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## ***Ambassador Walter F. Mondale's Speech to the Jiji Press' Research Institute of Japan***

### ***The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship — the Bedrock of Stability in East Asia for the 21st Century***

***Shin Takanawa Prince Hotel  
Tokyo, Japan  
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***(as prepared for delivery)***

Thank you for inviting me to speak before you today. Last week, I visited Korea, and the week before I was in Jakarta for the APEC meetings. Sandwiched in between was a trip to Niigata, and before that I went down to Kyushu. So I am pleased to be home in Tokyo and to address a "home town" audience that is only a short drive from the Embassy.

I want to speak to you today about our security relationship. But before taking up that topic, I would like to speak for a moment about APEC and the U.S.-Japan global agendas, two important and timely subjects.

#### **● APEC**

I believe that the APEC meeting in Jakarta was historic. As you know, APEC began in 1989, as a very loose, very informal gathering of foreign ministers and trade ministers from the region. Though Europe has a long history of this kind of a multilateral meeting, APEC's wide scope is relatively new in Asia. Our first real breakthrough with APEC came in Seattle, where all of the APEC leaders came together for the first time. In Jakarta, we reached another milestone in the building of the Asia-Pacific community: committing to fully open trade in the region by the year 2020.

No one expects, or wishes, APEC to be like the EU or the OECD — it has a decidedly different tone, more consensual, less formal, less institutionalized. But we are seeing a growing recognition among Asia-Pacific leaders in all fields of the importance of regional cooperation and a growing commitment to making this happen. There is indeed an Asian-Pacific community, and it has a very bright future.

I was also gratified that the U.S. and Japan were on the same side of the table. We worked well together and with the many others there who are committed to moving APEC forward. The next meeting of APEC will be hosted by Japan in Osaka. As chairman, Japan will have a tremendous opportunity to lead the way toward implementation of the agreements reached in Jakarta and to give greater definition to APEC by setting forth a blue print for the future.

President Clinton has also accepted Prime Minister Murayama's invitation to make a state visit to Tokyo in connection with the APEC summit.

I am delighted I will be here for these events, and I look forward to their great success.

So even though APEC happened last week, and I understand that this makes it old

news, I believe that APEC is very big news indeed when we consider the future of this region. I am convinced that — more than any other body — APEC will be a key forum for shaping the Asia-Pacific community from here on out.

### ● Our Common Agenda

I also want to talk a bit about the summit at Jakarta between president Clinton and Prime Minister Murayama. This was a productive and very positive encounter. The trade agreements we reached at end of September set a very positive tone for the meeting, and both leaders had a chance to focus on the many areas of cooperation in our relationship. At the very top of this list were the initiatives the U.S. and Japan are making to promote our Common Agenda on global issues in the Pacific region and throughout the world.

I am afraid that the Common Agenda is one of those "good" news items that rarely gets the attention it deserves. Let's face it: "good" news just cannot compete for media attention with "bad" news. It's a funny thing, but some seem to relish a fight more than they would like to hear that our two countries together are saving lives around the world. But this is exactly what we are doing through the "Common Agenda."

When President Clinton met with Prime Minister Miyazawa in July of 1993, they agreed not only on a framework to address our trade problems, but also to move forward on a Common Agenda to tackle many of the world's most pressing long-term global issues such as the environment, population growth, the prevention of disease and the development of technology and human resources.

Our Common Agenda has been a great success. In the area of population and health assistance alone, our two nations will spend \$12 billion by the year 2000 on population and AIDS-related assistance for developing countries. We are working together to wipe out polio worldwide by the year 2000 and we are collaborating on the "children's vaccine initiative," a program to improve vaccines for the world's needy children. On the environment, we are working to protect the world's forests — in the Philippines, one of these programs will help protect 25,000 acres of rain forest. These are just a few of the 19 areas that the Common

Agenda now encompasses. We are also cooperating in areas such as narcotics control, protecting the oceans and coral reefs, developing environmentally safe, energy-efficient technologies and telecommunications, to name just a few.

Next week, our Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs, Tim Wirth, will be here meeting with senior Japanese officials on the Common Agenda. I hope all of you will take note of this visit and give our Common Agenda the attention I believe it deserves.

### ● The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship

The other topic I want to talk about with you today is another area of good news that does not seem to get the attention it deserves — and that is our security relationship.

### ● Our Regional Presence

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, I sense a degree of uncertainty in both the United States and Japan as to the continuing rationale for America's forward deployed presence in East Asia. This is understandable given the fact that for forty years our primary objective was containing the Soviet threat and the spread of communism, objectives that by their very success have largely lost their relevance. But I believe the reasons for America's military presence in Asia are as compelling as ever: America is a Pacific nation, with a stake in the security of the region. Stability and security in the Asian-Pacific theatre is essential for economic development. Economic progress, in turn, promotes democratic change. And prosperous democracies make for peaceful neighbors. America's commitment to Japan and Asia is rock solid.

America is a Pacific nation. This is not simply political rhetoric, it is a geographic, demographic, and cultural fact. Pacific waters lap the shores of five of our fifty states. Our population is increasingly centered in western states that look more to Asia than to Europe. And about seven and a half million Americans trace their ancestry to the Asia-Pacific and the numbers are growing — our Asian American community today is double what it was only ten years ago.

Our economy's health increasingly depends upon trade with our Asian-Pacific partners. Already, 40 percent of our trade is in this region. Japan is our largest overseas trading partners. We sell more to Singapore than to Italy or Greece; and more to Malaysia than to Russia. Almost two and a half million American jobs are directly related to our exports to this market. By the year 2000, it is estimated that our trade and investment flows across the Pacific will be double the trans-Atlantic volume. In the years ahead, this region will have a critical impact on my country's economic growth — on trade, jobs and our national prosperity.

American security depends on Asian security. Because of our geographic, cultural, and economic ties, my country has always had an enduring interest in stability in this region, and this stake is growing, not diminishing. Our national security depends on preventing the rise of any hegemonic power or coalition and in stopping the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and ballistic missile systems. We have a strong interest in fostering the growth of democracy and human rights — values so necessary for long-term peace and prosperity.

These interests have deep roots. Our desire to trade with Asia prompted us to send Admiral Perry to negotiate with Japan to open her economy to the world in the 19th century. Our strategic stake led us to mediate the end of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905, to respond to aggression in the 1940s, to defend the ROK in the 1950s and to assist South Vietnam in the 1960s. And these interests account for the commitment we have made to arrive at a peaceful resolution of the North Korea nuclear problem and to removing trade barriers in the Asia-Pacific region.

Since the end of World War II, to secure these interests, my country has maintained a strong defense capability in the Asia-Pacific through a series of bilateral alliances, most prominently with Japan and Korea, where we station most of the 100,000 military we have in the region.

In the post-Cold War era, we must take the existing security framework in East Asia that has been built up over the past fifty years and build on this to create a stronger bilateral,

regional and global security framework that can maintain stability and contribute to regional integration.

Let me share with you my sense of how I see our two nations working together on security issues in this new era — bilaterally, regionally, and globally.

### ● The Centrality of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance

I want to begin with the central component, our bilateral security alliance.

Since the end of World War II, Japan has been the cornerstone of our engagement in Asia. Of all of our bilateral security ties, none is stronger or more important to America than our bilateral security relationship with Japan. And I think that the same holds true for Japan.

The support within Japan for our security relationship is stronger than ever. With Prime Minister Murayama's endorsement of the Treaty this year, and the shift in the position of the Japan Socialist Party, there is now a public consensus here that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty serves Japan's interests and is a source of regional stability. For the first time since 1960, the existence of our alliance is no longer an issue in Japanese domestic politics.

There is no greater manifestation of Japan's support for our military presence than the very generous host nation support we receive. Japan assumes more than half the cost associated with our bases — some \$4 billion dollars. We are now in the process of discussing a renewal of the host nation support agreement, and we expect this to go smoothly.

Our bilateral alliance is the heart of stability in East Asia and makes possible our forward deployed presence in the region. From our bases in Japan, and with the roughly 47,000 American servicemen and women here, we can contribute both to the security of Japan and more broadly to maintaining international peace and security in the Far East.

In the years ahead, our governments are determined to strengthen this strategic partnership. We hope to find ways to make it easier for our forces to work together in peacetime. We want to enhance the interoperability of our forces by together developing and producing military systems. We



are looking into possible cooperation on Theater Missile Defenses, and we are exploring ways to work together on peace-keeping operations.

At the same time, we are addressing base issues and other concerns of the Japanese public. I am very much aware of the impact of our presence on Okinawa. With the support of the government of Japan, we are discussing the consolidation and realignment of certain facilities there. We are also working with the government of Japan to reduce the intrusiveness of our training activities in other parts of the country, consistent with the need to maintain readiness.

#### ● Regional Cooperation

But our security treaty and our military presence in Japan is only one facet of how our two countries cooperate in promoting regional and world peace and security.

Historically, this diverse region has been one of the most unstable parts of the world. But in the last twenty years, this region has been remarkably at peace. I believe that America's strategic, political, and economic engagement in East Asia and our commitment to Asian security have been the major contributor to this stability.

In defending our own interests, America's strategic presence in the region has also benefited the rest of the Asia-Pacific community, including Japan.

The stable environment that we so very much need here is also what Japan and others in the Asia-Pacific have counted on for their economies to flourish. This region is now home to some of the world's most promising economies — economies that are now committed to creating the world's largest area of free trade and investment and that will likely lead world growth into the next century.

In the diplomatic arena we are working together more closely than ever to maintain this stability.

I see our coordination in handling the North Korea nuclear problem as a model of how, by working together from the very start, we are able to make headway in solving a tremendously complex and delicate problem. You know, we should not forget how tense and volatile the situation with North Korea was last May. North Korea had denied IAEA inspectors access to key North Korean nuclear facilities and was refusing

to live up to its NPT commitments. We seemed to be headed toward United Nations sanctions and a very difficult situation indeed.

Yet, working closely with Japan and South Korea, and with important support from China, we have negotiated a breakthrough agreement that averts the threat of nuclear proliferation and potential conflict. Diplomacy has been the key, but I believe that diplomacy was only successful because of our security commitments and our military presence in East Asia. Building on the unprecedented and very timely efforts of former President Carter, we have achieved what I believe is an historic agreement that will help protect and promote not only regional stability but also the international non-proliferation regime.

We are now in the implementation stage of the North Korea agreement, and the success of this phase also will require us to continue to work together closely.

#### ● Japan's Expanding Role

I think that cooperation between our two countries, working with other states and international organizations such as the U.N., will be increasingly important in solving other regional and global problems.

In this interdependent world, we must also look at expanded multilateral cooperation. The unique security challenges in Northeast Asia, a region where great powers have clashed in the past, provide a rationale for a separate forum to promote peace and stability in Northeast Asia. In this regard, I believe that the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is an important step. With the ARF, the nations of the region for the first time have a multilateral forum in which to discuss ways to enhance regional security. We fully support this dialogue, and we believe that over the longer term the ARF will contribute significantly to East Asian security as a supplement to, but not a substitute for, our bilateral security commitments.

Similarly, as you know, we very much support Japan's effort to gain a seat on the U.N. Security Council and we support this unconditionally. We do not believe that a permanent seat for Japan is dependent upon her ability to participate in all aspects of U.N. peacekeeping operations. That is an issue for Japan to decide.

That said, my government welcomes Japan's engagement in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. Japan has made an important contribution to PKO operations in Cambodia, Mozambique and now to humanitarian relief in Zaire. We hope that the Japanese government will build on the momentum achieved from these successful deployments to join other PKO activities in the future. A more prominent role for Japan in the U.N. would demonstrate that Japan is shouldering responsibilities commensurate to her international stature.

● **Need for Continued U.S. Engagement**

While I expect that the burden for protecting the security of the region will be more widely shared in the coming years, I do not see this as a substitute for American leadership or a forward-based U.S. military presence.

I am convinced that for the foreseeable future, only a continuing American military presence, centered on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and supplemented by our other bilateral alliances, will be able to maintain regional stability.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, and now the recent agreement with North Korea, suggest that the "threat" in East Asia is clearly receding. But many uncertainties remain. Let me go over just a few:

— we are facing the prospect of a number of potentially destabilizing political transitions throughout the region, but most importantly in China and North Korea;

— on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea's recent agreement to freeze and then dismantle its worrisome nuclear facilities is extremely welcome news, and a very positive step bringing us closer to real stability on the Korean Peninsula. But we are not there yet and stability will not be in sight until the agreement is fully implemented, and North and South Korea resolve a number of other outstanding issues. North Korean troops still remain firmly entrenched along the DMZ;

— The region also must contend with a host of unresolved territorial disputes including

the six-way dispute over the Spratleys and concerns about a regional arms race.

These are just a few of the uncertainties facing the region in the post-Cold War era. As Asian-Pacific powers, we all have a stake in their successful resolution. But America's strategic engagement in the region, in particular, remains vital if we are to solve these problems.

The U.S. Defense department will shortly be issuing a report on U.S. security strategy in East Asia that will reconfirm our commitments and underline our intention to maintain current force levels in the region. Our active engagement will still be essential not only to meet our existing security commitments but also to mobilize ad hoc international coalitions on security and other issues as we did in the Gulf War.

The American people understand that in order for America to play a constructive role in ensuring the stability of East Asia as we move into the next century, we must remain fully engaged in the region — economically, politically, and strategically. History has shown that without such engagement, we risk our own peace and prosperity.

I believe that all nations of East Asia welcome our strategic engagement and see it as a force for peace and stability. My country fully intends to continue to fulfill this role which both protects American interests and benefits Japan and the region as a whole. We will do so by continuing to work closely with our allies, particularly Japan, to uphold and strengthen the existing security framework in East Asia that has been so successful and to look for opportunities to build on this framework.

Our approach will be one of understanding, respect, and partnership. We must listen as well as speak. Above all, we must recognize and honor the growing self-confidence and understandable pride of the nations of the region. Only by following this course will we be able to build a lasting framework for peace and stability in East Asia.

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