

YOMIURI (Page 1) (Full)  
December 7, 1995

**Yomiuri-Gallup Joint Opinion Poll: Japan-U.S. Relations -- "Good" Down to All-Time Low of 23 Percent on Japanese Side; "Security Treaty Is Beneficial" -- 60 Percent in Both Countries**

The *Yomiuri Shimbun* conducted a joint public opinion survey with Gallup, a U.S. pollster firm, both in Japan and in the U.S., from October through November, to probe into how the two countries' peoples view the bilateral relationship in various areas, such as economic, defense, and human exchanges, upon entering into a new era of the two countries fifty years after the end of the War. As a result, the rate of those in Japan taking a "good" view of the two countries' present bilateral relationship decreased to a little over 20 percent, marking an all-time low ever since the survey started in 1978, and "bad" topped "good" for the first time. In the U.S. as well, "good" was at the second lowest rate, following the 1992 survey which showed an all-time low. As seen in such fact-finding, the two peoples' respective feelings toward the U.S. and Japan are now unprecedentedly cold. Such seems to have projected the intensification of trade disputes between the two countries and the waning of the public perception of an "alliance" after the end of the cold war. In Japan, it can presumably be taken as a strong reflection of public antipathy toward the incident of U.S. servicemen's rape of a schoolgirl in Okinawa Prefecture. As for the public evaluation of the two countries' security treaty, the rate of those thinking of it as "beneficial" reached about 60 percent both in Japan and in the U.S.. In Japan, however, more than half of those surveyed insisted that the U.S. armed forces deployed in Asia "should be reduced."

The Japan-U.S. joint opinion poll has been conducted annually since 1978. This year, the survey in Japan was conducted in late October on an interviewing basis. In the U.S., it was carried out from the middle of

October through the beginning of November in the same way.


Asked about today's Japan-U.S. relations, those who gave affirmative answers in Japan -- including both "very good" and "good" -- totaled 23 percent, showing a decrease of 12 percentage points over last year. In the U.S. as well, the total rate of such affirmative answers dropped to 29 percent, showing a decrease of 4 percentage points over the preceding year. "Bad" in Japan totaled 32 percent, an increase of 8 percentage points over the preceding year, while the total rate of such negative answers in the U.S. was 13 percent. Thus, the rate of negative answers in Japan was about 2.5 times higher than in the U.S. It seems that the Japanese public is rather taking a severer view of the present conditions of Japan-U.S. relations.

In reply to a question asking about whether or not it will be in the interest of Japan and the U.S. to maintain the two countries' security treaty, the rate of those who answered "yes" -- including those who answered "yes to some extent" -- reached 57 percent in Japan, while the rate of those who do not think so was 23 percent. In the U.S., "yes" totaled 63 percent, while "no" was at 22 percent.


Asked about the reason for "yes," the Japanese public gave such reasons as: (1) The security treaty is the basis for maintaining the Japan-U.S. relationship (54 percent); (2) it will lead to stability in Asia and in the Middle East (50 percent); and (3) it is indispensable for the defense of Japan (38 percent). In the U.S., it was because: (1) It is possible for U.S. armed forces to take quick action when there is a dispute in Asia or in the Middle East (36 percent); (2) it will lead to stability in the whole of Asia (35 percent); and (3) it prevents the two countries' economic relations from worsening (33 percent).

# Japan-U.S. Relations: "Good" or "Bad"?

## Japan



## U.S.



YOMIURI (Pages 10 & 11) (Extract)  
December 7, 1995

**Japan-U.S. Joint Opinion Poll Conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun and Gallup: Growing Sense of Rivalry, Reflecting Economic Friction**

**Questions & Answers**

(The figures are shown in terms of percentage.)

**Q: Which country or area do you think will be the strongest economic rival to Japan (or the U.S.) from now on. Pick just one from among those listed below.**

	Japan	U.S.
U.S.	32.1	---
Japan	---	54.2
China	33.5	17.7
East Asia	10.8	5.9
Republic of Korea [ROK; South Korea]	12.9	2.1
Britain	0.4	1.3
France	0.8	0.7
Germany	0.7	6.4
Middle East	0.3	2.8
Other answers	0.1	0.3
No answer	8.3	8.6

**Q: [Asked only in the U.S.] Which country or area in Asia are you most concerned about? Pick just one from among those listed below.**

Japan	25.0
China	17.3
ROK	2.5
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)	1.8
Vietnam	4.3
Malaysia	2.3
Taiwan	2.9
India	6.8
Thailand	2.6
Indonesia	2.1
Philippines	9.4
Other answers	0.3
None	14.3
No answer	8.3

**Q: Do you think America should build up its military presence in Asia, keep it at the present level, or reduce it, on the whole?**

	Japan	U.S.
Buildup	1.8	8.0
Present level	32.8	47.4

Reduction	56.8	31.7
No answer	8.6	13.0

**Q: Do you think the present Japan-U.S. relationship is going well, or do you not think so? (Continued)**

	Japan	U.S.
Very good	1.0	2.4
Good	22.2	26.1
Neither good nor bad	39.2	51.6
Bad	32.4	12.5
No answer	5.2	7.4

**Q: [Asked only in Japan] What do you think America should do for a better relationship of Japan and America in the 21st century? Pick up to three from among those listed below.**

America should maintain and reinforce the Japan-U.S. security treaty.	19.7
America should change its hard-line stance in the trade talks.	39.4
America should tighten its cooperation with Japan to settle international issues.	29.1
America should deepen its understanding of Japanese culture, economic and social customs.	38.8
America should activate human exchanges between Japan and the U.S.	27.4
America should weight its policy toward countries in Asia.	22.7
America should display its leadership in international politics.	12.1
Other answers	0.9
Nothing in particular	10.3
No answer	7.1

**Q: [Asked only in the U.S.] What do you think Japan should do for a better relationship of Japan and America in the 21st century? Pick up to three from among those listed below.**

Japan should play an even more positive role in international peacekeeping activities.	34.3
Japan should play an even more leading role in Asia.	6.3
Japan should import more foreign products, including U.S. products.	43.8
Japan should make its trade practices even more fair.	56.5
Japan should build up its defense power that can contribute to the stability of Japan and Asia.	13.4
Japan should further deepen its understanding of American culture.	18.3
Japan should further activate human exchanges between Japan and the U.S.	11.2
Other answers	0.2
Nothing in particular	2.4
No answer	9.9

**Q: Are you now more interested in America (or Japan) than you used to be five years ago, or are you now less interested?**

	Japan	U.S.
My interest has become very strong.	7.5	9.2
My interest has become slightly strong.	23.5	22.8
No change	55.0	49.3
My interest has become slightly weak.		
My interest has become very weak.	1.3	3.9
No answer	3.3	7.8

**Q: Is there anything that reminds you of America (or Japan) or let you know about America (or Japan). If any, pick as many as you like from among those listed below. (The same question was asked in a joint survey conducted in Japan, the U.S., and Europe in September 1993.)**

	Japan	U.S.
Cars, motorcycles	35.4	69.1
Photo cameras	2.4	53.8
Computers	32.0	47.6
Household electric appliances	6.3	49.5
TV games	2.7	27.8
Food	12.8	8.5
Movies, videos, animation	39.1	8.7
Art exhibitions	1.9	4.4
Fashion	11.9	3.0
Publicity, advertisements	9.9	6.3
Music	22.7	3.7
Sports	38.5	5.3
Big amusement parks	15.3	1.3
Books, magazines	4.8	5.7
Outdoor leisure	12.1	1.4
Nothing in particular	1.1	0.6
Nothing in particular; no answer	13.4	8.6

**Q: [Asked only in the U.S.] Do you think America should help Japan if it is attacked by another country's armed forces, or do you not think so?**

America should help Japan.	49.3
America should not help Japan.	31.0
No answer	19.7

**Q: Do you think it will be in the interest of Japan (or the U.S.) to maintain the Japan-U.S. security treaty?**

	Japan	U.S.
Yes	18.9	29.9
If anything, yes	37.7	32.6
If anything, no	15.3	15.3
No	8.2	6.2
No answer	20.0	16.1

**Q: [Asked only in Japan] [To only those who answered "yes" and "rather yes" in the foregoing question] Why do you think it will be in the interest of Japan? Pick up to three reasons from among those listed below.**

Because it will lead to stability in Asia and in the Middle East.	49.7
Because it is the basis for keeping up Japan-U.S. relations.	53.9
Because it is indispensable for the defense of Japan.	38.0
Because Japan doesn't have to spend much money for its defense.	14.4
Because it prevents Japan-U.S. economic relations from worsening.	21.6
Because it brakes Japan from turning into a military superpower.	26.6
For other reasons.	0.1



No answer	2.3
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**Q: [Asked only in Japan] [To only those who answered "no" and "rather no" in the foregoing question] Why do you think it will not be in the interest of Japan? Pick up to three reasons from among those listed below.**

Because there is no military threat of aggression against Japan.	18.7
Because Japan may be involved in America's military operations.	46.6
Because it obstructs equal negotiations in the economic and diplomatic areas.	41.1
Because Japan has to bear the burden of expenses for the stationing of U.S. armed forces in Japan.	41.5
Because U.S. military bases have caused noise pollution and U.S. servicemen have brought about crimes.	59.4
Because it will not make us think of defending our own country ourselves.	21.7
For other reasons.	0.6
No answer	1.3

**Q: [Asked only in the U.S.] [To only those who answered "yes" and "rather yes" in the foregoing question] Why do you think it will be in the interest of Japan [TN: sic]? Pick up to three reasons from among those listed below.**

Because it will lead to stability in the whole of Asia.	34.9
Because it is helpful for America's national defense.	32.5
Because U.S. forces will be enabled to take quick action when a dispute occurs in Asia or in the Middle East.	35.8
Because the two countries' military ties prevent their economic relations from worsening.	32.8
Because it will be in the national interest of America to defend Japan.	16.8
Because it can prevent Japan from turning into a military superpower.	25.8
For other reasons.	0.5
No answer	3.5

**Q: [Asked only in the U.S.] [To only those who answered "no" and "rather no" in the foregoing question] Why do you think it will not be in the interest of Japan [TN: sic]? Pick up to three reasons from among those listed below.**

Because it is not helpful for America's national defense.	23.0
Because Japan should self-defend itself.	35.6
Because defense spending will not decrease.	26.7
There is no imminent military threat to America in Asia.	16.7
Because America does not have to defend Asia.	19.6
Because it will not be in the national interest of America to defend Japan.	17.2
For other reasons.	1.0
No answer	12.9

**Q: How do you think Japan-U.S. economic relations will turn out from now on. Pick just one from among those listed below. (Continued)**

	Japan	U.S.
The two countries' economic relations will improve very much.	0.9	10.6
The two countries' economic relations will improve slightly.	20.1	37.1
The two countries' economic relations will remain unchanged.	39.6	18.0
The two countries' economic relations will worsen slightly.	30.0	16.5
The two countries' economic relations will worsen very much.	3.1	3.8
No answer	6.2	14.1

**Q: Over the last several years, Japan and America have disputed with each other, centering on their economic relations. Do you think the major responsibility lies with Japan, or do you think such rests with America. Or do you think both countries are equally responsible? (Continued)**

	Japan	U.S.
The responsibility rests with Japan.	9.2	32.2
The responsibility rests with America.	19.6	4.8
Both Japan and America are responsible likewise.	65.9	52.8
No answer	5.3	10.3

**<Method of Survey>**

This survey was conducted both in Japan and in the U.S. with the same contents. The survey on the Japanese side was conducted, as a part of *The Yomiuri Shimbun's* planning of its monthly nationwide public opinion survey, toward a total of 3,000 persons chosen from among all eligible voters throughout the country (at 250 points) on a stratified two-stage random-sampling basis, by interviewing them on October 28 and 29. Answers were obtained from 2,009 persons (67 percent), excluding those who could not be interviewed. In the breakdown of those who responded to the survey, males accounted for 45 percent, and females -- 55 percent. The survey on the U.S. side was entrusted to Gallup, with which *The Yomiuri Shimbun* has concluded a special-agent agreement, and it was conducted all over the U.S. The survey in the U.S. was conducted on the basis of door-to-door visits for individual interviews between October 13 and November 8 at 146 points which were chosen on a stratified multi-stage random-sampling basis, and answers were obtained from a total of 1,022 eligible voters aged 18 and over. In the breakdown of those who responded to the survey in the U.S., males numbered 521, and females -- 501.

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# Stop Japan-U.S. ties from worsening

A warning about the present state and future of relations between Japan and the United States has been delivered by the Japanese and American peoples. This may encapsulate the results of the latest survey conducted jointly by The Yomiuri Shimbun and Gallup Organization.

The need for special attention to bilateral ties is conspicuously reflected in the pollees' perceptions of current relations. Only 23.2 percent of Japanese, the lowest rate since the annual survey started in 1978, regarded Japan-U.S. relations as very good or good. Moreover, the percentage was exceeded by the rate of Japanese who consider relations to be in a poor state (32.4 percent) for the first time.

Americans who felt relations are good accounted for just 28.5 percent, the second-lowest level since 1978, though it was not as bad as the corresponding Japanese figure.

### Trade issues cited

The percentage of those who think bilateral relations are sound began to drop sharply in 1992. The downward trend may be attributable to changes in relations in the wake of the Cold War, but a more direct cause seems to have been trade friction.

This is seen in the pollees' responses to the question of what the other country should do to improve bilateral relations. At the top of the list for Japanese is a change in the United States' tough stance in trade negotiations, while the largest group of American respondents said Japan should make its trade rules and regulations more fair.

There is no denying that stable development of bilateral relations is vital, and for Japan in particular. Further efforts by both nations are needed so that strained economic relations will not adversely affect overall ties.

In the survey this time, many Japanese respondents said if better relations are to be established, Americans must better understand Japan's culture, economy and social

customs.

Such respondents are believed to have had in mind the Clinton administration's get-tough approach to Japan. Many Japanese think the administration attaches too much importance to "results." While Japan must, of course, relax regulations and make other efforts, we want the United States to deepen its understanding of Japan.

### Security treaty's significance

Although the respondents assessed Japan-U.S. relations in most fields, including economic ties, in negative terms, both Japanese and Americans expressed realistic views on security issues. Concerning the Japan-U.S. security treaty, 56.6 percent of Japanese and 62.5 percent of Americans said it is definitely or may be in their national interests to maintain the treaty.

In Japan, 56.8 percent of respondents said the U.S. military forces deployed in Asia should be reduced. But more than half of this group felt that maintaining the bilateral security treaty is in their national interests. It is thus apparent that, at a basic level, the significance of the treaty is perceived by both Japanese and Americans.

However, some Americans think Japan should be responsible for defending itself. They are no doubt dissatisfied with the one-sided nature of the security treaty. For the treaty to operate in an effective way, Japan should resolve the issue as to whether it has the right of collective defense. As long as this remains unclear, Japan will not be able to fully meet its responsibilities.

Streamlining and reducing the U.S. military bases in Okinawa Prefecture has become an important bilateral issue. It is time for Japan to discuss the right of collective defense, without regarding it as a taboo, while at the same time endeavoring to resolve the U.S. base issue.

(From Dec. 7 Yomiuri Shimbun)

TDY 12/7/95 p. 11



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December 7, 1995

**"Pessimistic Arguments" Conspicuous in Japan: Takeshi Igarashi, Tokyo University Professor**

This year, marking the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II, seems to see relations between Japan and the United States at a turning point, as can be seen in the problem of redefining the Japan-U.S. security-treaty arrangement. During the transition period, there is every possibility that trends of public opinion in the two countries will decide the future course of the bilateral relationship. What is symbolic in the latest public-opinion survey is that Japanese public opinion in general has a more pessimistic outlook than the U.S. has. On the present situation, as low as 13 percent of Americans polled answered Japan-U.S. relations are bad, while in Japan, 2.5 times as many as people so replied. Regarding future economic relations, 48 percent of American respondents said, "will improve," but in Japan, below half that percentage -- no less than 21 percent -- so replied.

The differences in outlook for Japan-U.S. relations are also manifested in the perceptions of the international situation. Asked which country of the world will become a major economic competitor, 54 percent of Americans surveyed cited "Japan," while in Japan, 34 percent cited "China," and 32 percent mentioned "the U.S." This difference is a reflection of Japanese people's strong tendency to place an emphasis on Asian countries. The Republic of Korea (ROK) was also cited by 13 percent of Japanese polled -- more than six times as many as Americans who cited that country. The gaps in the perceptions of the international situation were also seen in connection with the Japan-U.S. security arrangement. To a question about U.S. troops stationed in Asia, there was a pronounced contrast. A majority of the Japanese polled -- 57 percent -- answered, "should be reduced," but in the U.S., which is said to have turned inward-looking, those favoring such reduction totaled 32 percent, meaning Americans favoring withdrawal from Asia remain at less than the one-third level.

The reason why the argument for downsizing the security arrangement is gaining strength in Japan is found in the result of the survey that 30 percent of Americans polled said the security arrangement "is in the interest of" their own country positively, but no more than 19 percent

who so answered in Japan. However, if those who answered, "rather in the interest [to their country]," are included, those favoring the security arrangement stand at 63 percent in the U.S. and 57 percent in Japan, both exceeding a majority. So it may be said that a number of people favor the continuation of the security arrangement in both countries. As the reasons why it is "in the interest" to their country, in Japan, 54 percent said, "It is a foundation to maintain bilateral ties between Japan and the U.S.," followed by the reason why "it will lead to stability in Asia and the Middle East," which accounted for 50 percent. In short, it is possible to see that so-called "internationalists" consider it to be in the interest [to their own country].

Meanwhile, as the reasons why it is "not in the interest" [to their own country], 59 percent -- highest -- cited, "There is the noise problem caused by U.S. military bases and U.S. soldiers' crimes and the like," followed by "there is the fear of [Japan] being involved in U.S. military actions" -- 47 percent. Judging from such a result, it seems that those emphasizing citizens' viewpoints -- "citizens' groups" -- think it "not in the interest" [to their own country]. Although citizens' groups account for only 23 percent, they cannot be ignored in terms of the allocation of the burden of the security arrangement. Partly because of a strong argument calling for downsizing the security arrangement, it seems unlikely that it will be necessary in the future to realign and reduce U.S. military bases in a rational manner.

Of Japanese of their fifties or below, irrespective of their age brackets, 60 percent favor an argument for downsizing the security arrangement in Japan. Those in such age brackets have a strong tendency to look on China as a rival. This also reflects a trend to attach importance to relations with Asian countries. Japanese of their forties or over relatively tend to take a viewpoint of regarding the security arrangement as beneficial, so there seems to be a generational gap in the perspectives of Japan-U.S. relations.

(120704ku)

YOMIURI (Page 1) (Full)  
December 7, 1995

**Japan, U.S. Need to Play Global Role:  
Ezra Vogel, Harvard University  
Professor**

If United States President Clinton and Prime Minister Murayama meet as early as possible in 1996 and announce a new course for the U.S.-Japan security alliance in the post-cold war period, they will gain strong support in both countries across the board, although some biased persons may still have be critical.

According to a recent survey by the *Yomiuri Shimbun* and the U.S. Gallup Organization, 63 percent of Americans think that keeping their military bases in Japan to defend Japan and East Asia is or may be in the national interest of the U.S. And Americans who think it necessary to defend Japan in emergencies account for 49 percent, higher than in 1979 (47 percent), the peak year of the cold war.

This result may suggest that the U.S.-Japan security arrangement in general is supported by Americans of all classes. In addition, people who are regarded as influential opinion-leaders in society and those with academic backgrounds or with high occupational positions, who tend to make their views clear, are stronger supporters.

In Japan, too, the U.S.-Japan security alliance is strongly supported. According to survey conducted in mid-September (before the rape case of a schoolgirl in Okinawa Prefecture [TN: sic; the rape incident occurred on Sept.4] by the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 70 percent of Japanese surveyed thought the alliance with the U.S. was needed to maintain peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. Although the survey this time by [the

*Yomiuri Shimbun* and Gallup] was conducted at a time when people's anger had reached the boiling point because of the rape incident, those favoring the [U.S.-Japan] Security Treaty reached 57 percent, and those supporting the Japan-U.S. security arrangement topped opponents to it.

The U.S.-Japan security arrangement has gained strong support from Democratic President Clinton, in addition to former presidents Reagan and Bush from the Republican Party. Republican Congressmen, who were elected in the mid-term election in September 1994 and Republicans who support House Speaker Gingrich, slashed budgets in many areas, but were unwilling to touch military spending, not to mention the absence of any call for trimming U.S. troops based in East Asia.

It then can be safely said that political support in Japan for the U.S.-Japan security setup is widening over what it was during the cold-war period. At the October 21 protest rally which marked the climax of people's anger, Okinawan people called for reduction of U.S. troops based on Okinawa, but there was no request for abrogating the security treaty nor any call for complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japan. Governor Masahide Ota of Okinawa Prefecture has refused to sign as a proxy land-lease contracts to extend the use of land by U.S. forces, but even Governor Ota has given support to the U.S.-Japan security arrangement.

This means that the Japanese people support the U.S.-Japan security arrangement as the best means to deal with the current uncertainties. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) has more than a million of troops, possesses missiles whose range can reach Japan, and has stored enough plutonium to manufacture one or two atomic bombs. Russia is not a military threat, but the northern territory issue is a long way from reaching a settlement. For

now, China is not a military threat, either, but it hardened its stance when Japan protested against its nuclear testing. Japan has now taken on a global role to protect not only the Japanese archipelago but also global peace in the world. Instead of containing the common enemy, Japan and the U.S. now should join hands to be able to respond quickly to an emergency, as well as to maintain stability.

(120705ku)

Note for Walter Mondale

**From:** Andrew Meyers  
**Date:** Fri, Dec 8, 1995 12:03 PM  
**Subject:** Some thoughts on the U.S.  
**To:** Rust Deming; Walter Mondale

## MEMORANDUM

TO: The Ambassador

CC: Rust Deming, DCM

FROM: Andy Meyers

SUBJECT: Public Opinion: and themes for the U.S.

Very  
Good

While we talked the other day about public opinion in Japan, but as we put together your speech for the U.S. and think about your trip in March, I wanted to offer a few thoughts based on recent public opinion in America

What is most striking about the data is the historically low feelings American's have towards Japan. Different times call for different approaches to this relationship, but the deteriorating level of support in the U.S. has reached a point where this is worthy of closer consideration.

We are quick to point out the U.S. respect for Japan is at high levels. The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations is one good indicator. They report that 96% of the leaders and 85% of the public feel that the U.S. has a vital interest in Japan. The Gallop/MOFA poll from spring of this year puts American's trust in Japan at close to all time highs, with 54% saying Japan is a dependable ally.

It is important, however, to distinguish respect, from whether people in the U.S. like Japan or not. The most recent Sankei/Gallop/USA Today poll indicates a narrow plurality 46% like Japan vs. 45% who said they do not. This is a sharp drop from a peak of 82% in 1979 when slightly more than 10% had unfavorable feelings. Undeniably, feelings towards Japan are deteriorating.

This distinction between respect and admiration has important implications for Japan policy. In both economic and security policy there is the danger that unless the U.S. sees the alliance as beneficial, support for the policy will fall off.

At the heart of the problem is the very simple question of whether this relationship is working for the American people. The Yomiuri/Gallop poll just released tells a remarkable story, only 26% of American's feels the relationship is going well (Yomiuri/Gallop poll 12/96). What are the reasons for this?

As Thomas Jefferson once wrote, "Reason, justice and equity never had weight enough of the face of the earth to govern the councils of men. It is interest alone which does it."

What is the security interest?

Looking first at security, the Gallop/MOFA poll points out the vast majority (84%) see the

U.S.-Japan Security Treaty as being beneficial to the U.S. This level has remained pretty constant over the past 12 years.

In yesterday's Yomiuri poll 62% responded the Security Treaty was in our best interest. When asked why, the most popular reason cited (36%) was that the troops are needed for quick deployment in case of a war in Asia or the Mid-East; 35% said this leads to stability in Asia and 33% felt the security relationship was needed to keep economic relations from deteriorating.

However, it is premature to assume that this translates to unquestioned support for our troops. In fact, the free rider theory lives on. The public remains skeptical that our troops actually are of greater benefit to the U.S. than Japan. As the recent Sankei/Gallop poll points out, 58% of American's think our troops in Japan are beneficial to Japan while only 31% think they are beneficial for the U.S.

When the Asahi queried on what should be done about the bases in Okinawa, a plurality of Americans, 49% favored a gradual reduction, while 41% felt the current level should be maintained. (This does not specify reduction whether the reduction is troops or bases).

So, while the public accepts the overall justification for the military presence, this has not translated into long term support. If we are looking for greater support for these bases, it will be important to appeal to those interests mentioned above of forward presence and Asian stability.

Is trade in our best interest?

Americans view on whether trade with Japan is beneficial is a bit less solid. A TBS/CBS poll from June pointed out that a narrow plurality, 45%, felt this was beneficial, while 40% responded that it was not.

Japan clearly stands out as our chief economic competitor, but being a competitor may not necessarily be bad. In the Yomiuri poll, 54% placed Japan as our most formidable economic opponent with China a distant second at 18%. In another question 66% percent classified Japan as a "rival" versus only 3% who said Japan was an "enemy." As we have pointed out in past speeches, competition has been good for the U.S. economy often providing the external pressure needed to shake up some of our most important sectors.

However, skepticism concerning Japanese trade practices seems to be on the rise. The Potomac Associates noted recently that American's who viewed Japan as unfair in trade relations grew from 51% in 1989 to 70% in 1994. In the CBS/TBS poll 81% thought Japan restricts the sale of U.S. goods. At the same time we see support levels of around 60% for the 100% sanctions imposed on Japan this spring. What appears to be happening is that as American's become convinced that the Japanese market is closed, their feelings towards that country have dropped and support for sanctions has grown.

As we think about what we want to say in the U.S. this spring, it is worthwhile to remember the important benefits this relationship can provide. It is rather remarkable that America is seeing double digit growth of exports during an economic downturn in one of the worlds most developed economies. It is also remarkable that it should cost less to station troops in the world's most expensive country than it is to station them in Alabama. If American's had a bit more of a sense of the opportunity here now, this would have a very strong impact on their image of Japan as a free rider and send a very positive impression about why it is in our best interest to keep this relation solid.



## U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS IN TRANSITION: THE NEED FOR A POST-COLD WAR VISION

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*Weak  
alternative*

This presentation to the Southern California Japan Seminar allows me to reflect on the events of this past year, assess the current state of U.S.-Japan relations, indicate three major contradictions in policy that need to be addressed, and propose seven concrete steps the United States government can take to reconstruct this vitally important but increasingly fragile relationship. Given the nature of this audience, my talk tonight will focus primarily on public policy issues. Those interested more narrowly in the business dimensions of the relationship are referred to a paper I will present at lunch tomorrow at the California Club to the Japan America Society of Southern California entitled "Business Challenges in the U.S.-Japan Relationship."

### I. REFLECTIONS ON 1995

This past year--the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II--was to mark the conclusion of the "postwar era" and the beginning of the "post Cold War era" in which the U.S. and Japan could enter into a truly equal partnership befitting the 21st century. Yet, a series of incidents has brought to the surface the underlying concerns, complexities, and contradictions in the relationship between the two most powerful economies in the world:

1. The Japanese government's negative response to offers of assistance from abroad--including the U.S.--in the aftermath of the Great Hanshin Earthquake of January 17 reinforced the foreign image of the Japanese government's fundamental narrow-mindedness, insularity, and distrust of the outside world.
2. On January 23, the Japanese government announced that a controversial 12.3 billion yen war museum will not touch on Japan's war responsibility but will focus instead on the lives of bereaved families of the war dead.
3. Aum Shinrikyo, the religious cult charged with the March 20 sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway system, was scrutinized for, among other things, its anti-American teachings, its extensive international activities, and its plans to assassinate world leaders including the President of the United States.

4. On April 19, the yen reached a postwar record high of 79.75 yen to the dollar, leading many in Japan to denounce the U.S. for manipulating the currency markets in an attempt to destroy the Japanese economy.
5. May and June were replete with news accounts of a U.S.-Japan "trade war" over automobiles and automobile parts, with the U.S. being vilified in Japan for threatening to impose tariffs of \$5.9 billion on 13 models of Japanese luxury cars.
6. On June 9, the Lower House of the Diet after heated debate passed a resolution expressing remorse for Japan's wartime behavior but notable for its vagueness, euphemistic phraseology, and failure to include a proposed passage expressing Japan's determination not to repeat acts of aggression and the colonizing of other Asian countries.
7. The September 4 rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan girl, allegedly by three U.S. servicemen, created such a public furor in Japan that it brought into question the viability of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. A *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* nationwide public opinion poll conducted in mid-October revealed that only 43.5 percent of the respondents supported the treaty (down from 59.8 percent in the previous poll in August) and that 40.2 percent advocated abolishing the treaty (up from 28.7 percent in the previous poll).
8. The October 15 *New York Times* report of alleged CIA wiretapping of Japanese trade negotiators received wide publicity in Japan and was seen by many as proof of heightened distrust between the two countries and of U.S. targeting of Japan as an adversary, replacing the role played by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
9. On November 2, U.S. authorities announced a 24-count criminal indictment against Daiwa Bank Ltd. that could lead to fines of more than \$1 billion and ordered the bank to terminate its operations in the U.S. The U.S. expressed anger that Japanese regulators did not notify U.S. banking authorities of Daiwa's irregularities for nearly two months.
10. On November 13, Takami Eto was forced to resign his Cabinet post as head of the Management and Coordination Agency after telling a group of Japanese journalists that Japan "did some good things" during its colonial rule of Korea from 1910 to 1945. This followed a string of comments by senior Japanese politicians justifying Japan's conduct in the 1930s and 1940s that Asian countries found offensive.
11. Finally, the cancellation of President Clinton's trip to Japan to attend the APEC heads of state meeting in Osaka on November 19 and subsequent state visit to

Tokyo elicited Japanese criticism for the perceived low priority the Administration has given to APEC, Japan, and Asia.

## II. ASSESSMENT OF STATUS QUO

As the above list indicates, 1995 witnessed a deterioration in the U.S.-Japan relationship that went far beyond the trade tensions that have been at the center of bilateral disputes over the past two decades. Until the summer of 1995, it could be said that there were three "pillars" of the relationship--security, political, and economic--and that only the economic ties needed repair because the other two were in fine shape. Events of the past few months have proven otherwise.

Why this gap between the perception--until a few months ago--that "things are fine" and the reality that "things are unraveling"? Fundamentally, it is the inability or unwillingness of policymakers in both countries to face up to the fact that the end of the Cold War requires new ideas, approaches, and institutions. The framework that had served both countries so well during the first 40 years following World War II had become outmoded by the mid-1980s, but the two governments have, in a policy sense, been on "automatic pilot," assuming that minor refinements would be enough to maintain the relationship.

In fact, the recent strains demonstrate the necessity of coming to terms with the new realities of the post Cold War world. The new realities include the following:

(a) The relative wealth and power of the two countries have seen tremendous change. In 1955, the U.S. economy was 26 times the size of the Japanese economy; by 1994, it was 1.4 times. At the height of yen appreciation in April 1995, the U.S. economy was only 1.2 times the size of the Japanese economy.

(b) With wealth and power comes confidence. Japan is no longer willing to submit to every request put forth by the U.S. Not that Japan was in fact ever fully doing what the U.S. wanted. It was, however, remarkably skillful in creating the illusion in the minds of Americans that it was. Japan's new confidence obviates this charade; thus the "Japan that can say 'No!'"--seen as so unusual a few years ago--has by now become a fact of life.

(c) With wealth and power comes independence. Japan feels it can now diversify its interests to Asia and Europe and not rely solely on the U.S. for economic and political benefits; this independence may eventually assert itself in the security realm as well.

(d) With wealth and power comes influence. Japan's desire to become a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, for instance, is based partly on national pride, partly on a desire to contribute, and partly on a desire to

shape and influence world events in a multilateral setting. Japan's ability to influence bilateral relations can already be seen by its lobbying activities in such capitals as Jakarta, Bangkok, and Washington, D.C.

(e) These developments are bolstered by a generational change in Japan. Many younger Japanese, with little historical memory of the 1940s and 1950s, are in some sense more "international"--widely traveled, fluent in foreign languages, etc.--than their elders, but also more "nationalistic" in their confidence about Japan and assertion of Japanese superiority toward others including the U.S.

The growing gap in consciousness between the two publics is indicated in the results of a Gallup/Yomiuri Shimbun poll conducted in the U.S. and Japan in October and November and published in the *Yomiuri Shimbun* of December 7, 1995:

When Americans were asked, "What do you think Japan should do to improve its relationship with the U.S. in the 21st century?," the top two responses were "Japan should make its trade practices more fair" (56.5%) and "Japan should import more foreign products, including U.S. products" (43.8%).

When Japanese were asked, "What do you think the U.S. should do to improve its relationship with Japan in the 21st century?," the two top responses were "The U.S. should change its hard-line stance in the trade talks" (39.4%) and "The U.S. should deepen its understanding of Japanese culture, economics, and social customs" (38.8%).

The same poll asked both publics, "Over the last several years, Japan and the U.S. have had disputes centering on economic relations. Do you think the main responsibility lies with Japan or with the U.S.? Or do you think both countries are equally responsible?" The "Both share equal responsibility" response was given by 65.9% of the Japanese respondents and 52.8% of the American respondents.

However, among Japanese only 9.2% thought Japan was mainly responsible and 19.6% thought the U.S. was mainly responsible, whereas among Americans only 4.8% thought the U.S. was mainly responsible and 32.2% thought Japan was mainly responsible. That is, the percent of American respondents who attributed the problems to Japan (32.2%) was nearly four times the percent of Japanese respondents who attributed the problems to Japan (9.2%), a similar but inverse ratio to the Americans (4.8%) and Japanese (19.6%) who attributed the problems to the U.S.

### III. COLD WAR CONTRADICTIONS

The end of the Cold War--symbolized by the collapse of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989--has fundamentally recast the environment surrounding the United States and Japan. Yet U.S. policymakers have not adjusted to the new realities.



They continue to adhere to ideas, approaches, and institutions that may have served the two countries well for four decades following the Second World War but have since become obsolete. Three legacies of the Cold War are in particular need of reassessment.

### **1. The Security Relationship**

Despite the Clinton Administration's efforts to justify continued U.S. "deep engagement" in the security of East Asia--as evidenced by *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, issued by the Department of Defense in February of this year--the contradictions of this policy are all too evident in the case of Japan. Here we have a relationship between the two most powerful economies in the world, one continuing to suffer both egregious asymmetries in market access and a massive bilateral trade deficit--\$66 billion at last count--in which the deficit nation is providing the military security of the surplus nation.

Of course, the surplus nation can afford to pay the mercenary fees of "host nation support." But notice the disdainful Japanese term for this support--"*omoiyari yosan*," literally, "sympathy budget," implying that Japan is magnanimously propping up the U.S. with funding since the erstwhile Big Brother is too poor on its own to finance its 47,000 armed forces in Japan. This is surely not a stable condition.

Curiously, many Americans and Japanese agree that the current security arrangement is based on an "unequal treaty"--but from totally different perspectives. For Americans, the treaty is unequal in favor of Japan because it obligates the U.S. to come to the defense of Japan if it is attacked but does not reciprocally obligate Japan.

In addition, last year, security specialists seriously considered the following scenario: North Korea attacks South Korea. The U.S., under the U.S.-ROK security pact, comes to the aid of the South. Japan is under no treaty obligation to provide military personnel, so it does not. In addition, with the Socialists as part of the coalition government, Japan is even reluctant to allow U.S. military bases in Japan to be used by the U.S. to support operations on the Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, U.S. body bags mount while Japan looks the other way. As one U.S. senator commented during a trip to Japan at the time, "This could create the worst crisis in U.S.-Japan relations since the Second World War. It would make our differences over the Persian Gulf War look like peanuts."

Many Japanese, on the other hand, believe the "unequal treaty" favors the U.S. They see the presence of U.S. forces in Japan as unwanted, anachronistic, and imperialistic arrogance on the part of Americans still suffering victor mentality from both the Second World War and the Cold War.

Headlines from the October 14 edition of a popular Japanese magazine aptly



reflect this view: "Handling of Rape of an Okinawan Girl by U.S. Servicemen Proves Japan Still an American Colony! In the Face of Such Humiliation, Why Should We Submit to U.S. Demands to Increase 'Sympathy Budget' by 3 Billion Yen?" The article resentfully goes on to list the "unequal" and "extraterritorial" benefits accorded U.S. military personnel on Okinawa--ranging from exemption from paying the monthly NHK viewers fee to not being required to obtain a local license to drive vehicles. This astounding bilateral gap over notions of an "unequal treaty" cries out for redress.

## ***2. The Political Relationship***

Many Americans believe that the U.S. should encourage Japan to play a more active role in international affairs. The assumption is that Japan's interests are identical to, or at least compatible with, those of the U.S. Thus the Administration supports Japan becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

While this may have merits, it should be realized that one of the main arguments being used by Japanese seeking a permanent seat is that by attaining it Japan can use its Council vote as a bargaining chip--i.e., as leverage--in bilateral, especially trade, negotiations with the U.S. It should be noted that few Japanese remember that it was with U.S. support that Japan joined the GATT, IMF, World Bank, and OECD--institutions now often used by Japan to counter the U.S.

## ***3. Separating the Security/Political from the Economic Relationship***

During the Cold War, it was convenient to separate the security/political relationship, which was basically cooperative, from the economic relationship, which grew increasingly competitive and sometimes confrontational. However, such a separation makes little sense now.

First, the U.S. can no longer afford to treat Japan as two countries, one a close political/security ally, the other a formidable economic rival. Both aspects of the relationship need to be forged into a coherent, coordinated, and comprehensive policy toward Japan, not the piecemeal patchwork we have at present where the right hand rarely knows what the left hand is doing.

Second, Japan has no illusions about separating the two sides of the relationship. To the contrary, Japan has consciously and consistently exploited the U.S. bifurcation and played the "security card" against the U.S. by encouraging its "pol/mil" lobby in the U.S. to weigh in against those pursuing U.S. economic interests. It is a curious irony of postwar U.S.-Japan relations that the protector has been at the mercy of the protected.

These are only three of the numerous contradictions in the U.S.-Japan

relationship surfacing in the aftermath of the Cold War. The sooner U.S. policymakers wake up to the new realities and act on them, the sooner the bilateral relationship will be put on a constructive course for the 21st century.

#### **IV. SOME MODEST PROPOSALS**

What is to be done? The following are seven concrete steps the U.S. can take to repair, recast, and reconstruct the relationship:

##### ***1. Formulate a Japan policy***

Japan is too important to forget each time the U.S. trade deficit drops or a Bosnia erupts. As the second largest economy in the world and as a growing political force in international affairs, Japan deserves the constant attention of policymakers at the highest levels of the U.S. government. What is needed is a clear, coherent, consistent, comprehensive, and realistic policy toward Japan based on long-term U.S. strategic interests and priorities.

##### ***2. Integrate security, politics, and economics***

In the post Cold War world, the U.S. can no longer afford to bifurcate Japan into two countries--one a trusted security/political ally, the other an economic rival competing fiercely for world markets. Japan needs to be dealt with holistically as the powerful nation that it is, one that routinely and skillfully plays off American policymakers managing the security and political relationship against those overseeing the economic relationship.

##### ***3. Consider the regional and global framework***

Japan's economic power is too great and its political power too ascendant to be considered in isolation from the rest of Asia and a broader international context. The U.S. needs a sophisticated, realistic, and strategic analysis of Japan's growing role in the world and what it means for American interests. For instance, the U.S. security presence in Asia cannot be considered apart from the economic benefits Japan reaps from it.

##### ***4. Plan and shape the future***

The U.S. should establish alternative scenarios of how the relationship may evolve over the next five, 10, or 20 years, focusing on what is desirable, feasible, and attainable. While trying to shape the future in light of American interests, the U.S. should forecast areas where the two countries can cooperate, where they will compete, and where they are likely to conflict. The aim should be to maximize areas of cooperation, ensure benefits from competition, and minimize areas of conflict.

### ***5. Cool the rhetoric while solving problems***

An unfortunate side-effect of the U.S. lacking a coherent Japan policy is that contentious bilateral issues often take on a life of their own with no context of where they fit into the overall relationship. In the past, when the U.S. pursued these issues in a publicly adversarial manner, the Japanese reacted with resentment, defensiveness, and a sense of victimization.

Recently, however, the Japanese stance has turned to outrage, defiance, and the threat of counterretaliation coupled with an adroit cultivation of allies in Asia and Europe in an attempt to isolate the U.S. The U.S. needs to cool the public saber-rattling, build allies in Japan and abroad, and focus on practical, results-oriented problem-solving based on a credible set of positive and negative inducements for Japan to change.

### ***6. Use expertise on Japan***

The U.S. needs policymakers who understand Japan--its language, history, psychology, politics, economy, and business practices. The U.S. government's Japan expertise, especially on economic issues, is far from adequate. Only by having such expertise is it possible for the U.S. to formulate and implement a coherent Japan policy that maximizes U.S. interests while minimizing Japanese resentment. Japan must be taken seriously enough to be dealt with by Americans who know that country, just as Japan has the good sense to use government officials and business people knowledgeable about the U.S.

### ***7. Establish a White House Office of Japan Policy***

An institution is needed to centralize U.S. policy toward Japan. An Office of Japan Policy, staffed by Americans with extensive knowledge of and experience in Japanese affairs, should be established to ensure that Japan commands the constant and coordinated high-level attention in the U.S. government that it deserves. Only an office in the White House can play the role of an honest broker that will balance competing interests among the numerous and diverse U.S. government agencies dealing with Japan. Such an office would provide the expertise, continuity, and institutional memory that are prerequisites for the formulation and implementation of a comprehensive Japan policy.

## **V. CONCLUSIONS**

With the U.S. and Japan comprising 40 percent of the world's GNP, how these two nations identify problems, resolve differences, and work together has profound implications for the international system. The events of 1995 are a warning to all of us that a fundamental reassessment and reconstruction of the U.S.-Japan relationship in

line with the new realities is imperative if we are to realize a truly equal, meaningful, and mutually beneficial partnership.

It should not be taken for granted that the U.S. and Japan will naturally be able to sustain in the future the close and cooperative relationship enjoyed over the past 50 years. The vast domestic changes in the two countries, coupled with the transformation of the international environment, require that the U.S. consciously formulate a future vision that will help guide the two countries into the 21st century. As Proverbs 29:18 reminds us, "Where there is no vision, the people perish."

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