

SHIMODA'94

memorandum

No. 5

October 6, 1994

Japan and the World after the Cold War

IOKIBE Makoto

Professor, Kobe University

First, I would like to argue in broad perspective, which agenda, among possible Japanese political issues, will emerge out of this unpredictable situation after the destruction of "the 1955 regime" which has been so stable and binding. Second, what will be the major issue replaced with ideological struggles heated during the Cold War era in terms of international politics.

I The Future of Japan's Politics

1. The Three Policy Lines in Postwar Japan

As table 1 indicates, in postwar Japan's politics, there were mainly three ideological policy positions: a) the progressive position putting up "Democracy and Peace", with the idea to aim at the ultimate goal of socialistic society, b) the position which Premier Shigeru Yoshida declared along the line of "Economy comes first to be a commercial (trading) state" under the U.S. umbrella of security and a free trade system, c) the reactionary position which exclaimed to amend the Constitution for re-armament based on the argument of traditional view on sovereign states.

During 1945-1960, these three policy groups could gain political leadership one after another. As for the 1950s only, these three groups might have been said to win over almost evenly divided popularity as table 1 shows.

b) and c) used to form each party in the early stage, which one can describe as the conservatives, merged into the LDP in 1955. By so doing, the LDP commanded roughly two thirds of the seats, whereas the Socialists kept the remaining one third. The ratio of the parliamentary seats at the time became the fundamental characteristic of "the 1955 regime" later on.

However, during the struggle over the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty which erupted in 1960, a) and c) camps collided intensely, and both retreated after failing their appeals consequently. In the aftermath, the political context changed markedly to the extent of emphasizing more fully economic growth, symbolically epitomized in the "double income plan" by Premier Ikeda. The policy priority on economy thence defined the basic line of successive administrations until Miyazawa's. Although it is very true that Nakasone himself was close to c), and Miki and Kaifu were slightly close to a), however, b) remained unchangeably the fundamental political

[Table 1] Changes after World War II

Three Political Lines Ideology Periodization	(A) Peace & Democracy To Socialism	(B) Economy First To Commercial State	(C) Constitutional Revision & Rearmament To Traditional Powers
(1) Early Occupation Reforms, 1945-48	G S / G H Q ① Katayama ② Ashida ③ Yoshida ④ Hara ⑤ Shide ⑥ Kuni ⑦ Higashi-		
(2) Economic Recov- ery & Peace Treaty, 1949-54		G2/GHQ, Dodge, Dullas ⑥ Yoshida	
(3) Quest for Political System 1954-60	(⑦ Ishibashi)		⑦ Hatoyama ⑧ Kishi
(4) Economic Society, 1960-71		⑨ Ikeda ⑩ Sato	
(5) Quake on Post- war Systems, 1971-78		⑪ Tanaka ⑫ Miki ⑬ Fukuda ⑭ Ohira	
(6) Neo-Conserva- tive 1979-89		⑮ Suzuki ⑯ Nakasone ⑰ Takeshita ⑱ Uno ⑲ Kaifu ⑳ Miyazawa	
(7) End of 55 System 1989-93 J C P J S P L D P ↔ ↔ ↔ K o m e i D S P			

[Table 2]

2-1: The Three Political Lines in Postwar Japan (Under the Cold War & 1955 System)

<p>(1) <u>Peace and Democracy</u> <u>Under Socialism</u> "neutrality without armament" (JSP: left & right)</p>	<p>(2) <u>Commercial State</u> * <u>Economic recovery first</u> * Free trade system under U.S. security (LDP left) Yoshida to Miyazawa</p>	<p>(3) <u>Traditional Sovereign Power</u> * "Re-armament, amending the Constitution" (LDP right) Hatoyama, Kishi</p>
--	--	--

2-2: The Four Political Streams in Post-Cold War Japan - Realignment

<p>(a) <u>No Military at All</u> * "No" even for PKO * Keep Article IX ("No" to Political Reform) (JSP left)</p>	<p>(b) <u>Civilian Power</u> * Mainly civil & non-military * Political <i>stability</i> <i>domestic status quo</i> <i>respect vested interest</i> environmental issue, human rights, ...<i>dovish line</i> (JSP right + LDP left), Gotohda Kono, Takemura of Sakigake (Funabashi, "Global Civilian Power")</p>	<p>(c) <u>Normal State</u> * Expand international role * Strengthen political leadership * Radical domestic reform * not only PKO but PEU (Ichiro Ozawa of Shinseito)</p>	<p>(d) <u>Sovereign Power</u> * Rearmament - independent military power * nuclear weapon "no" at present but when ...? (strategic analyst abroad)</p>
--	--	---	---

2-3: Policy Positions Relating to the Two Basic Issues

Two Basic Issues		U.S.-Japan Security Treaty	
		Keep	Abolish
Constitution Article IX (Renunciation of War)	Keep	(2) (b)	(a) (1)
	Amend	(c) (3)	(d)

2. Post Cold War: Policy Line After the 1955 Regime

In 1989, the very year when the Berlin wall came tumbling down, Japan's politics also was thrown into a commotion, triggered by the revelation of the "Recruit Scandal". It caused a precipitous drop in the LDP's support rate and the LDP dealt a crushing defeat in the House of Councillors election that year. In 1993, splits within the LDP brought about Hosokawa's coalition government that consisted of seven other parties. This political event brought to an end the uninterrupted rule of the LDP for 38 years.

How can one envision the future of Japan's politics from the current situation? As table 2 shows, three policy lines seems to be evolving into four lines. There are two extreme positions: first, the position which is against any sign of militant power, this is in fact described as the ultra conservative line which persists in rather lavishly a Japanese domestic orientation after the World War, and the second position which exclaims to amend the Constitution to obtain independent military power and terminate the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Neither of them enjoy much popular support at present.

Therefore, substantial issues are likely to be raised between "civilian power" and "normal state". The former mouths dovish lines and inclines to maintain the status quo: take care of the weak, and pay attention to vested interests of various domestic groups as well. Present Murayama's coalition government by the LDP, the Socialist Party and Sakigake Party represents this position. Externally it supports disarmament and ecological issues, while internally it puts priority on welfare. In this sense, it tends to be a big government. Ichiro Ozawa, on the other hand, represents to advocate "normal state" arguments. He pointed out that because of excessive indulgence to anti-military, economy oriented stance in the postwar era, today's Japan has come to lack congruent institutions and due leadership as a state. For this reason, he called for drastic reforms. It implies that the state should restore its role in the international global community in terms of military as well as the non-military aspects. Also it argues that government itself should carry out the reform to be a small government. As he played a decisive role in creating the coalition, the Hosokawa cabinet more or less represented this view.

These two groups are comparable to a contrast of Republican Party and Democratic Party in the U.S. The party systems in East Asian countries, notably the Japanese one, may fall into a category in which the dimensions between the liberal and conservative represent continua, not dichotomies, and the differences are in degree not in kind. In this sense it is similar to the U.S. type of system rather than the European type. Especially after the end of the cold war, the ideological issues over left and right seem to have much less meanings. However, its real reason may lie deeper in the historical changes in the structure of labor forces as analyzed by Jun'nosuke Masumi and Yutaka Tsujinaka: major political parties whose principle constituents are labor class and labor unions, for example, the Labor Party in the U.K. and the Social Democrats in Germany, have grown out of experiences undergone over a considerable period of time during which the secondary sector was the primary labor force in their industrialization. On the contrary, in the U.S., Japan, or other East Asian countries, as the population of the primary sector declined, the secondary sector rose. But as soon as the secondary sector began to enjoy a majority, the tertiary sector got the better of it and for good. Within such a social structure, it is almost impossible for the progressive party backed by the labor class to become a countervailing power for the conservatives. If any, the labor unions may be left to join one element of constituency for liberal political parties.

The future dimensions of Japan's politics may be constructed along these lines as follows; big government or small government; maintenance of the status quo or change the present situation; be against any militaristic actions or an all-round contributor. These lines simply reflects today's diverse societal needs which may appear contradictory. Therefore, regardless of which position each party endorses, it should improve on the contents anyhow. For this, Japanese political parties should find a way to openly recruit relevant political skills and resources as well as to adopt an adequate decision making system and a set of policies, so that they can select those to fill roles as the elites who play a vital part in adequate political policy decision making, which has become inescapably complicated after the Cold War.

II Post Cold War Period

1. The World after the Cold War: Three Pessimistic Scenarios

As the East-West Conflict has vanished, people began to talk about oneness of the peaceful world. Soon after it faced a severe setback, they vehemently talked about the coming "new world disorder". In my view, these can be classified into three scenarios.

The first scenario can be summed up as "the Eruption of Conflicts of Nationalism". Righteous statism and ethnocentric self-determination may very likely collide with each other, and regional conflicts will prevail all over the world. After the "bipolar conflicts" ended, here come multi-, or innumerable-polar conflicts.

Second, regionalism to form blocs will emerge: Unification of European Community can be seen as the fortification of Europe, and NAFTA is being formed out of regional protectionist intentions. Asian countries may well react to this trend to preemptively protect themselves from possible harms. In this way, the world will be separated into conflicting tri-polars: European, American, and Asian regionalism blocs, as in the 1930s when World War II was imminent.

Professor Samuel Huntington's "The Clash of Civilization" focuses on the differences in race, ethnicity, religion, and culture. On the grounds of those differences, each civilization will be at odds. He warns that western civilization is now at its peak, reveling in its victory over the Cold War, meantime, other civilizations may seek a turnabout. Among seven to eight major civilizations exist in the world, Islamic and Confucian civilizations are especially anti-west. At this very point in common, they are showing signs of conspiracy. Therefore, bipolar conflicts may come next, but will be totally different from the past.

2. Political Dimensions After the Cold War: Beyond the World Disorder Views

Each perspective mentioned above about the world after the Cold War is virtually incorrect and sounds too deterministic. I do not mean that the indicative facts or trends do not exist. In our world of such diversity and size, any claims can be made out of existing facts. However, it is wrong to generalize with only a handful facts to the points as if it were an unchallenged truth.

For example, if the claims made in "The Clash of Civilization", were true, Iraq led by Saddam Hussein should have had wholehearted support by every single Arab and Islamic country, and prewar Japan should have been welcome by many other Asian countries of Confucian civilization. As we all know, the fact is exactly the opposite. Wars between states develop from conflicting relations of the states at the time. To beat any rival, in defiance of the commonality, they may very well ask for help from their ally(ies) that even belong to other civilizations.

These elements have manifested themselves in the post Cold War: ethnicity, regionalism, and civilization, originate fundamentally their unique history. The famous ancient Greek Tragedy "King Oedipus" has an underlying theme of tragedy which becomes unavoidable after Oedipus opens the door to look into his past left untouched until then. The torments in Yugoslavia, for example, is a notable product of this kind of act. They were at last unhooked to turn straight to settle an old score of their hostility and hatred that had simmered for so long against other ethnic groups.

However, the kind of logic imputing to the past is not always sufficient. It is true that people are prone to act according to their darker side of feelings, but, they can also learn a lesson from the deed, and find a way to control it. Having experienced two World Wars in the 20th century, mankind has tried to temper expansion of state sovereignty, once referred to as "Leviathan" or "Behemoth", in the name of promoting international public goods. What easily come to our mind is some explicit steps, among others, such as that of today's international economic framework which aims at guaranteeing free trade among nations, and the denunciation of a war of aggression as spelled out in the U.N. Charter. The development of global interdependence, transportation, and communication proceeds the unreversed diffusion of borderless economy, security, and culture with facing conflicts out of the differences at times. In the present state, does swinging back to the traditional framework of destructive conflicts such as in ethnicity, regionalism, or civilization, contribute to any betterment of national lives? Even though many are absorbed by deplorable post Cold War strife, one should not blind oneself from the other created by already existing cooperative systems intact at the various levels. In other words, two opposite directional forces; the force of polarization stemmed from traditional identity of certain ethnic groups and the force of long term trend of globalism from semi-institutionalized international cooperative systems are competing with each other to the full. Under the circumstance, mankind must use wisdom to figure out an adequate combination of them, and avoid choosing an alternative.

冷戦後の日本と世界

神戸大学 教授

五百旗頭 眞

小論において、第1には、戦後半世紀近く日本政治を縛ってきた「55年体制」が現在崩壊し、流動化しているが、今後の日本政治の対抗軸はどこに置かれるだろうか、巨視的な観点からコメントしたい。第2に、冷戦体制崩壊後の世界はどこへ向かうのだろうか。東西、左右のイデオロギー軸に代わって、何か国際政治の対抗軸となるだろうか。21世紀に向かっての世界システムの変化という誰にも分からない問題について語ってみたい。

I. 日本政治の行方

1. 戦後日本政治の3路線

〔Table 1〕に見るように、戦後日本の政治は主として3つの立場から構成されていた。(A)「平和と民主主義」を標榜し、「社会主義社会」の実現を理想とする革新陣営、(B)経済中心主義をとり米国のリードする安全保障体制と自由貿易体制に加入して、「通商国家」としての再生を目指す吉田茂が据えた路線、(C)伝統的国家観に立って、主権国家である以上、十分な軍事力が必要であり、そのためには、「改憲再軍備」をすべきであるとの路線、の3政治路線である。

〔Table 1〕に明らかなように、1945-60年の間に、3つの政治路線はそれぞれに政治的主導権をとる機会を得た。1950年代について大雑把に言えば、(A)(B)(C)3路線はそれぞれ約1/3ずつの国民からの支持を得ていたといっておくであろう。

(B)(C)が1955年の保守合同によって自民党にまとめられたので、保革もしくは自社はほぼ2対1の勢力比となり、それが、「55年体制」の基底をなした。

ところが、1960年の安保闘争によって(A)と(C)は正面から激突し、双方とも傷つき後退した。池田首相が「所得倍増論」を掲げて(B)の経済主義路線を国内政治に定着させたあと、宮沢喜一に至るすべての政権が基本的に(B)を継ぐことになる。たとえば、中曽根は(C)に近く、三木や海部は(A)に近いとしても、(B)が自民党政治、もしくは高度成長以後の日本政治の基軸であることに変わりはない。

[Table 1] Changes after World War II

Three Political Lines Ideology Periodization	(A) Peace & Democracy To Socialism	(B) Economy First To Commercial State	(C) Constitutional Revision & Rearmament To Traditional Powers
(1) Early Occupation Reforms, 1945-48	G S / G H Q ⑤ Katayama ④ Asahida ③ Yoshida ② Hara ① Shide-kuni Higashi-		
(2) Economic Recovery & Peace Treaty, 1949-54		G2/GHQ, Dodge, Dullas ⑥ Yoshida	
(3) Quest for Political System 1954-60	(⑦ Ishibashi)		⑦ Hatoyama ⑧ Kishi
(4) Economic Society, 1960-71		⑨ Ikeda ⑩ Sato	
(5) Quake on Post- war Systems, 1971-78		⑪ Tanaka ⑫ Miki ⑬ Fukuda ⑭ Ohira	
(6) Neo-Conservative 1979-89		⑮ Suzuki ⑯ Nakasone	
(7) End of 55 System		⑰ Takeshita ⑱ Uno ⑲ Kaifu ⑳ Miyazawa	
<p>1989-93 ←-----→ L D P</p> <p>←-----→ J S P</p> <p>←-----→ J C P ←-----→ K o m e i</p> <p>←-----→ D S P</p>			

[Table 2]

2-1: The Three Political Lines in Postwar Japan (Under the Cold War & 1955 System)

<p>(1) <u>Peace and Democracy</u> <u>Under Socialism</u> "neutrality without armament" (JSP: left & right)</p>	<p>(2) <u>Commercial State</u> * <u>Economic recovery</u> first * Free trade system under U.S. security (LDP left) Yoshida to Miyazawa</p>	<p>(3) <u>Traditional Sovereign Power</u> * "Re-armament, amending the Constitution" (LDP right) Hatoyama, Kishi</p>
--	--	--

2-2: The Four Political Streams in Post-Cold War Japan - Realignment

<p>(a) <u>No Military at All</u> * "No" even for PKO * Keep Article IX ("No" to Political Reform) (JSP left)</p>	<p>(b) <u>Civilian Power</u> * Mainly civil & non-military * Political <i>stability</i> <i>domestic status quo</i> <i>respect vested interest</i> environmental issue, human rights, ...<i>dovish line</i> (JSP right + LDP left), Gotohda Kono, Takemura of Sakigake (Funabashi, "Global Civilian Power")</p>	<p>(c) <u>Normal State</u> * Expand international role * Strengthen political leadership * Radical domestic reform * not only PKO but PEU (Ichiro Ozawa of Shinseito)</p>	<p>(d) <u>Sovereign Power</u> * Rearmament - independent military power * nuclear weapon "no" at present but when ...? (strategic analyst abroad)</p>
--	--	---	---

2-3: Policy Positions Relating to the Two Basic Issues

Two Basic Issues		U.S.-Japan Security Treaty	
		Keep	Abolish
Constitution Article IX (Renunciation of War)	Keep	(2) (b)	(a) (1)
	Amend	(c) (3)	(d)

2. 冷戦後＝55年体制後の政治路線

ベルリンの壁が崩れた1989年、日本政治もリクルート・スキャンダルに揺れ、参議院選挙において、自民党は大敗した。1993年、自民党は分裂して、細川護熙を首班とする非自民7党連立内閣が生まれて、自民党は38年間続いた政権を失った。

今後の日本政治はどのように再編されるのか。〔Table 2〕のように、戦後の3政治路線が4つに分解しつつ展開しているように思われる。両極をなす(a)の徹底した非軍事路線—それは実は戦後日本の国内的枠組みを死守せんとする超保守主義的立場である—と、(d)の改憲再軍備と日米安保の廃棄を双方とも行って、自律的軍事大国化を目指す路線は、いずれも日本国内にほとんど支持勢力を持たない。

それゆえ、今後の対抗軸は、(b) civilian power と (c) “normal state” の間に生ずるであろう。(b)は、非軍事民生中心のハト派路線を掲げ、社会的弱者をいたわり、国内諸勢力の利益や既得権を尊重する現状維持的志向性を示す。現在の自民・社会・さきがけ3党連立による村山政権はこの立場を代表する。対外的には軍縮を好み、地球環境にやさしく、国内では福祉を中心に国民にやさしくを説き、その点で大きな政府に傾く。(C)の“normal state”は小沢一郎の主張するところであり、戦後日本が非軍事・経済主義に極端に耽溺したために国家としての全体政策とそのための制度およびリーダーシップを失ったと批判し、大胆な改革を主張する。日本国家の非軍事・軍事双方にまたがる国際的役割の回復と、内政面では「小さいが強い政府」を志向する体制内革新派である。小沢に支えられた細川政権は、ほぼこの立場を代表していたといえよう。

この二つのグループは、アメリカにおける民主党・共和党の対比と類似している。日本をはじめとする東アジア諸国の政党システムは、保革のイデオロギー軸に沿った西欧型よりも、リベラルと保守との間で、力点の置きどころをたがえる包括政党間の争いという米国型を基本的に踏襲するであろう。それは、一つには、冷戦後の時代に保革のイデオロギー軸が色あせたからであるが、より根本的には、升味準之輔や辻中豊が示唆するように産業構造の歴史的変化に起因するであろう。イギリスの労働党や、ドイツの社民党のように、労働者階級もしくは労働組合を基盤とする大政党が成長するには、第二次産業優位時代がかなり長期にわたって持続せねばならない。アメリカ、日本、東アジア諸国の場合、第一次産業人口が低下するのと交差して第二次産業人口が上昇するが、トップに踊り出たか出ないかの間に、第三次産業人口が首座を奪い、第二次産業は永久に首位を楽しむ機会を失う。このような構造の社会では労働組合を基盤とする革新政党が保守政党の対抗勢力として社会を二分するような事態は期し難い。労働組合は、おそらくよりリベラルな政党の支持基盤の一つを成すに留まるであろう。

今後の日本政治の対抗軸は、(b)対(c)が大きな政府対小さな政府、現状維持的対現状変更的、非軍事主義対オールラウンド派、内部和合重視対対外的役割重視などに沿って構成されるであろう。そのいずれかが正しく、他方が誤っているという問題ではなく、矛盾に満ちた多面的な社会の必要の各局面を反映しているのである。従って、今後の政党がどの立場をとるかということ以上に、いずれの立場であれ、質的に向上することが重要な課題となろう。開かれた人材補給システムを見出して天下のよい人材を国政エリートに組み込むことは政党の基本的な任務である。そして、冷戦後の状況に適合的な政策と決定システムを見出し実現することが急務である。

II. 冷戦後の世界の行方

1. 冷戦後の世界—三つの悲観論

冷戦期の「二つの世界の対立」が消えたあとは、平和的な一つの世界への道が広がるという夢が一時高まったが、それが挫折したあと、「新世界無秩序」の到来を予想する議論が流行する。そうした悲運論を三つに大別しよう。

第1には、ナショナリズム暴発論である。すなわち冷戦秩序崩壊のあと、国家的エゴイズムと民族分離主義が世界に歯止めを失ってぶつかり合い、地域紛争の頻発が地表をおおう。「二つの世界の対立」のあとに来るものは、「無数の世界の対立」であるとの見方である。

第2に、地域主義化 もしくはブロック化論である。EC統合は「ヨーロッパの要塞化」であり、北米自由貿易機構（NAFTA）もまた保護主義的な地域ブロック結成の試みである。アジアも対抗上、地域機構を築くことになるだろう。かくて、1930年代の第二次世界大戦に向かった時代と同様に、欧・米・亜のregionalism に糾合され、鼎立対決に向かう。「二つの世界の対立」のあとに来るものは、「三つの世界の対立」であるとの見方である。

第3は、ハンチントン教授の「文明の衝突」論である。冷戦期はイデオロギー対立を特徴としたが、今後は人種・民族・宗教・文化等の依拠する文明間の対立の時代を迎えるであろう。西洋文明は冷戦の勝利により地球全体をおおう絶頂期にあるが、今後は他文明による反西洋の逆流がテーマとなるだろう。世界にある7～8の文明のうち、イスラム文明と儒教文明がとりわけ反西洋的であり、両者は反西洋的結託のきざしを示している。「二つの世界の対立」のあとに来るものは、異質で別種の「二つの世界の衝突」である。

2. 無秩序論をこえて — 冷戦後の対抗軸

以上の三つの冷戦後世界に関する展望は、いずれも誤りである。誤り、という意味は、そのような事実や動向が全く存在しないという意味ではない。広く多様な世界には、どんな主張をも裏付ける諸事実がある。間違いというのは、たとえば1～2割の事実、せいぜい3分の1の事実をもって主要な事実もしくは全面的事実と説くことである。

一例のみ、ここではハンチントンの「文明の衝突」について言うなら、もし文明圏ごとに諸国が集まるのであれば、サダム・フセインのイラクは全アラブ諸国とイスラム諸国に支持され、第2次世界大戦期の日本は儒教圏とアジアの諸国に支持された筈である。事実、その文明圏の他の自立的な国々は、ほとんど米国側につき、イラクや日本に対して戦った。昔も今も、将来も、国家間の戦争は国家間の対立関係から生ずるのであり、同文明の隣のライバルと対立するため外部文明の友人を調達することがなくなりはないであろう。

民族にせよ、地域主義にせよ、文明にせよ、冷戦後の主役と上に指名されたものは、いずれもすぐれて土着的・伝統的要素である。ギリシャ悲劇の古典『オイディプス王』のテーマは、「過去という扉を開いた瞬間から悲劇は不可避となった」であった。ドロドロした裏切りと不義と憎しみからまる民族間の「過去」を、冷戦終結は例えばユーゴーにおいて開いてしまったのである。歴史に不変の要素であるだけに、それは誠に根強い。

しかし、他面から見れば、このような昔よりの要素しか語らないのは、発想の貧困をも示すものではなかろうか。人は暗い情念に突き動かされはするが、その悲劇から学習し、それを飼い慣らす術をも開発する。20世紀の再度の世界大戦を経て、人類は「レヴァイアサン」や「ビヒテス」にたとえられた無際限の国家主権を、国際公益の名において「サポートしつつ制約する」に至った。自由貿易体制と呼ばれる国際経済システムや国連憲章による侵略戦争の否定がその代表的措置である。地球の狭小化と相互依存の進展は、一面異文化間の摩擦をもたらしつつ、ボーダレス・エコノミー、ボーダレス・セキュリティ、ボーダレス・カルチャーをも進行させる。このような段階においてエスニシティ、民族、地域、文明の古典的枠組に回帰することは不可能であるし、強行すれば、全ての国民生活を貧弱にし破滅すらさせるであろう。冷戦後の世界に「無秩序」のみを見て、ほとんどあらゆる分野に存在する国際的協議体とそのルールが織りなす「分野別・重層的協調システム」という「秩序」を見落としてはならない。

言い換えれば、冷戦後の世界には、民族などの「伝統的アイデンティティー」と「ある程度制度化された国際協調システム」が、根強い伝統的要素による個別化・分解化の動力とグローバリズムの長期的趨勢との間でせめぎあっているのである。その二者択一が問題なのではなく、その組み合わせとそれをいかに使いこなすかが、現在我々に、鋭く問われているのである。

REGIONALISM IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC, AND THE ROLES OF KOREA, THE U.S. AND JAPAN

Byung-joon Ahn, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea

In the post-Cold War world, regionalism is emerging as a compromise between nationalism and globalism in both geopolitics and geoeconomics. The blockization of EU, NAFTA and APEC have been somewhat slowed down since the completion of the Uruguay Round in December 1993 and its ratification at Marrakesh in April 1994. It is said that East Asia is going to benefit most from these liberalization trends. In the security realm, too, the U.N. has expanded its peace-keeping operations throughout the world. But these global activities have been insufficient to meet the rising demands for multilateral cooperation. Therefore, regional approaches to economic and security cooperation have been suggested as an alternative to the inadequacy of globalism and the danger of nationalism. Nowhere is this trend more outstanding than in the Asia-Pacific where protectionism and arms race are on the rise.

By "regionalism" we refer to efforts at promoting economic and security cooperation among three or more states in a geographically confined area according to certain principles.¹ In the Asia-Pacific, these principles are currently developing as what may be called "open regionalism" for economic cooperation and "soft regionalism" for security cooperation. By the former we mean regional efforts at promoting free and open trade and investment; by the latter we mean regional efforts at promoting peace and stability mainly through cooperative dialogues than collective

¹This is adapted from John Gerard Ruggie's definition of multilateralism. See Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in Ruggie (ed.), *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p.14.

treaties or organizations. "The Asia-Pacific" refers to a wider region encompassing East Asia and North America.

It is important to investigate what regionalism means in the Asia-Pacific, what issues are being raised for regional economic and security cooperation, whether this is feasible, and if so, what roles Korea, Japan, the U.S. and other countries should play to build a "New Pacific Community" that President Bill Clinton called for when he visited Japan and Korea in July 1993.

I. The Asia-Pacific as the Center of the World's Economic and Security Gravity.

The Asia-Pacific is emerging as the center of the world's economic and security gravity. It is the most dynamic economic region. It is also a vast region where China, Japan, the U.S., Russia and a number of other countries are contending economically and strategically. Whether regionalism succeeds here may decisively affect the shape of global prosperity and security, too.

It should be pointed out at the outset that the Asia-Pacific as an economic and security region is quite different in several aspects from the Europe-Atlantic where regionalism has been most successful.² First of all, unlike Europe Asia is characterized by diversity and asymmetry in culture, political and economic system. Interstate relationships are primarily bilateral and are not grouped in common institutions like EU and NATO. Balance of power and nationalism are still alive in East Asia as unsettled territorial disputes remain and communism also surviving. As a result of these differences, the sense of regionalism and community is relatively weak here as compared to Europe and America.

²Byung-joon Ahn, "Strategic Trends in East Asia," *The Pacific Review*, vol.4, no. 2 (Summer 1991), pp.109-116; also see Byung-joon Ahn, "Strategic, Political and Economic Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region," in Hong Yung Lee and Chung Chongwook(eds.), *Korean Options in a Changing International Order*(Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1993), pp.8-16.

Nevertheless, there have been renewed interests in regionalism in the Asia-Pacific partly in response to the emergence of EU and NAFTA but more importantly, they have resulted from an increasing recognition of the economic and strategic importance of this region in the world after the end of the Cold War and the Uruguay Round. Initially, Asia used to be a geographical concept as were Europe and America. But East Asia involving Japan and such Newly Industrializing Countries as South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore has been the fastest growing economic subregion. As this trend of high growth spreads to Southeast Asia and China, Asia as a geographic concept has gradually yielded to Asia as a most dynamic economic region. When such European descendants as New Zealand, Australia, Canada and the U.S. joined this region as they did in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation(APEC) forum, the designation of "Asia-Pacific" has come to refer to a combination of East Asia and North America to make the largest region to which the center of the world's economic and strategic gravity is shifting from the Europe-Atlantic. What this region is still lacking is a common political and cultural identity.

Two somewhat diverging imperatives are at work in the Asia-Pacific. ~~Political imperatives~~ are tending toward nationalism, balance of power and sovereignty as shown by the lack of a collective security organization but economic imperatives are tending toward interdependence, borderless economies and open regionalism as shown by the successful launching of APEC and the deepening networks of corporations and non-governmental organizations(NGO) in the private sector. In order for the Asia-Pacific to accomplish an effective regionalism, therefore, it is desirable that the economic imperatives spill over to and eventually prevail over the political imperatives. Conversely, without a certain degree of common security interests and compatible values, it will be difficult for this region to share a true sense of community.

In attempts to build a regional community, too, there are two distinctive approaches. One approach is placing more emphasis on the need for "re-Asianization," an attempt to galvanize a self-reliant group of Asian countries alone without involving America and even Oceania by promoting intra-Asian economic cooperation and by fostering certain Asian values distinctive of Western values. By and large, ASEAN countries and Malaysia in particular, China and some conservative elements in Japan support this view, stressing an Asian identity of their own traditional and political values.

Another approach is placing more emphasis on the Pacific by involving America and Oceania to maintain both economic and security ties between East Asia and these two continents. The advocate of this school aims at building a more open region on the basis of not only common interests but also common values which are compatible with the norms of such global institutions as the World Trade Organization, IMF and OECD. A majority view in the U.S., South Korea, Japan, Australia and Canada advocates this approach by stressing the need for forging some effective linkages between East Asia and North America. When China joins the WTO, this approach will be further strengthened.

At the cost of some oversimplification, four broad observations are in order on regionalism in the Asia-Pacific.

First, the overall trend of economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific can best be described as "open regionalism" because most countries do champion the principle of open and free trade and investment at APEC. This loose forum had resulted from the non-official Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference(PECC) consisting of businessmen, academics and officials. This is why such subregional groupings as ASEAN Free Trade Area(AFTA), Northeast Asia, and NAFTA

can find a common ground in trying to make APEC consistent with GATT.

Second, the state of security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific remains "soft regionalism" in the sense that its agenda, leadership, institutions and membership are still being explored at various forms of loose dialogues. The only official form of regional security dialogue is the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF) launched in Bangkok in July 1994 which resulted from a decision adopted at the ASEAN Post-Minister Conference(PMC) in July 1994. A non-official forum called the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific(CSCAP) was also established as a Track Two endeavor in June 1993 in addition to a host of other seminars and roundables on security issues that had been going on in the Asia-Pacific.

Third, in order for regionalism to succeed in the Asia-Pacific, economic imperatives for interdependence must prevail over political imperatives for nationalism. This depends on whether the participating countries can agree on the shape of agenda, leadership, institutionalization and membership. Ultimately, a sense of regional identity requires them to share not merely common interests but also compatible values and culture.

Fourth, to build a New Pacific Community the U.S., Japan and South Korea should sustain a steady partnership for security, interdependence and democracy, given the high volume and intensity of interaction between these allies. In order to keep the U.S. engaged in East Asia, to deter North Korea from developing nuclear weapons, to keep China constructively engaged in interdependent relationships, and to promote democracy, South Korea, Japan and the U.S. must have a division of roles commensurate with their capabilities. The U.S. must assume leadership in promoting security cooperation and Japan economic cooperation. South Korea can provide bridge-building roles between these two super powers and between them and the other small

countries, and between market economies and planned economies. Only when the U.S. is prepared to act with these partners that share its purposes, will its idea of a New Pacific Community make concrete progress.

II. Economic Cooperation: Open Regionalism.

On balance, the direction of economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific tends to develop toward open regionalism as it is primarily market-driven even though it is managed by mercantilism states. By definition, open regionalism is consistent with such principles of global trade regime as nondiscrimination and reciprocity. Whether these can be actually realized depends on whether or not Asia's relations with America, and especially on Japan's relations with the U.S. can remain benign and at least non-confrontational. As long as economic imperatives take precedence over political imperatives and as long as the Pacific view holds sway over the Asian view advocating an "Asia for Asians," economic cooperation may well proceed in an open and trans-Pacific route instead of forming an Asian block separately.

1. A New Asian Community or A New Pacific Community?

Roughly speaking, two versions of economic cooperation are contending in the Asia-Pacific as pointed out above. One version envisions a New Asian Community involving Asian countries only and excluding American and Oceanic countries. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's proposal for forming an East Asian Economic Caucus(EAEC) represents this view. Another version is the call for creating a New Pacific Community of common interests and values as President Clinton did by combining East Asia and NAFTA. Japan as a global superpower and as an Asian member of G-7 holds a key to determining which version will prevail.

Asia continues to be a region of most dynamic economic growth in the world. Japan had led

this growth drive as a prototype "capitalist developmental state" during the 1960's; the "four little dragons," i.e., South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, followed suit during the 1970's; the ASEAN countries also tended to model after these successful cases of rapid industrialization during the 1980's; and China and Vietnam have also emulated them by seeking export-oriented economic development, trying to accomplish "a socialist developmental state" at least in the economic realm without changing their communist one-party rule. Only North Korea is resisting this tide of reforms and open-door policy.

What is new in this Asian dynamism is the rapid rise of intra-Asian trade and investment reaching as high as some 40 percent of the total as a result of continuing economic growth in these countries. Economic growth is being fueled by trade and investment within East Asia itself. Reforms and open policy in China in particular are accelerating the pace of Asian economic integration by generating new sources of exports and imports. East Asia's GNP is reaching almost one-third of the world's and still growing at around 7 percent per annum. More importantly, the saving rates in most Asian countries are above 30 percent of GNP and their capital control two-fifths of global reserves; Taiwan holds the world's second largest foreign reserves while most Western countries including the U.S. remain a huge importer of capital. Most importantly, by 1992 the volume of intra-Asian trade had exceeded that of trans-Pacific trade.

This economic robustness has rekindled the move toward ascertaining a self-sufficient Asian Community. The Clinton administration's trade policy of insisting on numerical targets in negotiation with Japan and of linking human rights, labor and environmental standards to trade issues has further prompted Asian countries to seek an Asia for Asian attitude; they resent Washington's tactics of using "a heavy-handed sledge-hammer to crack the nut" in Australian



MINNESOTA HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Copyright in the Walter F. Mondale Papers belongs to the Minnesota Historical Society and its content may not be copied without the copyright holder's express written permission. Users may print, download, link to, or email content, however, for individual use.

To request permission for commercial or educational use, please contact the Minnesota Historical Society.



www.mnhs.org