

CBS NEWS POLLAmbassador
FYI

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FOR RELEASE: 6/16/95
6:30 p.m. EDT**CBS NEWS/TOKYO BROADCASTING SYSTEM POLL:
TRADE TROUBLES AND U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS**

June 4-6, 1995

The recent acrimony over trade between Japan and the United States has the public in both countries more concerned than usual about relations between the two. In surveys conducted jointly by CBS NEWS and the TOKYO BROADCASTING SYSTEM in the United States and Japan, U.S.-Japan trade disputes weigh more heavily on the minds of Japanese -- nearly all of whom worry about their own country's economic situation. Meanwhile, Americans are expressing a strong belief in the "Buy America" principle and have much more optimistic views about the U.S. economy than the Japanese have about theirs.

TRADE RESTRICTIONS AND THE LUXURY TARIFF

The Japanese historically have paid more attention to trade conflicts than Americans have. But the U.S. threat to impose a 100% tariff on imported Japanese luxury cars has been noticed in BOTH countries. Nearly two out of three Americans have heard or read something about the dispute; 84% of Japanese have.

Opinion about the tariff threat divides along national lines. Most Americans view the tariff as an appropriate response, while the vast majority of Japanese do not.

IS 100% LUXURY CAR TARIFF APPROPRIATE?YES
NO

<u>U.S.</u>	<u>JAPAN</u>
56%	9%
38	79

There is, however, a surprising willingness in BOTH the U.S. and Japan to accept at least some of the blame for the trade problems between the two countries. More than four in ten Americans and more than six in ten Japanese give their countries a share of the blame for current trade problems. And majorities in both countries believe the Japanese government restricts the sale of American goods at least somewhat.

MORE TO BLAME FOR U.S.-JAPAN TRADE PROBLEMSU.S.
JAPAN
BOTH EQUALLY

<u>U.S.</u>	<u>JAPAN</u>
34%	29%
46	22
7	42

CBS News interviewed a nationwide random sample of 1,256 adults by telephone in the United States June 4-6, 1995. The Tokyo Broadcasting System interviewed a nationwide random sample of 1,255 adults by telephone in Japan June 5-7, 1995. For each country's results, the error due to sampling could be plus or minus three percentage points for results based on the entire sample.

There is LESS willingness in either country to shoulder part of the responsibility for U.S. auto makers' failure to sell cars in Japan. Americans blame Japanese trade restrictions, while the Japanese say it is more because of the lower quality of U.S. cars and the lack of a selling effort by U.S. auto makers. In fact, by more than 14 to 1, Japanese say their country's cars are a better value than American cars. Americans are evenly divided on this question.

BUYING AMERICAN

In this survey, Americans express a strong preference to buy American. More than three out of four would choose a U.S. car if they were going to buy a new one. 81% would buy American given a choice between an American and a Japanese product at the same price. Half would STILL buy American even if the Japanese product cost less. There is more willingness to buy Japanese among several groups: the young, the college-educated, Westerners, those who think trade with Japan is good for the U.S., and the 39% of Americans who say they have ever owned a Japanese car.

THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

Six out of ten Japanese and more than a third of Americans think relations between the two countries today are UNfriendly. For the American public, this is the highest figure in the ten-year history of CBS News/TBS polling, and the second highest figure among the Japanese public. In the past, trade disputes have affected Japanese opinion about relations between the two countries, while the overwhelming percentage of Americans have viewed U.S.-Japan relations through rose-colored glasses -- even when disputes have arisen. Now, while the American view is still rosier than the Japanese view, the change is significant.

<u>RELATIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND JAPAN</u>		<u>U.S.</u>	<u>JAPAN</u>
FRIENDLY		60%	39%
UNFRIENDLY		36	60

One reason for Japanese concern about trade problems in this poll is a strong worry about the state of Japan's economy. 86% of Japanese describe their country's economy as being in BAD condition -- higher than the number of Americans who described the U.S. economy that way at any time in the last ten years. In fact, for the last year and a half, most Americans have said the U.S. economy is in GOOD shape.

As for the future of U.S.-Japan relations, there is also more concern than usual. Most Japanese (and many Americans) don't expect the trade situation to change much in the next few years, but 27% of Americans and 20% of Japanese think it will get WORSE. And more than a third of Americans say their own attitude about buying Japanese products has changed because of current trade problems with Japan. Another reason for concern in Japan is that less than half of the Japanese public now think trade with the United States is good for the Japanese economy - down 16 points since 1989.

Neither country's citizens express much trust in their elected leaders in dealing with trade disputes. In the U.S., only 38% say President Clinton is doing a good job solving trade problems between the U.S. and Japan. Only 12% of Japanese think Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama is doing a good job with trade, and the same low 12% of Japanese give good marks to Clinton.

CBS News/Tokyo Broadcasting System Poll
U.S./Japan Survey
June 4-6, 1995

4. How would you rate the condition of the U.S./the Japanese economy these days? Is it very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad?

Total Respondents

	<u>U.S.</u>		<u>JAPAN</u>		<u>U.S.</u>		<u>Japan</u>	
					<u>Jun93</u>		<u>Jun93</u>	
Very good	3	%	1	%	1	%	1	%
Fairly good	50		12		33		28	
Fairly bad	30		61		40		58	
Very bad	15		25		23		11	
DK/NA	2		1		3		2	

17. How would you describe relations between Japan and the United States today? Would you say relations are very friendly, somewhat friendly, somewhat unfriendly, or very unfriendly?

					<u>U.S.</u>		<u>Japan</u>	
					<u>Dec94</u>		<u>Dec94</u>	
Very friendly	5	%	1	%	7	%	1	%
Somewhat friendly	55		38		72		49	
Somewhat unfriendly	32		54		15		45	
Very unfriendly	4		6		3		4	
DK/NA	4		1		3		1	

18. On balance, do you think trade with Japan/the U.S. -- both buying and selling products -- is good for the U.S./the Japanese economy, or is it bad for the U.S./the Japanese economy, or does it have no effect?

					<u>U.S.</u>		<u>Japan</u>	
					<u>Jun93</u>		<u>Jun93</u>	
Good for U.S./Japanese economy	45	%	47	%	46	%	59	%
Bad for U.S./Japanese economy	40		17		40		8	
Has no effect	6		31		10		32	
DK/NA	9		5		4		1	

CBS News/TBS Poll -- U.S./Japan Survey -- June 4-6, 1995

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19. How much have you heard or read about the United States government's threat to impose a one-hundred percent (100%) tariff on Japanese luxury cars sold in the U.S. -- a lot, some, or not much?

Total Respondents

U.S. JAPAN

A lot	25 %	52 %
Some	38	32
Not much	32	9
Nothing (Vol.)	3	6
DK/NA	2	1

20. The United States government has threatened to impose a one-hundred percent (100%) tariff on Japanese luxury cars sold in the U.S. in retaliation against Japanese trade practices that make it difficult for U.S. car companies to compete in the Japanese market. Do you think the threatened 100% tariff on Japanese luxury cars sold in the United States is appropriate, or not appropriate?

Appropriate	56 %	9 %
Not appropriate	38	79
DK/NA	6	12

21. Which country do you think is MORE to blame for the current trade problems between the United States and Japan -- is the United States more to blame, or is Japan more to blame?

U.S. more to blame	34 %	29 %
Japan more to blame	46	22
Both equally to blame (Vol.)	7	42
DK/NA	13	7

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Total Respondents

22. Have recent trade problems with Japan changed your attitude about buying Japanese products?

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>U.S. May87</u>
Yes	35 %	25 %
No	62	71
DK/NA	3	4

23. How much do you think Japan's government now restricts the sale of American goods in Japan -- a great deal, some, not much, or not at all?

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>JAPAN</u>	<u>U.S. Jun89</u>	<u>Japan Jun89</u>
A great deal	48 %	14 %	42 %	18 %
Some	33	53	35	65
Not much	7	23	8	14
Not at all	2	2	2	2
DK/NA	10	8	13	1

24. What is the MAIN reason more United States cars are not sold in Japan? Is it MAINLY because the Japanese government restricts the importing of American cars; OR is it mainly because American cars are of lower quality than Japanese cars; OR is it mainly because American automobile companies have not tried hard enough to sell their cars in Japan?

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Japan</u>
	<u>May88*</u>	<u>May88*</u>
Japanese government restrictions	45 %	10 %
U.S. cars lower quality	19	45
U.S. companies not tried hard enough	22	37
Other reason (Vol.)	3	3
DK/NA	11	5

*Varied wording: The 1988 question asked about "goods" in general, not "cars."

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25. Dollar for dollar, whose consumer products are a better value -- the United States's, or Japan's, or are both about equal?

Total Respondents

U.S.

United States	32 %
Japan	20
Both equal value	42
DK/NA	6

26. Dollar for dollar, whose cars are a better value -- Japan's, or the United States's, or are both about equal?

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>JAPAN</u>	<u>U.S.</u> <u>Dec94</u>	<u>Japan</u> <u>Dec94</u>
Japan	30 %	87 %	27 %	83 %
United States	31	6	28	3
Both equal value	33	2	39	14
DK/NA	6	5	6	--

27. If you were going to buy a new car today, which country's car would you buy -- the United States's, Japan's, South Korea's, Germany's, or some other country's?

	<u>U.S.</u> <u>May88</u>	<u>Japan</u> <u>May88</u>
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U.S.	77 %	2 %	71 %	2 %
Japan	12	81	16	74
South Korea	--	--	1	1
Germany	5	13	7	20
Other country	1	2	2	1
DK/NA	5	2	3	2

28. Do you think President Clinton is doing a good job or a poor job in solving trade problems between the United States and Japan?

	<u>U.S.</u> <u>Jun93</u>	<u>Japan</u> <u>Jun93</u>
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Good job	38 %	12 %	31 %	14 %
Poor job	43	76	38	83
DK/NA	18	12	31	3

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28a. **Japan Only:** Do you think Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama is doing a good job or a poor job in solving the trade problems between Japan and the United States?

Total Respondents

Good job
Poor job
DK/NA

JAPAN

12 %
78
10

29. In the next few years, do you think the trade situation between the United States and Japan will get better, get worse, or stay about the same?

Will get better
Will get worse
Will stay about the same
DK/NA

<u>U.S.</u>	<u>JAPAN</u>	<u>U.S.</u> <u>Jun89</u>	<u>Japan</u> <u>Jun89</u>
32 %	12 %	36 %	11 %
27	20	17	39
37	64	43	47
4	4	4	3

30. Have you ever owned a Japanese car?

Yes
No
DK/NA

U.S.
39 %
61
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30a. What is the MAIN reason why you bought a Japanese car -- price or quality?

Price
Quality
Both equally (Vol.)
Other reason/neither (Vol.)
DK/NA
Never bought Japanese car

U.S.
12 %
17
6
3
1
61

31. If you wanted to buy a product, and you saw one that was made in Japan and another that was made in the United States for the same price -- would you probably buy the Japanese product, or the American product?

Buy Japanese
Buy American
Depends (Vol.)
DK/NA

U.S.
11 %
81
7
1

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31a. What if the Japanese product were less expensive? Then would you probably buy the Japanese product, or the American product?

Total RespondentsU.S.

Buy Japanese	27 %
Buy American	48
Depends (Vol.)	13
DK/NA	1
Would buy Japanese in Q31	11

32. In general, would you say you try to buy the best product, regardless of whether it is American-made or imported, OR would you say you try to buy American-made products instead of imported products whenever you can?

U.S.

Best product	39 %
American-made	57
Depends (Vol.)	4
DK/NA	—

32a. Japan Only: How much do you support the Murayama Cabinet -- very much, somewhat, not very much, or not at all?

JAPAN

Very much	2 %
Somewhat	36
Not very much	49
Not at all	11
DK/NA	2

Unweighted

Total U.S. Respondents	1,256
Total Japan Respondents	1,255

NOT FOR ATTRIBUTION

NOTES FROM A LECTURE BY PROFESSOR GERRY CURTIS
BEFORE THE OPEN FORUM

February 23, 1995

Relations between all states are dynamic, and that includes the United States and Japan. Today, with the Cold War over, there is evolutionary change in both the world and the US-Japan relationship, and there is a pressing need for creative thinking in US-Japan relations.

- o After 50 years we need to re-think the relationship and our alliance, and how we relate to each other on regional issues such as the emergence of China. We need to rethink Japan's role in international institutions.
- o There is growing self-confidence in Japan. They believe that based on their success they can get some things right without having to be told what to do by the United States.

I am not convinced that the US Government is dealing with this challenge as well or successfully as it should. And this didn't start with the Clinton Administration.

We need to understand the new thinking and dynamics that are occurring in Japan. Japan's perception of how to relate to the U.S. also is changing -- although its thinking is still incomplete. But one thing we know is that they have learned how to say no -- and they like it. But I have been searching in vain for evidence that they know what to do after they say no. So there is a standoff in our relationship.

Mutual trust is eroding in both countries, and this is eroding the underpinning of our "propensity to cooperate" with each other. There is another problem, not just in Japan but throughout Asia, and that is the decline of what Joe Nye calls America's "soft power" -- the esteem that others have held for our economy, our society, and the way we deal with other countries. There is a growing atmosphere in Japan and Asia that they don't want to be lectured to by us. At the same time, there is growing Japanese "soft power" in Asia.

In the future Japan will be a powerful country, but it also will be more a more normal country.

I believe that this relationship is not being managed as effectively as it could be, on either side. To pursue US policy, we need a better understanding of the political, economic, and social trends in Japan.

Japan's political system today is stalemated. There is no leadership. The New Frontier Party party is not viable and may not be here next year. The Socialists will disappear. The LDP may split. Japanese politics will not sort itself out until two or three elections take place. It will be the end of the century before we see the lines of new party competition. In the end we probably will see three political forces, with vague policy differences.

In the meantime one does not see the bureaucracy in charge -- if that means a coordinated policy apparatus. Ministerial competition is a feature of Japanese society. The political leadership has opted out of providing leadership, and Japan has a bureaucracy that only knows how to do what it always has. Japan does not have, and never has had, the kind of monolithic, all-powerful bureaucracy that some people in the US Government seem to think exists. The rigidities of Japan's governmental system are now the salient feature.

Ronald Dore once described Japan's "flexible rigidities" -- that such things as lifetime employment, one party rule, a strong bureaucracy, and so on were rigidities that actually were strengths. But today they are being seen as just that -- rigidities. The Kobe earthquake is being read that way -- an inflexible, rule-bound bureaucracy, without political leadership, incapable of responding.

Japan in many ways has been like an airplane on autopilot. As long as the destination is clear and the weather is fine, everything goes along smoothly. But what if there are unanticipated storms, or another airplane shows up? There is no pilot, and no navigator. There is a psychological problem here. Japan has been flying along so well, so they hesitate to turn off the autopilot and turn the controls over to someone who might crash the plane. So they just hope that the storm will pass. There is a normal Japanese resistance to change, and inertia.

What is very impressive in Japanese history is the way they can mobilize their resources behinds their goals to deal with the trends of the time. How Japan can adjust to what is happening in the world is a theme that goes back to the Meiji era. Japan tries to make the world happy so the world will get off Japan's back, and leave them alone without Japan becoming isolated. In 1945 the trend of the time was democracy and an alliance with the United States.

Every country has difficulty dealing with uncertainty, but Japan more so, since it always tries to shape its policies to deal with the outside environment. What is striking in Japan today is that it is not determining, let alone debating what its national interests are in this changed environment. And don't hold your breath waiting for them.

But there is a real opportunity for the US to provide some ideas, hints, and leads on where Japan can go.

The Kobe earthquake showed that the true strengths of Japan lie not in its bureaucracy but in its people -- their resilience, their cooperation, their determination. Japan's economic success had a lot more to do with its people than its government. Without the Japanese people, the GOJ's policies would not have worked. Put those policies in another country, with other people, and they would not have worked.

The Japanese are not 10 feet tall. People now realize that. But there is a danger is going into the other direction and thinking that they cannot do anything right. In the future Japan will be a normal country, with slower economic growth and higher unemployment. It will face more problems that resist resolution.

There are changes in Japan in consumer attitudes. No more nouveau riche -- and there is an opportunity for us here to make consumers our allies. Why can't we figure out rhetoric that appeals to play to their attitudes, rather than using rhetoric that alienates them?

There is a growing sense in Japan of Asia and being Asian. It squares the circle in Japanese thinking, the debate between whether they are part of Asia or part of the west. We should support that. We don't want to drive them towards Asia as an alternative to the West. But in the future Japanese policies, at least in Asia, will not follow the US lead. But if we handle them with a modicum of reason, we can be in parallel steps.

Rhetoric and style have real meaning in Asia and Japan. We need to be very specific and tough about what we want in trade, but we should do the talking in private. In public we should appeal more broadly to Japanese interests. This administration seems to have reversed that order. The rhetoric is "Japan is trying to do us in." SII, by contrast, emphasized the commonality of US policy goals and Japanese consumer interests.

The US also needs to pick issues where there is a real chance of success. Tough rhetoric, combined with losing on the issues, hurts us throughout Asia. It conveys the impression that the US is impotent and has nothing more than words.

Security should be a serious issue for discussion with the Japanese. We should talk now in private about the future. China is a looming problem for Japan.

REPORT ON THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND JAPAN

March 1, 1995

Submitted
in Compliance with
Section 1325 of the
FY 95
Defense Authorization Act

AMERICAN REGIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN ASIA

There is no more important bilateral relationship than the one we have with Japan. It is fundamental to both our Pacific security policy and our global strategic objectives. Our security alliance with Japan is a major factor in promoting stability in Asia, and this fact is undiminished by the end of the Cold War. In fact, the uncertainty brought about by the end of the Cold War, and the disappearance of a single overriding threat, make it imperative for the United States to recognize the importance of alliance relations in meeting mutual security goals. Our mutual interests remain unchanged -- deterrence, mutual security, stability, and economic and political progress.

Asia as a whole is increasingly important to the United States. Asian friends and allies are critical to the success of our global strategy in many respects. Their cooperation is necessary to deter potential threats, counter regional aggression, ensure regional peace, impede proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and help protect sea lines of communication both within the region and from the region to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Asian countries have an important role in promoting a more open international economic system. United States trade with the Asia-Pacific region in 1993 totaled over \$374 billion and accounted for 2.8 million United States jobs. Given Japan's economic and political weight, it is a natural partner in our efforts to fashion a viable post-Cold War regional and international order. Our forward deployed forces in Asia, based primarily in the Republic of Korea and Japan, have ensured broad regional stability, helped to deter aggression against our allies, and contributed to the tremendous political and economic advances made by nations of the region.

THREATS, DANGERS, AND RISKS TO THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

A new pattern of international relations is emerging in East Asia. Its chief characteristics are a weakened Russia, rising Chinese power, a continuing military confrontation in Korea, strong Japanese influence, and growing bonds among the states of Indochina and ASEAN. The United States must participate actively in this emerging pattern of relations if it is to

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maintain its own security. A withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region, or a perception within the region that we intend to withdraw, could create a power vacuum that other countries might wish to fill.

East Asia no longer faces a Soviet military challenge, although the possibility of a failure of reform in Russia is a factor in Asia's future. North Korea continues to present a formidable conventional capability that poses a risk of war that cannot be ignored. Social, political, and economic transitions now occurring in Asia raise uncertainties, and could result in regimes more stridently nationalistic and hostile to U.S. interests. Leadership transitions in North Korea and China could have a major negative affect on the region. Threats of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, unresolved territorial disputes, and the proliferation of illegal narcotics create a potential for political instability and conflict.

Today, our security commitment continues through a stable forward-deployed force of about 100,000 United States personnel, backed by the full range of capability at the ready for the United States Pacific Command. Post-Cold War reductions in United States forces in the Asia-Pacific region have essentially leveled off. Within this stable force level, capabilities will continue to improve as weaponry and equipment are upgraded.

A continuing United States security presence is viewed by almost every country in the region as a stabilizing force. Allies of the United States can base their defense planning on a reliable American security guarantee. But even beyond the nations with whom the United States has a treaty alliance, the stability brought about by United States military presence provides a sound foundation for economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region, benefiting Asians and Americans alike. Regional prosperity depends on regional stability and on maintaining critical SLOCs for access to Persian Gulf oil and the free flow of commerce.

U.S. SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND THE ALLIANCE WITH JAPAN

The February 1995 East Asia Strategy report explains the American intention to continue the policy of engagement in East Asia and the Pacific,

and renews our commitment to Japan's defense and regional stability. We propose to enhance the bilateral dialogue on the future of the U.S.-Japan security relationship because of its extreme importance America's security. It is in America's interest -- a fundamental interest shared by the other nations of the region, especially Japan -- to preserve the benefits of expanded trade and political progress which have exemplified the changes in East Asia and the Pacific during the last two decades.

Japan's role involves greater contributions to regional and global stability. Japan is the world's largest Official Development Assistance provider and has increased its involvement in humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts around the globe, including in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Zaire. Japan's support for emerging democracies, particularly in Asia; and continuing close cooperation with the United States in a strategic partnership, including generous Host Nation Support (HNS), is conducive to regional peace and stability and supports broad mutual global objectives.

In compliance with the Mutual Security Treaty of 1960 and the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, U.S. security objectives are to assist in the defense of Japan and maintain East Asia's security and stability through our forward-deployed military presence; maintain U.S. access to facilities and areas provided by Japan under the Mutual Security Treaty and Status of Forces Agreement; encourage Japan to continue providing generous HNS for U.S. forces, including the funding of yen-based labor and utilities costs and facilities improvement (\$4.8 billion in 1994); promote vigorous military-to-military ties and cooperative activities and exercises with the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) to enhance interdependence and interoperability; and support Japan's assumption of greater political responsibilities, both globally and regionally, consistent with the Mutual Security Treaty.

THE ROLE OF THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY IN ACHIEVING U.S. SECURITY OBJECTIVES WITH JAPAN AND IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States (known as the Mutual Security Treaty), is as relevant today as when it was signed on 19 January 1960. The Treaty emphasizes the need to strengthen bonds of peace and friendship, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law. It also encourages closer economic cooperation to promote economic stability and well-being in both countries. Specific articles within the treaty call for a mutual agreement for the defense of Japan, and the use of facilities and areas by the United States for contributing to international peace and security in the Far East. The treaty has unambiguous provisions to allow the safeguarding of U.S. interests. Although the political and economic situation has changed dramatically over the past few years, the foundation of U.S. forces' capability in the Far East—the security treaty—remains the linchpin for protection of U.S. vital national interests in East Asia. In summary, current and foreseeable U.S. national security objectives in Japan and neighboring areas are being met through the provisions agreed to in the existing U.S.-Japan security treaty. The treaty and base structure it facilitates are absolutely essential to regional stability throughout East Asia.

THE U.S. STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING ITS SECURITY OBJECTIVES WITH JAPAN

The U.S. strategy for achieving its security objectives with Japan has four basic principles: U.S. regional presence; Host Nation Support; close cooperation with the Japan Self Defense Forces; and regional responsibility.

The Government of Japan grants to the U.S. the use of facilities and areas on its territory because the Japanese people realize that it is in our mutual interest to do so. Most Japanese welcome the U.S. presence and understand the role that it plays in the defense of Japan and the maintenance of regional security. For their part, U.S. forces in Japan seek to be good neighbors, and cultivate the closest possible ties with host communities.

The collapse of the Soviet Union has removed the historic threat-based rationale for Japan's security. As a result, some Japanese attach less importance to the U.S. - Japan defense relationship than was the case during the Cold War. Some Japanese citizens who live in the vicinity of U.S. bases have called for the consolidation or elimination of these bases. U.S. Commanders do everything possible to minimize the inconvenience associated with our training activities. It is USG policy to return or consolidate facilities and areas when possible, in a way consistent with the purposes of the Mutual Security Treaty and U.S. training needs.

Both sides recognize that generous Japanese HNS buttresses U.S. domestic political support for a continued U.S. forward presence. The present HNS agreement expires in early 1996. Maintaining generous levels of Japanese HNS will require that we negotiate a new agreement by that time. U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) and the American Embassy in Tokyo are negotiating a new agreement at this time, in coordination with Washington agencies.

The structure of U.S. forces in Japan and the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) are in part designed to complement each other. In line with the division of roles and missions, U.S. forces maintains power projection and offensive capabilities, while the JSDF is devoted to defense of Japanese territory and sea lanes out to 1,000 miles. In addition, the two sides pursue a robust schedule of bilateral exercises. The JSDF participates in biannual RIMPAC and annual KEEN EDGE, YAMASAKURA, and COPE NORTH exercises.

Japan makes a direct contribution to U.S. operations by continuing to base its own forces on U.S. equipment, procedures, training, maintenance, and logistics.

The United States Government encourages Japan to assume greater political responsibilities globally and regionally. Japan has responded in many ways, e.g., financially supporting the Gulf War coalition, sending Self Defense Force peacekeeping personnel to Cambodia and Mozambique, and dispatching relief personnel to Zaire in connection with the Rwanda refugee

crisis. The United States is discussing with the GOJ the possibility of cooperating in peacekeeping and disaster relief operations.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS THAT REGIONAL SECURITY DISCUSSIONS, CONSULTATIONS, OR FRAMEWORKS COULD MAKE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF U.S. AND JAPANESE SECURITY OBJECTIVES

Dialogue at all government levels is essential for creating bonds and underwriting U.S. national security objectives. Bilateral relationships are the solid foundation of the USG position in East Asia. We strongly support multilateral dialogues and discussions that contribute to regional security through exchanges on such issues as increased transparency regarding security policies, military doctrine, and defense budgets. However, they cannot, and should not, replace the strong bilateral alliance ties in the region. Regional security dialogue backed by strong bilateral relationships and tangible in-theater assets clearly foster attainment of U.S.-Japan security objectives.

HOW THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN ADDRESS JOINT INFRASTRUCTURE MATTERS THROUGHOUT JAPAN

Security Consultative Committee (SCC)

The SCC was established under Article IV of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan. The original arrangement in January 1960 established the principals in this forum as the American Ambassador to Japan and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC); and the Japanese principals as the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA). In 1990, at the request of the GOJ, the U.S. principals were changed to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. This new ministerial arrangement is referred to as the "2+2". This forum meets as required on matters of bilateral defense policy, consults on the activities of U.S. forces, and discusses regional security issues of mutual concern.

Security Sub-Committee of the SCC (SSC)

The SSC was established concurrently with the SCC to establish the SCC's agenda and to address issues at the working level. The principals on the U.S. side are the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The Japanese principals are the Director General of the North American Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the director General of the Japan Defense Agency's Defense Policy Bureau. This forum meets routinely. Similar groups with lower level participants meet frequently to work on issues of mutual concern or interest, in support of the SSC.

U.S.-Japan Joint Committee

The Joint Committee was established by Article XXV of the U.S. - Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), more formally known as the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and Japan, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan. The Joint Committee serves as the primary mechanism for technical consultations between the United States and Japan on all matters regarding the implementation of the SOFA which require bilateral review. In particular, it serves as the forum for consultation on matters pertaining to the use of facilities and areas in Japan by U.S. forces. The Joint Committee meets on a bi-weekly basis to discuss recommendations from its numerous sub-committees and to exchange information with the GOJ. The principals on the U.S. side are the Deputy Commander USFJ, the American Embassy Political Minister, the USFJ Director for Plans and Policy, representatives of each U.S. Service Component Commander. The principals on the Japanese side are the Director General of the North American Affairs Bureau of MOFA, the Director General of International Affairs of JDA, the Director General of the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA), the Director General of the Agriculture Structure Improvement Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries, and selected staff officials from various GOJ ministries.

The Facilities Sub-Committee (FSC)

The Facilities Sub-Committee was established under the Joint Committee to address issues involving facilities and areas provided to U.S. Forces by the GOJ. The Facilities Sub-Committee is chaired jointly by the Director of Logistics/J4 of USFJ and the Director General of DFAA. Once coordination is complete on an issue, a separate memorandum to the Joint Committee is prepared. Signature of the U.S. Representative and the Japanese Representative of the Joint Committee constitutes an international agreement which is reportable under the Case Act.

U.S. commands and USG representatives maintain a close working relationship with local political leaders and municipal governments in Japanese host communities. However, MOFA, JDA, and the DFAA represent the details of and negotiate base issues with local municipalities and other interested Japanese parties. It would be inappropriate for the U.S. government to engage in direct negotiations on local issues with local representatives, and it is a longstanding U.S. policy to not do so.

The Joint Planning Committee (JPC)

The Joint Planning Committee was approved at the XVII meeting of the Security Consultative Committee, on 27 November 1978. The Joint Planning Committee reviews joint plans, exercises, training, studies and provides guidance for new activities. It is the principal bilateral military forum for joint studies and associated activities. The Joint Planning Committee meets semi-annually usually in June and November. The U.S. principals are the Deputy Commander USFJ and various HQ USFJ representatives. The Japanese principals are the Chairman, Joint Staff Council, and the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground Self Defense Force, Maritime Self Defense Force, and Air Self Defense Force.

The Joint Interoperability Coordinating Committee (JICC)

The Joint Interoperability Coordinating Committee was established by the Memorandum for the Conduct of Studies on Interoperability by JSDF-

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USFJ, on 23 May 85. The purpose of the Joint Interoperability Coordinating Committee is to conduct interoperability studies to improve the capability of U.S. and Japanese forces for bilateral combat operations in defense of Japan. The scope of the studies includes operational and equipment interoperability. No established requirements govern frequency of meetings. The U.S. principal is the Deputy Commander USFJ. The Japanese principals are the Director of the Joint Staff Office, JSO J5, and JSDF Component Staff representatives.

JAPAN'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE STATIONING OF U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN

Under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Japan provides a stable, rent-free environment for our military operations. Japan also contributes by far the most generous HNS of any of our allies. (\$4.8 billion at 100 yen/\$1 for Japanese fiscal year 1994.) The high level of GOJ financial support makes stationing of U.S. forces in Japan highly cost-effective. By the end of JFY-95 (31 March 1996), Japan will pay for 100% of Japanese employee labor costs and utilities costs. GOJ assistance also includes provision of new facilities construction, base and facilities land purchase and rental, and a range of other direct and indirect payments amounting to well over half the total cost of deploying our forces to Japan.

Our Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps bases in Japan support our first line of defense in Asia and the Pacific. These forces are prepared to deal with a wide range of local, regional and extra-regional contingencies extending as far as the Persian Gulf. Given the great distance involved in crossing the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the U.S. emphasis on a smaller, agile, and more mobile force designed to respond to regional contingencies greatly increases the geographic significance of our bases in Japan.

U.S. naval forces operating from Japan have access to some of the most sophisticated ship repair facilities in the world. These facilities contribute directly to our ability to maintain critical naval deployments, and have become even more important since the U.S. withdrawal from facilities at Subic Bay in the Republic of the Philippines. This value was amply

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demonstrated during the deployment of the USS Midway Carrier Battle Group during operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. The fact that airwing aircraft from USS Midway (since replaced at Yokosuka by USS Independence) flew more sorties in the Gulf than any other carrier wing, with no loss of personnel or aircraft, is testimony to the high quality of training and superior maintenance conducted at U.S. facilities in Japan.

THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN JAPAN

Bilateral Discussions On Joint Infrastructure Matters

Land and facilities infrastructure issues are addressed within the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee process. The primary working-level venue for addressing these issues is the Facilities Sub-Committee. The Joint Committee addresses base-related issues on a regular basis. USG policy is to consolidate U.S. facilities where possible and to return excess facilities in a way consistent with the Mutual Security Treaty and U.S. training requirements. In cases where facilities have been identified for consolidation or reversion, it is the responsibility of the GOJ to provide similar facilities in a suitable location.

Three Okinawa base-related issues have been the focus of discussion over the last two years: the status of Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, Naha Military Port, and the continuation of Marine artillery live-fire training over Okinawa Route 104.

Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield (YAA) The Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield occupies 470.9 acres in Yomitan Township, Okinawa. U.S. forces presently use the facility for parachute training and base recovery after attack (BRAAT) training. The GOJ has formally requested that 23 acres of the facility be redesignated as joint use for the construction of a highway. The GOJ also has requested that 7.4 acres of the facility be redesignated as joint use to allow construction of a Yomitan Township administrative office center. The Facilities Sub-Committee established a bilateral working group on Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield in June of 1994 to discuss these issues.

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Naha Military Port (NMP) The Naha Military Port occupies 140 acres in the City of Naha. The United States and Japan agreed in 1974 that the United States would return Naha Military Port if Japan provided a suitable relocation site. The Facilities Sub-Committee established a bilateral working group on Naha Military Port in December 1994 to discuss this issue.

Live-fire Artillery Training Cessation of live-fire artillery training over Okinawa Route 104 will require that the training be relocated, as current training has already been reduced extensively to accommodate local concerns. The United States is presently discussing this issue with the GOJ.

U.S. Training Activities

The training of U.S. forces operating in and around Japan is crucial to the credibility of their readiness to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations. Training is a key ingredient of deterrence, and fundamental to the resultant peace and stability promoted by the presence of U.S. forces in East Asia and the Pacific. A visible, realistic U.S. and bilateral USFJ training program is a vital component of U.S. strategy.

Achieving exercise program objectives depends on developing and maintaining strong military-to-military relationships through an extensive program of bilateral exercises with the JSDF. There are 20 bilateral exercises held annually with JSDF counterparts. The COMUSJAPAN exercise program prepares assigned U.S. forces to execute the USCINCPAC Cooperative Engagement strategy, to respond to contingency situations, and to conduct joint and bilateral operations supporting U.S. national policies and strategy. COMUSJAPAN'S warfighting focus continues to concentrate on major and lesser regional contingencies within the Japan AOR.

Exercise KEEN EDGE is the only JCS-sponsored joint and bilateral exercise conducted in Japan. It has the flexibility to employ numerous scenarios across the entire range of conflict. It enhances interoperability with military forces throughout the AOR and is the framework for bilateral readiness and planning.

Current issues associated with training

Low-Level Flight (LLF) U.S. forces conduct carefully structured low-level flight training in Japan's territorial airspace to maintain aircrew readiness in support of objectives of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty--that is, to contribute to the defense of Japan and maintain regional stability. In order to be effective, this training has to be rigorous, demanding, and as realistic as possible.

For many years, the United States and Japan have agreed to a division of roles and missions, roughly splitting offensive and defensive responsibilities in the defense of Japan. One result of this cooperative approach to defense is that U.S. forces have the responsibility for the majority of the air-to-ground missions required for the defense of Japan.

It is a vital requirement for U.S. forces to maintain and improve the readiness and proficiency of its pilots, and a set amount of low-level flight training is indispensable for this purpose. The ability to fly close to the ground increases survival potential and significantly improves the possibility of mission success. Fundamentally, the best aircraft and weapon systems in the world are useless without the aircrew proficiency to successfully employ them. Moreover, degraded proficiency reduces safety.

U.S. forces in Japan have always paid maximum attention to public safety, making every effort to limit the impact of their activities on local communities to the maximum extent possible. The flight safety record of U.S. forces operating in and around Japan is very good, primarily due to the high state of readiness made possible by excellent maintenance and realistic training. Aircraft accidents and incidents are rare. While public concern regarding flight safety increases when an incident does occur, U.S. forces consistently give highest priority to safety and the protection of lives and property.

Field Carrier Landing Practice/Night Landing Practice (FCLP/NLP) Safety considerations require pilots of the USS Independence air wing to recertify their carrier landing qualifications just prior to each deployment. This entails

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numerous runway approaches by each pilot during both day and night flying conditions within two weeks of going to sea. These operations, particularly night landing practice, generate complaints from residents around air bases and from local government officials.

The U.S. Navy has instituted many practices to lessen the impact of field carrier landing practice and night landing practice on surrounding communities, such as terminating operations by 2200, limiting holiday operations, and distributing the required field carrier landing practice and night landing practice operations evenly among the various available airfields. The Navy's use of GOJ-provided facilities at the remote facilities of Iwo Jima island for as much of this training as practicable has reduced the level of noise in congested areas surrounding U.S. airfields in Honshu.

Not all field carrier landing practice and night landing practice can move to Iwo Jima. Furthermore, the use of Iwo Jima is an interim solution until an alternative can be found closer to Atsugi Naval Air Facility, the base of the Independence air wing when it is not embarked for shipboard operations. Although local communities remain extremely sensitive to this issue, the visible reduction of noise achieved through the use of Iwo Jima and better understanding by the GOJ of why the U. S. Navy must perform these operations have helped mitigate this problem.

Charlie/Golf Airspace Erosion International air carriers are seeking a route along the western coast of Japan through two blocks of training airspace reserved for military use by the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF). The northern block, known as Area Charlie, is used heavily by USAF F-16 aircraft operating out of Misawa Air Base. Any reduction in use of Area Charlie will severely limit readiness in this AOR, which, in turn, will impact regional stability.

Environmental standards

U.S. facilities in Japan meet all environmental standards of the United States or Japan, whichever are the more restrictive.

MAJOR U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN

47,000 U.S. personnel ashore (approximate)
12,000 U.S. personnel afloat (approximate)

Yokota Air Base

- COMUSJAPAN Headquarters
- Logistics/Transport hub
- 374 Airlift Wing

Yokosuka Naval Base

- USS Independence Battle Group
- 9 surface combatants
- 7th Fleet Flagship
- Major ship repair facilities

Atsugi Naval Air Facility

- Carrier Air Wing Five
- Light helicopter anti-submarine squadron 51

Sasebo Naval Base

- Amphibious Ready Group Bravo
- 4 amphibious ships
- 2 Ocean Tugs

Okinawa

- III Marine Expeditionary Force
- Futenma MCAS (MAG 36)

Iwakuni

- Marine Air Group 12

Misawa Air Base (Northern Japan)

- 35 FW
- 48F-16 aircraft

Kadena Air Base (Okinawa)

- 18th Wing
- 54 F-15 aircraft
- E-3 AWACS
- Tankers
- 353 SOG

Camp Zama

- U.S. Army, Japan Headquarters/IX Corps
- 17 ASG
- MEDDAC JAPAN

Torii Station (Okinawa)

- 1st BN, 1st SF Group
- 10 ASG

U.S. Military Bases in Japan
Total Number of Facilities: 94
Total Acreage (exclusive use): 78487.1

Number and Location of US personnel.

LOCATION	MILITARY	CIVILIAN	TOTAL
MAINLAND JAPAN	16,273	2,928	19,201
OKINAWA	23,715	2,013	25,728
AFLOAT FORCES	13,033	11	13,044
ROTATIONAL FORCES	5,860	0	5,860
TOTAL	58,881	4,952	63,833

NOTE: The Civilian category includes DOD and DoDDS civilians.

The location and size of major Military units:

SERVICE	LOCATION	UNIT	SIZE
ARMY	Camp Zama	USARJ/ IX Corps/	1,046
	Torii Station	TAACOM	840
AIR FORCE	Kadena AFB	18th Wing	7,463
	Yokota AFB	374th Wing	4,204
	Misawa AFB	432nd Wing	3,876
MARINE CORPS	Camp Courtney	III MEF	11,777
	Camp Foster	MCB, CAMBUT	968
	Futenma MCAS	MCASFutenma	147
	Iwakuni MCAS	MCASIwakuni	2187
NAVY	Yokosuka Naval Base	7TH Fleet	10,769
	Sasebo Naval Base	7TH Fleet	2,279

The GOJ has expressed satisfaction with joint management of land issues. Since its inception, the Joint Committee has resolved many issues, resulting in the return of a large number of facilities and acreage to Japan. Both the United States and Japan support the government to government Joint Committee process to resolve land issues as an alternative to political fora and direct appeals to the U.S. by affected local governments. Working together in good faith, the two central governments continue to search in a deliberate process for solutions which combine to serve the interests of Japanese landowners and the public and also meet mutual defense requirements.

U.S. controlled land in Japan is reduced consistent with the military mission of U.S. Forces there and the Status of Forces Agreement. The number of U.S. controlled facilities in Japan has been reduced by more than 97% since 1952. Total U.S. acreage in mainland Japan has been reduced by 97%, from 262,400 acres to 19,776 acres. In the same time, the number of U.S. facilities in mainland Japan has decreased from 3,765 to 56. On Okinawa, since the 1972 reversion, the number of U.S. facilities has decreased from 83 to 40. U.S. acreage on Okinawa has been reduced from 69,000 acres to 58,624 acres, and U.S. facilities there have decreased by over 50%.

There are currently 96 U.S. controlled facilities throughout Japan. U.S. forces currently control a total of 78,400 acres in Japan, and have joint use of 164,573 acres controlled by the Japan Self Defense Forces.

FACILITIES RETURNED 1984-1994

Name	Acreage	Mission	Location	Release Date
Naha Air Force and Navy Annex	8.82	Logistics	Okinawa Prefecture	31 Oct 86
Makiminato Housing Area	410.37	Housing	Okinawa Prefecture	31 May 87
Yokawame Communication Site	6.74	Comm.	Aomori Prefecture	3 Jul 91
Rokko Communication Site	2.51	Comm	Hyogo Prefecture	12 Nov 92
Makiminato Service Annex	0.3	Logistics	Okinawa Prefecture	31 Mar 93
Naha Cold Storage	0	Logistics	Okinawa Prefecture	31 Mar 93
Takachibuto Communication Site	240.54	Comm	Hokkaido	1 Jul 93
Sunabe Warehouse	0.84	Logistics	Okinawa Prefecture	30 Jun 93
Daikan Yama Communication Station	2.27	Comm	Kanagawa Prefecture	31 Aug 93
Minami-Tori Shima Communication Site	194.21	Comm	Tokyo	1 Oct 93
Yokohama Cold Storage Warehouse	5.5	Logistics	Kanagawa Prefecture	1 Apr 94
Chiran Communication Site	4.0	Comm	Kagoshima Prefecture	10 May 94

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Yosami Communication Site	389.5	Comm	Aichin Prefecture	1 Aug 94
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