



[Return I. Holcombe Papers.](#)

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328) 2440 (74)
 2296
 1440
 1312
 128

248) 1790 (72) 1
 1736
 540
 4967
 44

328 222
 80
 248

358) 1720 (5)
 1500

140
 183
 323
 153
 58
 211

Mason d at Hanelburg
 Daniel B Demarest d NYC

Post for Duty

Officers - 10; men, 130. S.S. 1 off. 2-3 men.

On extra duty 4 offrs.

Sick including ord. 238. m

Detached Service (including 2 offrs + 45 men Co. C.) 17 off. 166 men

Total present and absent 415

3 bugles 12 musicians

Enlisted men killed and died of wds.

Loss July 2

K + M. W. 3 offrs 65 men = 68
 Wounded 6 " 112 " = 118
 Total 186

Summary

Total K + d. of wds = 95
 " ord not mortally 150
 missing 0
 Total 245

Loss July 3

K + M. W. 4 offrs 22 men = 27
 Wounded 3 " 29 " = 32
 Total 59

List for July 2 includes 1 killed
 + 1 ord. in forenoon before charge - (2);
 3 ord in Co. F (3) and 2 ord in
 Sharpshooters (2) - total 7; leaving
 179 K + ord on charge.

Aggregate Loss

July 2 K. and mortally ord 68
 " 3 " " " " 26
 Total K and M. W. - 94

141

Wounded not mortally
 July 2 6 offrs 112 men = 118
 " 3 3 " 29 = 37
 Total wounded not mortally 155

$$\begin{array}{r} 244 \\ 58 \\ \hline 186 \end{array}$$

179

Killed July 2

A 6
 B 3
 C 2 K both days
 D 5
 E 3
 F 6
 G 4
 H 5
94 men
 2 opps (Muller & James)
Total 36

Killed July 3

Q 3
 R 1
 S 2
 T 3
9 men
 1 opps
Total 10
 Sharpshooters 1
11

K. July 2 36
 " 3-11 11
 S of Mds 47
14
 61

Loss July 2

K 36 W 124 = 160
 Add 3 Co & 2 SS.
 1 K in forenoon 29
 1 W " " "

Loss July 3

K 11 W 28 = 39
 9 Mds July 3
128
 32
160

K 47 MW 14 W. 161 = 222
175
222

S. of Mds. both days

A 5
 B 1
 C 3
 D 2
 E 2
 F 1
14
 4
18

Wed July 2

A 13
 B 23
 C 17
 D 19
 E 14
 F 14
 G 16
 H 13
115 men in charge
 8 opps " "
123
 3 in Co F
 2 " " L
128

Wed July 3

A 4
 B 2
 C 7
 D 2
 E 3
 F 1
 G 6
 H 3
 K 1
29 men
 4 opps
33
 10 K
43

222
 47
175

160
 43
203 K+W both days

139
 53
 192

4
 2
 2
 1
 1
 4
 14

K July 2

A 6
 B 3
 C 2
 D 5
 E 5
 F 6
 G 4
 H 5
 34

44

15-3
 21
 132

Wed July 3

Wed July 2

A 4
 B 2
 C 7
 D 2
 E 2
 F 1
 G 6
 H 3
 I 1
 28

A 13
 B 23
 C 17
 D 19
 E 14
 F 16
 G 13
 H 115
 I 26
 141

3

Wed book days

War Records Vol. 2 7 Part H 176

to Minn. K, 3 pp 47 men - 50

Wds 14 Apr 159 men 173

223

82d Arty - 3 pp 42 K, 12 Apr 120 wds - 1 pp 47 capt & miss = 192

Mustering of regiment - Apr. 29/61 (2)

(1)

Field staff

Sub-officers & their companies

Gettysburg (3)

Statistics of losses & enlistments in the war (4)

Seven days battle (5)

Promotions (6)

General Conditions before Bull Run (6)

Recognition by G. F. K. "

Best Disciplined "

~~See~~

Antietam

Sam Bloomer (6)

Sept parade - Apr. 30/64 (6)

Morgan Discharge (7)

Colwell discharge (7)

Adams discharge (7)

May 23/63

Flag presentation at Friedrichsburg (7)

Dr. Haud prisoner (7)

Sam Bloomer 2nd Lieut in Invalid Corp. (7)
Aug. 1, 1862

Interactions with enemy soldiers
anecdote (7)

Promotions of officers of 1st to
other commands (8)

Woman's antecedents (8)

(2)

Col. Dana " (8)

Col. Sully " (8)

" Morgan " (8)

" Colville " (8)

Gettysburg (9)

" (10)

" (who commanded) (13)

Return to state (14)

Josias R. King subsequent command (14)

Helfferich's major in heavy artillery (14)

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Antietam (94)

Flag bearers (94)

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Alvarez's death (99)

John's May death (100)

Wm B. Leach 101 - death & history life.

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Wg.

(6)

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A precious opportunity was neglected, and it was noon of Sept. 14 when Franklin stormed the crest of the mountain at Crampton's Gap, after a hard won victory over Cobb's and Sumner's Brigades, of McCraw's, and Mahone's Brigades of R. H. Anderson's Division,

which had been left to guard the pass. ^{Freeman lost in} Killed and wounded 531,
 The Confederate loss was about 800; in Cobb's brigade alone 690.

The same day the Union fight ^{through the Seventh mountains} went on for the possession of Fox's and Turner's Gaps, six miles north of Crampton's. There was hard fighting and many splendid deeds by both sides. On the Confederate side, the fighting was done mainly by D. H. Hill's Division ^{of first} with Calquitt's and Garland's brigades of five regiments each. Two other brigades of his Division, Rodes's and George B. Anderson's, became actively involved, and in the afternoon Gen. George T. Anderson's, Kemper's, ^{and Jenkins's} Drayton's, ^{and Jenkins's} Brigades of Longstreet's came up. Longstreet's entire Corps had come

Lee at Antietam

General after general rode up to his headquarters, all with the same tale of discouragement and the same counsels of retreat. Gen. Hood was quite unmaimed, "My God," cried Lee with unmounted force and vehemence, "where are the ^{main of the} splendid division you had this morning?" And Hood answered: "They are lying back there on the field where you sent them." Even Stonewall Jackson urged retreat and had nothing to suggest but immediate withdrawal. Then Lee, who was on horseback, rose in his stirrups and said: "Gentlemen, we will not cross the Potomac tonight. Go to your respective commands, strengthen your lines, send two officers from each brigade to collect your stragglers. If McClellan wants to fight in the morning I will give him battle." A few minutes later Gen. Longstreet asked him: "Are we in ~~good~~ condition to fight to-morrow?" and Lee answered confidentially, "No; we are not—certainly not." Then he added with a smile: "We shall not have to fight; McClellan will not attack us. Do you believe he will?" And Longstreet shook his head. ^{27. P.} Henderson, Vol. 2, p. 323

Lincoln at Charleston Sept. 18, 1858
Said same thing at first meeting at Atlanta
This paragraph quoted at Lenoxy Oct. 13

I will say then that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black races; that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white people; and I will say, in addition, that there is a physical difference between the white and black races which I believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior, and I, as much as any other man, am in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race.

Burnside

547

All through the forenoon Burnside's attempts to carry the bridge had only excited the contempt, derision, and laughter of G. R. Jones, Longstreet, and Lee. They refused to re-enforce Toombs, believing that his 500 men and two batteries would be sufficient to resist Burnside's 13,000 men and nine batteries. So Longstreet repeatedly sent brigades from the Confederate right, near the bridge, up to help the Confederate left, and he furnished a great part of the force that fought ^{on} the Confederate center; but he did not think it worth while to help old Bob Toombs who, Horatius-like was keeping the bridge as in the brave days of old." But when Ferrero's Brigade

advances had no "steam" behind them. ^{Consequently}
 in the North Cape, from Burnside's front
 the Mexicans were secured a field of Lombard's gun
 mounted on a carriage, which was making the

At last at 1 o'clock, or a little later, Gen. Burnside
 ordered Gen. S. D. Sturgis, who commanded a Division,
^{of the Ninth Corps,} to charge across the bridge. Gen. Sturgis took Ferrero's
 Brigade, and putting the Fifty-First Pennsylvania, Col. Hartranft, and the Fifty-First New York,
 Col. Patten, in advance, with the Twenty-First and Thirty-
 Fifth Massachusetts following, he sent them charging
 across the bridge. They not only carried the bridge, but
 swept up the heights beyond and soon had secured
 a menacing position at the left end of the Confederate
 line. And this was done with practically, very little loss;
 only two Confederate batteries and a handful of skirmishers
 defended the bridge when the charge was made; yet Gen.
 Ferrero says that he "carried the bridge at the point of the
 bayonet at 1 o'clock, losing in doing so a large number of
 officers and men." *

* Gen. Ferrero also reports that after carrying the bridge he sent "one
 regiment" to the top of the hill "to retain the position gained till re-en-
 forcements should arrive." He would hardly have sent such a small force to
 such an exposed position if there had been much danger.

the bridge by sending his men at the creek above and below the bridge. The banks were steep, there was water in the creek, the Union regiments went in one ^{or two} at a time, and Tombs's 500 lay low and had easy work ~~holding them~~ ⁱⁿ and driving them back. Burnside steadily refused to try to carry the bridge itself, though McClellan sternly ordered him to, and though he had three divisions with thirty regiments of infantry and twenty batteries. The timorous general persisted in trying to cross the creek above and below the bridge*
 * He sought to cross the stream by the lower ford, and finally the

At 10 o'clock Tombs moved his three ~~up~~ little regiments down the creek to resist the passage of the lower fords, and thus left the bridge and the upper ford uncovered and practically undefended. Tombs was now re-inforced by the other two regiments of his brigade, the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Georgia, and by five companies of the Eleventh Georgia.
But this addition strengthened the defending force by ~~practically~~ only one regiment.
 The 1st, 15th and 17th replaced the 2nd and 20th, which went to the rear to fill cartridge boxes,
thus leaving Tombs but three regiments, his original number.
 It was easy to hold the lower fords, for the Union

Meanwhile a series of farcical operations had been conducted by Gen. Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, at the extreme left of the Union line and consequently the extreme right of the Confederate position. Here over Antietam Creek was a fine stone three-arch bridge, 110 feet ^{and} in length, ^{comprising} a part of the road from Rohrer'sville, six miles southeast of ~~Sharpsburg~~ and from down Harper's Ferry way. Sharpsburg is less than a mile west and a little north of the bridge. There is a narrow valley on either side of the creek above and below the bridge and back of the valleys are long high ridges. Just over the ridge to the west is ~~the~~ Sharpsburg, then a village of ⁵⁰⁰ badly frightened people; now a burg of 1,000 self-contained inhabitants.

The south or right of the Confederate line ran nearly down to the north end of the bridge. To guard that structure and prevent a Union force from crossing and rolling up the Confederate right was Gen. Robert Toombs's Brigade of Georgians, D. R. Jones's Division of Longstreet's Corps. It was stationed well up the slope of the northern ridge bordering the Antietam, in a rather thin skirt of trees, where were many ~~large~~ boulders. The front of the line was at first the Second and the Twentieth Georgia Infantry,

Each of the infantry were two batteries, Eubank's and Richardson's.

Gen. Toombs says were "about 400 muskets strong" Sate the Fiftieth Georgia, "scarcely 100 muskets," and a company from Jenkins's South Carolina brigade were added.

Confronting and threatening the bridge was Gen. Burnside's Fifth Corps, with three divisions, comprising thirty good big regiments of infantry and twenty batteries, in all 13,819 men present for duty." (McClellan's report.)

Gen. Burnside, on September 7, had been placed in command of the right wing of McClellan's army, composed of Hooker's Third (?) and Ren's Fifth Corps. Gen. Reno was killed at South Mountain, Sept. 14, and the next day Gen. McClellan "detached" Hooker and his Corps from Burnside's command, and Burnside placed Gen. J. D. Cox in temporary command of the Fifth Corps, Gen. Cox having previously led a division in that Corps.

It was Gen. McClellan's idea to attack both ends of the Confederate line at nearly the same time, defeat them and push them back on the center, and then attack the center, thus, in sporting parlance, "playing both ends against the middle." Hooker and Manassas were first to attack the north end, and Burnside the south. If either attack was a complete success, the other would be; but neither was.

The high ridge on the east side of the Antietam had a string of Union batteries along it on the evening of the 16th and they commanded the Confederate position at the bridge and D. R. Jones's Division, farther up the line, rather fiercely. Two companies of Lombardmen and a company of Texans belonging to Hood went across the Antietam and engaged the Union skirmishers until after dark. Embank's, aided by Eshelman's of the Washington (New Orleans) Artillery, attempted to answer the Union artillery fire, but Gen. D. N. Hill says the attempt was simply a "melancholy farce." *

Gen. McClellan says he ordered Burnside to attack at 8 o'clock on the 17th, but Burnside says it was 10 o'clock when he received the order. The issue of veracity was never settled. Gen. Cox thinks it was about 9 o'clock when McClellan's order came. It was known that there were fords above and below the bridge, and Gen. Isaac P. Rodman (not Gen. J. J. Rodman, the inventor of the gun) was directed to cross with his Division of two brigades and Scammon's Division (formerly Cox's) at the lower ford, half a mile below the stone bridge. Sturgis's Division and Crook's brigade ^{of Cox's} were on both sides of the road in front of the bridge, while Willcox's

* "An artillery duel between the Washington Artillery and the Yankee batteries across the Antietam, on the 16th, was the most melancholy farce in the war." — Hill's report.

Division was in reserve in the rear of Sturgis. The batteries to the northeast were still in place. These arrangements, it would seem, were sufficiently magnificent to defeat 500 Confederate infantry and ~~two batteries with~~ seven cannon of small caliber.

As there were fords across the stream easily passed, both above and below the bridge, and the way up the hill towards Sharpsburg and the Confederate position as easy one place as another, it would seem that the Union commanders might not have troubled themselves ^{much} about the stone arch bridge. A crossing above and below would take the bridge as certainly and much more easily, than a direct assault. In fact Rodman's Division and Scammon's Brigade crossed easily with artillery at the lower ford and part of Crook's brigade crossed at the upper ford, both crossings being practically unresisted.

But Burnside had orders to carry the bridge by assault and he seemed determined to do it, ^{although he acted very leisurely about it} Gen. S. D. Sturgis was selected to conduct the work. Burnside thought best to put regiments along the creek ~~at~~ on each side of the bridge and let them open fire on the Confederates on the other side of the stream, halfway up the hill, among the trees.

Then when the Confederates were driven away or were in confusion by the firing on them, two or three regiments could charge over the bridge. Two attempts of this kind were made and both failed. Tombs's men, from their vantage ground, had a plunging fire on the troops down in the valley and slew them by scores, and wounded them by hundreds. The greater part of Crook's brigade, with the Eleventh Connecticut of Rodman, tried this ~~and~~ brilliant maneuver with disastrous result. Col. Kingsbury, of the Connecticut regiment, was among the killed. Then Sturgis sent in Gen. Nagle's brigade, and it too made a bloody failure. Precious hours were wasted in this criminal blundering.

All through the forenoon Burnside's attempts to carry the bridge had only excited the contempt, derision, and laughter of B. R. Jones, Longstreet, and Lee. They refused to re-engage Tombs, though he begged them to, because they seemed to think that with his 500 men and seven cannons he was able to resist Burnside with his 14,000 men and nine batteries. So Longstreet repeatedly sent brigades from the Confederate right, near the bridge, up to help the Confederate left, and he furnished a great part of the force that fought on the Confederate center; but he did not think it worth while to help old Bob Tombs, who, Horatius-like, was keeping the bridge against great odds.

At last, about 1 o'clock in the afternoon, when all the other fighting was well over, at Antietam, Gen. Burnside's troops carried the stone arch bridge, and thereafter unto this day it is called the Burnside bridge. ~~It was carried in this way.~~ Gen. McClellan sent word that it must be taken at all hazards. Gen. Burnside was greatly worried over the matter and directed Gen. Sturgis to "capture the bridge, for God's sake." So Sturgis selected the Fifty-First New York, Col. R. B. Potter, and the Fifty-First Pennsylvania, Col. John H. Hatraupt (both officers afterward greatly distinguished) to do the assaulting and the Twenty-First and Thirty-Fifth Massachusetts regiments were to follow them. All four regiments belonged to Gen. Ferrero's brigade, Sturgis's Division.

The two Fifty-First's rushed across the bridge in fine style and in a few seconds had reached the west bank of the creek. The two Massachusetts regiments followed quickly and the work which had required Burnside four hours to prepare was executed by a small battalion of his men in four minutes. Gen. Ferrero reports that he sent "one regiment up to the top of the hill to retain the position gained till re-inforcements should arrive."

So the position was "cinched" against the Confederates and was a great menace to them; ~~at least it would have been had an enterprising, intelligent Union commander been in charge of the "cinch."~~

~~To one who was not present and saw it, but forms his opinion from the records of and from other printed authorities,~~ it is difficult to determine whether the charging across and capture of the Burnside bridge was a remarkable feat ^{or not}. It is questionable whether the assault or charge was very strenuously resisted, ~~whether they were there to resist it.~~ The bridge was so under the heel that the Confederate batteries could not reach its assailants, and according to the Confederate authorities there could not have been more than 400 infantry present as defenders. ~~Zoumb's~~ ^{Zoumb's} claims he had but 500 in all at the first, and of these the 100 of the Fifth Georgia and the half company were "too far below on the creek to resist the main point of attack and rendered little or no service in this fierce and bloody struggle." Gen. D. R. Jones says that Gen. Zoumb had but 403 men in the fight and until the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Georgia came (which was after the bridge was carried) "my force had been too weak to aid him with a single man."

400
168
240

551

Gen. Tombs claims that ~~the~~ ^{had been killed} Lieut Col. Holmes, and "fully one-half" of the Second Georgia killed and wounded, and the Twentieth had also suffered severely in killed and wounded" before the Ferrero regiments carried the bridge. Both his regiments, he says, were "nearly out of ammunition." The General says he led his entire command away from the bridge to the "two lower fords," where Gen. Rodman and Col. Seaman had crossed or were crossing and mentions no special fighting as having occurred when the charge was made. But Gen. S. R. Jones says: "The gallant Second and Twentieth (Georgia) having repulsed five(?) separate assaults and exhausted their last rounds of ammunition, fell back, leaving the bridge to the enemy."

The fact that Gen. Ferrero, immediately after his regiments had crossed, rushed only one of them to the top of the hill is evidence that there was not much danger to be feared from the Confederates present at that time. Gen. Tombs reported the loss of his two regiments at Antietam at 138 killed and wounded, and 21 missing, ^{out of the 400 with which he fought.} Probably the bridge was defended by 250 men when it was captured.

Radman and Seaman crossed at the corner
 and under a shower of grape, but no musketry.
 After a slow movement, lasting two hours, the rest
 of the Ninth Corps was on the west side of the center
 line. When these troops were in position the Confederates
 But, referring to the charge, Gen. Burnside, in his
 report, says:

Our loss at this place was fearful, the enemy
 being posted in rifle-pits and behind barricades,
 within easy musket range of our men and almost
 entirely concealed and covered from our shots. We
 lost at this point some of our most valuable officers.
 Among them was Col. H. W. Kingsbury, of the Eleventh
 Connecticut, and Lieut. Col. Bell, Fifty-First Pennsylvania.

It is difficult to see how the loss could have been
 "fearful," since there were not more than 275 Confederates
 to inflict it, and the charge was made and
 the fighting all over and Lomb's men in full retreat
 in five minutes. The distance that Ferrera's
 men had to travel in making the charge was not much
 over 400 yards. Col. Kingsbury had been killed an
 hour before, in the attempted charge of Crook's Brigade.

3-3-3

Had the matter been intelligently managed on the Union side, the bridge would have been carried by 9 o'clock at the latest, and then the battle would have resulted differently, as will be explained. But Gen. Burnside, like the rest of McClellan's generals, had been informed by ~~the~~ McClellan himself and made to believe that the Confederates numbered 100,000 men, while the Union force was but 87,000. So every general was very cautious about his movements, fearing at every step that a huge rebel force would suddenly rush out upon him and crush him. Then this was the Burnside who, after his brigade had fought splendidly for 20 minutes at Bull Run, obtained permission to march it back to fill the cartridge boxes, then marched it off the field and never returned, though the fighting lasted five hours longer.

Radman and Scammon crossed the Antietam at the lower ford "under a shower of grape," and formed on the left of Sturgis's division, with Willcox's on the right of Sturgis's, the entire line facing to the west and occupying the crest of the ridge just in front of the village of Sharpsburg. The idea was to charge.

the right end of the Confederate line; but it was two hours after the bridge was carried before the Union force was ready. It was 3 o'clock when the line, ^{was formed} and at that time Gen. Burnside came across the creek "to hurry matters," though he soon returned. *

To resist Burnside Gen. Jones put in Zoumb's reconstruction brigade of four Georgia regiments, the Second and Twentieth having filled their cartridge boxes; and also Drayton's and Kemper's and Walker's (or Jenkins's) brigades; Garnett's (or Pickett's) brigade afterward came in. The entire five brigades numbered probably 2,000 men. Garnett says he had less than 200. Of his five Virginia regiments the Eighth entered the fight with 22 men and lost 11, but was commanded by Col. Eppa Hunton. The Nineteenth had 50 men commanded by Lieut. Wood. The Fifty-Sixth had 40 men.

The Union advance was made about 3:45 o'clock, two hours too late for its success. Had it been made even an hour earlier, all would have been well.

* It was charged by McClellan and others that Gen. Burnside "did not cross Antietam creek that day and at no time was in peril." But Gen. Cox testifies that Burnside came over at 3 o'clock "to hurry matters," and that he was in personal danger, for he was near an ammunition wagon at one time and this wagon might have been exploded by a shell from the enemy!

Jones's little brigades fought very fiercely, but they were driven all the same. Kemper's and Drayton's were driven back through the outskirts of Sharpsburg. ~~Walker's~~ Walker's and Garnett's were also pushed back, and finally Toombs's was forced to give way. On the Union side Sturgis's Division had been left in reserve, and the old Kanawha Division, (Cox's) now under Beaumont, and Willcox's were doing the first fighting and doing it well. Welsh's and Christ's brigades of Willcox drove the enemy through fields and farm yards until they reached the edge of Sharpsburg. The greater part of the ^{Corps} batteries had crossed the creek and were at work and they blew Gen. Jones's shattered force out of an apple orchard and from an elevation, and Willcox's infantry pushed forward and occupied the high ground commanding Sharpsburg on the ~~side~~ southeast, where the National Cemetery is now located.

Rodman's Division was now coming forward from the lower fords to join in a swing to the

right designed to sweep Jones's Division clear away. The Division had not come far when it encountered the enemy; and it seemed that this enemy was another force than that fighting Wilcox and Scamman. In truth it was. Many of the men, though Confederates, wore bright blue Union trousers and other pieces of the Yankee uniform.

The force that Rodman encountered was A. P. Hill's Division, with five brigades, Branch's ^{North Carolina}, Gregg's ^{South Carolina}, Field's ^{Virginia}, Archer's ^{miscellaneous}, and Pender's ^{Virginia}; the sixth, Thomas's ^{Georgia}, had been left at Harper's Ferry. Many of the ragged ^{and destitute} Confederates, when the boxes of captured Union clothing were opened at Harper's Ferry, helped themselves to what they needed most in the way of wardrobes, and this is why they were so finely dressed when they came to Sharpsburg. Gen. Hill left Harper's Ferry that morning at 7:30. After a march of 17 miles he says the "head" of his Division reached the Antietam battle field at 2:30; the whole Division was up at 3:30 and went into battle about 4.

Coming into the fight Hill sent Pender's and Field's Brigades down to near the mouth of the Antietam to watch

the lower fields and they did no active work in the battle. So Hill fought with but three brigades and he says they did not comprise "over 2,000 men." He had also four batteries, Braxton's, Pegram's, and Crenshaw's Virginia and McIntosh's Pee Dee, South Carolina, Battery. Two of these went in in advance of the infantry.

There was a little corn patch 100 yards wide on the outskirts of Sharpsburg and behind it and through it and over some plowed ground A. P. Hill first advanced his forces. The Union troops had done well; had broken Gen. Jones's division and driven it back, and had just captured the Pee Dee battery, when Hill's infantry became actively engaged. As Lawton's division coming suddenly up had defeated Hooker, and as McLaws's and Walker's Divisions hastily appearing had driven off Sedgwick, so now A. P. Hill's sudden and unexpected advent on the battlefield checked and drove back Burnside. Hill boasts that, "my 2,000 men, with the help of my four splendid batteries, drove back Burnside's Corps of 15,000 men." While the boast is much exaggerated, the painful truth is that Burnside's Corps was driven back.

Within a few minutes after Hill's men went in

558

346
138
484

Archer's Brigade had re-captured McIntosh's Pee Dee battery, Rodman's two brigades had been routed and in trying to rally one of them, Harland's, Gen. Rodman fell mortally wounded ^{by a musket ball.} By sunset the whole Union line had fallen back to the crest of the bridge over looking the bridge and Antietam creek.

Gen. McClellan was badly frightened at the result. He actually feared that the Confederates would crush Burnside's Corps, cross the stone arch bridge, turn the Union left flank and disastrously defeat the whole Union army! He sent orders ^{to Burnside} to hold his line. It has always been reported ^{and not denied} that this order was in these words: "Hold your ground! If you cannot, then the bridge, to the last man. Always the bridge! If the bridge is lost, all is lost!" How ^{correctly} ^{or incorrectly} the Young Napoleon judged the situation ~~to~~ everybody that has investigated the subject now knows.

Gen. Hill reported that his loss in killed and wounded out of his ~~of~~ 2,000 men was 346, Gen. Tombs said he lost 138. Gen. Jones's five brigades probably lost 100 to the brigade. So that the total Confederate loss at ~~at~~ in the fighting at the extreme Confederate right was about 1,000.

Gen. O'Brien Branch, of North Carolina, and two Colonels were among the Confederates killed. Gen. Branch was the commander that fought Fitz John Porter at Hancock's House the previous May.

The Total Loss in Burnside's Ninth Corps was 2,349. Of this number only 113 were reported missing, so that the killed and wounded numbered 2,236. By far the greater portion of the casualties occurred in Burnside's foolish attempts to carry the stone arch bridge by placing men in exposed positions on either side of it and not expending more effort at a direct assault. The only direct assault succeeded, but it was not made till ~~at~~ 1 o'clock. It could as well have been made at 9, and should have been.

Delays are dangerous always, and military delays are perhaps the most harmful. Had Gen. Burnside carried Antietam bridge at 8:30 or 9, or made a formidable demonstration at that time, he would have been engaged with John G. Walker's division, which at that time, ~~or perhaps at 9:30~~ was guarding the Antietam lower ford. It was after 9 o'clock when Gen. Walker received orders to go up and

help the Confederates left against Sedgwick's oncoming charge. Walker's two strong brigades got on Sedgwick's left flank in the Dunker church woods and caused the main trouble resulting in Sedgwick's retreat under Sumner's orders. Sedgwick could have repelled McCraw's front attack, and doubtless would have done so; but the coming of Walker's division caused the mischief. If Burnside had begun operations at 8:30 or even 9, Walker would not have come.

Again, if Burnside had carried the bridge at 10 o'clock and thrown his troops across the Antietam and vigorously engaged the enemy, he could have rolled up the Confederate right and A.P. Hill would not have interfered. The probability is that Gen. Hill would have learned the situation before getting near Sharpsburg and would have turned and gone back to Harper's Ferry for safety. But if he had come he would have wished he hadn't. Burnside's slowness and indecision, like McClellan's, were fairly criminal offenses against the Union cause.

123
36
159
169

872

Capt. Coates reports: "Our loss is 4 commissioned officers and 47 men killed, 13 officers and 162 men wounded, and 6 men missing—total 232, out of less than 330 men and officers engaged." In Capt. Coates's revised report made near Ellis Ford, Va., August 3, he incloses a list of the killed and mortally wounded in the fights of both days, and says of the charge the first day: "We there lost in killed and wounded more than two-thirds of ~~the~~ our men and officers who were engaged." (Ibid, p. 374.) Now two-thirds of 282 is but 188.

The nominal list of killed and wounded furnished by Capt. Coates shows that on July 2 the Regiment lost 2 officers (Muller and Farrar) and 34 men killed outright and 8 officers (Calville, Adams, Downie, Harmon, Sinclair, Peller, Demarest, and De Gray) and 115 men wounded, a total of but 159. (Ibid, p. 375-6.) But this list does not include any wounded from Company H, the Hastings Company, which had 6 men killed. The average wounded in the other companies is about 14, and this number added to 159 makes 173. There are still lacking 15 names to make 188.

152) 1350 (90
K&MM
* 5 76

870

330
282
48

282
48
234

Within the few minutes required to "charge those lines" at Gettysburg, the First Minnesota, out of 282 officers and men, lost 235 killed and wounded—none captured or missing—or 82 per cent of the number engaged. This gave the Regiment the "sad but glorious" distinction of losing more men in a single battle than any other regiment in the Union army save the Thirty-Ninth Missouri, which in its engagement with 400 guerrillas and irregulars at Centralia, Mo., in September, 1864, had 135 killed and one wounded out of a total force of 152, or 90 per cent. As near as can now be determined, 2 officers and 34 men of the First Minnesota were killed and died on the field July 2, and 2 officers and 14 men died of wounds they received, a total of killed and died of wounds of 52. Seven officers and about 132 men, a total of 139, were severely wounded, making the aggregate of killed, mortally wounded, and severely wounded 191.

330
 $\frac{232}{98}$ men left after
 the fight

11) 330 30
 871

Within the few minutes required to "charge those lines" at Gettysburg the First Minnesota lost heavily. The eight companies engaged had in the aggregate 282 officers and men, according to the reports, an average of about 35 men to the company. Companies C and F were temporarily absent. The entire number of officers and men of the Regiment when it ^{came to Gettysburg} entered the fight, was, according to the report of Capt. Coates, commanding the Regiment July 5, 330. This would allow but 48 to both C and F, or 24 officers and men each. Whether Capt. Coates included Company E, the Sharpshooters, among the 282 cannot be said.

Lockien says of the regimental loss: "Of the 262 men who made the charge, 215 lay upon the field, stricken down by rebel bullets, 47 were in line, and not a man was missing," etc. But by an innocent mistake the learned writer exaggerates the loss. He evidently derives his figures from Capt. Coates's report of July 5, 1863, (Vol. 2 Minn. in Civil & Ind Wars, p. 372) though the report, Lockien says, is condensed from one that he made. Stating the entire loss of the Regiment, in the fights of both days,

July 2 - 200 lbs. and 34 men held on field (36) 200 lbs and 4 men M.W.
 (6) Total K 4 M, 91, 40 lbs and 38 men - 42 - 30 lbs and 120 men Wd, 12-3.
 Total 42 K and 123 men = 165
 July 3 - 100 lbs and 8 men K (9) 200 lbs and 3 men M.W. (5) Total K x M. W. = 46
 Total 114; 100 lbs and 29 men Wd. (32) Total K x M. W. = 46
 165
 211
 Total 2 days
 330
 201
 129

Capt Louis Muller, Co E } K July 2
 Lieut Waldo Farrar, Co J }

Capt Joseph Periam, Co. K } Died July 7 Wd July 2
 Lieut. David B. Demarest, Co. E } Died July 30

Capt. Thomas Sinclair, Co. B, }
 Lieut James Schray, Co. G, } Wd. July 2
 Lieut Geo. Boyd, Co. I }

Capt. Nathan S. Murrick, Co. G } K. July 3
 Capt Wilson B. Farrell, Co. M. W. July 3 - Died July 4
 Lieut. Chas. H. Mason, Co. D } " " " " " Aug. 18

Lieut Wm. Harmon, Co. C, }
 Lieut. C.B. Kiffelfinger, Co. D, } Wd. July 3
 Lieut. Wm. M. May, Co. B. }

P. for duty May 342
 15 days 31
 373
 144
 224
 168
 P. for duty July.
 Chas. H. Mason
 373
 168
 205

42
 14
 56

Enlisted Men.

Wounded July 2		Killed July 2		Wounded July 3		Killed	
A	13	G	14	A	4	G	1
B	23	H		B	2	H	6
C		I	16	C	7	I	3
D	17	K	13	D		K	1
E	19		11 5 inches	E	2		29
F*		J	3	F	2	J	1
			2				10
			1				
			20				

* Not in charge but lost 3 on skirmish line.

Died of Wds. Ried both days 40 lbs 14 men = 18

871

and 29 men wounded, a total of 46, ~~including~~ including a loss of 1 killed and 2 wounded in the Sharpshooters deducting these 46 from 232, (which Capt. Coates says was the total number lost in both days, counting 3 men wounded in Company D) leaves but 186 as the number killed and wounded on the Charge.

In his report of July 5 Capt. Coates says: "Our loss is, 4 commissioned officers and 47 men killed, 13 officers and 162 men wounded, and 10 missing, a total of 232, out of less than 330 men engaged." Three officers (Capt. Periam, July 7; Lieut. Semarest, July 30; and Lieut. Mason, Aug. 18) and 7 men died of wounds after Capt. Coates made his report, according to the original monthly return of the Regiment for July, 1863, now on file in the State Adjutant General's office. But that return also shows that only 2 officers and 32 men were killed on July 2, the day of the Charge. One officer (Capt. Massick) and 8 men were killed on the field July 3, and 2 officers (Capt. Farrell, July 4, and Lieut. Mason, August 18) and 3 men died of wounds, a total of 14 killed and died of wounds, July 3. The wounded were 3 officers and 29 men, as stated above.

According to the return mentioned the First Minnesota had killed and mortally wounded at Gettysburg 7 officers and 47 men killed and died of wounds, a total of 54, and this includes the loss in both days of fighting.

Livamore

U. forces with engaged 88,289 77,518
 Campd " " " 75,000 or between 74,186 and 76,300

Lanes

Union - K 3155; Md. 14,529, total 17,684; M. 5365 = 23,049
 Campd 3903; " 18,735 22,638 5425 28,063
 capt after battle 1360
26703

369
65
11'
26 AC, 812) 5880(71
54 3376 90 11 568.4
10 4135 7
112 5
960

K M. Can
112 350 516
350
516
978

N

8-73

Lochren says of the fighting of the Regiment on July 3: "Our loss in killed and wounded in this day's fight was seventeen." It seems that he took this number 17 from Capt. Coates's total of both fights which gave him 215, and which he says was the number that "lay upon the field" after the charge. But the nominal list furnished by Capt. Coates shows that on July 3 the Regiment lost 2 officers (Messick and Farrill) and 9 men killed, and ~~and~~ 4 officers (Mason, Hefelfinger, Harmon, and May) and 28 men wounded, a total of 43 killed and wounded, instead of only 17. These figures do not take into account the 4 wounded men in Company I that served with Battery A, Fourth U. S., nor the one man, Sylvester Brown, of the Sharpshooters who was killed at Woodruff's battery July 3; nor does it include three men of Company I, wounded July 2 when absent from the Regiment.

The Regiment lost 3 officers (Perriam, Mason, and Semarest) and 14 men that died of wounds, a total of 17. We know that Capt. Perriam and Lieut. Semarest were wounded July 2, and Lieut. Mason July 3, but it cannot be told from the records on which day the mortally

wounded of the men were hit

65-8-679

477 - just south stood a larger square
brick house. The cluster of houses and
the brick house became rallying



THE BEACON TABLET

the flag to other brave hands. He had received it when the gallant Burgess fell with it at Savage's Station and had borne it in honor thereafter. The Brigade entered the West Woods to the right or north of the Dunker Church. ^{The report was given by Hopp's Division, two brigades, Egw's and Wofford's.} Directly opposite was the old Bernard E. Bee brigade of Bull Run, now commanded by Col. E. M. Law, of the Fourth Alabama. ^(Law's report) The regiments were ^{as of old,} the Second and Eleventh Mississippi, Fourth Alabama, and Sixth North Carolina. German's Brigade had last met them at Fair Oaks. ^{Now they were soon driven out of the woods and left the field.} Sedgwick's Division had now reached the most advanced position against the enemy that was occupied by the Union forces during the battle. German's was the front brigade. It constituted a diagonal line, from north-west to south-east, facing toward the southwest, and the First Minnesota was on the northwest end, the farthest regiment to the front that day. The Division had come into the woods between Williams's and Green's

* "Under direction of Gen. Hood, I reformed my brigade in the rear of Saint Mungas Church (Dunker's Chapel) and together with the Texas Brigade, which had also retired, again confronted the enemy who seemed to hesitate to enter the road." — Law's report, War Recs., Vol. 19, part 1, p. 936.



A 497

Divisions of Mansfield's Corps, which had succeeded not only to the position of Hooker's Corps on the field, but to its fate. Both Divisions were in disorder and badly scattered. In passing into the woods the Thirty-Fourth New York ran afoul of a derelict regiment, the One Hundred and Twenty-Fifth Pennsylvania, which in the wreck of William's (now Crawford's) Division, had drifted away upon the sea of battle; and the two regiments were badly tangled for awhile. This caused the gallant Thirty-Fourth to become detached from the Brigade for a time, the Pennsylvania regiment intervening. There was also ^{wide} a gap between the left ^{of the Thirty-Fourth} and French's Division. Of course all this time the Brigade was firing upon the enemy - or upon the enemy's supposed position for no enemy could be seen. It was receiving a deadly fire in return. It was steadily but slowly pressing forward, driving back Law's and Hood's Brigades and "Lige" Anderson's as well. It was losing men fast but it had them to lose. The enemy was running short of ammunition and was being badly shattered. Gen. Hood had called loudly and repeatedly for reinforcements and not receiving them had ordered his ~~own~~

36
45
57
58
+ 190
4970

Sumner's Brig. loss.

498

and it was striking

Barkley's Brig	891
Cobb's	357
Kershaw	936
Sumner	709
	<u>2,893</u>

McLaws' Div.

Command to retire ~~to the right on Early's command.~~ But just at that critical time, when ^{but at this decisive time} ten minutes more would have brought a Union victory, ~~Confederate re-enforcements came.~~

It was not later than half past 10 o'clock when McLaws' Division, 2,893 men, arrived ^{at Lee's headquarters} from Harper's Ferry. They had left the Ferry at midnight, waded the Potomac, and by a roundabout route had marched nearly 18 miles to get to Sharpsburg ^{which they reached at sunrise.} The men had no bread ^{including Kershaw's brigade}; many had not eaten for two days.* All were there ^(not note) fore desperate and wolfish and in fine fighting trim, in one respect.

McLaws had four brigades and their respective strengths were thus apportioned: Barksdale's, 891 (see note); Cobb's, 357; Kershaw's, 936; Sumner's, 709; total, 2,893. They were brought into action in response to Hood's frantic demands and relieved his two brigades, they going to the rear to "fill their cartridge boxes" (?) returning at 1 o'clock. This must be copied. It was marked out in mistake for the footnote on p. 496.

* "Owing to the exigencies of the service my command were without their usual supply of subsistence from Monday morning, Sept. 15th until the night of the 17th. All were worn and famished." Kershaw's report, War Recs. Vol. 19, part 1, p. 864. Gen. Barksdale (ibid. p. 883) reports that many of his brigade had been on duty for five or six days and on the march from Harper's Ferry many feel exhausted and that he took less than 800 into the battle.

658

points for the disordered troops returning from the attack. The fork in the telegraph road and the brick house were less than 150 yards from the stone wall, behind which Longstreet's infantrymen were posted, and which ^{extended} along the edge of the plain in front of the brick house for half a mile. A little in advance of this brick house a slight rising ground afforded some protection from the musketry behind the stone wall, but not against the combined and converging ^{fire of the Confederate artillery on the heights. It must be borne in mind that the stone wall was at the base of the hill. That battery was on the crest, 100 yards back of and 50 feet higher than the wall.} Now, the Confederate force on the heights and Mery's Hill was of Longstreet's Corps. Mc Law's Division, with four brigades — Kershaw's South Carolina, Barke-dale's Mississippi and Cobb's and Sumner's Georgia — was in front; in its rear as a reserve was Ransom's Division, two brigades of North Carolinians; to the south of Mc Law were Pickett's and Hood's Divisions; to the left was R. N. Anderson's. Gen. Mc Law ^(in Battle & Casuals) says that the heights above Kershaw's and Barke-dale's brigades were crowned with 18 rifle guns and 8 smooth bores; the official records confirm this and also show that there was present Col. Walton's Washington Artillery,

64
73
48

2021

659 and 50 feet higher than 2081

These guns being 100 yards back of the stone wall (behind which the infantry lay) could easily fire over that infantry without danger to them.

nine guns, and Alexander's Artillery Battalion, seven batteries, with a number of smooth bores from the reserve artillery. French's Division did not have to go against the right of Hood's and the left of Anderson's Divisions, but it had to squarely assault McLaws' and Ransom's and indirectly attack Pickett's ^{division} and Featherston's Mississippi brigade of Anderson's Division. In all French's men had to undergo the fire of 20,000 infantry and ^{at least} 53 pieces of artillery. The division went into the charge with less than 2,800 officers and men. It was composed of 11 old and two new regiments, ^{and the old regiments averaged less than 200 men apiece.}

A few minutes after noon French's Division ^{which} charged, Kimball's brigade leading, and a part of his brigade getting into the cluster of houses, which Gen. Kimball in his report calls "a small village." No sooner had the Division burst upon the plain than from Longstreet's 53 cannon and Longstreet's 20,000 infantry came terrible and horrible volleys. The shot and shell opened gaps in the ranks, but the gaps were closed, and the constantly thinning lines pressed bravely on. They nearly reached the stone wall when ^{Cobb's brigade and} all the infantry within range opened upon

275) 1166 (40
1100
60

660

4834) 20210 (42
19336
8740

them. Let us hasten with the story. The shattered and broken brigades, having lost ^{nearly} half their number, fell hastily back, amid the shouts and yells of the Confederates. Back they went to the brick house and the cluster of houses, where they reformed and held their ground under a continuous artillery fire. The division had lost 1,160 in killed and wounded out of about 2,750. Among the killed was Col. Zimm, of the 130th Pennsylvania, a new regiment; this brave officer, while carrying the flag of his regiment, ^{fell} following French's came Hancock's Division, with Zook's, Meagher's Irish, and Caldwell's brigades in that order. Zook's and Meagher's got nearer to the stone wall than any who had gone before except a few of Kimball's men, and nearer than any brigade that followed them; this was what the burial parties reported. Half a dozen of Meagher's Irishmen and a like number of Zook's Fifty-Third Pennsylvania were picked up within 50 feet of the wall. Hancock's men were driven back as French's had been. Hancock took in 4,834 officers and men and lost 2,021 in killed and wounded, including 34 officers killed outright.

*Foot note - See opposite side of sheet for copy.

* Post note, To go on opposite side of sheet.
 According to Col. ^{Robert} McMullan's report, ^(see War Recs.) it was "twelve or fifteen minutes after" the repulse of French's division from in front of the stone wall when the Confidante Gen. Thos. R. R. Cobb, commanding the Georgia brigade, was mortally wounded. A stray bullet passed through the calf of his leg, cutting an artery. He received prompt and thorough attention but died in two hours. His five Georgia regiments were the principal defenders of the stone wall. He was a brother of Howell Cobb, ^{and was} a noted lawyer and author of law books.

661

Gen. Couch now ordered out ^{Col.} Owen's and ^{Col.} Hall's Brigades of Howard's division. Luckily he did not call for Sully's Brigade. ^{Gen.} Couch's first intention was to send these brigades to the right to make a flank attack, instead of pushing them as a forlorn hope over the ground where French and Hancock had gone. But Hancock and French called earnestly for help and Couch countermanded the first order and sent Gen. Howard with the two brigades mentioned to support Hancock. Howard left Sully's Brigade in the outskirts of town ready to support either Owen or Hall.

Col. Owen moved out Hanover street and crossed the canal on the bridge. He began to receive case shot and shell before he got outside of the town. Kirby's battery came up to his support and opened on the enemy at a thousand yards. ~~Col.~~ The Colonel deployed the brigade on a plowed field and advanced to within 100 yards of the Confidante "first line," which was the stone wall near the base of the hill. ^{The original, crowned crest was called the second line.} A terrific fire was opened on him and he ordered his brigade to lie down, which it did, ^{and} this saved many ~~of~~ men. The brigade fired on

662

the enemy and kept fighting until nightfall. Col. Owen was a brave man and a skillful officer and knew how to take care of his men and at the same time ^{make them} acquit themselves creditably. He reported to Gen. Howard while on the field: "I was sent out here to support Gen. Hancock's Division; but there is not much left ^{left} to support." The total loss of killed and wounded in the brigade was 258, of which Baxter's Grenades (72d Pa.) lost 71, and ~~the California Regiment (71st Pa.) 44.~~

Col. Hall, of the Seventh Michigan, commanding the Third Brigade, (Dana's old command) followed Col. Owen, but was not nearly so careful of his men. He went tearing up against a part of the stone wall near the foot of the hill and made two determined attempts to carry it and kill all the "rebs" in his front. He was driven back both times. The first fire on him must have been a terrible one, for it drove back the Seventh Michigan, the Lammery Regiment, the Fifty-Ninth New York, and the Abeneteenth Massachusetts, but the brave Twentieth Massachusetts never budged an

8) 515 (64
 48
 35

663

and two days before ^{had} lost 97 on Hanover street, while driving the Mississippians out of town.

$$\begin{array}{r} 800 \\ 133 \\ \hline 667 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{r} 280 \\ 163 \\ \hline 443 \end{array}$$

inches, though it lost 125 of its 300 men. The fleeing regiments soon stopped, reformed, and came back, and again tried to carry the Confederate position. The Nineteenth Massachusetts drove some skirmishers out of some houses, captured the buildings, and held them, but lost severely, including two commanding officers and nine officers in all. Col. Hall reported to Gen. Howard: "I can hold my position, but can't advance" and Howard replied: "Hold your position." And Col. Hall and what men he had left held on till late at night, when Sykes's Division relieved them. Hall's regiments were all old 1861 men and did not average 175 men to the regiment. The Forty-Second New York (Tammany) had but 110. The 20th Massachusetts had 260, and lost in all 128. Col. Hall reported that he took but 800 in all into the fight and his total loss was 515—more than 64 percent.

Gen. Conck, about 11:45, ordered Gen. Willcox to send a Division of the Ninth Corps to assault the Confederate position on the heights to the left of where French and Hancock had tried. Willcox sent Sturgis's Division, Agli's and Ferrero's

1019

Gen. Cobb killed
Humphreys' attack

664

Brigades, and they went up the hill and ^{attacked} assaulted Pickett's and Hood's Divisions and got terribly repulsed, and driven down the hill. The total loss of the Division was 1,007. Hood's Division lost but 343, and Pickett's 46. Law's brigade of Hood, lost 218 and the Fourth Alabama, the First Minnesota's old antagonist, had 4 killed and 18 wounded.

About 3 o'clock Gen. Hooker, commanding the Center Grand Division, (Stoneman's Third and Butterfield's Fifth Corps) came upon the field. Some time before this, however, Whipple's Division of Stoneman, had come over and relieved Howard's, so that the ~~and~~ latter might join in the center attack, and Griffin's of Butterfield, had come over to the support of Sturge's. Humphreys and Lykes with their Divisions, of Butterfield, came to Couch's support. Gen. Couch's Divisions had been fought to a standstill. He asked Sumner for help, and Sumner answered at 2:40: "Hooker has been ordered to put in everything; you must hold on until he comes in." It will be remembered that Hooker's Grand Division was to furnish re-enforcements.

665-

Gen. Conch told Hooker that Marye's Heights could not be carried by a front attack, but might be by an assault on the ~~Confederate~~ left - the Union right. Hooker replied: "I will go and see Hancock about it," and away he rode to confer with that accomplished general. ^(Conch in Pratt's + Seals) Very often did a Union general in doubt what to do, "go and see Hancock about it." Hooker left word with Humphreys to take Conch's orders and Gen. Butterfield told him the same.

There was a lull in the ~~Confederate~~ firing on the ^{Confederate} center and Gen. Caldwell sent word to Hancock that ^{the} enemy was retreating from Marye's house. Hancock passed the word on to Gen. Conch and Conch said to Humphreys: "Gen. Humphreys, it is reported by Gen. Hancock that the enemy is falling back; now is the time for you to go in." Humphreys' Division had but two brigades, eight regiments, all Pennsylvanians, and all new recruits but one, the Ninety-First Pennsylvania. ^{The new recruits joined the army the day after Antietam and this was their first battle.}

Spurring to his work, Gen. Humphreys led his two brigades over precisely the same ground traversed by French and Hancock. There is still a

debate

666

as to which of the three divisions got the nearest to the Stonewall on Marye's Heights. The musketry fire on Humphreys' men was very heavy and the artillery fire was terrible. At one time Gen. Couch thought ^{that} Hooker's batteries on Palmyra Heights were firing short and dropping shells into Humphreys' division, and sent word to that effect. Humphreys was very gallant. He charged with his men, had two horses killed under him, and then charged on foot. All to no purpose. The division was driven back to the foot of the hill, but in first-rate order and some of the men were very cheerful. Col. Clark's and Col. Allen's regiments, of Col. Allenback's brigade, came back hurrahing and singing, and as they went into position at the foot of the hill some of them were heard to call out exultingly: "Well, we had a h — of a time, didn't we?" (Humphreys' report.) The division went in with 3,500 men, and lost 1,020. Gen. Couch should not have sent it in. He ought to have known that the Confederates were not retreating; what would they be retreating from, and why? (over)

752
 66
 120

 938

Potomac Trail & Piedmont

(Insert after "retreat, from and why?")

II Just after Humphreys' charge was made, Griffin's Division of Butterfield's Fifth Corps, three brigades, made a charge on the stone wall over the ground where Sturgis's brigades had assaulted, to the left of the main line, and against Hood and Pickett. Same result. The Division was repulsed with a loss of 66 killed, 752 wounded, and 120 missing, or 938 in all. Instead of sending a force of at least three divisions, strong enough to accomplish something, Burnside's idea—apparently borrowed from McClellan—was to send one division at a time.

667

About 5 o'clock,

While Gen. Humphreys was leading his Pennsylvanians on their hopeless charge, Getty's Division of ^{by Gen. Willcox} Willcox was ordered to the charge on the left of the route taken by French, Hancock, and the rest. It went out Prussia street, the Third street south of Hanover, and struck into and upon an unfinished railroad cut and track; when completed this was called the Potomac, Fredericksburg & Piedmont Railroad. Soon after getting out on the unfinished railroad ^{Hawkins' advance brigades} came under a hot fire and was somewhat cut up before it had advanced half as far as French and Hancock.

Gen. Couch, feeling himself responsible for the predicament of Getty's men, sought to save them. He ordered Col. Morgan, his chief of artillery, to send a battery across the canal, plant it near the brick house, and shell the ~~enemy~~ ^{line} that was doing so much harm. Morgan said: "General, a battery can't live there." Couch replied: "Then it must die there."

Col. Morgan selected Hazard's Battery—B, First Rhode Island—for the job, and right gallantly Capt. Hazard took it out, unlimbering near the brick house, with his six guns he opened on Longstreet's 53. He lost

... and Hancock came back to town.

127
54
122
248

296
255
551

668

heavily but kept on fighting. Gen. Hooker came to the field and sent Frank's Battery, 4th First New York to help Hazard.

Only Rush Hawkins's First Brigade was conspicuously engaged. It did not charge very far or very hard, for darkness came on, and it soon fell back, as Gen. Getty reports, to "the cover afforded by a depression of ground and the bed of an old canal." From this position the ^{brigade} was withdrawn behind the Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad grade and finally stationed at the slaughter house near the corner of Princess Anne and Purria streets for the night.

Harland's Second Brigade advanced in the rear of Hawkins's to the railroad and there stayed until next morning, when it returned to its former station on Caroline street. It lost one officer (Col. Cross, Fourth Rhode Island) and one man killed and 9 wounded. The total loss in the Division was 551. Rush Hawkins's terrible Zouaves (Ninth New York) did not charge, but guarded a battery at a brick kiln, else the result might have been different!

... .. came back to town.

669
Burnside Wants More Men Killed.

This bloody day at Fredericksburg should have proven to Gen Burnside the folly of an attack directly against the front and center of a powerful and well concentrated and well established enemy, when a well conducted flanking movement was possible. The success of such a direct attack is always doubtful; in this instance there was no chance of success, and if the effort had succeeded it would have cost too much.

All of Burnside's generals except Sumner ^{had} protested against the assaults on Mary's Heights. Sumner supported the idea of a direct assault but not with only one Division. When Burnside appealed to him he weakened and said: "I always support my commander." And now Burnside was determined to repeat the assault on the 14th. At 11 o'clock ^{the night of the 13th} Sumner, Hooker, Franklin, and other officers were in consultation at the Phillips House. Burnside came suddenly in, saying as he entered the door: "Well, it's all arranged; we attack at dawn, the Ninth Corps in the center, which I shall lead in person. The troops that did not fight to-day will get plenty to do to-morrow."

Gen. Willcox, Humphreys, Getty, Butterfield, Meade, and others had sent Rush Hawkins to the conference to

say for them that there must be no more assaulting. Hooker had been swearing that there had been enough of slaughter and Sumner agreed with him. After Burnside had made the announcement there was silence for a few moments, and then Hooker arose and pointing his finger at Sumner said: "Sumner, tell him," and then stretched himself on a bed. Sumner stated the object of Rush Hawkins's visit, and ~~Sumner~~ said the troops had met with such disasters, were so fatigued, etc., that they ought not to be required to make another assault so soon — "wait a few days." Burnside finally consented to postpone the attack and did so.

Gen. Couch was not at this Council. He was very angry with Gen. Hooker — so angry that he was beside himself and might have shot his senior officer had he met him then. That afternoon, when Hooker went "to see Hancock," he talked with that general and then went back across the river and saw Burnside. He told Burnside that there had been enough men sacrificed; that even the stone wall could hardly be carried, but that if it should be, the line of the 53 cannon and the supporting works on the crest could not possibly be taken. To all this Burnside replied: "That crest

must be taken to-night."

Hooker returned to the battle side of the river in great rage. He was directing the formation of Humphreys' Division when Gen. Couch rode up and again urged that the assault be made far out to the right. Hooker replied very hotly and insolently. He said bitter things. He said that Couch was very ready to suggest where troops should be sent, but he insinuated that he was unwilling to lead them and afraid to go with them. Gen. Walker, who, as Gen. Couch's Adjutant General, was present at the time, tells the rest of the story in his History of the Second Corps, p. 179:

Stung by the insults, broken-hearted at the defeat of his Corps and the massacre of his gallant soldiers, and perhaps shrinking from the spectacle of a fresh slaughter, Gen. Couch turned away and dashed up the telegraph road. Passing Hazard's battery, he rode slowly up to Adams's gun, which was being served in the road, and stopped and talked with Adams; then he galloped forward to the extreme advance of the Union line at the end nearest town. Here, while under fire, he stopped and talked

John R.

(with Col. Brooke, of Zook's Brigade, who begged and almost prayed him to return. Then, turning to the left, he rode ^{slowly} down the full line of his Corps, just in the rear of where the men lay, and then rode back again—all the while under a most terrible fire!

That was simply a piece of fool-hardiness. Gen. Conch would not have attempted it had he not been half-distracted by his senior commander's insults. He was accompanied by three of his staff, but set out alone. Apparently he wanted to be killed with his Corps on the field, but though under a continuous storm of shot, shell, and musket balls, during his ride, not one of the party, nor even a horse, was seriously hit.

After dark Conch was ^{out on the line,} having his wounded brought off the plain, when an order came ^{to him} from Hooker relieving the Second Corps and putting Syke's Division of regulars in its place. Instantly and indignantly Conch said to the officer that had brought the order: "No! Say to Gen. Hooker that no man shall take the place of the Second Corps until General Sumner gives the order. The Corps has fought and gained this ground and shall hold it." But about midnight an order came from Sumner for Syke to relieve the Second Corps, and Conch assented and French and Hancock came back to town.

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The repulse of Humphreys and Griffin virtually closed the battle of Antietam. Gen. Hooker, at nightfall, took the situation in hand and stopped the assault. To the Committee on the Conduct of the War he said: "Finding that I had lost as many men as my orders required me to lose, I suspended the attack." (Report, Vol. 1, p. 668.) And Gen. Burnside did not overrule the somewhat presumptuous action, so far as it affected operations that night. It was later that he threatened to renew the attack in the morning.* Gen. Walker says:

During the two days that followed, Gen. Burnside remained shocked and bewildered at the disaster which had befallen his army — at one time telegraphing to Washington that though his assault had not been successful, he

* Gen. Hooker strenuously opposed the attacks on the 13th. In his report he says: "A prisoner in the morning had given to Gen. Burnside, Gen. Sumner and myself full information of the position and defenses of the enemy; that it was perfectly impossible for any troops to carry the position; that if the first line was carried a second line of batteries commanded it. The result of the operations of Gen. Sumner's Corps fully confirmed the statements of this prisoner, a very intelligent man. *** I dispatched an aide to Gen. Burnside to say that I advised him not to attack. The reply came that the attack must be made."

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had gained ground and was holding it; at another time
scheming to transfer all his troops to the left and again
assault where Franklin did; at another time declaring that
regardless of what had been said he would form his old Ninth
Corps into column and lead it in person up Mary's Heights;
at other times plunged in the deepest distress.

Occasionally during the night of the 13th the troops
lying out on the field did considerable firing. Some
alarm would start a fusillade in which thousands of
muskets would be discharged; or the alarm would cause
an artillery duel which would again shake the ground
on which thousands of dead and wounded men lay.
At last all grew fairly quiet save for the groans and
cries of the wounded to whose acute agonies of their hurts
were now added the sufferings of thirst and of freezing.

During Sunday night, the 14th, Gen. Howard
was ordered to relieve Gen. Sykes's Division at the
fronts. Gen. Howard sent five regiments under command
of Col. Morgan, of the First Minnesota. These were the First
Minnesota, the 71st and 127th Pennsylvania, the Fifteenth
Massachusetts, and — all day of ~~the~~ Monday, the 15th.

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these regiments were under fire from artillery and sharpshooters. They were stationed along the Union reserve line of the preceding days and along the mill race or canal. The right of the line was 100 yards west of the tomb of Mary Washington, the mother of the Father of his Country; she died Aug. 25, 1789, and was buried here at her request. * A fine monument was ~~subsequently~~ erected over the grave, in 1894, by the Women of America.

Even back into the town as far as Caroline street—the second from the river—Union troops were stationed during the 15th and there was a constant interchange of shots with the enemy. There was danger that the Confederates would learn the shaken condition of the Union army and charge down the hill upon it, with deplorable results to it. The detachments holding the ground were expected to meet this attack if it should be made. It would have been made had not Lee discovered from certain indications that Burnside intended a renewal of his assaults. Really this was the Union general's in-

* Though born in Westmoreland county, on the southern Potomac, George Washington was reared to manhood in Stafford county, on a plantation a few miles east of Fryingpan.

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declared intention. Every general he had visited ^{his proposition} almost to the point of insubordination.

Then Gen. Burnside insisted that the town be held and occupied. He said that if this were done the loyal people of the country would say that the battle had not resulted in total defeat and would be in some sense consoling. He urged, and his generals agreed, that the attack be postponed for a few days at least. So preparations were at once begun for intrenching and holding the town, and at 6 o'clock on the evening of the 15th Gen. Burnside returned to his headquarters across the river at the Lacy House, apparently satisfied and contented that he was to hold his ground.

But he changed his mind, and between 8 and 9 o'clock the troops in the town received orders to recross the river to Falmouth, and during the night, and under cover of the darkness and a driving storm, this movement was accomplished. Butterfield's Fifth Corps, ~~was, however, left in the town a few hours~~

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The Forces and Losses in the Battle.

According to the records and documents revised in 1884, some 22 years after the battle of Fredericksburg, the forces present on that occasion were as follows; Union troops present on both sides of the river, 104,903 infantry, 5,884 Cavalry, and 5,896 artillery—a total of 116,683.

Number of men actually engaged in the battle (receiving and returning the fire of the enemy, etc.) about 72,000; but not more than half of this number participated actively in the fighting. Confederate troops present for duty equipped, 78,513.

Of these it is claimed that only 58,500 of all arms were in line ~~and~~ ^{in line} arms at Fredericksburg; but it is further claimed that only 28,000 of these took actual part in the fighting, some 30,000 being held in reserve. ~~Confederate estimate is ridiculous: Less than 20,000 of our army ~~was~~ ^{were} actively engaged.~~

The Union loss was reported at 1,284 killed, 9,600 wounded, 1,769 captured and missing; Total 12,653. The Confederates reported that they captured but 936 prisoners (Gen. Lee reports "more than 900.") and it is quite probable that of the captured and missing 800 were killed and not identified, increasing the Union loss in killed to more than 2,000. Two Union generals were killed, Geo. D. Bayard and C. F. Jackson. The Union loss in killed and wounded, 11,684, was 16 percent of the ^{whole} number of (See Over)

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men engaged, or 72,000. But of this large number several thousand did not fire a shot or make an assault and their loss was trivial - some regiments reporting less than 50 - while Hancock's Division lost 42 per cent of its number engaged; French's, 40 per cent. Out of not more than 4,800 (Gen. Meade says only 4,500) men taken into action Meade's Division lost 3,337 in all, or 70 per cent; 2,776 were ^{reported} killed and wounded, or 60 per cent, but the number killed must have been larger. Gibbon's, Sturgis's, ^{Humphreys's} and Birney's Division each lost about 30 per cent.

The loss in the First Minnesota was slight, only two officers and 15 men wounded, as reported by Lochan, two officers and 10 men wounded and two men missing as reported by Col. Morgan. The nominal list shows one officer and 13 men wounded, as follows: Capt. John J. McCallum, and Private Wm. M. Herbert, of Company F, and E. B. Robinson, of Company B, were hurt so badly that they were transferred to the Invalid Corps. John M. Darns, of Company B, Thomas Kelly, of Company D, James E. Russell and B. K. Soule, of Company G, were discharged from service on account of their wounds, while Chas. W. Sarant, of Company D; Chas. A. Berdan, Daniel Bond, Almeron Davis, and Josiah Richardson, of Company H; Chas. B. Boardman and Alex Shaw, of Company K, were severely wounded.

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

The Confederate loss as reported was killed, 608; wounded, 4,116; captured or missing, 653; total, 5,377. The Union Provost marshal delivered ^{but} 356 Confederate prisoners (nearly all taken by Franklin's command) at Aquia Creek, from whence they were sent north. It is probable ^{therefore} that of Gen. Lee's captured and missing 300 were killed, making the total Confederate killed about 900. The loss in killed and wounded, 5,016, was about 17 per cent of the number engaged, 30,000. Two generals were killed, Maxey Gregg and T. R. R. Cobb.


A comparison of the losses attests not only the security of the shelters from behind which the Confederates fought, but the bravery of the Union soldiers that assaulted them.

The Confederates gathered off the field 11,091 Union muskets, of which 1,400 were damaged and had to be sent to Richmond to be repaired. They also ^{secured} ~~picked up~~ 2,000 sets of accouterments, mostly from dead men. These came very handy, for there were 5,000 unarmed new conscripts with the army.

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Among the other visible spoils of the victory the Confederates secured several hundred suits. On the night of the 13th and 14th they slipped upon the battlefield and stripped the bodies of ~~the~~ ^{nearly all the} dead Union soldiers. They took every blanket, overcoat, dress coat, jacket, pair of trousers, and pair of shoes, and in some instances stripped the corpses entirely naked. A Confederate officer wrote: "The evening of the battle the field where the Federals charged was fairly blue, but the next morning it was white with the stripped bodies." Of course all of the 900 Confederate dead with clothing worth taking were stripped. Stonewall Jackson had told his barefoot men that after the next battle they could get plenty of shoes and other clothing from the dead Yankees, and they did so.





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THE BEACON TABLET

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The First Minnesota at Fredericksburg.

Early on the morning of December 11 the First Minnesota left its camp east of the Rappahannock and marched ^{about 120 miles} to near the river opposite Fredericksburg. The entire division halted for the day under the shelter of a hill. There was no possible danger ^{in this neighborhood,} except from the Confederate artillery, away across the river on Marye's Heights, and not much from that. ~~The Confederates had 300 pieces, says Gen. Longstreet, in his book, "Manassas to Appomattox," (p. 300) says the Confederates had on Marye's Hill at this time 306 pieces of artillery, including two 30-lb. Parrotts and ~~an~~ an English Whitworth gun; but only these and half a dozen 20-lb Parrotts could be depended upon to throw a shot across the river, and both of the 30-pounders burst after a few discharges. The Union forces had 370 cannons of all calibers, including several siege guns not used.~~

The operations which included the laying of the pontoon bridges and the expulsion of the Seventeenth Mississippi from the town were well known to the entire division. The sound of the musketry was even heard. And late in the afternoon

when Gen. Burnside ordered the bombardment of the town, the thundering of the ~~147~~ pieces artillery fairly shook the earth. Two companies of the Nineteenth Maine were sent to support a battery on the north side of the river, though why a battery in such a locality needed support is not clear. The pontoon bridges were completed at sunset, and soon after Howard's Division crossed upon them under the enemy's fire. There were still some Confederate skirmishers in the houses and elsewhere among the back streets ^{and some of Hall's brigade were looking after them.} Also there were two batteries at work a mile back from the river, and they were throwing shot and shell at the advancing ~~the~~ Union troops all the time.

Sully's Brigade crossed the river with 2,211 officers and men. It bivouacked on ~~in~~ Sophia street, the street directly in front of and parallel with the river, and here it remained till morning. Only Howard's Division crossed that night, so that Gen. Howard was in command of Fredericksburg. Hall's Brigade advanced skirmishing

* At that time the streets of Fredericksburg running north and south, or parallel with the river, were in order, commencing on the river front, Sophia, Caroline, Princess Anne, Charles, Prince Edward, Winchester, and Barton. Hanover was the principal street running perpendicular to the river, or east and west. The streets north of it were in order George, William (or Commerce), Amelia, Lewis, Dauguerre, and Hawke. Those south of Hanover were Charlotte, Wolfe, Prussia, Frederick and Princess Elizabeth. The court house faced west on Princess Anne, between Hanover and George.

from the river along Beuge and Commerce streets two blocks, or to Princess Anne, but the Twentieth Massachusetts had charged and driven back the Mississippians two blocks farther, to Prince Edward. Owen's Brigade got only one block from Sophia, or to Caroline street, but it skirmished all the way and captured 21 prisoners, mostly from the Twenty-First Mississippi. The Brigade bivouacked on Caroline. Howard's Division contained about 3,500 officers and men.

When faint daylight ^{on the 12th} came, Owen's and Sully's brigades of Howard, and Hawkins's Brigade, of the Ninth Corps, were ordered to advance upon the back streets of the town and clear them of the enemy's troops, who were supposed to have been re-embarked during the night and to be fortified in some manner. A bloody ~~fight~~ ^{encounter} was looked for, but not a man of the First Minnesota or of Sully's Brigade flinched. All preparations were made for a hot time, but when the advanced skirmishes went out they found that the Confederates had retired from the town during the night. Then Howard's three brigades were ordered into various positions, some inside and some without the city, to cover the crossing of the remaining troops.

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Sully's Brigade was moved out and dispersed among several positions in the western suburbs of the city to the north of Hanover street. The First Minnesota was along or near the upper part of the canal and not very far from Mary Washington's grave, which is about half a mile back from the river. The regiment was on picket duty during the day and the night following, and throughout the entire time was under a very ^{heavy} ~~dangerous~~ artillery fire from ~~the~~ Marye's Heights. There was good shelter, however, and the boys found it, and only two men were wounded.

On the night of the 11th, while Owen's and Hall's men were skirmishing with the Mississippians, only two blocks away, and the bullets were whistling in every direction, the looting commenced. The citizens had abandoned their homes after having foolishly held to them until it was too late to remove their contents and had left, bearing with them but few of their possessions. The contents of the stores had been for the most part taken away, but series of boxes of tobacco had been left. Lockman says:

Some of our boys made their way to the houses and stores, and returned laden with provisions, wines, liquors, tobacco and a violin. Soon quadrilles and contra dances were under way, the melody of the fiddle being often varied by the hissing of passing bullets. The next morning early we moved into one of the principal streets, and because the houses had been used as cover by the enemy, the men ransacked them and the stores, from which the owners had fled. Provisions were found in abundance and boxes of tobacco were thrown out on the sidewalk that all might help themselves. The men were not allowed to quarter in the houses, but fences and outhouses were broken up for little fires in the street and over these they boiled coffee and fried bacon. Many carried out furniture and ate their suppers from sofas and upholstered chairs. * * * Gen. Sully took possession of a handsome residence that chanced to be near the place occupied by the Regiment, and when it was invaded by a squad of the boys told them to help themselves freely, as the place belonged to his brother-in-law, "a d— rebel." * The boys took nothing and kept off all other marauders.

* Lochren also notes that there were several excellent portraits in this house, which, he says, were painted "by the General's father, the eminent painter, Thomas Sully." It is more probable that the pictures were made by the General's sister, Mrs. Jane Darley, wife of John C. Darley, the owner of the house. Mrs. Darley was a very talented and skillful artist as was her brother Thomas Sully, Junior.

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Even during the early hours of the 12th, while the army was crossing and troops were being shifted from place to place, the plundering went on and continued the rest of the day, as long as there was anything to take. Other troops than those of Howard's Division were now in the town. Hancock's and French's men were the first to come that morning. In his "History of the Second Army Corps," (p. 153) Gen. Walker says:

"Much of the plundering was done in a spirit of fun rather than of hatred. The writer recollects seeing one gigantic private of the Irish Brigade wearing the white satin bonnet of some fair secessu bride, while another sported a huge "scoop" bonnet of the olden time. One man had a coffee pot that would hold ten gallons; another was staggering under a featherbed which he had carried from a house and meant to sleep on that night in the open air; the Inspector General entered a house on the outskirts occupied by the picket reserve and every man was wearing a lady's chemise over his uniform. But many things were done which could not be excused as frolics. Pianos were broken and thrown into the street, elegant furniture chopped up, family portraits pierced

(by bayonets, choice libraries scattered, frescoed walls done over with charcoal sketches by rude military amateurs, etc.

In this near vandalism there was, strictly speaking, nothing contrary to the laws of war. The people of Frederickburg were ardent Confederates, deadly enemies of the Union army. They urged Mayor Slaughter not to surrender the town; they refused to remove their property, and to remove themselves until the last moment, when Union bullets were flying through the streets; their town was captured by fierce and deadly fighting, ^{street by street} and English, French, or German troops would have stripped it of everything they could carry off and then destroyed every house in the place — and the laws of war would have justified them. All the same it would be pleasanter to remember Frederickburg had there been no looting by any Union soldiers. About 48 hours afterward many that participated ⁱⁿ were lying ^{frozen corpses} ~~cold in death~~ out on the slopes below Marye's Heights.

At 8 P. M. of Friday evening, the 12th, the First Minnesota went out and relieved the Eighty-Second New York, on the elevated ground in the western suburbs of town, near the Tomb and the unfinished monument of Mary Washington.

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The Regiment spent the night of the 12th in cold, comfortless vigil on the picket line, having been moved out from down town just after night-fall. In the morning of the 13th Howard's Division was moved to the right rear of Fredericksburg again, this time to be ready for action at any moment. Sully's Brigade was on the right flank and the First Minnesota was on the extreme right of the Brigade. Kirby's Battery was ordered up to this quarter, but as no position could be found for the guns "in battery," the three sections were placed in the ends of the streets, Lewis, Dauguer, and Hawke. The Regiment was sent to support the battery. It was on a ridge in full view of the enemy's batteries on the crest of the ridge in front. They seemed to concentrate their fire on the Regiment, and Kirby and gave them a tremendous cannonading. But the Minnesotians found good shelters of one kind or another, lay close to the ground, and lost but 7 men wounded; Kirby had 4 wounded.

While the Regiment lay here it saw - imperfectly, yet plain enough - the terribly bloody and wholly futile

1888

attempts made by the Divisions of French, Hancock, and Humphrey, and their comrade brigades of Owen and Hall, to carry the Confederate position behind the stone wall on the telegraph road and the batteries on the crest of Mary's Heights. The field was only a mile away. The men momentarily expected orders to move out and participate in the charges and every man was ready. Nobody sought to slink away.

(Insert after "tomb." No paragraph, but put it in ()
* (American soldiers engaged in fratricidal war and killing one another almost over the grave of the mother of Washington!)

En route Surgeon Haven, of the Fifteenth, was killed by an exploding shell from a Confederate battery on the ridge. When night came on, the First Minnesota was ordered to the front as a reserve and support to the picket lines and remained on ^{their} duty till daylight when it was moved back to Princess Anne Street where it remained quietly during the day. The position was under shell fire from the batteries

1888

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The field was only a mile away. The men
obediently expected orders to move out and
participate in the charges and every man was
ready. Nobody sought to slink away.

At 2:30 the Nineteenth Maine was sent
to the extreme right of the Brigade and the Union
line near the paper mill at the upper end of the
canal. ^{250 feet} The Fifteenth Massachusetts ^{came up} ^{from the} ^{mouth of Mary Washington's} ^{at the} ^(present)
came up from downtown and was sent out to relieve the pickets
of Owen's Brigade, which was getting ready to charge.
En route Surgeon Haven, of the Fifteenth, was killed
by an exploding shell from a Confederate battery on the ridge.

When night came on, the First Minnesota was
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sition was under shell fire from the batteries

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on Mary's Heights. The Confederate gunners seemed to follow the rule of Donnybrook Fair and whenever they saw a Yankee head they tried to hit it with a solid shot or shell. They had a good range and command of the streets running east and west and could send shots down them with great accuracy, and would do so whenever a bunch of "Yeds" attempted to cross them. Lockren says he saw a young lady ("the only woman I saw in the place") walking along the sidewalk of a street leading towards the river while a bunch of soldiers ^{was} starting to cross at a corner in front of her. Instantly half a dozen shells came shrieking down the street and exploded near the corner. The soldiers ran or threw themselves on the ground, but the brave Southern maiden continued her walk, apparently unafraid and undisturbed.

It was soon after dark of the 14th ^{as previously noted,} when the five regiments of Howard's Division were ordered to the front to relieve a portion of Gen. Syke's regulars. These regiments were for the time under the command of Col. Morgan, of the First Minnesota, which regiment was one of them.

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The regiments went out ^{on} along the Telegraph road and were stationed for a considerable distance along a line in front of where the regulars had been posted, and which ran over a part of the ground where the hardest fighting had ^{been} occurred. Only a few rods to the front was the Confederate rifle-pits, now formidable in character and strongly manned. The picket regiments of Cobb's Georgia Brigade, of McLaws's Division, occupied them the first part of the night, but after midnight they were relieved by the four Georgia regiments of Paul Sumner's Brigade. Featherston's Mississippi Brigade had its pickets out to the right front. (See reports of Mc. Law, McMillan, commanding Cobb's brigade, Sumner, and Featherston.)

During the night, when it was intensely dark in front, the clinking of picks and shovels was heard to the front, indicating that the Confederates were either strengthening the positions they occupied or digging new rifle pits in front preparatory to a sudden assault on the Union lines. The guide furnished ^{to} Col. Morgan had left and nobody knew the situation in front topographically or militarily. Col. Morgan greatly desired to

knew what the enemy was doing.

Lieut. Chris. B. Heffelfinger, of the Minneapolis Company (D) volunteered to try and find out. He took Corporal William N. Irvine, (commonly called Newell Irvine) with him. Irvine was also a Company D man. The two crawled carefully out to the front and wriggled themselves slowly along until they discovered what the "Johnnies" were up to. They were busy at work on their rifle pits. Hearing the enemy's position the lieutenant and the corporal separated—spread apart—so as to hear and see as much as possible. Lieut. Heffelfinger got along all right, but Corporal Irvine did not get very far until a big Georgian called out in the Southern vernacular, "Who comes thar?" In a trice the luckless corporal was a prisoner, booked for Belle Isle or Libby,* but Lieut. Heffelfinger crawled back in safety and reported. It was a hazardous exploit but of great value.

Col. Morgan at once sent to the rear for intrenching tools

* Corporal Irvine got back from prison all right. He veteranized and enlisted in Company B, First Battalion, and was made a sergeant. He was killed in front of Petersburg in June, 1864.

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and by working hard the remainder of the night a good trench and breastwork were made amply sufficient to shelter the men. If this protection had not been secured, the Union line at the front would not have lasted half an hour after daylight the next morning. The enemy's rifle pits were not a hundred yards away, their heavily entrenched lines were only a short distance to the rear of the pits, several buildings within easy range were filled with sharpshooters, while the Union line would have been comparatively unsheltered and in the open.

If the Union line had been driven back a Confederate assault would have followed on the greater part of the Union positions then being held, and the greater part of those depending thereon, were not in condition to resist an assault. In his report of the battle Col. Morgan makes the following reference to this incident:

I regret here also to mention the loss of a brave and intelligent soldier, Corporal Irvine, of Company D. He was sent by my order to examine a point where the sound of intrenching tools could be heard, and which we afterward

(ascertained to be within the rebel lines. As he did not return, it is presumed he was captured by the enemy.

In his official report Gen. McLams, in front of whose Confederate Division the First Minnesota was on December 15, says: "On the 15th it was discovered that the enemy had constructed rifle pits at the edge of the ravine to our front."²³

Only the First Minnesota and the Fifteenth Massachusetts were present on the Union picket line from Sully's Brigade at this time. But on Monday, the 15th, the firing at the front began to be pretty severe, indicating that the Confederates were trying to break the line preparatory to an assault. Then Gen. Sully brought up the Nineteenth Maine and the Eighty-Second New York to re-enforce their two comrade regiments. The Thirty-Fourth New York was down town on Prussia street, near the Richmond railroad.

When it came up the Nineteenth Maine was sent to the right under cover of some houses. The Eighty-Second was placed behind some houses to the front. Lieut. Murphy, of the Eighty-Second, was sent by Gen. Sully, with a few men, to occupy a house on the right of the First Minnesota. The devil-may-care Irishman thought he had been sent on a picnic. He and Lieut. Huggins took but five men and ran out

laughing and cheering, under heavy volleys from the enemy, which somehow failed to kill anybody, and got safely into the house and began peppering away from it. In a few minutes Col. Huston sent up Company C to re-enforce the seven brave spirits and the house was held until 8 o'clock that night. In his report Col. Huston says:

The occupying of this house was the most hazardous undertaking we had to perform. The lieutenant-colonel commanding the regiment feels grateful to Lieutenants Murphy and Higgins for its accomplishment.

In the afternoon the enemy on the Confederate left — R. H. Anderson's Division — gave the regiments on the Union skirmish line much annoyance and uneasiness. Frank Huger's Virginia Battery, belonging to Mahone's Brigade, got a position on the heights, a mile above the Marye House, from whence it had a good enfilade range on the Union line. Gen. Mahone himself,

* Gen. Sully says in his report that he sent "Lieutenant Murphy in command of two companies" to take the house, but Col. Huston reports the facts as stated above.

whose brigade was on the northern section of the Confederate ridge, assisted in putting the guns, four in number, in position. They opened and sent solid shot, shells, and case-shot down the line in fair range and with most uncomfortable accuracy. Even though the men were lying down, they were in great danger from the hurtling and screaming projectiles coming from the right; but if they rose and sought shelter by running to the left they would be under almost perfect range and ⁱⁿ deadly peril. So Sully's Brigade lay low and mighty still!

There were two regiments, the Seventy-First and One Hundred and Twenty-Seventh ^{of Owen's Brigade} Pennsylvania, on the right of the First Minnesota. (Some term them "a brigade.") ^{they too came under the} fire of Mahone's artillery. The One Hundred and Twenty-Seventh was a new regiment and on the 13th, when under fire, had broken and run. It now repeated the disgraceful performance. Huger's shells and case-shot were too much for it, and it rose ~~from~~ and scampered away toward the left in search of safety. In vain did the men of the First Minnesota yell

* In his report Gen. Anderson says: "It is due to Brig. Gen. Mahone to say that he discovered and pointed out the important position for a battery which enfiladed the slope, and that he rendered very efficient service assisting in the construction of the battery which drove them from their place of shelter along the skirmish line."

And this was not the end! In at dawn a new force,
Gen. Stornoway's force, came up, and out out
the machine, but artillery in position, and made, apparently,
all preparations for attacking. |||

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at them, as they passed wildly by, to "go back,"
and that they were jumping from the flying pan
into the fire; they would not be satisfied until
they ran on and came out under ^{the} almost direct
fire of at least two batteries, when they returned to
the position they had left.

The Seventy-First was the old "California" regi-
ment and had been under fire repeatedly, but some-
how it became ~~the~~ frightened and followed off
Col. Jennings's regiment, the One Hundred and Twenty-
Seventh. There was a great hubbub for a few minutes,
but amidst it all the First Minnesota remained
unshaken and only laughed at the fear and ridic-
ulous conduct of some of its comrades.


Gen. Howard, who witnessed the whole scene,
turned to Gen. Sully and said: "Sully, your First
Minnesota doesn't run." Gen. Sully afterward said
that he had really been afraid that the Regiment might
run, but now he turned to Howard and said proudly:
"General, the First Minnesota never runs!" In an
address to the Regiment a few days later and in general orders
Gen. Howard complimented it for its conduct on this occasion.

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The position occupied by the First Maine at Fredericksburg was a trying one. The long hours spent under a deadly fire, without opportunity, or permission to fire a shot in return, constituted an ordeal through which no body of men may desire to pass. The time was spent under great and exhaustive strain, which called for the exercise of the greatest fortitude. The men would really have preferred to spring up and out into the open, fight it out with the enemy, and have done with it.

As has been stated, Burnside declared that he would hold Fredericksburg, and Sully's Brigade had been ordered to build intrenchments where they were, commencing that Monday night, but at sundown the General changed his mind and all of Howard's Division was withdrawn, he crossed the Rappahannock and got back into the old camp in the rear of Falmouth by daylight the next morning, Monday, December 16.



698-719



**THE BEACON
TABLET**

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In Camp Again at Palמות.

Upon returning to its former camping ground in the rear of Palמות, practically in fair view of the Confederate positions still on the Marye's Heights ridge, the First Minnesota resumed the ordinary routine of camp duties. And for more than four months the Regiment was practically inactive, and so was the army to which it belonged — at least the few movements it made were ineffectual.

There was a great deal of discontent in the army after Fredericksburg. Both officers and men were ^{bitterly} ~~greatly~~ dissatisfied with Gen. Burnside. They blamed him wholly for the loss of the battle — blamed his ignorance, his lack of ability, and his want of tact. They clamored to have McClellan restored to command. They did not realize that Burnside's tactics at Fredericksburg were exactly those of McClellan — delay, delay, delay, and then, when an attack was made, make it with only one division, or possibly two, at a time, as McClellan fought at Antietam. Gen. Sumner said there was "a great deal of croaking" among the officers. The privates knew that they had not had a fair chance at Fredericksburg, and in their minds

they had dismissed Gen. Burnside long before President Lincoln had.

A few days after the battle there was a grand review of the Second Corps at which both Gen. Burnside and Gen. Sumner were present. Had ~~it been~~ ^{been} McClellan at the main station, the troops would have yelled their heads off as they passed him; but they marched by Burnside in freezing silence. The situation was very embarrassing, and to relieve it Gen. Sumner directed Gen. Couch to call for "three cheers for Gen. Burnside!" The Corps and Division Commanders and their staffs rode along the lines, waving their caps or swords, but from the ranks came only derisive cries and hootings.

Gen. Burnside began immediate preparations for crossing the Rappahannock again and giving battle to Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet. He meant to snatch victory out of defeat. But this time he would not cross directly at Fredericksburg - oh, no! On the 29th of December his plans were prepared for crossing the river ^{with a large force} seven miles below Fredericksburg with a view of turning Lee's ^{right} position. At the same time he would

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send a cavalry expedition to the Confederate rear to cut
the Richmond railroad. The latter ^{movement} had already ^{begun} ~~started~~
when ^{December 30} the General received an order from the President
directing him not to make a general movement of the
army "without letting me know all about it." Sur-
prised and demanding an explanation, Burnside hurried
to Washington and learned that Gen. Newton and
Cochrane had been there and told the President that
the whole army, generals and all, was in such a state
of demoralization and distrust of Gen. Burnside that
his contemplated movement would result in great
disaster. The cavalry was recalled and the entire
movement abandoned.

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Gen. Burnside's "Mad March."

Gen. Burnside's position with the army at this time was certainly not a comfortable one. He knew that he did not have the confidence of either his officers or his men. He knew that he was universally regarded as a failure, and that many thought he was a fool. But he was a good loyal man and as frank and honest as he was true. He had protested that he was not able for the position when the command of the army was faced upon him, and he had earnestly said so. To please the many admirers of McClellan he adopted that general's tactics. He strove to please. Of Fredericksburg he frankly said: "For the failure of the attack I am responsible."

But at last Gen. Burnside prepared a plan for another movement on the enemy, and this time he let Lincoln "know all about it." He realized that if he was successful he would again have the confidence of the army; but he forgot that this confidence should be obtained first, for it was clearly essential to success. And this confidence was very hard to secure.

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The General now essayed to go up the Rappahannock and cross it at Banks's Ford, six miles above Fredericksburg, and turn Lee's left flank and drive him upon the Atlantic coast. This was the crossing which Gen. Sumner wished to pass the preceding November. Banks's Ford was not then a ford, and must be passed by pontoon bridges. It would be difficult to make the necessary movements without detection, but the General tried to. He said that Sumner's Right Grand Division was in plain sight of Mary's Heights, and the Second Corps was to take no part in the movement, since it could not break camp without displaying its proceedings to the enemy's view. So the Second Corps, with Howard's Division and the First Minnesota, was to stand fast. Burnside, ^{foolishly} thought he could deceive Lee as to where he meant to cross and made formidable feints at this place and that place, both above and below Fredericksburg.

The weather and roads had been in good condition generally since the battle, and on the 20th of January, 1863, the columns were put in motion for Banks's Ford with all the secrecy possible. The

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Grand Divisions of Hooker and Franklin had been selected for the movement, and they marched up the river on parallel roads and camped that night in the woods. Part of the Second Corps was moved below Fredericksburg to make feints there. A reserve Corps, commanded by Gen. Franz Sigel, had been added to the army, and it was sent to guard the communications with Aquia Creek Station. Preparations for crossing were pushed; ~~during the 21st;~~ artillery was put in position to cover the movement; the pontoons were brought up, and Burnside determined to make the passage on the morning of the 21st.

But on the night of the 20th a terrible storm of sleet and rain and wind came on and continued during the night and throughout the next day. ~~morning~~. The artillery wheels and the pontoon rafts soon turned the region into a series of almost impassable morasses of Virginia mud and beds of sticky clay. By daylight only 15 pontoon boats had been brought up, and 125 were needed. Everybody and everything was

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stuck in the mud^o. The movement was intended to be a surprise, but on arriving at the Ford Burnside found a large division of Lee's army in position on the other side, while the remainder of the Confederate forces were massed, ready for business, only a mile or two in the rear.

All the day of the 21st the army labored to get its pontoons up to the river ready for launching. But the gigantic storm and down-pour had played havoc with the roads whose bottoms ^{50 ft} apparently had subsided several feet. All wagons sank to their axles. As many as fourteen horses and mules were hitched to one pontoon wagon, but although accomplished masters of the profane language swore at them and cruel task-drivers lashed them unmercifully, they could not be made to draw the vehicle, with its ponderous boat, six feet. Then long stout ropes were attached to the wagons, and 150 infantrymen detailed to pull each wagon along, but they could not budge it. Night arrived and not a boat had been put in. The Confederate pickets, with mocking sympathy, shouted across the river that it was "too

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bad that your fellows are having so much trouble to build your bridge; if you will wait till to-morrow we will come over and help you." Then they added, sarcastically and with malicious meaning: "If you will only come over and pay us another visit like you did at Fredericksburg, we will build the bridge all ourselves!" (See Swinton; also Eggleston's "Recollections.")

That night there was more bad weather and the next morning dawned upon another day of rain and storm. The ground had gone from bad to worse. An undecipherable chaos of pontoons, ambulances, and wagons encumbered all the roads. Supply wagons were sunk to the beds and many upset by the roadside; batteries were stalled in the mud, ammunition wagons mired, and hundreds of horses and mules suffocated and buried in the liquid muck. The three days' rations were exhausted, and at last Gen. Burnside determined to abandon the expedition. Nearly the whole infantry force was put to work at corduroying the roads, and on the 22d, abandoning much property, the army ^{started} floundering and staggering back to the old camps—and thus ended Gen. Burnside's "Mud March."

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Burnside Is Removed - Replaced By Hooker.

Many of the officers of the army declared that the heavy storms overhead and the Virginia mud underneath which destroyed and prevented Burnside's movement might be attributed to Providence as a divine interference in behalf of the Union cause. They said that had the army succeeded in crossing the river, it would have been defeated in the rough country worse than it was at Fredericksburg. Gen. Hooker went swearing around that everything would soon go to the infernal regions; Gen. Brooks, commanding the First Division declared that Gen. Burnside was incompetent, and that, if the Administration retained him in command, it, too, was incompetent. Other generals had "talked about" the commander ^{volubly} openly, publicly, and, Gen. Burnside thought, disgracefully.

On the evening of the 23d, the next evening after his return from the Mud March, Gen. Burnside issued "General Orders No. 8," dismissing from the service Gen. Hooker, as "unfit to hold a commission at a crisis like the present;" dismissing Gen. W. F. H. Brooks, for "complaining of the policy of the Government and for using language tending to demoralize his command," and dismissing Gens. John Newton and John Cochrane, "for going

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to the President with criticisms upon the plans of their commanding officer." The order also "relieved from duty" with the Army of the Potomac, (directing them to report to the Adjutant General for orders) Gens. Franklin, "Baldy" Smith, Sturgis, Ferrero, and Lieut Col. J. N. Taylor, the Adjutant General of the Right Grand Division. The last named officer, he said, "can be of no further use to this army."

Armed with this order and with his own letter of resignation from the command of the army and from the service, Gen. Burnside repaired to Washington ^{on the 24th} and demanded that President Lincoln approve either the order or the letter. The President declined to endorse either in full. He would not remove the generals and he would not accept Burnside's resignation from the service. He promptly told Burnside, however, that he would relieve him from the command of the Army of the Potomac as soon as he could decide upon his successor, but that he was "too good a soldier" to lose entirely from the service.

The next day, by "General Orders No. 20" the President relieved Gen. Burnside from Command of the Army of the Potomac "at his own request." He also relieved Gen. Sumner from command in that army, also "at his own request." He relieved Gen. Franklin without reason given.

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The same order directed, "That Maj. Gen. J. Hooker be assigned to the command of the Army of the Potomac." Both Sumner and Franklin outranked Hooker at the time, but both were willing to get out of the way, for they were tired of serving in that army. Franklin, however, was under a cloud of censure by the Congressional Committee and by some of his associates, who said that he did not do all that he could and should have done with his Left Grand Division at Fredericksburg. Not long after Franklin was sent to Louisiana and Sumner was given command of the Department of Missouri. Burnside was given a rest of 30 days and then Lincoln gave him command of the Department of Ohio, with headquarters at Cincinnati, so that he could keep watch over the rebels in Kentucky and at the same time repress Vallandigham and the other "Copperheads" of Ohio.

Burnside was a ~~loyal man~~ loyal to the core. He unselfishly ^{to the President} said that Hooker's appointment was "the best solution of the problem possible," and that no one would be happier than himself if Gen. Hooker should lead the Army of the Potomac to victory. (Aric. + Hay.) His

order taking leave of the army manfully and chivalrously commended the "brave and skillful general" who was to succeed him to that "cordial support and co-operation" which he alleged he had always received - but which he and everybody else knew he had not.

Gen. Burnside had important commands in the army until the close of the war, but never distinguished himself except in his defense of Knoxville, Tenn., against Longstreet, in November, 1863, ~~although~~ he was at all times in active service and very faithful, but never highly efficient in it.

But he left behind him two inventions which will ~~always~~ perpetuate his name if not his memory. He it was who invented a certain style of wearing whiskers, wherein the ends of the mustache are prolonged until they connect and unite with ~~an~~ an area of beard on the rear of either jaw, producing a very picturesque effect in most instances. The Burnside whiskers - or "burnsides" - are popular and much affected to this day. The other benefit which he left to mankind was the ^{fashion of forming a} longitudinal depression, resembling a little canyon, in a soft hat, which, when properly made, causes the headpiece to assume a rakish but somewhat graceful shape. The Burnside hat is well and favorably known, especially among southerners.

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Gen. Hooker in Command.

The Army of the Potomac was in rather bad shape when Gen. Hooker took hold of it. Desertions were going on at the rate of about 200 a day, and at the time of his assuming command the official rolls showed an absence from this Army of the enormous number of above 80,000 men — "absent from causes unknown." (Cond. War., Vol. 1, p. 112.) Very few of these men were absent legitimately. An overwhelming majority of them were deserters, men shamming sickness or disabilities of one kind or another, alleged recruiting agents, or officers and men lurking about their homes on some frivolous pretext and protected by officers with whom they had influence. Many said they were dissatisfied with the President's proclamation emancipating the slaves in districts still in secession and rebellion; these said they "didn't want to free the niggers," and would no longer peril their lives to accomplish that result. The true reason controlling all these malingerers was ^{that} they wished to avoid the dangers and hardships of a soldier's life themselves and let somebody else endure them. After the war was over they could lie about their wounds and pose as heroes just the same.

Gen. Hooker at once instituted and enforced rigorous measures of reform. He greatly checked desertion and absenteeism; he did away with the nuisance of the "Grand Divisions"; he infused vitality into the general administrative service; he instituted a system of granting furloughs for meritorious conduct; he consolidated the Cavalry instead of leaving it scattered by brigades among the Grand Divisions, and he gave distinctive badges to the different Army Corps.

The badges were greatly admired by the men. They became general throughout the entire army and every good soldier was, ^{almost} as devoted to his badge as to his flag. Gen. Conch says (Batts. & Leads.) that Gen. Dan Butterfield, who became Hooker's Chief of Staff, originated the idea and divided the badges in detail; but Swinton says the germ of the badge designation was the happy thought of Phil Kearney who, at Fair Oaks, ordered the soldiers of his Division to sew a piece of red flannel to their caps, so that he could recognize them in the tumult of battle. The badge of the Second Corps was a trefoil, or three-leaved clover, which came to be designated by other Corps as the shamrock, the ace of clubs, etc.

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Gen. Hooker had been a fairly good officer under McClellan, although he did not manage well at Antietam, since he allowed Stonewall Jackson's 8,000 men to thrash his 14,000. Yet he was said to be a "dashing" general and he had somehow gained the sobriquet of "Fighting Joe." The latter title he always rejected. "It sounds as if I were a plug-ugly or a pirate," he said. He was really an affable man and made friends readily, yet he had a petulant temper and indulged it frequently. He always seemed anxious to fight the Confederates, yet he tried to appease fraying by his soldiers, whom he reminded in a general order that "this is a war between fellow citizens of a common country, and should be conducted accordingly; it will end in the triumph of the Union Cause and then our present foes will be our warm friends."

Rainy came
in April

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In Camp on the Rappahannock,

The Army of the Potomac had a fairly comfortable season during its encampment on the Rappahannock opposite Fredericksburg during ~~the first part of the winter~~ and Spring of 1863. The troops constructed ~~to~~ for themselves comfortable quarters, which were generally small log cabins with wedge-shaped tents for roofs, and each cabin had a fire place which answered very well to warm the little room. All kinds of supplies came up regularly from Aquia Creek Station, mails were received, ~~and~~ visitors came from the North, and although there were many cold days and nights they were easily endured and the world went very well there.

On the 5th of February Gen. Hooker issued an order abolishing the Grand Divisions and adapted in its stead a Corps organization of the Army, as follows: First Corps, Gen. Reynolds; Second Corps, Gen. Couch; Third Corps, Gen. Sickles temporarily; Fifth Corps, Gen. Meade; Sixth Corps, Gen. Sedgwick; Eleventh Corps, Gen. Sigel; Twelfth Corps, Gen. Slocum. In April Gen. Howard, who had commanded the First Minnesota's Division (Second of the Second Corps) so long and so ably

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was made a major general and given Command of Gen. Sigel's Eleventh Corps. He was succeeded in the Command of the Division by Gen. John Libban, from the First Corps, who had greatly distinguished himself on the left, under Franklin, at Fredericksburg. There were re-organizations from time to time.

January 27 President Lincoln and Mrs. Lincoln visited the ^{army} and spent a few days at Falmouth. Gen. Hooker gave them a dinner at the Lacy House. The Corps Commanders were present. The President confined the table talk chiefly to a discussion of getting the better of "those fellows on the other side of the river" — Lee and his army. When taking leave of Gen. Hooker and Couch, the President said very earnestly: "Gentlemen, in your next fight don't send in a few at a time; put in all your men." (Couch in Batts & Leads.) On the 8th of April the President again visited the army and had a long and earnest consultation with Hooker and Couch and again besought them to "put in all your men" in the next battle. On both visits there was a grand review of the Second Corps.

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All the time the Confederate pickets were on the opposite bank of the river confronting the Union sentinels, for several miles. For some time the personal relations of the two picket lines were not especially cordial; but as the weeks passed the men became somewhat acquainted and ~~they became~~ very friendly. Some of the men ^{of the respective armies} covertly carried on quite a trade with the enemy. The Union pickets exchanged "sure-enough" coffee for genuine Virginia leaf tobacco and swapped New York and Washington ^{news} papers for those of Richmond and Charleston. Bits of news were freely exchanged, and some items were sent from each side that were not news! In April, while Lincoln was on a visit to the army, the Confederates halloed across the river: "You all have taken Charleston!" The report was believed by many and caused some excitement. But finally calling across to the Confederates was forbidden under severe penalties, but the friendly intercourse did not entirely cease. ^{was tried} Through the device of making miniature boats and rafts, equipping them with sails and loading them with articles of barter. The sails would be properly set by experienced sailors, and quite often a kind breeze wafted the little crafts safely across to their destinations. But quite often the sail would blow around ^{at the wind change} and the craft drift away and never be heard of.

The First Minnesota on the Rappahannock.

The First Minnesota encamped and waited for over four months on the east or left bank of the Rappahannock River on what are yet called the Stafford Heights, because in Stafford County. The experience was only the routine of camp life and was comparatively uneventful. The drills were resumed and there was a dress parade every evening, as in the Regiment's first days. The weather was disagreeable. January 29, fully five inches of snow fell, but it all melted away in a few days. The coldest day was February 3, but five days later the weather was warm and springlike. A heavy guard was constantly kept out and picket duty along the river was kept up but under discomforts and difficulties.

Just across the river the Confederates were worse off. They did not have to drill, but they were indifferently supplied with provisions, and clothing, and hospital stores. A ration consisted of a small piece of indifferent fat pork with an occasional scrap of fresh beef, tough and stringy, and a little cup full of flour or unbolthead corn meal. A gill or so of molasses and a little brown sugar were infrequently added to the ration, but salt was always scarce. Not a grain of coffee or leaf of tea, and only one biscuit to every three men — and that commonly one taken from a dead Union soldier.

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April 2 Gen. Ramsey paid the Regiment a visit, and was enthusiastically welcomed. He brought a new flag for the Regiment, presented by the ladies of Minnesota and inscribed upon it were the battles in which the First Minnesota had then been engaged. On the 8th, when President Lincoln was on his visit to Gen. Hooker, he went through all the camps, not omitting the camp of the First Minnesota.

Gibbar's Division, to which the First Minnesota belonged, was in camp just below "Chatham," commonly called the Lacy House, so often the headquarters of the Union generals. The camp was near the river and within direct range of the 300 Confederate cannon in battery along the Marye's House ridge, only a mile away. Just across the thin narrow and fordable river were camps of Confederate ~~and~~ infantry, within easy musket shot, and the opposing pickets were almost within a stone's throw of one another. Loud conversation was easily heard, and though talking was strictly forbidden by each side, there was a great deal of good natured badinage indulged in between these deadly enemies.

Gen. Gibbon then advised the 31st Maine
 with their arms and to surround the men
 during Thirty-fourth. This was done and then Gen.
 Gibbon addressed the regiment. He told the men that
 their conduct was most reprehensible; that even if they
 were entitled to their discharge it must come regularly and
 honorably; that they ought to assume their duties with
 the matter could be arranged and then go back to old Ken-
 tucker County in honor and glory, but that if they
 did not take up their arms again he would order the
 31st Maine to fire into them. The men ^{opened by Gen. Sully} ^{and Gen. Gibbon}
 A court of inquiry demanded by Gen. Sully and Gen.
 Gibbon of Gen. Hancock and Fort and Col. Canale, General
 that Gen. Sully, probably doubted his authority, under
 the existing circumstances, to order extreme measures in the
 case of the Thirty-fourth, and that he ought not to have
 been removed from command. Gen. Sully approved the
 finding, but Gen. Gibbon approved Sully's action to com-
 mand in the Army of the Potomac, and May 10 he was sent
 to Dakota to fight Indians. Jackson says he was the best
 soldier of all its soldiers by the first Minnesota where mentioned, a
 short time before he left his brigade, presented him with a powder
 barrel that cost \$1000.

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About the 1st May the Thirty-fourth
 York, by its conduct prejudicial to good order and
 military discipline, caused a great tumult in Gib-
 bon's Division. This regiment had long been in the
 same brigade with the First Minnesota and was now
 regarded as a good comrade. It was a two-year
 regiment, recruited in the early spring of 1861, and
 a majority of the men claimed that their term of service
 expired May 1, 1863 and that date had now arrived.
 So on May 1 those of the regiment who had enlisted
 two years before stacked their arms and refused to do
 any sort of duty, even to answer to roll call. Gen. Sully
 tried to reason with them and induce them to continue
 on duty a few days longer, as a battle was imminent
 and the brigade was under marching orders. But they
 would not heed the brigade command and Gen. Sully
 reported to Gen. Gibbon.
 "Can't you enforce discipline in your brigade?"
 indignantly demanded Gen. Gibbon. Gen. Sully an-
 swered that he could not in this case without pro-
 ceeding to extreme measures which he did not wish
 to do. Gen. Gibbon at once ordered Gen. Sully to give
 up the command of his brigade, and appointed Col.
 Hudson in command in his stead. The order read
 that the removal was because Gen. Sully had "re-
 ported ~~to~~ to the General commanding the Division
 that it was not in his power to enforce discipline
 in his command."


(See back of preceding page - numbered 719)

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**THE BEACON
TABLET**

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The Battle of Chancellorsville

Gen. Lee visited Richmond a day or two after the battle of Fredericksburg, and Jeff Davis and the Confederate Cabinet informed him that the war was practically over. They said that the result of the battle had completely discouraged the North; gold had gone to 200; the business men were demanding the close of the war, and that there would be complete peace and a recognition of the Confederacy within 60 days. (Batts. & Seals. Vol. 2, p. 84; Longst., Memoirs Appo., p. 317, etc.) Davis directed Lee not to "harass his men" by hard duties, because they would soon be sent home.

But time passed and peace did not come and conditions became such that Lee had to "harass his men" by making them build intrenchments all along the right or south bank of the Rappahannock from Skinker's Creek, below Fredericksburg, to the United States Ford, 25 miles above. These lines of works were practically continuous, and by the middle of April Lee had his troops so disposed that they could be readily concentrated at any given point. At intervals along these intrenchments were battery epaulements, or short

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embankments of earth for the protection of artillery. There was no place, for ~~25 miles~~ from six miles below Fredericksburg to 20 miles above, where the Rappahannock could be crossed without meeting the most determined and most dangerous resistance. Gen. Lee's 60,000 men were strung along this line, but ^{over} half of them were massed about Fredericksburg and Mary's Heights.

The Conspicuous right flank, below Fredericksburg, was much more strongly fortified than when Gen. Franklin tried so unsuccessfully to turn it in December. Lee gave himself little concern about that end of his line. The Yankees, however, might turn his left flank by going 25 miles up the river, or westward, above the confluence of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, and crossing the former at Kelly's Ford, 15 miles above its confluence, then marching ten miles to the southeast and crossing the Rapidan at Ely's Ford, or at half a dozen other places, and then march eastward and southward against the left end of his line. When such a march was completed the

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Union army would be to the ^{westward and} southward of the Confederate position and command Lee's retreat southward to Orange C. H. and Gordonsville—the only practicable route for retiring in that quarter. There was a great area of scrub pine ^{and jack oak} forests and thickets in the region, which was commonly called the Wilderness. Roads were scarce and the road to Gordonsville could be easily seized and held.

But if Lee's right ^{reast} flank, just below Fredericksburg, should be turned, it would be bad for him. The Union troops would seize the only line of retreat to or communication with ~~the southward~~ Richmond. This was the dirt road running southward, via Bowling Green, the county seat of Caroline county, to Richmond, and this dirt road ran substantially parallel with the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad, by which Lee's army received its supplies. If the Union troops got upon this line Lee would have to fight very hard to drive them from it. The probabilities all were that he would be forced to come out into the open country and fight the Union forces on ground

723.

of their own choosing; and then, if he were defeated, his army would be in great danger of destruction, since it would not have proper roadways to fall back over. There would probably be the same result if Lee's left or west flank was turned. In the case of either turning, Lee would have to come out from behind his intrenchments along the Rappahannock.

Gen. Hooker now had ^{under his direct command} 130,000 men and 400 pieces of artillery present and ready for duty. Lee had 60,000 of all arms and 180 cannon. Hooker had 10,000 cavalry under Stoneman; Lee had 8,000 ^{under Stuart} with 1,600 under Wade Hampton absent. The Union generals Peck and Dix, down at Suffolk — which is 15 miles southwest of Portsmouth and Norfolk and 60 miles southeast of Petersburg — had been preparing an expedition to go up and take Richmond, and ^{in February} Gen. Longstreet, with 10,000 ^{and Hampton's Cavalry} men, had been sent down from Fredericksburg to Suffolk to combat this expedition, and to collect and forward supplies to the army. Before ^{Longstreet's} departure Lee's army numbered 75,000 men in round numbers. Longstreet and his two divisions, Rickett's and Hood's, did not get back to Lee till May 10.

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Gen. Hooker had thorough knowledge of the situation and took an intelligent view of it. He determined to attempt the turning of one or the other of Lee's flanks and force the Confederates to come out and fight away from their fortifications. He began operations as soon as spring fairly opened. Fredericksburg is in the same latitude as St. Louis and spring begins about the 1st of April.

April 13, the General directed Gen. George Stoneman, (who was in command of the Union Cavalry in the region about Warrenton, on the Orange & Alexandria railroad) to cross the Rappahannock well up the river, west of the Orange & Alexandria, and throw all his Cavalry except one brigade between Lee's position and Richmond. If this movement were successful it would cut off one of Lee's two lines of supply and work great injury to him. But heavy and continuous rains prevented this movement at that time. ~~Until Sheridan got hold of it the Cavalry of the Potomac Army of the Potomac was generally unfortunate, and if it was not one thing that prevented its efficiency it was another.~~

Melzie
Chancellor

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decided

Gen. Hooker, ~~determined~~ to turn Lee's left or
west flank. He would send a strong column 27
miles up the river to Kelly's Ford, which was un-
defended, cross the Rappahannock there, then move
^{down} to Ely's Ford over the Rapidan, cross there and take
up a position six miles southeast of the latter ^{stream} in the
vicinity of a post office called Chancellersville. This
"village," afterward so well noted, was a ^{single} fine brick farm-
house, the residence of a Virginia farmer named ^{Amos}
Chancellor. The house, a two-story brick, stood directly
on a ^{macedamized} turnpike road running west from Fredericks-
burg, which was ten miles eastward. There were other roads
connecting Chancellersville with Fredericksburg, ^{and leading to Lee's rear,} but none
so direct or so good as the turnpike. West of Chan-
cellersville two miles or so the turnpike forked; the
right hand road kept westward through the Wilder-
ness, and the left hand, a plank road, curved
southward towards Orange C. H. At the forks of the
road stood a two-story farm house called Dordall's
^{then kept by Melzie Chancellor,} Tavern, and a small frame church building called the Wil-
derness Church. The country was generally undeveloped
and woods and thickets abounded; there were but few farms.

15,649
16,799 Smart
 44,582 Army
61,381
 with Jarn's arty, computers
 Lee's Army
 726

33,333 men
2,582 officers
 35,915
 6,967
1,700
 44,582

At the Chancellorville house there was also a cross
 roads. Five miles east ^{of that house} and a mile west of Salem Church,
 the Fredericksburg Turnpike forked; the main road con-
 tinued westward and a plank road turned to the
 southwest for a few miles and then, curving north-
 ward, crossed the turnpike at Chancellor's and con-
 tinued northward to the United States Ford over
 the Rappahannock. This road from Chancellor's to the United States Ford,
 three miles north, became highly important.

To mask or conceal his movement up the
 river from Lee, Gen. Hooker put three Corps,
 — the First (Reynolds) the Third (Sickles) and the Sixth
 (Sedgwick) under Gen. Sedgwick, and directed him
 to cross at Fredericksburg and make a direct dem-
 onstration against the enemy as soon as the
 main turning force was well under way.
 Gibbon's Division, of the Second Corps, was to ^{act} under Sedg-
 wick's orders, but for the while to remain in camp
 on the heights opposite Fredericksburg.

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Gen. Hooker began his demonstrations on April 21, and they were made at intervals at Kelly's Ford, ^{and} Rappahannock Bridge on the west, and at Port Royal on the east. It was plain ^{to everybody} that the Union army was about to cross the river, but the idea was to keep Lee guessing where the crossing would be. He and Jackson were always of opinion that it would be to the west, and they were quite disconcerted when Sedgwick with a powerful force crossed below Mechanicsburg on the 29th. But their discomposure did not last long.

The grand turning column was composed of three Corps, the Fifth (Meade), the Eleventh (Howard) and the Twelfth (Slocum). Marching from ~~off~~ Palmyra on Monday morning, April 27, this force reached the vicinity of Kelly's Ford the next day. During that night and the next morning the passage of the Rappahannock was made at Kelly's Ford on a canvas pontoon bridge, which was laid with but little opposition from the Confederate pickets. After crossing the river the three Corps marched on parallel roads towards

Chancellorsville, having just to cross the Rapidan. The Eleventh and Twelfth Corps came to that little river at the Germanna Ford, eight miles northwest of Chancellorsville, and captured about 50 Confederates engaged in rebuilding the bridge. The left column, the Fifth Corps, crossed at Elys Ford. The stream was barely fordable, but the infantry men stripped for the work and noisily plunged in, wading across safely, hallooing and laughing. The water came up to the shoulders of many, but the boys put their bayonets on their guns and then put their clothes and cartridge boxes on the points of the bayonets. Both Corps reached Chancellorsville, on the 30th, and that night Gen. Hooker established his headquarters here, in the Chancellor house. Hancock's and French's Divisions of Couch's Second Corps also came up to this point that evening; they had crossed the Rappahannock at the U. S. Ford. ^{Gibson's Division had been kept at Fredericksburg.}

Gen. Hooker now had a position which took in reverse Lee's ^{entire} fortified line and was only ten miles west of Fredericksburg; moreover ~~Gen. Hooker~~ ^{he} held this position with 50,000 good men, and had 30,000 more within easy call. Was he to disobey Lincoln's injunction and not "put in all" of them? So far he had succeeded admirably.

He had marched 50,000 men, (carrying nearly 60 pounds each, and encumbered with artillery and trains) 37 miles in two days, had bridged and crossed two streams, and had lost only half a dozen men, two mules, and one mason. At such an accomplishment McClellan would have stood aghast and Burnside been overcome with wonder. Hooker now established his line ^{east and west and fronting south} along the Fredericksburg Turnpike, with the rear towards the M. S. Ford, properly guarded.

Sidgwick had been demonstrating below Fredericksburg, as has been noted, to keep Lee's and Jackson's attention while Hooker with his three Corps was getting to Chancellorsville. Now that Chancellorsville had been secured, the ~~First and Third Corps~~ ^{was} ~~were~~ not needed, and Sidgwick directed ~~Reynolds~~ ^{Reynolds} and ~~Sickle~~ ^{Sickle} to march ^{below} it quickly to Gen. Hooker, and it arrived at Chancellorsville, Friday evening, May 1. Hooker now had five Corps.

As formed on Friday evening Hooker's battle line was nearly five miles long. It extended along the Turnpike, facing southward, from a point two miles east of Chancellorsville westward to Dowdall's Tavern and the Wilderness Church, ~~three miles~~, when the line bent abruptly back

northward; the portion of the line turned back faced westward and was held by Devens's and Schurz's Divisions of Gen. Howard's Eleventh Corps.

Gen. Hooker fortified his line with rifle pits and log-and-earth breastworks with brush abatis in front. ^{His artillery commanded all the narrow roads leading to his positions from the front.} Saturday morning, May 1, Gen. Reynolds brought up the First Corps and it was put in the rear with the Second Corps as a reserve. ^{making the sixth of Hooker's Corps} "Put in all your men," Lincoln had said; Hooker was keeping nearly one-third of them out. And yet he was entirely satisfied. He meant to have Lee attack him and to fight on the defensive. He would not attack Lee — it was too risky. He had an almost impregnable position, ^{he thought,} with his breastworks, his abatis, his brush thickets, ^{his six Corps,} etc. He had chosen the battle ground; Lee would have to come to it — and let him come!

Well, Lee came all right, but he did not endorse Hooker's plans and did not fight in accordance with them; Hooker had failed to obtain his co-operation in this respect. Lee placed Stonewall Jackson to watch the ground below Fredericksburg, where Sedgwick was demonstrating

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33,333
2,582
35,915

and as soon as his scouts sent him word that a large Federal army was in the neighborhood of Chancellorsville he sent up Gen. R. H. Anderson with his Division of five brigades (21 regiments and four battalions) to watch the U. S. Ford and attend to matters generally. Anderson got up on the 29th but on the 30th the three Corps came to Chancellorsville and were in Anderson's rear and he had to fall hastily back from ^{the U. S. Ford,} which he did, and took up a position at the east end of Hooker's line and fortified himself. The next morning he attacked Stonewall's Twelfth Corps, the main Union command, but he did not attack very furiously. Instead of sallying out with 25,000 men and surrounding and capturing this impudent ^{and presumptuous} Confederate with his 8,000, ^{by attacking him in pieces,} Gen. Hooker contented himself by ordering Stonewall to simply resist Anderson's attacks.

As soon as Gen. Lee found what the situation was at Chancellorsville, he ordered up Stonewall Jackson with his four strong Divisions, 19 brigades, or 35,000 men

* Gen. Anderson's falling back from the U. S. Ford uncovered that passage so that Gen. Couch crossed the Second Corps very easily.

5,500
325
5,825

122,306
29,388 Sedgwick
92,918
15,700 1st Corps
77,218 75,000

Sedg. 2,182 men
1,245 officers
1,136 arty
5,825 ~~liber~~
29,388

Anderson	McLaws
7,665 men	7,984 men
<u>567</u> opps	<u>583</u> opps
8,232 Anderson	8,567
<u>6,567</u> McL	<u>2,000</u> Parksdale
14,799	6,567
28,000 Jackson	
<u>42,799</u>	

1st
15,998

1st Corps (Reynolds) ^{opps} 16,918 = 52 guns
5th " " ^{opps} 15,724 42
32,642 94

Jackson
33,333
2,582
35,915

1st	5th
14,728	113,989
<u>1,054</u>	<u>1,878</u>
1,061	857
16,843	115,724
<u>65</u>	
16,918	

122,306 35,915

732

Infantry 106,877 men
6,961 officers
113,838 Total
8,468 Arty
122,306

in all* from below Fredericksburg. Leaving Early's Division (four brigades) of Jackson and Parksdale's Brigade of McLaws ~~to defend~~ to defend Fredericksburg, Gen. Lee took McLaws's Division (now three brigades) of Longstreet and Jackson's Corps, now with three Divisions and 15 brigades, and marched westward to attack Hooker at Chancellorsville. McLaws's Division marched at midnight of April 30 and Stonewall Jackson, now with 27,000 men, started at dawn on Friday, May 1, joining Anderson in four hours. Lee now had about 43,000 men against Hooker's 75,000. That same Friday morning Gen. Hooker ordered a reconnaissance to the east of his line for two miles. This expedition was made on three roads running eastward, and was resisted only on the turnpike road. The ~~reconnaissance~~ ^{movement} was made in search of a better position, some of the generals saying they did not like being "shut up in a thicket," which would allow an enemy to slip up and surround them on all sides. The reconnaissance, ^{which was} composed of Slocum's ^{and Meade's} entire Corps and Hancock's Divisions of the Second found at about three miles east of Chan-

* On April 1, according to the reports, Jackson had in his Corps "present for duty" 35,915 officers and men. (War. Recs. Vol. 25, part 2, p. 696)

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Chancellorsville a splendid position. It was on an elevated ridge, and commanded not only the ground about Chancellorsville to the west but the open country to the rear of Fredericksburg on the east, while the left of the ridge uncovered Banks's Ford and allowed easy communication and connection with Sedgwick's Corps. From this ridge, too, Lee could be advantageously attacked and if the attack should be repulsed a safe retreat was afforded.

Couch was in charge of the reconnoitering ^{force} and he and the other generals sent word to Hooker what a great commanding position they had found, and asked him to come out and look at it. To their surprise Hooker sent back instant word for all three columns to fall back to Chancellorsville. The generals earnestly protested. Gen. Warren and others went to ~~the~~ General, ^{Hooker} and fairly begged him to come out from the Wilderness, where he could not maneuver his army, and place it on that splendid situation which meant so much. (Couch's report.) Hooker said to Gen. Warren: "I tell you, I mean to fight on the defense only. Lee will attack me here and be completely defeated. If he retreats

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without a battle he is ruined, for Sedgewick and I will have him between us. I will not take the offensive — not just now." (Cam. on Civil War, Vol. 1, p. 112.)

Gen. Hooker had been all right up to this time. He had been eager for battle, earnestly so, but now that he was confronted with one he seemed to fall down. Swinton who (as special correspondent of the New York Times) was present at this time says he seemed to suffer a collapse of his powers, and thereafter, except for one or two momentary flashes of talent, his conduct was marked by feebleness and faultiness — and stubbornness. (Swinton's Camps, p. 280.) The charge of drunkenness at this time was freely made.

So the columns came back, all the generals angry and disgusted and Couch fairly beside himself with rage. The Confederates ^{followed} ~~chased~~ Sykes's Division and killed and wounded 70 of his men, but Hancock's Division re-enforced Sykes and the two came away safely, though followed by skirmishers and their rear pounded by cannon balls fired from artillery placed on the very ridge which Hooker had forced them to abandon!

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The real fighting at Chancellorsville has been written about hundreds of times and is doubtless well enough known; the information on preceding pages, however, is perhaps not so familiar to those who read this book and may be of interest.

It is known that Gen. Lee and Gen. Jackson, after consultation decided not to attack Gen. Hooker as and where he wanted them to. They decided to pick their own fighting ground. The story has been told over and over how ^{while Anderson and Meade were attracting Hooker's attention to his east or left flank} Jackson took his Corps of 27,000 or 28,000 men and after a circuitous march of from 13 to 15 miles fell upon the extreme Union right flank, which was on the turned up end of the line facing west and composed of Devens's and Schurz's Divisions of Howard's Eleventh Corps. Jackson hit the Union line "endwise," and hit it suddenly and very violently, and to those who were hit the blow was as unexpected as it was disastrous. The line was rolled up and pushed backward continuously, for Hooker's position was surrounded by brush thickets and troops could not well be employed for defense — could not be spread out. The Confederate infantry deployed in the thick brush at each side of

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the road, leaving the road itself for their batteries. When cleared places were reached the Union troops deployed, got batteries into position, and did very well. Luckily night soon came, Stonewall Jackson was mortally wounded (by his own men) and the Union troops saved themselves for the time.

Saturday night the engineers traced out a new line of defense for Hooker. The new position was three miles to the rear of Chancellorsville and covered the roads to Ely's and the U. S. Ford, the only lines of retreat now left open. On his death bed Stonewall Jackson said that if he had not been shot when he was he would have cut off Hooker from the U. S. Ford and forced him to surrender or cut his way out.

Sunday morning, May 3, Jeb Stuart, who had succeeded to Stonewall Jackson's command, advanced against the Union line at daylight. In a little time he gained the crest of a hill whereon he set 30 pieces of artillery and proceeded to blow away everything about the Chancellorsville house, and his shells set that building on fire and burned it up. Gen. Hooker's headquarters were in this house. He was standing on the front porch leaning against a

ht	16,918	mins	52
5th	15,724		42
	<u>32,642</u>		<u>94</u>

737

pillar, when a shot splintered the post and knocked him down, rendering him unconscious for a few minutes. When he recovered he rode away to the rear. Gen. Couch was acting as second in command, and Hooker instructed him to withdraw the army to the new position which had been fortified during the night. This fortification was a breastwork extending from the Rappahannock on the northeast around to the Rapidan on the northwest, and was below the junction of the two streams. Once inside of this fortified line, the army was safe, for the flanks could not be turned on account of the rivers. Meade's Fifth and Reynolds's First Corps — 32,642 men and 94 cannon occupied this fortification and within it the other Corps took refuge. The Fifth and First Corps had not been in the battle, although Lincoln had twice said to Hooker: "Put in all your men in the next fight." Lee gathered up his forces and was about to attack this new position with all his men, when his motions were stopped by bad news from Fredericksburg.

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Notes on Chancellorsville

The first Union Corps struck by Stonewall Jackson was the Eleventh. It numbered 11,500 men, and of these 4,500 were Germans, and somehow it has often been called the "Dutch Corps" and we have often been told that a German command was the first struck, and that it ran without firing and that the rout of the Eleventh Corps was due to the "cowardly Dutchmen," etc. The truth is the first command struck by Jackson's men was McLean's brigade of Devens's Division and this brigade ran without much fighting and in disorder, but this was an American brigade of one Connecticut and four Ohio regiments. Burchbeck's German brigade of Von Steinwehr's Division held its position an hour, fighting against great odds.

Gen. Couch was so indignant at Hooker's mismanagement of the battle that he refused to serve any longer under him. He had not forgotten Hooker's insult at Fredericksburg, but he would have tried to forget it had Hooker consented to leave his brush patches and post his army on the commanding position east of Chancellorsville. Had Hooker done this, Lee would have probably not risked a battle, but would have fallen back to the North Anna, his favorite choice for a battle ground. After the war Gen. Hooker visited Chancellorsville and readily admitted that he should have placed his army where Couch, Warren, Hancock, and others recommended. Gen. Couch was at his own request relieved from the command of the Second Corps and placed in command of the District of the Susquehanna, with headquarters at Philadelphia.

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Two Union ^{major} generals, Hiram G. Berry and Amiel M. Whipple, both Division commanders in Sickles's Third Corps, were killed. Gen. Charles Devens, of the Eleventh Corps, was severely wounded, and Gen. Wm. Hays, of French's Division, Second Corps, was captured. On the Confederate side Gen. E. H. Paxton, of Jackson's Corps was killed, Gen. Jackson himself mortally wounded, and Gens. Mcowan, ^{Ramsbury,} Michells, Heth, and Pender were severely wounded.

Among the gallant minor officers ^{mortally wounded} on the Union side, was Lieutenant Edmund Kirby, of Kirby's famous Battery I, First U. S. ^{Gen.} Couch sent for Kirby's Battery which defended the position at the Chancellor house, but it was so tangled up in the brush and woods and with other batteries that it could not be extricated, and Sep-pien's Fifth Maine Battery was brought up. Stuart's batteries concentrated all their fire upon it and in a few minutes Capt. Peppien was mortally wounded and the other two officers severely injured. Then Lieut. Kirby was sent for to work the battery. He came dashing up and worked the guns for a few minutes, when 28 of the battery men having been killed and wounded, the ammunition in the limber

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cheats exhausted and all the Confederate batteries still pound-
ing it, Gen. Couch ordered ^{it} ~~the battery~~ away. Just then a
two-ounce ball from a case-shot shattered the gallant officer's
thigh and he fell. The men came to bear him away. "No,"
said Kirby, "take away that gun first," nor would he
be carried off until all the guns had been removed. He
was taken to the rear and sent to Washington, where he
died May 28. On his deathbed he was made a
brigadier general ^{to date} from May 3, when he was
wounded. At his death he was not 23. He was born in
New York, the son of an old army officer, graduated from
West Point three weeks after Ft. Sumter fell, and
immediately entered ^{the} army as first lieutenant of Rick-
ett's Battery, ^{1st} ^{Regt} ^{U.S.} He was in every battle with the brigade to
which the First Minnesota belonged up to Chancellorsville.
He was the only officer that during the war was promoted from
a ^{first} ^{lieutenancy} ^{directly} to a brigadier generalship.

The Union army held its position within the forti-
fications covering the U. S. Ford until the evening of ^{Tuesday} ~~the~~
May 5, when the various Corps recrossed the Rappa-
hannock and went back to the old camps at Fal-
mouth. Lee meant to attack Hooker, breastworks or no
breastworks, the following morning.

23,730

2d 14,713

3d 16,491 5th 13,989

1,194

1,077 878

947

1,153 857

6th Corps 21,182
1,245
22,427

16,854

18,721 15,724

5,825
11,029

1st Corps 16,918 x

2d " 11,029

3d " 18,721

11th

12th

5th " 15,724 x 11,033
33

11,544

12,178

11th " 12,927 11,366

626

751

12th " 13,450

757

521

88,769

12,927

13,450

6th

2^d = 11,029 ^{cannon} 28 1st = 16,918 ^{cannon} 52

21,182

3^d = 18,721 54 5th = 15,724 42

1,245

11th 12,927 36 32,642 94

1,136

12th 13,450 28

23,667

56,127 = 146

5,825

29,492

McCraws 7,984

Anderson 7,605

Jackson 35,915

7,638

Stuart 6,509

8,577

567

8,234

596

458

2,859

Barksdale

8,234 Early

8,234

6,967

5,718

27,681

2,322 8th Cav

2,322

2,522 8th Cav

5,718 McCraws

8,232 Anderson

43,953

The Armies and Their Losses

The total number of Union troops actually and actively engaged in the battle of Chancellorsville was about 60,000. The fighting was nearly all done by the Second, Third, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps, which had, according to the report for April 30, present for duty equipped, in the aggregate, 56,127 officers and men, infantry and artillery, and 146 pieces of cannon. The First and Fifth Corps were on the field but stood afar off "in reserve" listening to the fighting. Only a few of their regiments did any fighting, and they only skirmishing. Not more than 4,000 men of the two Corps were thus engaged. The First Corps had only 9 men killed.

The Confederates had on the field at least 43,000 men; a careful and conservative computation makes their force present and taking an active part in the fight as 43,953 including 2,322, one-third of Stuart's Cavalry under Fitz Hugh Lee, which shielded Jackson's march, fought in the battle, etc., its two batteries alone losing 18 men. The forces that actually fought were 40,000 Unionists to 43,953 Confederates. Gen. Lee "put in all his men" - no reserves.

The Union loss in the battles around Chancellorsville from May 1 to May 6 was reported as 1,082 killed, 6,849 wounded, and 4,214 missing, a total of 12,145. Of the missing probably 500 were killed and lay in the thickets; the skeletons of scores were found the next Spring. Total killed, therefore, at least 1,500.

The Confederate loss was reported (quite imperfectly) at 1,649 killed, 9,106 wounded and 1,708 captured or missing; of the missing probably 400 were killed, making the total Confederate killed over 2,000. The total was 12,463, a little more than the Union loss. Chief Surgeon Hunter McGuire reported 1,581 buried by his details and 8,700 wounded cared for in his hospitals, not counting 35 batteries and Fitz Hugh Lee's brigade of Cavalry, nor the men buried by their comrades.