

WALTER F. MONDALE

Talking Points

University of Minnesota
School of Journalism - Student Assembly
Professor Gilmore
DATE: October 22, 1981, 11:15 am

Talking Points:

- o Our history has shown that one of the best checks or controls on the actions of government is a strong and independent press:
 - what would our country be like today if John Peter Zenger had not asserted and won the right to speak out against the tyrannous rule of colonial government;
 - it is difficult to picture what our society would be like today if Elija Lovejoy and the abolitionists had not stood their ground, and given their lives, for the cause of emancipation;
 - one can only shudder to think what our future would be like if the New York Times had not exposed a policy of mistakes and misdeeds in the Pentagon Papers.
- o We all must imagine how freedom itself can exist without a free and independent press.
- o Having such a free press is one of the two acid tests that distinguishes a free from a closed and repressive society. In the closed societies of today, the greatest threat to tyranny is not an opposing army, or rebels and guns... instead it is the printing press, the radio station, books, leaflets, newspapers and television -- it is the free spreading of ideas.
- o The second acid test of free societies is the existence of free political activity. For it is through politics that people combine their interests into a cause, announce their principles and lodge their criticism of government.
- o For the most part, the reporters it has been my privilege to know in twenty years of public life are hard-working, dedicated, intelligent professionals, devoted to our free political system and deeply concerned about the future of our country.
- o There are some who are lazy or out of their depth -- as with any profession -- even politics.
- o What I have to say today about areas where improvements can be made by the members of the press and the students of journalism is intended to strengthen, encourage students and reporters to be more independent, build you up and highlight your importance to our democratic process.

o The Press:

- Emphasis on "making news" instead of dealing with the substance of both issues and politics, i.e., we should not allow the news to be limited to whatever is most startling, or most dramatic.
- Pack Journalism: perhaps because editors will think reporters missed the main story, or perhaps because reporters are timid with their own judgements -- reporters often repeat the same story and in the same way that their colleagues do.
- Mistrust: reporters have an obligation not to prejudge an issue or a candidate for public office.
- Emphasis on numbers and expectations, at the expense of substantive coverage.

For instance, when you emphasize the horse race, you are stressing how the race (campaign) is going and not what's going on -- not the ideas, and people and politics that are the point of the competition.

- Shallowness of Television: most people get their news from TV - the very best medium for conveying the color of a campaign and the personality of a candidate... but the substance of a campaign is another matter.
- o The substance of the energy program cannot be filmed.
 - o The years of arms control efforts cannot be summarized in twenty seconds.
 - o And the merits of either cannot be praised or dismissed with a phrase. Their merits reside in the details, and can only be appraised through a long, serious discussion of the complicated issues... which is not very colorful TV.
- o If there is room for improvement by members of the media and students of journalism, then there certainly are steps all of us can take together to improve government, politics and the media.
 - o I think that outstanding journalist, David Broder, put it best when he said this:

"Standing on opposite sides of the room and hollering at each other, which is frequently the pattern of behavior in which press and politicians have found themselves, is really a futile kind of exercise. Both have an obligation which they have to remember. They must remember to inform the public, so as to arm the public with the essential information that makes public policy-making a meaningful process. And that is an obligation which neither the politician nor the reporter can fulfill alone."

WALTER F. MONDALE

Talking Points

University of Minnesota
Political Science
Professor Shively

DATE: Thursday, October 22, at 2:15pm

Class: Open to all graduate students (40) and faculty members.

Professor Shively has requested that we address the current situation in the Middle East, with particular attention paid to the following issues:

- the Middle East after Sadat
- political stability in Egypt
- the Camp David Accords
- other Arab nations -- especially Libya and the Sudan
- U.S. policy and interests in the Middle East
- AWACS

Attached is a paper addressing the issues listed above.

EGYPT AFTER SADAT

ISSUE DEFINITION

The assassination of President Mohamed Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt puts in jeopardy a U.S.-Egyptian relationship that has become central to this country's calculations in the Middle East. Since he became President of Egypt in 1970, Sadat has radically changed the alignment of forces in the region. He moved Egypt from heavy dependence on the Soviet Union to its current position as second-largest recipient of U.S. aid and a potentially major element in the Reagan Administration's strategic consensus in the Middle East-Persian Gulf area. His dramatic move toward Israel in 1977, which culminated in the Camp David Peace accords, was key to the consolidation of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship, but cost Sadat heavily in terms of his relations with other Arab nations and his support among elements within Egypt. His death raises serious questions as to the future stability and foreign policy of Egypt.

Congress will be deeply involved in U.S. decisionmaking in the wake of Sadat's death because of the great importance of U.S. aid to Egypt. Nearly \$2 billion in economic and security assistance for Egypt is proposed in FY 1982 appropriations legislation currently before Congress. Moreover, a proposal to implement a recent agreement for U.S. sale of sophisticated Hawkeye surveillance aircraft -- the Navy's version of AWACS -- to Egypt could well require Congress to make an early assessment of the future of U.S.-Egyptian relations in the post-Sadat era.

of even more immediate relevance to congressional decisionmaking is the impact of Sadat's assassination on the disposition of the Reagan Administration's proposed sale of AWACS and F-15 enhancement articles to Saudi Arabia. From one perspective, Sadat's death underlines the uncertainty and fragility of U.S. relations with its allies in the Middle East, an important consideration of many who oppose the sale. From another perspective, however, the Saudi AWACS commitment now assumes increased importance because Sadat's death has complicated President Reagan's efforts to build a strategic consensus in the Middle East.

This policy alert provides preliminary information and analysis designed to be helpful as Congress approaches these and related issues. Following an initial summary of what is currently known about the events surrounding the assassination, this alert provides an initial assessment of its implications for Egypt's political future, the possible consequences in the international politics of the Middle East, Soviet reactions and interests, and U.S. policy options.

EGYPTIAN INTERNAL IMPLICATIONS

THE SUCCESSION

According to the 1971 Egyptian constitution, when the office of President becomes vacant, the 392-member People's Assembly nominates, by a two-thirds vote, a candidate to be President. The candidate is presented to the people for approval or disapproval in a national referendum. Once approved by simple majority, the candidate is sworn in as President, and may appoint one or more Vice Presidents, a Prime Minister, and a cabinet, to whom the President may delegate such authority as he deems necessary. A new President must be approved by referendum within 60 days of the Presidential vacancy. Presidents are elected for six year terms. Under Article 84 of the constitution, the Speaker of the People's Assembly, elected by the Assembly, becomes the temporary President during the period of up to 60-days allowed for the nomination and referendum processes.

The constitution was implemented following the September 28, 1970, death of President Jamal Abd al-Nasir. Then Vice President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat was endorsed by the Arab Socialist Union (at that time Egypt's only legal political party) on October 3, 1970, nominated by the People's Assembly on October 7, elected in a public referendum on October 15, and sworn as President on October 20, 1970. President al-Sadat appointed Air Force Commander General Muhammad Husni Said Mubarak as Vice President on April 16, 1975.

Following the death of President Anwar al-Sadat on October 6, 1981, Vice President Husni Mubarak announced that Speaker of the People's Assembly Sufi Hassan Abu Talib would become the temporary President until elections of a permanent President are held. President Abu Talib's first decree appointed Husni Mubarak to be Vice President, with the added authority of Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Late on October 6, the National Democratic Party endorsed Mubarak to be the next President. The People's Assembly will meet October 7 to begin the formal process to elect a new President, a process which may be completed by mid-October.

POLITICAL STABILITY

At the same time, unconfirmed news sources stated that Mubarak was also named "head of Government," which implied that Mubarak would be the Prime Minister, a post al-Sadat held in conjunction with the Presidency. President Abu Talib also declared a 12-month state of emergency in Egypt, but it is not clear if the state of emergency would preclude holding the People's Assembly nominations or the popular referendum within the constitutional 60-day requirement. Until further information becomes available, it appears as though Abu Talib will be acting President in keeping with the constitution while real authority may rest with Mubarak, the Vice President, Commander of the military, and head of Government.

Other news reports from Cairo suggested that military units with small arms had been dispatched to protect Government buildings and foreign embassies and to disperse crowds in cities. The Western Military District (the Western Desert and the border with Libya) was placed under martial

law. Despite the news broadcasts from Libya that a full scale rebellion was underway in Egypt, most Western news agencies reported that Cairo and other Egyptian cities were calm. For the next few weeks, Egyptian stability may depend upon two factors: first, that an orderly transition of authority take place, that the people be assured that the established process will be followed, and that the Egyptian leaders are able to project the image of competence and control; and second, that the military and the police maintain order and contain any attempts to seize control of the government. The military and its leaders may be under suspicion because the assassination of al-Sadat was carried out by military personnel, and suspicions will remain that the assassination may have been the first step in an attempt at a military coup d'etat. Stability may depend upon relations among several Egyptian leaders with military connections, foremost among them Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Kamal Hasan Ali, a former army general and Defense Minister, and present Defense Minister Muhannad Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala, another army general. How they, and other military leaders, will cooperate with Mubarak, himself a former general in the air force, and President Abu Talib, who has not served in the military, remains to be seen.

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY

It is unlikely that the assassination of President Sadat and the Egyptian succession will have an immediate detrimental effect on the implementation of the peace treaty with Israel. Egypt has invested time, energy, and its prestige in the peace treaty in order to regain sovereignty over the Sinai. Israel is scheduled to complete withdrawal from the Sinai in April 1982. Sadat was willing to risk his stature in the Arab world to regain the Sinai, and he surrounded himself with the leaders who shared his estimation of the importance of the Sinai and the peace treaty. Other Egyptians who did not agree with his signing of the peace treaty, such as General al-Shadhli or Foreign Minister Kamal, resigned from the Government.

An appearance of excessive conciliation toward Israel will be a major political danger for President Sadat's successor. Thus, Israeli-Egyptian relations and cooperation in cultural, economic, tourism, transportation, and other areas may well not be as close as they may have been under Sadat, and a "cooling off" between Egypt and Israel is a strong possibility. It is also likely that new Egyptian leaders may make overtures to the Arab world, particularly to regimes which enjoyed good relations with Egypt in the past, to re-establish some of the contacts that existed before Egypt signed the peace treaty and the Arab states broke relations with Egypt in March 1979.

Finally, the possibility cannot be excluded that Sadat's successor(s), will not have solid political and public support or Israeli trust and that the Egyptian-Israeli peace could unravel.

Egyptian-Israeli-American negotiations to determine the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have not produced any tangible progress, and it is questionable whether new leaders in Egypt will have the same persistence as a-Sadat to keep alive the attempt. The talks may continue, but with an even lower prospect of success.

Both Egypt and Israel will need time to re-establish the mutual trust generated by a-Sadat; both will need to be convinced of the other's good intentions to implement the peace treaty. Some Israelis do not favor the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, and may use the change in Egyptian-led leadership to reassert their case. All Israelis will be hesitant to accept the new Egyptian Government's commitment to maintain the peace. Similarly, the Egyptians will need to be reassured that Israel will not use the occasion of Egypt's adversity to avoid or delay relinquishing the Sinai. Both countries will be looking toward the United States, as a major sponsor of the peace keeping unit to be established in Sinai once Israeli withdrawal is completed, for reassurance as it moves toward completing plans for the peacekeeping troops.

THE ARAB WORLD

Until the actual character of the successor administration in Egypt becomes clear, the regional implications of the assassination can only be a matter of speculation.

Saudi Arabia. Sadat's death is likely to create considerable apprehension among the Saudi political leadership. It will probably result in greater Saudi attention to national security issues. Of foremost concern initially is likely to be internal security, but the Saudi leadership will also be interested in doing what it can to assure that problems in

Egypt do not destabilize other areas of the region and do not lead to renewal of Arab-Israeli warfare. The assassination will likely reinforce Saudi suspicions of both the Soviet Union and radical-revolutionary elements in the region. It may also heighten Saudi concern over the prospect of encirclement by hostile forces.

Since 1977, Egypt has presented a major policy dilemma to the Saudis. On the one hand, the Saudis shared Sadat's concern over the Soviet threat to the Middle East and the dangers posed by Arab radicalism. On the other hand, the Saudis felt obligated to oppose the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, in solidarity with the Arab mainstream. Saudi policy approaches to a post-Sadat Egypt will likely be cautious, but aimed at inducing sufficient changes in Egyptian policies toward Israel and the Palestinian question to make a closer Saudi-Egyptian relationship possible. Though a successor regime that continued Sadat's policies on these issues would be a disappointment to the Saudis, a far greater threat would be a radical regime that, while anti-Israel, was also closer to the Soviet Union and to other radical Arab regimes such as Syria and Libya. Should such a regime begin to emerge in Egypt, the Saudis would likely indicate their extreme concern over Gulf and Arabian Peninsula security to the United States.

IRAQ

Iraq's interests are relatively remote from those of Egypt, despite traditional Iraqi-Egyptian rivalry over leadership of the Arab world. Since the early 1970's, the Iraqis have pursued a generally pragmatic course in the region, although they have continued to clothe their behavior in revolutionary rhetoric. A change in the Egyptian leadership is unlikely to reverse present Iraqi cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Jordan, as well as continue the prevailing shift in Iraq's orientation toward the West from the Soviet Union. Iraq's present concerns lie primarily in the goal of stability in the Gulf region as a consequence of the Iranian revolution.

JORDAN

The personal antipathy in the relationship between Sadat and Jordanian King Husain adversely affected relations between Egypt and Jordan during the 1970's. A change in the Egyptian leadership will therefore offer prospects for improvement in relations between the two countries. The principal concern of Jordanian foreign policy is a favorable settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Jordan's main importance for Egypt derives from its potential role regarding the West Bank.

SYRIA.

Syrian-Egyptian relations have been difficult since the end of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, and were aggravated by the 1977 Sadat initiative to Israel. Syria is a member of the Steadfastness Front opposed to the Egyptian-

Israeli peace treaty; Syria needs Egypt to create a credible threat to Israel. If Egyptian policy should change with a new leadership, Syria probably would be foremost in welcoming Egypt back into the Arab fold.

PLO

Egypt has been the only front-line Arab state without a significant Palestinian problem or population. The PLO generally has been at odds with Egypt since the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty but it has had little leverage with the Egyptian leadership. It has supported the Steadfastness Front opposing the peace treaty. A change in Egyptian policy toward Israel would be regarded with satisfaction by all elements of the PLO.

Implications for Libya and Sudan.

Egypt's relations with Libya were near the crisis point just prior to the assassination of President Sadat. In 1972, the two countries had agreed to merge, but relations soon grew strained because of Sadat's suspicion's of the revolutionary enthusiasm of Col. Qadhafi, the Libyan leader, and because of Qadhafi's criticism of Sadat's conduct of the October 1973 war against Israel, which Qadhafi viewed as poorly planned and insufficiently aggressive. Libya and Egypt fought a brief border war in 1977 following several terrorist incidents in Egypt and the expulsion of thousands of Egyptian workers from Libya. Sadat said that this war was intended to teach Qadhafi a "lesson" and threatened further "lessons" if Qadhafi's conduct so warranted. After the 1978 Camp David agreement, Qadhafi became an architect of the "rejectionist front" against Egypt.

Libyan-Egyptian tensions escalated in late 1980 and during 1981 as a result of Libya's intervention in Chad, and in recent weeks Sadat had been particularly concerned about a possible Libyan threat to Sudan. In Sadat's view, violent incidents that had broken out along the lengthy Chad-Sudan border demonstrated Libya's intention, in league with the Soviet Union, to overthrow the government of President Numeiry in Sudan. Numeiry was the only Middle Eastern leader willing to cooperate openly with Sadat, and Sadat saw Sudan, strategically located astride the Nile and across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia, as critically important to Egyptian security.

Col. Qadhafi, in a speech on October 5 -- one day prior to the assassination of Sadat -- called for the overthrow of Numeiry, whom he described as "dirty and depraved." Qadhafi added that Numeiry could not rely on Sadat for support because "we are stronger than al-Sadat." Informing Palestinian, Sudanese,

Egyptian, and African revolutionaries that "the money is available," the Libyan leader went on to say that "We also proclaim our alliance forever with the Sudanese people until they overthrow Numeiry and with the Egyptian people until they overthrow the traitorous agent, al-Sadat." President Sadat, in an interview published on the same day, called Qadhafi a "maniac" and asserted, as he had before, that Libya had become an instrument of Soviet designs in Africa and the Middle East.

In view of the recent acrimony in Libyan-Egyptian relations, Qadhafi will almost inevitably be suspected of playing a role in the assassination of Sadat. Suspicions will be heightened by the broadcasts from Libya since the assassination calling for popular uprisings in Egypt and Sudan. One of these broadcasts called on the Egyptian people to seize and burn Sadat's body. The Libyan broadcasts, and the recent background of tension in northeastern Africa, suggest an intensity of feeling that could lead to further crises.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY AND INTERESTS

STRATEGIC AND REGIONAL GOALS

President Sadat was a staunch ally of the United States and a courageous statesman. His sudden death will raise serious questions about ongoing programs in the region of the Middle East and Persian Gulf and be seen as the beginning of a dangerous period for U.S. efforts to strengthen peace and resist further Soviet penetration there. Though the extent of this danger will depend on the transition of power in Egypt and the depth of internal Egyptian support for Sadat's programs, the short-term uncertainty over Egyptian stability and foreign policy direction will unquestionably complicate U.S. foreign policymaking.

U.S. relations with Sadat were almost entirely positive since he decided to cut relations with the Soviet Union and then, after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, to seek closer relations with and support from the United States. Subsequently, dramatic progress was made toward peace between Egypt and Israel, and the U.S. worked closely with Sadat in efforts to rebuild the Egyptian military and to strengthen the Egyptian economy.

It was Sadat's plans to raise the Egyptian economy that caused him the greatest disappointment and generated the most opposition to his policies. His decision to solicit the aid and friendship of the United States was largely based upon his conviction that this country could help bring about rapid economic change within Egypt. The sources of Egypt's problems are deep seated, however, and noticeable improvements will inevitably be slow in coming. Moreover, domestic opposition to economic reforms had begun increasingly to constrain Sadat's policy flexibility.

The United States has become deeply committed to Sadat's ambitious internal economic development programs and policies. Indeed, the United States currently provides more economic aid to Egypt than to any other nation and donates 40 percent of its food aid to Egypt through Title I of the food for peace program (PL 480). The Agency for International Development (AID) operation in Egypt is the largest in the world, with well over 100 personnel in the country. U.S. economic programs have attracted criticism within Egypt because they have thus far appeared to benefit mainly the technocrats and entrepreneurs rather than the impoverished lower classes. Though many support Sadat's initiatives, some U.S. analysts have argued that the U.S. is becoming too visibly associated with programs that are in danger of generating political opposition more rapidly than economic development.

In return for U.S. support, Sadat closely identified himself with U.S. interests in the Middle East. He did this with his dramatic initiatives in bringing about peace with Israel and his solid endorsement of U.S. efforts to formulate a strategic consensus in the region. Sadat saw Egypt's long-term interests as being closely parallel to those of the United States and had offered to cooperate closely in countering regional threats. Thus, the extent to which Sadat's successor decides to pursue this identification of Egyptian interests with those of the U.S. will be a primary concern of U.S. policymakers.

Bilateral relations between the United States and Egypt have gone beyond the peace treaty with Israel although the future of U.S. military and economic support for Egypt would certainly be called into question if Egypt withdrew from participation in the peace process with Israel. President Sadat was also steadfast in his support of U.S. efforts

to free the hostages held in Iran and was alone in allowing the military rescue mission the use of Egyptian facilities in our attempt to free them by force. More recently, in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Sadat supported U.S. efforts to establish a strategic consensus against further Soviet encroachments into the Persian Gulf region. In conjunction with this U.S. initiative he allowed joint U.S. and Egyptian military exercises within Egypt. In this regard he was openly supportive of U.S. plans to build a rapid deployment force (RDF) for possible use in the Persian Gulf region and had offered with few reservations Egyptian facilities for contingency use by the force.

President Sadat was personally involved in virtually all of the U.S. initiatives in the Middle East and many believed that his continued support was essential for their success. Some who argued that the United States had placed too much confidence in one man will watch closely now as the succession unfolds. To be sure, there would have been problems even had Sadat continued in power; there was troublesome unrest within Egypt and growing domestic opposition to Sadat's policies. Meanwhile, the other Arab countries were watching closely for signs of an Egyptian abandonment of the Palestinian cause in exchange for the Sinai in April 1982 and they were certain to cause problems if they thought that was the case. His successor will face the same problems and others; whoever assumes power can hardly be expected to align himself more closely with the U.S. than Anwar Sadat had done. His challenge, from the U.S. perspective will be to maintain close relations with the United States and Israel and while mending Egypt's political fences with it's Arab neighbors.

AWACS SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA

President Sadat's death provides new arguments for both supporters and opponents of the arms sales package to Saudi Arabia. The credibility of those contending arguments over the coming weeks may well shape the prospects for the sale.

For those who are greatly concerned about the instability of Middle Eastern regimes, Sadat's death emphasizes the unpredictability of domestic politics in the region and makes the possibility of comparable turmoil in Saudi Arabia seem less remote than it did a week ago. Opponents of the sale who are primarily concerned about Israel's security will watch for evidence that Egypt's new leaders might retreat from Sadat's rapprochement with Israel, a development that would increase the significance of whatever threat AWACS in Saudi hands would pose for Israel. From this perspective, Sadat was the foremost Arab leader who saw the Soviet Union as the principal threat to the region so that Egyptian departure from his policies would fatally weaken prospects for a strategic consensus.

Many supporters of the sale emphasize the importance of standing behind President Reagan in order to create a view of the United States as a dependable and predictable ally that is committed to a strategic consensus in the Middle East. They will argue that Sadat's death is a blow to the President's short term plans for that consensus -- and especially for his efforts to enhance the U.S. presence in the region -- and that it is therefore doubly important for Congress promptly to support the President on the sale.

If Libyan involvement in the assassination were to be established, the case of those supporting the President's strategic consensus-building efforts would be strengthened. Evidence that the assassination was planned and carried out

independently by disaffected Egyptians. On the other hand, would give greater credibility to those concerned with the instability of regimes in the region.

The speed and effectiveness with which a sense of stability and continuity can be created in Egypt will shape the extent of the effect of Sadat's death on the sale to the Saudis. An early atmosphere of continuity in Egypt could significantly dissipate the effect of the assassination on the arms sale debate, whereas uncertainty about the future of Egyptian stability and foreign policy will likely lead both supporters and opponents of the sale to emphasize the significance of Sadat's death for their case.

WALTER F. MONDALE

Talking Points

University of Minnesota
Hurbert H. Humphrey Institute
"Core" Class
Professors Gessaman and Einsweiler

DATE: Thursday, October 22, 3pm

Talking Points

Distinctions in Process: The senate vs. the Executive Branch

- o I have had a unique experience... servings in both the U.S. Senate and serving as Vice President.
- o This rare opportunity allowed me to work in and understand the workings of two of the world's most fascinating institutions... the U.S. Senate and the Executive Branch of the U.S. Federal Government.
- o I will always remember the feelings I had as a Senator about the White House when I witnessed all those resources and all that power and then my feelings as a Vice President looking at the Senate with all that power and all that flexibility.

You develop a sharply different perspective depending on which end of Pennsylvania Avenue you sit.

- o For the most part, the distinctions between a Senator and a Vice President or President are associated with :
 - the geographic area he or she represents -- a single state as compared with the nation as a whole.
 - limited Senate staff resources vs. virtually unlimited Executive Branch staffing support.
 - the Administration is expected to formulate an agenda and proposals to deal with problems; a Senator can judge and respond to proposals put forth... and on occasion propose his own solutions to problems in areas of interest.
 - the Executive Branch is required to deal on a daily bases with National Security matters and developments in foreign policy and intelligence. A senator, unless he serves on the armed services or foreign relations committees, rarely deals with foreign policy so directly.
 - all issues require an administration position, and a knowledgeable Vice President to support those positions -- Senators can pick and chose their issues.
 - media coverage is automatic for the administration... the problem becomes one of getting good news coverage. A Senator can spend all of his time looking for the press just to let his constituents know what he is up to.

- o Let me talk specifically about how the Senate and the Administration disperse their respective responsibilities:
- o While the separate branches of government were originally designed to be separate and equal branches of government, the Executive Branch, until recently, has eclipsed the Legislative Branch in personnel, technical support, and resources.
- o The modern Senate has established the:
 - Congressional Budget Office
 - Government Accounting Office
 - Congressional Research Service
 - Office of Technology Assessment
 - Cost Accounting Standards Board
 - and an expanded Committee structure.
- o The Senate has also allowed a large staff base to address constituent and committee-related assignments... all in an effort to deal with the Executive Branch on a more equal basis.
- o A Senator can serve on as many as 10 committees/subcommittees. He will have people either on his personal staff or committee staff responsible for the work going on in that committee.
- o A Committee Counsel or Staff Director for a committee are very powerful positions
 - at times these staff members speak for and act like they are the Senator.
- o A Senator has a dual purpose... represent his constituents and represent the best interests of the nation as a whole.
- o A typical day, if there is such a thing, in the life of a Senator consists of meetings...
 - meetings with constituents who need relief from one federal agency or piece of legislation or another.
 - meetings with staff members to go over the days, months agenda.
 - meetings with fellow members of Senate committees, subcommittees, and select committees.
 - meetings with Administration officials to determine what exactly the Administration wants in the form of legislation.
 - and finally, meetings with the press to describe what it was the Senator did for his constituents and the nation that day.

- o A Senator, for the most part, reacts to pressure from constituents, lobbyists and friends on issues. He is a judge who listens to arguments and testimony and then votes.
- o On occasion, a Senator can put forth his own initiative, designed to address problems his constituents face, or deal with problems he has a strong interest in.
- o The Executive: has, at its disposal, the federal workforce:
 - all 13 Cabinet level Departments
 - the Office of Management and Budget
 - Council of Economic Advisors
 - National Security Council
 - CIA
 - Domestic Policy Staff
 - Trade Representative
 - Office of Science and Technology Policy
- o The Executive Branch - and the administration elected to run it for at least four years, is responsible for putting forth an agenda -- ideas -- solutions to problems -- all across the board.
- o At first you realize just how big and diverse our nation is. You also quickly understand we are an international power with responsibilities extending far beyond our own borders.
- o Most of the work in the White House on the administration's proposals is time spent on building support, coalition and understanding for an administration position.
- o Second, marshalling vast resources to convince the Congress and the American people of the worthiness of our plans.
- o Finally, when looking at the distinctions between the Senate and the Executive Branch, it is always helpful to remember that we all work for the same goal, a better - stronger America.

WALTER F. MONDALE

Talking Points

University of Minnesota
Law School Class: "The Lawyers Role in Washington"
Professor Victor Kramer

DATE: Friday, October 23, 1981, 10:15 AM

This class is an honors seminar for third-year students. The subject of the seminar is the role of lawyers in Washington.

This particular class has already met with Ben Civiletti and Lloyd Cutler... you are the last top level Washington official they will meet with.

You have been asked to address the importance of having lawyers serve in the federal government in general, and the White House specifically. Your talking points (see attached) make special reference to the role of the President's Counsel and the numerous interactions between the White House and the Justice Department.



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