

VIETNAM AND MIDDLE EAST

92 CONGRESS FIRST SESSION
1971

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S. 376—VIETNAM DISENGAGEMENT ACT OF 1971

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, the 91st Congress ended at a moment of deceptive apathy about the war in Indochina.

Many of us in the Senate felt this sense of indifference. In some ways, we even welcomed it. We were numbed by the frustrating debates.

And, in fact, there seemed to be a breathing space.

The Church-Cooper amendment was supposed to put clear limits, by law, on more U.S. involvement in Indochina. The Secretary of State assured us there was no real difference on that score between the Senate and the administration. Of course, we were told, there would be no wider war.

But as this new Congress begins, our "advisers" are seen again in Cambodia, and our bombers and helicopters are all over Indochina. As I wrote the President recently, there are reports that our CIA and military are instigating and supplying a new invasion of southern Laos by Thai battalions. These reports have since been substantiated by sources in Laos.

I also came back to the new session to find on my desk this letter from Minnesota. The signature is withheld to protect the privacy of the family:

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: I write to you my plea, not only because as the years have gone by more people believe, admire, and appreciate the stand Senator McCarthy took against the war, but because I feel you too would have the great courage to step forth.

We have just buried my son, who never had the chance to hold his baby daughter in his arms. He was killed in combat December 23, 1970 in Vietnam—Mike went not believing in the cause but only because he felt he was no better than anyone else who was forced to go.

I know now that we, their very own family and friends, not some government, are forcing them to go. From the outpouring of sympathy from our relatives, friends, and total strangers, I realize the people want an immediate withdrawal so no more will die in vain. I'm sure the outcry of the people coupled with giving the boys an opportunity to serve their country only in a truly peaceful effort here in these United States so all its people will gain the principles for which our Flag stands. If ever our dear Flag is being desecrated it is in Vietnam.

Therefore my plea—please lead the people in this truly great country in a cry for

immediate withdrawal so no more sons, brothers, and fathers will die in vain.

The columnists and pollsters tell us the war is no longer a major issue.

It is an issue for this mother, and the thousands like her all over America.

It is going to be a major issue for this Congress until every American soldier is out of Indochina.

I am not talking about Nixon's war or Johnson's war. This war belongs at the doorstep of every public official—including myself—who stood by and let it happen.

We quibbled. We gave the benefit of the doubt. We were never more wrong.

We are in danger of doing it all over.

The North Vietnamese, the Vietcong, the Pathet Lao, the Thai, the Cambodians—everybody knows what we are doing in Indochina except the American people, who are paying for it all with their men and their money.

That is why I asked the President about reports of U.S.-supported Thai troops in Laos. That is why the administration must be pressed at every turn to define the vague formulas, to say what they mean on these life-and-death issues.

When the President stood before the Congress and the country to tell us the state of the Union, he had an obligation to tell us the truth about the state of this war.

We paid nearly 50,000 lives and billions of dollars for that kind of straight talk from our President.

But whatever the evasion, the false optimism, or the sophistry, the Congress has an obligation to draw the line once and for all on the killing and dying.

Then, and only then, can any public official really answer the plea of these mothers—"so no more sons, brothers, and fathers will die in vain."

I am proud, Mr. President, to join in cosponsoring the Vietnam Disengagement Act of 1971, which would bring the orderly withdrawal of our forces by the end of this year.

The need for this act is as overwhelming today as it was last year when it was known as the end-the-war amendment. Of the many questions that test this Congress, none will weigh more heavily on our place in history.

We saw our Nation sink into the Vietnam tragedy before, and failed to stop it. We cannot let that happen again.

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REVENUE SHARING

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, the concept of revenue sharing is older than our Constitution. The Basic Land Ordinance of 1785 provided that one 640-acre plot in each township was to be set aside for the maintenance of public schools.

In 1836, the Surplus Distribution Act made provision for the distribution of a \$37 million Federal surplus to the States, in four installments. The State of Maine, with typical Yankee frugality, made a per capita distribution to its citizens of the Federal funds. The fourth installment, however, was canceled because of a financial crisis.

More recently, we have witnessed the proliferation of categorical grants in aid. Grant in aid programs, with direction and ultimate control remaining with the Federal Government, increased from 18 in 1932 to over 500 in 1970, involving \$24 billion. The maze of these programs is so perplexing that the Senator from Delaware (Mr. ROTH) has had a fine bill to create a catalog of Federal assistance programs where they can at least be found in one list.

Fundamental to our governmental structure is the premise that many problems can be most appropriately solved at the State and local level. Housing programs and standards designed for Brooklyn, N.Y., may not be responsive to the housing requirements of a small town in Ohio.

The States and local communities should be responsive and creative laboratories for the solution of their own problems. But they have not had the financial capacity to undertake meaningful solutions.

To make matters worse, the demand for State and local services has shown a disproportionate increase. From 1960 to 1969 civilian employment of the Federal Government increased 22.8 percent. But during that same period, the number of local government employees increased 46.1 percent and the number of State employees increased 73.2 percent. In 1969, we had 2,975,000 Federal employees and 9,716,000 State and local employees, but many of the latter were in federally mandated, directed, and structured programs.

In his message to Congress on February 4, 1971, President Nixon pointed out that:

In the last quarter century, State and local expenses have increased twelvefold from a mere \$11 billion in 1946 to an estimated \$132 billion in 1970. In that same time, our gross national product, our personal spending, and spending by the Federal Government have not climbed even one-third that rate.

In addition to their economic difficulties, localities have a growing sense that they do not have control over their own development. Regional planning organizations curb local autonomy and the grant in aid programs restrict local creativity. There is a sense that all of our communities are being stamped out by a giant Federal cookie cutter.

We cannot expect creative leadership if State and local governments do not have both responsibility and financial capability.

As a former member of the Ohio House of Representatives and the Republican floor leader for 2 years, I became directly involved with the problems of State finance. For that reason I was happy, in 1965, to accept the invitation of the Republican National Chairman, Ray Bliss, to head a Republican task force on the functions of Federal, State, and local governments. We conducted studies of State and local government finance for over 3 years and made a comprehensive recommendation for Federal revenue sharing.

During the last Congress, I sponsored H.R. 9973 and cosponsored H.R. 13982, which were revenue-sharing proposals. Unfortunately neither measure was acted upon by Congress.

I am gratified that President Nixon has made revenue sharing one of his top priority items for the 92d Congress. I have joined as a cosponsor of this measure. In doing so, I am not unmindful of various alternative proposals which are worthy of full consideration. These include a proposal for Federal tax credits for State income taxes paid, and proposals to federalize all welfare programs, thereby relieving States of their share of this massive financial burden.

The resident's revenue sharing proposal is in two parts. The first part, which I have cosponsored, will provide \$5 billion of new money for State and local governments. This will be unrestricted money, to be used as State and local governments may deem most appropriate for their particular needs. It will be their choice of priorities, not ours in Washington. Under the proposed formula, approximately 48 percent will be distributed to local governments. However, the bill contains an incentive provision whereby any State may adopt an alternative formula for intrastate distribution. A State adopting such an alternative plan will receive an incentive increment from the Federal Government. I believe that as we consider this measure, we should provide a minimum total pass through formula, whereby local government is assured of its share under any alternate intrastate allocation plan adopted by the State government.

The second part of the revenue-sharing proposal will convert one-third of the existing narrow-purpose aid programs into grants for six broad purposes: urban development, rural development, education, transportation, job training, and law enforcement. This program will involve \$11 billion, including \$1 billion of new money. By broadening the areas of categorical grants, States and local governments will for the first time have the flexibility to tailor their programs to their problems, instead of fitting programs around specific Federal grants limitations and earmarking. In far too many instances, communities have not been able to avail themselves of Federal dollars for the reason that the available grants are not appropriate to their specific problems. By broadening the grant areas, we invite local governments and States to be more creative in designing programs that will solve problems. No longer will there be pressure to accept an unsuitable program for fear that the

Federal dollars will not otherwise come into the community.

While I cosponsor this measure, I will keep an open mind with respect to improvements which we may care to make in the formula for allocation of dollars among States and the formula for direct distribution to local governments. In addition, I shall consider appropriate changes to include autonomous local governmental units, such as school districts in Ohio.

But while we may wish to reflect longer upon the specific formulae in this bill, its basic philosophy is sound. A recent Gallup poll indicates that 77 percent of the American people support the concept of revenue sharing. They know that if we call upon our States and local governments to assume an increasing role in solving the problems of America, it is time that we gave these governments the resources to do the job.

A NEW INVASION OF LAOS

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, we have mounted a new invasion of Laos.

The American people were the last to know. But we have come to expect that.

Again the war is wider. In the name of getting out, we are going back in as deep as ever.

It is typical of our plight that what seemed ridiculous a year ago is now the deadly serious policy of our Government.

On January 19, I warned that we had begun a new involvement in southern Laos. I asked the President about reports that we were secretly supporting several Thai battalions in attacks which were part of a steadily increasing escalation in the area since August.

I was concerned that this could lead to growing American embroilment, and would be another blow to the negotiations, not to mention the chances for a return of our prisoners.

Where does it stop?

The limited assistance to South Vietnam led to American advisers and the bombing of the North.

We know where those so-called limited commitments took us.

A "limited" invasion of Cambodia has led to Laos. If the South Vietnamese sit astride the Ho Chi Minh Trail—in treacherous terrain, perhaps encountering a major enemy force for the first time—they risk disaster. That risk is already drawing our planes into heavy new bombing.

Where will that bombing draw us—to Hanoi, to Haiphong, to the Chinese border?

Behind it all is our refusal to face the truth in South Vietnam. The million-man South Vietnamese Army is the basis of our policy—to withdraw and yet to preserve the Saigon regime at the same time.

In the end, this policy is built on sand. That is why we bomb and invade.

We have seen this logic before. If only we "hurt" the other side, if only we show ourselves manly, or ferocious, or unpredictable, the truth will somehow be postponed or go away.

Congress and the American people have to recognize what this could mean

for the future. The administration is so committed to the Thieu-Ky regime, and so doubtful of its strength, that they refuse a compromise settlement and launch a wider war.

How then can they really continue on withdraw our forces when the Saigon regime could collapse after we are gone? This policy does not "protect" our withdrawal. It will prevent it.

And if we go on and on with the slaughter, when will our prisoners of war see their families again?

The administration has taken us this far down the road because we have let them. But a senseless war tolerated in frustration or misunderstanding is no less senseless.

The Congress must vote immediately on the Vietnam Disengagement Act, to bring our men home by the end of this year. We must extend that legislation to cover all Indochina, to end the bombing, and to bring about an immediate return of our prisoners in exchange for withdrawal.

History has given us words for what we are doing in Indochina. We are making a wilderness of devastation in three countries, a wilderness of our own schools and cities and farms starved by war spending.

We are making a wilderness, and call it peace.

PRIDE IN NEW HAMPSHIRE'S NATIVE SON—ALAN SHEPARD

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I have sent the following wire to Capt. Alan B. Shepard, Jr., at the Space Center in Houston, Tex.:

Heartiest congratulations on a magnificent job well done. I know all Granite Staters join together at this time in their pride in New Hampshire's native son. We are all standing a little taller today.

It is a long way from Derry, N.H., to the Fra Maurs highlands of the moon, but Alan Shepard has made this trip with enormous skill and great dedication.

It has been a hard road beset by many many obstacles. I well remember the time only a few years ago when physical problems seemed to have ended his chance to reach the moon. In the popular parlance: "His chances hardly seemed worth a nickel." But Alan Shepard was never one to let a tough road hold him back. With great perseverance he stands today as the successful leader of our most productive trip to the moon.

I guess none of us can truly comprehend what personal dedication and ability one must have to play the leading role in a moon flight. Years of the most rigorous physical and mental training must go into every flight. A whole new complex of the most involved science must be learned to be called upon when needed to achieve the greatest possible results from such an undertaking.

In reading the millions of words written on the Apollo 14 flight, I have been struck with the many times the reporters have used "flawless," "magnificent," "precise," "looking good," and many other glowing descriptions of the flight. I do not for one moment detract from the great contributions by Alan Shep-

ard's crew, Comdr. Edgar D. Mitchell and Maj. Stuart A. Roosa. Nor do I fail, in any way, to realize that without the thousands of dedicated and tireless effort of the ground crews this flight would not have been possible in the first place or achieved its successful conclusion.

But I will have to be pardoned if I give my major praise to Alan Shepard. He captained the flight that brought back the largest and most significant collection of lunar samples. These are going to add immeasurably to our knowledge of our universe. Apollo 14 set up on the moon much more elaborate experiments than any of us believed possible.

And as one who enjoys the chance for an occasional round of golf, I was most pleased by his moment of relaxation when he used the six iron for some shots into the lunar darkness. There was a real twinge of envy when he recorded his one shot as going "miles and miles and miles." If we could just do the same here on earth.

The New York Times, in reporting the "on-the-nose" splashdown this morning, quotes George M. Low, NASA Administrator, as saying:

On that first Mercury flight in 1961, Alan Shepard tested man's reaction to the space environment. On Apollo 14, just 10 years later, Alan Shepard and his crew demonstrated that man belongs in space—that man can achieve objectives well beyond the capabilities of any machine that has yet been devised.

Alan Shepard is no machine. He is a very real person. As a Senator from his native State, I am proud to pay due recognition to what he has done for his Nation. He deserves the pride all New Hampshire has for him.

LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, February 16 marks the 53d anniversary of Lithuanian independence. On that day we will pay tribute to a people whose fight for freedom and liberty has often been difficult, but never has faltered. I welcome this opportunity to join with Senators in saluting the Lithuanian people in their quest for independence from Soviet rule. There are more than 1 million people of Lithuanian descent in America today.

February 16 is the anniversary of Lithuania's first liberation from Russian oppression, in 1918. It is touched with sadness only because the Baltic States are no longer free. The United States has consistently refused to recognize the illegal incorporation of Lithuania and her sister states into the Soviet Union. Let us hope that the self-determination of these people will soon again be realized. Let us reaffirm our support for their struggle and undying efforts to be free.

CONSUMER'S STAKE IN U.S. AIR TRANSPORT INDUSTRY

Mr. PEARSON. Mr. President, yesterday the Senate Aviation Subcommittee heard important testimony from several witnesses who represented the point of view of the flying public.

One witness, Mr. Shelby Southard of the Cooperative League of the U.S.A.,

submitted a particularly thoughtful statement, in my judgment, one which I was not able to hear in person but have since considered in some detail. The general thrust of his statement is that the American consumer has an important stake in the U.S. air transport industry, a stake which is sometimes overlooked in the boardrooms of our Nation's airlines.

Accordingly, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Southard's statement be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE OF AVIATION OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SUBMITTED FOR THE COOPERATIVE LEAGUE OF THE U.S.A., FEBRUARY 8, 1971

First of all, Mr. Chairman, may I thank the Subcommittee for giving me the opportunity to testify at these hearings as a representative of the Cooperative League of the U.S.A. and of the consumer movement where our League seeks to play a constructive role. The American consumer has an important stake in the U.S. air transport industry, and it goes beyond the reliability of domestic services.

During the past decade, the introduction of the low-cost charter has brought overseas vacations by air within reach of millions of Americans who had never flown before. Demand for overseas charters, both for educational and recreational purposes has grown rapidly, and chartering is now a major feature of many of our cooperatives as well as other organizations. For example, the Greenbelt Consumer Service, a cooperative here on the East Coast, and the Berkeley Cooperative in California utilize charters to provide low-cost overseas vacations for thousands of their members each year.

The importance of chartering is demonstrated by the fact that cooperatives and trade unions have banded together to form their own organization—the American Travel Association. ATA's purpose is to promote purposeful low-cost international travel for large numbers who would not otherwise be able to enjoy it.

Let me emphasize that I am not an expert on air transportation. My purpose today is to present to your subcommittee a consumer's-eyeview of Senate Bill 239, which would amend the Federal Aviation Act, among other things, to simplify the regulations governing group air transportation, and to strengthen the U.S. Government's ability to protect the rights of American citizens who travel abroad on low-cost charter flights. The Cooperative League of the U.S.A. is happy to support this legislation, not only for its potentially beneficial effects on the air transport industry, but also because we believe it will increase the availability of low-cost air travel to the American consumer.

In recent years we have seen more and more important pieces of consumer legislation pass through both Houses of Congress and across the desk of the President. And we have witnessed in them an ever-widening area of consumer protection provided through Federal law and legislative oversight. Gone is the old view of consumer interest as merely a matter of honest food labeling or accurate weights and measures. It has been replaced by a much broader concern for the individual in a fast-changing environment. This is as it should be.

We are most gratified, therefore, to see that this bill follows that pattern by recognizing the basic right of consumers to band together for the purpose of increasing the purchasing power of their combined resources. This, of course, is the basic premise

why he changed his substitute from his amendment of yesterday?

Mr. CHILES. I do not yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, a point of order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Florida does not yield.

Mr. CHILES. I think Senators know whether they can look people in the face and say, "We really want to get our prisoners out. We really want to end this thing. We really want to see if we can end it." I think this substitute gives us the ability to do that and allows us to show that we do care about these men and we do care about ending the conflict.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WEICKER). The time of the Senator from Florida has expired. All time having expired, the Chair will advise those in the gallery to refrain from demonstrations, that neither expressions of approval nor disapproval are permitted.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Florida. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. SPONG (when his name was called). Mr. President, on this vote I have a pair with the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT). If he were present and voting, he would vote "yea." If I were at liberty to vote, I would vote "nay." Therefore, I withhold my vote.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I announce that the Senator from Arkansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) is absent on official business.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness and, if present and voting, would vote "nay."

The Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) is detained on official business, and, if present and voting, would vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 44, nays 52, as follows:

[No. 96 Leg.]

YEAS—44

Anderson	Humphrey	Nelson
Bayh	Inouye	Packwood
Brooke	Javits	Pastore
Burdick	Jordan, N.C.	Pell
Case	Kennedy	Percy
Chiles	Magnuson	Proxmire
Church	Mansfield	Ribicoff
Cranston	Mathias	Schweiker
Eagleton	McGovern	Stevens
Gravel	McIntyre	Stevenson
Harris	Metcalf	Symington
Hart	Mondale	Tunney
Hartke	Montoya	Williams
Hatfield	Moss	Young
Hughes	Muskie	

NAYS—52

Alken	Curtis	McClellan
Aiken	Dole	McGee
Allott	Dominick	Miller
Baker	Eastland	Pearson
Beall	Ellender	Prouty
Bellmon	Ervin	Randolph
Bennett	Fannin	Roth
Bentsen	Fong	Saxbe
Bible	Gambrell	Scott
Boggs	Goldwater	Smith
Brock	Griffin	Sparkman
Buckley	Gurney	Stennis
Byrd, Va.	Hansen	Talmadge
Byrd, W. Va.	Hollings	Thurmond
Cannon	Hruska	Tower
Cook	Jackson	Weicker
Cooper	Jordan, Idaho	
Don	Long	

PRESENT AND GIVING A LIVE PAIR, AS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED—1

Spong, against.

NOT VOTING—3

Fulbright Mundt Taft

So Mr. CHILES' amendment was rejected.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR BYRD OF WEST VIRGINIA

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. Mr. President, we are about to vote on amendment No. 143, offered by Mr. McGovern, Mr. Hatfield, and other distinguished Senators. The amendment is often referred to as the "end the war amendment," which is indeed a misnomer. No amendment is going to end the war in Vietnam. The sincere purpose of the authors of the amendment, however, is to end America's participation in that war. While I have a great respect for the authors of the amendment, it is my judgment that the amendment, if adopted, would not end America's participation in the war. Pragmatically speaking, the amendment, if adopted, would probably be voted down in the other body, and it would undoubtedly meet with a Presidential veto even if the House of Representatives were to accept the amendment, in which case it would not be possible to get a two-thirds majority of both Houses to override the veto. So, I think it is unrealistic to believe that America's participation in the war would come to an end if this amendment were agreed to here in the Senate.

I am opposed to the amendment, and I now state my opposition thereto, not from the standpoint of my position in the leadership, but rather from the standpoint of my responsibility as a Senator from the State of West Virginia, and because I owe my constituents an explanation of my vote.

I have not had a great deal of mail on this subject, but it is only fair to state that the majority of the letters which have reached my office from West Virginia reflect support for the amendment. I respect the viewpoints of my constituents who have so written but, even though the majority of the letters reaching me have urged that I vote for the amendment, my convictions lead me to oppose it. And I want to say here and now that there is no political gain whatsoever to be derived from a vote against this amendment. I feel that it is my responsibility always to weigh the opinions and viewpoints of my constituents, but I also feel that it is my responsibility as a United States Senator, after weighing the viewpoints of my people and after weighing the facts on a given question, to vote for what I think is best for my country in the long run.

With respect to the McGovern-Hatfield amendment, I wish we had never become involved in the war in Vietnam. But we became deeply involved. I do want to see our men brought home from the war as soon as possible, and I hope that the President has in mind a tentative date for the total withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. I have in the past urged him to accelerate the withdrawal, if possible. I have also expressed to him privately my hope that he did have a date in mind for total withdrawal

but that he not publicly announce such a date. So, I do hope that the President has a withdrawal date in mind, and, if this should be the case, I think he should not publicly announce such a date until at such time as, in his judgment, based upon all of the facts, it would be beneficial to do so.

Having said this, I am strongly opposed, at this particular time at least, to the setting of a withdrawal date by legislative action. To do so would inform the enemy as to the date for final withdrawal, thus allowing the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong to sit back and prepare for that date, and then launch an all-out attack on South Vietnam. Moreover, the enemy, once it knew our timetable for withdrawal, could prepare to attack our own remaining forces at a time most advantageous to the enemy. Additionally, the President's negotiating power at the Paris talks and elsewhere would be greatly dissipated by such a publicly announced withdrawal date. So, I see no benefit whatsoever to be gained by telegraphing such a withdrawal date to the enemy, and I do see many possible pitfalls for ourselves if this should be done.

Whether or not our country should have gotten involved so deeply in the war is a matter which can only be debated now, and the future historian will write the verdict most objectively. The fact remains, however, that we are involved in the war, and the President is doing everything possible to bring about a gradual and orderly withdrawal of American forces—a withdrawal which has been accelerated beyond his previously announced schedule of withdrawal.

The President promised to get us out of the war, and he is keeping his promise thus far. As Commander in Chief, he has the primary responsibility for the conduct of the war, and he has the primary responsibility with respect to negotiations to bring about the release of American prisoners and to end our participation in the combat.

I do not think that the Congress should now attempt to take over a responsibility which belongs to the Commander in Chief. I think the responsibility should remain where it ought to be, and now is—squarely on the shoulders of the Commander in Chief. I believe that any action on the part of Congress at this time to set a withdrawal date, would undercut the President in his efforts to negotiate, and it would also interfere with his schedule of withdrawal—a schedule which is calculated to best protect our forces during the process of that withdrawal and which is also calculated to give the South Vietnamese at least a fighting chance for survival against Communist subversion and aggression. If our objective of thwarting Communist aggression in South Vietnam was valid in the beginning, then I feel that the President's efforts to schedule a gradual and orderly withdrawal in such a way as to give the South Vietnamese a chance of survival in these few remaining months are also valid.

A military withdrawal, I am advised, is one of the most difficult of all military maneuvers. The logistics of withdrawal

constitute a difficult problem. I understand that the withdrawal schedule which the President is implementing is one which takes into account the logistical problems involved, and I do not believe that a December 31, 1971, date, as set forth in the amendment, is a feasible one.

Mr. President, our fighting men did not ask to go to Vietnam. I want to see them brought home. But as long as they are in Vietnam, I will not vote to cut off the funds with which to support them. I think the best plan is to support the Commander in Chief, whether he be a Democrat or a Republican, in his efforts to successfully complete the withdrawal of American forces from participation in the Vietnam conflict. For these reasons, I shall vote against the McGovern-Hatfield amendment.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, this afternoon the Senate has a new chance to vote to end the war in Indochina. I hope that every Senator will embrace the opportunity to examine the nature and scope of American involvement in the war—a war that to many of us has become an interminable procession of American and Asian deaths in a cause unworthy of the most powerful and compassionate Nation in the world.

The inequity, inconsistency, and inhumanity of our policy in Indochina has become intolerable.

At the founding of our Nation, when we declared our independence from the tyranny of Great Britain, we wrote a Declaration of Independence asserting the truth that all men are endowed with certain inalienable rights, including the most basic right of all, the right to life. Yet, for years on end, we have indiscriminately bombed the life out of hundreds of thousands of innocent people in Vietnam.

We wring our hands over the plight of the prisoners. We deplore the brutal treatment they receive at the hands of the North Vietnamese. We share the anguish and suffering of their families here at home. Yet, we refuse to take the single obvious step that could bring them freedom. We refuse to set a date to end the war. If one thing at least is clear about the horror and confusion of the war, it is that the way to free the prisoners is to end the war—not, by some inverted logic, to insist that we can get them out by refusing to end the war.

And, finally, we argue that if only we stay a little longer in Vietnam, if only we keep the withdrawals to a modest rate, we will give South Vietnam one more chance to survive. Yet, that is the argument we have heard time and again for the entire decade of our involvement in Vietnam.

That argument was long ago unmasked for what it is—an argument based not on the survival of South Vietnam or on the best interests of the people of that embattled nation, but on the survival of President Thieu and his Government in Saigon. The recent passage of a law in South Vietnam that virtually eliminates all opposition to President Thieu in this fall's election campaign is fresh evidence, if we needed any, that the

interests of President Thieu do not coincide with the best interests of the people of his country. Yet, the Government of the United States stands silent, while once again the people of South Vietnam are denied the right to free elections and self-determination, the right for which 45,000 American soldiers have died.

Surely, if there were any political and philosophical fallacy that should have been laid to rest by now, it is the domino fallacy, the idea that somehow South Vietnam is vital to the national interest of the United States. I believe instead, and I have believed for many years, that the true path of national interest for the United States in Asia lies in rapid and complete withdrawal from Vietnam, not in our present policy of creeping withdrawal and continued war.

We want peace, and we see only war. We want an end to the killing, and we see only senseless slaughter. We want a date to end the war, and the only date we see is election day 1972.

And while we wait, we know that until we end the war, we cannot end the killing. Tens of American lives a week, hundreds of American lives a month, thousands of American lives a year.

And that is only a small portion of the heavy price of death the war is wreaking in Vietnam. We measure American dead by the thousands each year, but we measure Vietnamese dead by the tens and hundreds of thousands.

How much longer must we endure this senseless killing and destruction? How much longer must we wait before we end the war and find the peace?

Perhaps the most appalling aspect of the disclosures in the New York Times this week—more appalling even than the deceptions now laid out in black and white—is the terrible shock of renewed realization that we are still fighting the war those documents describe. Today, in 1971, years after those Vietnam memorandum were written, years after those policy papers were discussed, and years after those position options were prepared, we are still at war in Asia. Many of the passages we read are as current today as the day they were written. All we have to do is change the dates.

And we know that today the same sort of memorandum are being written, the same sort of policy papers are being discussed, and the same sort of position options are being prepared. Surely, if we learn any lesson from this tragic disclosure, it must be the lesson that we can no longer repeat the mistakes of the past. We must prove that America is big enough to learn from the missed opportunities and missed perceptions of the past, and reject the hypnotic fantasies of our policy in the sixties.

Let me conclude by reminding every citizen that our struggle is historic. We are not the first people to be divided by the continuation of a war unjust and immoral. The indignation in our chests, and at times the rage in our voices, while people die in our name and under our flag, has occurred before. We can gain strength to do what we have to do when we remember that in other centuries,

other Americans have tried to stop other American governments from acts unnatural to our traditions and beliefs.

As long ago as 1777, at the founding of the American Republic, Edmund Burke wrote to his constituents in Bristol, protesting the war with the Colonies and the shame it was bringing to England's noble tradition. As Burke said—But America is not subdued. Not one unattached village which was originally adverse throughout that continent has submitted from love or terror. You have the grounds, and you have no more. The cantonments of your troops and your dominions are exactly of the same extent. You devastate, but you do not enlarge the sphere of authority.

Burke went on to predict—as we could predict today, unless we act together—that even though the lesson may be obvious to all, the violence would continue. He said—

But in case the sword should do all that the sword can do, the success of arms and the defeat of policy will be one and the same thing.

That is why we are here today, 200 years later, to convince our Government that the success of arms means the defeat of policy for the United States of America in Vietnam. That is the crisis we face, and that is why we must vote to end the war.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, today I shall vote in opposition to the Hatfield-McGovern amendment. President Nixon deserves support in his efforts to bring the war to an early settlement. This amendment would not contribute to that goal.

I am not unmindful of the agony and frustration which millions of Americans have experienced with respect to the war. Many have been opposed to our involvement in Vietnam since the early sixties. Many critics of the war may say that by voting against the Hatfield-McGovern amendment that we are insensitive to the efforts to end the war. This is entirely untrue. We all hope to see a total end to the fighting in Southeast Asia before the end of this year.

My reasons for voting in opposition to the Hatfield-McGovern amendment are that the adoption of that amendment will be likely to, first, make negotiation more difficult because the other side would know when we will leave; second, could simply end American involvement in the war without ending the war itself; third, would not assure the identification and release of all of our prisoners of war; and fourth, is not directed toward making the South Vietnamese Government more representative and politically viable.

This war has been a difficult and controversial chapter in American history. We all seek its rapid conclusion. In my judgment, however, we must work earnestly for a negotiated settlement which is the only avenue toward a lasting peace in Southeast Asia. No easy formula is available. Restriction on the President's negotiating latitude seems more likely to prolong the war than to end it.

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, today we have, once again, a chance to put a stop to the war in Indochina.

The debate has been going on now for 7 years. It has all been said. There should be no more need to say what this war has done to the peoples and lands of Indochina—or what it has done to America.

The New York Times has now documented in awful detail how the last administration led us into this war. There in black and white is proof of our worst fears about the origins of this folly—the loaded options, the unquestioned assumptions and, perhaps most shocking, the enormous political deception of the Congress and the public.

These documents are damning not only for what is in them—but also for what is not.

Amid all the careful calculations about the fate of the regime in Saigon, where are the calculations of the fearful human costs of the war?

Where did this Government ask how many American lives, how many Vietnamese lives, how many billions in wasted resources, would be consumed to satisfy its policy?

Where were the thoughts of what the war would do to American society—how it would ravage our cities and farms, and our spirits, as brutally as any bombardment.

This record can only leave, as David Broder wrote so powerfully in the Washington Post, “a sickening feeling of deception and betrayal.”

And most of us who had public responsibility during that period bear a part of the shame.

Yet we must also wonder how far the present administration has escaped the blind mistake of the last. If we could see the records of the decisions to invade Cambodia and Laos, or of the dealings with the present regime in South Vietnam, how different would they really be?

Nearly 15,000 Americans have died in Indochina, and over 50,000 have been wounded, since this administration took office promising to end the war.

Is this administration unstained by pride and delusion, by false assumptions and political manipulation, by dishonesty with the American people?

The record of 7 years begs so many questions.

How many more men must be killed, how many more billions will be wasted?

With the overwhelming majority of our constituents wanting us to end this war once and for all, how much longer will the Congress go on appropriating the money to perpetuate the tragedy?

And if we do not stop the war now, how much does representative government mean in this country?

That is why this vote is so much more than a trial of policy.

It is a test of this institution and of its pretense to legislate in response to the will of the people.

Most of all, it is a test of our ability as a nation to cleanse ourselves of incredible error and dishonor.

I pray we will not fail that test any longer.

Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, we are debating today a measure of great importance and are going to shortly be putting the Senate on record as to

whether or not we support the President's conduct of ending the long war in Vietnam. There have been very many words said on both sides of this matter and, having participated extensively in the debate on this matter last year, I feel that there is very little new that I can add.

I feel that we must, as a body, support the President in this most difficult task of peace in Indochina. President Nixon came into office on a pledge to end the war in Vietnam and bring a lasting peace with honor to Indochina. The President has kept every pledge to the American people that he has made in this regard. He has reversed the continuing escalation of the war in that area and has brought home nearly half the American soldiers who were serving in Vietnam at the time that he took office. By December of this year, he will have brought the American strength down to just a little more than 180,000 with further reductions to be announced in November of this year. Our casualty figures are the lowest that they have been in 5 years and they are continuing to decrease. Every indication is that we are winding down the war in Indochina and that the South Vietnamese are becoming stronger and more able to exist without U.S. fighting men continuing to be with them. I believe that the best way to see a true end to the war in Vietnam is to support the President in this difficult hour and make certain that his policies of disengagement are a success.

Mr. President, I am also concerned with the assertion of some who support the pending amendment that by setting a date for U.S. withdrawal in Vietnam, our prisoners of war will soon be released. They give no support to this theory but as former Secretary of Defense Clifford said, he had “reason to believe” that such would be the case. If we review the history of the treatment of prisoners of war in Indochina, we can immediately ascertain that nothing could be further from the bounds of reasonable expectations. In 1954, the French Government signed a peace treaty with the Government of North Vietnam. Part of this treaty was an article calling for the release of all French prisoners within 30 days of the signing of the 1954 Geneva Accord. In spite of this agreement, the North Vietnamese did not respond to French efforts to achieve the release of their prisoners until November of 1962, some 8 years after the original accord. This reinforces my belief that you cannot trust the word of the North Vietnamese, even when the agreement is in the form of a treaty. I cannot imagine how we can abandon the fate of the thousands of Americans who are in North Vietnamese hands simply because some have a “reason to believe” that they will be released if we set a date for withdrawal in Vietnam. I for one will not abandon these Americans. I support the position that we must not set a date for withdrawal until all our prisoners of war are released. To do less could well mean many more years, if not a lifetime, of imprisonment and possible torture by the North Vietnamese enemy.

I believe it is, therefore, essential that

we defeat this McGovern-Hatfield amendment if we are to maintain a hope for a true, negotiated settlement in Vietnam and if we are to achieve a quick release of our prisoners of war in Vietnam. I shall therefore vote against this amendment and urge my colleague to do likewise.

Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. President, similar to the saying, “it takes two to tango,” for the United States it takes two to make war and it takes two to end war. The power of declaring war is vested with the Congress and its execution is vested with the President. Any treaty to end the war made by the President must be ratified by the Senate and any legislation by the Congress ending the war must be executed by the President. It is a conjunctive duty and responsibility. The two must work together and I believe in the case of the McGovern-Hatfield amendment that there is constitutional authority for the Congress to act. But I do not believe as a practical matter that the Congress can legislate the end of the war. The McGovern-Hatfield amendment is completely unworkable and only adds to the chaos and confusion. Let us assume that this proposal were the law of the land. In subsection A, moneys to prosecute the war in Indochina are cut off as of December 31, 1971, but in paragraph B, the Congress reconfirms the President's authority to protect South Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians. The least we have learned after 10 years at war is that South Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians can only be protected with force. So what we cut off in paragraph A is put back on in paragraph B.

We all know what the Congress wants. But what it wants is impractical to obtain through legislation. We all refuse to admit it and inwardly take some satisfaction in cleansing our consciences that in our hearts we have demonstrated that we are against the war. Demonstrate, yes, but legislate, no. If I were President I would set a target date—publicly—for prisoner release and troop withdrawal. I would publicly come clean with the American people. I would tell once and for all the truth about the war in Vietnam. I would tell of the danger involved by prompt withdrawal and I would accept responsibility for that danger. I would tell what I knew of the Thieu-Ky government. The fact that after 10 years of the most costly sacrifice, President Thieu with his political cronies could come and pose the dilemma of him being the only candidate on the ballot is unthinkable. This is what is presently posed. I would tell the truth about Cambodia and what my commitment really was there. I would stop trying to run a secret war with executive privilege in Laos and would tell the truth there. I would not try to separate the war in northern Laos from the war in southern Laos. I would not describe as successful raids made to free prisoners in places where prisoners did not exist. I would stop bringing injunctions against the news media for printing the history of this war. No single thing could put us more assuredly back together as a peo-

ple than coming clean on the war in Vietnam.

And the Congress must come clean, too. No one wants to abandon the prisoners. But when you fix a firm date to end the war by cutting off all funds thereafter, then there is no reason for enemy to negotiate prisoner release for an ending to the war. You cannot instruct the President to negotiate and at the same time destroy his ability to negotiate. The best brains have tried and failed and only have to look at the amendment. All the best brains of the Senate, all the Harvard lawyers, all the whiz kids on the Senate staffs, all the legal writers of the news media, all the legal scholars of law schools, aides to Supreme Court Justices, and all together, what have they come up with? Paragraph 1 of the amendment says "no more money" and paragraph 2 says:

Well yes, money can be spent for troop withdrawals and for arranging protection for South Vietnamese, Laotians and Cambodians who might be endangered by our leaving.

Now, that is a result of all of the dedication and determination of those who genuinely feel that the war should end and that the Senate is a proper forum to bring about that end. I feel just this way. I voted for the Cooper-Church amendment to get us out of Cambodia. I voted for the Mansfield amendment to get us out of Europe. I voted for the Senate Policy Committee resolution earlier this year that in the 92d Congress we should work to end the involvement in Indochina and bring about the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and the release of all U.S. prisoners in a time certain. But under the present circumstances I believe the President should be given one more chance to expedite the return of the prisoners and troop withdrawal.

If we ever reach a point where we believe he should not be given another chance, then the Congress should come clean and say so and not take and give at the same time.

Mr. JORDAN of Idaho. Mr. President, the Vietnam war is taking a terrible toll of our young men, not only by death and disabling injuries but by drug addiction as well.

The American people are weary to the bone and fed up with this ill-conceived conflict. In addition to its cost in human resources this war has placed a strain on other resources—both financial and of the spirit. It has fractured the unity of spirit and national purpose which has made this Nation great.

I wish I could support the McGovern-Hatfield amendment, because I do believe that a date should be set for total withdrawal but I believe that the time for total withdrawal should be negotiated by the President in his role as Commander in Chief.

The President has said that he would set a time for withdrawal when it serves the best interests of the United States. He is deescalating the war steadily and with finality.

I urge the President to use every means at his disposal to negotiate a release of our prisoners and to announce a policy of

complete and total disengagement to begin concurrent with the release of our prisoners.

As a Senator of the United States I pledge my support to such a policy for total disengagement and I hope it will begin soon.

Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, the proposal now under consideration in the Senate to provide for the termination of U.S. support for military operations in or over Indochina by December 31, 1971, is not in the best interests of the United States or the interests of world peace. The proposal is not improved by additional provisions which allow for the President to provide for the safe withdrawal of American forces, and to arrange for asylum or other means of protection for South Vietnamese citizens who may be placed in danger by our withdrawal.

The amendment is defective because it threatens to throw away everything the United States has worked so hard for all these years, and is now on the verge of attaining. Moreover, at no cost to the North Vietnamese Communists, the United States would be making a unilateral gesture with no quid pro quo whatever.

For the United States to withdraw at the end of 1971, could well destroy the chance for the South Vietnamese to achieve the full capacity to provide for their own defense—a capacity which by the end of the year will be within grasp. U.S. forces are now down to 251,000—less than half of the number in the country in 1969. The South Vietnamese are now entirely self-sufficient in providing for their own naval requirements. Most of the ground combat is now handled by the South Vietnamese, as is the close air support. The United States is providing primarily logistics which the South Vietnamese are not fully capable of managing on their own. In addition, the United States is providing air interdiction of invading North Vietnamese forces which serves to enhance the prospects for early U.S. withdrawal by permitting more time for the training of South Vietnamese to take over the remaining noncombat requirements which form the overwhelming portion of the U.S. participation in South Vietnam.

The relationship of this proposal to the issue of the release of U.S. prisoners of war deserves special attention. The barbaric and inhumane treatment of prisoners of war by the North Vietnamese is well known. Not as well known, but equally important is the fact that the North Vietnamese have never seriously bargained in good faith over any element of the Vietnamese conflict. There is simply no further unilateral gesture which would appease the North Vietnamese and induce them to cooperate with the United States and the South Vietnamese, because their fundamental objective evidently continues to be to achieve dominion over all of Indochina.

It must be remembered that the North Vietnamese promised to "negotiate" if only the United States would cease its regular bombing of the North. The

United States ceased its bombing of the North, but no serious intention to negotiate was ever manifested. The North Vietnamese simply raised their demands to the level which required the United States to abandon its efforts in South Vietnam in exchange for yet another North Vietnamese promise to "negotiate" about the return of prisoners. Now it appears, according to a report in the Washington Post of June 9, 1971, that even if the United States were to set a date for total withdrawal, the North Vietnamese have advised us that the United States would have to cease all aid to South Vietnam before the U.S. prisoners could be returned.

It appears clear, on the basis of experience, that while enactment of the amendment would deal away a critically important card and restrict the President's flexibility in achieving the earliest feasible withdrawal of our men from combat in Southeast Asia and in securing the release of the prisoners of war, it will do nothing to increase Hanoi's inclination to negotiate in good faith or to relinquish her hold on the prisoners until she has secured the last possible advantage by her exploitation of their plight. To suggest otherwise would be a cruel hoax on the families of these unfortunate men and would do nothing to hasten the achievement of a stable peace.

I am convinced, on the record, that there is no man in the United States more anxious to see us safely out of the Vietnamese conflict than Richard Nixon, and no man who has worked more effectively to achieve this objective. I will not, under these circumstances, vote to impose gratuitous obstacles in his way, obstacles which can only impede his ability to complete the job in a responsible manner.

SENATOR RANDOLPH STATES HIS SUPPORT OF MORE RAPID CLOSEOUT OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM CONFLICT

Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, on May 31, 1971, Prof. Edwin C. Barbe, of the engineering faculty of West Virginia University, wrote to me from Morgantown, W. Va., on behalf of an affirmative vote for the McGovern-Hatfield amendment. In my response of June 8, I wrote, in part, including this answer to an allegation he had made that my vote would be unresponsive to the wishes of West Virginians:

I consider very carefully the viewpoints of the constituency I represent. Not only do I receive substantial numbers of communications from fellow West Virginians, I visit throughout the State frequently and engage in personal conversations with hundreds of people. I also must assess my responsibility as a legislator charged with a national obligation.

We are presently involved in an unpopular war far from our borders. It is regrettable that our Nation is in the position where it continues to invest so much in human and monetary sacrifice for other nations which claim to be defending their freedom against communist aggression. It is tragic that we became so deeply involved in Southeast Asia. And I desire, as much as any person, to end our involvement.

I have generally supported the President in his efforts to withdraw our troops from South Vietnam and to accelerate the training of the South Vietnamese to defend them-



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Senate

SENATE RESOLUTION 148—SUBMISSION OF A RESOLUTION RELATING TO PEACE TALKS CONTINGENT UPON ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

(Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.)

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, I wish to introduce a resolution for Mr. MONDALE and myself which calls on the administration to give the most urgent and serious consideration to the recent Communist proposals on withdrawal of U.S. forces and repatriation of U.S. prisoners. The Mondale-Eagleton resolution also specifies that the upcoming South Vietnamese election or other political events in South Vietnam should in no way delay or serve as a barrier to reaching an immediate agreement on these proposals.

Mr. President, the Mondale-Eagleton resolution comports with the expressed will of the U.S. Senate as indicated by the 61 votes cast for the Mansfield amendment. It expresses the deeply held belief of a majority of Senators of both parties and all political persuasions that the Government of the United States has honorably fulfilled whatever its commitment to the people of South Vietnam might have been and that the only remaining objective of the Government of the United States is to achieve the release of its prisoners of war.

This resolution will not buy time for the Thieu government in Saigon but if accepted and followed by the President could buy life for many young Americans in Vietnam or on their way there and cut the time that U.S. prisoners of war remain in prison.

On behalf of my colleague from Minnesota (Mr. MONDALE) who initiated this important resolution, I ask unanimous consent that the resolution and his remarks on it be printed in full at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the resolution and statement were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SENATE RESOLUTION 148

Whereas the overwhelming majority of the American people desire the earliest possible return of our prisoners and withdrawal of all our forces from Indochina, conditioned only upon the safety of our men;

Whereas the President has stated as a purpose of his policy in Indochina the prompt return of prisoners of war and the safe and orderly return of U.S. forces;

And whereas the President has stated his commitment that repatriation of U.S. prisoners and withdrawal of U.S. forces will not be contingent upon the imposition of a political settlement in South Vietnam;

And whereas the Senate of the United States has by a clear majority expressed its desire that all U.S. forces be withdrawn from

Indochina and that all U.S. prisoners be repatriated promptly;

And whereas the current negotiating proposals of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong delegations in Paris may permit a negotiated agreement for repatriation of prisoners and prompt and secure withdrawal of U.S. forces independent of a political settlement in South Vietnam;

Now, therefore, be it resolved, that it is the sense of the Senate that:

(1) the highest urgency of this Administration shall be to pursue promptly, with good faith, and with the full resources at its disposal the current proposals made by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong Delegations in Paris,

(2) the sole consideration in negotiating these proposals be that an agreement be reached which provides for repatriation of all U.S. prisoners simultaneously with the safe withdrawal of all U.S. forces, and

(3) under no circumstances should such agreement be contingent upon, or delayed until, the completion of South Vietnamese elections in October 1971, or any other South Vietnamese elections or political events.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR MONDALE

This Administration is coming to its moment of truth in Vietnam.

The other side has now offered to return our prisoners of war in exchange for a definite withdrawal of all U.S. forces. And most important, they have apparently dropped a central part of their earlier position—the insistence that withdrawal of forces and repatriation of prisoners be accompanied by political agreement in which the United States, in effect, overthrew the present regime in Saigon.

No one can be certain what lies behind this major change in the position of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese. Some argue that it is only a ploy to embarrass the Administration and provoke its critics. Perhaps there has been a judgment in Hanoi that the Saigon regime will collapse in any case with an ultimate departure of American forces. And there is at least the theoretical possibility that this reflects a decision on the part of the Communists to deal with the political future of South Vietnam through independent negotiations between themselves and the non-Communists in the South—assuming of course that non-Communist political forces will survive our departure. I don't know the answers to these questions about Hanoi's motivation in making this extraordinary move, any more than I know how seriously this Administration intends to respond.

But one thing is clear: this negotiating offer will lay bare—at long last—President Nixon's ultimate intentions in Southeast Asia.

If, as the President has said so often, our purpose is a secure withdrawal of U.S. forces and the prompt return of our long-suffering prisoners of war, and if the South Vietnamese are nearly as self-sufficient politically and militarily as the Administration has claimed them to be, our response in Paris should be affirmative. If it is, there is certainly a chance that both prisoners and troops can be home by Christmas.

But this offer will also expose some other "ifs" in the President's policy. If the real purpose of our policy is not to end the war but to prop up a regime in Saigon, if we are unwilling to face the truth about the strength of the Saigon regime and its million-man army, if we are still pursuing some idea of victory or humbling of the other side whatever the cost—then the Administration will let this opportunity for settlement be lost.

I do not underestimate for a moment the difficult questions to be solved in this kind of negotiated withdrawal of U.S. forces. But I think it's time to cut through the diplomatic rhetoric about "complexities" and get to the heart of the problem: The American people want our men and prisoners home from Vietnam, and they want them home now.

They do not want our men to go on being killed and maimed, to go on suffering in communist prison camps, for the sake of some generals in Saigon who cannot stand on their own feet even after the sacrifice of 50,000 American lives and over \$100 billions from the American taxpayer.

It has been suggested that the Administration will delay any settlement until the South Vietnamese Presidential elections in October. If that turns out to be true, the Americans who die and are wounded between now and then will truly have been sacrificed in vain. The record is all too clear that the present regime in Saigon is trying to prevent an authentic democratic election. The thought that we would keep our men in battle to preserve that corruption and travesty is literally sickening.

We must not mistake the momentous waive of public opinion on this subject.

This is certainly not a partisan matter. All of us who supported the last Administration's war policies bear responsibility for the terrible price of the war.

I and many other Democrats and Republicans must share the blame that our society—and this is expressed most poignantly in the bitter frustration of so many young men returning from Vietnam—is very nearly at the breaking point over the war.

But President Nixon now has a rare, perhaps fleeting opportunity to avert that break here at home and end the continuing death and destruction in Indochina.

If he does not seize the opportunity—and I pray that he does—the American people can only conclude that this Administration's policy may be more concerned with the fate of a dictator in Saigon, more concerned with some strange concept of pride, than with the future of this country.

In the final analysis, this is the President's responsibility. But the Senate also has responsibility in this vital matter—the responsibility to make its position unequivocally clear to the Administration.

Toward this end, I will introduce and seek an early vote on a sense of the Senate Resolution calling on the President to give the highest priority to the proposals submitted by the other side at Paris. This Resolution would make clear that the Senate believes that an agreement must not be prevented by any deferral or condition related to the upcoming elections in South Vietnam.

Hopefully, the Senate will take this opportunity to inform the President of its sense of urgency and seriousness in this matter.



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Senate

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, past several weeks have brought new evidence—if any were needed—of how much the war in Indochina has scarred us as a people.

There was the complex tragedy of the trial of Lieutenant Calley, more mass marchers for peace around the country, and an effort to disrupt the Government in Washington.

But I was particularly struck by another, relatively quiet event. It was the solemn procession of Vietnam veterans past the Capitol grounds to throw away their medals. These young men have come to hate this war so deeply that they disowned honors won by risking their lives for their country.

This is what we have come to.

Our losses of war are not only 50,000 lives and billions wasted. The casualties have also been trust and pride and confidence—the basic strengths that nourish America's unity.

And now, amid all the embitterment and division brought by the war, the Senate comes to debate the draft.

We are asked to decide fateful questions of citizenship and responsibility, at a time when so many citizens feel their responsibility is to end the war rather than sustain it.

We are asked to summon young men to play out some final bloody act in the tragedy, at a time when 70 percent of the American people want no more of our sons to die in Indochina.

I cannot vote that summons.

So long as this war continues to divide America and squander her resources, I will oppose an extension of the draft.

At the same time, however, I do not believe the Congress can now make a sober and fully dispassionate decision regarding alternatives to the draft, such as a volunteer army.

My vote against extension of the draft, therefore, is not an endorsement of an all-volunteer force. I have serious reservations about an all-volunteer army.

But I will give this and other alternatives the most thorough examination as the Senate continues in the months ahead to consider the future shape of military service.

In summary, my position on the issues now before the Senate is as follows:

First, I oppose extension of the draft so long as the war continues. If the administration truly wants to end this war, there will be no immediate military need for the manpower provided by extending

the draft at this point.

Second, if some extension of the draft should pass the Senate, I will support an amendment to prevent any more young men being sent to the war in Southeast Asia unless they volunteer.

Though they are only 25 percent of the total army, draftees have been 70 percent of the hard-core combat forces in Vietnam.

Draftees have been 57 percent of the total casualties in Vietnam.

The death rate among draftees in 1970 was twice the rate for nondraftees.

The burden borne by draftees in this war has been singularly cruel and unusual. It must be stopped.

Third, if the draft is extended despite opposition, I will support legislation offered by Senator KENNEDY to eliminate certain inequities in the present system. Specifically:

To establish a ceiling on draft calls and to reassert congressional authority over the draft.

To broaden the definition of conscientious objectors to conform to the Supreme Court's decision in *Welsch* against U.S., and to restore the Justice Department's role in reviewing conscientious objectors cases.

To provide new legal rights to registrants, including the right to counsel and the right to present witnesses at all selective service proceedings.

To prohibit by law the use of the draft as a punishment for protest activities.

To eliminate previous legal restrictions on judicial review of questions of law in classification proceedings.

Finally, I want to pose questions which have troubled me most about an all-volunteer army, and which have persuaded me that the eventual replacement for the present system of military service will demand far more attention than we have given it so far.

Will an all-volunteer force, as now envisioned, be an army of the poor and the black?

Testimony by the Department of Defense, and the overwhelming evidence from campuses across the country, indicates that college graduates do not want to serve in the military.

College graduates simply prefer other alternatives to a career in the Army. Yet other alternatives are not available to many noncollege educated young Americans. For example, although the unemployment rate for our overall population

stands at the intollerable level of 6.1 percent, unemployment among black youths has reached 30 percent. For white youths who are not in college, the unemployment rate is twice the national average. What kind of options are really open to these people?

If military pay is to be used as an incentive for volunteers, if even present pay is better than the income of the poor, who will volunteer for the Army? Will it not be those with the least chance for a decent life in this country?

And will that be a just sharing of the citizens responsibility for national defense?

Supporters of a volunteer army say the underprivileged will be better off in the military, receiving higher salaries and better training than they could find elsewhere. They say all Americans deserve freedom of choice.

But what is the meaning of freedom of choice to a volunteer who is part of the 30-percent unemployment figure. How much freedom of choice do we have in this country for those without an education and without a job?

If supporters of a volunteer army are serious about freedom in this case, I think they should be sure volunteers really have the option to choose between the army and another job or an education. Unless realistic alternatives to military service are available to these young men, it seems to me that they will have neither freedom nor choice.

Then there are questions regarding the political implications of an all-volunteer force.

During the Vietnam War, the presence of draftees has insured that the Army contains a civilian-oriented, skeptical prize-winning journalist who exposed My Lai to the public, wrote me about his experience with that incident.

I interviewed perhaps fifty former members of Charlie Company while researching my newspaper articles and book on My Lai, and without fail found that the only honest information about what happened that day came from draftees. I'm convinced that had most of the young men at My Lai been career soldiers, the story never would have been developed.

Col. Anthony B. Herbert, a highly decorated career Army officer echoes Mr. Hersh's findings. Speaking from his own experience in the military, Colonel Her-

bert wrote me what he thinks would happen if a voluntary army replaced the draft:

Eliminate these internal sets of checks and balances (the draft) and you will, I believe, end up with a professional career oriented group who will attack every problem in light of what is best for the Corps rather than for the country at large. The officer corps would soon become a military aristocracy. Those of us present in the Officer Corps today have witnessed a so-called professional group among us who attempt to do exactly just that in the name of loyalty to the Officer Corps and/or army, rather than to their country. It was not a professional army officer or even a professional enlisted man who brought My Lai to the attention of the U.S. public. There have been other similar incidents, maybe not on so large a scale, which have occurred throughout Vietnam. Many I have seen reported in Inspector General files, Criminal Investigative files, and news media. None by the so-called "professional types." If there had not been draftees and other non-professionals at My Lai, I say the U.S. public would still not know of it.

These facts and testimony seem to me to raise grave doubts about the potential injustices and abuses of an all-voluntary military force.

George Bernard Shaw once said:

Liberty means responsibility. That is why most men dread it.

The Senate's decision on the draft is one of those dreadful responsibilities.

I believe we have an obligation to stop the conscription of our young men to fight a senseless war. But I believe we have an equally pressing responsibility to see that we do not replace the present system with something potentially worse.

And I also believe that the citizens of America—all its citizens, rich and poor—have a responsibility to the national defense and well-being of their country.

We must not magnify the tragedy of Vietnam by letting its cruelty and injustice obscure that responsibility.

Many of those who have opposed extension of the draft have done so with enormous energy, determination and a true spirit of public service. I would hope those qualities are brought to bear in the months ahead for construction of a just and workable alternative for service to our Nation.

I ask unanimous consent that certain letters be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

APRIL 5, 1971.

Senator WALTER F. MONDALE,
Capitol.

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: My beliefs about the merits of a draft against an all-volunteer Army is an extremely personal, based on my work in connection with the My Lai expose. I interviewed perhaps fifty former members of Charlie Company while researching my

newspaper articles and book on My Lai, and without fail found that the only honest information about what happened that day came from draftees. The "lifers" and officers simply refused to tell the truth.

I'm convinced that had most of the young men at My Lai been career soldiers the story never would have been developed. I can make no general conclusions about the merits of a draft vs. an all-volunteer Army. I don't know all of the facts. But I do know the thought of having only careerists in the service leaves me with dread.

I'm not sure if this helps or not.

SEYMOUR M. HERSH.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
Fort McPherson, Ga., April 5, 1971.

HON. WALTER F. MONDALE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR MONDALE: In response to your letter dated March 30, 1971, concerning VOLAR I must preface my remarks with the fact that our Chief of Staff has already committed us to the support of replacing our present force with an all-volunteer one. As a subordinate of course I will support this concept and do my utmost to complete the mission, i.e. at present I am Reenlistment Officer Third U.S. Army which is at present in first place of all Armies in CONARC by reenlistment rate. However, I feel that loyalty to my country must over ride loyalty to a Chief of Staff or any other, single person or group. I have been asked a straightforward question. I would consider it disloyal to my country as well as lacking in moral courage to give any answer other than a straightforward one in return. With this in mind, if the answer below is not sufficient or needs clarification please feel free to call on me for further response.

The United States is not a professional militaristic nation. I mean in effect we are not directing expansion or conquest via an aggressive military policy. Our Army has been directed throughout our history as a defensive arm only.

In the defense of a free nation, a nation "of the people, by the people" all segments of that nation should participate in its defense. In a free nation's Army, if that nation is to remain a democracy an Army should reflect in almost equal portions those same percentages of all segments as are present in its overall population, Catholic, Protestant, Jew, other, white, black, yellow, red other, plus all social class levels etc., etc. Regardless of what the VOLAR Committee has written or believes just the fact that this could possibly not be the case should deter us from adopting the VOLAR concept.

As present in the U.S. Army with all segments represented, especially non-professionals in the sense of non-volunteers, or volunteers only for short periods rather than intended careerists the Army has an inherent set of checks and balances so necessary for a free nation in maintaining civil control of its armed might.

Eliminate these internal sets of checks and balances and you will, I believe, end up with a professional career oriented group who will attack every problem in the light of what is best for the Corps rather than for

the country at large. This is no figment of my mind, I assure you. The Officers Corps would soon become a military aristocracy. Those of us present in the Officers Corps today have witnessed a so called professional group among us who attempt to do exactly just that in the name of loyalty—the Officers Corps and/or Army, rather than to their country. It was not a professional army officer or even a professional enlisted man who brought My Lai to the attention of the U.S. public officials. There has been other similar type incidents, maybe not on so large a scale, which have occurred throughout Vietnam. Many I have seen reported in Inspector General files, Criminal Investigative files, and news media. None by the so called "professional types." If there had not been draftees and other non-professionals at My Lai, I say, the U.S. public would still not know of it. A careerist is very reluctant to speak out and terminate a career—which is the case even in today's Army. The Army professionals have much power which can be brought to bear internally in order to prevent those within a command from speaking out, which is why we hear about these things many times only after one of the non-professionals is out of service. Just knowing these individuals are in a command may times prevents crimes from being committed by those who fear exposure from such "left wingers," "rabble-rousers" and "hippy types."

Mr. Mondale, please feel free to use my remarks however necessary. Mr. Peterson stated that it has been difficult to obtain permission from other officers to be quoted. Just this fact alone should exemplify what I have stated concerning the "professional" in the sense I feel we would have them in an all-volunteer Army. Because my views are not single. It is the prevalent view among my military associates who I assure you are many of our finest Army officers today with tremendous records. That I chose to speak out, many feel, will result in great pressures being brought to bear upon my family and self. All I can reply is that I feel that someday a much greater pressure, the conscious, will be brought to bear upon those for what they know and yet fail to say.

Finally in order to get a little more exact idea of some of the results of professionalism I refer you to the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories (FIRL) Career Motivation Study, Junior Officer Retention, DA Pamphlet 600-20, dated August 1969, in order that you can read directly statements of many young officers on their observation of our so called "professional" segment of the Officers Corps.

I thank you for your letter and the opportunity to express this view to so distinguished a panel, with the possibility of effecting such action before it is too late.

Sincerely,

ANTHONY B. HERBERT,
Lt. Col., Infantry.

way; yet when he was victorious, as he often was, he never attempted to take the honor for his achievements. Whether Walter was working in Washington for a new high school on the reservation, or whether he was here at Cherokee seeking to establish the Boy's Club, he had in mind one steady purpose: the advancements of his people. Never did he seek tribute for himself. In fact, as Senator Ervin said upon hearing of Walter's death, "North Carolina has lost one of its finest leaders. Walter Jackson devoted all of his life to his people. He virtually ignored his own material well being—and indeed, his own health—in order to serve the Eastern Band of the Cherokee Indians. He was a true friend."

Walter loved these mountains, these valleys, and these coves, and often he spoke of them and the people they have produced. As these mountains tower in Western North Carolina so did Walter's character and his devotion to the simple people of his home place. Walter derived his strength from these mountains, and he was always mindful of the 121st Psalm, which opens with the words "I will lift up mine eyes unto the hills, from whence cometh my help."

My friends, this is the way Walter Jackson lived. I do not attempt to make him larger in death than he was in life. I simply want him to be remembered as the good and decent man he was, a man who devoted his life to the needs of his people, and who was always able to defeat the forces of hate and jealousy with forgiveness and compassion.

Those of us who admired and loved him, and who accompany him to his rest today, pray that what he was to us during his life on earth will be an abiding inspiration to those of us who remain to carry his torch.

FRANK DRYDEN—OUTSTANDING ALUMNUS OF PARIS HIGH SCHOOL

Mr. COOK, Mr. President, this past Saturday, Mr. Frank Dryden, executive vice president of the Tobacco Institute, was presented an award as the outstanding alumnus of Paris High School, Paris, Ky.

I think it most appropriate that this honor was accorded to Mr. Dryden, as most of his career as a public servant has been directed toward serving the needs of Kentucky as well as the Nation.

Upon graduation from the University of Kentucky he became a marketing specialist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture until 1953. He has also held the following positions:

Administrative assistant to former Senator Earl Clements, 1953-56;

Member of professional staff, U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, 1957, 1958, 1962, and 1964;

Deputy chief clerk, U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 1958-62;

Director, Joint Congressional Inaugural Committee for 1961 Presidential Inauguration;

Deputy Director, Office of Emergency Planning, Executive Office of the President of the United States, 1964-66;

Alternate member of President's Conference on Administrative Procedures, 1962;

Executive Vice President, Tobacco Institute, 1966 to present;

World War II, lieutenant and captain with the 111th Infantry Combat Team—bronze star, beach arrowhead, combat infantryman's badge, honorably discharged as major.

Member: Baptist Church, Kiwanis Club, Capitol Hill Burro Club—past president—former Senate Office Building Administrative Assistants, and Phi Delta Theta.

VIETNAM REVISITED

Mr. MONDALE, Mr. President, my distinguished and extraordinarily able colleague from Hawaii (Mr. INOUE) recently addressed a gathering at George Washington University on the tragic war in Vietnam.

His words capture the horror and folly of this war. More importantly, he provides a clear analysis of the lessons we must learn from this tragedy.

Senator INOUE's speech should give all of us renewed hope that America can emerge from this experience a wiser people, able to avoid any repetition of the mistakes of the past.

I ask unanimous consent that Senator INOUE's remarkable speech be printed at this time in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

VIETNAM REVISITED

I wish to speak to you this evening about the most tragic difficulty which has faced our nation this past decade and which despite the claims of some political pundits is still very much responsible for the death in our spirit—I speak of Vietnam.

Some who claim to measure the public mood have told us Vietnam is no longer an issue—but I do not agree. I do not think the people are apathetic about Vietnam—they are rather discouraged—they rather have a feeling of some impotence concerning their ability to bring significant change to American policy.

These feelings are fully shared by many of us in the Congress but I think we must continue to face up to the issue which is Vietnam and to exert our maximum effort to bring about a truly new policy.

Vietnam is and remains the crucial issue facing our nation.

I believe that but for this we would not see our Nation so torn by violence, so pummeled by bombing, and so wracked by inflation, or so polarized into opposing groups. If it were not for Vietnam our many problems of inadequate housing, and inadequate funds for education, health, pollution control, the problems of the draft, and innumerable other difficulties with which we wrestle would be immeasurably easier to resolve.

I believe, therefore, that the time is overdue that we re-examine the problem which is Vietnam despite the understandable desire of most Americans to push this unhappy subject from their minds.

I can understand the reluctance of many Americans to think about what we are doing in Vietnam and elsewhere in Indochina.

I can appreciate their reluctance to let it intrude on their thoughts. It is unpleasant to hear of massacres such as occurred at My Lai. It is unpleasant to talk of American war crimes. It is a most unpleasant task to bring criminal charges against American soldiers who, under the stress of combat, commit acts which no civilized people can tolerate or ignore.

Distasteful as it may be, Vietnam remains a problem that must be discussed and dealt with, if it is ever to end.

It would seem that the conflict raging in Southeast Asia is now entering a new and perhaps critical phase. The broader nature of this conflict becomes ever more evident.

The whole question of our continued and increased involvement in these areas which

recent events raise, directs our attention to what should be the lessons of Vietnam. I believe it would serve us well to take a good look at them.

This war has, to date, cost our nation the lives of over 45,000 of our finest young men. And the grim toll continues to mount each week. This climbing death toll is a tragedy fully appreciated only by those loved ones who bear the primary burden.

We must add to this total of dead the more than 295,000 Americans who have been wounded in battle—more than half of whom were wounded seriously enough to require hospital care. And of these numbers, many horribly scarred and mangled.

A new dimension has been added to this problem of the wounded. Because of the helicopter and the advances of medical science many more seriously wounded survive than was the case in previous wars. Men who formerly would have died on the field of battle are now living—though some exist as virtual vegetables.

Such has not always been the case. In my own situation, I remember well that day in World War II when I was wounded. It was about three o'clock in the afternoon. It was nine o'clock in the evening, six hours later, that I reached a forward aid station, and I a.m. by the time I got to a field hospital. Today, that time lag has been cut to less than an hour in most cases. The result has not only been a reduction in loss of life, but also a rapid increase in the number of permanently disabled who now flood over veterans hospitals; invalids whom we are not caring for with adequate funds, facilities, and programs.

This war has also brought forth a new breed of Americans—Americans bitter with their government—Americans without faith in our institutions or our leaders.

And our cost in this conflict is, of course, not a measure of the war's total cost. We must add the more than 125,000 South Vietnamese troops who have died to date. These still die at a 20,000 annual rate. We must also add the 4,000 dead among our other allies, who have been fighting there.

And we must add the 25,000 Vietnamese civilians who were killed last year and the more than 25,000 the year before plus the more than 100,000 civilians who were wounded each year.

This war's cost must also be measured in the number of enemy dead, which are estimated at more than 700,000, in addition to their uncounted wounded.

We must add further the awesome cost of the damage wrought on the Vietnamese countryside by the use of modern weapons of conflict. This includes the destruction of plant and animal life and the changes we have wrought in the ecology of the land—changes which will endure for many years.

The cost of warfare is fantastic. World wide military expenditures now total \$200 billion a year. These are increasing at a 7 percent annual rate with no limit in sight. This is more than three times the rate of increase in the value of our gross world product. Meanwhile education and health expenditures remain not only far less but are showing no per capita increases. Today, the nations of this earth spend an average of \$7,800 per year for each man in military uniform while spending an average of \$100 per year for education for each child of school age.

As we bear these awesome burdens of war, and witness our many other pressing, but as yet unmet needs, we must ask ourselves—why don't we stop? Why don't we bring this Vietnam war to an end?

It is to this question that I wish to address myself today.

We had taken an important step towards ending this war. We had publicly and officially concluded this war could not be won militarily.

along with representatives from the state, county and federal governments. The local business community was well represented. All the people came to pay their respects to the Cherokee's dead leader.

The night before had been spent in the traditional Cherokee sitting up at the Macedonia Church, then on Friday the body was taken to the gym that Jackson had fought for during his days as a councilman.

Banked by flowers the services began with the Snowbird Quartet singing in their native language, Rufus Edmisten, Mr. and Mrs. Jackson's friend and assistant to Sen. Sam Ervin, delivered the eulogy. Then Lou Crowe in a high sweet voice sang "The Holy Hills of Heaven Call Me." The Rev. Enoch Owl and the Rev. James Parris officiated.

Ushers were Robert Evans, John Standingdeer, Alvin Chiltoskie, Frank West and Isaac Welch. They estimated that 1,200 people attended the funeral.

Planists were Rosilee Teesateskie and Lucy McLaughlin.

Pallbearers were members of the Cherokee Boys Club. Honorary pallbearers were members of the tribal government. The Steve Youngdeer Post provided a 12 man honor guard.

The entire tribal police force stood at attention as the chief's body was brought through the honor guard to the waiting hearse marked by the seal of the Cherokee nation in the window.

Chief Jackson was buried with full military honors at the Jackson Family Cemetery in Soco Valley.

CHIEF'S DEATH NOTED BY CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS

During Chief Jackson's last illness his condition was the concern of many of his friends in Washington, D.C. These friends visited with Walter when it was allowed and comforted Mrs. Jackson and the chief's sister, Mrs. Naomi Bowman, when he was too sick to have visitors.

After Walter's death, Sally Jackson asked special friend, Rufus Edmisten, Sen. Sam Ervin's assistant, to deliver the eulogy at the Chief's funeral.

North Carolina's congressional representatives immediately issued statements.

Sen. Sam Ervin, Jr. said, "North Carolina has lost a great leader. He virtually ignored his own material well-being, indeed his own health, in order to serve the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians. He was a true friend."

Sen. B. Everett Jordan said, "Jackson was willing to sacrifice everything for the good of his fellow man. He was a great leader of the Cherokees and served them as an ambassador of the highest caliber. Our state will sorely miss him."

Rep. Roy A. Taylor issued the following statement concerning the death of Chief Jackson:

"I was very sorry to learn of Chief Walter Jackson's death. He was a warm, friendly individual whom we all looked forward to seeing when he came to Washington. He always seemed to have the welfare of the Cherokee Indians at heart, and vigorously pursued those programs which he felt would improve their social and economic conditions."

"The chief's ability to combine his congenial manner with serious purpose caused him to be one of our favorites and we join the people of Cherokee in missing him."

JACKSON ONLY SECOND CHIEF TO DIE IN OFFICE

Walter S. Jackson was the 20th man to hold the position of Principal Chief since the tribal reorganization in 1869. He was only the second chief to die in office. The first was Lloyd Welch who served from 1875

to 1880. Welch was succeeded by the famous Nimrod Jarrett Smith.

Carl Lambert, Official Historian of the Eastern Band, noted recently that Jackson will be the tenth chief to be buried in the Soco Valley. The others are Yonagusta, Stillwell Saunooke, Andy Standingdeer, Jesse Reed, Bird Saloneeta, John Goins Welch, David Blythe, John Tahquette and Henry Bradley.

Lambert is concerned that some of the graves of former chiefs are unmarked and that when the people who know the locations die, the knowledge will die with them. He believes that putting appropriate headstones would be a good project for the tribal government or some local service organization.

EDITORIAL FROM THE CHEROKEE BOYS CLUB NEWSLETTER

We at the Cherokee Boys Club had the honor and privilege of working closely with Chief Jackson since our beginning. When he was Vice-Chief he went to the Council and helped us get the land and the original donation which the Tribe gave us to get us started.

Throughout the years we have had the privilege of working with him on many projects, not only for the club, but for the entire Reservation. We have had the privilege of traveling with him on many, many trips. We know without a doubt that every decision he made was not made for his personal benefit, but for the benefit of our Cherokee people and our Reservation. We know that he made many trips, made many phone calls, wrote many letters, saw many people, to help promote ideas and projects for our people when he was not physically able even to be working.

We could go on and on with his accomplishments, but we are very thankful for the fact that while he was alive, even before he became ill, that we always thanked him and told him of our appreciation for the job he was doing, not only for us but for all of his people.

We thank God for having had the opportunity of knowing him and working with him. We pray that with the help of God we will be able to continue the many projects which Chief Jackson has helped us to start and has helped us to develop. We thank God for the great leadership which Cherokee has always had and for the great leadership which we know we will continue to have. We must remember that our leaders however, can accomplish only as much as we as followers help them to accomplish.

We learned many years ago that there is no limit to what can be accomplished if we will pray for each other, rather than criticize each other. Since our leader was a Christian, he is now being rewarded for his faith and for his work. Since we who remain were his friends, we will be rewarded throughout the years by his inspiration and ideals which will continue to live with us.

MANY TRAVEL TO ATTEND FUNERAL

One of Walter Jackson's qualities was that a man's station in life made no difference in whether he liked him or not. However, Walter was the leader of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians and in paying respect to both the man and the position many people attended the Chief's funeral Friday representing groups.

Tribal leaders attending were: Tribal Chairman Bety Mae Jumper of the Seminole Tribe of Florida, Choctaw Chairman Emmett York and Community Action Program Director Phillip Martin and Chairman Bufalo Tiger of the Miccosukee Tribe of Florida. Jarrett Blythe, former Principal Chief of the Eastern Band was present.

From the United Southeastern Tribes

came: Wayne Zunigha, Joe Long, Sherman Carter and Key Wolfe.

The Cherokee Historical Association was represented by Carol White, Harry Buchanan and Francis Haezel.

Others in attendance were: Harry Rainbolt, Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs; Keith Snyder, U.S. Attorney from Asheville; Tom Woodard, Superintendent of Swain County Schools; Bob Goforth, North Carolina Department of Conservation and Development; James Bally, Tribal Attorney; John Bacon and Wilbur Creaswell, Tribal Auditors; June Myers, former tribal clerk, and representatives from each of the plants on the reservation.

Special friends from Washington were Wilbur Paul, Nick French and Martha Moore.

Both the state police and the park service were represented.

EULOGY FOR WALTER S. JACKSON, DELIVERED AT CHEROKEE, N.C., APRIL 30, 1971

(By Rufus L. Edmisten)

Friends of the Chief, I want to express a tribute to a man whom we mourn today in these hills he loved so much. I come to you today with a sad heart, but in a spirit of thanksgiving because we shared the privilege of knowing Walter Jackson. Although the man has passed away, his spirit and his accomplishments are with us.

One of the great things about this Country is that a man, regardless of his station in life, can achieve great things. America has produced many leaders of the people, and Walter Jackson was such a man. Walter's life bore witness to the rewards of a lifetime spent in devotion to high principles and to the improvement of the lot of his fellow men.

The man we honor today struggled hard and steadfastly against the forces of death, with the stoic courage for which his people have long been admired. But he did not struggle alone. By his side in a strange and distant city were his faithful, devoted wife Sally, and his sister Naomi Bowman. As winter waned and spring came to these hills of North Carolina, they waited and watched through countless hours of agony and silence, hoping against hope, while the signs of life rose and fell. Not one time did Sally Jackson cease in her absolute devotion to the man she loved and the man who loved his people so deeply. She bore the burden with a rare dignity, befitting the wife of the Chief.

Perhaps the highest tribute that can be paid Walter is to proclaim that he was a man of the people, be they high or low, black, white, or red, rich or poor; indeed, he was a friend to all. The history books may not often record this virtue, but it makes a man great in the book of life.

Rudyard Kipling, in his famous poem "If", said:

If you can talk with crowds and keep your virtue,

Or walk with Kings—nor lose the common touch,

If neither foes nor loving friends can hurt you,

If all men count with you, but none too much:

If you can fill the unforgiving minute

With sixty second's worth of distance run,

Yours is the earth and everything that's in it,

And—which is more—you'll be a Man . . . !

Walter Jackson was a man. He walked with the great and powerful, yet he never forgot the common man. Walter believed that true worth was in doing, not in seeming. His great contribution was that he did something each day; he did not merely dream of great things to do by and by.

On the many occasions when Walter came to Washington to do something for his people, he worked in his quiet and effective

While this was a significant move, I regret that the steps we have taken subsequent to this declaration have not been consistent with that conclusion. Our actions have not demonstrated acceptance of that fact. We still speak blithely of Vietnamization of the war—a military victory for the Saigon government. We named our adventure into Cambodia "Operation Total Victory". We stage and support a South Vietnamese incursion into Laos. We verbally unleash the South to invade the North. As long as we pace our withdrawal to the take-over of our share of the fighting by the forces of Thieu and Ky and to the level of military activity of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese forces, we will be unable to end our involvement in Vietnam. We can be forced to retain our military presence. We will not be the master of our own forces nor of our destiny in Southeast Asia.

The one essential step which we must take to bring this war to an end is to admit to ourselves—and to the world—that we made a tragic mistake. We must acknowledge that the Vietnam war has been a failure—that victory is unobtainable.

This is a difficult admission to make—especially when we remind ourselves of the enormity of this war's cost. Few want to admit error in judgment—and even fewer, when it involves a cost of nearly 50,000 American lives.

It is difficult to face up to the charge that these men's lives may have been wasted. And so we continually struggle to come up with a justification for continuing this war. We walk a tight rope of uncertainty.

We say we will withdraw our American troops—but there is to be no deadline. The grand justification for our continuing presence—the Vietnamization of the war—means merely we will substitute to the maximum extent possible, Americans killing and being killed by Asians, with Asians killing Asians.

The success of Vietnamization demands the military success of the government in Saigon and the defeat of the Communist forces. To achieve this success will require the continued presence and involvement of American troops in vast, if unknown, numbers.

There was a time when nearly all Americans supported the Vietnam war. On the important Tonkin Gulf Resolution only two Senators voted in opposition. Our most vocal doves of more recent years were not in that number. And neither, I must say, was Senator Daniel K. Inouye.

Looking back, I was convinced that there was legal and technical justification for our involvement in Vietnam. There were our treaty obligations under SEATO and other agreements. There were the reports of inhumane killing and slaughter of South Vietnamese civilians by the Viet Cong. There were the reports of some 8,000 political assassinations by the end of 1964.

Yes, one can agree that there may have been justification—but events have clearly demonstrated there was at the same time an error of judgment—an error of judgment which has involved four American Presidents as well as the lives of almost 50,000 Americans.

The rationale for our involvement in Vietnam assumed our ability to win the war and, thereby, gain the peace, and rebuild a nation—a nation at peace with itself, and the world.

Not only have we been unable to "win the war", but we now find our actions almost indistinguishable from those of the enemy. We developed operation Phoenix—employing mercenaries to torture, assassinate and murder members of the Viet Cong infrastructure. The ends now justify our means. We have adopted those tactics which we self-righteously condemned a few years ago.

We employed instruments of war we deemed too horrible for use on European battlefields. We have used chemical agents,

Defoliants and tear gas. We have employed tear gas not as a non-lethal weapon to avoid the killing of non-combatants, but as an agent to drive the enemy from his lair so we can gun him down.

Yes, we entered Vietnam as friends. We embraced the people of South Vietnam as brothers and sisters. An untold number of Americans made the welfare and the freedom of these Vietnamese people their personal cause. We tried to heal the bodies of the sick, and the injured. We tried to educate the children and help the farmers increase the food supply. In so many ways our cause was certainly humanitarian and moral.

But as we increased our presence, and as the conflict became increasingly an American war, we found a change taking place—a change in our national attitude as well as a change in the character of the war. The Vietnamese, whether friendly, neutral, or unfriendly, became "gooks." Our soldiers viewed them increasingly with contempt and suspicion. Some came to consider all Vietnamese as enemies in their inability to distinguish friend from foe in the kind of guerrilla war we were fighting. "The only good 'gook' is a dead one," became their philosophy.

And so now we have My Lai. We have American soldiers and officers charged with the murder of women and children. And we have American generals charged with trying to keep these tragic incidents from becoming more widely known, and the perpetrators from being punished.

We established a price list for the accidental killing of Vietnamese in non-combat accidents. For instance, our military trucks, careening through narrow village streets, have killed many Vietnamese natives. The relatives of accidental victims of our unconcern can collect from Uncle Sam, \$318 for a year old child, \$201.95 for a ten year old. And if the son or daughter is twenty years of age the family gets just over \$30 whereas we may pay as much as \$100 for a water buffalo, and 400 times his daily wage to the surviving wife of a wage earner who loses his life through an American's misadventure. In 1969, we paid out a total of \$1,231,920.16 in claims to the South Vietnamese. Is this our war reparations?

I was deeply saddened by what happened at My Lai—but I was not surprised. When men are trained to hate and to kill with proficiency, and when they reach the frame of mind where those whom they have come to help are called "gooks", and when we place impersonal price tags on human beings, we should expect My Lai to occur. When we consider a six months old baby an enemy—when war reaches such a stage—when it causes Americans to so act—it is time we called a halt. There can no longer be any justification for the war's continuation. Nor can any legal argument be considered a sufficient reason for continuing the fighting and killing.

Almost all our leaders have admitted that there is no military solution to this conflict—that it must be resolved politically.

I know it is the prayer of every American that the course upon which the President has now embarked our Nation in Indochina is a correct one. This is a prayer which I share deeply and fully. As a member of the United States Senate and as an American citizen, I want very much to support my President, particularly on an issue of such magnitude, in these trying times.

But if the experience of this past decade has within it any lessons—particularly for the Congress—for those of us who are fixed with some direct responsibility for the conduct of our Nation's foreign policy—then we must recognize and act on that higher responsibility to our Nation's welfare. We cannot abdicate our responsibility.

I, therefore, could not support the President's decision to widen the war. I deplored

the President's decision to launch an American attack into Cambodia.

Neither could I welcome the more recent incursion into Laos.

The President's words and actions must make us doubt our ability to learn from the past. His are the same arguments which were summoned forth in sending advisors to South Vietnam a decade ago. These are but a repetition of what we heard when advisors became combat divisions. It is but a reiteration of the voices which were raised in justification of the bombing of North Vietnam. Must each American President learn anew from the experience of his own administration?

Our President's arguments indicate that this may be so. He opened other and even more dangerous chapters in the tragedy of our involvement in Indochina. History shows that this involvement came in a three step phase. First, American advisors were sent to assist the South Vietnamese. Second, with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, our President requested of the Senate the authority to deploy American combat troops to Vietnam. Third, was the bombing of North Vietnam. The war escalated and still there was no victory in sight, and President Johnson then moved to de-escalate the war.

And now, President Nixon, has expanded the conflict, to Cambodia and to Laos and increased the bombing once again.

Our President presented us with a fait accompli. These expansions were initiated without prior consultation with the Congress much less its approval.

President Nixon has renounced his own earlier statements of policy and purpose. This is no longer a war to be curtailed, contained or settled politically, this is now once again a war for military victory.

The President justifies his action as necessary to prevent the defeat and humiliation of our great Nation. Frankly, what is so wrong with a great people swallowing some pride and admitting mistake? What is the test to true greatness? Is it to continue and expand a bankrupt policy? I think not. I pray not.

Can we possibly achieve peace by insisting that Hanoi, and China, and the Soviet Union, must acknowledge defeat and admit humiliation? I think not.

If we are to be true to ourselves—to our highest ideals—we must be big enough to place the peace of the world and the saving of human life above saving face. We must be willing to admit error and so adjust our policy. For neither our conscience nor the conscience of mankind will permit us to use our awesome weapons of war which will be essential if we insist on military victory and expand this conflict to that end.

Yes, a political solution will require that we swallow some pride—that we even lose some face. Difficult as that may be for the United States, I believe it will be essential and we must face up to the unpleasant task.

By so doing we can close an unfortunate chapter in our history. We can ring down the curtain on the Vietnam war, and do so a little stronger for lessons we have learned.

It is not our will or courage which is being tested. It is our judgment.

If we truly learn our lesson from this tragic experience and apply it as a guide for future action, then we can say our Nation's sons have not died in vain. Their sons and younger brothers, and your sons and mine, may be saved because of their suffering and sacrifice.

To learn our lesson we must look to the origins of our Vietnam involvement. How did this come about?

It grew out of a period in our history when out of our fear of Communism and fear of being called "soft on Communism", we went to the aid of every self-proclaimed anti-Communist on the face of the globe. It grew out of the McCarthy era. It was part of the fall-out from charges of a China sell-out,

and the public condemnation of a great American patriot, General George Marshall.

Vietnam grew out of an oppressive atmosphere which produced a Title II as part of our Internal Security Act authorizing the establishment of American concentration camps. It grew out of times which approved the destruction of an Oppenheimer for his views and friendships.

Vietnam grew out of a post World War II period in which we held unchallenged military supremacy in the air, at sea, and in nuclear power. It grew out of the mistaken belief that such power provided an adequate response to "wars of liberation". Military might became a substitute for understanding.

Vietnam grew out of an almost religious fervor to fight monolithic Communism wherever and whenever we sensed its presence.

Vietnam grew out of an American public opinion which encouraged our intervention at any time and place whenever a leader of a foreign government found himself insecure in his seat of power and could "con" us into the belief that the only alternative to coming to his rescue was a Communist takeover and, therefore, a threat to our national security.

Having described the conditions which led to Vietnam, what then are the lessons?

I believe there are several.

Vietnam should teach us to be very cautious in making commitments less we be "conned" into offering our men and our treasury to scoundrels who proudly proclaim "send me help and I will fight the Communists for you". Some of these now live in fancy European villas and have fat Swiss bank accounts. We must be very selective when and where we involve our Nation. Every currently non-Communist part of the world is not necessarily vital to our security.

Vietnam should teach us that we must whenever we have the opportunity, decide in favor of people and not tyrants.

Vietnam should teach us that though we may have superior weapons and military hardware, conscience will not permit, or circumstances may prevent, their use. Our possession of this vast arsenal may encourage our engagement in circumstances where it is of no value. Therefore, weak countries may be able to nip with relative immunity at the heels of the mighty.

Vietnam should teach us that it is very easy to get embroiled on a very limited scale in conflicts where the pay-off may look good, but which have a capacity to spread, dragging us in ever deeper in a futile effort to salvage our investment.

Vietnam should teach us a greater realism of our limited ability to effect change in the social, economic, and political order of a Nation or a people, as well as the possibility disastrous affects of such misdirected efforts on ourselves as a people, and as a Nation.

These then are some of the lessons which must be clearly kept in mind as we look to the future in Cambodia, in Laos, and in Thailand. Our involvement now may be quite limited. The pay-off may look good. But the dangers are also great. It is much easier to get in than to get out.

Despite the Nixon Doctrine—or Doctrines which have now been enunciated, our future course in Southeast Asia is far from clear. It is certainly not clear to Hanoi and Peking. How could it be when it is unclear to us?

It can only be clarified if we go beyond Vietnamization. We must, therefore, take additional steps.

The first of these is, as I have said, to acknowledge failure for our Vietnam policy. We must admit error in judgment. Neither we, nor the governments we support, can militarily win the war in Indochina. We must make clear that we seek a political settlement.

Second, we should propose an immediate and complete cease fire without terminal date. To secure such a cease fire, we should

if necessary, be prepared to unilaterally halt all offensive operations and limit our forces and those under our control to purely defensive roles. Negotiations with an enemy is always a difficult process, but it is more difficult while the fighting rages, than after it has been halted.

The talks in Paris are getting no place. There is no sign of progress. But Vietnam is not isolated from the larger problems of Southeast Asia—from the problems of Cambodia and Laos.

We should, therefore, call for a conference on the over-all problems of this area known as Indochina. This should be an Asian conference, and not a European conference trying to impose European solutions on Asian problems.

It is time that we and other Western powers realize that these Asians are no longer wards of Western colonial powers. We should recognize not only their weaknesses, but also their apparent strengths—the desire, capacity, and ability to govern themselves.

We should make it crystal clear that we will abide with the outcome of these political negotiations. Accordingly, we must forthrightly face the possibility of an Indochina in the sphere of influence of Hanoi.

It is true that such a policy is not without risks. But neither is the current policy—a policy with no end in sight after nearly a decade of fighting.

Throughout most of my years in public life, I have wrestled in my own mind and conscience with the problem. I have joined Presidents and bishops, as well as military men, in support of some of our actions. I hope that I have learned—that we have all learned—from this tragic experience. I hope that we as individuals have learned more humility—and also that we have learned some humility as a Nation.

This knowledge will serve us and mankind well in the years ahead.

A RICH ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY IN ALASKA CAN BE INSURED

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, one of the most perplexing problems facing our Nation today is the question of how we may make sufficient use of the great natural resources of the State of Alaska and, at the same time, preserve and insure a rich environmental legacy for our own and succeeding generations.

A great debate over this question has been carried on at all levels of Government, in the media, and has even reached into the campus and the home. As a representative of the people of Alaska, and as a resident and frequent beholder of its natural beauty, I have been deeply concerned with this problem and have been active both as a participant and as an auditor of the debate.

You will be pleased to know that at least one company in one recent situation found a viable and workable answer to this problem, a solution which should be of benefit to the people of Alaska while having a minimal present and future impact upon the ecology.

This solution is described in a recent U.S. district court decision in Alaska, Sierra Club against Hardin, in which the plaintiffs sought to have the sale of timber in Alaska's Tongass National Forest by the U.S. Forest Service declared invalid. There is an aspect to this decision which will be most reassuring to all of us who have sought an answer to the problem of how to use and simultaneously protect the environment of Alaska. The court's decision in favor of the defend-

ants was based to a significant degree upon the fact that the company purchasing the timber, U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., had selected and retained a "blue-ribbon panel of conservationists" to supervise the selection of a site for the company's mill which would have the least environmental impact.

In the language of the court:

... U. S. P. (U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers) had expended substantial sums to insure that the impact of the mill would be minimized by comprehensive site planning and the most advanced technology available. The mill site selection was supervised by a blue-ribbon panel of conservationists selected from universities in the United States and Canada. A specially commissioned field study sponsored by U.S.P. resulted in a seventy page technical report published in November of 1969 by the Institute of Marine Science of the University of Alaska. It seems unlikely that in investigation by federal experts would have been more comprehensive and unbiased.

Considering the impressive credentials of the U.S.P. panel of environmental experts assigned to the project, the high quality of its research product, the advanced stage of planning as of January 1, 1970, and the exorbitant cost of any further delay, the Forest Service was justified in its reliance upon U.S.P.'s environmental studies.

In its conclusions, the court adds:

The Forest Service was justified in relying on the environmental impact investigation conducted by U.S.P., and under the circumstances the Act was complied with "to the fullest extent possible."

The decision includes the names of the members of this blue-ribbon panel, and I would like to cite them here, as they are a most impressive group of environmental scientists. They are: Dr. Donald J. Zinn, professor of zoology, University of Rhode Island; Dr. R. Van Cleave, dean of the College of Fisheries, University of Washington; Dr. A. Starker Leopold, professor of forestry and zoology, University of California, Berkeley; Dr. Stanley Cain, professor of natural resources, University of Michigan; and Dr. Ian McTaggart, dean of graduate studies, University of British Columbia.

Certainly, U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, which is one of our Nation's leading forest products companies, is to be commended for its foresight in selecting and using this panel of eminent conservationists. In the first place, they have found a viable solution—one acceptable to a Federal court—to the development of one of Alaska's great natural resources. However, in the broadest sense, the company has demonstrated that through the right cooperative effort between industry and people who understand the environment, Alaska and our Nation can, indeed, progress while preserving and ensuring the protection of our natural beauty and our resources.

EVENTS IN EAST PAKISTAN

Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, all of us have watched with deep concern the events of the past 2 months in Pakistan. We watched first as the Government of Pakistan, reportedly with considerable disregard for human life, suppressed those in East Bengal who favored either a looser confederation of the two halves of the country or complete separation.



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THREE MISTAKEN ASSUMPTIONS OF CURRENT U.S. MIDEAST POLICIES

Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, the distinguished senior Senator from Minnesota recently addressed a gathering in Minneapolis concerning our Nation's present policies in the Middle East.

His remarks display an unusually keen awareness of the self-defeating nature of the tactics now being employed by our own Government to reach a settlement between Israel and Egypt. Senator MONDALE will have performed a great service if his dispassionate analysis of the implications of Secretary Rogers' recent trip is heeded.

Senator MONDALE eloquently describes the dilemma posed to American interests by downplaying our interest in Israel's security. As the Senator puts it:

To disguise our ultimate interest in Israel's security is to endanger that interest by fostering miscalculation among all the parties.

Senator MONDALE has pinpointed three highly dubious assumptions upon which the State Department's present policies rest:

That our immediate objective should be a definite "settlement" managed from the outside.

That the U.S. can and should act as middleman in negotiations.

And finally—

The forecast of doom if we don't sponsor instant negotiations and a settlement.

I agree fully with Senator MONDALE's assertions that the only chance for peace is Arab acceptance of Israel. And I wish to underscore his observation that the Arabs will never face up to that acceptance so long as outsiders hold out the prospect of forcing Israeli concessions bit by bit.

At a time when Israeli doubts about U.S. intentions and vague assurances are so strong, Secretary Rogers' calculated snubs to Israeli sensitivities during his visit there could only maximize their worst suspicions. While I certainly do not question the Secretary of State's desire for peace in the Middle East, I must question the way he is going about finding it.

I commend Senator MONDALE's perceptive speech to all my colleagues who share a desire for a lasting peace in the Middle East.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of Senator MONDALE's speech be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

SPEECH BY SENATOR MONDALE

Diplomacy, we are told, is often the art of delicate understatement—even in the face of catastrophe.

The Captain of the *Titanic* was reportedly being diplomatic, for example, as his great ship struck an iceberg and was sinking in the North Atlantic.

Learning there were not enough lifeboats for all passengers and that her husband would be left behind, a sobbing woman cried out to the Captain, "How can this happen . . . this ship was supposed to be indestructible."

"Madam," the Captain coolly replied, "that appears to have been an unrealistic assumption."

As for both diplomacy and sinking ships, I want to talk to you tonight about some "unrealistic assumptions" behind this country's policy in the middle East.

The columnists tell us we are now at another turning in the baffling and volatile part of the world. The Secretary of State has flown 18,000 miles, bargained with Arab and Israeli, and returned with vague hints of some agreement to re-open the Suez Canal.

By now, there is something tiresome in these clichés of crisis, the expectant shuffling of officials, the intricacy of formulas. The diplomatic graveyard in the Middle East is strewn with turning points, climatic moments and the pretensions of governments. But if the diplomatic game seems mundane, the reality of the problem is not.

We are dealing with the hopes and fears and passions of over 60 million people.

Their conflict traces a bloody history, all the more venomous because it's within living memory. Divisions of culture and religion are inflamed on both sides by charges of genocide. Fierce nationalism pits Arab against Arab as well as against Israel.

The price is an appalling waste of precious resources.

Arabs and Israelis, people with rich traditions of learning and compassion, spend together twice as much on weapons as on schooling for their children, and five times what they invest in health care.

Four of the Arab nations have per capita incomes of less than \$1,000, yet they spend more than 10% of their Gross National Product on arms.

And over all the hate and waste is the pervasive danger of a clash between the great powers.

At stake is the survival of the region . . . and perhaps the peace of the whole world. That is why—for all the claims and formulas—our policy in the Middle East is deadly serious business. That is why we have to examine the basic assumptions that sent Secretary Rogers on this trip and other diplomatic excursions.

For I am afraid that he carried with him—over every one of those 18,000 miles—dangerous misconceptions about the Middle East and the role of the United States in bringing peace to the area.

It seems to me the principal misconception has been a chronic flaw in our policy since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

For over two decades, we have been stuck in a dilemma of our own making.

On one hand, extraordinary factors of history and morality have given us an abiding stake in Israel's security. Five Presidents—if not always their Secretaries of State—have understood that behind the whole elaborate mess was a simple fact: we could not let Israel go under.

On the other hand—in some murky mixture of oil politics, fear of "losing" the Arabs (who were hardly "ours" to begin with), and sheer bureaucratic momentum—our diplomacy has strained mightily to disguise to everybody that irreducible interest in Israel.

It still does. Our dilemma is that we cannot have it both ways. To disguise our ultimate interest in Israel's security is to endanger that interest by fostering miscalculations among all the parties.

An Israel unable to rely on our support, Arabs emboldened by what seems to them our equivocation, Russians tempted by our apparent irresolution—none will make the hard decisions to build a peace in everyone's interest.

Our present course runs into the logical dead-end of that dilemma—a confrontation with Israel over a "settlement."

Never mind that a meaningful settlement is probably impossible to achieve by pressuring Israel—or, even if proclaimed, that it could still damage our long-range interests.

The current pre-occupation, for instance, is the opening of the Suez Canal. We are leaning hard on the Israelis to extract the necessary concessions from them. And the immediate beneficiary will be the naval power of the Soviet Union. And an open canal, once more an important link for world commerce, would be one more hostage to Soviet diplomacy. But we seem intent on a deal—even to the point of paying to dredge the Canal ourselves. (I wish we were as anxious to clear the pollution from our own lakes and rivers.)

Not that the Nixon Administration has a corner on this sort of folly.

We should not forget—the Israelis certainly haven't—that Israel gave up the gains of the 1956 war for an all too vague formulation of support by the Eisenhower Administration . . . a promise shamefully sidestepped when the going got tough again with Nasser and the guerrillas.

When Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran in 1967, the studied hesitation of the Johnson Administration may well have confused both sides to the point of hastening hostilities rather than heading them off.

We stood by in 1967 while the UN peace force was pulled out summarily on Egypt's order. As Arab rhetoric became more inflammatory and the noose tightened on Israel's sea outlet through the Gulf of Aquaba, the U.S. leisurely debated schemes for sending in neutral flagships to "test" Arab intentions.

And when Abba Eban came to Washington that fateful spring—expecting us to produce on a decade of promises—he got embarrassed evasion and patronizing preachments on restraint.

It was not surprising that the Generals prevailed over the diplomats in Tel Aviv. Our equivocation left Israel almost no choice but to strike for her life.

That pattern of evasion and preaching has been repeated again and again by this Administration.

We drew the Israelis into the present cease-fire last fall on the condition that neither side would seize military advantage from the truce.

Then, as the Soviets stole a major tactical march by moving up their missiles under shelter of the agreement, we first denied it . . . then said we were checking . . . then said it was true, we knew it all along, and it was a bad thing. The missiles are still there, but I wonder about our credibility with the Israeli Government—let alone what the Arabs and Soviets think they can get away with.

Now Secretary Rogers has reportedly had a quarrelsome session with Mrs. Meir to pressure her on opening Suez.

According to the *New York Times*, the Arabs are naturally pleased. Last Sunday's *Times* reported:

"With the U.S. now actively involved in the negotiating process and its big power prestige on the line, the Egyptian leadership seems confident that the focus of any American pressure . . . will be on Israel, particularly in regard to a first-stage Israeli pullback and a re-opening of the Suez Canal."

The mistakes have been shared amply, then, by both parties. They have been especially magnified, however, by the peculiar bureaucratic aberrations of the Nixon Administration.

With the White House staff openly dominating policy on the major issues of Vietnam or arms control, the State Department has tried to save its bureaucratic face by zealously trying to redraw the map of the Middle East. If the process has been therapeutic for morale, the cost has been high—an often heedless pushing for settlement for settlements' sake, policy more by adrenalin than by analysis.

But whatever the combination of misperception and mismanagement, U.S. policy has come to rest on three highly dubious assumptions.

Each is clung to with the same reverence and bravado as the "unsinkability" of the *Titanic*. And each leaves us short of lifeboats.

The first of these assumptions is that our immediate objective should be a definitive "settlement" managed from the outside. We reason that since the parties are too greedy to get together themselves, someone should do the job for them.

Yet—much as we all want peace—realistic planning, even with the current cease-fire, must begin with the high probability of some kind of continuing state of conflict in the Middle East over the next 3-5 years. Even with some kind of political settlement now, there would probably be prolonged tension and more shooting.

And putting first things first, our overriding objective should be to avoid direct U.S. involvement in those likely hostilities.

Talking about a "settlement" in this context obscures the basic issue: how to cope

The most recent experience, in fact, is that matters can get much worse precisely when the diplomatic traffic is heaviest. Witness the hijacking crisis, the Jordanian civil war and the unchallenged advance of Soviet missiles amid all the diplomatic maneuvering of last summer and fall.

As for outside management, I believe external powers can and do influence events. But much more by their material investment than by their questionable ingenuity in drawing plans for somebody else's borders.

The United States can have most influence in the Middle East by clearly and firmly placing its weight behind its interests, even if we never utter a word about the details of a settlement.

We are now squandering that influence in a pretentious and almost frenzied quest for an agreement which would push Israel back to her vulnerable 1967 borders.

The second mistaken assumption in our policy derives from the first. It is that the U.S. can and should act as middleman in negotiations.

The argument is that the Israelis will respond to our pressure. And the Arabs need evidence that we want a fair settlement before they'll agree.

Yet as any lawyer or labor-management negotiator knows, the every task of mediation necessarily imposes an ambiguity on the mediator's relation with all parties.

The more credibly we play the mediator's neutral role in the Middle East, the more we defeat the very purposes of mediation.

For the Israelis, our neutral stance heightens their fears that we will abandon them. And we risk provoking a more desperate and reckless policy from them when we supposedly want just the opposite.

Israel may "need" us in the sense that U.S. budgetary and military aid is their optimum option in maintaining their defense.

But the vital Israeli decisions—those they see, such as borders, involving their existence—are not amenable to our leverage.

Where national survival is at stake, our influence will be effective only if we assuage fears—never if we try to exploit them.

We have authentic influence on Israel only to the degree we help remove the threat to its existence.

The hard truth is that the only chance for peace in the Mid East is Arab acceptance of Israel.

But the Arabs will never face up to that acceptance so long as outsiders hold out the prospect of forcing Israeli concessions bit by bit—which is precisely what this Administration has been holding out in its formula-mongering over the past 18 months.

As with the Israelis, our ambivalent policy only promotes Arab recklessness and intransigence.

The third assumption behind U.S. diplomacy—in some ways the most fashionable and foolish—has been the forecast of doom if we don't sponsor instant negotiations and a settlement. The Arabs, we are told, will grow ever more radical, and the Soviets will pick up all the chips.

Yet the evidence to the contrary is overpowering—and the attrition of the Palestinian guerrillas in the most dramatic recent example. The existence of a strong, secure Israel—able to preserve the status quo until a genuine settlement is achieved—in the long-run weakens rather than strengthens the Arab radicals who are staking everything on confrontation.

Nor can the Russians easily endure the persistent frustration of their Arab clients.

We should certainly be concerned with the Soviet influence in the Middle East. But a settlement made now in the shadow of Russian missiles will only enhance that influence.

Moscow's stock will go down precisely as the Arabs come to understand that Israel and the United States will not be moved by vacant formulas or menacing gestures.

These three assumptions have led us, then, away from the one strategic principle from which our Middle East policy must proceed—firm, unequivocal support of Israel.

The irony is that we are not choosing here—as so often in policy questions—between what is right and what works.

I personally believe we have a moral commitment to Israel. But it is equally clear that a strong Israel is also the best hope for an enduring peace in the Middle East.

And even if the standard is a more narrow measure of U.S. national interest, a strong Israel is the sole guarantee over the next decade that we will not be embroiled directly in the conflict in the area.

I should add that only a sure sense of Israeli security can keep the lid on the terrible Pandora's box of nuclear armaments in the Mid East.

None of us can predict the outline of a plausible settlement at this point.

At a minimum, however, I think we have to return to the guideline of "secure and recognized boundaries" for Israel as required in the November 1967 UN Security Council Resolution.

It also seems to me that much of the present buffer areas around Israel—to the degree that they lessen the need to mobilize and fight by an irreversible timetable—are really a deterrent to all-out war.

But there is no question that political realities will dictate eventually some kind of settlement on Israel's borders. Territory cannot indefinitely purchase safety at the expense of unrelieved Arab embitterment.

Finally, there is one absolutely essential complement to strong Israeli security—justice for the Arab refugees.

The Palestinian Arabs have been that unstable mass in the area—threatening to explode and bring the whole region down around them.

They cannot go on living in the soul-destraining squalor of the refugee camps. Another generation of Arab children cannot be left to despair and hatred.

If these injustices persist, no peace—however firm at the beginning—will last long in the Middle East.

All of us—above all, Israel, but also her friends in this country—have a responsibility to help remove that disgrace and danger.

We must make a start at that. And our government must stop trying to be something we are not.

We are not a disinterested mediator obliged to cool detachment toward both sides.

We are a vitally interested friend of Israel. And everyone must understand that if the long process of resignation and reconciliation is to begin at last.

Once we have set ourselves right, I think there is genuine hope for the Middle East.

We can help make it what its great human and material potential promise it could be.

A land not of the maimed and the orphaned, but of safe, healthy, self-respecting children.

A land not of pillboxes and national hatred, but of gifted peoples working together in gathering prosperity and peace.

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are normally negotiated in the spring and early summer although teaching does not begin until September;

Whereas the inequitable treatment of teachers arises from the clash between the timing of the freeze announcement and the traditional fall date for starting school; and

Whereas this effect of the wage-price freeze lowered the morale and efficiency of America's teachers: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Cost of Living Council be advised that it is the sense of the Senate that the Pay Board and the Cost of Living Council should permit any teachers' salary increases contained in contracts for the school year which began in the fall of 1971, to become effective.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSOR OF A RESOLUTION

SENATE RESOLUTION 180

At the request of Mr. RIBICOFF, the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. WILLIAMS) was added as a cosponsor of Senate Resolution 180, calling for peace in Northern Ireland and the establishment of a united Ireland.

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 49—SUBMISSION OF A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION RELATING TO TREATMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONERS OF WAR

(Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.)

Mr. ALLOTT. Mr. President, on behalf of myself and Senators ALLEN, ANDERSON, BAKER, BAYH, BEALL, BENNETT, BENTSEN, BIBLE, BOGGS, BROCK, BUCKLEY, BURDICK, BYRD of Virginia, CANNON, CASE, CHILES, CHURCH, COOK, COTTON, CRANSTON, CURTIS, DOLE, DOMINICK, FANNIN, NG, HANSEN, HARRIS, HRUSKA, HUMPHREY, INOUE, JACKSON, JORDAN of North Carolina, JORDAN of Idaho, MAGNUSON, MCGEE, MCINTYRE, MILLER, MONDALE, MUSKIE, PACKWOOD, PASTORE, PEARSON, PELL, RANDOLPH, RIBICOFF, ROTH, SCOTT, SPONG, STAFFORD, STEVENS, STEVENSON, THURMOND, TOWER, TUNNEY, WELCKER, WILLIAMS and YOUNG, I submit for appropriate reference a Senate concurrent resolution calling for the humane treatment and release of American prisoners of war held by North Vietnam and its allies in Southeast Asia. This resolution is identical to House Concurrent Resolution 374, introduced by Congressman ZABLOCKI, which was passed unanimously by the House of Representatives on October 4, 1971.

North Vietnam has held American prisoners since 1964. Because of the inhumane and illegal treatment being given American prisoners of war in Southeast Asia, there is a clear necessity for the Congress to speak out against these outrages. The Congress should adopt this resolution to express our solidarity of support to the wives and children, mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters, relatives and friends, of men who are missing or captured and to let them know that we share their deep anguish. We must assure those families of prisoners and of the missing that we, in the Congress, continue to place the highest priority on efforts to obtain humane treatment and early release of our men.

Regardless of how individual Senators might differ in their approach to the termination of hostilities in Indochina, all Senators must join in expressing empathy for the brave Americans who are held prisoner or are listed as missing in action.

The concurrent resolution reads as follows:

S. CON. RES. 49

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),

Whereas more than one thousand six hundred members of the United States Armed Forces are prisoners of war or missing in action in Southeast Asia; and

Whereas North Vietnam and its allies in Southeast Asia have refused to identify all prisoners they hold, to allow impartial inspection of prisoner facilities, to permit free exchange of mail between prisoners and their families, to release seriously sick and wounded prisoners, and to negotiate for the release of all United States citizens they hold captive; and have committed other violations of the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War, which North Vietnam ratified in 1957; and

Whereas the General Assembly of the United Nations and the International Conference of the Red Cross have adopted resolutions calling on all parties to armed conflicts to comply with the terms and provisions of the Geneva Convention so as to insure humane treatment for prisoners of war; and

Whereas it is the policy of the United States to observe the requirements of the Geneva Convention in treatment of prisoners; and

Whereas the Congress, the executive branch, and the American people have repeatedly appealed to North Vietnam and its allies in Southeast Asia to comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention; and

Whereas every opportunity should be pursued which will focus attention on the plight of these United States servicemen and the anguish suffered by their families and friends, and bring to bear against North Vietnam and its allies the force of world opinion on behalf of humane policies: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress strongly protests the treatment of the United States servicemen held prisoner by North Vietnam and its allies in Southeast Asia and calls on them to comply with the requirements of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

The Congress approves and endorses efforts by the people and Government of the United States, the United Nations, the International Red Cross, and other leaders and peoples of the world to obtain humane treatment for prisoners of war and immediate repatriation of the sick and wounded; and urges that negotiations for the release of all prisoners in the Indochina conflict be given the highest priority by the governments and peoples involved, and calls upon the signatories to the Geneva Convention who have relations with the parties involved in the conflict in Indochina to act as protecting powers to see to the welfare and safety of the prisoners of war and missing in action.

Resolved further, That it is the sense of the Congress that allied authorities should—

(1) Arrange the immediate, unconditional release of as many North Vietnamese prisoners of war held in South Vietnam as are willing to return to their homeland, up to a number equaling the number of Americans listed as missing in action or imprisoned in Southeast Asia.

(2) Effect the release of all such prisoners simultaneously from the same location on the demilitarized zone at the conclusion of a ceremony during which officials of al-

lied governments would issue a supply of rations to each prisoner released and make an appropriate public appeal to North Vietnamese, National Liberation Front, and Pathet Lao leaders for similar humane treatment of prisoners they held. Prisoners would then be permitted to proceed on foot toward North Vietnam.

(3) Plan and carry out all procedures under the close supervision of the International Red Cross and take special precautions to prohibit forced repatriation. Passed the House of Representatives October 4, 1971.

EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1971—AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENTS NOS. 658 THROUGH 663

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. ERVIN (for himself, Mr. ALLEN, Mr. BAKER, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. BROCK, Mr. BYRD of Virginia, Mr. EASTLAND, Mr. ELLENDER, Mr. GAMBRELL, Mr. GURNEY, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. JORDAN of North Carolina, Mr. LONG, Mr. MCCLELLAN, Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. TALMADGE, Mr. THURMOND, and Mr. TOWER), submitted six amendments intended to be proposed by them jointly to the amendment of the House to (S. 659) a bill to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965, the Vocational Education Act of 1963, and related acts, and for other purposes.

REVENUE ACT OF 1971—AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO. 664

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. CHILES. Mr. President, I am submitting an amendment to the pending bill to allow a person to deduct child care costs as business expenses. I believe major bills concerning child care expenses now pending before the Senate Finance Committee miss the target this amendment aims for. The pending proposals offer a piecemeal approach toward helping working mothers and mothers who want to work. These proposals simply increase the limitation on the tax deduction for child care expenses. They increase the limitation on income of families that may use the child care tax deduction. Or they increase the Federal share of child care expenses for welfare recipients—still setting unrealistic limitations. These measures fail to recognize the fact that because costs for child care are necessary to seek income, these costs are, in fact, business expenses.

Before legislation in 1954 permitted even limited child-care deductions, the Internal Revenue Service had not allowed these costs as ordinary and necessary business expenses that could be deducted directly from gross income at the top of the tax form. A 1939 court case backed this ruling. But the attitudes and the times have changed. The judge in the 1939 case simply said that it was not necessary for women to work. The fact is, however, that more mothers than ever are working outside the home. Between 1950 and 1970 women members of the labor force increased from 33 to 43 percent. During that same period the number of mothers in the labor force rose from 22 to 42 percent. 11.6 million

women with children under age 18 are now in the labor force. The country's employment trend is clear.

Over 4.2 million mothers with preschool-age children are working outside the home. And the Department of Labor expects this figure to keep rising. The increasing cost of child care for children of working mothers causes great hardships in many cases. Federal support for child care is now authorized under the Social Security Act. It is estimated that approximately \$310 million will be provided by the Federal Government for child care services under Social Security Act programs. Under existing law a woman taxpayer is eligible for a child care expenses tax deduction if the child care is necessary in order for the mother to work. This deduction is presently unrealistically limited to \$600 if the woman has one child and to \$900 if she has two or more children.

My amendment would consider child care costs as legitimate business expenses. A business expense is money spent to obtain or protect income. Obviously women with children cannot get that income without spending money for the care of their children.

This proposal would not give women a special exemption. Rather, it would treat child care like any other legal business expense to be deducted from income.

I want to make clear the fact that it is designed to cover child care expenses for the purpose of enabling a taxpayer to be gainfully employed. No deduction will be allowed to a married taxpayer unless the spouse is employed, incapacitated or institutionalized and the spouse's employment makes such care necessary. As a recent article in the National Observer pointed out, the entire cost of a yacht can be deducted if you can establish that it is used for your business. The dollar limitation in existing and even proposed legislation bears so little resemblance to the actual costs of child care as to be totally unjust.

Mr. President, there simply seems to be no possible way to justify the present unfair situation. If a businessman wants to take someone out to an expensive restaurant for lunch he can write it off as a business expense—because it protects his income. An individual can write off any number of expenses as business expenses if they can be seen to in some way help to seek and protect his income. Women, in particular, are seriously discriminated against in that getting someone to take care of their children is obviously necessary to protect income if they work outside the home. And yet child care is a cost that is not considered a legitimate business expense. I believe if we can write off lunches at expensive restaurants, we can certainly write off the care of the children of working mothers.

I urge my colleagues to consider the obvious merit of allowing child care expenses to be deducted as business expenses.

AMENDMENT NO. 665

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by him to the bill (H.R. 10947) to provide a job development investment taxes, to reduce certain excise taxes, and for other purposes.

AMENDMENT NO. 670

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. WILLIAMS submitted an amendment, intended to be proposed by him, to House bill 10947, supra.

CHILDREN'S DENTAL HEALTH ACT OF 1971—AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO. 666

(Ordered to be printed and referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.)

RHODE ISLAND AND DELAWARE AND LEAD-BASED PAINT POISONING

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, this past January the Congress passed a much needed program to protect our Nation's children from lead-based paint poisoning.

Since this problem is concentrated in our Nation's cities, the law required that grants be made to local units of government.

This requirement has had an unforeseen adverse effect in the States of Rhode Island and Delaware.

The two smallest States of the Nation are, for all practical purposes, city States; and, in recognition of that fact, and, in an effort to eliminate needless fragmentation of health services, these two States merged their local departments of health into statewide health departments.

The unfortunate result of these commendatory steps by the States of Rhode Island and Delaware has been their ineligibility to receive grants for the prevention, detection, and treatment of lead-based paint poisoning.

I am today submitting an amendment for Senators PASTORE, BOGGS, ROTH, and myself to correct this oversight and to make the State departments of health in Rhode Island and Delaware eligible recipients of grants provided by Public Law 91-695, the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act.

I ask unanimous consent that my amendment be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the amendment was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AMENDMENT NO. 666

At the end of the bill add a new section as follows:

SEC. 5. Title V of the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:

"AUTHORITY TO MAKE GRANTS TO STATE AGENCIES IN CERTAIN CASES

"Sec. 504. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, grants under sections 101 and 201 may be made to an agency of State government in any case where units of general local government within the State are prevented by State law from implementing or receiving such grants or from expending such grants in accordance with their intended purpose; and in any such case the term

'local' when used in section 101 or 201 with respect to any program shall be deemed to read 'State'."

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I plan to attach this amendment to another bill designed to protect the health of children, S. 1874, The Children's Dental Health Act.

In the State of Rhode Island between 1960 and 1970 there were 63 reported cases of lead poisoning treated in hospitals. Since 1970 there have been 117 reported cases of lead-based paint poisoning treated in the hospitals, and another estimated 200 children have been found to have elevated blood levels possibly related to lead-based paint poisoning. The State of Rhode Island needs the assistance of funds provided by the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, and its children should not be denied that protection because of a technical deficiency in the act. It would be my hope that this amendment would be favorably considered.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that letters from the Governor of Rhode Island on this subject be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND & PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS,
Providence, R.I., October 1, 1971.

HON. CLAIBORNE PELL,
Old Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CLAI: I am enclosing for your examination a copy of a letter which I have sent to Secretary Richardson of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. It concerns the fact that Rhode Island will apparently be denied participation in the Federal program to combat lead poisoning because such funds are to be limited to local governmental health units. As you know, we have no such local units because the State has assumed full responsibility in the health field.

Your support for my effort to secure funding would be greatly appreciated. Also, if it becomes evident that the necessary modifications cannot be made by administrative decision, I would hope that the necessary amending legislation could be introduced in the Congress.

Kind regards,
Sincerely,

FRANK LICHT, Governor.

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS,
Providence, R.I., October 20, 1971.
HON. CLAIBORNE PELL,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CLAI: This is to give you further information relative to our State's participation in the new Federal program to combat lead poisoning.

Unfortunately, the situation concerning our participation remains unresolved. Since the State has assumed all health responsibilities, it is not simply a matter of having the State Health Department act as the liaison for the individual communities.

The local communities do not have health officers, and therefore do not have the available mechanism for drawing applications and ultimately administering the programs in this area. Under the guidelines now in effect, the State Health Department would have to locate and train local officials in order to participate in the program. This would be not only a difficult and costly pro-

the Associated Press and was on the board of Marshall Field Enterprises.

Surviving are his wife, Katherine, who was formerly married to the late Marshall Field IV, a son and two daughters from previous marriages, and a stepson and two stepdaughters.

POSSIBLE INVASION OF NORTH VIETNAM

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, yesterday the Senator from Ohio (Mr. SAXBE) and I introduced a bill, S. 974, to prohibit both an invasion of North Vietnam by U.S. ground forces and U.S. combat air support for a South Vietnamese invasion of the North.

We are deeply concerned at the ominous signs that such an invasion may be under consideration.

As I pointed out yesterday, President Thieu, of South Vietnam, is reported to have openly advocated an invasion.

This morning there are disturbing new reports that President Thieu is not only predicting an invasion, but has also asked the South Vietnamese general staff to draw up detailed plans for an American-supported attack across the borders of North Vietnam.

These reports—filed by correspondents in Vietnam—merit the most serious consideration by Congress.

I ask unanimous consent that articles published in the Baltimore Sun and the Washington Post be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THIEU ASKS PLANNING OF DRIVE INTO NORTH
SOUTH VIETNAM'S CHIEF DESCRIBES MOVE AS
BEING "ONLY A MATTER OF TIME"

(By Michael Parks)

SAIGON, Feb. 25.—President Nguyen Van Thieu has asked the South Vietnamese general staff to draw plans for an American-supported invasion of North Vietnam, an operation he described yesterday as being "only a matter of time."

President Thieu asked for detailed plans for a series of coordinated strikes across the demarcation zone and at points farther north along the Lao border, according to usually reliable South Vietnamese military sources.

The plans presumably would call for extensive American air support, President Nixon and other American officials have pointedly refused to rule out such an operation.

WEEKEND CONFERENCES HELD

Their statements had been generally regarded as attempts to deter North Vietnam from sending troops to counterattack allied forces assaulting the Ho Chi Minh trail but it was unclear whether President Thieu is engaged in a similar faint.

He reportedly made the request for battle plans after a series of weekend conferences with top South Vietnamese generals, who are said to have urged him to strike now at Communist troops and supplies in the North while enough U.S. troops remain to support the invasion.

Mr. Thieu also asked for a diplomatic assessment of whether Communist Chinese troops would be sent to aid North Viet * * * invaded, according to South Vietnamese and foreign sources here.

Both requests were said to have been made early Monday. On Wednesday, President Thieu told local leaders in the Central Highlands city of Pleiku that "a march north . . . is only a matter of time," the official government news agency reported.

"NOT JUST PLANNING EXERCISE"

In Saigon, government spokesmen declined to elaborate or clarify the reversal of the President's Public position but several military planners at the Joint General Staff said they had been specifically told that "this is not just a planning exercise."

American officials, caught by surprise by the statement, said they believe the plans were "only for contingency purposes, just a routine updating."

Some Americans also suggested that the reports of a planned invasion, which have been circulating for three weeks, were meant to force the North Vietnamese to dilute their opposition to the allied operations in Laos by keeping more troops at home.

Diplomatic sources here reported, however, that representatives of at least three countries that have diplomatic relations with China have been asked for their assessments of whether Chinese troops would be sent to aid North Vietnam if it were invaded.

"PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE"

This prompted one rankings diplomat to comment, "this whole thing is an elaborate psychological warfare operation. If they were going to invade, they wouldn't go around announcing it. But that's what I said about the Laos operations, too."

President Nixon, speaking with newsmen last week, refused to speculate on the possibility of American air support for a South Vietnamese invasion of North Vietnam.

While American participation would have to be approved in Washington, Mr. Nixon said that "South Vietnam now, as we withdraw, has an ever-increasing responsibility to defend itself. South Vietnam will have to make decisions with regard to its ability to defend itself."

THE NEXT LOGICAL STEP

Shortly after the U.S.-South Vietnamese invasion of Laos, Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky said the next logical step would be an invasion of North Vietnam, a course of action he has long advocated.

William P. Rogers, the U.S. Secretary of State, said then that such an operation was "Not under consideration now." He declined to comment further, saying the proposal was not that of President Thieu.

Gen. Do Cao Tri, who was killed in a helicopter crash Tuesday told newsmen last week that "hypothetically speaking, the most effective way to shut off the enemy's supply line is to destroy it at its origins in North Vietnam."

But General Tri warned that "there are many very difficult military problems involved in an invasion of the North. The enemy's defenses would be very heavy, our supply lines very vulnerable and the prospect of long campaign very large."

THIEU SAID TO PREDICT ATTACK ON NORTH
SOON

(By Peter Osnos)

SAIGON, February 25.—President Thieu, who until this week had expressed no eagerness to invade North Vietnam, was quoted today as saying a drive across the Demilitarized Zone would take place "in the near future."

Regional and local militias, the president reportedly said, "are able enough to take firm control of internal territory. Main forces can have a free hand for action. Thus a march to the north is only a matter of time."

Thieu's statement, quoted by a number of Saigon newspapers, was made in remarks yesterday in Pleiku to a hawkish audience of 5,000 civil servants and Montagnards.

The crowd, which was said to have enthusiastically applauded mention of the Laos invasion, cheered when Thieu said there would be a "march to the north in order to attack the lair of aggressive Communists directly. This will occur in the near future."

The president's aides could not be reached

tonight for confirmation of what he had said. But one government spokesman said the newspapers that printed the remarks were "right."

It was the second time in three days that Thieu had spoken of a possible South Vietnamese drive to the north, but the latest declaration represents a significant escalation of rhetoric.

In Vungtau Monday Thieu said: "If we dare to launch operations into neutral Cambodia and Laos, why shouldn't we dare to attack the very origin of aggression?"

Whether or not an invasion is actually being planned, Thieu's attitude is seen here as having two immediate benefits for the Saigon government:

First, it diverts local attention from the fighting in Laos, where a South Vietnamese ranger battalion took heavy losses last weekend and the operation to disrupt the Ho Chi Minh Trail is apparently bogged down.

Second, the sabre-rattling is likely to make the North Vietnamese uneasy, meaning they will keep their forces deployed above the DMZ rather than send them against the South Vietnamese in Laos.

The American embassy had no comment on Thieu's statement. A spokesman said that efforts to reach the president's staff for elaboration tonight had been unsuccessful.

While Thieu often takes an uncompromisingly hard line against the Communists before sympathetic audiences, veteran observers here could not recall him advocating a northern invasion—let alone predicting that it would soon take place.

This kind of talk, until now, had only been heard from Vice President Ky, whom officials in Saigon and Washington refuse to take seriously.

Thieu, some observers believe, may be attempting to outflank Ky in hawkish Vietnamese circles that have been calling for an invasion of North Vietnam as a natural follow to the Laotian operation.

While the accuracy of the newspaper reports of Thieu's remarks have not been officially confirmed, the government has not discouraged their publication. If the accounts were embarrassing the president, the papers could have been seized or at least warned against repetition.

EMPLOYMENT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, recently the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIER) made a statement that appeared to be highly critical of the Department of Agriculture. The statement would cause many who read the RECORD to believe that the Department of Agriculture under Secretary Hardin's management was increasing the number of people employed in the bureaucracy that was serving the farmers of our country.

All of us would like to see the number of Government employees reduced. I think this includes not only farm citizens back home but members of the Cabinet, such as Secretary Hardin, and many Members of the Congress. I certainly would applaud any effort to reduce the payroll by any reasonable means. It is important that the record be set straight. It is important that we examine what has happened in the Department of Agriculture since Secretary Hardin took office. It does not show an increase in the number of employees administering our agricultural programs.

In the fiscal year 1968 the total number of full-time employees in the Department of Agriculture was 85,397. The esti-

mated number of employees for fiscal 1971 is 85,600 and the estimated total number for fiscal 1972 is 87,300. However, the figures on the meat and poultry inspection show that the number has increased from 7,293 in fiscal 1968 to an estimated 9,750 for 1972. This is an increase of approximately 2,500 employees for this particular activity. In the Food and Nutrition Service, which administers the food-stamp and school-lunch programs, the number of employees over the same period has increased 500.

The point is these meat and poultry inspection and school lunch and food stamp programs are not farmer programs. They are not programs which have a part in administering the agricultural programs. They are consumer programs. They represent recent enactments of Congress intended to serve consumers and not producers of food.

Consequently, if due allowance is made for this increase in personnel for consumer services, the actual number of employees engaged in agricultural matters has been reduced under the leadership of Secretary Hardin.

I hope the day will soon arrive when the taxpayers of the country will not have to support as big a bureaucracy as they are now supporting in any Federal agency or department. This depends in a large measure, however, upon Congress. Congress adds programs and adds programs. Congress writes the laws relating to civil service and other employment practices. If there is a waste of manpower, and I believe there is, Congress has the primary responsibility.

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE CLEAN LAKES ACT OF 1971

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I speak in support of the Clean Lakes Act proposal because I am convinced that this legislation could be of great help in improving and maintaining the unique purity and clarity of one of the Western United States', indeed the Nation's, most treasured resources, Lake Tahoe.

Nestled in the 10,000-foot Sierra Nevada peaks between Nevada and California, Lake Tahoe is one of the purest water bodies in the world. Since its creation as a glacier lake many thousands of years ago, its color has been a deep, crystal-clear blue.

Lake Tahoe itself is only 22 miles long and 12½ miles wide, but it is deep enough to cover the State of Texas with an 8-inch film of water. At a depth of 1,645, the size is being diminished by algae and mud expanding in the water—a result of man's disturbance of the soil in the watershed.

Thousands of people are being drawn each year to the lake basin to live, work, and play. The present permanent population is estimated at 50,000 and growing. Vacationers swell that amount by an additional 100,000 during peak times. As the use of the Lake Tahoe Basin increases, the water body is in danger of prematurely aging—a process called eutrophication. Scientists tell us fertility in the lake has increased by 72 percent in the last 10 years, and if this progression

continues, the lake will decline rapidly, possibly within 20 years.

The fertilization process has been speeded up by the people influx and all that goes with it: Lumbering, roadbuilding, clearing land for housing development, ski slopes, and golf courses.

This is Tahoe's tragedy: The masses of people who flock to the lake and enjoy its beauty are by their presence destroying its prime attraction—its clarity—and thus their reason for being there.

A regional planning agency was approved by Congress a year ago and the agency is already actively involved in establishing standards and controls over air and water pollution, zoning, building, and general development of the lake and surrounding area. But the lake is already in trouble from past neglect. Some research into the eutrophication process is being carried out under a Federal Water Quality Administration grant. We are finding out the causes of eutrophication, its processes, and results, but we have not yet been able to come up with some cures.

This is why the clean lakes bill is so encouraging. The bill directs the Environmental Protection Agency to provide technical and financial assistance to the States and municipalities in carrying out a comprehensive program of pollution control, including the use of harmless methods to destroy unwanted algae. It would help by providing aid to improve land shores and aid in recovery of overgrowth of algae and trash from the surface.

Lake Tahoe is fortunately in a position where it can easily reverse its present dangerous course. This legislation can insure that we do so.

PENTAGON PROPAGANDA—PURE, SIMPLE, AND PERVERSIVE

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, in the complex and often bizarre world of government bureaucracies, propaganda goes by many names: Public information, public education, public service, media assistance.

Tuesday night CBS News discussed what the taxpayers are really getting for their \$30 million—it could be as high as \$190 million, and probably is—that each year goes for "The Selling of the Pentagon." Propaganda—pure, simple, and pervasive.

The Pentagon's almost unlimited manpower and money are used to justify the military's view of such things as the ABM and our SALT position; the continuation of the war in Vietnam and its extension into Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam; the requests of the military and the merits of a specific weapons system.

This use—I believe misuse—of the Pentagon's public relations machine has far-reaching consequences. By creating an atmosphere of fear, by selectively releasing information to bolster its own arguments, by retreating behind the barrier of "national security" when its viewpoint is disputed, the Pentagon effectively views the public debate and interplay which are so much a part of

our democratic decisionmaking process. In a democracy dependent on the judgments of an informed electorate, there is no higher form of subversion than the suppression or distortion of facts.

A monolithic voice speaking at Government expense to sell its own policies presents a great danger to democracy.

"The Selling of the Pentagon" was reporting at its best. But Congress, not the press, must bear the responsibility of carefully scrutinizing the moneys it authorizes and appropriates. And "The Selling of the Pentagon" shows just how much work we must do in the first session of the 92d Congress.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the transcript of "The Selling of the Pentagon" be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the transcript was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CBS REPORTS: THE SELLING OF THE PENTAGON

(As broadcast over the CBS television network, February 23, 1971)

Produced and Written by: Peter Davis.
Correspondent: Roger Mudd.
Research: James Branon & Helen Moed.
Executive Producer: Perry Wolff.

ROGER MUDD. Last spring American soldiers fought a two day battle that did not get into the newspapers or onto the television news broadcasts. Very few people even knew about it. The battle was fought neither in Vietnam, nor in Cambodia, nor anywhere else in Southeast Asia. All the action took place in North Carolina. This was a military exercise, but it was also an exercise in salesmanship—the selling of the Pentagon.

SPEAKER (for Marine Corps). Gentlemen, today we have shown you the individual Marine—the man who implements foreign policy. He comes from all walks of life, all over the USA. He's not much different from the young men we see on the street corner of America today, except he's been trained a Marine.

He believes in what he is doing, and he's dedicated to his country and to the job at hand, whatever it may be. In short, we could say he has a lot of plain old, red-blooded American guts. Now this concludes our demonstration at this range. The escorts will now show you to your buses. Thank you very much.

ROGER MUDD. Nothing is more essential to a democracy than the free flow of information. Misinformation, distortion, propaganda, all interrupt that flow. They make it impossible for people to know what their Government is doing, which, in a democracy, is crucial. The largest agency in our Government is the Department of Defense, and it maintains a public relations division to inform people of its activities.

In December, Congress cut the appropriations for this division, but, according to the Pentagon, it will still spend 30 million dollars this year on public affairs—an amount more than 10 times greater than what it spent to tell people about itself just 12 years ago. Even this figure may be only the tip of the public relations iceberg. A special, still unpublished report for the prestigious 20th Century Fund estimates the real total at 190 million dollars. The combined news budgets of the three commercial television networks—ABC, CBS, and NBC—are 146 million dollars.

Whatever the true cost at the Pentagon, there have been recent charges in the press and in Congress that the Department is using these public relations funds not merely to inform but to convince and persuade the public on vital issues of war and peace. Ten



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Senate

PROBLEMS OF RECONSTRUCTION OF VIETNAM AFTER THE WAR

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, I should like to commend to the Senate a speech of Senator WALTER MONDALE which he gave to the Baptist National Convention on May 14. He seeks to stimulate thought on the problems of reconstruction of Vietnam after the war is ended and American troops have departed.

The Senator has my gratitude for providing the needed incentive in calling for research by Far East experts, and I am certain that other Members of the Congress will want to find a forum for offering constructive suggestions to the executive branch and committees of Congress on this subject.

Senator MONDALE's thought that an international conference be called is a useful suggestion. In such an event, however, the United States should in no way attempt to dominate or seek to influence the outcome, as has been our tendency in years past. Rather we should provide the research assistance, the technical expertise which is needed and which is asked for.

I ask unanimous consent that these remarks be printed in the Record.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

REMARKS BEFORE BAPTIST NATIONAL CONVENTION

(By Senator WALTER F. MONDALE)

You asked me tonight to speak about peace and justice in the international community.

That was a generous choice of topics. We could talk of so many urgent needs—peace in the Middle East . . . an end to the savagery in Pakistan . . . justice for the victims of racial tyranny in Southern Africa . . . justice for the Arab refugees in the Middle East.

But nowhere tonight are the human stakes in peace more pressing—nowhere in the healing of justice more needed—than in the devastated lands of Indochina.

I could talk about the Indochina we all know too well—

The towering illusions and senselessness of the war.

The promises unmet in Paris and the blunders hidden in Laos and Cambodia.

The corruption of the Saigon regime and the barbarity of North Vietnam toward American prisoners.

And not least, the scarred and crippled young veterans who came to Washington a few weeks ago to turn in their silver stars and purple hearts . . . because they wanted this country to be through with the whole soul-destroying mess.

As for that Indochina, I think our obligations are clear.

We have more than met our military duty to the defense of South Vietnam. We now have a duty to ourselves to bring our men home.

But beyond the tawdry glitter of Saigon or the demonstrations in Washington, there is another Indochina—an Indochina seldom mentioned in Congress—by the Administration.

It is a land of fallow paddy fields, napalmed villages and defoliated forests—of bombed out schools and hospitals, and too many orphanages; of miserable resettlement camps for literally millions of refugees; of broken bodies and scarred minds; and of mute scenes of forgotten skirmishes.

I could talk to you of the tragedy in all this. But I would rather speak of hope.

President Johnson proposed such an effort six long years ago in an address at Johns Hopkins University.

"Neither independence nor human dignity," he said, "will ever be won . . . by arms alone. It also requires the work of peace."

But the drums of war drowned out those words.

It is time to muffle those drums . . . and hear the cries of the children of Indochina. The task will be enormous.

Even before the devastation and anguish brought by the war, most of the people of Indochina lived out a dreary cycle of want—malnourished, ill-housed, prey to disease, and facing death before 40.

The countries of Indochina were largely impoverished agrarian societies. The billions we have spent thus far in the name of helping them have done little to change that.

And in many ways, the war has made matters so much worse.

It has done irreparable harm to the village and family structure which were the foundations of life in rural Indochina.

A recently returned American observer (Don Luce) has estimated that more than one third of the Vietnamese people have been refugees.

Before the war more than 80 percent of the population was rural. Now it is 50 percent.

The family unit has been fragmented. The kinds of work the new urban population have been forced to do has wrenched the Vietnamese economy from agricultural pursuits to service functions. Yet no significant industrialization has taken place.

When the American military establishment departs, as it soon must, some of the older people will go back to the war-torn countryside. But what of the young who have no roots outside the cities? What will they do?

We have created in these newly urban masses, a well-paid proletariat, an American dependency. There is nothing to take our place when we are gone.

Nothing, that is, unless we begin to think and talk and formulate some meaningful alternatives to the economic and social vacuum which our military departure will create.

The problems are of a different order in Cambodia or Laos or North Vietnam, but they are just as compelling.

The technology that stripped bare the forests of Indochina must be put to work to bring farms back to life.

The organizational skills and money that mobilized more than a million men to fight a war can put them to meaningful work in building peace-time economies.

None of us can lay out a plan assured of success. The obstacles are too formidable for optimism. We would be unlearning all the lessons of this war, if we did not admit the incredibly complex political and human obstacles which will stand in the way of a reconstruction program.

We should never forget the pretensions that took us into this war.

We thought that we could shape the politics of Vietnam.

Then we thought that we could roll back with weapons an indigenous political movement that enjoyed wide support in South Vietnam.

And then we thought that we could destroy enough of that land to change the course of its history.

We succeeded only in destroying. We proved only that we were terribly wrong and that we couldn't decide their destiny for the people of Indochina.

But if we can combine the wisdom won through that folly and the energy and resources we brought to the war, we can help lay the framework for an enduring peace.

And we can be no less ambitious in that than we were in the work of destruction.

First, this could not be a unilateral American effort. We have had enough of that, and so have the people of Indochina.

Other countries have played significant roles in the conflict in Indochina, and they should also be involved.

The People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union should participate. The neighboring countries of Malaysia, Thailand, Burma, Indonesia and perhaps even India and Pakistan, should be brought in. Japan,

which is assuming an important position in international regional affairs should be a participant at an early stage.

Even more important, it must be the victims of this war—South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—who will play the major organizational and managerial role in their own development. Again, if this war has taught us anything, I would hope that it is that no outsider can make their decisions for them.

How could it begin? Here in the United States, perhaps, a bipartisan, bicameral group in the Congress like the Members of Congress for Peace Through Law might examine the situation in Indochina and the possibilities for organizing an initial research effort in consultation with the Executive Branch. President Johnson's Johns Hopkins speech of April 5, 1965 might be a good point of departure. And President Nixon supported this concept in his Foreign Policy Message to the Congress last year.

After preliminary work, an international conference could be called to determine the overall goals for a South East Asian Development Association. Invitees could include all the nations of Indochina, China, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Soviet Union and other countries in South and Southeast Asia.

The site for such a conference could be determined through consultation. Perhaps two conference sites could be selected initially, one in a major non-Communist capital in the region—Tokyo, Bangkok or Jakarta.

I think it might be appropriate for the other to be in Peking.

Such a conference could discuss broad plans for the reconstruction of Indochina and its economic reintegration into the economy of the region.

Each participating nation, aside from those of Indochina, could contribute funds. The programs could be administered by a joint council with a revolving chairmanship made up of the Indochinese members.

As for the U.S. contribution, we might start with a percentage of the total amount this country has spent in war efforts in Indochina since 1961. If that figure were to be only one percent, the total would be \$1 billion.

And that would be only a start on the needs of reconstruction. Others would also have to give generously.

The organization, for example, could maintain a coordinating secretariat in Tokyo. Japan could thus be brought into the mainstream of the plan. That strikes me as altogether fitting, since the Japanese have profited more than any other Asian nation from this war.

Of course, other major offices should be located in the nations of Indochina.

A possible point of departure for the organization's efforts might be the Mekong Valley Authority plan proposed by President Johnson and endorsed by President Nixon as well. This would underline the bipartisan nature of the American involvement in the plan.

It would be essential that there be no military assistance component in this multilateral effort. I realize that military aid may be an unfortunate necessity for the security of the countries involved, but this could be much better handled through bilateral aid mechanisms.

I can see a number of regional organizations which might be established under the direction of South East Asian Development Association. These could include:

- An Agricultural Research Institute;
- A Public Health Organization;
- An Industrial Development Corporation;
- An Agricultural Commodities Bank;
- An Export-Import Bank, and
- A University Center along the lines of the East-West Center of the University of Hawaii.

Certainly none of these suggestions should be taken as firm or binding. What I have been trying to do is to stimulate ideas. Each country will inevitably have special problems and needs which are not always amenable to multilateral efforts.

Ultimately, the decisions are with the nations of the area.

But perhaps these thoughts are at least

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start in the right direction.

In any case, we must confront both the problems and the opportunities.

A generation in Indochina has not known what it was like to sleep without fear of terror or the sound of bombs. A generation of peasants has not been able to walk out in their fields without searching the skies or hillsides or undergrowths for the threat of death.

And that fear and misery and bitterness will never make the generation of peace all of us—critics and supports of the Administration alike—want so desperately for our children.

John Kerry, the leader of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War, said it eloquently before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The people of Indochina want, he said, "... to be fed, to bury their dead in plots where their ancestors lived, to be allowed to extend their culture, to try and exist as human beings. . . . I think we have a very definite obligation to make extensive reparations to the people of Indochina."

And President Nixon said it in a speech to the United Nations in 1969:

"When the war ends, the United States will stand ready to help the people of Vietnam—all of them—in their tasks of renewal and reconstruction. And when peace comes at last to Vietnam, it can truly come with healing in its wings."

In this common effort, we can bind up not only the wounds in Southeast Asia, but also perhaps the divisions the war has created in America.

And if we truly believe in international peace and justice, we can do no better—and no less—than to try.

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