

OPINION ANALYSIS

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A Japanese Snapshot of American Society

Findings from a recent USIA-sponsored public opinion poll in Japan provide some insights into Japanese views of American society.*

Key Findings

- Three-fourths of the Japanese public see the U.S. as a violent society that is racially and economically divided.
- A majority do not think that America is an orderly society, and half think the public good is often subordinated to individual rights.
- At the same time, some key positive images of the U.S. are also as widespread: its political process is widely viewed as responsive to the public; its citizens as active in community affairs; and its arts as creative and dynamic.
- Majorities believe there are fundamental differences in American and Japanese values -- in work, family, lifestyle, and ethics.
- The public's views of American society occur against a background of overall favorable attitudes toward the U.S. While public opinion of the U.S. may be influenced in part by its images of American society, it is affected as much or more by what America does in the international arena.

Mixed Images of American Society

Respondents were asked how well each of 16 descriptions applies to the U.S. and to American society. Although these descriptions are far from comprehensive, analysis of the pattern of replies yields several clusters of images, providing a rough picture of American society from the perspective of the Japanese public.

- *Violence and Sharp Economic and Racial Divisions.* Some three-fourths see the U.S. as a violent society marked by racial division and severe economic disparities -- including a quarter to a third who think these images describe America "very well."

	Describes American Society			
	Very well	Fairly well	Not very well	Not at all
It is a violent society	24%	52	15	1
Blacks and whites do not get along	25%	48	17	2
There is a wide gap between rich and poor	36%	43	13	2

The notion of the U.S. as violent and dangerous undoubtedly has been reinforced by the rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by three American servicemen last fall and the murders of Japanese students and others in the U.S. in recent years.

* Face-to-face interviews were conducted March 7-14, 1996, among a representative national sample of 1,007 adults age 18 and over. Security-related findings were reported previously in B-23-96, "Japanese Public Opinion on U.S.-Japan Relations," March 29, 1996; economic-related findings were reported in B-25-96, "Japanese Public Opinion on Economic, Trade Issues," April 10, 1996.

Among the various sources of information about the U.S., the daily news media may play a special role in helping shape this negative image of American society. According to a 1994 joint Japan-U.S. study of television news broadcasting (where most Japanese and Americans get their news), Japanese television news paid considerably more attention to the U.S. than did American television to Japan, and covered the U.S. disproportionately compared to the rest of the world.¹ The study also found that Japanese TV news coverage of the U.S. tended to focus heavily on domestic problems, with slightly over 40 percent of the stories covering natural and man-made disasters and violence. Although most of the coverage of the U.S. was straightforward, deviations from neutrality were mainly negative. In particular, the study found that Japanese newscasters in about a quarter of the newscasts aired by commercial networks (other than NHK, the Japan Public Broadcasting Corporation) expressed opinions about the stories they reported, and their comments were decidedly negative.

However, in several other key areas, Japanese images of the U.S. are widely positive:

- *A Participatory Democracy.* American citizens are widely seen as effectively engaged in the political process: public opinion influences political decisions (76%); and citizens participate actively in community affairs (58%). (See table below)
- *Creative, Dynamic Arts.* Also brightening the picture of the U.S., there is majority agreement (three-fourths) that American arts and literature are creative and dynamic.

The public tends to be more divided in their other views of American society:

- *Unfettered Big Business.* Although there is considerable uncertainty (three-in-ten "don't know"), Japanese are somewhat more likely to see big business in the U.S. as operating without sufficient supervision by the government or the public (47% vs. 25%) than to see consumers as having many safeguards (37% vs. 31%). This mixed image of the American marketplace could undercut the public's receptivity to U.S. arguments for further deregulation of Japan's economy along an American model.
- *Individual Rights, Selfishness.* While many (3-in-10) are again uncertain, the public tends to think that the U.S. extols individual rights to the point of sacrificing the interests of society (51% vs. 19%). However, American justice is seen as fair and effective, though by a somewhat narrower margin (45% vs. 27%).

Opinion divides on whether "everyone thinks only of himself" (47% agree; 43% disagree) in America, but a majority (64%) reject the notion that American society is selfish to the point where it "neglects the sick and elderly."

- *"Not Japan."* In "Social Consciousness" surveys sponsored by the Prime Minister's Office, the diligence of the Japanese people and "public order/safety" are perennially perceived as among Japanese society's strongest qualities. Majorities feel that these qualities do not apply to American society.
- *Anti-Japanese Prejudice.* For a majority (62%), and particularly among older Japanese, a perception of the U.S. as a racially divided society is related to a sense that Americans are prejudiced against Japanese. Although the university-educated also perceive such a prejudice, they tend to view it as an issue distinct from the black-white division of American society.

¹"Creating Images: American and Japanese Television News Coverage of the Other." Summary of Conference and Research. Tokyo: The Mansfield Center for Pacific Affairs, 1994.

- *A Society in Decay?* Japanese views are mixed on this summary assessment of the health of American society: slightly more agree (45%) than disagree (38%) that American society is in decay.

Images of American Society				
(percentage)	Describes very well	Describes fairly well	Describes not very well	Describes not at all
Public opinion influences political decisions	21	55	10	2
Citizens participate actively in community affairs	19	39	15	3
It has a creative, dynamic arts and literature	30	44	11	2
Big business operates without sufficient supervision by the gov't or the public	11	36	21	4
Consumers have many safeguards	5	32	27	4
The public good is often subordinated to individual rights	11	40	16	3
The system of justice is fair and effective	8	37	22	5
Everyone thinks only of himself	9	38	38	5
It is a society that neglects the sick and elderly	3	16	51	13
The work force is very diligent	4	32	49	12
It is an orderly society	4	29	44	14
There is a lot of prejudice against Japanese	10	52	24	3
It is a decaying society	6	39	32	6

Differing Values

Not only do Japanese have a rather mixed picture of American society, but they perceive fundamental differences in values between the two countries. Majorities ranging from six-in-ten in the case of ethical values to three-quarters in the case of lifestyle values see differences between Japan and the U.S. (See table below)

The university-educated and younger Japanese are not significantly different in their views from the general public. In fact, younger Japanese appear more widely conscious of lifestyle differences.

Japanese and American Values			
(percentage)	Very/Fairly Similar	Somewhat Different	Very Different
Work Values	23	45	23
Family Values	24	47	21
Lifestyle	20	44	32
Sense of right and wrong	29	40	20

Framing the Picture: Overall Likes and Dislikes About the U.S.

Japanese images of American society should be considered in the context of their overall positive attitudes toward the U.S. In mid-March 1996, before President Clinton's visit to Japan, two-thirds (65% vs. 31%) had a favorable opinion of the U.S. and over half (54% vs. 42%) thought relations between the two countries were in good shape.

When Japanese are asked for more detail about what they like and dislike about the U.S. and what they see as the chief irritants in bilateral relations, their answers suggest that their views may be influenced in part by their images of America as a society and a nation. But they are also influenced as much or more by their perceptions of what America does -- its actions and policies and, especially, how it interacts with Japan.

In March, when asked "why some people might dislike the U.S.," the leading reason was the presence of the military bases. Previously, it was U.S. market opening pressures. Yet views of American society have not been far behind: "violence and disorder in American society" has been in second place for two years, and earlier -- in May 1994, shortly after the murder of two Japanese students in the U.S. -- it tied for first. Very few see an American cultural threat to Japan.

Main Reasons Why Some People Dislike the U.S. (multiple responses)			
(percentage)	May 1994	Sep 1995	March 1996
Presence of U.S. bases in Japan	22	23	40
Violence and disorder in American society	52	35	33
U.S. market opening pressures	52	48	33
U.S. bullies its allies and always expects them to give in to its wishes	36	31	27
U.S. military intervention abroad	20	17	15
Negative influence of American culture	9	6	7

There is only a limited sense that "differences in language, culture and national traits" are much of an obstacle to good U.S.-Japan relations. In fact, half say these differences are no obstacle at all. Although a third see them as a minor hindrance, only 10 percent think the differences are a major obstacle. Among six disparate factors (shown below), "America forcing its foreign policies on Japan" and the U.S. military presence is most frequently rated a major obstacle (each 4-in-10) to good relations, while "unreasonable trade demands" (3-in-10) ranks close behind. Some also see "inflexible" Japanese bureaucrats and the media exaggerating bilateral problems as major hindrances.

Obstacles to Good Relations Between Japan and the U.S.			
(percentage)	Major <u>Obstacle</u>	Minor <u>Obstacle</u>	Not an <u>Obstacle</u>
America forcing its foreign policies on Japan	39	45	6
The presence of U.S. military forces in Japan	38	43	12
The U.S. making unreasonable trade demands	31	53	6
Japanese bureaucrats are inflexible in trade negotiations	26	47	12
Media coverage exaggerating problems that otherwise might be solved quietly	18	44	23
Differences in language, culture and national traits	10	34	51

When given a list of six possibilities, what impresses Japanese most about the U.S. is also what it does -- e.g., "its leadership in world affairs" (43%). Still, the U.S. is admired as much for its political system (20%) as its technological achievements (22%) and economic success (21%). Sixteen percent (more among younger Japanese) choose its cultural contributions. The "unity of its people" (5%) impresses few Japanese.

How the Poll Was Taken

Poll results are from a public opinion survey based on face-to-face interviews with 1,007 Japanese age 18 and over, carried out nationwide by Shin Joho Center between March 7-14, 1996.

The questions were written by the USIA Office of Research. The Japanese translation was prepared by the contractor, and checked by USIS Tokyo and the Office of Research.

Nineteen times out of twenty, the results based on the sample used in this survey will differ by no more than 4 percentage points in either direction from what would be found if it were possible to interview every adult in the country.

In addition to sampling error, the practical difficulties of conducting a survey of public opinion may introduce other sources of error into the results.

Additional technical information on the methodology of the survey may be obtained from the analyst.

Clinton finally gets it right

By GERALD CURTIS

When it comes to Asia policy, President Bill Clinton has to be given credit for getting his timing right. Republicans eager to pounce on him for inconsistencies in China policy, deterioration in relations with Japan, and for creating uneasiness throughout Asia about the United States' commitment to the region suddenly have found themselves without very much to attack.



A good illustration of their dilemma is a column on China policy by Steve Forbes in the May 20 issue of *Forbes* magazine. According to *Forbes*, the U.S. should continue most favored nation China, condemn China's human rights record and pressure it to respect intellectual property rights. China should be kept

gue states

weapons and was possibly coming into possession of nuclear arms. These so-called weapons of mass destruction are fairly regarded as the great equalizer among nations at different levels of power. To become equal is why lesser countries like Iraq seek nukes, and it is why greater countries like the U.S. seek to thwart them.

Some rogues armed only with conventional weapons are dangerous, but nuclear proliferation makes them particularly dangerous.

Besides nuclear ambition, the other familiar signature of the rogue is a predilection for terrorism as an alternative or complement to nuclear arms. Here too the fear is not fanciful.

A focus on rogues, argues Klare, ties us to high military spending, feeds imprudent temptations of intervention and diverts us from the chaos agenda. But military spending, while it might be further lowered, lingers at the lowest level in percentage of GNP since 1940. Interventions still must conquer the sturdy misgivings of a casualty-shy American public. The chaos agenda of environmentalism, ethnic conflict and the like — which Klare favors — would be slow going in the best of circumstances.

Klare fears that while certain states (Libya, Iran) pose "a threat of sorts," the rogue idea is being pumped up out of proportion to the "actual danger." In a world with its rogue states and unclear outlaws tamed would be a different place, and an easier one.

out of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund until it changes its commercial behavior to conform to universally recognized rules, and the U.S. should use sanctions to punish China for unfair trading practices.

The U.S. also should remain politically and militarily involved in the Asia-Pacific region and make it clear to China that we would not countenance the use of force against Taiwan. This is not a bad policy prescription. The problem for the Republicans is that it is a pretty good summary of the Clinton administration's current China policy.

In his hourlong Asia policy speech delivered last month, soon to be former Sen. Bob Dole set out to castigate the Clinton administration for its failed Asia policy and ended up endorsing almost every substantive policy the administration is currently pursuing in Asia. He too favors continued MFN treatment for China, close security ties with Japan and an aggressive policy to pry open Asian markets. Only on North Korea did Dole try to stake out a position substantially different from Clinton's.

But Dole's preference for isolating North Korea and for confrontation instead of dialogue was greeted with dismay by South Korea leaders. They could hardly be expected to be enthusiastic about a U.S. policy shift that might provoke North Korea into a desperate attack on the South. It is reasonable to believe that President Dole would be much more cautious in his Korea policy than candidate Dole.

It is possible to identify the key pillars of Clinton's Asia policy today in a way that could not be done even less than a year ago. It includes a triple-pronged policy toward Japan of closer security cooperation, continued pressure to open Japanese markets further to foreign goods and investment, and efforts to coordinate policy on a range of regional and global issues.

The only difference with this policy that could be discerned in Dole's Asia speech was that he would be even more inclined toward unilateral measures to deal with market access problems in Japan than Clinton has been. If Japanese think that the Republicans are somehow "softer" on trade than the Democrats are, they should look again, especially now that the Clinton administration seems to have acquired a better appreciation of the limitations of a so-called "results oriented" strategy for dealing with trade issues.

The administration seems to have resolved its ambivalence about policy toward China. Its China policy includes unambiguous support for MFN continuation and for dialogue with Chinese lead-

ers. Judging from recent speeches and comments from both Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Secretary of Defense William Perry, the policy of "punishing" China by refusing to talk to its leaders fortunately appears to have been abandoned.

The policy also includes a tough position both on trade issues, such as the current confrontation over the Chinese government's failure to adequately protect intellectual property rights, and on political and security matters. The ending of two U.S. aircraft carrier groups into the Taiwan Strait during Taiwan's presidential election campaign sent a strong signal to the PRC that the U.S. would not simply stand by and do nothing in the face of a Chinese policy of intimidation. And in so doing it sent a reassuring message to the rest of Asia that the U.S. intends to remain a powerful player in maintaining a balance of power in the region.

Those who continue to attack the administration's Asia policy are not gaining much from it politically. Patrick Buchanan tried to play an Asian card, and a more broadly protectionist and isolationist card as well, but it did not bring him the support in the primaries he was hoping for. There is considerable congressional support for suspending MFN for China, but this is a matter of Congress voting its heart on human rights rather than its head on China policy, and knowing that if it passes a bill to suspend MFN, Clinton will veto it.

Events of course could undo the Asia policy that is now taking form. Another Tiananmen, a rapid worsening of the trade balance with Japan, a crisis on the Korean Peninsula in which Japan fails to adequately support the U.S. — it is not difficult to imagine scenarios that would undermine current U.S. policy.

There is also the possibility that Clinton will do a flip flop on some key aspect of his Asia policy for purely domestic political reasons. After all, the consensus on Asia policy that is reflected in the positions taken by top political leaders in both parties has not been embraced by many important constituencies in the American political system. No one can know for sure whether Clinton will stick to his present course — on China policy in particular — as the presidential election approaches.


But for the moment U.S. policy looks to be in pretty good shape. Finally the administration seems to be crafting a post-Cold War Asia policy that makes sense and that stands a good chance of being continued no matter what the outcome of the November presidential election.

Gerald Curtis is professor of political science at Columbia University. The Japanese translation of this article appeared in the *Tokyo Shimbun* of June 1.

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JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT
U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
SEPTEMBER 19, 1996

1. The Governments of Japan and the United States held a meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in Washington, D.C., on September 19, 1996. Japan was represented by Minister for Foreign Affairs Yukihiro Ikeda and Minister of State and Director-General of the Defense Agency Hideo Usui. The United States was represented by Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Secretary of Defense William Perry.
2. All the members of the SCC underscored the crucial importance of the U.S.-Japan Alliance as the most effective framework for the two nations to work closely together to achieve common security objectives and to maintain stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. They noted that the April summit between Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton and the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security (Joint Declaration) marked a significant step toward reaffirming and strengthening the U.S.-Japan security relationship. They expressed their strong resolve to follow up the Joint Declaration by actively pursuing specific items for bilateral cooperation under the U.S.-Japan security relationship, as well as regional and global cooperation.
3. The members of the SCC reiterated that the broad support and understanding of the Japanese people is indispensable for stationing U.S. forces in Japan. They agreed to continue to work closely together, making every effort to deal with various issues related to the presence of U.S. forces in Japan, particularly in Okinawa. The SCC reviewed progress made by the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) since April, issued a status report, and renewed their firm commitment to successfully conclude the SACO process by the end of November 1996.

In this regard, the Japanese members explained the sincere efforts by the Government of Japan now underway to maintain close communications with Okinawa Prefecture and to develop domestic measures to alleviate the burden on the people of Okinawa due to the concentration of the United States facilities and areas. The United States members expressed their appreciation for these efforts, and the September 10, 1996 statement by Prime Minister Hashimoto.

4. The SCC noted with satisfaction that discussions are well underway at the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC) to review the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (Guidelines), and adopted the Progress Report on the Guidelines review.

The SCC also emphasized the importance for both sides to actively provide a clear explanation of this review to the countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Japanese side explained that extensive studies on possible contingency responses have been conducted within the Government of Japan at the instruction of Prime Minister Hashimoto. The two sides noted the significance of future achievements in these studies in the context of the review of the Guidelines.

5. The SCC noted with satisfaction the preparations underway for the implementation of the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America.

The two sides expressed their appreciation for substantial progress in mutual exchange in the areas of technology and equipment. They welcomed the Exchange of Notes concerning the production of the Support Fighter (F-2) and the completion of the relevant notification to the United States Congress.

The members of the SCC, reiterating the Joint Declaration, confirmed their continued cooperation in the bilateral study on ballistic missile defense.

The two sides expressed their satisfaction with the implementation of the New Special Measures Agreement which entered into force on April 1, 1996.

6. To strengthen the bilateral security relationship in this new era, the SCC agreed to study two new initiatives: measures to enhance consultations under urgent situations through the use of advanced technologies, such as secure video teleconference systems; and to explore new areas to increase training opportunities.

7. The two sides exchanged views on the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region. They reaffirmed that continuous and in-depth exchange of information and views is critical for ensuring close coordination of our policies aimed at achieving common objectives. From this perspective, they reviewed regional security dialogues and exchanges on defense matters with countries in this region.

8. The members of the SCC agreed to continue to consult closely on defense policies and military postures, including the U.S. force structure in Japan, to best meet the security requirements of the two countries. In this connection, they reconfirmed that the SCC remains an extremely valuable forum for discussing all the important matters in the area of the U.S.-Japan security relationship, and stressed the need for holding at least one meeting every year.

STATUS REPORT ON THE SPECIAL ACTION COMMITTEE ON OKINAWA
U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
SEPTEMBER 19, 1996

1. At the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) held on April 15, 1996, Minister Ikeda, Minister Usui, Secretary Perry and Ambassador Mondale agreed to several significant initiatives and issued the SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) Interim Report. At that time, the SCC also emphasized the importance of implementing these and has instructed SACO to form and recommend plans with concrete implementation schedules by November 1996.

In the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security issued on April 17, 1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton welcomed the far reaching measures outlined in the SACO Interim Report and expressed their firm commitment to achieve a successful conclusion of the SACO process by November 1996.

2. Regarding Futenma Air Station, intensive consultations have been conducted on ways to meet the conditions for its return as stated in the SACO Interim Report. To determine the most appropriate solution which will minimize the burden on the people in Okinawa and maintain the military functions of the Futenma Air Station, SACO will conduct intensive joint studies on three possible alternatives:

- (a) Incorporate the heliport into Kadena Air Base.
- (b) Construct a heliport at Camp Schwab.
- (c) Develop and construct a Floating Offshore Facility, using advanced technology and engineering.

These studies will be done in a comprehensive manner, and will take into account safety, noise, operations and technical aspects, as well as environmental and financial factors.

Both sides agreed to establish a special working group for these joint studies. SACO will make a final report on the basis of these studies. The SCC agreed to reach a decision by the end of November on the basis of this final report.

3. Progress on Several SACO issues:

- (a) As a result of bilateral discussions thus far, working level coordination has been completed between Japan and the United States on the five items, namely, the Aha Training Area, Gimbaru Training Area, Yomitan Auxiliary Airfield, Sobe Communication Site and a plan for building new noise reduction baffles at Kadena Air Base. The Government of Japan,

having already explained this outcome to the Okinawa Prefectural Government, is now coordinating with local authorities regarding required relocations.

(b) The Joint Committee accepted the results of the study on Artillery Live-fire Training over Highway 104. This study examined technical issues regarding the suitability of possible alternative maneuver areas of the Japan Self Defense Forces. The Government of Japan is now coordinating with the local authorities concerned on the eventual relocation of this training to mainland Japan.

(c) Discussions on SOFA related issues are well underway. The revision of the relevant Joint Committee agreements on the quarantine procedures is expected in the near future. Intensive work is also underway for reaching early conclusion on items such as accident reports and removal of expended munitions.

4. SACO will redouble its efforts to complete bilateral working-level coordination as quickly as possible on the remaining items. The SCC reconfirmed the need to achieve a successful conclusion of the SACO process by the end of November 1996.

PROGRESS REPORT ON THE GUIDELINES REVIEW
FOR U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE COOPERATION
SECURITY CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
SEPTEMBER 19, 1996

In the "U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security" signed by Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton on April 17, 1996, the two leaders agreed to initiate a review of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation ("Guidelines") to build upon the close working relationship already established between Japan and the United States. The two leaders also agreed on the necessity to promote bilateral policy coordination, including studies on bilateral cooperation in dealing with situations that may emerge in areas surrounding Japan and will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security.

On June 28, 1996, the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States agreed on the reconstitution of the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation (SDC), established under the authority of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC). This Subcommittee has adopted the following structure as a useful way to organize the review:

- Cooperation under normal situations
- Actions in response to an armed attack against Japan (to include imminent armed attack)
- Cooperation in situations that may emerge in areas surrounding Japan and will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security

The SDC held a series of discussions on the conduct of this review. On the basis of these discussions, the SDC recommended and the SCC approved the following purposes, principles and scope for this review. The SCC directed the SDC to proceed with the intention to complete the review by Autumn of 1997.

1. Basic purposes and principles of the Guidelines Review

(a) This review will be conducted to achieve a more effective relationship for U.S.-Japan defense cooperation in a new era on the basis of the new "National Defense Program Outline" and "U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security." It builds upon existing bilateral defense cooperation achieved under the current Guidelines.

(b) Both sides have established the following goals:

(1) to provide a transparent outline of bilateral defense cooperation in a new era, taking into account many changes in the security environment, such as the Asia Pacific region, and

(2) to provide a general framework and policy direction in order to facilitate and promote a variety of bilateral programs, such as joint studies, for building the basis of more effective cooperation.

(c) Both sides agreed that this review will proceed in accordance with the following principles. The review will:

(1) not change the rights and obligations under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and related arrangements.

(2) not change the fundamental framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

(3) be conducted within the framework of the Constitution of Japan.

2. Scope of the study and consultation

(a) Cooperation under normal situations

It is crucial to maintain close bilateral cooperation under normal situations to foster a more stable security environment, and to deter armed attack against Japan. Additionally, it is also important to enhance consultations in different fields and at diverse levels. This includes increased cooperation and consultation in the following areas:

- (1) intelligence sharing
- (2) defense policies and military postures
- (3) bilateral studies, exercises and training opportunities
- (4) bilateral policy coordination for international peace and stability
- (5) defense and security dialogue

(b) Actions in response to an armed attack against Japan (to include imminent armed attack)

Bilateral actions in response to an armed attack against Japan remain a core aspect of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation. While close cooperation already exists in this area under the current Guidelines, such cooperation should be further strengthened. The two countries will build on the achievements of the past and will make adjustments in view of developments since forming the current Guidelines. The SDC will identify potential new areas for cooperation. This will be done in the context of the post-Cold War security policies in both countries, such as those articulated in Japan's new "National Defense Program Outline" and the "United States East Asia Strategy Report."

(c) Cooperation in situations that may emerge in areas surrounding Japan and will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security.

It is extremely important for both countries to establish a smooth and effective mechanism to address such situations. Through this mechanism, both nations can better prevent, control and manage situations, from pre-crisis through post-crisis phases.

The SDC will examine future directions of bilateral cooperation, based on Japanese and U.S. defense policies and equipment, in view of their respective needs, and taking into consideration the progress of the Japanese internal studies on contingency responses. Potential functions and fields for bilateral cooperation include:

- (1) Humanitarian relief operations
- (2) Operations to evacuate non-combatants
- (3) Use of facilities by U.S. forces
- (4) Rear area support for U.S. forces' activities
- (5) Operations of the Japanese Self Defense Forces and U.S. forces

The 'weak' Japan is a myth

Wealth, leadership by stealth give Tokyo influence

By BRAD GLOSSERMAN

Staff writer

Being rich has its benefits. Possession of the world's second largest economy has given Japan access to the highest councils of international decision-making, the ongoing campaign for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council notwithstanding. The nation plays a leading role in multilateral institutions while its public sector aid programs and dynamic private sector extend Japan's influence across the globe in subtle and important ways.

Despite all this, it is an item of faith that Japan's political influence is vastly disproportionate to its economic wealth. Critics routinely complain that Tokyo either has no foreign policy or is only capable of responding to international events. Implicit in this criticism is the government's perceived inability to harness the country's economic strength to the pursuit of national goals.

That failure is in the eye of the beholder, argues Reinhard Drifte, director of the University of Newcastle's East Asia Center. Drifte believes Japan has immense power over international relations, and exercises that influence in decisive ways to protect its national interest.

If "proof of power lies in the ability to change the behavior of foreign actors," then Tokyo has plenty. "Japan meets its political and economic interests quite well. It matches ends to means with a minimum of input and a minimum of political costs," Drifte elaborated in an interview last week.

The problem for most observers is that Japan has chosen not to demonstrate its strength. Instead, it leads in an incremental, low-profile way. Drifte calls it "leadership by stealth."

The immense strength of the Japanese economy — weakened by the fallout of the "bubble era" but still an international powerhouse — is used not only for narrow economic gains but also to gain recognition and prestige on the global stage. Drifte believes that through the use of its global partnership with the United States and its aid and assistance policies, "Japan is changing or reinforcing international regimes in ways that increasingly benefit its national interests."

Drifte points to the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations to make his point. The

long history of trade disputes has made it abundantly clear to Tokyo decision-makers that their economic system differs in significant ways from those of their major Western trading partners. But those differences fall for the most part outside the scope of international regulatory regimes.

According to traditional tests — tariff levels, for example — Japan is a paragon of GATT virtues. Japanese officials can claim that their economy is far more consistent with GATT or World Trade Organization rules than its competitors. As a result, said Drifte, "Japan is projecting itself as a model GATT member while using GATT rules to refute attempts by other countries to use measures incompatible with GATT to counter Japanese advantages related to its political economic system which are outside of GATT regulations (for example, the cumbersome distribution system, the bias against foreign products and ser-

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vices, high entrance costs for newcomers)."

By refusing to make a deal on rice, Japan held up a final settlement of the Uruguay Round. Critics note Tokyo was forced to accept imports in the end, but Drifte argues that what matters is Japan's ability to stick to its position as long as it did, the fact that it cushioned the blow with a huge subsidy to domestic farmers, and was not punished for its obstinacy. Said Drifte, "Japan is just so powerful and so important that it can get away with these things."

Japan demands that its trading partners accept a high degree of interdependence, while fending off dependence on its own part — and gets away with it. Thus, Drifte argues that "we have to recognize it as the exertion of power when Japan tries to maintain a political and economic system which has been significantly different from that of comparable

industrialized nations."

Influence is wielded in other subtle ways. Contributions to multilateral organizations have given Tokyo more say over the way aid is given, which has been used to support its more statist development program. Drifte argues that if other countries share Japan's political economy, then Tokyo will be able to avoid the bilateral trade rows that have colored its relations with the West. Investment and technology transfer shore up Japan's influence in other Asian capitals. For proof of Tokyo's power, there are the frequent, unofficial visits of Malaysia's Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir to Japan; there is also the decision by the military junta that rules Myanmar to announce first to the Japanese Embassy news of the release of prodemocracy leader Aung Sun Suu Kyi from house arrest.

Agenda setting and rule making are relatively dull aspects of international relations. They cannot compare to leading U.N. coalitions are hosting international peace conferences. But their impact on international outcomes is every bit as important. Japan excels at working behind the scenes to gain support for its positions at international forums. Even when it refuses to act — for example, by permitting the yen to appreciate in value — it has a profound impact on Asian nations holding yen loans. It is in these unexceptional — yet critical — dimensions of international life that Japan excels.

Still, the myth of Japanese impotence prevails. It is the motivating force behind the drive for a seat on the Security Council, the spur for Japan to become a "normal" country.

Drifte cautioned Japanese policymakers about the lure of power politics. "Japan needs to be more inventive," he said, "and not be entrapped in the 'power game.' The equation of economic strength with military power is outdated. Japan can better exercise political power without using a military agent."

Instead, he believes Japan should stake out a place in the realm of ideas. The country should develop critical policy forums like London's International Institute for Strategic Studies, places where it can utilize the knowledge of its academics and professionals. This is the best way for Japan to get the most "bang for its buck."



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