

Common interests bind U.S., Japan after Cold War

This is the first part of an analysis on the Japan-U.S. relations. The conclusion will appear on Tuesday—Ed.

Special to Asahi Shimbun

The central fact about the Japan-U.S. relationship in the post-Cold War era is that the two allies have far more common interests than differences, even though trade disputes dominate the headlines in both countries. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, there continues to be a common purpose that requires the continuation of the alliance.

Who is to bring some order to this world in flux? To attain the kind of world that both the United States and Japan want—a world at peace, a world that respects human rights, a world of open, market-oriented economies—the United States and Japan must work together. A revitalized U.S.-Japanese partnership dedicated to that effort would greatly increase the chance of its success. But an end to the partnership, or an erosion of it, would make success impossible.

In the Asia-Pacific region, too, the United States and Japan have a common goal. They need to build a stable, peaceful, prosperous Asia.

Japan and the United States share five specific interests in the Asia-Pacific region. First of all, they have a common interest in maintaining their alliances.

- The alliance is essential for regional stability. Without it, a power vacuum would develop, a new and dangerous arms race would ensue and regional tensions would almost certainly grow.

- The alliance creates a favorable balance of power in the Pacific. Without the bases in Japan, especially after the loss of its Philippine bases, the United States would find it difficult to maintain credible forward deployment in Asia.

- The alliance is essential to Japanese security as long as there is no reliable

and effective multilateral security system in Asia. In particular, the U.S. nuclear deterrent is indispensable as long as there are nations with nuclear arms—Russia and China—so close to Japan.

- The alliance contributes to Japanese moderation. A Japan tied to the United States will decide that it needs less military strength than a Japan cut loose from the American safety net. The alliance helps assure other nations in Asia. Japanese military strength linked to the United States worries China and other Asian nations less than an autonomous Japanese military capability.

- The alliance is a hedge against future uncertainties in Russia, China and North Korea.

- The alliance helps offset the inevitable economic tensions between the two large trading partners because there is mutual awareness that they cannot go too close to the water's edge without adverse strategic consequences. Even the Clinton Administration, which has been overly strident on economic issues, has come to understand this.

Secondly, in addition to maintaining and strengthening their alliance, the United States and Japan have a common strategic interest in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles. The United States, with Japanese support, has gone to great length to negotiate a nuclear freeze package with North Korea. Japan has played a crucial role in this effort.

There are two reasons for this. Both countries have a strong national interest in maintaining and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. North Korea's defection from that regime would be a serious blow to the integrity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and might encourage other non-nuclear powers to develop nuclear weapons. If North Korea were allowed to develop nuclear weapons, South Korea might well follow. This would place

Japan in a dilemma.

The third common strategic interest of the United States and Japan is to work together bilaterally and multilaterally to defuse the various territorial issues and regional disputes in East Asia—the standoff between North and South Korea, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the China-Taiwan issue, and the territorial disputes between Russia and Japan and between China and Japan. An eruption of any of these disputes into armed confrontation could jeopardize regional peace and prosperity.

Washington and Tokyo worked closely together with Seoul to develop a nuclear freeze agreement with North Korea and to set up the Korean Energy Development Organization, which will work out the details of implementing the nuclear freeze. This is a good example of how the two allies, working closely, can defuse potential regional conflicts. They both need to work more closely in the future to develop a common policy toward China and to defuse the China-Taiwan issue.

Fourth, the United States and Japan have a common interest in developing trans-Pacific regional institutions such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC, which contain the seeds of a future Pacific Community. Although progress in this direction is likely to be slow because of the enormous diversity of political systems and cultures in Asia, and because of mutual suspicions, it need not be negligible. The ASEAN Regional Forum has already begun to talk about increased military transparency and the Chinese have agreed in principle to share some military information with the ASEAN countries and to discuss military transparency with Americans and Japanese.

Finally, the United States and Japan have a common strategic interest in trying to improve relations with the two other great powers in the Pacific re-

gion, Russia and China, and to work together with these two other great powers to achieve peaceful solutions to regional disputes. Preventing the emergence of new fault lines between the major powers such as those that divided the region during the Cold War are clearly in the interest of both the United States and Japan.

In addition to their common strategic interests, the United States and Japan have a number of common economic interests. U.S. exports to Japan doubled between 1985 and 1990 and, despite the trade problems, the U.S. exports to Japan exceed U.S. exports to France, Germany and Italy combined. For Japan, the United States remains the most important single country market.

But the United States and Japan share an even greater economic stake. That is to maintain and strengthen an open world economy. For both the United States and Japan, the greatest single threat now that the Soviet Union is gone is the danger of a global depression brought on by the rise of economic nationalism and protectionism. History teaches that an open world economy is essential to global economic prosperity but the 1930s show such an open world economy cannot always be guaranteed.

Yet the triumph of economic nationalism in the United States and Japan, the world's two largest trading nations, would threaten a collapse of the international economy, greatly increase the chances of a world depression, and strengthen the most extreme nationalistic forces all over the world.

Thus, the United States and Japan must redouble their efforts to ensure that the world economy remains open. This means that the huge trade imbalance between the two countries must be reduced.

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ACN 11-13-95 p.8

NIHON KEIZAI (Page 3) (Full)

October 27, 1995

Interview with Ezra Vogel, Former U.S. National Intelligence Council Head; Efforts to Explain Meaning of Security Arrangement Necessary; Arms Race Should Be Avoided

Harvard University professor Ezra Vogel, former head of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) for East Asia under the Clinton Administration, held an interview with a Nihon Keizai reporter on the 26th to share his views on the Japan-U.S. relationship, focusing on the bilateral security arrangement. He expressed concern about weakening interest in national security among younger Japanese. In addition, he stressed that Japanese leaders ought to clearly explain to the people the need to maintain the security alliance.

Q: After the Okinawa rape case, arguments even calling for abrogating the bilateral security treaty have emerged in Japan.

A: Recent opinion polls indicated that Japanese younger generations are asking: "Why is the security treaty necessary?" That is because Japanese politicians have not explained clearly why it is indeed necessary. I can understand Japan's mentality to avoid spelling out reasons to maintain the treaty for such would require discussing openly the Chinese "threat." But if persons in responsible positions explain it more clearly, I'm sure more people will opt to support the treaty.

Q: How do you view the Japanese government's approach to the security issue?

A: People in Washington (U.S. government) are now saying, "We have made it clear that the U.S.-Japan security arrangement is necessary. But why we don't hear such a view coming from Japan?" The U.S. government is looking into measures to deal with the Okinawa problem at the working level. What I can say at this point is that we will not change the functions of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ). A joint statement focusing on the meaning of the U.S.-Japan security arrangement will be issued as planned at the U.S.-Japan summit talks in November.

If Japan opts to abandon the security treaty, its relations with neighboring Asian countries would deteriorate due to their concern that Japan might have begun to pursue a military buildup aiming even at going nuclear, and this would lead to accelerating the arms race in Asia. Japan's burden would increase to cover the costs of strengthening its military power. That's not all. It will be saddled with negative factors, such as instability in the region. Such would be undesirable for Japan.

102705st

Date: Wed, 1 Nov 1995 14:55:03 -0800
From: Cato Institute <cato@cato.org>
To: fukuzawa@ucsd.edu
Subject: Cato: US alliance with Japan is unjust

Another perspective to add to the debate....enjoy!

STUDY RELEASE

November 1, 1995

U.S. alliance with Japan unjust and unstable, study concludes

The U.S. military alliance with Japan not only provides a lucrative defense subsidy to the Japanese at the expense of American taxpayers; it also enables Tokyo to evade important security responsibilities in East Asia, according to new study from the Cato Institute.

In "Paternalism and Dependence: The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship" (Policy Analysis no. 244), Cato's director of foreign policy studies, Ted Galen Carpenter, contends that the alliance is designed for a bygone era in which Japan was economically weak and the two countries faced a powerful global military threat--the Soviet Union. Today Japan is an economic great power and should play the lead role in promoting security and stability in East Asia instead of relying on the United States to do so.

Financial consequences of the alliance:

- * The defense subsidy to Japan has amounted to more than \$900 billion (1995 dollars) since the early 1950s.
- * Being East Asia's policeman costs America approximately \$40 billion a year.
- * The United States spends nearly six times as much on the military as does Japan.

Other drawbacks:

- * Japanese officials admit that, in the event of war in East Asia, Japanese military units would not join U.S. forces in combat operations unless Japan itself were attacked.
- * The United States is the "point man" in any East Asian crisis and thereby incurs risks that should normally be borne by Japan and other regional powers.
- * Japan and its East Asian neighbors view the U.S. military presence as a psychological security blanket, and they use it as an excuse to engage in domestic political posturing rather than forge their own defense relationships to deal with threats to their mutual interests.

Carpenter warns that an alliance in which one party must assume most of the risks and costs while the other party merely reaps the benefits is unstable as well as unjust. U.S. policymakers who foolishly try to preserve an inequitable status quo risk an abrupt, acrimonious rupture in the U.S.-Japanese relationship. There are already some warning signs:

- * Americans angry at Japan's trade policies are beginning to suggest that Washington threaten to terminate the alliance as bargaining leverage in trade disputes.

- * A growing number of Japanese suspect that the U.S. military presence in East Asia is motivated by lingering American distrust of Japan.

Recommended action

America's East Asian policy should favor a regional balance of power with Japan as the front-line state for promoting stability. Instead of being Japan's military patron, Washington's goal should be a mature relationship between two great powers. Actions that the United States ought to take include

- * the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Japanese territory within five years and the termination of the alliance two years later;

- * the creation of a limited, informal security relationship with Japan emphasizing an ongoing military dialogue and periodic joint military exercises;

- * efforts to encourage greater security cooperation between Japan and other democratic states in East Asia; and

- * the establishment of a more modest U.S. military presence based in Guam and other central Pacific locations.

Tokyo, Japan
December 6, 1995

UNCLASSIFIED
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

TO: The Ambassador

THROUGH: DCM - Mr. Deming
A/EX

FROM: POLMIN - Neil E. Silver

SUBJECT: Security Round Table

~~SENSITIVE~~

Synopsis attached

At 0830 on Thursday, December 7, we will have a Security Round Table to discuss general Security Issues. We will have the participation of the PolMil Section, DAO, MDAO, RAS and USIS. We expect to have a general discussion on the following themes:

- 1) Japan's Strategic Environment
(Led by Neil Silver/POLMIN)
- 2) The Rationale for the U.S. forward presence and the Alliance, the EASR and the NDPO: Are there better justifications?
(Led by Dave Straub/POLINT)
- 3) What do the Polls say?
(Led by Paul Blackburn/USIS)
- 4) Is Japan changing its opposition to Collective Security?
--The three principles on arms exports
--"Power Projection"
(Led by Mark Lambert/POLMIL)
- 5) Next year's agenda.
(Led by Dave Shear/POLMIL)

Appendix:

Rationales and graphics.

At yellow Tab.

Security Round Table
Dec. 7, 1995

Ideas to think about

Japan's Strategic Environment

Do we really understand Japanese thinking in terms of defense? Why is it so hard to see eye-to-eye?

We must ask ourselves whether we have a convincing rationale for a Japanese audience.

The Japanese live in a difficult neighborhood, have somewhat strained relations with Korea and China, took 20 years to get Okinawa back, and have yet to sign a treaty with Russia after 50 years. In spite of the complexity of the region, they are reluctant to speak officially of specific threats like they had previously talked openly about the Soviet threat.

Asia does not fit the European concept of a collective security regime, although the ARF is an active "regional talk shop."

Japan is unique as a country with demonstrated military potential which relies on another nation for security.

Chalmers Johnson and Ken Pyle say we are preventing Japan from "growing up" to assume the burdens of an adult nation. The Japanese are not forced to think through their own security paradigms.

We need to see if there are better justifications for our policy, and make sure that we direct these more effectively to the Japanese. In this context, it will be helpful to find out what is behind the polling data we see--look for underlying factors driving public opinion.

The Japanese carry around diverse "packets of ideas" on defense that are not necessarily related to each other in any logical fashion. (Ideas deal with imperialism, pacifism, going it alone, etc.) But many of these concepts have proven difficult, and they hold on to the U.S. because they are not sure where to go. And since they are in a difficult neighborhood, they find comfort in the strong backing of America.

We need to study concepts held by the Japanese audience (how they are educated, what they think, etc.) to target our message. Some elites may argue that changing textbooks will change the mindset.

We see the polling data without a scientific background (analysis of factors at play).

Rationale for U.S. Presence

Two documents which attempt to articulate a rationale for the U.S.-Japan alliance are the Nye Report and the NDPO. These cite regional uncertainties, tensions, and military power balances vaguely, without explicitly citing threats--the NDPO does mention "the Korean Peninsula."

While these justifications help explain the alliance in broad terms, they do not necessarily offer a convincing rationale for our forward deployed forces in Japan.

With the Nye Report, it is difficult to tell who the audience is. The document loses impact by not focusing arguments, and uses rather bureaucratic language. It is also too long. The troop levels (100 thousand and 47 thousand) are not clearly justified in the report.

It would be helpful to package a better rationale. It would be specific, short, include graphics, and articulate clearly why our presence is important from the Japanese point of view.

The figure of 47 thousand is not necessarily a carefully calculated number, but a ceiling that represents a certain level of commitment and projected force. If we were to lower the figure, we would lose credibility and capability to respond.

When shown in comparison to other military forces in Asia, the U.S. numbers are very small (see graphic).

We use "military concentrations" in other nations in the region as a "throw-away line" to justify our presence, but it could be presented as much more--our numbers are very small in comparison. We act as a "trip-wire" or a life insurance policy, which reflects the Japanese propensity to refer to the "Security Guarantee" (anpo).

The concentration of forces in Okinawa is a legitimate concern, but when viewed in terms of the overall Japanese population, or in terms of combined Japanese and U.S. forces in Japan, our presence looks quite small. Okinawa is not as "victimized" as they plead. Also, in terms of acreage used for bases, Okinawa may not sacrifice much more land for defense than other areas--the Japanese use more land elsewhere in Japan.

We must be careful as the 47 thousand number decreases over time. Nye and Campbell wish to stop beating that drum, as the number reflects a ceiling, and actual numbers could go as low as 40 thousand in the foreseeable future. We may need to prepare the Japanese (officials) for this drop in numbers, but we cannot let on that troop strength is decreasing. The press would certainly catch on, and we'd be on a slippery slope that would encourage Ota and others. While the troop numbers may certainly be decreased when conditions change, now is not the time to suggest that conditions warrant a draw-down.

Polling Insights

USIS characterized three polls (Asahi / Yomiuri / USIS telephone poll) which indicate that perceptions of the U.S.-Japan relationship have worsened.

Trade frictions sway these figures, but focusing on security alone we find rather high levels of support (71, 64, and 57 percent). When it gets to the specifics of the U.S. presence, however, the numbers drop significantly (Asahi poll says 76 percent want some reduction in the U.S. presence, while the USIS poll came in at 82 percent--respondents wanting the U.S. to leave completely totaled 14 and 12 percent).

Male respondents are more positive about the U.S. presence, and the security alliance, than are females.

Younger people (20 to 29 years old) tend to view the U.S. positively, and favor the security relationship, but they are less supportive when asked specifically about the U.S. military presence in Japan. A high number call for a reduction in U.S. military facilities, and over 50 percent do not feel that U.S. forces are important for the defense of Japan itself.

These trends are reflected in the general population, with reasonable levels of support for the relationship, and support for security ties (as being good for relations and good for the region), but less support for bases and a low rating of U.S. forces as a protector of Japan itself.

Without an obvious threat, like the Soviets used to provide, many people can't see why they should be paying the costs associated with security.

Many Japanese did not see Iran or Iraq as real problems, even when the U.S. saw the situation as a crisis. Many Japanese actually worry about a unified Korea, which Americans see as very positive.

It would be helpful to have polling data probe the sources of information that lead people to respond the way they do.

It would also be helpful to see if the Japanese view security provided by Japanese forces any differently from the security provided by the U.S. (Are attitudes regarding U.S. forces peculiar?)

Military studies and "strategic scholarship" are not viable academic disciplines in Japan. Japanese shy away from wearing military uniforms in public, even when commuting between functions at which uniforms are worn.

A tent pitched in the wrong place in Okinawa got two minutes on the NHK news, as if the U.S. troops who made such a minor mistake warranted national coverage.

Collective Security

Pyle's book refers to three "sacred cows" in Japanese defense:

- A prohibition on "collective security"
- The three principles of arms exports
- Defensive defense (no offensive capability)

Current reality is not so clear cut, however. Collective security is a matter of political judgment rather than a legal or constitutional issues. Nakasone had argued for sending mine-sweepers to the Gulf, and the NDPO refers to enhancing a regional security framework. It can be argued that Japan works through the U.N. to ensure "collective security." The regional context of security is being more openly considered.

Exports to nations under embargo, communist states, or countries likely to go to war (which could mean any nation) are theoretically banned, but Japan modified this in 1983 to permit exports of technology (blueprints, etc.) to the U.S. so long as the U.S. did not re-export this material elsewhere. MITI is now exploring exports of "components" to the U.S. The LDP ensured that this question remained flexible in the recent NDPO. We do not have a clear policy from Washington in this area, and must press them to send guidance.

Offensive capability may develop in minor ways, such as the carrying of machine guns in Middle East PKO operations, and air refueling capability (to extend the range of planes). USG policy seems to concur with this movement. While the scope of refueling capacity would be small (4 to 5 planes), this is a radical change that could alarm Asian neighbors. (The Russians are asking many questions.) The NDPO is tailored to allow some flexibility--permitting this refueling capacity.

Next Year's Agenda

The big items in 1996 are the President's visit and Okinawa.

When the President leaves, we need to make sure there are other issues, or the focus on Okinawa could make a resolution more difficult.

Japan is reconsidering its 1978 Defense Guidelines, which gave political cover to joint planning with the U.S. (which was done secretly). Initially planning for an "Article 5 situation" (defending Japan from aggression), this may expand to an "Article 6 situation," (planning for regional stability).

We must work hard on the security declaration, and keep Japan focused on the broader alliance.

We may find this easier without the present coalition government.

We need to think of other agenda items to "sweeten up next year."

On security, we need to consider what can be said publicly, and why the alliance is necessary.

There are many things that can be said privately. (Citing China as threat causes them to cry "containment" rather than "engagement." Editorials from Asia express fear over a resurgent Japan. Some Japanese themselves are skeptical of their ability to control themselves if they rearm. These are real problems, but can't be stated publicly.)

P.S.: The Indy will not be in port after April 16--even in the event of a Presidential visit??

Copies of graphics and other materials used at the meeting are attached.

RATIONALES FOR THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE AND THE US FORWARD
PRESENCE IN THE EASR AND THE NEW NDPO:
ARE THERE BETTER JUSTIFICATIONS?

Rationale for the Alliance in the EASR

- Guarantees security amidst continuing uncertainty and tensions
- Counters immense concentrations of military power

Rationale for the Alliance in the New NDPO

- Guarantees security amidst continuing uncertainty and tensions, including "Korean Peninsula"
- Copes with "large-scale military capabilities, including nuclear arsenals"
- Some countries expanding and modernizing militaries

Rationale for Forward Presence in the EASR

- Deters/stops North Korean aggression
- Ensures rapid, flexible worldwide crisis response
- Overcomes handicaps of time and distance
- Discourages emergence of regional hegemon
- Enhances US influence
- Produces stronger ties with national military leaders
- Demonstrates US commitment to the region
- Results in force economies for US
- Promotes civilian control of military in host countries
- Promotes mutual understanding
- Japan ideally located for rapid regional deployment
- Cheaper to station in Japan than in the US
- GOJ most generous with host nation support
- Japan a stable and secure base of operations
- GOJ buys US weapons
- US procures Japanese technology

Rationale for Forward Presence in the New NDPO

- (Not explicitly explained. Importance of US cooperation in many areas is simply asserted, repeatedly.)

Critique of Rationales

- Don't distinguish between rationales for alliance and for forward presence
- Unclear who audience is: US, Japanese, or third country
- For lay and executive audiences, EASR too long, prose turgid, substance often redundant, lacks graphics
- No justification is included for 100,000 and 47,000 figures

Some Suggestions for Improving Rationale

- Write rationales with specific audience in mind

- Write short, stylish, readable paper with graphics and anecdotes

- Specify why 47,000 figure is reasonable

 - Compare to size of other military forces in region

 - Compare to size of Japanese population


 - Anything smaller risks no credibility, lack of capability in first days of crisis

- For Japanese audience, stress and explain 50 years of **peace** from US alliance,


 - security as basis of strong bilateral alliance, "insurance premium" aspect of

 - forward presence, regional reassurance, protection of oil supply


Active & Reserve Military, 1992



USFJ "Footprint" in Perspective



USFJ "Footprint" in Perspective



- JSDF Active & Reserve
- Japanese Population
- USFJ



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