES OUR PARTY HAD EVER HELD. (I WAS IN TOWNS THAT EVEN HUBERT HUMPHREY DIDN'T REACH,) THIS PAST YEAR ALONE I GAVE MORE THAN 325 SPEECHES, AND HELD MORE THAN 450 CONFERENCES AND INTERVIEWS. I TALKED WITH MAYORS, GOVERNORS, SENATORS, LEGISLATORS, CITY COUNCIL MEMBERS; WITH ELECTED OFFICIALS, BUSINESS LEADERS, LABOR LEADERS, ETHNIC LEADERS, EVEN CHEERLEADERS -- WITH JENS OF THOUSANDS OF AMERICANS. BE A SPOKESMAN IS A TWO-WAY STREET. YOU NOT ONLY SPEAK TO EVERY SEGMENT OF THE COUNTRY; YOU LISTEN. AS I TRAVELED AND LISTENED, I THINK I LEARNED AS MUCH ABOUT OUR COUNTRY AS ANYONE KNOWS AND WHEN I BROUGHT THIS KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS AND OPINIONS BACK TO THE WHITE HOUSE, IT ENHANCED MY ABILITY TO ADVISE THE PRESIDENT FROM A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE.

FOREIGN POLICY

OF ALL THE AREAS IN WHICH TWOULD STRENGTHEN THE

PRESIDENT'S ABILITY ON SERVE, ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT WAS

IN THE FIELD OF INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND FOREIGN
POLICY. THE PRESIDENT HAD AGREED THAT IN ADDITION TO MY

DOMESTIC ROLE, I WOULD ASSIST HIM IN THESE AREAS -- AND IN FACT I WAS INVOLVED IN MOST OF THE PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS IN FOREIGN POLICY.

I HEADED SEVERAL DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ABROAD, STARTING
JUST A FEW DAYS AFTER OUR INAUGURATION WHEN I VISITED THE
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM; BELGIUM, INCLUDING
THE NATO AND COMMON MARKET HEADQUARTERS IN BRUSSELS; GERMANY,
FRANCE, ITALY; ICELAND; AND JAPAN. I CONDUCTED A WIDE RANGE
OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS TO (FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELTS, FOLKS,
THIS IS GOING TO BE A LONG RIDE) ISRAEL, EGYPT, THAILAND, THE
PHILIPPINES, INDONESIA, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, VENEZUELA,
BRAZIL, PANAMA, MEXICO, CANADA, NORWAY, SWEDEN, FINLAND,
DENMARK, THE NETHERLANDS, SENEGAL, NIGER, NIGERIA, CAPE VERDE,
YUGOSLAVIA, SPAIN, PORTUGAL, AUSTRIA, THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC
OF CHINA, AS WELL AS A VISIT TO SPEAK TO THE UN CONFERENCE
ON INDOCHINESE REFUGEES IN GENEVA, AND AN ADDRESS TO THE
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN
NEW YORK.

I ALSO RECEIVED LITERALLY HUNDREDS OF FOREIGN LEADERS
AND VISITORS FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD AT MY OFFICE IN THE
WHITE HOUSE.

I WORKED CLOSELY WITH ALL THE SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY
LEADERS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND WITH THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, AS WELL AS THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AND PARTICIPATED IN ALL NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL MEETINGS, AND IN AS MANY MEETINGS OF ITS

VARIOUS COMMITTEES AS MY SCHEDULE PERMITTED. I ALSO WAS A MEMBER OF THE SMALL GROUP WHICH MET WEEKLY -- THE SO-CALLED FRIDAY MORNING FOREIGN POLICY BREAKFAST -- WHICH BECAME A LITTLE NOTED BUT EXTREMELY IMPORTANT REGULAR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT AT WHICH MANY OF THE MOST CRUCIAL FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS WERE MADE.

IN ADDITION, I SPENT HUNDREDS OF HOURS OVER THE LAST FOUR YEARS IN INFORMAL MEETINGS OR IPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ADVISORS, DCI, THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, THE SPECIAL TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, AND THE WHOLE RANGE OF OFFICERS CHARGED WITH MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING FOREIGN POLICY.

THIS INTENSIVE INVOLVEMENT WITH ALL ASPECTS OF INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY, AND FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS PERMITTED ME TO STRENGTHEN THE PRESIDENT'S DEALINGS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN A NEW, AND, I THINK, PROFOUNDLY DIFFERENT, WAY FROM THE PAST. I THINK THERE WERE SEVERAL REASONS FOR THIS.

FIRST, I WAS PRIVY TO ALL THE INFORMATION BEARING ON DECISIONS THAT HAD TO BE MADE.

SECOND, BECAUSE OF THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE ROLE THE PRESIDENT PERMITTED ME TO PLAY, I WAS ABLE TO BRING ABOUT DECISIONS WITHIN OUR OWN GOVERNMENT BEARING UPON RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. LET ME GIVE YOU A FEW EXAMPLES.

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IN THE SUMMER OF 1979, I WAS CHARGED WITH REPRESENTING THE UNITED STATES AT A UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEES, HELD IN GENEVA. AT THAT TIME, VIETNAM WAS FORCIBLY EXPELLING TENS OF THOUSANDS OF ITS OWN CITIZENS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WAS DOING LITTLE ABOUT IT. BOATAPEOPLE WERE DROWNING, AND PASSING SHIPS - INCLUDING OUR OWN, DID NOT STOP TO PICK THEM UR. AND F TO REACH LAND, THE CHANCES WERE GOOD THAT THE HOST GOVERNMENT WOULD PUT THEM BACK OUT TO SEA. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THIS UN CONFERENCE WOULD BE AS MEANINGLESS AS ONE HELD SOME 40 YEARS BEFORE ON THE PLIGHT OF THE JEWISH REFUGEES FROM NAZI GERMANY -- UNLESS WE COULD GET FIRM COMMITMENTS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO HELP RESETTLE THE REFUGEES. AND WE WOULD NOT GET THOSE COMMITMENTS, UNLESS THE UNITED STATES TOOK THE LEAD, SO BEFORE I SPOKE TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, I MADE SURE THAT OUR OWN GOVERNMENT MADE FIRST, A DECISION TO GIVE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR RESETTLING REFUGEES, AND SECOND, A DECISION TO USE OUR SEVENTH FLEET TO PICK UP DESPERATE BOAT PEOPLE. WHEN I MADE THESE ANNOUNCEMENTS IN MY SPEECH, THE OTHER DELEGATES JOINED THE EFFORT. AND THE POINT IS THAT BECAUSE OUR GOVERNMENT HAD FIRST MADE THE NECESSARY DECISIONS, THE UNITED STATES WAS ABLE TO PLAY A DOMINANT LEADERSHIP ROLE AT GENEVA. -

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THERE WERE MANY OTHER EXAMPLES OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS THAT WERE SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE WE WERE ABLE TO FORCE AGENCIES OF OUR OWN GOVERNMENT TO MAKE THE DECISIONS ESSENTIAL TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS. WHEN I VISITED THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA WE HAD JUST FORMALLY ESTABLISHED REGULAR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. BUT THE BROAD RANGE OF ECONOMIC, TRADE, SECURITY AND OTHER AGREEMENTS THAT CHARACTERIZE A NORMAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ANOTHER MAJOR POWER WERE YET TO BE FULLY DEVELOPED. TO DO SO REQUIRED A NUMBER OF DECISIONS TO BE MADE THROUGHOUT OUR OWN GOVERNMENT. By way of preparing for my visit to the PRC, those decisions WERE MADE -- AND THE RESULT WAS THAT THE VISIT, AND THE AGREEMENTS WE REACHED IN A WIDE RANGE OF AREAS, MOVED OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA FROM ONE LARGELY NOMINAL TO A BROAD AND DEEP ONE WHICH I BELIEVE HAS SUBSTANTIALLY HELPED BOTH OUR NATIONS.

OR CONSIDER THE CASE OF NIGERIA, A COUNTRY OF EXTREME INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE. IT IS THE WEALTHIEST AND MOST INFLUENTIAL BLACK NATION IN THE WORLD. ON MY VISIT WE WERE ABLE TO REACH LONG DELAYED BASIC AGREEMENTS WITH NIGERIA IN AGRICULTURE, TRADE, ESTABLISHING BILATERAL COMMISSIONS, AND OTHER UNDERSTANDINGS ON A WIDE RANGE OF US/AFRICAN ISSUES THAT I BELIEVE CONSTITUTES A FUNDAMENTAL IMPROVEMENT IN US/NIGERIAN RELATIONS.

all am leaders

ANOTHER REASON THESE MISSIONS WERE SUCCESSFUL IS THAT
OTHER NATIONS UNDERSTOOD MY POSITION IN THE ADMINISTRATION,
AND KNEW THAT I WAS ABLE TO SPEAK WITH AUTHORITY FOR THE
PRESIDENT. PERHAPS OF ALL THE FUNCTIONS I PERFORMED AS VICE
PRESIDENT, IT WAS THESE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS -- AND THE ROLE
I PLAYED IN INTELLIGENCE, SECURITY MATTERS, AND FOREIGN POLICY

THIS ESSENTIAL ROLE. THERE ARE SO MANY NATIONS THAT DESERVE HIGH LEVEL, POLICY-SENSITIVE ATTENTION OF A PERSONAL NATURE.

A PRESIDENT SIMPLY DOES NOT HAVE THE TIME TO DO AS MUCH OF THAT AS THE SITUATION WARRANTS. IF THE PRESIDENT WERE TO FULFILL THIS ROLE COMPLETELY, HE WOULD HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO TIME TO PERFORM ANY OF THE OTHER FUNCTIONS OF HIS OFFICE.

-- THAT I FOUND THE MOST SATISFYING AND MOST USEFUL.

THE INSTITUTION OF THE VICE PRESIDENCY

I HAVE DESCRIBED SOME OF THE WAYS IN WHICH PRESIDENT CARTER PERMITTED ME TO LET OUT THE ROLE WE HAD OUTLINED AT THE START OF OUR ADMINISTRATION. NOW LET ME GENERALIZE FOR A MOMENT.

MANY OF YOU WILL RECALD FROM YOUR OTHER ACADEMIC WORK
THE TERM "VESTIGIAL ORGAN."

The Appendix 23 -

FUNCTION -- BUT HAS ATROPHIED, BECAUSE WITH THE PASSAGE OF TIME THE NEED FOR IT HAS DISAPPEARED.

THE CLASSICAL VESTIGIAL ORGAN, OF COURSE, IS THE APPENDIX.

ONCE, PERHAPS, IT HELPED OUR ANCESTORS DEAL WITH THE CRUDER

DIET THEY FACED. TODAY, MILLENIA OF EVOLUTION HAVE RENDERED

IT WHAT ITS NAME CONVEYS: AN APPENDIX, AN EXTRA BIT THAT

CAN ONLY CAUSE TROUBLE.

WHAT I HAVE BEEN TRYING TO STRESS THIS AFTERNOON IS THAT THE VICE PRESIDENCY IS VIRTUALLY THE MIRROR IMAGE -- THE OPPOSITE AND CONVERSE -- OF THE APPENDIX.

EVOLUTION -- THE GROWTH AND FERMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS -- HAS TRANSFORMED THE VICE PRESIDENCY FROM A VESTIGIAL ROLE, TO A VIABLE AND VITAL ONE.

FOR GENERATIONS THE VICE PRESIDENT UNIQUE QUALITIES HAVE ALL BEEN DORMANT. BUT CHANGES IN THE PRESIDENCY HAVE MEANT THAT THOSE QUALITIES FOR THE FIRST TIME ARE BEING INVIGORATED.

OVER THE YEARS, THE MORE INTIMIDATING A PRESIDENT'S

POWERS BECAME, THE LESS LIKELY HE GREW TO HEAR FRANK TALK -
AND THAT IS WHAT THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S

UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM CAN PROVIDE.

THE MORE THE NATION DEMANDED A PRESIDENT PERSONALLY

TO DO, THE LESS TIME HE HAD TO SORT THROUGH AND ORDER THOSE

PRIORITIES -- AND THAT IS WHAT THE VICE PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL

FREEDOM FROM LINE RESPONSIBILITY CAN HELP HIM ACCOMPLISH.

THE MORE BUREAUCRATIC AND STREET-WISE THE PRESIDENT'S OWN EXECUTIVE BRANCH BECAME, THE LESS ABLE HE WAS TO COAX DECISIONS FROM IT -- AND THAT IS WHAT THE VICE PRESIDENT'S INHERENT DISTANCE FROM INTRA-MURAL ALLEGIANCE CAN HELP HIM ATTEMPT.

THE MORE COMPLEX THE CONGRESS BECAME, THE LESS SURE THE PRESIDENT GREW THAT HIS LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM WOULD BE ACTED ON -- AND THAT IS WHERE THE VICE PRESIDENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL DOUBLE-IDENTITY CAN BE MOBILIZED.

THE MORE DENSE AND INTRICATE THE ISSUES FACING AMERICANS BECAME, THE LESS EASY IT WAS FOR THE PRESIDENT ALONE TO EDUCATE AND LEAD THE NATION -- AND THAT IS WHERE THE VICE PRESIDENT'S ELECTORAL MANDATE FROM ALL THE PEOPLE CAN BE PUT TO USE.

THE MORE COMPLEX AND DIVERSE OUR POLITICAL LIFE BECAME,
THE LESS POSSIBLE IT WAS FOR THE PRESIDENT TO SENSE THE
TEXTURE THAT MAYORS AND GOVERNORS FEEL, AND LISTEN TO THE
MUSIC THAT MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HEAR IN THEIR DISTRICTS --



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