

**Public Opinion and the Times
Yomiuri Poll**

Cold Ties between Japan and the U.S.:

Japan with a Faint Sense of Urgency, and Worrisome Perception Gaps

The Yomiuri Shimbun and Gallup, a U.S. pollster, conducted a joint public opinion survey in the fall of last year. Its results revealed the severeness of Japan-U.S. relations. The joint survey started in 1978. Since then, *The Yomiuri* and Gallup have continued to ask about "Japan-U.S. relations." In the survey conducted last fall, however, the public view of the two countries' relationship was found to have worsened unprecedentedly. Particularly on the side of Japan, the rate of persons who answered that the bilateral relationship was in "good" condition was an all-time low at 23 percent. On the other hand, however, the rate of "bad" views marked an all-time high at 32 percent, and the figure became higher than the rate of "good" views for the first time.

On the U.S. side as well, "good" (29 percent) decreased during two consecutive years, and it was the second lowest rate ever. The affirmative view of the bilateral relationship in terms of "good" was below one-half of the highest rate both in Japan and in the U.S., and the survey resulted in showing that the Japan-U.S. relationship was at new crossroads 50 years after the end of the War.

The public view of Japan-U.S. relations is now unprecedentedly cold in both countries. For one thing, it might be affected also by the survey's timing (mid-October through early November 1995). For the Japanese side, it conceivably was affected by such factors as that the impression was strong that the U.S. showed an overbearing posture at the auto trade talks in June while implying its intention of invoking sanctions, and that the survey was carried out right after U.S. servicemen's rape of a schoolgirl in Okinawa Prefecture and the local public's negative reaction against that rape incident was strong.

On the other hand, the U.S. side also seems to have had such circumstances as that it encountered the Japanese side's unprecedentedly dogged resistance at the auto trade talks, and that the U.S. side became strongly conscious of

Japan's position after the threat from the Soviet Union vanished. We cannot ignore the impact of such factors on the two peoples' respective perceptions.

Despite those factors, however, it is evidently true that Japan and the U.S. are most important to each other. The U.S., particularly for Japan, is the main trade partner, and Japan's policy toward the U.S. is the main and the only feature of Japan's diplomacy. Nevertheless, the two peoples' emotional "confrontation" heated up to this extent, and we wonder why ... We wonder if such a relationship can be called a "mature, adult relationship" for Japan.

In the depths of such a cold attitude at the basin of bilateral relations, there were two worrisome "gaps" between the two nations' respective perceptions. One was that "curious self-confidence" was seen on the side of Japan which was panting from the long-lasting recession following the bubble economy's collapse.

"What do you think was America to Japan for a while after the War? What about now?" In reply to this question, 60 percent of those surveyed (in Japan) grasped the two countries' postwar bilateral relationship as something like a senior-junior relationship, comparing America to a "parent," "teacher," or "big brother or sister." However, the rate of those who had such images today was down to 12 percent. To the Japanese, America today is imaged in the context of human relations at the same level as a "friend" (21 percent) or a "teammate" (15 percent). The rate of those having such severe images as a "rival" was as much as 30 percentage points lower than the U.S. side's 67 percent.

"Which country do you think will be the strongest economic rival from now on?" In reply to this question, 54 percent of those surveyed on the U.S. side gave "Japan," which ranked first and was far beyond all other countries.

In Japan, "China" came first at 34 percent, outranking "America" which was at 32 percent.

In the U.S., however, more than 80 percent of those broken down into the category of college graduates, administrators, and specialists regard Japan as a "rival" today. In the degree of interest in Japan in the recent five years as well, 48 percent of those broken down into the category of college graduates and half of those in the category of administrators and specialists answered that they were "much more interested" in Japan. In other words, it is obvious that those having strong influence in American society are powerfully trying to roll back against Japan which America used to overpower economically. But, the Japanese are insensitive to that.

In Japan, of course, some business leaders and economists have whispered, "If America rolls back in real earnest, we may not hope for even the present level of prosperity we are enjoying now." But, the Japanese people are little aware of such a possibility. They may say that "Japan is now already ahead of the U.S. economy," or have not yet come out of their illusion in the bubble boom days that "Japan is now an economic superpower that can buy even America's big businesses." At any rate, such is a worrisome perception gap.

Another "gap" can be seen in the Japanese attitude about defense. Asia is where economic activities are most active. Another aspect of the region, however, is that it has many trouble sources. About the U.S. military presence in Asia, the rate of those having a negative opinion insisting on "reduction" reached 57 percent. But, the *Yomiuri* found from the results of its nationwide public opinion survey conducted in July 1995 that 59 percent of those surveyed in Japan "think America will help Japan" when attacked. Such a selfish argument does not seem to pass muster in the cool and hard international community.

Those thinking "it will be in the interest of Japan" to maintain the Japan-U.S. security treaty also accounted for 57 percent. As for what lies behind that opinion, it seems that the Japanese are enjoying only the fruit of the bilateral security treaty and trying not to see its negative side. It may cover up even the status quo of Okinawa where many U.S. military bases are located and which was hit by miserable incidents.


To those who answered that "it will be in Japan's interest," we asked why they think so. As a result, 54 percent answered that "it's because the security treaty is the basis for maintaining Japan-U.S. relations," and 50 percent

answered that "it will lead to stability in Asia and in the Middle East." These two reasons outstripped all other reasons. The following reason was that "it's indispensable to the defense of Japan," and this reason marked 38 percent as one of the top three reasons. As against this result, 36 percent in the U.S. answered that "it's against an emergency in Asia or in the Middle East," and another answer from 35 percent on the U.S. side was that "it's for stability in Asia as a whole." As seen in such answers, the U.S. side clearly shows its positioning of the bilateral security treaty in its global strategy. This perception gap between Japan and the U.S. is a natural consequence of the treaty's history and nature. But, there is a question as to how much the Japanese people are aware of the difference between the two nations.

Now, the Japanese Government has stepped into a foreign policy eyeing "Japan's role in the world" and "responsibility on the part of an advanced economy" in such approaches as a bid for permanent entry into the United Nations Security Council and the positive dispatches of troops to U.N. peacekeeping operations. But the survey this time unexpectedly resulted in revealing the reality that the Japanese people's awareness does not follow it. So as to have Japan's international contributions, which are based on the Japan-U.S. security treaty, bear fruit, we think it will be the primary task to fill in this perception gap immediately, first of all. How about this idea? (Kyoko Kimura, Opinion Poll Section)

(Attached charts and tables on following page.)


How is the Japan-U.S. relationship now? Good or bad?
("Neither good nor bad" excluded.)



Japan-U.S. Joint Survey on "Japan-U.S. Relations Now"
(The figures are shown in terms of percentage.)


	Japan			U.S.		
	"Very good" & "Good"	"Neither good nor bad"	"Bad"	"Very good" & "Good"	"Neither good nor bad"	"Bad"
1978	43.6	31.6	10.3	50.6	35.1	4.5
1979	47.6	31.8	11.6	57.3	30.1	4.4
1980	48.8	28.3	13.3	61.0	29.3	3.1
1981	43.4	32.4	14.5	55.0	32.7	3.7
1982	33.4	35.4	22.3	47.1	36.6	7.7
1983	47.8	31.0	12.8	63.4	28.4	2.9
1984	53.0	31.5	8.1	58.8	31.7	3.2
1985	40.8	35.0	16.9	60.2	30.1	4.0
1986	42.1	32.1	16.8	59.7	32.0	3.4
1987	32.6	34.1	26.7	48.3	38.7	7.0
1988	41.7	35.4	17.5	48.1	39.1	6.0
1989	38.0	36.1	18.4	45.6	40.4	9.3
1990	43.2	34.1	19.0	49.4	38.7	7.9
1991	40.5	37.5	18.6	41.8	41.5	9.9
1992	30.0	40.7	25.2	26.2	49.7	18.7
1993	29.5	43.3	22.3	36.5	41.8	12.3
1994	35.4	36.2	24.1	32.5	46.0	12.7
1995	23.2	39.2	32.4	28.5	51.6	12.5

Q: "What do you think Japan (America) should do for a better relationship between the two countries toward the 21st century?"



Do you think it will be in the interest of Japan (America) to maintain the Japan-U.S. security treaty?

(The figures are shown in terms of percentage.)



Do you think America should build up its military presence in Asia or maintain it at the present level?

(The figures are shown in terms of percentage.)

	Build up	Present level	Cut down	DK/NA
Japan	1.8	32.8	56.8	8.6
U.S.	8.0	47.4	31.7	13.0

Do you think Japan and America are now getting along well with each other, or do you not think so?

(The figures are shown in terms of percentage. DK/NA = "Don't know"/"No answer")

		Very good	Good	Neither good nor bad	Bad	DK/NA
Whole		1.0	22.2	39.2	32.4	5.2
Male		1.6	24.7	38.4	32.3	(Omitted)
Female		0.6	20.2	39.8	32.5	"
Age group	20's	1.8	15.8	40.1	37.0	"
	30's	0.3	20.9	42.2	34.1	"
	40's	1.6	20.4	40.0	33.6	"
	50's	0.7	24.2	36.0	34.7	"
	60's	0.8	24.4	41.1	26.8	"
	70 and over	1.1	29.3	34.2	25.5	"
Educational background	Elementary school, junior high school	0.7	23.6	37.8	29.0	"
	Senior high school	1.2	21.9	39.7	32.8	"
	University	0.9	21.2	39.7	35.2	"
	DK/NA	5.9	29.4	29.4	23.5	"
Occupational category	Self-employed	2.2	27.2	35.3	28.5	"
	Salaried	1.0	21.3	39.0	35.1	"
	Unoccupied	0.6	21.2	40.9	31.0	"
Occupation	Agriculture, forestry, fisheries	2.0	21.8	38.6	27.7	"
	Commerce, industry, services	2.4	29.5	32.9	29.5	"
	Free	0.0	33.3	46.7	20.0	"
	Administrators, specialists	1.6	18.9	36.2	41.7	"
	Deskworkers, engineers	1.4	23.6	39.6	33.5	"
	Labor, services	0.5	19.8	39.4	34.4	"
	Housewives	0.8	19.6	41.6	32.5	"
	Non-housewife women in the home	0.0	21.4	38.6	27.1	"
	Students	0.0	14.6	31.7	48.8	"
	Others, unoccupied	0.6	27.1	41.8	24.3	"

Japan-U.S. Relations Now (on the U.S. side)

(The figures are shown in terms of percentage.)

		Very good	Good	Neither good nor bad	Bad	DK/NA
Whole		2.4	26.1	51.6	12.5	7.4
Male		3.6	26.9	49.9	13.8	5.7
Female		1.3	25.4	53.1	11.3	8.9
Age group	18 ~ 29	1.5	22.7	50.0	14.5	11.1
	30 ~ 49	3.3	29.1	54.3	7.9	5.4
	50 ~ 59	2.0	26.6	46.2	18.4	6.8
	60 and over	2.1	24.0	51.1	15.4	7.4
Educational background	Junior high school or under	0.7	25.8	45.3	12.2	15.9
	Senior high school	3.8	27.2	48.8	11.8	8.4
	College students	2.0	26.3	53.0	15.5	3.2
	College graduates	1.9	24.0	61.9	9.6	2.5
Occupation	Administrators, specialists	2.9	27.5	51.4	16.4	1.7
	Deskworkers, sales	2.6	28.4	53.9	7.8	7.2
	Agriculture, labor	3.3	26.7	50.5	9.6	9.9
	Unoccupied	1.2	20.8	54.7	15.9	7.3

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U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS
IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

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THANK YOU FOR INVITING ME THIS AFTERNOON. THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP IS THE FOUNDATION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO OF THE MOST IMPORTANT COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD. OUR ALLIANCE HAS SERVED AS THE CORNERSTONE OF STABILITY IN EAST ASIA FOR MORE THAN 40 YEARS, AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT IT WILL CONTINUE TO CONTRIBUTE TO REGIONAL AND WORLD STABILITY FAR INTO THE FUTURE.

THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN PART OF MY LIFE SINCE CHILDHOOD. I WAS LIVING IN JAPAN WITH MY PARENTS IN 1952 WHEN THE SAN FRANCISCO PEACE TREATY AND THE SECURITY TREATY WENT INTO EFFECT. I SPENT TWO SUMMERS IN OKINAWA AS A TEENAGER WHEN MY FATHER WAS THE U.S. CONSUL GENERAL THERE. DURING MY OWN CAREER AS A U.S. FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER, I HAVE BEEN POSTED TO JAPAN FOUR TIMES, AND WORKED ON JAPANESE AFFAIRS IN WASHINGTON; MUCH OF THIS TIME HAS BEEN FOCUSED ON THE POLITICAL/MILITARY ASPECT OF THE RELATIONSHIP. I HAVE WITNESSED THE VITALITY AND ADAPTABILITY OF THIS CRUCIAL ALLIANCE.

PRESIDENT CLINTON WILL BE IN TOKYO FOR A STATE VISIT NEXT MONTH. A KEY ELEMENT OF THE APRIL SUMMIT WILL BE A SECURITY DECLARATION WHICH WILL REAFFIRM THE CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE. IN ONE OF THE GREAT DIPLOMATIC SUCCESS STORIES IN MODERN HISTORY, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES OVERCAME WAR AND HOSTILITY TO FORGE A SOLID ALLIANCE. TODAY, THIS ALLIANCE IS AS IMPORTANT AS IT HAS EVER BEEN. IT CONTINUES TO ENSURE THE STABILITY WHICH MAKES ALL OTHER PROGRESS POSSIBLE.

AN ENDURING CONVERGENCE OF INTERESTS

OUR SECURITY TIES HAVE ALWAYS BEEN ROOTED IN THE COMPATIBILITY OF AMERICAN AND JAPANESE INTERESTS IN EAST ASIA. JAPAN AND THE U.S. ARE BOTH STABLE DEMOCRACIES COMMITTED TO PEACEFUL PROGRESS. WE BOTH BELIEVE THAT MARKET ECONOMIES ARE THE BEST MEANS TO PROSPERITY, AND WE BOTH SHARE A VITAL INTEREST IN A PEACEFUL, STABLE, AND PROSPEROUS ASIA-PACIFIC REGION.

THE THREATS TO THESE SHARED INTERESTS, HOWEVER, HAVE EVOLVED OVER TIME. THE ALLIANCE WAS FORMULATED DURING THE KOREAN CONFLICT, AT THE HEIGHT OF THE COLD WAR. OUR TWO COUNTRIES SHARED A COMMON INTEREST IN CONTAINING THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CHALLENGE OF

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM. THE AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOR OF THE SOVIET REGIME, ARMED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MADE IT RELATIVELY EASY FOR BOTH GOVERNMENTS TO EXPLAIN TO THEIR CITIZENS THE BASIS FOR THE ALLIANCE.

THE U.S. AND JAPAN HAVE ALWAYS WORKED HARD TO ADJUST OUR ALLIANCE TO CHANGING TIMES. IN 1960, WE REVISED THE SECURITY TREATY TO REFLECT A MORE EQUAL RELATIONSHIP. IN 1972, WE RETURNED THE ADMINISTRATION OF OKINAWA TO JAPAN, WHICH ENDED THE POST WORLD WAR II PERIOD. AND IN THE 1980S, JAPAN ASSUMED AN INCREASING SHARE OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE BURDEN, INCLUDING THE PROTECTION OF SEA LANES AND GENEROUS HOST NATION SUPPORT AGREEMENTS.

THE 1990S HAVE POSED A NEW AND PERHAPS MORE FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE TO THE ALLIANCE. THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR HAVE CAUSED CRITICS IN BOTH JAPAN AND THE U.S. TO ARGUE THAT WITHOUT AN IMMEDIATE MILITARY THREAT, THE RATIONALE FOR THE ALLIANCE HAS EVAPORATED. THESE CRITICS TEND TO ARGUE THAT THE POST-WAR STRATEGIC DIVISION OF LABOR BETWEEN THE U.S. AND JAPAN, BY WHICH THE U.S. DID THE "HEAVY LIFTING" OF GUARANTEEING SECURITY WHILE JAPAN PROVIDED BASES FOR THE U.S. AND ENJOYED THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF STABILITY, IS NO LONGER VALID. THE DEBATE ABOUT THE CONTINUING

RELEVANCE OF THE ALLIANCE WAS FURTHER STIMULATED BY THE DEPLORABLE INCIDENT IN OKINAWA LAST SEPTEMBER. IN JAPAN, PERHAPS FOR THE FIRST TIME SINCE THE REVERSION OF OKINAWA IN 1972, THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP BECAME A FRONT-PAGE STORY. AT THE SAME TIME SOME AMERICANS, NOTING THE EMOTIONAL REACTION IN JAPAN, RAISED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE LONG-TERM VIABILITY OF OUR ALLIANCE.

I BELIEVE THAT VIGOROUS DISCUSSION IN BOTH COUNTRIES ABOUT THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP IS A HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF NATIONAL SECURITY BE DEBATED OPENLY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES SUCH AS OURS. I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE RESULT OF THIS DEBATE WILL BE A REAFFIRMATION BY BOTH COUNTRIES OF THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF OUR ALLIANCE TO JAPAN, THE U.S., THE REGION, AND THE WORLD.

IT IS NATURAL TO ASK WHY THE ALLIANCE IS STILL IMPORTANT. IT IS TRUE THAT THE LOOMING SOVIET THREAT IS GONE. IT IS TRUE THAT EAST ASIA IS, FOR THE MOST PART, AT PEACE. HOWEVER, BENEATH THE SURFACE, THERE REMAIN SOURCES OF SERIOUS TENSION.

FOR THE FIRST TIME THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ALLIANCE IS NOT DIRECTED AT ANY SPECIFIC COUNTRY OR

DESIGNED TO COUNTER AN IMMINENT THREAT. RATHER, THE TREATY IS A HEDGE AGAINST UNCERTAINTY. THESE UNCERTAINTIES INCLUDE THE SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, THE NATURE OF CHINA'S FUTURE ENGAGEMENT WITH THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY, THE PROGRESS OF DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA, UNRESOLVED TERRITORIAL DISPUTES THAT COULD AFFECT VITAL SEA LANES, AND THE THREAT POSED BY THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.

WE ALSO SEE INCREASING MILITARY SPENDING BY MANY ASIAN COUNTRIES. IN THIS FLUID ENVIRONMENT, THE REMOVAL OR DRAMATIC REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCES COULD SEND THE WRONG MESSAGE ABOUT OUR COMMITMENT TO THE REGION.

IN THE LONGER TERM, COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES IS LIKELY TO INCREASE AS THE DYNAMIC ECONOMIES IN EAST ASIA PURSUE AMBITIOUS DEVELOPMENT PLANS, AND THIS COULD GIVE RISE TO TENSIONS. THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN EAST ASIA HELPS ENSURE THAT RESOLUTIONS TO THESE TERRITORIAL AND RESOURCE ISSUES ARE PURSUED PEACEFULLY.

AS WE LOOK TO THE FUTURE STABILITY OF THIS REGION, WE MUST LOOK SOBERLY AT THE FACT THAT THE END OF THE COLD WAR DID NOT USHER IN AN ERA OF CERTAINTY OR PREFACE THE ADVENT OF STABILITY. MANY ARGUE THAT

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IS EVEN LESS STABLE -- WITH GREATER POTENTIAL FOR SMALLER-SCALE CONFLICTS IN UNEXPECTED PLACES -- THAN IT WAS UNDER THE PRIOR BI-POLAR INTERNATIONAL PARADIGM. FROM ANY PERSPECTIVE, TENSIONS REMAIN, BUT SO DOES THE U.S.-JAPAN COMMITMENT TO SECURING OUR NATIONS' INTERESTS HERE.

THE AMERICAN STAKE IN ASIA

THE UNITED STATES IS IN ASIA TO PROTECT ITS OWN STRATEGIC, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS. STABILITY AND PROSPERITY IN THIS REGION ARE KEY TO A HEALTHY AMERICA, AND OUR STAKE IN THE REGION IS INCREASING, NOT DECREASING. OUR TRADE WITH ASIA EXCEEDS THAT WITH EUROPE, AND THE REGION WILL BE EVEN MORE IMPORTANT TO US IN THE FUTURE. FOR AMERICA TO PROTECT ITS INTEREST IN THIS VIBRANT REGION, WE MUST REMAIN ENGAGED ECONOMICALLY AND STRATEGICALLY.

U.S. STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT MEANS MUCH MORE THAN STATIONING A GUARD AT THE GATE -- IT MEANS FOSTERING STABILITY IN A BROAD SENSE. INCREASED PROSPERITY HAS BEEN ACCOMPANIED BY THE SPREAD OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS AND GREATER RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO MAINTAIN AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH ASIAN

NATIONS CAN PURSUE PEACEFUL DOMESTIC GOALS AND REGIONAL COOPERATION, NOT MILITARY COMPETITION.

UNLIKE EUROPE, EAST ASIA DOES NOT HAVE MULTILATERAL SECURITY STRUCTURES, SUCH AS NATO OR THE CSCU, TO MANAGE THE SHOCKS AND TENSIONS OF A DIVERSE ASIA-PACIFIC COMMUNITY -- OR TO PREVENT A DE-STABILIZING POWER VACUUM.

AS WE LOOK TO THE FUTURE, WE NEED TO CONSIDER WITH OTHERS IN THE REGION WAYS TO DEVELOP REGIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURES TO SUPPLEMENT THE AMERICAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN EAST ASIA. LAST YEAR, ASEAN AND ITS DIALOGUE PARTNERS TOOK THE FIRST STEP IN THIS DIRECTION WHEN THEY INAUGURATED THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF). THE UNITED STATES IS A KEY PARTICIPANT IN ARF AND LOOKS FORWARD TO ITS DEVELOPMENT. BUT THIS WILL TAKE TIME. MOREOVER, THE PREREQUISITE FOR BUILDING A MULTILATERAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK IS REGIONAL STABILITY, WHICH CAN ONLY BE MAINTAINED IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE BY THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE -- THE CRITICAL FACTOR IN THE PACIFIC SECURITY EQUATION.

OUR SECURITY ALLIANCE IS WELCOMED BY NEIGHBORING NATIONS. RECENT STATEMENTS AND EDITORIALS FROM ALL OVER THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION REAFFIRM THE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN FORCES TO STABILITY IN THE WESTERN

PACIFIC. OUR ASIAN NEIGHBORS KNOW, AS WE DO, THAT A HEALTHY U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE IS GOOD FOR THEM.

WHILE IT IS NOT FOR ME TO PRESENT THE JAPANESE PERSPECTIVE ON BILATERAL SECURITY RELATIONS, I DO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS BROAD SUPPORT IN JAPAN FOR OUR ALLIANCE.

IT IS THE POLICY OF ALL JAPANESE POLITICAL PARTIES, EXCEPT THE JAPAN COMMUNIST PARTY, THAT THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY SERVES THE NATION'S INTERESTS AND IS A SOURCE OF REGIONAL STABILITY. THERE IS NO GREATER MANIFESTATION OF JAPAN'S SUPPORT FOR OUR MILITARY PRESENCE THAN THEIR VERY GENEROUS HOST NATION SUPPORT -- SOME FIVE BILLION DOLLARS THIS YEAR, OR ABOUT HALF OF THE TOTAL COST OF OUR PRESENCE HERE. THE JAPANESE DIET LAST NOVEMBER OVERWHELMINGLY PASSED LEGISLATION EXTENDING THIS SUPPORT FOR ANOTHER FIVE YEARS.

WHILE THERE IS BROAD SUPPORT IN JAPAN FOR THE ALLIANCE, THERE IS ALSO INCREASED QUESTIONING OF THE NEED TO KEEP U.S. FORCES HERE AT CURRENT LEVELS, PARTICULARLY IN OKINAWA. WE UNDERSTAND THE BURDEN ON JAPANESE COMMUNITIES THAT HOST AMERICAN BASES, AND WE WORK HARD TO BE GOOD CITIZENS. HOWEVER, BOTH THE U.S. AND JAPANESE GOVERNMENTS AGREE THAT AT THIS TIME WE

NEED TO MAINTAIN THE PRESENT LEVEL OF U.S. FORCES IN THE REGION AND IN JAPAN.

WE ARE VERY MUCH AWARE THAT PEOPLE IN OKINAWA PREFECTURE IN PARTICULAR FEEL THAT THE SECURITY BURDEN HAS BEEN DISPROPORTIONATELY PLACED UPON THEM. OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE ESTABLISHED A SPECIAL ACTION COMMITTEE ON OKINAWA (SACO) WHICH IS NOW CONSIDERING ADJUSTMENTS IN OUR PRESENCE TO REDUCE IRRITANTS AND TO CONSOLIDATE BASES, CONSISTENT WITH OUR RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE TREATY. THIS MAY REQUIRE THE RELOCATION TO MAINLAND JAPAN OF SOME ACTIVITIES NOW CONDUCTED IN OKINAWA.

I HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM THE SACO MEETING IN WASHINGTON, D.C. LAST WEEK. WHILE I CANNOT ELABORATE ON DETAILS, I CAN TELL YOU THAT WE ARE MAKING GOOD PROGRESS. WE HOPE TO HAVE SOME SIGNIFICANT STEPS TO ANNOUNCE BY THE TIME OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT.

ONGOING DEFENSE COOPERATION

OUR TWO COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR WAYS TO STRENGTHEN OUR ALLIANCE. THE CO-DEVELOPMENT OF THE F-2, FORMERLY CALLED THE FS-X, IS A PRIME EXAMPLE OF U.S.-JAPAN COOPERATION IN THE DEFENSE ARENA. WHILE THAT PROJECT WAS ONCE A SYMBOL OF POTENTIAL DISPUTES

BETWEEN US, IT IS NOW A STRONG SYMBOL OF HOW MUCH WE CAN ACCOMPLISH TOGETHER. THE U.S. AND JAPAN ARE ALSO WORKING ON CROSS-SERVICING AGREEMENTS WHICH WILL ALLOW FOR MORE OPERATIONAL COOPERATION, AND WE ARE SEEKING WAYS TO WORK TOGETHER ON PEACEKEEPING AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS.

EVERY DAY WE ENJOY THE PEACE AND PROSPERITY WHICH ARE BUILT UPON A FOUNDATION OF ASIA-PACIFIC STABILITY. THERE HAVE BEEN MANY CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OVER THE LAST 40 YEARS, BUT THE VALIDITY AND IMPORTANCE OF OUR ALLIANCE CONTINUES. FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY COOPERATION WILL REMAIN THE KEY FACTOR THAT UNDERPINS THIS REGION'S STABILITY.

THANK YOU. I'LL BE HAPPY TO RESPOND TO ANY QUESTIONS THAT YOU MAY HAVE.



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