

The behavior of twentieth-century Japan during the Pacific War closely resembles that of the sixteenth-century Japan under Hideyoshi. In both cases the country attempted aggressive overseas expansion in order to achieve national unity and invigorate the national economy. The only difference is that the sixteenth-century Japan depended upon Asia for the supply of manufactured goods, whereas the country's leaders during and after the Meiji period (1868-1912) saw the continent as the source of raw materials and importer of Japan-made manufactured products. This difference indicates what Japanese did and achieved during the Tokugawa period (1603-1867). Fully aware of their nation's low-level technology and poor development of information, intellectual and political systems—factors behind Hideyoshi's ill-advised decision to invade Korea—they devoted themselves to overcoming these deficiencies.

A second similarity between the modern and Hideyoshi's times is the influence of Europe. Hideyoshi's invasions were prompted by reports of the way Spain and Portugal were expanding their colonies in Asia and by his confidence in military might based on advanced weaponry. Prior to the invasions, he presented letters not only to China and Korea but also Taiwan, the Spanish colony of the Philippines and the Portuguese colony of India demanding that they submit to his authority. These demands naturally went ignored and Hideyoshi became a laughing stock. The wealth of the territories the Europeans controlled in Southeast Asia was irresistible to Hideyoshi.

The wars Japan engaged in after the Meiji Restoration were also inspired in part by European example, and their ultimate goal was to gain control of Europe's Southeast-Asian colonies. Japan after the Meiji Restoration hired numerous European and American experts to help in its process of modernizing the nation, educators, technicians, specialists in all fields from engineering to pharmacy, and sent many young men and women abroad to study. As a result, its institutions and society became deeply infused with European values and European views of the world. The more steeped Japan became in Western values, the more alienated it became from the value system centered on Confucian "virtue" which was at the heart of Chinese civilization. In the sixteenth century, the upstart Hideyoshi became the leader of the country in a time of turmoil and his lack of the knowledge and cultivation needed to incorporate his country into the China-centered value system must be attributed to his failure to follow the culture of "virtue." After the Meiji

Restoration, however, Japan's rejection of the continental culture system was not due to ignorance or ill-breeding, but to contempt of Asia which fueled its "dissociate from Asia" (datsu-A) policy. fx

The third resemblance between the Pacific War and Hideyoshi's Korean expeditions was in Japan's incapacity to calculate beforehand the tremendous losses and futility of foreign aggression. Not the slightest thought was given, especially, to how much time it would take to restore good relations with neighboring nations after the adventure was over. We can tell from the lines of *jōruri* plays and essays written in the early Edo period that the people of that time understood the evil that had been done and the lessons it taught. Chikamatsu Monzaemon's "Honchō Sankokushi" [The Japanese Tale of the Three Kingdoms] is a puppet play that describes Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea. This play was performed for the first time in Osaka in 1719, after memories of the war had considerably dimmed. Characters modelled after Hideyoshi, his generals in the field Katō Kiyomasa and Konishi Yukinaga, as well as a courageous Korean general called in the play Boku Hangan. Historian Che Guan believes that this character is modeled after the heroic Field Marshall Kim Shibing who struggled to hold a key fortress against the Japanese but was ultimately defeated.<sup>15</sup> In the play, Hideyoshi performs religious rites at the grave erected to inter the ears of Korean warriors brought back to the shogun as prizes of war (*mimizuka kuyō*), and at the ceremonies a documentary play-within-the-play is performed about the Korean War. In that performance, the courageous Kim is tortured by Katō and Konishi after the battle and his legs pulled out.

In 1763, a play by Monzaemon's successor, Chikamatsu Hanji, entitled "Tenjiku Tokubei sato no kagami" [The Story of Tenjiku Tokubei], was performed. In this play, a real-life merchant engaged in trade with Thailand is portrayed as the son of an official modelled after Kim Shibing, and a conspirator in a plot to avenge the atrocities of the Korean War. The protagonist is proficient in magic and, even though a Christian, is a symbol of Korea's deep-seated grudge against Japan. The Tenjiku Tokubei series in Edo-period drama are well known, but I did not notice such a close connection between them and the Korean wars until it was pointed out by Che Guan. If we accept Che's interpretation, the images embodied by Tenjiku Tokubei can be considered reflections of the images of Asia held by the common folk of Edo-period Japan. These stories depict the Asia of countries like Thailand and

Vietnam where Japanese were involved in trade, the *namban* Asia of the European-centered Christian culture, the exotic Asia where wizards establish themselves in the guise of Christian missionaries and Muslim traders, and even the terrifying Asia of the vengeful Koreans who hate no other people as intensely as the Japanese.

M The common people's view of Asia was formed in this fashion, through plays like these. Meanwhile, as an outgrowth of the diversification of Japanese thought during the Edo period, a new branch of learning known as Kokugaku (National Learning) developed. Kokugaku was a kind of experiment to see whether Japan could create its own indigenous system of thought transcending both Buddhist and Confucian ideology. In the eighteenth century, there were two schools of Kokugaku, one (ethnocentrism) represented by Motoori Norinaga (1730-1801) and the other (rationalism) by Ueda Akinari (1734-1809). Motoori believed that the world consisted of high and low ranking and that Japan was superior to all other countries. To him it was self-evident: even the Mongols had been unable to conquer Japan, and it had never been annexed by any neighboring nation. China was simply big, but neither its population nor cultivatable land was large. Nothing up to the level of Japan. By comparison, Japan was wealthy. And the Japanese myths, unlike the mythology of other countries, was the only true story of the creation. This is the nationalistic ideology that became established in Motoori's time, forming a major school of so-called National Learning.

N The ideas of Ueda Akinari, on the other hand, represent a very different approach to National Learning. He termed Hideyoshi's invasion of the Korean peninsula in the attempt to occupy China "laughable." He explained that the world was divided up like the organs of the human body. One might exploit another country, but ultimately, since it was an alien country, it would be estranged. And he uses the example of Korea to illustrate his point. Regarding the Qing (Ching) dynasty which ruled China during the Edo period, he observed that the Manchus were outsiders who had taken over the country, and he predicted that eventually the country would revert to Han control. He turned out to be right: the Han people returned to power and the Manchu people have been nearly extinguished. When Ueda spoke of "country," one should point out, he meant not territory, but "nation" or "ethnic group." "If you annex peoples who speak different languages and have different customs, they will almost inevitably part ways; that is the law of nature," he said.

Already Ueda knew what the world would be like after the end of imperialism and after the end of the twentieth-century Cold War as well. He believed that ethnic groups are stronger than states, and unlike Motoori, he saw all ethnic groups, including the Japanese, as equal. This was another branch of Kokugaku thought, but with Japan's emergence into the modern age, it fell from sight under the wave of ethnocentric ideology that Motoori had founded.

### Edo Period Diplomacy

✓ The Edo (Tokugawa) period, despite its introspective image as symbolized by the policy of seclusion (*sakoku*) mainly adopted to keep Christianity at bay, was a time when Japan developed diplomatic relations in the genuine sense with the rest of Asia. The Tokugawa family had not sent troops on the Korean expeditions and it was quick to overpower the declining Toyotomi family which had exhausted most of its wealth and lost many of its ablest retainers on the peninsula. The Tokugawa shogunate set out to build a peaceful state based on a national unification nearly achieved by Oda and Toyotomi. Founder Tokugawa Ieyasu launched diplomatic relations with Korea soon after defeating Hideyoshi's forces, beginning with the return of more than 3,000 Korean captives from Hideyoshi's invasions, a reward to Sō Yoshitomo, lord of Tsushima, for his service as mediator. At the request of the Korean side, he also sent an official message in which he promised to arrest men who had desecrated the Korean imperial mausoleums. In 1605, he repatriated another 1,300 captives, and at his invitation a large Korean embassy consisting of 504 members visited Japan in 1607. Records say Ieyasu cordially received the mission. A total of twelve embassies—nine counting from the formal embassy following the settlement of the "king title" issue (Yanagawa Incident)<sup>16</sup>—came to Japan, each made up of four or five hundred people, the last arriving in 1811.

Receiving the embassies was an emulation of the China-centered tribute system. Ryukyu, too, was "requested" through the medium of the lord of the Satsuma domain (present-day Kagoshima) to dispatch an embassy, and by the mid-nineteenth century a total of eighteen Ryukyuan tribute missions travelled to Edo, the seat of the shogunate. Unlike in the Korean case, the Ryukyuan embassies began under threat, for the Satsuma domain invaded Ryūkyū over the repatriation of castaways in 1609, and carried its King Shōnei back to Japan. The shogunate also demanded that the Ainu people, by way of the



Matsumae domain (southern Hokkaido), to make a ritual visit of greeting to the Shogun in 1633. In the same year, the head of the Dutch factory at Hirado, Kyushu, was commanded to come all the way to Edo. By receiving the courtesy visits from Korea, Ryūkyū, Ainu, and the Netherlands, the shogunate established an Edo-centered pseudo tribute system. I call it pseudo because it lacked important aspects of the China-led system. First of all, there is no record telling that Japan returned gifts worth double the value of the tributary goods it received, as China did for its tributary nations. Nor could it provide an umbrella of military security, either. The Koreans, Ryūkyūans, and Ainu did not voluntarily join the "tribute" system in hope of profitable trade. In other words, there was no moral pillar in Japan's diplomacy—like the virtue (de) of China's tribute system—that voluntarily attracted other Asians. This pseudo tribute system, however, reflected the image of the country Japan wished to become. Japan planned to be a "civilized state" among its Asian neighbors, an idea never conceived by the Sengoku ("Warring States") warlords. Edo-period Japan nurtured a ruling class of a type totally different from the previous period, with leaders who were literate and well-educated. A Korean observer of the Sengoku leaders wrote:

None of Japanese generals understands [Chinese] characters. . . . They do possess the major books on military science stamped with their seals, but none can read even half of line. They fight separately in battle, and are pleased and satisfied even by a temporary victory. They never think of studying strategy in classical military books.<sup>17</sup>

In *Haeyoo rok*, Shin Yoochan writes:

They slight the written language in employing people and conducting public affairs. The imperial regent [Hideyoshi], the governors of provinces, and all the other government officials were all unable to read [characters]. They use only the *kana* characters mixed with few score Chinese characters, and using this mixture, letters, instructions, orders, and records are made to convey messages from above to below. This is the level of national leadership [in Japan].<sup>18</sup>

Seen as a barbarian state of this low caliber within recent memory, Japan under the Tokugawas sought for the first time to associate on an equal footing with China, Korea, and Vietnam. It resolved to match them not through military might but in terms of technology and culture/civilization. It was this shogunal stance that was responsible for the distinguishing features of the Edo period—peaceful relations with other countries, efficient bureaucracy, improved infrastructure, public peace and order, and a high standard of education. The pseudo-tribute system was absolutely necessary to build such a civilized nation. Besides establishing diplomatic ties with Korea, Ryūkyū, Ainu, and the Netherlands (Batavia) through that system, the shogunate also applied a similar method for maintaining internal control of the nation, requiring all the domain lords in the country to travel to Edo in alternate years. Though a unified nation, Japan during the Edo period was made up of more than 260 domains, each of which had their own political, cultural, and economic systems independent from the shogunate. The alternate attendance (*sankin kōtai*) system was aimed partly to prevent war within the country. Prevention of war was also among the purposes of the "tribute" relations with Korea and Ryūkyū. Because of this system of frequent journeys by large daimyo entourages to Edo every other year, road networks were built nationwide, people other than samurai were able to travel safely, mail and finance systems were established, river and coastal transportation by boat was well developed, and remarkable progress was made in the circulation of goods and information. Domain-run schools were built to educate samurai children, large quantities of books imported from China as well as of reprinted documents from Korea and Ryūkyū. Books were reprinted in large numbers in Japan, too. Many Confucian scholars were trained, and lively scholarly and philosophical discussion was widespread. Korea came to see Japan as a prosperous nation whose people and national wealth were at a high ebb, with no signs of war since Ieyasu's foundation of the shogunate. There were still some foolish leaders in the ruling class, writes Shin Yoohan, but generally the rulers led luxurious lives and were accustomed to easy circumstances. They dreaded fighting. Koreans began to feel that even if a ruffian like Hideyoshi appeared again there would be no danger.<sup>19</sup> Except for the Yanagawa Incident of 1631, the Tokugawa shogunate was successful in its international relations, which finally became worthy of the name diplomacy, making Japan a genuine member of the East Asia community.

## Notes

1. Ishihara Michihiro, *Wakō* [The Wokou]. Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1964, p. 9.
2. Feng Meng-long, *Gujin xiaoshuo* [Stories Past and Present]. Translation by Matsueda Shigeo, in *Sō - Gen - Min tsūzoku shōsetsushū* [Vernacular Fiction of the Song, Yuan, and Ming Dynasties], Heibonsha, 1970, pp. 7-9.
3. This subject is treated in detail in the research of Amino Yoshihiko.
4. Azekura Shobō, p. 93.
5. Song Hee-kyung, *Rōshōdō Nihon kōroku* [The Record of Song Hee-kyung's Journey to Japan], Iwanami Shoten, 1987, pp. 154, 155.
6. Matsuoka Susumu. *Setouchi suigunshi* [A History of Navies in the Inland Sea]. Miyaaura Primary School, Ōmishima, Ochi-gun, Ehime Prefecture, 1966.
7. Murai Shōsuke, *ibid.*, p. 94.
8. See "Gin no nagare de tsunagareta sekai" [The World Linked By the Flow of Silver] in *Asahi hyakka, Sekai no rekishi 67* [Asahi Encyclopedia, History of the World 67], p. B-424. Hamashita presents many interesting insights revising basic assumptions in Asian economic history throughout his work.
9. Kawakatsu Heita, "Kindai sekai shisutemu to 'sakoku'" [Modern World Systems and the Policy of Seclusion], *Bunka kaigi, 272-gō*, Zaidan Hōjin Nihon Bunka Kaigi, 1992, p. 26. This essay and discussion were later recorded in detail in Kawakatsu Heita (ed.), *Atarashii Ajia no dorama* [The New Asian Drama], Chikuma Shobō, 1994.
10. Hayama Teisaku, "Teppō no denrai to sono hamon" [The Introduction of Firearms and Its Effects] in *Nihon no kinsei 4* [Modern Japan, Vol. 4], Chūō Kōronsha, 1992.
11. Udagawa Takehisa, *Nihon no kaizoku* [Japan's Pirates], Seibundō Shinkōsha, 1983, p. 183.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
13. For these figures see Che Guan, *Bunroku-Keichō no eki* [The Bunroku and Keichō Wars]. Kōdansha, 1994.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Kang Hang, *Kan yō roku*, translated by Pak Chong Ming. Heibonsha, 1984.
16. This dispute is called Yanagawa Incident. In those days the heads of China's tributaries used the title "king of the state" to indicate they were subjects of the Chinese emperor. To establish equal diplomatic ties with Japan, Korea requested Japan to include the "king" title in its state message, but because Japan was not China's tributary there was no one with that title.

The Sō Family, daimyo of the island of Tsushima, wishing to see Korea and Japan build good relations, fabricated a state message from Japan with the "king" title contained, with the collaboration of his chief retainer Yanagawa Shigenobu. This fabrication was later revealed, and those taking part in it were punished. In 1635, Japan decided to call the shogun "Taikun" as a title to be used in its relations with Korea, and the international dispute was settled with that. That year, a Korean embassy accompanied by a circus troupe arrived in Japan, and from the next year on, Korea began sending formal embassies to Edo.

17. Kang Hang, *ibid.*

18. Shin Yoohan, *Haeyoo rok*, Heibonsha, 1974.

19. *Ibid.*

[This is a partial translation of the author's study "Ajia no naka no Nihon Zenkindai no rekishi" [Japan in Asia: The History of Images in Premodern Times.]



propitious for the United States to lend its support to this effort.\

//(b) SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.—It is the sense of the Congress that—\

//(1) the establishment of an international criminal court with jurisdiction over crimes of an international character would greatly strengthen the international rule of law;\

//(2) such a court would thereby serve the interests of the United States and the world community; and\

//(3) the United States delegation should make every effort to advance this proposal at the United Nations.\

//(c) REQUIRED REPORT.—Not later than February 1, 1994, the President shall submit to Congress a detailed report on developments relating to, and United States efforts in support of, the establishment of an international criminal court with jurisdiction over crimes of an international character.\

#### !SEC. 169. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT PARTICIPATION.!\

WTP  
✓  
//The United States Senate will not consent to the ratification of a treaty providing for United States participation in an international criminal court with jurisdiction over crimes of an international nature which permits representatives of any terrorist organization, including but not limited to the Palestine Liberation Organization, or citizens, nationals or residents of any country listed by the Secretary of State under section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 as having repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, to sit in judgement on American citizens.\

#### !SEC. 170. PROTECTION OF FIRST AND FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS.!\

WTP  
//The United States Senate will not consent to the ratification of any Treaty providing for United States participation in an international criminal court with jurisdiction over crimes of an international character unless American citizens are guaranteed, in the terms establishing such a court, and in the court's operation, that the court will take no action infringing upon or diminishing their rights under the First and Fourth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States, as interpreted by the United States.\

#### !SEC. 170A. JAPAN AND GERMANY BECOMING PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL.!\

WTP  
//(a) The Senate finds that—\

//(1) in the post-Cold War period, the international community expects the United Nations to play a larger role, particularly in peacekeeping operations that may, on occasion, require the use of force against determined aggressors;\

//(2) in the past five years the United Nations has engaged in more peacekeeping operations than in the preceding forty;\

//(3) the Security Council is the United Nations body chiefly responsible for matters of peace and security;\

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\\(4) the United Nations structure and the Security Council's roster of permanent members have remained largely unchanged since the United Nations was founded almost half a century ago;\\

\\(5) Japan and Germany, as the world's second and third largest economies, respectively, have attained levels of global reach and influence equal to or surpassing current permanent members of the Security Council;\\

\\(6) both Japan and Germany have announced their desire to gain permanent membership in the Security Council;\\

\\(7) any country accorded permanent membership must be capable of fulfilling the responsibilities of such status, including participation in any United Nations military operations;\\

\\(8) according permanent membership to nations not capable of carrying out these responsibilities will allow those countries to play a central role in shaping United Nations peacekeeping operations which could endanger the lives of American and other troops, but in which their own forces could play no part;\\

\\(9) currently, in both Japan and Germany the prevailing view is that each country is prohibited from carrying out all the responsibilities that permanent membership entails and appears reluctant to make the changes necessary to gain those capabilities;\\

\\(10) in Japan's case, further reconciliation with its Asian neighbors who suffered during the World War II period is recommended, therefore\\

\\(b) It is the sense of the Senate that--\\

\\(1) in principle, the United States should support both Japan and Germany in their wish to gain permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council; but\\

\\(2) neither Japan nor Germany should be admitted as permanent members until they are capable of discharging the full range of responsibilities accepted by all current permanent members of the Security Council.\\

!!SEC. 170B. TRANSMITTALS OF UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS.!!

\\(a) TRANSMITTAL TO CONGRESS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS AND REPORTS.—Section 4 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (22 U.S.C. 287b), as amended by subsection (a), is further amended by adding at the end the following:\\

UNP \\(c)(1) Not later than 72 hours after adoption by the Security Council of a resolution authorizing United Nations peacekeeping activities or any other action under the Charter of the United Nations (including any extension, modification, suspension, or termination of any previously authorized United Nations peacekeeping activity or other action) which would involve the use of United States Armed Forces or the expenditure of United States funds, the Permanent Representative shall transmit the text of such resolution and any supporting documentation to the appropriate congressional committees.\\

## PKO and the UNSC Permanent Seat for Japan

- o First, it should be noted that the resolution adopted by the Senate is not binding legislation, but rather an expression of the "Sense of the Senate" on the matter. *Wahut?*
- o Both President Clinton and Secretary Christopher have reaffirmed the long-standing U.S. position in favor of permanent seats on the Security Council for Japan and Germany. There are no conditions on our support, as there is no specific set of conditions written in the UN Charter for becoming a permanent member.
- o We support Japan's desire to play a larger role in the UN across the board. In this context we welcomed your historic decision to become involved in UN peacekeeping operations, one of the organization's key functions. Japan can be proud of its part in the international efforts to restore peace to Cambodia and Mozambique.
- o However, there are many other ways in which the UN strives to further the cause of peace, and Japan's contributions in these areas are also valuable and equally appreciated. It is up to the Japanese people to decide exactly how their country can best contribute to the mission of the UN. We are confident that the international community can expect Japan's role to match its international stature.
- o As for constitutional questions, I believe only the Japanese people can decide whether or not their country's basic law needs to be amended. My government is very aware of the sensitivity of this issue in Japan.

# UN-Representative Japan

The 48th General Assembly of the United Nations opened on September 21 in New York. "The UN is at the breaking point," said Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. "A UN renaissance remains in question."

In his policy address to the Japanese Diet on the same day, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa said, "I believe it is fully consistent with Japan's ideals of advocating international cooperation and aspiring to lasting peace that we actively contribute to UN peacekeeping operations under our peace Constitution. With the full understanding of the people, I intend for Japan to steadily do what it can in such UN-centered international efforts for world peace and stability." Hosokawa has also commented that he would like to reform and strengthen the UN.

LOOK JAPAN reviews Japan's contributions to the UN at this turning point in the history of the UN system and Japanese politics.

"HOW many Japanese professional staff do you think are working at the secretariat of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)?" asks Ku Tashiro, a member of the International Civil Service Commission of the United Nations. According to UN staff statistics as of the end of 1991, a total of 410 staffers, including 168 professional and 242 general staffers, are working at the GATT secretariat. Not one of the professional staffers is Japanese.

"This is a very symbolic fact when Japanese talk about human contributions to the UN and other international organizations," comments Tashiro. He says that it is the individual capability of each person that drives the UN family and other international organizations, while in Japan it is consensus among members that allows progress. Therefore, unless talented staff are positioned at certain influential posts, there is no room for contributions even if Japanese want to contribute.

## Japanese Professional Contributions to Major UN-Related Organs

Organization	No. of Japanese staff	Total no. of staff
UN	84	1,881
UNDP	25	564
UNHCR	4	172
UNICEF	0	400
UNRWA	0	68
ITC	0	72
ICSC	1	19
UNU	0	20
ILO	13	584
FAO	27	1,120
UNESCO	21	725
WHO	28	627
PAHO	1	168
ICAO	1	233
UPU	2	78
ITU	5	260
WMO	3	134
IMO	3	109
WIPO	2	125
IFAD	1	108
UNIDO	14	411
IAEA	18	674
WFP	0	157
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>253</b>	<b>8,709</b>

Source: United Nations, December 1991.

Of late, there has been increased involvement of Japanese in prominent positions in international organizations. Sadako Ogata heads the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Yasushi Akashi leads the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and Hiroshi Nakajima heads the World Health Organization (WHO).

Regarding the settlement of the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations, however, Tashiro is afraid that the Japanese contribution might be nil. Since there are no Japanese on the staff, a draft of the agreement will be made without Japanese input. Worse, while Japan is busy preparing countermeasures, it will be faced with more demands. "This is a good measure of Japan's international contribution," Tashiro says.

## UN AT THE CENTER

Immediately after its admission to the UN in December 1956, on its third application, Japan announced its three principles of foreign policy: making the UN the central focus of its foreign policy, cooperation with the economically advanced Western nations, and affirmation of its identity as an Asian nation.

## Japanese Monetary Contributions to Financial Development Organizations

Organization	Japanese contribution (\$ million)	Japanese contribution (% of whole)	Ranking
IMF	8,242	5.80	2
IBRD (World Bank)	11,312	7.43	2
IDA	14,682	20.18	2
IFC	80	6.38	2
ADB (Ordinary)	2,761	16.44	1
ADF	7,422	51.46	1
IDB (Ordinary)	584	1.08	11
IDB (Special)	208	2.40	7
IIC	6	3.13	8
AFDB	737	4.82	4
AFDF	971	14.28	1
MIGA	55	6.53	2
EBRD	852 (ECU million)	8.52	2

Source: MOF, 1992



There is no other nation in the world which places "the UN as the central focus" as a basic foreign policy. "Excessive trust often leads to blind acceptance," warns Tashiro.

The United Nations was officially inaugurated on October 24, 1945, and a draft of the UN Charter was signed by all 50 participating countries in the general meeting of the UN held in San Francisco on June 26, 1945. Germany and Italy had already surrendered in WWII; Japan was still fighting when the 50 nations made their pact.

Since then almost half a century has passed, and the character of both the UN and Japan has naturally changed. The number of participating nations has shot up to 184; the UN must be undergoing system fatigue.

"There are lots of areas which must be reviewed and altered. What has been pointed out about the tasks of the UN was all true," says Tashiro, "but they were too direct."


In 1985, Japan proposed that the administrative and financial systems be reviewed on the 40th anniversary of the UN. Recommendations of the resulting group were officially adopted in December 1986.

The report proposes the curtailment of certain UN organs, procedural simplifications, and personnel policy reform. In the Secretariat, regular staff will be reduced by 15%, and a 25% cutback in high-ranking staff is planned over a three-year period. Budgetary procedures will also be improved to check budget expansion and establish funding priorities. (See "Money and Politics" in the June 1987 issue of *LOOK JAPAN*.)

"If asked, 'What is the Achilles' tendon of the UN system?' I'd answer without any hesitation, 'Chronic budget shortage,'" says Tashiro.

"The annual expenditures of the UN and the UN family approach \$10 billion, including peacekeeping operation expenses. The number of professional and general staffers, excluding uniformed staff, for peacekeeping operations is approximately 60,000. The proportion of personnel expenditures is extraordinarily high, surpassing 70% of total expenditures."

Japan's set contribution rate to the UN budget is 12.45%, a figure surpassed only by the US, which contributes 25% of the total UN budget. Contribution rates of participating nations were originally set corresponding to a formula that takes into account the economic power, territory, and world influence of each nation, leaving the contribution rate of nearly 100 member



**One among many:** The Japanese flag alongside other nations' at UN Headquarters in New York City.

PHOTO: CHRISTOPHER SMITH/IMPACT VISUALS



## UN-REPRESENTATIVE JAPAN

countries at the 0.01% minimum.

"While the influence of the US was overwhelmingly large, this system could be maintained," Tashiro points out. "But half a century after this system was set up, serious consideration should be given to reform. The system of one country, one vote which underlies the structure should also be examined."

Japan has now become the world's second largest economic power. Based on its economic influence, Japan has voiced its desire to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Yet, as Tashiro points out, "Before this can be realized, the UN Charter must be altered. What is most important for Japan is that it must completely fulfill duties and responsibilities commensurate with those of a Security Council member state." Tashiro continues, "Since the UN is a global administrative system, Japan must contribute money, goods, personnel, management systems, and information."

Japan has contributed a great deal of money to international crises, such as \$13 billion to the Gulf War, and has generally gained international recognition as a nation which funds efforts. However, due to Japan's peace Constitution, there has been an absence of Japanese troops sent to conflicts abroad, and this has caused contention. Domestically, some wonder if Japan is indeed affluent enough to contribute anymore.

Japan's contributions to multinational developmental institutions, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank) and

the International Monetary Fund, have steadily increased. Voting rights at these institutions, unlike at the UN, are proportional to the ratio of monetary contributions from member countries.


Along with financial co-operation, Japan has moved actively to provide intellectual and technological support to industrially developing countries. Japan provides strong support to efforts by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to study the development experiences of Japan and other Asian countries, with the hope that useful patterns may be found to apply to other countries working out their own strategies for development.

### PEOPLE POWER


Considering Japan's large monetary contribution to the UN, the question arises as to why Japan cannot send the same proportion of personnel as financial support.

The UN itself has adopted a policy to increase the ratio of Japanese personnel in the UN and the UN family, and the Japanese government enacted a special law to dispatch public officers to multinational organizations abroad, encouraging Japanese to work in a framework of "international

## Percentage of Monetary Contributions to UN



## Percentage of Professional Staff of UN




Source: Ku Tashiro

## Ratio of Personnel to Monetary Contributions, Times 100

Nations with an index of 100 contribute an equal percentage of financial and professional resources to the UN. Nations short of the 100 index contribute a higher percentage of financial resources than professional staff; those beyond the 100 index contribute more staff than financial resources. Ideally, each nation should be at the 100 mark.

Source: Ku Tashiro



contribution of human resources."

Despite these efforts, the situation of under-representation of Japanese personnel compared to monetary contributions has not basically changed, although the number of Japanese entering international organizations has been increasing.

"This is partly because the economic pressure on Japan has greatly increased in recent years," Tashiro says. "With a population of 120 million, Japan's ratio to the global population of 5.5 billion is 2.2%. Japan's personnel representation in the UN is 2.4%. Presently, the ratio of Japan's GNP to that of the total world GNP is over 15%. Japan's monetary contribution to the UN is 12.45%. Considering these figures, it may be safe to say that they roughly match."

Tashiro continues, "The global community is requesting that Japan catch up with dynamic changes in terms of personnel. If we increase the supply of Japanese personnel fivefold, the international contribution of Japan will be satisfactory."

Tashiro analyzes the reasons for Japan's under-representation in the UN, pointing out that there are differences between the Japanese personnel management system and that of the UN. Whereas

in Japan, officers are expected to perform their given jobs under orders from a superior, under the UN system it is expected that officers take responsibility for their own jobs. Whereas in Japan, officers tend to be generalists, in the UN, officers are expected to be specialists, and those who do not deepen their special area of expertise through their duties are not well respected.

Moreover, in the UN, silence is simply regarded as a lack of contribution or lack of ability, not as modesty. Officers must state things clearly and unapologetically, and master the art of winning debates. Language is also a problem: common languages at the UN include English, French, Russian, Chinese, Spanish, and Arabic, not Japanese. Generally speaking, only those Japanese who have studied or lived abroad can master such communication.

Finally, the UN faces tough competition from major Japanese corporations in terms of attractive work. While UN staffers are guaranteed a very good standard of living, even better compensation is offered by major Japanese corporations willing to send workers abroad. The system of lifetime employment also does not work at the UN, so job security is another issue that keeps people away. Work in the UN can actually hurt a Japanese person's chances of advancing in a corporation or, especially, in the government: the system of promotions by seniority rejects latecomers and discriminates against those with experience in other organizations. (The average age of professionals in the UN is 47, and their average length of service is 6.5 years. The average age of entrants is 42.)

There are still more reasons, according to others who have worked at the UN. The UN is the embodiment of what was originally an American and European concept, and Japan is a late-comer to the system. Japan is referred to as one of the "former enemies" in the UN Charter. Also, Japan has heretofore generally seen the UN as a place for learning about the world situation, not as a tool for accomplishing Japanese diplomatic goals.

Moreover, there is sometimes a difference in academic preparation. In Japan, college is often seen as a relatively relaxed stage of life, and even those with post-graduate degrees can expect to deepen their knowledge in on-the-job training. Students in other countries often tailor their academic careers to match the requirements of the UN.

Japanese staffers have much to learn from those from other countries who exert efforts to contribute to the organs

to which they belong in other ways than plain desk work—for example, by doing their utmost to establish good human relations. There is a simple rule: those who are useful and have good experience are appreciated.

There is still a lack of appreciation in Japan for those who have worked outside the country. Generally speaking, there has been little effort towards constructing a general infrastructure to recruit, train, and nurture new participants in the UN. For example, there are very few universities in Japan where one can take classes about developing economies.

#### CHANGE

With the passing of almost four decades since Japan's entrance into the UN, the country's role within the UN has changed. Today Japan is expected

national policy. According to MOFA, the UN Bureau was "dissolved to form a better organization," the Foreign Policy Bureau.

MOFA says that it has not changed its recognition that the role of the UN will keep increasing in the pursuit of a new international order. Issues of security, human rights, refugees, and the global environment are tackled in overlapping ways by the UN and individual states through bilateral and multilateral agreements, so MOFA formed the new Foreign Policy Bureau to deal with such issues. The former UN Bureau had dealt only with UN-related issues, so the realm of the new bureau will be broader.

The ideals of the UN Charter are lofty and supreme, and it is important to appreciate the opportunity for all



Foreign Minister Tsutomu Hata and UNTAC Chief Yasushi Akashi in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

to actively provide new concepts and take the initiative in leading the UN. Japan must clarify how it will utilize its economic power for the global community. Japan must also realize that power without a clear vision looks threatening to others.

Tashiro says, "Japan will surely be given a permanent seat on the Security Council at some point. Before then, Japan must prepare to state clearly how it intends to contribute to the UN. At the same time, it is quite important for Japan to give serious consideration to how Japan can speak for Asia, particularly East Asia."

On August 1, the UN Bureau was cut from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the ministry responsible for propelling the centrality of the UN as a

countries to gather and exchange views. Even a small country can have its voice heard.

Although it is undeniable that the UN is riddled with critical, unresolved issues, we must acknowledge that without the UN there would be only disorder. Bilateral and regional negotiations alone cannot fully solve global issues.

The year 1995, the 50th anniversary of the UN, will mark a turning point in the organization. In Japan, too, it is expected that the new Hosokawa administration will give impetus to structural changes in policy formulation and execution. More concrete and constructive goals may result in gains for both Japan and the UN.

BY KUNIO NISHIMURA



AMBASSADOR OF  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
TOKYO

March 18, 1994

The Honorable Morton I. Abramowitz  
President  
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace  
2400 N ST NW  
Washington DC 20037-1153

Dear Mort:

Thank you for your letter of February 4, 1994, and the enclosed proposal for a new "International Crisis Action Group." As usual, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has come up with an innovative suggestion. Two main thoughts come to mind, based on the sort of issues we have faced in trying to encourage Japan to play a larger international role.

First, the Japanese talk a lot about wanting to play a role through the United Nations, even though their activity level remains rather low. But their focus on strengthening the UN raises the question of why this new organization should be independent of the UN. One can imagine a number of reasons why a coordinating/oversight organization might be more effective if kept small and independent, but these reasons are not spelled out in the proposal.

Second, the report speaks optimistically of why the UN and NGOs would welcome guidance and evaluation by the ICAG. Our general experience with the Japanese is that they resent outside criticism of their international humanitarian efforts. They have money to spend, but not a lot of experience and expertise. Nevertheless, Japanese national pride has limited the extent to which the United States and others can offer effective help or guidance as the Japanese feel their way with an expanding foreign program and a rising number of NGOs. An independent organization like ICAG (probably dominated by American and European personnel) might have difficulty carrying out its monitoring, evaluation and advice functions toward Japanese foreign aid operations and NGOs. At the very least, the

The Honorable Morton I. Abramowitz  
March 18, 1994  
Page 2

report should consider what the basis of the authority for the ICAG might be, or how it would go about engaging cooperation from countries like Japan.

I will be interested in hearing how this concept progresses. Keep up the good work.

With best wishes,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'W. Mondale', written in a cursive style.

Walter F. Mondale

WFM/llp



# Japan Backs China on Rights

## Western Ideas Have Limits, Hosokawa Told Li

Compiled by Our Staff From Dispatches

**TOKYO** — In a slap at Washington's policy on China, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa of Japan said Monday that he had told his Chinese counterpart, Li Peng, that the Western concept of human rights should not be blindly applied to all nations.

"I told him that it is not proper to force a Western- or European-type democracy onto others," Mr. Hosokawa said while flying back to Tokyo via Shanghai after his three-day trip to China.

"I made the same statement when I met President Clinton last November," Mr. Hosokawa said.

His remarks were made at a banquet given by Mr. Li on Saturday. Japanese Foreign Ministry officials traveling with Mr. Hosokawa had not made his statement public to reporters in Beijing. They had only said the Japanese prime minister urged Beijing to improve its human rights record.

Japan is locked in a difficult diplomatic situation: It wants to strengthen ties with China, the world's fastest growing economy, while facing a bitter trade dispute with the United States.

A spokesman at the Chinese Foreign Ministry said Mr. Hosokawa had said at the banquet that he fully understood Mr. Li's position on human rights, and lauded Mr. Li for China's active role in a world

conference on human rights last year.

Mr. Hosokawa explained to journalists accompanying him on the flight back to Tokyo on Monday that he did not intend to rebuff recent efforts of the United States to pressure China to improve its human rights record. But his remark was an implicit rejection of the U.S. policy of linking China's human rights policies to giving it favorable trade privileges.

The latest remarks by the Japanese prime minister could set off a fresh dispute with Washington and deteriorate already worsening relations with the United States. A meeting between Mr. Hosokawa and Mr. Clinton broke down last month after Japan rejected a U.S. demand for numerical targets to measure market-access improvement in such areas as insurance, medical equipment procurement and telecommunications.

Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher, in Tokyo earlier this month before going on to Beijing, asked Mr. Hosokawa to cooperate with Washington in pressing China to better its human rights record.

Mr. Christopher later warned China's leaders that they stood to lose their preferential trade status if they did not show progress on human rights.

Chinese police rounded up more than a dozen dissidents before and

during Mr. Christopher's visit, and told him Beijing would never bow to foreign pressure.

On Sunday, Mr. Christopher said he remained optimistic that China would meet Washington's demands for improvements in human rights and avoid the loss of favorable trade benefits. He held out prospects that the United States might separate its human rights and trade policies in the future.

"I still have high hopes they are going to be doing enough so we can find them in compliance" and renew the trading status, he said, noting two months remained before a decision was needed.

Chinese leaders have vehemently opposed linking the two, claiming that its human rights standards are an internal matter and that Asian nations have a different concept of rights than the United States and Europe.

In Honolulu on Sunday, a top Chinese official welcomed signs that the United States might compromise in its dispute with China over human rights and said Beijing was willing to discuss the issue as long as it was not linked to trade.

"The Chinese government has made it very clear that we are willing to discuss the issue with other countries," Finance Minister Liu Zhongli said.

(Reuters, AP)



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**Japan Digest**

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March 21, 1994

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## TODAY'S REPORT:

### FOREIGN RELATIONS

#### Hosokawa Warmly Received in China, but Gets Nowhere on Human Rights or Korea

Prime Minister Hosokawa urged Chinese leaders to do better on human rights and to persuade North Korea not to force a crisis over inspection of its nuclear facilities, but got no positive response on either issue, reports said. At a Saturday night banquet, Premier Li Peng, who had just stung Secretary of State Christopher by clapping dissidents in jail under his very nose, told Hosokawa China just doesn't agree with the U.S. on human rights. Hosokawa offered the opinion that even China had recognized human rights by signing the Vienna declaration last summer. But that was enough. After the public disagreement drew bold headlines back home, Hosokawa didn't mention it during his formal meetings on Sunday. Was that a backdown? Hosokawa told reporters, "Please understand that the formal discussions began at the banquet," and insisted he had said what needed saying. The Chinese, however, gave it a different spin, saying that Hosokawa had agreed with Li and had praised China's participation in the Vienna conference. A briefer quoted Hosokawa as saying "It is not a wise thing to try to impose one country's democratic values on another," Nihon Keizai reported. On North Korea's stall (see Defense), Hosokawa declared that "The patience of the international community is approaching its limit," and urged Li to use Beijing's influence. Li said obliquely that "It's also important to provide North Korea what it needs," and President Jiang Zemin later counselled "patience and moderation." That made it clear, Nikkei said, that Beijing doesn't approve the U.S. push for sanctions, and will force Tokyo to take sides if it comes to that. The subject will be on the agenda in both capitals again this week, when South Korean President Kim Young Sam passes through. Hosokawa also expressed concern about China's fast growing defense budget, but got only predictable replies. For all that, reports said, the atmosphere was friendly from first to last, with Hosokawa again apologizing for the war and his hosts thanking him for supporting China's membership application to GATT.

# ADVANCE COPY

YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full)

April 21, 1994

## *Results of Public Opinion Survey on "North Korea's Suspected Development of Nuclear Weapons"*

[Note] The figures are shown in terms of percentage (%). The survey was conducted over a period of two days, April 16-17, on a total of 3,000 persons chosen from among all eligible voters throughout the country. The retrieval rate was 71%. In the breakdown of respondents, males accounted for 46%, and females -- 54%.

### *Questions & Answers*

*Q: The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) is now being increasingly suspected of developing nuclear weapons, as the country has been rejecting the request of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for its investigation and inspection of important nuclear facilities. Are you concerned about the North Korean nuclear development problem, or are you not?*

Very concerned .....	31.3
Somewhat concerned .....	39.1
Not very concerned .....	21.7
Not concerned at all .....	5.2
No answer .....	2.7

*Q: Do you feel uneasy about North Korea's being suspected of developing nuclear weapons, or do you not?*

Feel uneasy .....	71.4
Don't feel uneasy .....	23.2
No answer .....	5.4

*Q: If North Korea refuses IAEA's inspection to the last, the United Nations could implement some sanction measures against North Korea, including economic sanctions. The Government of Japan has already decided to cooperate on the United Nations' course of action. Then, do you support Japan's cooperating on sanction measures against North Korea, or do you not?*

Support .....	60.2
Don't support .....	24.4
Other answers .....	0.9
No answer .....	14.5

*Q: [To only those who answered in the foregoing question that they "support"] Why do you support it? Pick just one reason from among those listed below.*

Because North Korea's nuclear development will threaten Japan's safety ...	41.9
Because North Korea's nuclear development will raise the Korean Peninsula's tension .....	10.4
Because North Korea's nuclear development runs counter to such global trends as nuclear disarmament .....	31.3
Because North Korea's attitude ignores the United Nations' agreement .....	14.2
For other reasons .....	1.0
No answer .....	1.2

*Q: [To only those who answered in the foregoing question that they "don't support"] Why do you not support it? Pick just one reason from among those listed below.*

Because Japan should aim at a solution through talks .....	55.3
Because Japan-DPRK relations will worsen .....	17.8
Because North Korea will be internationally isolated further .....	16.2
Because North Korea does not seem to develop nuclear weapons .....	4.1
For other reasons .....	1.5
No answer .....	5.0

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