

Memorandum from ...

RICHARD MOE

T.H.

Fritz -

Here's the memo we discussed.
Please don't give it to the reporter or even make reference to it because I've given it to the Dukakis people and there's some reason to believe they'll use parts of it.

Hope all's well.

lie f
center
memo

Memorandum
for
The Vice President

April 20, 1984

Re: The Vice Presidential
Selection Process

While it's clearly too early to begin the process of deciding who the Vice Presidential nominee should be, it is not too early to begin focusing on what the selection process itself should be. This memorandum attempts to raise some of the issues that need to be addressed in structuring such a process and suggests in broad terms what such a process might look like. Once you react to it, it can be fleshed out with specific steps.

Before attempting to outline the process, it is necessary to ask, what do you want the process to achieve? What are its goals? Here, roughly in order of importance, are those things I think any Vice Presidential selection process should produce:

1. The selection of someone who, if elected with you, is in fact, as well as perceived to be, fully capable of assuming the Presidency should that need ever arise.
2. Someone who, in broad terms, is both personally and politically compatible with you.
3. Someone who, all things considered, can help you win the general election and at the very least not be a drag on the ticket.
4. The avoidance of any later surprises and/or embarrassments.

5. The impression of you as a thoughtful and careful decision-maker who, despite whatever pressures may exist, makes up his own mind and places the interest of the country above all else.

6. By means of consultation within the Party and perhaps by the selection itself, the facilitating of reconciliation and unity within the Party.

Before outlining a suggested process, let me emphasize three points which I believe are critical to the success of any selection process.

First, you must ensure that you have sufficient time and freedom to make the best possible choice. The worst thing that can happen here, as history attests, is to be rushed to a decision at the convention itself without the opportunity to fully consider and reflect upon a range of choices. This means that the process must begin well before the convention; it also means that you should arrive at the convention with your decision virtually, but not necessarily finally, made. Given the certainty that there will be substantial other demands on your time and attention between the California primary and the convention -- platform, rules and credentials fights, your acceptance speech, fund-raising, reconciliation with other candidates, and perhaps even fighting for the nomination itself -- it is essential that you insist upon sufficient time to meet with prospective candidates, consult with a wide range of people, and most

importantly, reflect upon the choices you face. You should make it clear to everyone that regardless of whatever else is going on, you have to have large blocks of time set aside for this process.

Second, you should keep a genuinely open mind on the question of who you want to select for as long as possible.

Hübert always used to tell us that you shouldn't make a decision in politics until you have to, and nowhere does that rule apply more aptly than in picking a Vice Presidential nominee. It's not just a question of insisting publicly that you have not yet made a decision, but even more importantly it's a question of permitting yourself the option of changing your mind if the circumstances warrant. The most persuasive case for this approach is the fact that you never would have been selected Vice President unless Jimmy Carter had embraced it. He and others have told me, as I'm sure they have you, that he changed his mind several times during his own selection process. Every time he shortened the list you just barely made the cut, but as he learned more about you, you moved up higher and higher on the list. I think you should approach the process in the same way, that is, with a view of it as an educational process that is bound to teach you things about these individuals that you didn't know before. You have one big advantage that Carter didn't have: you know what the Vice Presidency is all about and exactly what

you would expect of someone whom you chose. Therefore you can focus virtually all of your attention on the individuals and their qualities as opposed to your concept of the office.

In making this decision, there are two threshold questions which need to be satisfied. The first is ability to be President and the second is personal and political compatibility with you. Once those questions are satisfied, it's still important in my judgment to keep an open mind on the political factors, i.e., who can help you most to get elected. For example, the conventional wisdom is that you should look for a Southern conservative Senator or Governor who can help you carry a significant part of that region. There is a lot to be said for that approach, but there is another approach which suggests that you should do the bold, unexpected and innovative thing by disregarding conventional considerations such as regional and ideological "balance" and picking instead someone -- a woman, a Black, another Presidential candidate, even a non-politician like Iacocca -- who would serve an altogether different political purpose. I'm not arguing for this approach but simply saying that it ought to be given a full hearing and not dismissed out of hand. You are already committed to seriously considering a woman, and the same consideration should be given to other approaches.

Third, despite all the pressures and temptations, you should never allow political considerations to be placed

ahead of the two threshold questions mentioned above. If someone is not perceived to be capable of becoming President, his or her choice will clearly be politically damaging to the campaign. The individual doesn't have to be well known to pass that threshold, but he or she must be able to stand up under all the scrutiny that you underwent and to pass muster. Also, if the individual isn't in fact compatible with you on fundamental issues as well as in terms of personal chemistry, it will result in an awkward if not miserable campaign and perhaps administration in which you are both explaining your differences. It's well to keep in mind that almost all the pressures and advice you will get on the Vice Presidency will be politically motivated. You're the one who has to keep in mind constantly what is most important: being able to do the job and being able to get along with you.

All that having been said, let me suggest several elements of the process for your consideration. The timing of these steps depends largely upon events since the public ones at least cannot be taken until the contest for the nomination is effectively over. Barring unforeseen events that's not likely to occur until after the California primary. If that's the case, the only thing to do before then is to respond to questions about the Vice Presidency to the effect that you don't intend to discuss the matter or even to focus seriously on it until the contest for the

nomination is effectively over, which you don't expect until after June 5th. Beyond that, here are the elements which I think the process should contain:

1. Make it clear publicly that this is the most important decision you expect to make before assuming the Presidency, together with the following points:

a. The criteria you intend to employ are as follows:

(i) the person chosen must be capable of serving as President if required to do so;

(ii) the person chosen must be personally and politically compatible with you;

(iii) the person chosen should be helpful in unifying the Party and in aiding Democratic prospects in the general election.

b. Outline the general process that you intend to follow in making the decision in terms of consultations, meetings with prospective candidates, etc.

c. Make it clear that you intend to keep your own counsel on this matter and that no one is authorized to speak for you as to your preferences.

2. Develop a list of those persons you want to seriously consider. As much useful information about them from publicly available sources as possible should be compiled and provided to you. This should be a fairly long list, say 15 to 20 persons and perhaps even more, and it should then

be determined whether it should be made available to the press. If so, the point would be to get these names into the public domain in such a way that it's clear that you're considering a full range of choices as well as in such a way that you will get useful press and public reaction to them. Obviously the construction of this list is extremely important. It's equally important to have an individual strategy for dealing with each person as to whether he or she wants to be considered. It's essential that throughout the process each candidate be treated with consideration, tact and sensitivity.

3. Establish a broad but manageable consultative process that has basically two elements:

a. Asking important persons and institutions for their recommendations early in the process. For example, it would be a useful thing for you to visit the House and Senate Democratic Caucuses in early June to talk about the Convention and the November election generally but also to specifically ask each member to convey to you privately his or her recommendations for the Vice Presidency. Similar invitations could be conveyed to the Democratic Governors and Mayors, the labor movement, your principal fundraisers, and other important groups. All of those who were helpful in the nomination process and/or who are important to the general election effort should be asked early for their suggestions. Apart from making them feel part of the process, this will reduce the pressure for individual consultation with each of them later on.

b. Asking people individually what they think about specific candidates. This can only be done by you spending a great deal of time either in person or on the phone. This will again involve important political and institutional leaders, but it should be designed primarily to get candid and useful impressions of individuals from persons who know the candidates well. Again, it was this kind of consultation on the part of Jimmy Carter in 1976 that helped your cause when he talked to so many Senators and others who knew you well.

4. Once the list is shortened to a manageable number, thorough financial and background checks should be undertaken on the final candidates. This obviously must be handled very carefully, sensitively and, most of all, confidentially. Each of the finalists should be asked to provide specific financial and other information, including past tax returns, which can be thoroughly evaluated. In addition, someone other than yourself should meet personally with each of the candidates to ask relevant questions. The one thing the process can't allow is major embarrassing surprises.

5. You should spend as much time as you think is required with each of the final candidates, with the particular purpose of trying to satisfy yourself on the compatibility question. I don't think these sessions should be as formally and publicly structured as Carter did his in 1976, because

most of these people you will already have known for some time. On the other hand, we shouldn't make any attempt to completely hide the sessions either. It's important that enough of this process be generally known so that, at its conclusion, you get full credit for having done a careful and thorough job. In any case, these sessions should be completed before you go to San Francisco.

All of this, of course, needs to be more fully fleshed out. I wanted to offer this broad outline, however, so that you could react to it generally and accelerate your own process of thinking about it, which I'm sure you've already begun. I've had some preliminary discussions on the process already with President Carter, Charlie Kirbo and others, and if you have no objection I thought I would spend a day or two in Atlanta talking with them more fully about how they designed their process and what they learned from it. It's clear from the above outline that I have used Carter's 1976 process as a model and I think it deserves to serve that role. Not only did it produce the right result (!), but it was perceived to be a careful and deliberate process which, once completed, enhanced Carter's stature.

Needless to say, I'm pleased and prepared to help you on this in any way you see fit.

Richard Moe

cc: Jim Johnson
Bob Beckel

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May 18, 1988

Mr. Richard Moe
Davis, Polk & Wardwell
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Suite 400
Washington, DC 20005

Dear Mr. Moe:

As you know, the Fund's Task Force on the Vice Presidency is nearing its end and there are two important pieces of information to be relayed to you at this time. First, a press conference has been scheduled to be held at the National Press Club on June 16. It will take place in the Zenger Room from 10:30 until noon and will be followed by a lunch from noon until 2:00 p.m. in the Private Dining Room. Heather Quist will call to confirm your attendance and make hotel reservations at the Hay-Adams for those needing them.

The second piece of business concerns the enclosed Task Force report and additional comments. I apologize for not leaving you more time to see them but we must have your final word on this by May 23 if we are to have the published report ready by June 16. The enclosed version of the report contains few changes from the version agreed to earlier. It has, of course, been copy-edited and the Task Force recommendations have been highlighted. In addition, a lead paragraph has been added to give the Report a more contemporary focus. Finally, Jack Watson has rewritten two paragraphs: the first on the majority's rejection of the special election idea; the second, in the duties in office section, on the issue of staff and resources at the vice president's disposal.

Given the strict time constraints, if I do not hear from you by May 23, I will assume you have approved the report. I look forward to seeing you on the 16th.

With best regards,



Richard Sinopoli
Program Officer

Memorandum from ...

RICHARD MOE

T.H.

Fritz -

Here's the draft report on the vice presidential task force which I just received. I don't know how helpful it will be in dealing with the Trib reporter, but I think you'll find it interesting nonetheless.

Dick

File

DRAFT

REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE VICE PRESIDENCY

The history of the U.S. vice presidency is uniquely American. Created almost by accident, held in little esteem for over a century, this position, a heartbeat away from the most important job in the modern world, has only recently been elevated to a matter of critical importance. Now there is intense interest in likely presidential running mates once the serious candidates for the presidency emerge. The way a candidate chooses his running mate is taken by many as an indication of the candidate's skills as a decisionmaker. The person chosen plays an important role in the presidential campaign. And, perhaps more important, the person chosen is someone the president and the public will have to live with for the next four years--and possibly beyond.

Historically, nine vice presidents--more than one-fifth of those who have held the office--have succeeded to the presidency upon the death or resignation of the incumbent president; four others have gone on to be elected president. Today, the vice president is presumed to be a candidate for president, and also presumed to be his party's frontrunner for the nomination; five of the seven most recent vice presidents subsequently received their parties' nomination in their own right, and George Bush seems certain to make it six of eight. Four of the five vice presidents who have succeeded to the presidency in this century later were elected to that office. The exception, Gerald R. Ford, came very close, as did the two most recent incumbent vice presidents to be nominated for president, Richard M. Nixon and Hubert H. Humphrey. For all the attention to the much-ballyhooed

"Van Buren Syndrome" (that is, that since Martin Van Buren in 1836, vice presidents have not been elected directly from the vice presidency to the presidency), no other office in recent years brings its incumbent as close to the White House as the vice presidency.

The modern vice presidency has also become an important and visible political institution. The vice president's access to the president and to staff, budget, and other resources has grown substantially in recent years. So have the duties that presidents, now almost as a matter of course, assign their vice presidents, both as diplomatic and political envoys and as confidential senior advisers. The growth of the importance of the role was made clear by the Twenty-fifth Amendment (1967), which assigned the vice president critical new roles in situations of presidential disability and created a mechanism to assure that the office would never remain vacant for long.

Despite these changes in the importance of the vice presidency, most discussions of the office are mired in hoary stereotypes. Pundits invariably trot out the familiar old quotes about the office--"not worth a pitcher of warm spit" (John Nance Garner), "not a crime exactly. . . but it's kind of a disgrace" (Mr. Dooley), the vice president's only job is "to ring the White House bell every morning and ask what is the state of health of the president" (Thomas Marshall), and so on. Proposals for reforming the vice presidency--other than abolition--usually fall into one of two categories. Some start from the belief that since the president is overburdened and the vice president has little to do, the pressure on the president should be relieved by assigning some responsibilities to the vice president. Others

start with the assumption that since the vice presidency is merely the successor office to the presidency and its lack of powers and duties discourages worthy political leaders from aspiring to the office, the role of the vice president should be made more substantial and thus more appealing.

To be sure, the vice presidency is not perfect. Strong arguments can be made that the office should never have been created by the Framers of the Constitution and that it now should be abolished. But a majority of the Task Force believes that, practically speaking, two centuries of history have woven the vice presidency into the fabric of the American constitutional order. The majority also believes that in recent times it has become a more prominent and, on balance, a more promising and constructive office.

The Task Force also strongly believes that understanding how and why the vice presidency has attained its present status is critical to ensuring that many familiar reform ideas, most of them unhelpful and outdated, are dropped from the political agenda, and that new ideas, designed to improve and enhance some recent aspects of the office, replace them. Specifically, the members of the Task Force unanimously reject recent suggestions that the vice president should be assigned an additional executive position, such as secretary of a department, in the administration.

Abolish the Vice Presidency?

The vice presidency was a late, even casual creation of the Constitutional Convention, designed mainly to buttress the electoral college method of choosing the president. Because the electoral college was created in an era of strong local attachments, the Constitution initially called on electors, when voting for the president, to "vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with

themselves." To assure that both votes would be cast seriously, the office of vice president was established for the runner-up in the presidential election; its occupant was to assume the powers and duties of the president (but not the office itself) in the event of the president's removal, death, resignation, or disability. The historical record also indicates that the Framers intended that the vice president's role as acting president would last only until a special presidential election could be held, but this was not clearly stated in the Constitution.

Two important developments during the nineteenth century undermined the Framers' intentions with respect to the vice presidency. First, political parties quickly formed and began nominating candidates for both president and vice president. As a result, the original electoral college, unsuited for party competition, broke down: in 1800, Thomas Jefferson and his vice presidential running mate, Aaron Burr, received an equal number of votes for president. Although the Twelfth Amendment (1804), which prevented recurrences of this calamity by forcing electors to vote separately for president and vice president, removed the Framers' original rationale for having a vice president, efforts to abolish the office itself failed. Instead, it devolved from its original status as the office awarded to the second-most successful presidential candidate to a political consolation prize for largely undistinguished party politicians.

Another nineteenth century development was the resolution (initially by assertion, then by custom) of the constitutional ambiguities regarding the vice president's status when the presidency became vacant in favor of full vice presidential succession to the presidency for the duration of the departed president's term. Although presidential succession acts in force from 1792 to 1947 mandated a special presidential election if both the

elected president and vice president left office before their original four-year terms had expired, in the absence of any surviving delegates to the Constitutional Convention or published records of its proceedings, Vice President John Tyler successfully claimed the presidency when President William Henry Harrison died in 1841. Later vice presidents followed his example.

In view of the early history of the vice presidency, the argument that the office never should have been created (or, at least, that it should have been abolished as part of the Twelfth Amendment) is strong. So is the presumption that a system of special elections whenever the office of president becomes vacant should have been created. Indeed, some members of the Task Force regard these proposals as appealing even now.*

Although the Task Force considers the idea of special presidential elections serious and provocative (not least because it conforms to the constitutionally-stated ideal that the president "be elected"), a majority rejects it for two main reasons. First, on a pragmatic note, two centuries of constitutional history have imbedded the vice presidency both in our national political institutions and in the public consciousness. Even with its inherent constraints and limitations, the vice presidency is part of our political heritage and tradition and should not be discarded unless there are powerful and compelling reasons to do so. The majority does not think that those reasons exist. Second, and the majority of the Task Force believes even more important, the vice presidency in recent years has begun to evolve into a more useful and valuable institution.

*See Comments by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Hugh Heclo, and Henry Reuss, page xx.

Simply stated, the overriding reason for having a vice president is to ensure that there is someone who is well prepared to assume the presidency on a moment's notice. The advantage of the vice presidency is that the person who holds the office, if the president permits it, can be as knowledgeable about the full range of government activities and presidential decisions as the president. Although the vice president, like the copilot of a jumbo jet, is not in command of the plane, the vice president is there to assist the president in the discharge of his duties, and he is ready to assume the controls whenever it becomes necessary to do so. Like a copilot, the vice president may never be called upon to "fly the plane," but it is comforting to know that he is there to do so if the need arises. In addition, the majority of the members of the Task Force believe that there have been some significant strides in the role of the vice presidency in recent years in the areas of selection, duties, and succession. Thus, the majority of the members of the Task Force believe that the evolution of the office under recent presidents has been constructive, and that the utilization of the vice president by the president should be encouraged and continued.

Selection

Selecting a vice presidential candidate is one of the most important decisions that a political party and its presidential nominee must make. Its importance derives mainly from the constitutional provision that in case of the death, resignation, disability, or removal of the president from office, the vice president shall become president. Accordingly, the Task Force has both assessed the vice presidential selection process carefully and considered ways of improving it.

The good news is that, in general, twentieth-century vice presidents have been better qualified to be president than those of the nineteenth century, and better qualified in the second half of the twentieth century than in the first half. One measure, albeit imperfect, of this improvement is that although none of the four nineteenth-century vice presidents who succeeded to the office upon the death of the president--John Tyler, Millard Fillmore, Andrew Johnson, and Chester A. Arthur--was even nominated by his party to run for the presidency, all five twentieth-century successor presidents (Theodore Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Gerald R. Ford) have been--and all but Ford were then elected. Another measure is the latest round of historians' ratings of the presidents; according to historians surveyed by Professor Robert K. Murray in 1981, the successor presidents of the nineteenth century included one failure (Andrew Johnson), two below average presidents (Tyler and Fillmore), and only one who was even average (Arthur). As a group, the twentieth-century successor presidents actually rate higher than the elected presidents--two near great presidents (Theodore Roosevelt and Truman), one above average (Lyndon Johnson), one average (Ford), and one below average (Coolidge).

The record of improvement in recent years is even more compelling. Since 1948, about half the vice presidential candidates--for example, Henry Cabot Lodge, Lyndon Johnson, Walter F. Mondale, and George Bush--have had more years of experience in high government office than the presidential candidates with whom they were running. In addition, about half the vice presidential candidates--for example, Earl Warren, Estes Kefauver, Hubert Humphrey, Lyndon Johnson, Mondale, and Bush--already had sought or been

prominently mentioned for the presidency in their own right at the time they were picked.

To be sure, vice presidential nominees have been and will continue to be selected by the heads of their tickets and their parties mainly to help win elections. Nominations for vice president are, first and foremost, political choices. Certain kinds of ticket-balancing--notably by region (north-south, east-west), religion (Protestant-Catholic), and experience (Washington-state government)--continue to be practiced, but others, balancing ideological opposites for example, rarely come into play. And to the extent that balancing the ticket helps to unite a political party, it furthers a commendable goal.

What has changed is the weight given to the vice president's capacity to succeed to the presidency. The choice of a nominee who seems less than competent or who differs substantially from the presidential candidate on the issues no longer passes unremarked. Instead, such a nomination invites a barrage of critical commentary by the press, negative advertising by the opposition, and embarrassment in network television debates between the vice presidential candidates. Ultimately, the price of a rash or overly "political" nomination for vice president is paid in the coin of the electoral realm: votes on election day.

The public's increased concern with the competency of the vice president can be explained in large part by the visibility of the office in an age of pervasive national government and electronic communications. Since World War II, moreover, the United States has assumed the role of leader of the Western alliance in a world beset by new technologies that make instant and total nuclear war a possibility. If, as Samuel Johnson said, "the

prospect of a hanging concentrates the mind wonderfully," so has the possibility that the death or disability of the president might mean that the vice president will exercise the powers of the presidency on short or even sudden notice concentrated some share of the public mind on the selection of vice presidents.

Parties and presidential candidates in search of victory have responded to these new public concerns. Jimmy Carter, like most recent presidential candidates, was able to sew up his nomination well in advance of the convention. His advisers developed a list of potential running mates; prospective nominees were then asked to provide extensive information about their backgrounds and finances and invited for long discussions with Carter. The process resulted in the selection of a vice presidential nominee, Walter Mondale, with whom Carter worked well during the campaign and in office.

Ronald Reagan's selection of Bush in 1980, although based on a less thorough search, demonstrates the political importance presidential candidates now attach to meeting public concerns about the vice presidency. Reagan seriously considered as potential running mates only those who already had undergone intense public scrutiny while running for or serving as president, notably Bush and former president Ford.

As the incentives for presidential candidates and their parties to seek out talented political leaders for vice president have grown, so have the incentives for such leaders to accept a vice presidential nomination. (One new disincentive--intense preselection scrutiny--also has been created, but it is hardly unique to the vice presidency.) Far from being a political dead end, the vice presidency is now the main steppingstone to a party's presidential nomination. Beginning with Nixon, every vice president who has sought to be nominated for president has succeeded. As noted earlier, no one

since Van Buren has done what Bush hopes to do in 1988--that is, be elected president while serving as vice president--but several have come very close and nine have become president through succession.

Thus, there have been noteworthy recent improvements in the vice presidential selection process. Perhaps more important, these improvements are grounded in political realities that are likely to endure. Even now, the selection process does not assure that vice presidential nominees who are qualified to be president will always be chosen. But, we suspect, it would be as impossible to devise a foolproof system for the selection of vice presidential candidates as it is to devise one for selecting presidential nominees.

The speed with which vice presidential candidates are selected can still create serious problems. Even early winners of their parties' presidential nomination, like Carter, have only a limited time to make one of their most important decisions; candidates whose fight for the nomination lasts until the convention run the risk of having to pick a running mate in less than a day. Experienced politicians are well aware of the dangers involved in making such an important decisions in the frenzied atmosphere of a candidate's hotel suite in the wee hours of the morning.

The Task Force believes that this problem can be alleviated without the passage of a new law or a constitutional amendment. Instead, the Task Force recommends that the press and the parties bring the issue of the choice of a vice president to the candidates' attention frequently during the primary campaign just as they would any other important presidential election issue.

Moreover, the Task Force recommends that the two national party chairs ^{possible} request that their parties' presidential nominees institute a process for the

evaluation of potential running mates at the earliest feasible time. The evaluation process that a candidate decides to employ--questionnaires, interviews, informal inquiries, polling, or a mix of these--is less important than the creation of the process itself.

The press should include questions about the procedures the candidate has established for evaluating potential vice presidents on the list of major questions it asks of the presidential candidates. Such an effort will be fruitless, of course, if platitudinous answers are allowed to pass unchallenged. And the press should bear in mind that the more frequently such questions are asked, the more likely candidates are to think about answers and act on them.

Duties

Presidents have long struggled with the question of what role their chief understudy could play in addition to serving as a living reminder of their own mortality. The Constitution states clearly that the "executive Power" is indivisibly invested in the president, and until very recently, the vice presidency was not thought of as a primarily executive office. For example, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower delegated tasks to Vice President Nixon, he was always careful to define these assignments as "requests" because he believed that the vice presidency was a legislative office. Eisenhower's view has a strong constitutional foundation--the vice president's only ongoing role, described in Article I, is to preside over the Senate, casting tiebreaking votes. Although the real meaning of the vice presidency derives from its relationship to the executive branch, and practice increasingly has defined the vice presidency as mainly executive in

character (Nixon reported that he spent 90 percent of his time on executive matters), questions about the executive functions that the vice president can and should undertake remain unresolved.

In addition to analyzing the effects of the vice presidency on the presidency, observers of the office have thought long and hard about its effects on the vice president. Is service in the office a "making" or a "maiming" experience? Clearly the vice president's relationship to the president must be confidential and subordinate; to become vice president is to be bound, by tradition if not by law, to the president's public policies and private direction. This status forces vice presidents to mute the very qualities of independence and leadership that brought them to their position and that would, if the call should come, invigorate their presidencies. The evisceration of the vice president is hardly inevitable--the generally successful record of the century's successor presidents demonstrates that--but clearly it is more likely to occur if the duties of the office are not substantial and challenging.

Thus, to enhance the usefulness of the vice presidency, the Task Force has developed three general precepts for future presidents that derive from the simple premise that the most important duty of the vice president is to be ready at all times to succeed to the presidency and that the correlative duty of the president is to see that the vice president is prepared to do so.

o The Task Force recommends that presidents should continue the practice established by their most recent predecessors, presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan, of granting the vice president complete access to the classified and confidential material that is available to the president. The extent, importance, and complexity of the U.S. role in world affairs does not

+ 6 his language

leave room for an information gap between the president and the person who is constitutionally charged to be ready to assume the powers and duties of the presidency on sudden notice.

X Personal Assistant *Pres + to his Staff, Cabinet etc*
 o The Task Force believes that the president should reject the

Agree
familiar suggestion that the way to enhance the vice presidency is to give the vice president a cabinet post or any specific managerial responsibility.

Historically, the two vice presidents who have been assigned such positions--Henry A. Wallace, who served as Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare, and Nelson A. Rockefeller, who served as head of the White House Domestic Council--abandoned their assignments in failure. An executive position may place the vice president in an uncomfortable and publicly adversarial relationship with both the president and other appointed officials. Moreover, unlike all other appointees, the vice president cannot be removed from the administration by the president. Such a position also focuses the vice president's attention on one policy area, however important that area may be, reducing the vice president's general preparedness for succession.

X Best way in specifying functions
 o The Task Force also recommends that the president and Congress provide the vice president with the resources needed to prepare for succession to the presidency and to carry out other responsibilities that are assigned by the president. Although for many years the resources of the vice presidency were woefully inadequate, recent vice presidents have been able to add to the resources of the office and preserve the gains of their predecessors, thereby adding substantially to the "institutionalization" of the vice presidency. Specifically, Johnson was given a suite of offices in the Old Executive Office Building (previous vice presidents had worked at the

Capitol); Agnew gained a line item for the vice president's office in the executive budget; Ford persuaded Nixon to increase his budget (and consequently, the staff he could hire on his own discretion) substantially; Rockefeller obtained a weekly private lunch with the president (along with a vice presidential mansion and a new seal of office); and Mondale was given an office in the West Wing, the right to attend all presidential meetings, and full access to the flow of papers to and from the president. Bush, with the approval of President Reagan, was the full beneficiary of the successful efforts of his predecessors.

I doubt this

The Task Force, in general, applauds these improvements in the vice president's capacity to serve the president and to prepare for the presidency. At the same time, the Task Force believes that the current budget and staff of the vice president's office are adequate and cautions against further increases in either.

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The Task Force also urges that each president and vice president define their working relationship, taking into account their temperaments, experiences, and strengths as well as their views of executive leadership. When, as has been the case in recent administrations, presidents trust and respect their vice presidents, they may want to adapt the following suggestions:

o Whenever possible, the vice president should serve as general adviser to the president on the full range of presidential issues and concerns. Presidents may wish to rely on vice presidents in this way in order to give them ^x experience in the broad array of policy areas that they need to be familiar with if they have to assume the presidency. After all, the vice president is first and foremost an understudy to the president and an understudy cannot be of much use if he knows only a fraction of the star's

lines. Recent presidents also have found that it can be in their interest to use the vice president as a wide-ranging senior adviser, especially since the vice president is among the most experienced politicians in the White House and one of the few members of the president's official family who is not burdened with specific assignments.

o The Task Force also recommends that the president assign the vice president other responsibilities that do not conflict with the role of general adviser. Among these is the occasional use of the vice president as a special presidential envoy in foreign affairs. Since the vice president enjoys a position of great esteem in other countries, messages communicated to foreign leaders or to their people by the vice president often carry more force than those sent through normal channels. The vice president can perform a similar diplomatic role domestically. Because other public officials and political leaders may be more willing to speak frankly to the vice president than to the president, the vice president also can be a useful sounding board for the administration and give the president a fuller sense of what Congress and the rest of the political community are thinking. And, of course, the vice president usually is the administration's most effective public and party advocate, speaking as proxy for the president.

at he is seen as a strong player
X Political Role & Lyin; Intra-Party
Succession

Every concern about the vice presidency is, in the end, a concern about succession. Selecting a vice presidential candidate can be instrumental in uniting a political party or winning the general election, but what makes vice presidential selection critically important is the possibility that the vice president may succeed to the presidency. Although



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