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THE VIRGINIA VALLEY CAMPAIGN.

By the middle of December, 1861, the Union troops had the Potomac river reasonably safe for navigation from its mouth to Washington, and this was of great advantage. They now sought to re-open the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, a great commercial artery connecting Washington and Pittsburg, and making it possible for supplies to be sent to the national capital directly from the West and Middle West, without going the round-about route by way of Baltimore.

The Confederates had broken this great iron thoroughfare in many places, at Harper's Ferry and elsewhere, and were determined that it should be kept broken. The Divisions of Gen. Stonewall Jackson and Gen. W. W. Loring had been sent up into what was called the Valley of Virginia, meaning the district of country through which flowed the Shenandoah and the Potomac, and especially the district between these streams, which unite at Harper's Ferry. The Valley of the Shenandoah, where some very important events of the War occurred, is that portion of Virginia lying between the Blue Ridge and the North Mountains and extending from the headwaters of the Shenandoah, near Staunton, to the Potomac. In 1861, The Valley was an exceedingly beautiful and fruitful region, capable of supporting and supplying a large army, and it was exceedingly important during the War from a military point of view. Winchester, the county seat of Frederick county, 25 miles south of the Potomac at Harper's Ferry and 15 miles west of the Shenandoah, was the key to the Valley. Fine turnpike roads, like the fingers and thumb of an outstretched hand, converged toward it from Romney, Martinsburg, Shepherdstown, Charlestown, and Berryville,

as well as from the principal gaps of the Blue Ridge.

After the battle of Bull Run the suddenly famous Stonewall Jackson was made a major general. He remained with his brigade in the vicinity of Centerville until October 4, when he was detached from it and sent to command the Confederate forces in the Valley of Virginia, and with them to keep out the Yankees and make war on the Baltimore & Ohio. He made his headquarters at Winchester. In the early part of December he was joined by his old brigade and by Gen. Loring with his division.

Jackson at once got busy. He raided the railroad and the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal, destroying the bridges of one and the locks and dams of the other, and though the winter was bitter cold he marched his troops in it here and there almost constantly, destroying property, threatening outlying Union military posts, and making trouble generally. He drove the Union troops out of Romney and Bath and stationed Gen. Loring at Romney.

January 4 and 5 Gen. Jackson attacked the Union forces under Gen. Fred. W. Lander at Hancock, 30 miles northwest of Harper's Ferry, on the Maryland side of the Potomac. Gen. Jackson was considerably superior in force to Gen. Lander, but the latter, though still suffering from the wound he received while fighting in line with the First Minnesota at Edwards Ferry, put up a brave fight and finally drove the Confederates away.

Gen. Jackson here stained his record. On the 4th, at dusk, when he came up to the confines of Hancock, he began, without notice of any sort, to bombard the town, with its women and children. Cooke in his Life of Jackson, p.92, claims that "Stonewall" gave the authorities of the town "two hours to remove the women and children." This is not true. No time was given.

Gen. Jackson claims in his report that he cannonaded the town in retaliation. He says:

> As the U. S. troops had repeatedly shelled Shepperdstown, and had even done so while it was not used as a means of defense, I determined to intimate to the enemy that such outrages must not be repeated, and directed a few rounds from McLaughlin's battery to be fired at Hancock.(War Recs.,Vol.5,p.391.)

The truth is that more than two of Jackson's batteries cannonaded Hancock, and fired not " a few rounds," but many, until they were silenced by the accurate firing of Lander's cannon. It was not until the next morning, the 5th, when he demanded that Lander surrender. The latter brusquely refused and Stonewall's batteries began to cannonade again. Lander's guns replied and soon knocked out the Confederate artillery. Jackson retired. He claimed that Lander had been strongly re-enforced during the previous night, but this was not true. The redoubtable Stonewall Jackson was simply licked, and he knew it. He says he withdrew "to avoid a sacrifice of life which I was unwilling to make."*

Leave out

Ten days after the bombardment of Hancock Gen. Jackson became involved in a terrible quarrel with Gen. Loring, his subordinate, then stationed at Romney. Gen. Loring and his division did not like Gen. Jackson and the Stonewall Brigade. Loring's division was composed of Gilham's Virginia brigade and battery and S. R. Anderson's Tennessee brigade and battery. These troops

Solid

*"On the next day the cannonade was resumed, and getting our range, the Federal batteries poured a heavy fire upon our troops. They had been re-enforced during the night and Jackson saw that the place could not be taken without very severe loss."-Cooke, Life of Jackson, p.92.

were wont to call out to the Stonewall Brigade as it marched by: "There goes the Mud Fence Brigade! There go Jackson's Pet Lambs!" (Cooke,p.96.) Loring and many of his division regarded Jackson as crazy, and Gen. Loring asked to be relieved from service under him. He and his officers protested to Secretary of War Benjamin against being stationed at Romney, but before this protest was received the Secretary, Jan. 30, ordered Jackson to order Loring from Romney, "back to Winchester immediately." Jackson obeyed the order, but then immediately resigned and demanded to be sent back to Lexington to resume his school teaching. They had a hard time, all of them, to induce him to withdraw his resignation.

Jackson's military judgment was correct. As soon as Loring left Romney, the Union troops occupied it and began to "spread out" through the country. Gen. Lander moved up the Potomac and the B.&O. to Paw Paw tunnel, and made 30 ,iles of the railroad safe. His district included Hampshire county,(now in West Virginia) of which Romney was the county seat. A great many men in that county belonged to the Virginia Confederate Militia, which, under the orders of Gen. Jackson and others, had done the greater part of the damage to the B. & O. railroad and the Chesapeake Canal. Gen. Lander, about January 20, told certain citizens that if any more damage was done to the railroad in that quarter, he would "burn the house of every secessionist in Hampshire county." (War Recs.Vol.5,p.1044.)

The Union troops badly defeated a force of militia at Hanging Rock, and February 14, with his wound still hurting him, Gen. Lander, leading his troops, drove a force through and away from Bloomery Gap and held the Gap. March 1, while with his divi-

sion at Paw Paw, though in camp on the Little Cacapon river, in Morgan county (now West Virginia) Gen. Lander was engaged in preparing a campaign against Stonewall Jackson, when he was seized with a congestive chill and died the following day. He was then in command of a force of 11,000 men and 26 pieces of field artillery. At the time of his death his Edwards Ferry wound was still unhealed. Gen. James Shields, one of Minnesota's first U. S. Senators, succeeded to the command of Gen. Lander's division.

About the 20th of February Gen. McClellan deemed it necessary to take additional measures to secure the re-opening of the Baltimore & Ohio, which was not yet in complete operation, Stonewall Jackson having burned some important bridges in the Harper's Ferry region. The General thought it might be necessary to fight a battle to secure the reconstruction of the road. (McClellan's report, Vol.5 War Recs.,p.48.)

Gen. Jackson and Gen. Loring, with their divisions, were now at Winchester and they had made all the trouble. They must be driven out of the Valley of Virginia or destroyed. Then Winchester and Strasburg must be held by the Union forces to protect the B. & O. on the South. Gen. Banks's and Gen. Sedgwick's divisions were ordered to Harper's Ferry and from thence to go down into the Valley and drive away the Confederates. The First Minnesota belonged to Sedgwick's Division.

On the morning of February 25, 1862, the First Regiment left Camp Stone for what was called the Valley Campaign. With the whole division it marched up the Potomac and went into a cold, snowy, frozen camp or bivouac near the Monocacy river. What a change to the comfortable quarters at Camp Stone the previous

evening! The next day the Regiment crossed the Monocacy at Winfield Mills and marched to Adamstown, a station on the B. & O. Here the division entrained and was taken by rail to Sandy Hook, a suburb of Harper's Ferry. The First Minnesota crossed the Potomac on a pontoon bridge. Its quarters that night were in some of the partially destroyed Government buildings formerly connected with the Harper's Ferry Arsenal.* These were examined with interest, especially those said to have been connected with John Brown's raid, in October, 1859.

At the beginning of 1861 Harper's Ferry had a population of about 5,000. A considerable portion of the people were connected with the old historic U.S. arsenal there. In June, 1861, this important factory was nearly all destroyed by Gen. Joe Johnston and his Confederates. They sent most of the arsenal property further south, set fire to the buildings and the great railroad bridge over the Potomac, and then set out for Winchester. When the First Minnesota came, solid piers of blackened masonry showed where had stood the magnificent bridges; the calcined and crumbling walls of the armory and arsenal buildings, and the fire stained ruins of other structures destroyed in the great Confederate conflagration gave an air of utter desolation to the deserted town. Only a few of the former population, and they the

*Lochren says the men were quartered in the buildings in which John Brown and his partisans "had attempted defense" at the time of their famous raid. But only Brown and 6 or 7 of his raiders "attempted defense" from the inside of a building, and this was a small brick house used to shelter a fire engine; and if it were ~~standing in 1862, which is doubtful,~~ would not have furnished quarters for a simple company of Minnesotians. The greater part of John Brown's "nineteen men so true" did their fighting behind walls outside of any building. Five were not in the town. But the boys believedwhat they were told and were just as well satisfied.

very poorest, had remained.(Lochren.)

Harper's Ferry, for some time after the war began, was regarded as a place of great strategic importance, and yet every force that occupied it found it untenable. And finally it was agreed that no force could hold it unless it was a force strong enough to hold both sides of the Potomac, and at the same time take the field against an invading army. Joe Johnston evacuated it, Patterson evacuated it; turn about Confederates and Unionists ran away from it; Gen. Miles attempted to defend it, and was killed and his army made prisoners.

It was a strikingly picturesque place. Its site was a sort of triangle, of which the Potomac and the Shenandoah, which here united their waters, formed the two parallel sides and an elevated plateau in the rear made the third. Its weakness as a military post was that it was exposed to enfilade and reverse fires from the lofty ridge across the Potomac called Maryland Heights and could easily be turned by an army crossing the river above or below.

When Gen. Sedgwick's division reached Harper's Ferry, it had 9,400 men and 18 field guns, three batteries.(War Recs.) Two brigades of Sedgwick's and the whole of Banks's division were thrown to the south or Virginia side of the Potomac; one brigade of Sedgwick's was left on the Maryland side to guard the Potomac and the Baltimore & Ohio from Great Falls to the mouth of the Monocacy. (Ibid,Vol.5,p.48.) A day or two after its arrival the Regiment was moved to higher ground and more comfortable buildings.

About the 1st of March Gen. McClellan divided his forces into army corps. Gen. Banks was made commander of the Fifth

Army Corps and given charge of affairs in the "Valley of Virginia." Sedgwick's Division was in Banks's command.

Very soon, with a force of perhaps 18,000 men of all arms, Gen. Banks moved up the Shenandoah valley towards Winchester, where Stonewall Jackson was stationed with only about 4,000 men, including 300 cavalry and Chew's horse artillery, under Turner Ashby, and the Rockbridge and Waters's batteries. Winchester is the county seat of Frederick county, is 30 miles southwest of Harper's Ferry, and a few miles west of Opequan Creek. As has been said the place was the key to the Valley of Virginia. During the War the town was fought for again and again. It was the initial point of one of the military routes to Richmond, 135 miles away. A railroad connected it with Harper's Ferry, and 75 miles south another railroad, in almost constant operation, ran to Richmond, with Gordonsville, in Orange county, the nearest most important station to Winchester.

Friday, March 7, the First Minnesota, as a portion of Banks's army, marched from Harper's Ferry, nine miles, to Charlestown, the county seat of Jefferson county, where John Brown was tried and hung. Harper's Ferry is in Jefferson county, now in West Virginia. At Charlestown the Regiment remained two days. On Sunday, the 9th, many of the men attended religious services, which were held in the Presbyterian church and conducted by Chaplain Neill.

Monday, March 10, the Regiment had the advance of the Division in the march to Berryville, the county seat of Clarke county, and 12 miles southwest of Charlestown. The march was over a fine macadamized road known as the valley "stone pike," but it rained that day and conditions were not altogether pleasant. If the turnpike had been a dirt road, the mud would have been knee deep.

As it was, the walking was good, although the stones of the road were a little rough on the men's thin and indifferent army shoes.

On nearing Berryville the Stillwater and Winona companies, B and K, were advanced as skirmishers. A section of artillery was also sent forward and fired a few shots; and then the Minnesotians, preceded by a detachment of cavalry, (which Lochren says was Van Alen's Third New York, but which "the First Minnesota" paper says was the First Michigan) dashed into the town. A company of Ashby's cavalry, in the place as a corps of observation, galloped away to carry the news to Jackson, at Winchester, that the Yankees were at Berryville, 12 miles southwest of him.

Jackson already knew that Banks's column was coming down upon him by the Martinsburg road. Three days before, on the 7th, Turner Ashby had been compelled to retire before Banks's advance, after a little skirmish at Bunker Hill, 15 miles northeast of Winchester, and nearly the same distance from Martinsburg. Shields, with Lander's old division, was also coming from Paw P aw way, and Jackson, if he remained in Winchester, would soon be between three fires, each bigger than he could light and keep burning.

Entering Berryville the first thing the Union troops did was to pull down from a liberty pole a small white flag marked "C.S.," and then to hoist the Stars and Stripes over the Clarke county courthouse, thus bringing the county back into the United States, as it were! The flag hoisted was the Old Glory of the First Minnesota, one given by the ladies of the State. The entire Regiment was very proud of the distinction given its colors.

The Regiment had representatives of every vocation in life, from statesmen and professional military men down to common laborers, trappers, and a man milliner! Of course there were printers, and good ones too. Some of these ascertained that there

was a printing office in Berryville, from which was issued a weekly newspaper called the Berryville Conservator. The editor and proprietor, H. K. Gregg, had run away. The Minnesota printers visited the office, found that one side of the paper for the week had been printed, and went to work and set up the other side and issued the paper the following morning. It was a four-page sh et of five columns to the page.

Two of the pages, the "secesh" side, constituted the Berryville Conservator; the other two, the Union side, made up "The First Minnesota." A large edition was issued and quickly sold. The printers publishing the Union side were Ed A. Stevens, Thos. H. Pressnell, O. Nelson, Chas. S. Drake, Frank J. Mead, Julian J. Kendall, and Henry W. Lindergreen, who styled themselves "the Typographic Fraternity of the First Minnesota Regiment." As shown by the copy preserved by Sam Bloomer in his scrapbook, now in the Stillwater Public Library, the Union side of the paper was filled with an humerous melange of patriotism, satire, jibes, jokes, and censure.

The "secesh" side was, and still is, interesting. Berryville was a small town and there were but few local advertisements. The bulk of the advertising patronage came from Winchester, only ten miles away. The people in both towns had come to be violent, vindictive, and even venomous Confederates. C. B. Rouss, of Winchester, appended to his advertisement the following offer, then peculiar to the degenerate and unscrupulous element of the Confederates:

> We take this occasion to renew the offer of $20,000 for the head of Lincoln, or $1,000 for either of his pet kangaroos and satellites, Scott, Seward, Greeley, Butler & Company. Also, to say that we are selling goods very cheap and expect a little lot this week from the Abolition devils.

The greater part of his advertisement was made up of the vilest abuse of President Lincoln, as: "He has done more harm

than any other man since the creation. He has, with a fiendish malignity, unsurpassed by the savage or barbarian, brought a calamity upon a happy country and a mighty people, amounting to universal destruction. Talk of Arnold or Judas; why, they were white men compared to this scoundrel."

There were advertisements of runaway slaves. "A girl who calls herself Mary Randolph," and who was "a bright mulatto, about 18 years old, tall and slender, hair quite straight, teeth a little decayed in front, no mark save a mole near the right eye," had run away on the 2nd of August, taking with her a boy of 15 years, "her brother, Frederick Randolph, also a bright mulatto, [who was their father?] with a low forehead, hair growing closely around it; is not very intelligent, and stammers slightly." A reward of $50 each was offered for their return if taken in Clarke county, "or what the law allows" if taken outside.

Another slave, James Johnson, 20 years old five feet and four inches high, "of copper color," had also run away and the same reward as for the Randolphs was offered for his return. John G. Morris, of Winchester, wanted to purchase "any number of negroes, for which he will pay the highest market price in cash that the market will justify." These ads were strange and suggestive literature to the Minnesota boys.

March 13, the Regiment, with the Division, set out for Winchester, 10 miles west of Berryville. Stonewall Jackson was reported to be still at Winchester ready for a fight, and the First Regiment wanted to balance the account it had against him for Bull Run. But when within two miles of Winchester it was learned that Jackson had retreated on the night of the 11th and was now miles away, to the southward in Page county, and in

almost inaccessible positions in the spurs and ranges of the Blue Ridge Mountains. The forenoon of the 11th he had fought with Banks's advance, on the Martinsburg road, six miles out from Winchester and been compelled to fall back.

Jackson was now alone as a general. Loring had been called to Richmond with some of his command. Jackson had bidden Loring a cheerful good-bye, saying he "ought to be cashiered." (Cooke, p.97.) He had now only a part of Loring's men, and his entire command, of all arms, did not exceed 4,000 fighting men. He reported that he had 3,087 infantry and 290 cavalry; but also had the extraordinarily disproportionate number of 27 peices of artillery, with nearly 350 men to serve them. And among his infantry was the old Stonewall Brigade! (Cooke, p.104-120.)

March 21, Jackson received word that the Union troops had abandoned Strasburg, on the Shenandoah, 20 miles south of Winchester, to which place they were falling back. He at once resolved to pursue them. Ashby, with the cavalry, was already after them. From Mount Jackson, (in Shenandoah county, on the North Fork of the Shenandoah river, 12 miles west of Luray, the county seat of Page county) to Winchester was fifty miles. This was a distance which Jackson must compass in two days with his "foot cavalry." He left Mount Jackson March 22 and marched 26 miles the first day. The next day at noon he caught up with the Union troops, who were commanded by Gen. Shields, near the village of Kernstown, close to Opequan Creek, four miles south of Winchester. The evening before, in a skirmish with Ashby's cavalry, Gen. Shields had his arm broken by a piece of shell, and now he carried the injured member in a sling.

Jackson rested his tired men until 4 o'clock in the

afternoon and then began to fight with about 2,800 infantry, 300 cavalry, and 18 cannon. The fight lasted until dark when Jackson was badly whipped and retreated, and the Union troops chased him back below Strasburg. It was claimed that the battle was lost by the Stonewall Brigade, which gave way, the men saying they had no cartridges. The total reported Confederate loss was 718; Union loss, 590.

Cooke (p.120) claims that in the battle of Kernstown Jackson's loss was 80 killed and 342 wounded, a total of 412; he takes no account of the missing. But the official records (War Recs.Vol.12 Pt.1,p.384) show that the Confederate loss was 80 killed, 375 wounded, and 263 missing, a total of 718; five officers were killed. The 33d Virginia, the First Minnesota's principal antagonist at Bull Run, sustained the heaviest regimental loss, 59 killed and wounded. Jackson lost two pieces of cannon and five caissons.

The official Union loss (ibid, p.346) is given as 118 killed, 450 wounded, and 22 missing; total 590; six officers killed. So the Union army lost 38 more men killed, 75 more wounded, and 241 less missing, a total loss of 128 less than the Confederates. As the Confederates retreated and left the field and the dead and wounded to the Unionists, it was a Union victory. Cooke says:"The battle was an undoubted defeat for the Confederates."

This was the second battle in which Stonewall Jackson was defeated. Gen. Lander defeated him at Hancock and Gen. Shields defeated him at Kernstown. Sometimes it is claimed that Gen. Jackson was never defeated.

Gen. Jackson claimed that he had but 2,742 infantry, 290 cavalry, and 18 pieces of artillery in the fight at

Kernstown. He had 9 regiments and one battalion of infantry, all Virginians, and three six-gun batteries, and Ashby's, 290 cavalry. Gen. Shields said in his report that he had but 7,000 men in the fight, including 24 batteries (ibid,p.342.)
He had 13 regiments of infantry, 7 companies of cavalry, and five batteries. He claimed that the Confederates had 11,000 men in action and that their loss was from 1,000 to 1,500 killed and wounded.

After the Unionists gave up the pursuit of Jackson at Cedar Creek, the discomfited Southern leader took refuge in his old camps about Mount Jackson. Here he remained until the middle of April, when Banks, now commanding the Department of the Shenandoah, resumed operations against him. April 27 Jackson was re-enforced by the divisions of Gen. Edward Johnson and Gen. Ewell. How he outwitted and overcame the Union forces in the Valley of the Virginia under Gens. Milroy, Banks, Freemont, and Shields and finally joined Johnston's and Lee's army before, Richmond, at a most critical time, is another story.

The Regiment, as stated, turned back when within two miles of Winchester, and returned to Berryville. This was pursuant to an order, issued that day by Gen. Banks, directing Gen. Sedgwick to return at once with his division to Harper's Ferry. On the 14th the regiment returned to Charlestown and on the 15th encamped on Bolivar Heights, in the rear of and commanding Harper's Ferry.

On the 13th, when leaving camp at Berryville for Winchester, the new colonel of the Regiment, who had been appointed to succeed Col. Dana, came up. This was the then Colonel Alfred Sully, who had been appointed February 22, while engaged in the

defense of Washington, and had been unable to join his new command earlier. There was some disappointment that Lieut. Col. Miller had not been promoted to the Colonelcy, but there was no ill feeling; it seemed best that an officer of long experience should command the Regiment, a West Pointer preferred, one that could fill Dana's shoes.

Col. Sully was born in Philadelphia, a son of the noted Thomas Sully, the English-American painter. He graduated from West Point in 1841, served as a lieutenant of the Second U. S. Infantry against the Seminole Indians and in the Mexican War, and as Captain in the Second U. S. Infantry was stationed at Fort Ridgely, Minn., in 1854-56, and again in 1857-58-59. In 1861, still with the rank of Captain in the regular army, he served in North Missouri, at Fort Leavenworth, and in the defenses of Washington. While stationed in Minnesota he had become acquainted with many prominent men, and was a frank and open aspirant for the colonelcy of the First Minnesota after Col. Dana was promoted. He had accompanied Sedgwick's Division from Harper's Ferry, expecting his commission every day.

Lochren says of Col. Sully: "He manifested from the first perfect reliance on the honor and good conduct of the Regiment and never placed a regimental guard about camp or bivouac. The men appreciated his confidence, and no instance occurred of any abuse of the privileges accorded, nor did any of them leave camp without permission."

The Regiment remained in camp on Bolivar Heights for a week. And this was a week of typical stormy, equinoctial weather. A beating rain or a driving wet snow fell every day. On the 22d the Regiment crossed the Potomac to Sandy Hook and took the B. & O. cars for Washington. It reached the capital at midnight,

and was given hot coffee and shelter from a most disagreeable storm at a place of refuge called the Soldier's Retreat, which had been established for such and other emergencies.

Going on the old camp ground near the capitol, the Regiment remained three days, or until the night of the 26th. Then, crossing the famous Long Bridge into Virginia, it was conveyed by railroad to Alexandria, which was reached after midnight. A cold drenching rain was again falling. Because "someone had blundered," the men had to stand in the street under the pitiless pouring until daylight. Then they were marched out to the old grounds, near "Camp Ellsworth," occupied before the march to Bull Run. Lochren says:"The men, wet and shivering, quickly resurrected a barrel of sutler's whiskey which they had purloined and buried the year before, and its contents fairly distributed, were probably beneficial in counteracting the effects of the exposure."

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PREPARING FOR THE PENINSULA.

The First Minnesota was ordered from the Valley of Virginia to Washington for a purpose. For the many weary and trying months after August, 1861, Gen. McClellan had been preparing the Union army for offensive operations against the Confederates. He had now the most gigantic military force ever before assembled in the country; old military men were astounded at the figures denoting its strength. It was completely equipped with every known implement and article used by soldiers.

March 15, 1862, the aggregate number of men "present and absent" under Gen. McClellan's command was 233,578; the number "present for duty" was 203,213. (Own Story,p.163.) His artillery consisted of 92 batteries of 520 pieces of cannon and 12,500 men. (Ibid,p.115.) He had been preparing this great host since August; the loyal States had willingly, even eagerly, furnished it, and still the General was calling for more men. The loyal people waited and waited and waited for some successful movement against the enemy in force, but none came.

For a greater part of the time, as when the First Minnesota lay so long inactive at Camp Stone, Gen. McClellan's troops did nothing but remain in camp, exercise in drills, draw their rations, and eat them. When they did move, the result was Ball's Bluff. McClellan had 100,000 men by January 1 ready to take the field, but he did nothing with them. He said he would not move until he got good and ready; he would take no chances. Let him alone until he got his machinery in good working order, and then he would start it and grind the Confederate forces to powder.

Abraham Lincoln was a very patient man, but his patience

was sorely tried by Gen. McClellan's elaborate and exhaustive deliberations. In January, when McClellan had 100,000 men in and near Washington, the President was very eager that the General should move. He sent for Gens. McDowell and Franklin, asked their advice, and told them that "the bottom would drop out of the whole thing," unless a forward and successful movement was soon made. If Gen. McClellan did not want to use the army then, Mr. Lincoln said he would like to borrow it and use it himself for awhile. (War Recs., McDowell's testimony; Swinton, p.80.) McClellan did not seem to realize that while he was taking so much time to get ready, the Confederates were also getting ready. He was, as we now know, far better prepared at any time than they were.* He was stronger in the early spring of 1862 than he had been in September previously, but they were much stronger, having in the meanwhile constructed strong fortifications, secured arms, ammunition, etc.

Out in the West things were going differently. By the 1st of February the States of Missouri and Kentucky, and practically Tennessee, were as safely secured to the Union as Massachusetts; and Mill Springs, Fort Henry, and Fort Donelson were the three bright openings in the lowering clouds which overcast the Union skies. Two men named Grant and Thomas were at the head of affairs in the West, and, as Lincoln said, they had "pitched right in at the start," knowing that they were as well able to fight as were their enemies. The great Mississippi Valley had

*At the battle of Wilson's Creek, Mo., Aug. 10, 1861, and in other engagements in the West many of the troops on each side were armed with flint-lock muskets, shot guns, and hunting rifles.

* According to the secret report of Col. J. Gorgas, Confederate Chief of Ordnance in November, 1861, the Confederates had many thousand men armed with smooth-bore and flint lock muskets, many others armed with shot guns and often bowling pieces, and thousands not armed at all. The number of musket cartridges did not average 16 to the musket; one battle would have exhausted them, and there was only one small cartridge factory running. In the battles of Wilson's Creek, Mo., and Mill Springs, Ky., hundreds of Confederates had only hunting rifles and shot-guns and made and furnished their own cartridges. A large majority of the Confederate soldiers up to 1863 were armed with old-fashioned smooth-bore muskets

been virtually secured to the Union before McClellan had gained a substantial foothold in the enemy's country.

It now seems almost incredible that Gen. Joe Johnston's Confederate army maintained its defiant and unassailed position in the vicinity of Manassas Junction, only about 25 miles from Washington City, from the battle of Bull Run until the evening of March 9 following. At the latter date, in the immediate front of Gen. McClellan's great army, only a score of miles away, Gen. Johnston withdrew his army and nearly all its camp material in safety Southward to the Rappahannock and below. So skilfully did he manage this movement, and so blind were the Union officers to it, that they did not capture a tent-peg, and the first intimation they gained of it was when they saw the smoke of the burning huts which had been the quarters of the Confederates and which they fired on their retirement.

The crude and simple device of placing big wooden logs across his breastworks to simulate cannon in position, which Gen. Johnston employed so successfully, has often been described. The "Quaker guns" completely deceived the Union officers on the outposts. They believed them to be real cannon and that Johnston's army was still behind them--when that army was forty miles away! Who and where were McClellan's spies and his cavalry?

Nearly three months before Gen. McClellan got his army in shape to suit him, he began to frame up plans for future operations against Joe Johnston, with a view of ultimately taking Richmond and practically ending the war. He seemed afraid to advance directly on Johnston and the Confederates immediately in front of Washington. He thought Johnston's forces largely outnumbered his own and besides they occupied strongly fortified

and well defended positions. Yet Johnston's army ran away from him finally!

But if the Confederate forces in front of Washington had been as strong as Gen. McClellan believed they were, their commander, the skillful tactician, Joe Johnston, would have led them forward at once, flanked McClellan out of his forts and out of Washington, defeated any detachment that came into the open field, and seized the national capital itself. The truth was Johnston's army was far less in numbers and strength than McClellan's and entirely unable to cope with the Union general's, and this Gen. Johnston and every subordinate of his well knew. Gen. McClellan ~~was an able general, but he~~ had serious faults--largely overestimating his enemy's strength being one of them.

Fearing to take what Lincoln called "the near cut road" to Richmond, directly across the country, and yet realizing the necessity of attempting the capture of the Confederate seat of government, Gen. McClellan planned to approach it by a round-about route. This route, he thought, should be by water, by way of the Potomac, the Chesapeake Bay, and the Rappahannock and York rivers.

The Rappahannock was to be ascended to Urbana and then ~~and~~ an army was to march from that town across to West Point, at the head of York river, which is formed by the union of the Mattapony and the Pamunkey rivers. That army was to unite with another which should come up the big York river to West Point, after demolishing the Confederate fortifications at Yorktown, near the mouth of the river, where Washington had forced Cornwallis to surrender, 80 years before. The armies united, they would set out for Richmond, following the Richmond & York rail-

road. West Point is twelve miles west of Urbana and the latter place is about the same distance from the proper mouth of the Rappahannock, ~~both rivers empty~~ which empties into Chesapeake Bay.

Lincoln's plan was to move the army directly against the enemy in front of Washington and strike his line first at a point on the Orange & Manassas railroad southwest of Manassas Junction, not far from the Bull Run battlefield.

McClellan's plan was conceived by him as early at least as January 1, 1862. On the 10th of that month Gen. Shields wrote him regarding it. Shields approved it, suggesting some modifications and changes. (War Recs.,Vol.5,p.700.) Among other things Shields wrote the following, which reads like axioms: "Richmond in the East and Memphis at the West are the two dominating objective points of the Southern Confederacy in this war. The possession of these points will break the power of that Confederacy." If only Richmond had been captured as soon as Memphis was, (and might it not have been?) how glorious the result!

Eight of McClellan's twelve generals approved his plan. The other four and the President stoutly contended against it. Gen. McClellan, like Darby, " 'ad 'is reasons" for his plan and submitted them in writing; Lincoln " 'ad 'is reasons" and announced them. Meanwhile the Confederates knew practically all that was going on and governed themselves accordingly.

The controversy over the plans was protracted from the 3d of February until March 9. On the latter date the Union authorities learned that Gen. Johnston had evacuated Manassas and gone southward with all his army and material, except some of the latter which he had to destroy, and leaving behind, as previously stated, some big logs with round black spots painted

on the ends to resemble holes to an observer at a distance, and these logs were laid across breastworks with the black spots or "muzzles" facing Washington!

Then, with a great show of activity and zeal, two regiments of Union cavalry, under Averell, were at once sent galloping toward the Quaker guns. The next day 5,000 cavalry and some infantry, under Gen. Stoneman, set out to follow the "fleeing rebels." But this force, finding it could not subsist on the poor exhausted country, went only ten miles beyond Manassas, or to Cedar Run, and then turned back to Washington. Gen. Johnston was two weeks in preparing and executing his retreat, and yet all of McClellan's cavalry under Stoneman and Averell, and all of his spies under Allen Pinkerton, never suspected what was going on within the Confederate lines.

Of course the Confederate abandonment of Manassas necessitated a change in McClellan's program. His favorite point for his new base of operations, as has been said, had been Urbana, on the lower Rappahannock, twelve miles east of the York river at West Point. Now the Confederates were south of the Rappahannock--even south of the Rapidan, near Culpeper and Gordonsville,--and Urbana and the Rappahannock river route had to be eliminated from the plan and only the York river route considered. Gordonsville is 5 miles south of the Rapidan, 80 miles southwest of Washington, 40 miles southwest of Fredericksburg, and 60 miles northwest of Richmond.

Gen. Johnston divined the plans and almost the details of Gen. McClellan's scheme for capturing Richmond by way of the Peninsula. It was singular that his spy work and secret service should be so much superior to those of Gen. McClellan. He was

as well prepared as he could be to thwart the plans of McClellan before that General began to execute them. He withdrew his army from Manassas to Gordonsville and the Orange county country, because here were supplies and a good railroad running 60 miles to Richmond, and here he could better organize and prepare His army to meet McClellan's and any other Union force sent out to divert his attention.

After Johnston's withdrawal McClellan changed his plans for his advance against Richmond. The Rappahannock river route was entirely discarded, and the route by the York river and the Virginia Peninsula definitely substituted. Fortress Monroe was to be the base of operations, instead of Urbana. The Union forces were to be transported by water and 127 transports were collected to convey them.

President Lincoln and Cabinet had given reluctant consent to the plan and even after agreeing to it had attached thereto many conditions or "strings." A sufficient force to defend and protect Washington was to be left behind, the Shenandoah Valley was to be well looked after, etc. But after all deductions Gen. McClellan expected to take with him, "a force of 146,122 present for duty, to be increased by a division of 10,000 formed from the troops at Fort Monroe--a total of about 156,000 men." (Own Story, p.164.)

The Administration agreed that he should have this number, but a short time thereafter withdrew McDowell's First Corps, Blenker's Division, and enough other troops to amount to 63,000. This reduced the army to a force on paper o f 93,000, but which, McClellan says, amounted to "only about 70,000 effectives." (Ibid.)

This reduction was as unwise as it was unjust. McClellan should either have been ~~xxx~~ removed from command, or he should have been given an opportunity to work out his plans and received in aid thereof the full support he had been promised, and which it was agreed he should receive. McDowell's Corps, the First, was detached from him, April 4, to his great surprise, after he had landed the advance of his army on the Peninsula. Blenker's Division was detached March 31, after the President had solemnly promised it should be retained. The President wrote the General that he made the detachment "with great pain, understanding that you would wish it otherwise."

The excuse given for withdrawing so many men from McClellan's command was that he had not left enough men to protect Washington. In all he had left 73,456, which had been agreed was enough. If the big army did its duty on the Peninsula, there would not be many Confederates at leisure to trouble Washington or any part of Northern Virginia.

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GOES TO THE FRONT BY ARMY CORPS.

On the 8th of March President Lincoln, after conference with his Cabinet and certain military men, but without consulting Gen. McClellan, divided the organization of the Army of the Potomac into four army Corps. McClellan says this "was the work of the President and Secretary of War, probably urged by McDowell." (Own Story,p.222.) The First Corps was to be commanded by Gen. McDowell; the Second by Gen. E. V. Sumner; the Third, by Gen. Heintzelman; the Fourth by Gen. Keyes.

Of Gen. Sumner, the commander of the Corps to which the First Minnesota was assigned, Swinton says: "He was the ideal of a soldier, but he had few of the qualities that make a general." At the time he was made commander of the Second Corps he was past 65 years of age, but he was vigorous in mind and body and capable of good work, as he demonstrated. He was not a West Pointer, but had served in the regular army for 43 years, or since 1819. His field service extended all over the United States and a great part of Mexico. In the early part of 1846, while in command of Fort Atkinson, in northeastern Iowa, he led a battalion of cavalry on a march through Minnesota. He marched up the Minnesota to Big Stone Lake, thence down the Red River to Pembina, and returned virtually over the same route. Later in the year he went to Mexico.

On the 11th of March Gen. McClellan was removed from the general command of all the armies of the United States and his authority confined to the Army of the Potomac. The order of removal said that it was issued because he had "personally taken the field at the head of the Army of the Potomac," and the infer-

ence was that he would have his hands full without undertaking to manage affairs in Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and elsewhere. He had been in general command since the retirement of old Gen. Scott, Nov. 1.

After McClellan had obtained the assent of the Administration to his plans, he really seemed eager for their fulfillment. The order to furnish him water transportation for his army to the Peninsula was issued February 27, and on the 17th of March it was ready--400 steamers and sailing craft. The van of the army was led by Gen. C. S. Hamilton's Division (afterward Phil Kearney's) of Heintzelman's Third Corps. On the 22d it was followed by Fitz John Porter's Division of the same Corps. The other divisions followed as fast as vessels could be furnished them.

OFF FOR THE PENINSULA.

On the evening of March 29 the First Minnesota embarked at Washington for the Peninsula. The Regiment went on board two small steamers, the Golden Gate and the Jenny Lind, with transports in tow, and early next morning the boats moved. The Regiment was still in Gorman's Brigade, with the 15th Massachusetts, the 34th and 82d (2d State Militia) New York, and Kirby's Battery, I, First, U. S. Sedgwick's Division was composed of Gorman's, Burns's, and Dana's Brigades, with four batteries. Sumner's Corps was composed of I. B. Richardson's and John Sedgwick's Divisions.

Down the Potomac, past the river forts, past Mount Vernon, past abandoned Confederate fortifications, past a great many sights and scenes strange but of interest to the Minnesota boys, went the vessels. That evening they cast anchor off Smith's Point, where the waters of the Potomac are lost with those of Chesapeake Bay. Many of the Minnesota men now saw the "salt water" for the first time.

The next day and night the vessels voyaged southward, sixty miles down Chesapeake Bay, then thronged with army transports of all kinds. On the morning of April 1, the Regiment halted for some hours at Fortress Monroe, the base of operations. Here, among other objects of interest, they saw the Monitor, which three weeks before, in its fight with the Merrimac, had distinguished itself and revolutionized the construction of war-vessels and naval warfare. Upon it now rested Gen. McClellan's hopes for the safe landing of his army on the Peninsula. If there was nothing to prevent her, the big solid iron-clad Merrimac was at liberty to

come down and play havoc with his transports, as it had with the Cumberland and the Congress. Of the Monitor Lochren writes: "It lay quietly among a crowd of vessels, so small and unlike anything ever before imagined as a water craft, and yet so powerful and impregnable. We could not study it enough."

Moving out from Fort Monroe, the Regiment finally disembarked at the ruins of the town of Hampton, which had been destroyed the previous spring. Here now is the site of a national soldiers' home. The men were glad to be on shore again, for some of them had been seasick, and the quarters on the ship had been very cramped and uncomfortable. But conditions on shore were not much improved, for that night the Regiment went into camp in a low field without wood and good water. The water was brackish from the salt and iodine of the sea. Lochren remembers that at this camp the Minnesota had a new experience in hunting for "grub" oysters. These oysters bury themselves in the mud and and are not found in sea beds. They are obtained generally by digging, or "grubbing" as the natives call it, and hence the local name. The Minnesota boys, who were "put wise" by some old sailors, hunted this luscious sea food in their bare legs, wading through the cold mud and finding the oysters with their toes! They were very fine oysters, too, and much relished.

THE PENINSULAR SITUATION.

The region of Virginia known as the Peninsula, on which McClellan's army landed, is in the southeastern part of the State. It is an isthmus, in a sense, formed by the York and the James rivers, but it becomes a peninsula by the extension of Chesapeake Bay and the ocean from the mouth of one river to the other. It is from seven to fifteen miles wide and fifty miles in length. The country is low and flat, generally wooded, but with many marshes. Looking toward the sea, the Peninsula has the big James river on the ~~left~~ right or west side. As has been stated, the York river is formed by the union of the Mattapony and the Pamunkey, at the town of West Point, and the James river has its source in the mountains of Virginia, near Lynchburg.

Fortress Monroe, at the lower extremity of the Peninsula, is about 75 miles southeast of Richmond. Gen. McClellan designed to approach Richmond up the Peninsula keeping open the James River on his left flank for the transportation of supplies. The York river could also be used for that purpose and the railroad from West Point westward utilized when a certain obstacle was removed.

That obstacle was a rather strongly fortified position at Yorktown, on the York river, nearly ten miles from its mouth. The Confederates had begun to fortify this position the previous fall and had made it strong against infantry and cavalry. The artillery with which its defenses were supplied was generally old and obsolete--big smooth bore guns taken from the Norfolk Navy Yard and intended for service on shipboard. The position was not defensible against the Union artillery, with its large calibered and skillfully rifled long range guns.

The chief constructor of the Yorktown defenses, and their commander afterward, was Gen. John Bankhead Magruder, a West Pointer, a soldier with a dashing record, and then 52 years of age. He had many military qualities; he was a fine civil engineer, a good tactician, a safe commander for a division of infantry or cavalry, and a dashing and very brave fighter. Convivial in his tastes, he was a great lover of a good time, and was withal chivalric and romantic. During the Mexican War, while the American army was before the city of Mexico, this incident took place: Magruder was commander of a skirmish line. He sounded a parley, suspended all operations, and under a flag of truce sent inside the Mexican lines a lady's glove, which one of his men had picked up and w ich he begged might be restored to its fair owner! In front of Richmond, his dragging brush up and down a dusty road and raising great clouds of pulverized Virginia dirt, making the Union generals believe that a large ~~rebel~~ Confederate force was marching along the road, is a well established fact.

Gen. Magruder's fortifications that girdled Yorktown about were practically on the site of thos e built and occupied by Lord Cornwallis's army during the War of the Revolution, 81 years before. Cornwallis's maps and plans on file in Washington, were studied and used to some extent by McClellan and his engineers. On the east side of the town was the big wide York river, virtually an arm of Chesapeake Bay. Across the river from Yorktown was Gloucester Point, also fortified. On the west was the Warwick River, asmall stream, heading a mile from Yorktown, and running nearly across the Peninsula from the York to the James, 14 miles, and emptying into the latter river.

The line of the Warwick was well defended. Its source was commanded by the guns of the Yorktown forts and its fords had been replaced by dams which were defended by artillery and

which raised the water in the stream so that it could not easily be waded or forded anywhere. Moreover the approaches to the stream on either side were through dense forests and swamps. McClellan's scouts had given him a very imperfect idea of the country of the Peninsula through which he would pass, and very scanty knowledge of the enemy opposing him.

At the beginning of the year the garrison defending Yorktown and all the approaches numbered, according to Magruder's report, about 3,500 men, chiefly artillerists. This force was known as the Confederate "Army of the Peninsula" from its organization. When McClellan's army landed at Fort Monroe and Hampton, Magruder had about 9,000. A week later he had 11,000. At the same time, down at Norfolk, the Confederates had 8,000 men under Gen. Benj. Huger. Gen. McClellan believed--or perhaps feared rather than believed--that these forces combined numbered 30,000.

Gen. Joe Johnston and all his generals knew that McClellan's objective point was Richmond. McClellan had admittedly 85,000 men, but the Confederates thought he had 110,000, and they wanted to be prepared to meet a force of that size behind their breastworks or in the field in front of their capital.. They would be compelled to bring up troops from as far away as Charleston, S.C., and the mountains of Kentucky and West Virginia, and the Federal approach must be delayed, and Magruder was instructed to cause that delay as long as it was safe and practicable.

Magruder estimated the importance of the delay: He was a great bluffer. He showed fight from the first, as if he had plenty of men. This boldness deceived McClellan, and made him stop to besiege, instead of merely halting to assail, the Confederate position at Yorktown. Gen. Heintzelman was not deceived. He believed, from the known facts and the reasons deducible

therefrom, that the force at Yorktown was not very large. He offered to take his own Army Corps, Hooker's and Kearney's Divisions, and shut Magruder up within the walls of Yorktown and keep him shut up until the Union fleet with its big guns could get at him, and then it would not be long until a surrender would come. Meanwhile McClellan with the main army would be marching on towards Richmond.

In his evidence before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Gen. Heintzelman said: "I think if I had been permitted to advance when I first landed on the Peninsula, I could have isolated the troops in Yorktown and the place would have fallen in a few days; but my orders were very stringent not to make any demonstration." (Report on Cond.War,Vol.1,p.347.) Gen. McClellan, however, expressed a contrary opinion. "When we did advance," he said, "we found the enemy intrenched and in strong force wherever we approached."(Ibid,p.429.)

It must be borne in mind, however, that Heintzelman's proposition was based on a movement to be made very soon after the army landed on the Peninsula--not ten days or two weeks after, but as soon as possible. For when it was certain that McClellan's army had come to Fortress Monroe, and even before it arrived, Gen. Johnston began re-enforcing Magruder, with his 3,500, and kept re-enforcing him as long as he could. McClellan's delay "gave the Confederate Government time to swell Magruder's handful to an army of respectable size." (Johnston's Narrative,p.111.)

But this force of 11,000 which Magruder had was stretched over a rather long line: "I was compelled," says he, "to place in Gloucester Point, Yorktown, and Mulberry Island fixed garrisons, amounting to 6,000 men. The balance of my line, embracing a length of thirteen miles, was defended by about 5,000 men. (Official

Report; also Swinton,p.109.)

Magruder greatly feared an assault, but it did not come. "To my surprise," he adds, "he [McClellan] permitted day after day to pass without an assault. In a few days the object of his delay was apparent. In every direction in front of our lines, through the intervening woods, and alon the open fields, earth-works began to appear." The Confederate position, with its 11,000 defenders, was to be invested by siege by the Union troops with 85,000 assailants. In this game of war spades were to be trumps, and shovels and mattocks the game cards.

But in a few days Magruder's army was stronger than 11,000 men. He says: "Through the energetic action of the Government re-enforcements began to pour in, and each hour the Army of the Peninsula grew stronger and stronger, until anxiety passed from my mind as to the result of an attack upon us." (Magr's Rep., in War Recs, Confed.Reps.of Battles,p.517; Swinton,p.109.) Finally the Confederate works at Yorktown were held by "about 35,000." (Johnston's Narrative,p.112.)

MCCLELLAN'S DAMAGING DELAY.

If Gen. McClellan had made a vigorous attack upon the Confederate lines at Yorktown at or near the time of his first approach, he would certainly have forced a passage at least at one point--and one passage would have been sufficient. Broken anywhere, the line along the Warwick River could not have been held an instant, and Yorktown, pressed on all sides, would have been his in a few days, and with it the garrison of 10,000 men which Joe Johnston so badly needed for the defense of Richmond.

On the 5th of April Gen. McClellan's army struck the line of the Warwick. At once his generals clamored for an immediate advance on the enemy. Gen. Barnard, the chief of engineers, advised an assault on the very walls of Yorktown. But McClellan said no. His generals wanted to win quickly by employing their greatly superior strength, but their commander wished to triumph by scientific methods such as are taught in the books and are so dear to certain professors in certain military schools.

At last, on the 16th, when it was too late, he permitted an attack. And this attack (on the dam near Lee's Mill) was made by only four companies of the Third Vermont, instead of by four regiments. The detachment waded the creek, breast deep, and carried the Confederate rifle pits. Then they were re-enforced by eight more companies of the Vermont brigade that came into the pits with them, while the four regiments of that brigade (Brooks's of W.F.Smith's Division) were in reserve, with Ayres's battery, all firing across the creek into the woods.

After a fight of an hour the twelve Vermont companies were driven out of the pits as the effect of a charge by the Fifteenth North Carolina, Seventh, Eighth, and half of the Sixteenth Georgia, the Fifteenth North Carolina, and two companies

of the Second Louisiana.(Magruder's report.) This force was supported by 5,000 infantry under Gens.Toombs and McLaws. Including the cannonading, which began at 9 A.M. by Ayres's Battery, the entire engagement lasted practically all day, the Union troops being ordered to retreat at 4 P.M.

The loss of the Union troops in the engagement at Lee's Mill--or the Burnt Chimneys, as it was often called--was officially reported as 35 killed, 121 wounded, and 9 missing, a total of 165. Of the killed 22 were from the four brave companies of the Third Vermont, D, E, F, and K, that made the assault on and carried the rifle pits, driving out the Fifteenth North Carolina. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was reported as 75.

"Thus," says Gen. Alex. Webb in his work "The Peninsula in 1862," p.66, "thus a fair opportunity to break the Warwick line was missed."

Gen. McClellan ordered the movement on the dam at Lee's Mill and claimed that it was a success. Gen. Keyes, who commanded the Fourth Corps, in which was the Vermont Brigade, disclaimed any responsibility for it. Gen. McClellan said the object of the movement was, "to ascertain the real state of the case on the enemy's side," and that this object was accomplished! Though he said the serious loss sustained in learning "the state of the case" was "to be regretted." Nobody ever believed the General's statement, and few thought him in earnest.

But now, to all who advised a vigorous policy and agressive movements continuously on the enemy, he had a ready answer by pointing towards Burnt Chimneys and Lee's Mill. And though he doubtless regretted the result of the movement there was a

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certain relish in his manner and tone when, in effect, he said, "I knew how an assault would turn out and I told you so."

Under now this great engineer officer--engineer in all his instincts--had his way and set to work to reduce Yorktown and push away the Confederates from his front by scientific methods. So for the next fortnight he fairly reveled in digging ditches, opening parallels, running traverses, calculating ranges and distance, and placing batteries and siege guns about Yorktown and its defenses. Observing the elaborate drawings and plans, covered with figures, "He is going to take the place by algebra," said Phil Kearney, sarcastically.

So a formidable siege was resolved upon. A siege as magnificent and well nigh as formidable as that levied against Sebastopol. Commodore Goldsborough was to assist with the navy on the York River or east side, though he wanted a guarantee that he would not be much troubled by the Confederates at Gloucester Point, across the river from Yorktown. The army was to constitute a great living wall along the Warwick river, from its mouth, on the James river, near Mulberry Point, eastward to the environs of Yorktown. Then Magruder was satisfied. He sat down behind his strong walls able to await without danger and receive without hurry the re-enforcements he needed.

Gen. McClellan never could be a great and successful general against alert, sagacious, and generally intelligent foes, such as the Confederates were. He was physically brave enough, and he was devoted to his country, for no more patriotic heart ever beat than that which pulsated within the breast of George B. McClellan. But he was too scientific to be a successful soldier in the field. He would have been unrivaled as the chief engineer of any army, but a failure as its commander. For he was not original; could not seize upon occasions without consulting

the books; could do nothing without he had a precedent for it; could not establish a precedent.

Gen. McClellan would not and could not have ridden the ride and fought the fight that Sheridan did at Winchester; would not and could not have made the march that Grant made to the rear of Vicksburg; would not and could not have made Sherman's march to the sea; would not and could not have made any one of the successful movements of the war that called for dash and vigor and aggressiveness. What would he have done had he been in Stonewall Jackson's place in the Valley of Virginia or at Cahncellorsville?

After sitting down before Yorktown, determined to besiege it, Gen. McClellan conducted his operations industriously. To be sure he worked deliberately, for haste and expedition in the discharge of affairs were never practiced by Gen. McClellan. The batteries when completed were not allowed to fire upon Yorktown, lest they provoke a return fire which would interfere with the construction of other works! But as soon as all the batteries were completed, and everything else was ready, then a simultaneous and overwhelming bombardment was to be opened upon Yorktown and the city reduced to capitulation or destruction within a few hours. It was expected that this great tornado of shot and shell would break in all its fury May 6.

But on May 4, just when the fireworks were ready to be let off, it was discovered that Magruder and his Confederates had evacuated Yorktown! They had taken with them practically everything worth carrying, leaving behind a lot of big smooth-bore cannon, rusty and antiquated, that were liable to burst all to pieces after a few discharges. Though the weather and the roads were bad they were skedaddling away in entire safety.

The truth is that a part of the Confederate line had been retired May 1. Over at its western extremity, at the Mulberry Point or Mulberry Island end, Gen. Peck's Union brigade was stationed. To this brigade belonged the Fifty-Fifth New York, Col. DeTrobriand's regiment. In his book, "Four Years with the Potomac Army," Gen. DeTrobriand says (pp.186-87) that the Confederates withdrew from Mulberry Island on April 30, in plain view of Gen. Peck's camp, and were unmolested, "in view of the positive orders received to reply only to an attack." Gen. Peck informed Gen. Couch of the incident, but nothing was done. That night, however, when the "saucy rebels" had the audacity to light their camp fires in plain sight and easy distance of the Union lines, Gen. Peck's battery threw a few shells among them and scattered them completely. On the morning of May 2, a negro swam across the Warwick and reported to Col. DeTrobriand that the Confederates had evacuated all their line in front of Gen. Peck and had "done lef' de country, sah." The next day Magruder and the rest left Yorktown and the remainder of the lines.

For the second time the enemy, with a greatly inferior force, had slipped away in safety from before Gen. McClellan. Gen. Magruder managed his retreat with the same masterly skill that marked Johnston's evacuation of Manassas. McClellan was wholly unconscious of what his enemy was doing. His stupendous efforts, his great engineering works, his millions of treasure expended, and his month of valuable--or invaluable--time had all been wasted. Cheated of an anticipated brilliant passage of arms, the Army of the Potomac secured for its work at Yorktown only the possession of the deserted works and about 70 old smooth bore siege guns, valuable now only for old iron. These the Confederates could afford to give as the price of an unmolested retreat.(Swinton)

THE FIRST MINNESOTA ON THE PENINSULA.

We left the First Minnesota at Hampton digging "grub" oysters in the marshes. April 5, at 1 o'clock in the morning, the Regiment broke camp and marched that day about ten miles to the northeast to Big Bethel. Here a year before had occurred an insignificant engagement called by courtesy "the battle" of Big Bethel, wherein 16 Union soldiers were killed and 34 wounded and the Confederate loss reported as "trifling," Among the Union killed was Maj. Theodore Winthrop, an accomplished and popular literary man, then acting as an aid-de-camp for Gen. Ben. Butler.

The march was trying on the men. The country was generally flat, without hills. The weather had changed to sweltering heat. Before they had walked many miles, many of them had thrown away their overcoats, their dress coats, and even their blankets, to lighten the loads they were compelled to carry. Previously, when marching through the Valley of Virginia, or about Camp Stone, the weather had been cool, and the loads carried were not uncomfortable.

The roads were very poor and muddy from recent rains. Now they were crowded with the material of the great army which was slowly creeping through the mud over the flat wooded country. The grass was quite green, the buds of the trees were unrolling into leaves as large as a swallow's wings, and in the branches the birds were nesting and singing. Spring comes earlier in Southern Virginia than in Minnesota.

At first the march was orderly, the men in four ranks with files well aligned and the route step observed. But under the hot sun and the unaccustomed burden of the heavy equipments,

the men disregarded the knowledge they had obtained by so much drilling and "disciplining" and straggled along the roads almost at will. They strayed away from the road, lagged behind, and mingled with the baggage wagons and ambulances. Finally they discarded every article of clothing they could possibly dispense with--and even then were scarcely able to drag one mud-laden foot after the other.

Lochren relates that on this route Gen. McClellan and his formidable staff and escort rode by the First Minnesota in a hurry to get to the front. The General and Col. Sully had served together in the regular army before the war. Now, as the commander passed, came first the formal military salute and then the informal cheery greetings: "How are you, Alf?" and "How are you, George?" At that time Gen. McClellan appeared strong, athletic, a splendid horseman, a beau sabreur, and in perfect health. He was a month or two past 35 years of age, just as old as Napoleon was when, after well nigh conquering the world, he was crowned Emperor of the French. His uniform was neat and well-fitting but plainer than that worn by any member of his staff. He was already popular with his soldiers, who called him "Little Mac," and thought him a gallant spirit and a great general. And this opinion the Army of the Potomac, as an army, always held. As he swept by the straggling ranks of the First Minnesota on this occasion, the men got into some semblance of order and gave their general three loud and hearty cheers.

The Regiment resumed its march toward Yorktown at 5 o'clock on the morning of April 6. It was raining and the mud became worse than ever. Two miles out from Big Bethel the sound of cannonading was heard in front. The Union advance had come up with Stuart's cavalry, and there was skirmishing. Desultory

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fighting was kept up at intervals during the day, whenever Stoneman's Cavalry came in contact with Stuart's. Sometimes the infantry of both sides became slightly engaged. Often the Regiment halted for several minutes. Then it hurried forward at "double quick," as if it were about to rush the Confederates with a bayonet charge. Really at times it seemed that the Minnesotians would soon become actively engaged. But the Confederates retired steadily, yet slowly, and at nightfall had gone into shelter behind the strong walls of Yorktown or the good breastworks strung along Warwick creek. And all the time it rained!

The First Minnesota, as a part of Gorman's Brigade, Sedgwick's Division of Sumner's Second Army Corps, marched to Yorktown with Heintzelman's Third Corps and went into camp with that Corps. Gen. Richardson's, the other Division, had not yet arrived on the Peninsula, and Gen. Sumner had been appointed by Gen. McClellan his second in command and was seeing to things generally in front of Yorktown. After the 6th of April he commanded the Union left wing, his own and Keyes's Corps.

Gorman's Brigade was encamped about two miles south of Yorktown, in what was known as headquarters camp No. 1, for some days. The First Minnesota was set to work cutting out and building corduroy roads over which supplies could be hauled from Hampton or Fortress Monroe. The camp was in a low muddy flat and it rained all the time. The men called it "Camp Misery." April 11 Sedgwick's entire Division was moved a mile away to another camp called Camp Winfield Scott. The Division's camp was on the left of Gen. C. S. Hamilton's, of Heintzelman's Corps, ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ and extended down to the Warwick creek bottom in front of Wynn's Mill, three miles south of Yorktown.

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Lochren notes that on the morning of this removal, a Union balloon was sent up from the York river to take a birdseye view of the Confederate situation. It went up in plain sight of all the camps and was an object of interest. It had lines attached to it and was to be drawn back to the earth when a good view of the enemy's position had been obtained. On this occasion the lines broke and the balloon went where it pleased, for it was not of the dirigible kind. It drifted over the Confederate lines, and there was some anxiety lest it should go to earth there, but it finally floated back and descended into Sedgwick's camp. Among the occupants of the balloon was Gen. Fitz John Porter, then commanding a Division in Heintzelman's Corps. The balloon was Prof. Lowe's and was regularly attached to the Army of the Potomac.

Camp Winfield Scott was a great improvement over Camp Misery. It was on higher and dryer ground and in a good piece of woodland which furnished abundant shade and fuel . Shelter tents, big enough for only two men on a campaign, were issued to the men, and were found to be just suited to their purpose. Here the Regiment spent the remainder of the month of April, from the 11th to and including the 30th. It was a twenty days' season of hard work. Every second day the men were on picket duty along the Warwick, with the Confederate pickets just across the stream, hidden in the woods, 300 yards away. When they were not on picket they were building fortifications or corduroy roads, or were being routed out of their beds by musketry firing on the picket lines and made to double quick out at some point supposed to be threatened by an assault from the enemy. And all the while it rained! The poor soldier boys went about commonly wet to the skin; for, even when not on duty, they had no waterproof shelter. The little "dog tents" leaked like sieves, there was a scarcity of rubber blankets and ponchos, and the only relief was when the rain clouds drifted away and the sun shone out--and then it was

hot as blazes.

All through the siege of Yorktown, night and day, there was cannon firing both by the besiegers and the besieged. It was quite ineffective; nobody was hurt. The Confederates did not dare to use the big old cast-iron guns within the fortifications lest they burst. They had a few rifled pieces and these were overworked so that some of them burst.(Magruder's report.) Gen. McClellan brought down and mounted some very heavy modern guns, including 100-pound and even 200-pound rifled pieces.

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THE CONFEDERATES EVACUATE YORKTOWN.

Saturday evening, May 3, the Confederate batteries in Yorktown kept up a fire of shot and shell on the Union lines until after midnight. Nobody hurt. It was all a bluff. At daybreak the next morning (Sunday) Gen. Heintzelman, at his headquarters, heard what he thought was skirmishing in Yorktown and saw a bright light there. Prof. Lowe, the noted aeronaut, immediately went up in his blloon and reported that the light was a burning vessel at Yorktown wharf, and it was subsequently learned that the noise like a skirmish was caused by the explosion of several thousand musket cartridges and shells of small caliber, which the Confederates were destroying in one of their magazines.

Then Gen. Heintzelman got a telegram from Fitz John Porter that the enemy was abandoning Yorktown. Heintzelman immediately went up in the balloon with Prof. Lowe and saw enough to convince him that the telegram was true. Descending, he ordered Gens. Hooker and Kearney to prepare their divisions and Col. Averell to prepare his Third Pennsylvania Cavalry tm march immediately. (Heintzelman's report, War Recs., Vol. 11, p. 456.)

On that Sunday morning, May 4, the Regiment, as usual when its turn came, went out on picket before daylight. But after daylight the word came that the Confederates had skedaddled, and then the men went back to camp for their tents and knapsacks, preparatory to marching. But they did not march far. Only to the Confederate intrenchments at Wynn's Mill and along the Warwick thereabouts. Lochren says that Dana's Third Brigade of Sedgwick's Division was first in the enemy's abandoned works, and Gorman's was next. Seemingly the Confederates had leisurely

made up their minds about evacuating, but when they did decide they stood not on the order of going but went at once.

About the 1st of May Gen. Magruder's spies and field glasses told him that the Union troops were ready to begin the long-threatened bombardment and at once he began to retreat.(See Magruder's report; also Johnston's Narrative,p.111.) The line of retreat was already fixed; there was nothing to do but follow it.

At Wynn's Mill, where the First Minnesota was, the Confederates left in a hurry. Their breakfasts, such as they were, and they were not very luxurious, were still in the frying pans, skillets, pots and bake kettles. They abandoned quite a stock of provisions and camp equipage. In a plantation store house near by was a goodly supply of delicious smoked hams and bacon. The men secured a large supply of frying pans and bake kettles. And all the while it rained! The brigade remained in the enemy's abandoned works at Wynn's Mill until on the morning of the 6th, when it marched three miles to the northeast, in deep mud and pouring rain, of course, to Yorktown.

The fortifications at Yorktown were of much interest to the Minnesota boys. They were scientifically constructed of dirt walls and sand bags, with timber re-enforcements, etc., and their armament was a miscellaneous collection of old United States naval guns which had been taken from the Gosport Navy Yard the previous spring. More than 70 pieces of these archaic, inefficient pieces of ordinance were left in the works. Most of them had not been and never were used, until they were broken up and sold for old iron. It was believed that a majority of them would burst after a few discharges, though they could throw a ball or shell weighing from 64 to 100 pounds. But what of that? McClellan's and Commodore Goldsborough's 125-pounder steel rifled Parrotts

would have knocked them all to pieces in ten minutes or less. The works at Yorktown were for the most part built by negro slaves impressed from their masters by the Confederate authorities.

To re-enforce the front walls or glacis of the works, in case of assault, and to make an approach to the works in any part dangerous, the Confederates had planted a considerable number of loaded shells, generally 8-inch and 10-inch mortar shells, so arranged as to explode when trod upon or otherwise disturbed. This was against the laws of war, and the Union commanders and some of the Confederate leaders protested against it. It was an ugly thing for men to do that prided themselves on their "chivalry." One or two of these infernal machines exploded within the fortifications after the Union troops had taken possession.

The fortifications at Yorktown would have been very difficult of capture by a direct assault of infantry. But they were not captured by such an assault, though they were captured. They could have been made to fall at least two weeks before they did had McClellan, say about the 10th of April, broken the thin gray line along Warwick creek thus flanking the position and compelling either retreat or surrender. From what we now know it is quite probable that on the 6th of April, when McClellan's army sat down before Yorktown, the Confederate defending forces numbered about 2,500 men for the Yorktown garrison, leaving 6,800 to defend the Warwick and Mulberry Island for a distance of nearly 14 miles, less than 500 men to the mile.

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THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG.

When the Confederates evacuated Yorktown and the line of the Warwick, they struck straight up the Peninsula for Richmond and the James River Valley. Their route lay through the historic old town of Williamsburg, once, from 1698 to 1779, the capital of Virginia and long the county seat of James City County. The town was founded in 1632 and William and Mary College opened in 1693.* Patrick Henry delivered his famous speech here.

Stoneman's Cavalry took after the retreating Confederates who were floundering through the mud as fast as they could, but that was not very fast. Stuart's Cavalry was protecting Magruder's (or rather Longstreet's) rear. Gen. Longstreet had, by orders, that morning relieved the forces in front of Williamsburg, Magruder's command, by two brigades of his own Division. Magruder was ill and Gen. D. R. Jones was given temporary command of his Division. Longstreet was in command on the field of all the forces. Gen. Sumner, as second in command of the Union army, had charge of affairs on that side, McClellan being absent at Yorktown.

Williamsburg is 12 miles west of Yorktown, but the Confederate fortifications were two or three miles nearer. Stoneman and his cavalry followed hard after Jeb Stuart's cavalry and Longstreet's infantry and nine miles out, or at Fort Magruder, brought them to a stand. They were too strong for his cavalry alone, and Stoneman waited for the Union infantry, Hooker's and Kearney's Divisions, which he knew were coming on through the mud.

On the morning of the 5th the battle of Williamsburg began. It lasted all day. There was some very bloody fighting. On the Union side Hooker's Division bore the brunt; it lost 1,575 men. The total Union loss was 468 killed, 1,442 wounded, and 373 captured or missing; total 2,283.

* William and Mary College was a noted institution. Four Presidents, Jefferson, Monroe, Tyler and W. H. Harrison were among its graduates as were John Marshall and Gen. Scott. The Government paid $64,000 for the damages done to it by the Army of the Potomac.

The total Confederate loss was 288 killed, 975 wounded, and 297 captured or missing; total 1,560. The aggregate loss of both armies in killed and wounded was nearly as large as at Bull Run.

Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock won great renown at the battle of Williamsburg. He was then in command of the First Brigade of W. F. Smith's Division of Keyes's Fourth Corps.

After the fighting was well over, McClellan came galloping upon the field. He issued no order, however, except to direct Gen. W. F. Smith to re-enforce Hancock strongly. This was not needed. Hancock already had the key to complete victory. Next morning, if the fight should be renewed, the Confederates would be disastrously defeated. Their commanders realized this, and that night Longstreet left the field and set out for the Chickahominy.

The Confederates did not want to fight at Williamsburg. They did not want to fight anywhere until they got in front of Richmond. Then they would make up for lost time! They would have run away from the Williamsburg fight if the mud had not been so deep and the rain had not poured incessantly.

OFF FOR THE CHICKAHOMINY.

The First Minnesota was within the fortifications at Yorktown that 5th day of May, when the battle of Williamsburg was being fought. It was twelve miles away, but the heavy atmosphere carried the sound well and the noise of the battle was plainly heard. Troops were moving out in the direction of the firing as rapidly as the terrible condition of the roads would permit, and the men thought a terrible conflict was raging.

About dark Gorman's brigade set out towards Williamsburg. It was a terrible march, though a short one. It was raining, of course, and the roads had been for a long time almost impassable. The mud and slush and ruts and quagmires were now something frightful. A black, impenetrable darkness added to the discomforts. Other troops were marching ahead, toiling along, with frequent halts. The Regiment ran into their wagons, their artillery, and the troops, and there was great confusion and disorder.

Though it had left Yorktown three hours before, the Regiment had compassed only about one mile, when it was ordered to countermarch and return to Yorktown. Welcome news! The return march was made in far less time than the outward, and at midnight the men were safely sheltered within Magruder's fortifications back of Yorktown.

Gen. McClellan had ordered up the naval vessels of Goldsborough and some transports to convey Franklin's Division and other troops up the big broad York River to its head, at West Point.

Franklin's Division belonged to McDowell's First Corps, which had been promised to McClellan as a part of his army, but which April 4, had been detached and kept at Washington, in open

violation of the agreed plan. The Division had been sailing about on transports near Yorktown and had not been ordered back to Washington. On the 3d of May it was disembarked near Yorktown to help take the place. Now it was ordered back on the transports to proceed up to West Point. It did not get away from Yorktown until the 6th and reached West Point the next morning.

The First Minnesota had been ordered back from the route to Williamsburg to follow with its Division that of Gen. Franklin by water to West Point. Gen. McClellan sent not only Franklin's but Sedgwick's and Richardson's Divisions of Sumner's Corps, and Fitz John Porter's of Keyes's Corps up the York River in transports to West Point and the right bank of the Pamunkey. The other Divisions, the wagon trains, and the reserve artillery moved subsequently by land. The First Minnesota left Yorktown in the afternoon of May 7, on the steamer Long Branch.

While at Yorktown the boys inspected the Confederate works, the quarters, etc., and came to the conclusion that the Confederate garrison had not been altogether happy during the siege. They were corroborated in their belief afterward when Gen. Magruder's report appeared. The General wrote:

> From April 4 to May 3 this army served almost without relief in the trenches. Many companies of artillery were never relieved during the long period. It rained almost incessantly; the trenches were filled with water; the weather was exceedingly cold; no fires could be allowed; the artillery and infantry of the enemy played upon our men almost continuously, day and night; the army had neither coffee, sugar, nor hard bread, but subsisted on flour and salt meat, and that in reduced quantities, and yet no murmurs were heard. (Magruder's Rep.,War.Recs.,Vol.11,p.408.)

Well, Yorktown was now taken, the lower Peninsula passed, and the first stage of McClellan's journey to Richmond compassed. And more than a month of valuable time had been spent and could not be gathered up again.

Many Union officers present had chafed at the delay. They believed, that an attack, well managed, by one-third of McClellan's force would suffice to capture the Confederate positions, Yorktown included.

The worst feature of McClellan's Campaign was the inexcusable delay of at least three weeks. This meant so much of ill to his army. The Confederates improved every hour of the delay in strengthening the old and preparing the new fortifications before Richmond and in assembling their scattered forces there. The Confederate Congress took vigorous military measures and at this very period passed the first conscription act, which gave Jeff Davis absolute control of the military resources of the Confederacy.

But while an enemy that could be met and contended with was getting ready to meet McClellan's army at Richmond, there was a more dangerous enemy awaiting the Northern forces, and this enemy could not be met and fought with outright. This was the deadly malaria of the low, swampy, miasmatic marshes and flats of the James and the Chickahominy rivers. Upon these flats and through these marshes and swamps the Union troops would have to go, and if they waited until near the 1st of June, the regular annual fever season would be on in all its terror and deadliness.

Gen. McClellan attributed his delay in forcing the Confederates away from Yorktown to two causes: First, the withdrawal of McDowell's First Army Corps from his army. The second cause, he said, was that Admiral Goldsborough refused to take his war ships and demolish the Confederate water batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester Point, and then push up to West Point, at the head of York River. The timid old Commodore thought the batteries "too strong" for him, and yet Gen. Johnston, Gen. Magruder, and

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their subordinates were daily expecting that he would run up and smash them with his heavy rifled guns, which he could have done in an hour. Except the artillerymen, they were garrisoned solely by Virginia militia and home guards, mostly old men and boys.

But on the 14th of April, in response to his repeated pleadings, the Government ordered Franklin's Division to join McClellan as soon as possible. The Division arrived at Cheeseman's Creek, below Yorktown, April 20, and then what did McClellan do with it? He kept it on the transports which had brought it from Washington for nearly two weeks, or until the day before the siege ended! It made no move toward Gloucester Point. It did nothing but sail idly around in the bay or swing at anchor in the harbor of Hampton Roads until the last day of the siege!

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FROM WEST POINT TO THE CHICKAHOMINY.

McClellan started the movement of his troops from Williamsburg on the 8th, Keyes's Fourth Corps in advance, following Stoneman's Cavalry, which soon opened communication with Gen. Franklin at Eltham, a little town two miles west of Yorktown, but on the south side of the Pamunkey. And on the 8th, while Keyes had just started to march, McClellan notified the War Department that according to the best information, "an army of from 80,000 to 120,000" was opposed to Franklin's advance, although, happily, that supposed huge force was "in full retreat to the Chickahominy." Actually there were but 10,000 men in front of Franklin! (War Recs., Johnston's Narrative, etc.)

That portion of McClellan's army which was sent up the York River from Yorktown to West Point made more progress with more safety than the troops that marched by way of and fought at Williamsburg. Franklin's Division was ordered up on the 5th, but did not leave Yorktown until the 6th. The distance from Yorktown to West Point up the river is about 30 miles. The Division reached Eltham, two miles south of West Point, at 1 P.M., immediately disembarked, and Gen. Franklin dispatched the transports back to Yorktown to bring up Sedgwick's Division. (Webb's Peninsula, p.82.)

On the evening of the 6th the killing of one of Franklin's pickets and the capture of two Confederate scouts gave notice that an attack might be expected on Franklin at Eltham the following morning. The attack came. Gen. W. H. C. Whiting's Division of Gustavus Smith's Corps, had marched out from New Kent Court House and at 7 o'clock, Gen. J. B. Hood's brigade leading, fell upon Newton's Brigade of Franklin. Other troops became engaged and there was artillery firing, but the commands most prominently engaged were Hood's Texas Brigade and the Hampton Legion on the

Confederate and John Newton's Brigade on the Union side.

After an hour or so of rather brisk fighting, the Confederates went back to New Kent. Their loss, as reported by Gen. Whiting, was 8 killed and 32 wounded. As it seemed was nearly always the case in every fight, the Union loss was far the heavier. Franklin reported it as 7 officers and 41 men killed, 6 officers and 104 men wounded, and 28 missing; total, 186.

On the retreat of the Confederates from Williamsburg, Heintzelman's and Keyes's Corps pushed forward as fast as they could, not especially after the fleeing enemy, who could not be overtaken, but to make haste and form a junction with Franklin's, Sedgwick's, and Porter's Divisions then near West Point or Eltham's. This was soon accomplished. As stated, the York river is formed at West Point by the union of the Pamunkey and Mattapony Rivers, and the Pamunkey is the western river. The North Anna, the South Anna, and the Little River between them ~~from~~ form the Pamunkey near Hanover Court House, a few miles northeast of Richmond.

The Pamunkey being navigable several miles above West Point, Gen. McClellan determined to make that stream the highway over which he should obtain his supplies, and some good point on the south bank was sought for as a depot for them and as a base of operations. Cumberland, a good landing fronting a wide, low, flat plain, was first selected, May 15. Vessels of good draft could sail directly from New York to Cumberland. But the very next day White Horse Landing, on the south bank of the Pamunkey, 15 miles up the river on a straight line from West Point, and 22 miles almost due east of Richmond, was selected as the permanent base.

White House Landing took its name from White House, a very fine plantation running along the south bank of the Pamunkey, and owned by inheritance from her mother's family by the wife of Gen. Robert E. Lee. It was a very historic site. It was formerly owned by the Widow Martha Custis and was her residence when she married George Washington. The ceremony took place in St. Peter's Episcopal Church, near the White House, an unpretentious building, isolated and still standing in 1862. Gen. Lee's wife was a granddaughter of Martha Custis.

The First Minnesota remained in camp near West Point, until May 9, when it moved up the Pamunkey, two miles or so, to Eltham Landing. It was on shipboard en route to West Point when the so-called battle of West Point was being fought between Whiting and Franklin, or rather between Hood and Newton. When it arrived at Eltham and went into camp, pickets were constantly kept out as if there was the greatest danger. The most advanced regiments were thrown back and kept near the river, and so the Confederates continued their march towards Richmond without being further troubled.

The Regiment remained in camp at Eltham for about a week, or until May 15. Then, when a rain the day before had softened the roads and another soaking one was falling, it set out on the march again, going directly westward towards New Kent C.H. It rained all day and a march of only about eight miles was made, the command going into camp in a yellow pine grove, two miles east of New Kent. Here a stop of three days was made.

May 18 the Regiment again moved, this time four miles, encamping on the farm of Dr. May, then a surgeon on the staff of Gen. Lee. After a rest of three days, the Regiment again moved,

and made a march of eight miles. This day, according to Lochren, it passes White House "and the church where Washington was married." At night it encamped on the York & Richmond Railroad, three miles from the Chickahominy, connecting the right wing of the army with the left. On the 23d it went forward four miles and camped on the river named.

The army had begun its advance from Eltham on the 9th of May, and on the 23d it was upon the Chickahominy. The distance traveled was about forty miles, and it had taken two weeks to make it, an average of less than three miles a day. The weather had been bad and the roads execrable, but the Confederates had the same obstacles, and yet they reached Richmond ten days ahead of McClellan's army.

Eltham Landing was so named from the large fine old estate near by. Here was a large, though somewhat dilapidated, old brick mansion, with large wings and other appointments. In connection was a high-walled family cemetery, with numerous monuments. The inscription on one of these fine structures testified that on this plantation there once lived "Ye Honourable William Bassett," who had died in 1727, and whose death was "a loss to his country, his county, and his family." Many of the Minnesota boys visited the historic old mansion and one or two wrote to the home papers about it.

For several days the Regiment was encamped on the plantation of Dr. Wm. Mayo, whose sister was the wife of old Gen. Scott. Unlike his loyal old brother-in-law, Dr. Mayo was a "secesh," and in May, 1862, was with the Confederate army. His plantation was about two miles from Cumberland Landing.

Gen. McClellan now had the James river to rely upon as a highway for the conveyance of his supplies, if the York River and the York & Richmond Railroad should fail him. On the 10th the Confederates evacuated Norfolk. The next day Tatnall blew up the Merrimac. On the 12th a Union fleet composed of the Monitor, Galena, Aroostook, Port Royal, and Naugatuck, under Commodore Rodgers, ascended the James to within twelve miles of Richmond, when they were checked by the guns of Fort Darling, on Drewry's Bluff, and compelled to return to Fort Monroe.

The march of the Minnesota boys from Eltham to the Chickahominy was a memorable one--memorable because so miserable. First, the roads were almost untraversable and the weather extremely disagreeable. It is a military ~~maxim~~ saying that in time of war all the roads are bad and all weather disagreeable, and the rule certainly applied to the Peninsula of Virginia in the spring of 1862. That is an old country and the roads were worn down well into the tough clay subsoil. The soil back from the streams was unproductive and its occupants were poor. Along the rivers there were some good plantations, but not many. Live stock of any kind was scarce. This is said, so that it will be understood that it was quite a poor country for foraging and adding fresh provisions to the soldier's stale rations. The situation has not improved much. The chief crop of Southeastern Virginia now is peanuts--or "goobers," as the natives call them.

But even if the country had been as fair as a garden of the Lord's, and as rich withal, that fact would not have helped the soldiers much. Gen. McClellan sternly forbade all unauthorized foraging, and enforced his orders too. The excess of precaution and the severity of his measures to preserve from trespass and

injury every species of property belonging to the people was felt by the soldiers as a grievance. Every farmhouse, cottage, and adult negro was furnished with a guard by the army provost guard of Gen. Andrew Porter, of Bull Run fame, who was Provost Marshal. And this provost guard went ahead of the main army, so that the column, when it came up, found the sentinels on duty, with strict orders to protect not only the persons and the household goods, but to watch over the farmyards, the stables, the forage, the wells, and even the rail fences of the people.

In his book, "Four Years with the Potomac Army," (p.215) Gen. Regis De Trobriand, a well known brigade commander, writes of this feature of McClellan's march from Eltham:

> I have seen our men, covered with dust and overcome by the heat, try in vain to get water from wells which were almost overflowing, but from which stringent orders drove them away, because the supply of water for a rebel family might be diminished. I have also seen them, covered with mud and shivering in the rain, prevented by orders of the general-in-chief from warming themselves with the fence rails of dry wood which were ready at their hands, because the cattle of a rebel farmer might get out and eat the grass in his fields while he was rebuilding his fences. In the first case the soldier had to go a long distance to fill his canteen with warm and muddy water from a pool or creek. In the second he had to pick up sticks or cut down green trees, hard to burn, incapable of making a fire big enough to dry one's self by, and hardly answering to boil his coffee.

The people did not seem to appreciate the consideration shown them. They were so ignorant, so illy informed, and filled with such bitter hatred for the Yankees that they did not give themselves the trouble to dissemble or even pretend that they were grateful. There were very few able-bodied men left in the country, and these were ministers, civil officers, doctors, and those who could do more good to the Confederacy by staying at home. The

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Confederate conscription had not been declared, but practically all the able-bodied men and boys over 16 in James City, Charles City, and New Kent counties were in the Confederate army; three-fourths of them could not have told you why to save their lives.

The adult people of the country therefore were for the most part women. Very few of these were even well mannered. All were vindictive. Many a woman boasted of her enmity to the Yankee soldiers, even while one of them was guarding her and her property. They were practically so many spies that Gen. McClellan was guarding and protecting. Everything they heard from the soldiers, every scrap of information they could procure, was reported to the Confederate lines as soon as possible. The horses, mules, cattle, and hogs, which the Union soldiers were so scrupulously compelled to respect, were sent to the Confederates whenever clled for, and most of these supplies had gone out before the Union army ~~arrived~~, "so that the Yankees won't get them." Many Confederates warmly approved Gen. McClellan's care of their property. The Richmond Dispatch said he was "the only gentleman in the Yankee army."

Gen. McClellan had been dissatisfied with the Corps arrangements. May 18, the President told ~~McClellan~~ him that he might re-organize the Corps and enlarge the number, but that the two additional ones, called the Fifth and Sixth, were to be considered and called "Provisional." The arrangement would be tried before finally adopted. So McClellan quickly gave the necessary orders, and soon the organization of the Army of the Potomac was as follows:

Second Corps, Sumner commanding;Divisions, Sedgwick and Richardson, as before.

Third Corps, Heintzelman commanding; Divisions, Kearney and Hooker; Porter's Division transferred.

Fourth Corps, Keyes commanding; Divisions of Couch and Casey; W. F. Smith's Division transferred.

Fifth Corps, Fitz John Porter commanding; Divisions of Morell,(formerly Porter's) and Sykes, and Hunt's reserve artillery, 22 batteries. Sykes's brigade of regulars had been enlarged to a Division by adding Duryea's Zouaves and the Tenth New York.

Sixth Corps, Franklin commanding; Divisions of Slocum (formerly Franklin's) and W. F. Smith, the latter formerly in Keyes's.

Unquestionably the dividing or sub-dividing of the Army Corps into but two Divisions each, made tham more easy to handle, but whether the plan was better for the service is questionable. Ye t the Second Corps, to which the First Minnesota belonged, got on very well with but two Divisions. The men believed in Sumner. "Old Bull will take us in and Old Bull will bring us out all right," the boys used to say. A great deal depends on the commander.

After the Confederates had retired from the Rappahannock and the Rapidan to go into organization at Richmond, early in May, Gen. McDowell's First Corps came down to Fredericksburg, on the Rappahannock, and occupied the country without opposition. In response to McClellan's repeated demands for re-enforcements, the President finally, notified him that McDowell's Corps would march to join him the 26th. But Stonewall Jackson had been making very serious trouble up in the Shenandoah Valley, and news came that he had Gen. Banks and his army "in a critical position" and was "making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry." So on the 24th the President notified McClellan of these troubles, and that the proposed movement of McDowell to join him would have to be "suspended" and McDowell and his army sent to help Banks

out of his scrape.

At Hanover C. H., 15 miles north of Richmond, near the Pamunkey, Fitz John Porter, May 27, defeated L. O'Brien Branch's brigade of Confederates. The Union loss was 62 killed, 223 wounded and 70 missing. The 25th and 44th New York lost 55 of the killed. The Confederates lost 73 killed, 192 wounded, and 56 prisoners. They also lost a 12 pound brass howitzer. According to the report of its Colonel, the 28th North Carolina took into the fight the unusually large number of 890 men and lost 20 killed. The Confederates retreated and were not pursued. ~~The Second Company of Minnesota Sharpshooters~~ afterward attached to the First Minnesota and called Company L ~~was~~ was in this engagement at Hanover and had two men, Hammond Dibbs and Ingor Ingalson severely wounded. The Sharpshooters and their Commander Capt. Wm. J. Russell, were complimented in the reports of the Union Commanders.

NOW COMES THE TUG OF WAR.

By the 24th of May Gen. McClellan had his army in front of Richmond. According to the morning reports of May 28, as certified to and made of record, there were in that army "present for duty," 98,008 men of all arms; of these, 4,572 were out of the fighting ranks on detached service. The official records show that on the 21st of May Gen. Johnston's army was 52,688 men of all arms; number of detached service men not given. The Confederate army was subsequently increased to 62,696, and still later, after Stonewall Jackson and others had joined, to 73,928, as Gen. Johnston records the number.

And, as a part of Gen. McClellan's great army, the First Minnesota was also before Richmond. It was only a unit among the hundreds of regiments, but it was as good and effective as any of them. As previously stated it was encamped near the north or east bank of the Chickahominy, about three miles up the stream from where it was crossed by the Richmond & York River Railroad and ten miles due east of Richmond.

The Chickahominy is called a river only by extreme courtesy; like the Warwick and other so-called rivers its dimensions are only those of a creek. It is rather a mere ditch that drains a long, swampy, and marshy district. It rises fifteen miles north of Richmond, flows southeastwardly and finally empties into the James River, 40 miles below that city. Opposite where the First Minnesota was camped the river, in its ordinary stage, was only about 40 feet wide. But this was the ditch part, the bed of the river. It was fringed with a growth of rather heavy forest trees, and bordered on either side by low, marshy bottom lands varying from

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half a mile to a mile in width.

There was then no place where the high ground came near the stream on both banks. But above the First Minnesota's position, five miles up stream, where the Gaines Mill road crossed, at the New Bridge; and four miles further up, where the Virginia Central Railroad crossed at the Mechanicsville Bridge; and two miles still further up, at the Meadow Bridge, the west bank of the river (the Confederate side) opposite each bridge was bordered by high bluffs; the east side was flat. The bluffs afforded Gen. Johnston fine positions on which to build his breastworks and place his batteries. McClellan, therefore, was obliged to select other and less dangerous crossings of the Chickahominy in order to come in contact with his enemy. (Own Story, p.362.)

Leave out

From West Point, by way of Tunstall's Station--the latter the most beautiful camp of the campaign--the army had followed along or near the Richmond & York River Railroad, which was repaired and put in running order as progress was made. Locomotives and cars were brought from New York to equip the road and it was put in good condition. This road crossed the Chickahominy two miles above Bottom's Bridge, and from thence the distance to Richmond was 12 miles, due west.

Three miles west of the Chickahominy, on the railroad, was Savage's Station, so called because a farmer ~~of that~~ named Savage lived near. The next station towards Richmond, four miles, was called Fair Oaks. Near the station was a farm that was so called. Many Virginia farmers, being of English descent, followed the customs of the landed gentry of England and named their residences and farms for certain characteristics or some fancy. Thus there

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were Westover, Brandon, Malvern, Fair Oaks, Briarwood, Seven Pines, etc. Old English names abound in Virginia, even contractions and corruptions of names surviving, Tunstall, contracted from Daltonstall, etc.

On retiring to the west bank of the Chickahominy the Confederates destroyed all the bridges except Bottom's. This bridge was where the Williamsburg stage road crossed the Chickahominy. As early as May 20, Gen. Naglee's brigade, of Keyes's Corps, crossed the river here and pushed forward to near the James River, some miles below Richmond, without finding the enemy in force. The remainder of the Fourth Corps, under Keyes, crossed on the 23d. By the 25th McClellan had his army astraddle of the Chickahominy, Keyes's and Heintzelman's Corps on the west or right bank and Sumner's, Porter's and Franklin's on the east side.

On the 24th, 25th, and 26th Naglee's Brigade made another reconoissance, going this time out along the Williamsburg stage road eight miles to the Seven Pines--seven tall, slender yellow pine trees, on the Williamsburg road, a mile southeast of Fair Oaks station. Near by was the house of a Mr. Allen. On the 25th the entire Fourth Corps was ordered to take up and fortify a position near the Seven Pines. Here was a cross roads; the Williamsburg road ran east and west and what was called the Nine Mile road crossed it here, running southeast and northwest. Keyes at once dug a strong line of rifle pits, and built good breastworks, with abatis in front, in the rear of the point where the Nine Mile road crossed the Williamsburg.

On the 24th, also, a detachment of Porter's Corps, with three batteries, drove out a rather light force that had been holding Mechanicsville, which was a small hamlet (now extinct) but was where three roads met. It was a mile north of the Chickahominy and ten miles or so north of Richmond. The Confederates retreated across the river over what was known as the

Leave out

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(Mechanicsville Bridge and burned the bridge after them. It was three days later when Porter defeated Branch's Brigade at Hanover Court House.) Leave out

The Confederates knew every move that McClellan made. Gen. Johnston was simply waiting to make one battle complete his work. He knew that McClellan had straddled the Chickahominy, and he tells us (Batts & Leads.Vol.2,p.211) that he wanted the distance between the two Corps on the west side of the river and the three on the east side to be increased as far as possible.

Gen. J. R. Anderson, in front of Fredericksburg with his Division, sent word on the 24th to Johnston that the advance of McDowell's Corps had left Fredericksburg for Richmond. At once Gen. Johnston summoned his generals in council preparatory for battle the next day, before McDowell could come within 20 miles of McClellan. The council was almost ready to adjourn, when a messenger came from "Jeb" Stuart saying that it was certain that McDowell's advance had returned to Fredericksburg and that the whole Corps was to be sent to the Shenandoah Valley. Then the battle was postponed. (Ibid p.212.)

As previously stated, the Confederates had destroyed the bridges over the Chickahominy except Bottom's bridge, opposite the lower extremity of the Union line. It was incumbent on Gen. McClellan to replace these structures as soon as the work could be done, working night and day. It is a military proposition that if a stream divide an army at right angles, it should be spanned as soon as possible by as many new bridges as practicable so that troops and guns may be readily passed from one side of the stream to the other.

(Insert where marked

Since the war there has been a spirited dispute between certain members of the First Minnesota and of the Fifth New Hampshire as to which of the two regiments built the so-called "grapevine bridge." The controversy might have been avoided if the parties thereto had taken a little trouble to examine the records and read up the history. There were two "grapevine bridges" so called, and the First Minnesota built one, the upper, and the Fifth New Hampshire the lower. The upper bridge was opposite the camp of Sedgwick's Division and the lower was opposite Richardson's Division.

Bloomer's diary for May 27, 1862, contains the following entry: "About 10 A.M. regiment fell into line and armed with axes, in addition to our regular soldiers' outfit, marched to the Chickahominy and built a bridge over it about 200 feet long." Mr. Bloomer denies that any "army engineers" superintended the work. He says that Capt. Mark Downie "was supposed to have charge of that part of the work" but really did not, and the Regiment's lumbermen did the work.

It has been claimed that the bridges were named because grapevines were used in their construction. But according to Confederate Gen. E. P. Alexander the name had another derivation. Gen. Alexander says ("Mil. Memoirs," p. 196), that just above where the upper bridge was built, there had been for many years a ford across the stream, and that this ford was locally known as the Grapevine Ford, because of the wild grapevines near it. When the bridge was built it was given the name of the ford. In one of his reports Jeb Stuart speaks of the "Grapevine Ford bridge."

On the 27th of May the First Minnesota was ordered to the Chickahominy to build a bridge for the crossing of Sumner's Second Corps. The Corps was to have two bridges called Sumner's Upper and Sumner's Lower; the First Minnesota built the Upper bridge, the one farthest up stream. Lochren says this bridge was built of logs cut near the banks by the men, and that it was completed before sunset, except a part of the corduroy approach, and that The work was superintended by the army engineers and executed in good style by the experienced wood workers of Minnesota.

~~To bind the cross logs of the bridge in their places grapevines were cut and used. These vines were abundant on the shores of the stream and easily procured. They answered their intended purpose only fairly well. Grapevines were also used in the construction of the Sumner's Lower bridge, built by Richardson's Division, and since the war there have been frequent controversies over which was the real Grapevine bridge and who built it.~~

The bridges were serviceable only part of the time; they failed when badly needed. A heavy rain fell, the Chickahominy went out of its banks, the Lower bridge was washed away, and the Upper was in a very precarious condition at a very critical time.

While the Regiment was at work on the Grapevine bridge, the men heard the sound of the fighting at Hanover C. H., twelve miles to the northwest. The next day Gen. McClellan dispatched the War Department regarding the affair at Hanover as follows: "Porter's action of yesterday was truly a glorious victory". But the same day he also telegraphed:"Porter has gained two complete victories over superior forces, yet I feel obliged to move in the morning with reinforcements to secure the complete destruction of the rebels in that quarter." The "reenforcements" mentioned

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which were to protect and aid Porter's Corps against Branch's brigade were from Sumner's Corps. The First Minnesota was one of the re-enforcing regiments. It marched from the Chickahominy to Hanover on the 28th, and returned the next day. Although Gen. McClellan had considered Porter's Corps in danger [?] from Gen. Branch's five regiments, it was a fact that after the Hanover fight Gen. Branch had marched rapidly to Ashland, and on the 28th hurried to Richmond and j ined A. P. Hill's Division!

Of the Hanover fight, which Gen. McClellan claimed was "truly a glorious victory" for Porter, the records show that the Union loss was 62 killed, 223 wounded, and 70 missing; total 355. The Confederate loss was 73 killed, 192 wounded, and 55 missing; total, 320. McClellan told the War Department May 30: "Porter has routed and demoralized a considerable portion of the rebel forces; taken over 750 prisoners, killed and wounded large numbers. (Own Story, p.375; also War Recs.) Yet the Union loss was the greater! Among the Union troops engaged at Hanover was Capt. W. D. Russell's Second Company of Minnesota Sharpshooters, (afterwards attached to the First Minnesota and called Company B) although they were not sent on the field in time to do conspicuous service. They had ~~one~~ two men wounded, Hammond Fallon and Finger Fingalson.

62
223
70
355

355

72

SEVEN PINES AND FAIR OAKS.

On the 30th of May the positions of McClellan's troops on the southwest or Richmond side of the Chickahominy were as follows: Casey's Division was on the right of the Williamsburg stage road extending from that road north to the York River Railroad at Fair Oaks Station. Couch's Division was at the Seven Pines, a mile southeast of Fair Oaks. These two Divisions belonged to Keyes's Fourth Corps. The two Divisions of Heintzelman's Third Corps were placed in the rear or east of Keyes's. Kearney's Division was on the York Railroad, strung along from Savage's Station to Bottom's Bridge over the Chickahominy, and Hooker's was from two to four miles south of Kearney's, along what was known as the White Oak Swamp. This swamp extended from Casey's Division several miles in a southeast direction to the Chickahominy.

The two Divisions of Casey and Couch were within seven miles of Richmond, and the two Divisions supporting them, Kearney's and Hooker's, were disconnected and strung out. It almost seemed as if Casey and Couch were in a condition inviting capture or destruction; ~~but~~ Gen.Keyes had frequently called Gen. McClellan's attention to the danger. If the condition was meant as an invitation, Gen. Johnston promptly responded to it.

The night of the 30th of May another heavy rain fell. All the Chickahominy bottoms were afloat. The grapevine bridges were in peril. About 8:30 the next morning, the 31st, Gen. Johnston moved eastward from his fortifications at Richmond to assault and destroy Keyes's isolated Divisions. He had in all

about 38,000 men and his force was divided into two wings. Longstreet commanded the right wing, which was originally ordered to operate mainly on the ~~southern~~ northern half of the Union line, by the Nine-Mile road, and Gen. Gustavus W. Smith ~~commanded the left wing, which was to assault the northern half of the Union position.~~ was to follow Longstreet and re-enforce him. Gen. D. H. Hill was ~~Whiting's Division~~ to move over the Williamsburg road and attack the Union position held by Casey's Division at the Seven Pines. Longstreet was to attack Couch at Fair Oaks as soon as he heard Hill's guns at Seven Pines. But Gen. Johnston gave his orders for battle verbally, not in writing, and Gen. Longstreet misunderstood them. Instead of marching on Gen. Couch by the Nine Mile road, he crossed over from that road to the Williamsburg road and joined Gen. Hill in the attack on Casey at the Seven Pines. These statements are made not on the authority of the official reports, but on that of Gen. E. P. Alexander, the distinguished Confederate artillery Chief, who, in his book, "Recollections," etc. says: "Neither Johnston or Longstreet, in their official reports or other writings, ever gave any explanation or even admitted openly that a mistake was made. But Gen. Johnston induced Gen. G. W. Smith to change his official report to avoid its being made public that a mistake was made therein."

Johnston's advance struck the Union skirmish line about 11 A.M., but the fighting did not get good and hot until 12:30. Casey's Division, at the Seven Pines, was the first struck by Longstreet and Hill, and was crushed and thrown back easily. Gen. Casey was 55 years of age. It was said that his Division was "the greenest in the army." Heintzelman said the regiments composing it were, "raw troops never before under fire. After once broken they could not be rallied. The road was filled with fugitives. A guard placed at Bottom's Bridge stopped more than a thousand men." (War Recs., Vol. 11, p. 815.)

The Confederate

Gen. Casey had breastworks, with abatis, and Naglee's brigade had really a strong position. But Dan Hill's Division of Longstreet's right wing got through the abatis and Rains's brigade gained the rear of the fortifications. When the forces that had made this detour opened a severe flank and rear fire, Casey's Division crumbled up, the cannon in the redoubt and a portion of those in front were captured, there was a general movement to the rear, and such of the troops as could be held together went back and were held to a stand at Gen. Couch's position at the Seven Pines. This was afterward called the "second line of defense."

Couch's Division fought with bravery and tenacity, for Darius N. Couch was brave and tenacious, and like master like man. Rather early in the action Gen. Keyes had sent back to Gen. Heintzelman--who was really in command of both the Third and

Now go up to "the Confederate advance struck," etc

Fourth Corps, the left wing of the army--for re-enforcements from Kearney's and Hooker's Divisions. But the message did not reach Heintzelman until 2 o'clock and it was after 4 o'clock before Phil Kearney, with his foremost brigade arrived at"the second position" where Couch's men and the wreck of Casey's Division were fighting for their lives--and more than their lives.

It did not take Phil Kearney but a minute to discover that there was "beautiful fighting along the whole line."* He threw Berry's brigade into the woods to the left or south of the road and moving up attacked the left of the camp and the works which Casey's men had occupied that morning, but which were now held by the enemy. As fast as his other troops came up he put them to fighting, and fighting hard, for that was the kind of a fighter Phil Kearney was. He had his left arm shot off in the Mexican War; but he could hold a bridle rein in his teeth, and with his good right hand he could wield a sword or a revolver as well as any man, and he delighted to ride straight against an enemy and either shoot or cut him down.

Meanwhile Longstreet's and Hill's Divisions, constituting the Confederate right wing, had been pushing forward on the Williamsburg road and doing all the fighting on the Confederate side. Gustavus Smith's left wing, Whiting's division, which was to perform an important flanking operation, had not been in action. Gen. Johnston was with this column, waiting to hear the fighting of Longstreet and Hill and to watch for the possible approach of McClellan's three Corps from the east bank of the Chickahominy over the upper bridges. "Owing to some peculiar condition of the atmosphere the sound of the musketry did not reach us until late," he says, and it was after 4 o'clock before Smith's Division came upon the field.

*See Stedman's poem,"Kearney at Seven Pines."

Couch was back on "the second line," struggling to relieve the pressure on him, and Kearney was helping all he could, when suddenly Smith's ~~advance~~ Confederate brigades came on Couch's right by the rear of the Nine-Mile road and also by the road toward Fair Oaks Station. Couch had two fresh regiments of Kearney and some of his own men, but Smith sent a force between him and his little command and cut him off from the main part of his Division. (Couch's report, War Recs.)

It was now between 5 and 6 o'clock, and it seemed that all of McClellan's army across the Chickahominy was doomed. Casey's Division had gone to pieces; Couch's was bisected; Berry's and Jameson's brigades of Kearney, which had gone up on the left, had been thrown back on the White Oak Swamp, and they only got back to the army late that night under cover of darkness; the Union center was struggling to escape. But, O, joy! Just at this crisis, when the fate of the day and of McClellan's army was trembling in the balance, relief appeared, and the action was determined by the sudden and inspiriting advent of a stray Union column from the north bank of the Chickahominy.

"Old Bull" Sumner had come!

At about 1 o'clock that day, when the Corps was in camp on Tyler's farm, back from the Grapevine Bridge, the men of Sumner's Corps first heard the fighting across the river between Longstreet and Keyes. It had been going on since 11, but had not been heard. Simultaneously with the sound of battle came an order from McClellan to Sumner saying in effect: "Hold your command in readiness to move at a moment's warning."

Gen. Sumner prepared to move by moving at once! In 15 minutes his two Divisions, Sedgwick's and Richardson's, were under

arms and marching down to the Grapevine bridges, getting ready to move! While waiting for the order the Grapevine bridge which the First Minnesota had built four days before was examined. The heavy rain of the previous night had set it afloat! At least the corduroy approaches were under water and the bridge itself was "precarious." Swinton (p.137) says:

"The rough logs forming the corduroy approaches over the swamp were mostly afloat and only kept from drifting off by the stumps of trees to which they were fastened. The portion over the body of the stream was suspended from the trunks of trees by ropes, on the strength of which depended the possibility of passage." (Swinton, p.137.)

In 1864 Col. Alexander, of the Engineer Corps, wrote an article describing the battle of Fair Oaks, and this article was published in the Atlantic Monthly for March of that year. Describing the crossing of Sumner's Corps on this occasion, the article says:

The possibility of crossing was doubted by all present, including Gen. Sumner himself. As the solid column of infantry entered upon the bridge, it swayed to and fro to the angry flood below or the living freight above, settling down and grasping the solid stumps by which it was made secure as the line advanced. Once filled with men, however, it was safe until the Corps crossed; it then soon became impassable.

It was the only bridge left intact. The rains descended and the floods came, and beat upon that bridge, but it fell not, because it was built by Minnesotians who knew their business! Sedgwick's three brigades crossed over it and two of Richardson's brigades followed them. The bridge which Richardson's men had built was partially washed away. In his report Gen. Richardson says his men "had to wade to their middles in water" before they could reach the part that was left. French's brigade crossed this bridge, after great difficulty, but Meagher's and Howard's went up and crossed at the Minnesota-built bridge.

Richardson had to leave all his artillery in the mud, and then he did not get to the firing line till after 6 o'clock, "it then being dark." (Richardson's report, War Recs.Vol.11,p.764.)

Sedgwick's Division got the order to cross at 2:30 and almost at once obeyed it, although all conditions were forbidding. Striking the west bank of the river, the Division set out at quick time, the men walking as fast as they could pull their feet out of the mud.

The First Minnesota had the post of honor. It was the regiment in the lead. (War Recs. Vol.11, Sedgwick's, Gorman's, Sully's reports; McClellan's Own Story, p.381.) Gorman's was the leading brigade, and right behind it came Kirby's battery,I, First U.S., which its commander, Lieut. Edmund Kirby had much trouble in getting to the front, by reason of the mud, etc. "I was obliged at times to unlimber and use the prolonge, the cannoneers being up to their waists in water." (Kirby's report.) After Kirby, came in order Burns's and Dana's brigades, followed by Tompkins's, Bartlett's, and Owen's batteries.

The Regiment, heading its Brigade, Division, and Corps, pressed well along the road to Fair Oaks through mud knee deep, the roaring of the lions of battle to the front exciting them, and the chance to serve the country after such a long wait inspiring them. Nearing the battlefield, swarms of stragglers were encountered. They called out that their regiments had been "all cut to pieces," that the enemy numbered "more than a hundred thousand men," and warning was given that if the Minnesotians went into the battle few of them would ever get out alive, etc. These doleful but craven howls only disgusted the boys and made them determined to acquit themselves like the men they were. The march

of three miles was made in less than two hours.

Reaching a point near Fair Oaks Station after 5 o'clock Sedgwick found Couch with a small force still battling, but bleeding at every vein. Upon debouching into the open wheatfield near the house of a Mr. Adams about a mile northeast of Fair Oaks, he saw that Gen. Abercrombie's Brigade, of Couch, was undergoing an attack which had been protracted for hours and had been hot and heavy from the first; the Brigade was about all in. O, how glad they all were, from Couch and Abercrombie to the privates in the rear rank, to see Bull Sumner bounding forward to their help! How they cheered when the Minnesotians came on the field!

Couch now began to deploy his own troops; he would not have dared to "string out" his men before. By Couch's request, approved by Sumner, the First Minnesota was promptly formed in battle line, under a sharp fire, and sent into a wheat field to the right of Abercrombie's Brigade to protect that flank. The wheat field belonged to a Mr. Courtney, and his house was a point where there was danger that the enemy would place a strong flanking force. Col. Sully placed the Regiment near the Courtney house, behind a rail fence. There was some danger that he would be set upon before his supports could be placed, and Gen. Sedgwick commended him for his "admirable coolness and judgment." (Sedgwick's report, War Recs.,Vol.11,p.791.)

The remainder of Gorman's brigade, the Fifteenth Massachusetts and the Thirty-Fourth and Eighty-Second New York, led by Gen. Gorman in person, was hurried to the left of Abercrombie's position. At 5:30 three of the mud-covered 12-pound Napoleons of Kirby's Battery came up. The other three were in the rear, buried in the ~~mud~~ mire, but were being extricated. Gen. Sumner immediately ordered them into position, the right piece resting on a

strip of woods and the left gun about 70 yards from the Adams house, and facing south towards Fair Oaks Station. The Fifteenth Massachusetts was supporting the battery.

Just in time! Gen. Gorman had not placed his men ten minutes, when Gen. Gustavus Smith's big Confederate Division burst forth upon them. Gen. Johnston had been holding back this wing of his army, and the men were all fresh and in fine condition. The Division was temporarily commanded by Gen. W. H. C. Whiting and it had five brigades, Law's, Hood's, Hampton's, Hatton's, and Pettigrew's. Law's Brigade was the old Barnard E. Bee's brigade that fought the First Minnesota at Bull Run, and here were the Fourth Alabama, Second Mississippi, Eleventh Mississippi, and Sixth North Carolina, all waiting to be paid for what they gave the Minnesotians at the Henry house!

The Confederates under the immediate eyes and direction of ~~Gen.~~ Gen. Johnston and Gustavus Smith, soon charged the new formation and position of the Union troops. Gen. Couch, out of all his good Division, had left but four regiments, two companies, and Brady's Battery. These had the center, and Sedgwick's Division was on both flanks; Richardson's had not yet arrived.

Here came the enemy on the old rebel charge and with the old "rebel yell." Law's and Pettigrew's brigades were to the left front of the First Minnesota and directly opposite Couch's regiments. The Minnesotians had an oblique fire on the Fourth Alabama, Second Mississippi, and their comrade regiments of Law's Brigade, ~~and briskly they kept it up.~~ Remember Bull Run! The entire Union line delivered concerted and frightfully destructive volleys upon their assailants as they advanced. Kirby's Battery added to the destruction with spherical case shot and shell from its three 12-pound Napoleons, and soon the gray masses

fell back and took shelter in the woods on the right. Kirby now had to turn his battery toward the west.

Just then Lieut. Woodruff came up with two of Kirby's guns that had been swamped, and Kirby put that section on the left of his other three guns and began banging away with all five into the woods where the enemy was forming for another charge. A few rounds had been fired when Lieut. French came up with the remaining gun. Unluckily just then a trail to another piece had broken, so that it was useless, and the supply of spherical case and shell had given out. Kirby cast the damaged piece to one side and sent two limber chests to the rear, where his caissons were buried in the mud, for more case shot and shell. The Confederates were now moving, but were beyond canister range, and Kirby had to throw solid shot among them, just to "occupy them," he says.

The First Minnesota was on the right of Gen. Couch's little force, and the other three regiments of Gorman's Brigade were to the left of Couch. Burns's Brigade was on the right of the First Minnesota, its left regiment, Col. Baxter's Seventy-Second Pennsylvania, overlapping a part of the Minnesota right. The brigade was under fire and lost 5 killed and 30 wounded. At midnight Gen. Burns took the Seventy-First Pennsylvania--the "California Regiment," of Ball's Bluff notoriety--amd two regiments of Dana's Brigade back to the Chickahominy to protect the line of communication; his three other regiments remained at Fair Oaks. His brigade was composed of four Pennsylvania regiments.

During the fighting a section, two pieces, of Battery A, First Pa. Hvy. Arty., Capt. James Brady commanding, which belonged to and had been serving with Abercrombie's Brigade, was sent to the right and the support of the First Minnesota. Capt. Brady, who was in charge of the guns, at once opened on the enemy with shell and

case shot, and kept up the firing till the victory was gained.

When the Confederates were for the second time showing themselves, Gen. Gorman was ordered to throw first the Eighty-Second, then the Thirty-Fourth New York, and then the Fifteenth Massachusetts upon the enemy's flank and front. The Eighty-Second, Lieut. Col. Hudson commanding, went quickly forward, through garden fences and other obstacles, until it reached a line 100 yeards from the Confederates when it opened a galling fire upon them. Then, by Sumner's and Sedgwick's orders, Gen. Gorman sent up the Thirty-Fourth, Col. Suiter commanding, to strengthen the Eighty-Second. Then he sent up Lieut. Col. Kimball, with the Fifteenth Massachusetts from Kirby's Battery, to support the two New York regiments.

The Confederates and the Unionists were each side pressing forward to meet the other, firing as they advanced. When the lines were about 50 yards apart, Gen. Sumner roared out with his great Yankee voice, loud as the bellow of a bull moose in the Aroostook woods: "Charge 'em with the bayonet, General Gorman!" Then he gave the same thunderous command to the Thirty-Fourth New York.

Rough work now and very deadly! The New Yorkers threw themselves headlong into the woods directly against the enemy. The Fifteenth Massachusetts came in support in the center. Two regiments of Dana's Brigade, the Nineteenth Massachusetts and the Tammany Regiment, (42d New York) had been left back on duty at the Chickahominy; the other two, the Seventh Michigan and the Twentieth Massachusetts, were up and Sedgwick ordered them to assist Gorman's regiments in the charge, and they did so, acting on Gorman's left.

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The charging promised at one time to be a very fierce and bloody affair. But the Confederates were receiving such crushing volleys from the five infantry regiments, and Kirby with his five good Napoleons was fairly blowing them to pieces with his fresh supply of spherical case and shell, that they were in no mood to receive the cold steel in their anatomies. From say 6 o'clock to 7:30 there was some of Phil Kearney's "beautiful fighting" on that Allen farm in the environs of Fair Oaks. And to this fighting the First Minnesota contributed. It was well protected, had a good enfilading range, and fought the Fourth Alabama and Second Mississippi under about the same conditions as those regiments fought it at Bull Run,--giving plenty without taking any.

The Confederates began to shrink away from the bayonet fighting. All but Hampton's South Carolina Legion. It stood before the Thirty-Fourth New York and lowered its bayonets to receive the charge. But when the New Yorkers had reached ten paces from the South Carolinians the latter excused themselves and hurriedly left the field.

And now the Confederates were driven from the field in the greatest confusion and wildest consternation. They left the ground well covered with their dead and wounded, and among them was some of the best blood of the South. They had no cannons with them in the woods or they would have been captured. They lost over 100 unwounded prisoners. Their shattered battalions were driven clear away from the field and Sedgwick's Division occupied it that night and until after daylight next morning.

The Confederate loss was frightful. Smith's Division, temporarily commanded by Gen. Whiting, took 8,670 men into the fight. Its total loss was, according to Gen. Smith's report,

1,283, or 164 killed, 1,010 wounded, and 109 missing. Law's (Whiting's) Brigade against which the Minnesotians mainly ~~fought~~ contended, had 28 killed, 286 wounded, and 42 missing, a total of 246. Among the Confederate killed was Gen. Robert Patton, commanding a Tennessee brigade of four regiments. Among the wounded were Gen. J. J. Pettigrew, who fell into the hands of the Twentieth Massachusetts; Gen. Wade Hampton, who received a musket ball in his breast, almost a death wound, and the then commander of all the Confederate forces at Richmond, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston himslef.

It was about 7 o'clock in the evening, or near sundown when Gen. Johnston was wounded. Gen. Hatton had just been killed by his side, and Gen. Johnston was encouraging the men of the Tennessee brigade. The five regiments under Gen. Gorman were coming, firing as they came, and Kirby's Battery was pouring in case shot and shell. Suddenly Gen. Johnston got a musket ball in his right shoulder. Before the shock had passed a shell from Kirby's B Battery burst in front of him and a considerable fragment struck him in the breast, crushing it in and knocking him from his horse. He was borne on a li ter to the rear and placed in an ambulance. Jeff Davis and Gen. Lee, who were in the rear, came up and saw the wounded general before he was taken to Rich mond. There he remained, often near death, until the 12th of November, nearly six months, before he was able for light service. (Johnston's Narrative.)

After Gen. Johnston was disabled, Gen. Gustavus Smith by right of seniority, assumed command of the Confederate forces, including Longstreet's, Hill's and Huger's, and exercised his authority until 2 P.M. of the following day, when he was relieved

by Gen. Robert E. Lee, who had been military adviser to Jeff Davis.

The total loss of Sedgwick's Division in this first day's battle of Fair Oaks,(Saturday, May 31.) was 347, of which there were 62 killed, 282 wounded, and 3 missing. Of the Division loss Gorman's Brigade had 41 killed, 157 wounded, and 3 missing. The Thirty-Fourth New York had 23 killed and 71 wounded. The First Minnesota in its sheltered position had but 2 men killed and 4 wounded. Henry Arnsdorf, of Company C, was killed early on the morning of June 1, while on picket, and Nicholas Hammer, of Company F, of Red Wing, was killed on Saturday. The wounded were Sergt. Chas. M. Tucker, of Company H, and Privates Geo. W. Patten, of Company D, James Cannon of Company I, Alexander Shaw and Andrew J. Truesdale of Company K.

The fighting was done mainly by Gorman's Brigade, as the losses show. Dana's Brigade had but two regiments--Seventh Michigan and Twentieth Massachusetts--and they lost 16 killed and 93 wounded on the charge with Gorman. The four regiments of Burns's Brigade were but lightly engaged and lost 5 killed and 35 wounded. Kirby's Battery had 1 killed and 4 wounded.

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THE SECOND DAY AT FAIR OAKS.

Sunday morning June 1 the fighting was resumed at Fair Oaks, running down to the Seven Pines. The Confederate right wing, Longstreet's and Dan Hill's Divisions, had suffered terribly on Saturday in defeating and driving Casey and Couch, but they were re-enforced that night by Huger's Division, composed of 16 regiments of infantry and six batteries, which were distributed among the three brigades of Gens. Mahone, Wright, and Armistead. To these were added Pickett's, Pryor's, and Wilcox's Brigades of Longstreet's Division. Gen. Smith's Division was not engaged that day.

This force under Gen. Dan Hill, attacked Richardson's Division, in position near Fair Oaks Station and below the railroad, but parallel with it, at 6:30 in the morning. There was a stubborn fight. Richardson was ready and waiting for the attack, his infantry bivouacked in line and his guns "in battery." He had hardly completed his arrangements when the whole front line of the enemy opened a heavy rolling fire of musketry within 50 yards. All three of his brigades, Howard's, Meagher's, and French's, became engaged, in all about 7,000 men.

In the severe fighting that ensued, Gen. Howard, while leading his brigade and pressing back the enemy, (Pickett's Brigade) lost his right arm. The Confederates were driven from the field at last and retired towards Richmond. They were not pursued. That Sunday night, by order of their new commander, Gen. Lee, they began to retire to their fortifications in front of Richmond. Monday morning they were all gone from the battlefield. They claim to have carried away 350 prisoners, ten pieces

of artillery, 6,700 muskets and rifles, five flags; besides medical, commissary, quartermaster's, ordnance, and sutler's stores, tents, etc., nearly all belonging to Keyes's Fourth Corps.(D. H. Hill's report.)

Gen. Gorman's Brigade took a creditable part in this day's engagement. Hardly had it begun when the General was ordered to leave the First Minnesota in its position on the right flank, the Fifteenth Massachusetts on the right front, and then to take the two New York regiments to the assistance of Richardson's Division. He first sent in the Eighty-Second, under Lieut. Col. Hudson, to attack the enemy's flank, while Meagher's Irish Brigade and other troops attacked the center. Soon after he sent in the Thirty-Fourth, under Col. Suiter.

The troops that became engaged did splendid work and Gen. Gorman praised them highly. Before noon the fighting was all over and the Confederates had retreated, leaving their dead and the greater part of their wounded in the hands of the Union troops. Just at the close of the battle Capt. Wm. F. Russell's Second Company of Minnesota Sharpshooters came upon the field and reported to Gen. Gorman. The General sent them at once to the firing line, where they did good work during the half hour they were engaged. The Company had one man wounded, Chris. J. Lind, whose trigger finger was shot off, necessitating his discharge.

The Union victory at Fair Oaks was won by Gen. Sumner and the two divisions of his Second Corps, with Heintzelman's Corps contributing. All military writers of authority agree upon this point. The great expert, Wm. Swinton, whose opinion was a composite of the judgments of the leading generals of the Army of the Potomac, says:

87

Thus, when all was lost, Sumner's prompitude saved the day.***The brave old Sumner now sleeps in a soldier's grave, b t that one act of heroic duty must embalm his memory in the hearts of his countrymen--Camps.Ar. of Pot.,p.138.

The grand total of the Confederate loss in the two days' fighting at Fair Oaks and the Seven Pines was 6,134, as follows: Longstreet and Hill's right wing, 816 killed, 3,739 wounded, and 296 missing; total, 4,851. Gen. Gustavus Smith's left wing, 164 killed, 1,010 wounded, and 109 missing; total, 1,283. They lost no artillery.

790
3594
647
5,031

The aggregate Union loss was 790 killed, 3,594 wounded, and 647 captured or missing, ^ Ten pieces of cannon were lost mall, 5,031. from the Fourth Corps, and this Corps sustained a loss in men of 384 killed, 1,746 wounded, and 458 missing. Sumner's Second Corps had 196 killed, 899 wounded, and 90 missing. Heintzelman's Third Corps had 210 killed, 959 wounded, and 99 missing. Kearney's Division sustained nearly all the loss in the Third Corps, viz: Killed, 193; wounded, 816; missing, 82; its comrade Division, Hooker's, was not actively engaged.

Gen. Joe Johnston was present with his troops in the battle, directing them, encouraging them and sharing their perils; he was desperately wounded in their midst. Gen. Gustavus Smith was also present with his Division, though he was half ill; June 2 he was prostrated by a paralytic stroke from which he did not recover for some months.

Gen. McClellan was not near the battle field until about noon of the second day, when all the fighting was over. All during the first day he was in his headquarters across the Chickahominy. He had a slight attack of camp diarrhea, which he claimed he

originally contracted in the Mexican War, and which, while it did not serve to prostrate him, kept him from the field. As at Williamsburg, when his presence was useless, if it had ever been valuable, he came up and congratulated the army. With Heintzelman and Sumner he rode along the lines and was greeted with great cheering and enthusiasm.

On his return to his headquarters that evening, the General essayed to re-cross the Chickahominy at the Minnesota men's bridge, but found the greater part of it carried away. He had to send his horse to Bottom's bridge, six miles down the river, while he crossed at the upper bridge, in a boat. (Own Story,p.384.)

#235 = 258

THE SEVEN DAYS' BATTLES.

After the battle of Fair Oaks--or Seven Pines, as the Confederates called it, perhaps because they won the fight at the latter locality and lost it at the first named--the general attitude of McClellan's army was not imposing or promising. The Corps on the west side of the Chickahominy remained there, and the army was still astride the stream, dangerously divided. McClellan began to fortify his position and to resume his call for re-enforcements. He did not attempt to follow up Sumner's great victory; perhaps he could not. He did not have much artillery on the west side, and it was difficult to bring more over the Chickahominy. Perhaps another general would have found a way of bridging that stream; and in two weeks it ~~WAS~~ lo. bridged.

The First Minnesota and the other regiments of Sedgwick's Division went into camps on or near Sumner's and Smith's battlefield in the vicinity of Fair Oaks, with Richmond only seven miles away--so near and yet so far. Great earthworks were built and supplied with cannon. Long lines of strong intrenchments were constructed and the position made so strong that it was practically impregnable to a direct attack from the enemy. But a fortified position does not always have to be directly attacked to be carried.

During the remainder of the month of June, excepting the last two days, the First Minnesota was kept almost constantly on picket or fatigue duty. It helped cut and build numerous corduroy roads,--for every road after it was cut out had to be corduroyed--and it felled acres of woodland in front of the fortifications. The Regiment was encamped in an angle which had a strong breastwork with traverses to protect the men from enfilading artillery For some time after the battle the officers of the Regiment had

their quarters in a good two-story farm house near Fair Oaks. But this house had a strong breastwork about it, with four pieces of cannon to defend it, and the ground was well cleared in front.

Day and night the Minnesotians had to be ready for battle. The picket lines were fired on every day by cavalry, infantry, and artillery. The Confederates seemed to take delight in shelling the Union lines. There were frequent alarms that "the Rebs are coming." Scarcely a night passed that the Regiment was not called into line to repel a supposed attack, notwithstanding the fact that night attacks of any importance have not been made by civilized armies for a hundred years. Sleeping or waking, the men had to keep their cartridge boxes belted about them and have their guns where they could instantly reach them.

The weather, of course, was generally hot; heavy rains were frequent. The land was low-lying. Water could be obtained by digging a shallow well, but to the unacclimated it was very unhealthy--practically poisonous. Nobody knew enough then to boil it to kill the disease germs. Disinfectants and anti-septics were then practically unknown. The xxxxfxxx surface water, which, from the rains, was always abundant, was xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx more healthful than the well water. But the surface water came through swamps and marshes wherein dead men and dead horses lay, putrid and horribly, and where there were always miasm and malaria.

The result was what every one expected when the Union army was losing so much time on the Peninsula and delaying its movements from West Point to Richmond. Disease broke out in the camps among the Northern soldiers, who would have become ill under almost any conditions in front of Richmond under the blazing skies of a Virginia June, but who, when the malaria was so abundant that

it could be smelled, might be lucky if they escaped with life. Diarrhea and flux attacked and prostrated thousands; malarial diseases of all kinds were generally prevalent, and the hospitals were crowded.

A new disease--it was never before known--called typho-malarial fever broke out. It was a combination of malarial fever and typhoid fever, and said not to be as dangerous as the latter but more severe than the former. It was first identified, described, and named by Surgeon Woodward, of one of the James River hospitals. The disease was caused by the impure water and the poisonous germs arising from the men's sinks, which were never in a sanitary condition. Over 12,000 cases of typho-malarial fever occurred in McClellan's army during June and July.(See Medical and Surgical History War of the Rebellion.)

But the First Minnesota was remarkably healthy during this period. While many another regiment numbered its fever-smitten members by scores, the First Minnesota counted its diseased by tens. The Regiment lost less than a hundred men by disease during its entire term; other regiments, especially some in the Western army, lost 200 and even 300. The Third Minnesota lost 119 of its men by death from malarial fever in the two months of May and June, 1864, while in camp at Pine Bluff, Arkansas.

The ravages of disease in McClellan's army were not confined to the stricken. Well men got the blues and to some extent lost their nerve. They sank in energy and were in dread, not of their enemies with guns in their hands, but of the pestilence that walketh in darkness and feareth not fortifications, shot, shell, or bayonets.

Nearly every day there was cannonading and affairs between the outposts. Confederate scouting parties approached the Union picket lines and banged away with cannon for an hour or so. The next day Union parties would return the visit and repeat the performance of the previous day. The object was to "develop the enemy's position" and see what he was doing.

While the weather generally was hot and sultry, there were exceptional and remarkable days. May 21, 22, and 23 the temperature was very hot, above 90 in the shade. But the 24th was a rainy day and the night uncomfortably cold; the 25th was a cold day, and on the morning of the 26th the tents were covered with frost. But the next day it rained and for ten days thereafter the temperature was warm and pleasant. From the close of the 24th of May until the 10th of June it was as fine fighting weather as any general could wish for; May 31 the battle of Fair Oaks was fought.

The latter part of the month of June was very warm; the 26th was the hottest day, 96 in the shade. The next day was hot and the battle of Gaines's Mill was fought under a broiling sun. There was a light rain on the 29th, the day of the engagements at Allen's Farm, the Peach Orchard, and Savage's Station. The night of the battle of Malvern Hill, July 1, the rain poured in torrents and so continued through the next day. Thereafter until the army left the Peninsula for Washington, from August 10 to August 20, the days were almost alternately hot, rainy, and pleasant; the nights invariably cool.

McClellan's position was not a happy one. He realized the necessity of action, but he did not know what form that action should take. Of course the omnipresent feeling that he needed reenforcements possessed him, and he called repeatedly and loudly for them. Seeing large detachments of Union troops scattered about

Virginia in what he thought were unmilitary positions, he urged that they be forwarded from where they were useless to him, where they could be advantageously employed.

Sumner's defeat of the Confederates at Fair Oaks greatly demoralized them. Their military men were disconcerted and Davis and his Cabinet were greatly alarmed. It was believed that naturally McClellan would follow up the victory. All the church bells of Richmond rang wild alarums calling out the able-bodied citizens to be organized as militia and home guards for the defense of the city against the supposed attack. The citizens of Richmond were recommended to leave the city and go to safer places in the State, and the Legislature of Virginia, then in session, appropriated $200,000 to aid them in fleeing to cities of refuge. Fitz John Porter, McClellan's closest confidante, urged the commander to attack Lee's outer line of works, held by shaken troops, while he would come down on their flank from Mechanicsville way. But the proposition was at once rejected. Meanwhile many citizens had fled from Richmond and many of the public records were sent away. Mrs. Jefferson Davis had been sent under escort of Senator Wigfall to North Carolina.

And all this had been accomplished by the soldierly ardor and intelligence of good and brave old General Sumner, whose prompt, unhesitating, and straight forward march to Fair Oaks had resulted in the Union success. And he was past 65 years of age, and grayer than a badger, but braver than a lion and stouter than a horse.

He was not in high favor with McClellan. His appointment to the command of the Second Army Corps had been bitterly opposed and never forgiven by the Commanding General. His being placed second in

command on the Peninsula was solely because he was senior Corps commander; had McDowell been present, he would have been given the position. McClellan had a contempt for Sumner's bluff, pugnacious disposition and lack of dandy graces, and always treated him with studied neglect and disrespect. Sumner's magnificent service at Fair Oaks was his revenge. (See Vol.5,N & H Life of Lincoln, p.389.) Yet in his "Own Story," long after Sumner was in his grave, McClellan praised him.

But Gen. McClellan was in no mood for attacking Lee in front of Richmond. His returns for the army present under him on May 30,--that is, "present for duty" and "equipped" to fight--was 98,008, with 280 pieces of effective artillery. At the same time Johnston's army, by its reports, had present in fighting trim, 61,387 men with an estimate of 1,000 on special duty, or a total of 62,000. (War Recs.,N.& H. Life of Linc., etc.) But at Fair Oaks the Union force was cut down 5,000 and the Confederate 6,000. By the 15th of June McClellan had been re-enforced by 32,360 men present for duty, and on the 20th he certified to an "aggregate present" of 127,327, though he said only 114,691 of these were "present for duty equipped." (War Recs. Vol.11, part 3, p.238.) At about the same time Gen. Lee's reports show that he had present for duty 80,762 fighting men.

Yet all the while McClellan's mind was filled with the idea that Lee had 200,000 men,"including Jackson and Beauregard." He thought Beauregard had sent detachments from his army then in front of Corinth, Mississippi, when that general could not spare a man and was himself begging for re-enforcements. Stonewall Jackson was really near Richmond with 16,000 men at the time, but this number gave Lee in the aggregate but 80,000, as we now know. July 10, after the Seven Days' Battles had been fought, Lee had but 65,419.(War Recs. Vol.11,part 3,p.645.)

The day after the last action at Fair Oaks, or June 2, Gen. McClellan wrote to the Secretary of War:"I only wait for the river [Chickahominy] to fall to cross with the rest of the force and make a general attack. Should I find them holding firm in a very strong position, I may wait for what troops I can bring up from Fortress Monroe." There were 18,000 at Fortress Monroe.

He had induced the War Department to send him McCall's Pennsylvania Division of McDowell's Corps, so that he would have half of that Corps, which he seemed to think so essential to him. June 7 he wrote: "I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here and the ground will admit the passage of artillery." McCall's Division arrived June 12 and 13, and on the 12th he telegraphed: "Weather now good and roads and ground rapidly drying." Yet he did not move. On the 16th he wrote: "I hope two days more will make the ground practicable. I shall advance as soon as the bridges [over the Chickahominy] are completed and the ground fit for artillery." On the 18th he reported a crisis:"A general engagement may take place any hour." Then everybody sat up and waited for the "engagement," but it did not come. But on the 25th he "called the turn" when he telegraphed: "The action will probably occur tomorrow, or within a short time."

Yes, the action did occur "tomorrow," but it was not an action of Gen. McClellan's bringing on.

LEE OPENS THE BALL.

Gen. Lee at first expected McClellan to attack him. Longstreet and Magruder were of opinion that he never would; they had met him on the Peninsula. Lee finally came to their opinion. After some days Lee, having received re-enforcements from Charleston and elsewhere, determined to himself take the offensive and renew the attack on the Union army, notwithstanding the ill success of Johnston at Fair Oaks.

He wanted to learn the exact situation in McClellan's rear, to the east of the Chickahominy, and he sent Jeb Stuart to inspect and report. With some 1,200 cavalry and two light cannon, Stuart started on the 13th of June to ride around McClellan's army. He rode north from Richmond, crossed the upper Chickahominy, skirted McClellan's line in the rear, rendezvoused at Hanover C.H., and with detachments of three regiments of Virginia cavalry--the 1st, 4th, and Ninth--swept southeast to Tunstall's Station and Garlick's Landing on the Pamunkey. At Tunstall's he burned the railroad station and some supplies; at Garlick's he killed some soldiers and teamsters and burned two schooners laden with forage. Then he turned westward, crossed the Chickahominy below McClellan's army, and came up the James river road to Richmond. He reported that Gen. McClellan's right and rear were unprotected by works of any strength. If Gen. Lee desired to attack in that quarter, there was nothing in the natural situation to prevent. No mention was made that the roads were too muddy or the weather too rainy.(Cooke, Life of Lee, p.67; Stuart's Report,Vol.11,War Recs.; McClellan's Stuart's Camps.,Chap.7.)

Stuart's raid decided Lee to attack McClellan's divisions on the east side of the Chickahominy. If the mountain would not

come to Mohammed, why, Mohammed would go to the mountain. If McClellan would not come where Lee was, Lee would go where McClellan was. All the American people, North and South, expected a fight between them, and if McClellan would not start it Lee would, for the people were paying for the show and must not be disappointed.

Lee had called all his available forces to him. Stonewall Jackson had been doing splendid work for the Confederacy up in the Valley of Virginia, but the exigency was such that he must be withdrawn from that district and come to the assistance of his general-in-chief. To deceive McClellan, Gen. Whiting's Division was actually put on the cars of the Virginia Central Railroad and sent northward to Gordonsville. The xxx word was ostentatiously given out, and everybody heard it, that Whiting was going to reenforce Jackson and that Jackson would remain permanently in the Valley. In a few days Whiting returned with his Division to Richmond and there were 16,000 men in his Company besides his own. Division.

Lee's plan contemplated that as soon as Jackson, by his maneuvers on the north bank of the Chickahominy, should have uncovered the passage of the stream north of Richmond, at the Mechanicsville and Meadow Bridges, his Divisions on the south side should cross and join Jackson's column. Then the united army would sweep down the north side of the Chickahominy towards the York River and eventually lay hold of McClellan's line of communications at the White House.(Lee's report, War Recs., Vol.11,part 2.)

On the afternoon of Thursday, June 26, Gen. A. P. Hill and his Division crossed the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge, high up the Chickahominy, west of Mechanicsville, swept down and captured the Mechanicsville Bridge--driving away the regiment and battery guarding it--and then the Divisions of Longstreet and Dan Hill

crossed and joined with A. P. Hill. At once the three Divisions marched down the north bank of the Chickahominy for two miles when they encountered part of Fitz John Porter's Corps in position on Beaver Dam creek, a small stream flowing southward into the Chickahominy, but big enough for Porter's purpose. Longstreet and the Hills did not seem to be interfered with by bad roads and rains, obstacles of which McClellan was always complaining and which he often cited as reasons why he did not move against the enemy.

Porter's positionwas a strong one, and he finally brought up all his corps to defend it. It was on the east side of Beaver Dam creek on a high ridge. He had good breastworks and some abatis. The Confederates had to cross the little creek to reach it, which had but one bridge, at Ellersons Mill, on the lower part of the line. McCall's Division, which had come from McDowell, had been added to Porter's Corps. The Union forces engaged amounted to 11 regiments and 6 batteries; Confederate forces, 21 regiments and 8 batteries.

The fight was a glorious victory for Gen. Porter. The Confederates charged his position again and again and each time were repulsed. Their losses were heavy. In some instances the killing was fearfully sickening. The Confederates retired a little after dark. Their loss in killed and wounded, as given by themselves, was 2,529 killed and wounded; missing 68. Porter's total loss was only 361. The Confederates were to get their revenge the next day.

After the battle was over,and well over, Gen. McClellan rode up from his headquarters near Gaines's Mill and remained with Gen. Porter until after 1 o'clock in the early morning. He was greatly alarmed to realize that the Confederates had again stolen a

march on him and were in a dangerous position on his flank, and he had determined to retreat with his great army from before Richmond, giving up all he had been contending for, and retire southward, below Richmond several miles, to a "new base" on the James River.

In vain did Fitz John Porter remonstrate with his commander. The victory of Be aver Dam Creek had been an important one. "Leave me here," said Gen. Porter;"give me three more brigades so that I can guard my rear and thus be practically inside a great fortification. I can hold off any force likely to be sent against me until you, with the other three or four Corps of the army, can go and take Richmond, which now must be defended by a force easily overcome. Their main force is in the field; but when you take Richmond, it will either have to come back across the Chickahominy, when we can defeat it in detail, or it will have to swing around to the west to guard a new Confederate capital."

Striding back and forth and raging like a son of thunder before him, did Gen. Porter for hours try to infuse some of his own great courage and noble spirit into his commander, who sat as if demoralized and incapable of understanding what was said to him. At last McClellan, as he rode away, said he would let Porter know by daylight what would be done. In his official report, Gen. Porter says:

> The commanding general, however, left me, with the ~~xxxxxxxx~~ intention of deciding on his arrival at his own headquarters whether I should remain where I was and hold Beaver Creek, or retire to a position selected by Gen. Barnard at Gaines' Mill.--(War Recs. Vol.11,part 2,p.223.)

In "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," Gen. Porter writes:

I determined to hold my position long enough to make the army secure. Though in a desperate situation, I was not without

strong hope of some timely assistance with which I might repulse attack and make the easy capture of Richmond by the main body of the army under McClellan the result of any sacrifice or suffering on the part of my troops or of myself. (Batts. and Leads.,Vol.2,p.336; see also Webb's Peninsula,p.130; N. & H. Life of Linc.,Vol.5,p.426; Chief Eng. Barnard's report,War Recs.,Vol.11,part 1,p.131;Magruder's report,ibid,p.59; D. H. Hill, Batts. & Leads.,Vol.2,p.361;Gen. Longstreet,ibid,p.426.)

It is not extravagant to say that had Fitz John Porter been in command of the army May 26,27,28, Richmond would have been under the Union flag on the 28th at the farthest.

But at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 27th McClellan ordered Porter to retire to Gaines's Mill and take up another position, and Porter did so. Here at 12:30 he was attacked and the battle of Gaines's Mill(or Chickahominy or Cold Harbor as the Confederates called it) was fought. It was a bloody victory for the Confederates.

Including French's and Meagher's Brigades of Sumner's Corps and Slocum's Division of Franklin's, which re-enforced him during the battle, Porter had about 28,000 men--50 regiments and 20 batteries, not all engaged. The Confederates had Stonewall Jackson's, Longstreet's, Dan H. Hill's, and A. P. Hill's strong Divisions, in all 65,000 men--129 regiments and 19 batteries. Stonewall Jackson had slipped down from the Valley and brought 16,000 men with him, and with these joined the Confederate battle line an hour after the conflict began.

Porter had a good position and fought desperately. But the heavy and repeated charges on the weakest part of his lines defeated him. The Union troops retired fighting (except at one point) turning from time to time to beat back the enemy. Gen. Porter rode among his men in the thickest of the fight. When they

were retreating he said to those of Morell's Division: "Retreat like men; don't run like sheep." He fought from half past 12 until half past 8, or eight good long hours. He knew for two hours that he was losing the battle, but he consoled himself and his generals withthe thought that he was holding back the enemy while McClellan was taking or had taken Richmond, and he was glad to make the tremendous sacrifice.

Porter's loss at Gaines's Mill was large in prisoners taken when the Confederates swept over the lines and when the wounded were abandoned on the field. He had 894 killed, 3,107 wounded, 2,836 missing; total, 6,837.

894
3107
2836
6837

On the Confederate side the losses in Jackson's, Ewell's, Whiting's, and Dan Hill's Divisions were 589 killed, 2,671 wounded, and 24 missing; total, 3,284. The losses in Longstreet's Division were estimated by his Adjutant General, Maj. G. M. Sorrel, at 500 killed and 2,500 wounded. Gen. A. P. Hill's casualties were estimated by his adjutant at 300 killed and 1,200 wounded, making the total Confederate loss 7,784, as against 6,837, the known Union loss. The total Confederate missing did not amount to more than 300, so that the aggregate of killed and wounded was about 7,800 Confederates to 4,000 on the Union side.

3,284
3,000
1,500
7,784

Yet Porter lost 14 pieces of artillery and was driven from the field, and so Gaines's Mill was a Confederate victory.* Gen. McClellan did not visit the battlefield at all, but that night Porter was called to McClellan's headquarters, which had been removed to the west side of the Chickahominy, near the upper Grapevine Bridge at the two-story house of Dr. Trent. Here all the Corps commanders had been summoned. McClellan announced to them that he

* Confederate Gen. Alexander says that if in the afternoon "a fresh division had been sent to Porter he would easily have held his lines till dark and might even have been enabled to make a successful counterstroke." — Recollections, p. 130.

had determined to retire southward with the whole army to Harrison's Landing, on the James River, where he could receive supplies and have the protection of the gunboats. He said it was dangerous for Porter to remain longer on the north bank of the Chickahominy and he was ordered to withdraw to the south bank and destroy the bridges after him. The plans to retreat to the James River were then explained and orders given for their execution.

RICHMOND WAS AT MCCLELLAN'S MERCY.

From the 25th to the 28th of May, while Lee, Longstreet, and the Hills were absent with their armies, Richmond was defended by but 25,000 men of all arms, of all classes, and in all parts and places of defense. These included about 2,000 militia or home guards. The entire force was commanded by Gen. Magruder, who had held Yorktown against McClellan and knew his enemy thoroughly.

Magruder was not seriously afraid of McClellan, but he thought some one of the latter's generals, like Sumner, might conclude he wanted Richmond and come after it. So Magruder repeated and augmented the devices he had used at Yorktown. He rattled about McClellan's entire front with so much noise and smoke as to create the impression that he had overwhelming numbers. He even displayed some troops in line of battle, hauled out some big cannons and banged away with them at Golding's Farm, near Franklin's position. A charge by 500 cavalry would have captured all these guns. Franklin was so impressed that he would be attacked that he refused to send re-enforcements to Porter when he was engaged in the death grapple at Gaines's Mill. Even old Bull Sumner, who "feared God and nothing else in the world," said, when he sent two brigades to Porter, that they were all he could spare, for he expected to soon have to fight himself!

Magruder went on with his clatter and had every man in the great Union army west of the Chickahominy with his musket in his hand and his accouterments on. He dragged brush along the roads and great clouds of dust rose above the trees, giving the impression of vast armies marching to battle, and employed other humbugging devices. But of the real condition of affairs in Richmond at the

time, he said in his report:

From the time at which the enemy withdrew his forces to this side of the Chickahominy and destroyed the bridges, to the moment of his evacuation--that is, from Friday night until Sunday morning--I considered the situation of our army as extremely critical and perilous. The larger portion of it was on the opposite side of the Chickahominy; the bridges had been all destroyed, only one (the New Bridge) was rebuilt, and it was fully commanded by the enemy's guns from Golding's, and there were but 25,000 men between McClellan's army of 100,000 and Richmond.

I received repeated instructions during Saturday night from Gen. Lee's headquarters enjoining upon my command the utmost vigilance, directing the men to sleep on their arms, and be prepared for whatever might occur. These orders were promptly communicated by me to the different commanders of my forces and were also transmitted to General Huger, on my right. I passed the night without sleep and in the superintendence of their execution.

Had Gen. McClellan massed his whole force in column and advanced it against any point of my line of battle--as was done at Austerlitz under similar circumstances by the greatest captain of any age--Napoleon though the head of his column would have suffered greatly, its momentum would have insured him success, and the occupation of our works about Richmond, and consequently of the city, might have been his reward. His failure to do so is the best evidence that our wise commander Lee fully understood that character of his opponent.--Magr's report, War Recs.,Vol.11,part 2,p.662.)

Gen. Joe Johnston and Gen. Beauregard are on record as believing that McClellan could "have been in Richmond on Friday, the 27th, before midday." In fact it is now hardly disputed but that any commander of pluck and ability could have taken the Confederate capital and totally routed the whole Confederate army by Saturday, June 28, at the farthest.

Alas! It might have been.

FIGHTING ON THE RETREAT.

With the transfer of the right wing, now only Porter's Corps, to the south side of the Chickahominy, the Army of the Potomac turned its back on the Confederate capital and the army defending it, and all the high hopes that the loyal people of the country had so fondly held were blasted. Porter withdrew his Corps the night of the battle of Gaines's Mill, by the assistance of French's and Meagher's brigades, which Sumner had sent, and crossed the Chickahominy by New Bridge safely. Some of Sykes's regulars were the extreme rear guard and burned the bridge next morning at daylight.

The Confederates strongly believed that McClellan would renew the battle at Gaines's Mill the next morning and they feared the result, so severely had they suffered. A council of officers was held the night of the battle, and Dr. Dabney, in his Life of Stonewall Jackson, p.473, says:"After many painful details of losses and disasters, they all concurred in declaring that McClellan would probably take the aggressive in the morning and that the Confederate army could not resist him."

But the next morning McClellan was running away from the force that dreaded him so much! Gen. Hooker, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, characterized the retreat as unwarranted, unjustified, and highly disgraceful.* Other generals held the same opinion.

Foot note

*"We were ordered to retreat and it was like the retreat of a whipped army. We retreated like a parcel of sheep; everybody was on the road at the same time; a few shots from the rebels would have panic stricken the whole command."--Com. on Cond. War, part 1, p.580.

McClellan's line of retreat toward his proposed new base on the lower James passed between that river and the Chickahominy. South from the Williamsburg road and the West Point Railroad it crossed the big White Oak Swamp, heretofore mentioned. This swamp headed just south of the Seven Pines, ran southeast for about nine miles to White Oak Bridge, then turned to the northeast for four miles and emptied into the Chickahominy two miles below ~~Batton~~ Bottom's Bridge. It was a deep marsh in the woods, and was from half a mile to a mile wide. Through the center ran a considerable stream which was its drain or outlet. This stream ~~xxxxx~~ had no banks. Numerous roads crossed the swamp in various directions, but it was seldom passable by them. McClellan's main line of retreat was over a good road and bridge and the Confederates could not easily flank it.

Keyes's Fourth Corps, which had been stationed on the northern margin of White Oak Swamp, was naturally given the advance of the retrograde march. By noon of the 28th, it had seized strong positions ~~xx~~ on the south side of the swamp to cover the passage of its comrade Corps and their impedimenta. Then followed McClellan's long train of 5,000 wagons and a herd of 2,500 beef cattle, all of which had to traverse that great morass by a single narrow road. The passage was successfully accomplished, however, in 24 hours. The night of the 28th Fitz John Porter's Fifth Corps was heading for the swamp en route to the new base.

Meanwhile, in order to allow the trains and the cattle to get well on their way, Sumner's Second, Heintzelman's Third, and "Baldy" Smith's Division of Franklin's Sixth Corps had been ordered to remain on the Richmond side of the White Oak Swamp during the whole day and until after dark of the 29th. Their positions were arranged to cover the roads from Richmond and also Savage's Station, on the railroad.

Gen. Lee soon discovered that McClellan was retreating, but he was not certain by what route. He could throw all his force across to the north side of the Chickahominy and fall back by way of the York River Railroad and the White House, or he might retreat down the Peninsula over the same route by which Gen. Johnston, in May, had retreated up the Peninsula. But McClellan had chosen neither of these lines. And so when on the 28th Lee threw out Ewell's Division and Stuart's Cavalry to seize the York River Railroad, he had his trouble for his pains. For McClellan had abandoned his line of supplies by the York River Railroad two days before. A great part of the stores at West Point had been sent to Savage Station, and the rest burned; the water transportation had been sent from the White House around and up the James River. Gen. Casey conducted proceedings at the White House, and it was during the conflagration which consumed the Union stores that the White House itself, owned by Mrs. Gen. Lee, was burned. Gen. Casey said he did not know who set the house on fire and that it was "against my express orders." (War Recs.,Vol.11, part 2,p.483.)

Upon learning definitely the route McClellan was taking, Sunday morning, May 29, Gen. Lee put all his columns in pursuit on parallel roads. Magruder and Huger were ordered out from Richmond to follow up on the Williamsburg and Charles City roads, the latter leading southeast below White Oak Swamp; Longstreet and the Hills were to hurry across the Chickahominy at New Bridge and move by flank routes near the James and try to intercept the retreat; Stonewall Jackson, crossing the Chickahominy at the upper Grapevine Bridge, was to sweep down the left bank of the river, crossing White Oak Swamp near its mouth and get on McClellan's left flank.(War Recs.; Swinton,p.155;Cooke,Life of Lee,p.89.)

Early on the morning of Saturday, June 28, the wagons of the Union army, laden with supplies, began moving south. They were passing the camp of the First Minnesota the greater part of the day. The word had gone out that the army was to retreat, and the men were in such moods as may be imagined. The general sentiment was that it was a terrible thing to "run without being licked."

In the afternoon the Minnesota men were ordered to pack up and "get ready to run," as they expressed it. At night even the shelter tents were packed and the boys bivouacked in the open air; there was no telling what moment the order to march would be given. At about 4 o'clock the next morning(Sunday, June 29,) the order came and was obeyed.

There were some unpleasant features connected with the movement. The great strong breastworks and fortifications which had cost so much time and labor to build, and which were well nigh impregnable, were abandoned without the snapping of a cap. The sick and disabled were sent to the general hospital at Savage Station and abandoned to the malaria and miasm of the Chickahominy bottoms and to the tender mercies of the Confederates. A few surgeons and some medical stores were left with them.

Scarcely had McClellan's movement to the rear begun when the Confederates on the Chickahominy side were upon him. At Golding's farm, two miles north of Fair Oaks, W. F. Smith's brigades, of Franklin's Sixth Corps, were stationed. The Confederates could cannonade them from Gaines's Mill battle ground. Gen D. R. Jones's Confederate Division crossed the river and the Seventh and Eighth Georgia regiments charged on the Thirty-Third New York, of Davidson's, and the Forth-Ninth Pennsylvania, of Hancock's Brigade, which were on

picket line, and the Georgians got badly licked. They lost over 100 killed and wounded and Col. Lamar, Lieut-Col. Tower, and 50 officers and men were taken prisoners. The Minnesotians heard the sound of this fight and knew the Confederates would give them trouble shortly.

THE FIGHT AT ALLEN'S FARM OR THE PEACH ORCHARD.

Very early on that Sunday morning, Gen. Sumner began the lead of his Corps eastward from and near Fair Oaks, on a parallel road with the York River road, in the direction of Savage's Station. At Allen's Farm, some two miles east of Fair Oaks, the Corps halted and made a temporary bivouac. There was trouble in the rear. The Confederates were following closely.

Gen. Magruder had run out of his works in front of Richmond the moment he heard the Federal troops were retreating, He had five brigades, under Bob Toombs, Howell Cobb, J. B. Kershaw, Paul Semmes, and Richard Griffith, and several batteries. He also had what was called a "railroad battery," which was a 32-pound rifled cannon with a sloping iron shield in front and mounted on a flat car which was moved by a locomotive over the York River road out from Richmond. This gun was in charge of a Lieut. Barry, and made to do good service.

Coming up with Burns's Brigade, which was the rear guard, at Allen's Farm, Magruder at once attacked, with Griffith's and Kershaw's Brigades in front and the railroad battery well advanced. (Why had not the track been torn up?) The little fighting done was in a peach orchard on the Allen farm, which comprised a part of the Fair Oaks battlefield. Gen. Griffith was killed and perhaps 20 more Confederates. The First Georgia had 3 men killed and 19 wounded. Col. Wm. Barksdale, Thirteenth Mississippi, of Ball's Bluff and Edwards' Ferry reputation, succeeded Gen. Griffith as brigade commander.

Tompkin's Battery(A, First Rhode Island) marched with Sully's Brigade from Fair Oaks to Allen's Farm, or the Peach Orchard, and went into position to the right of the Nineteenth

Massachusetts, of Dana's Brigade. The First Minnesota supported this Battery during the principal part of the action until the battery itself was divided, one section going to the west side of the railroad, and the other sections moving to the right and relieving Hazzard's Regular Battery. Tompkins's guns were actively employed, throwing case shot from 8 o'clock until the little fight closed, thus aiding in keeping back the enemy until the further retirement of the Union troops could be resumed in safety.

On the Union side, the fighting at the Peach Orchard was done principally by the batteries and Burns's Brigade, of Sedgwick's Division. The Seventy-First Pennsylvania(the "California Regiment") did the greater part of the infantry fighting. Gen. Sumner was on the field and had charge of the Union side of it. He delayed Magruder's advance for about three hours.

At this time Gen. Gorman had been stricken with malarial fever and Col. Sully was commanding his brigade. Lieut-Col. Stephen Miller had command of the First Minnesota. The Fifteenth Massachusetts had been sent forward to Savage's Station, with Meagher's Brigade of Richardson's Division, to destroy the immense stocks of stores which had to be abandoned. The remainder of the Corps soon followed.

The amount of stores which McClellan was forced to destroy at Savage's Station was something enormous. They were largely ordnance stores, but there were all kinds. Some trains were loaded with ordnance and then exploded; other were loaded, set on fire, and run eastward to Bottom's Bridge, where they plunged, locomotives, cars, and all, into the Chickahominy.

The fighting at the Peach Orchard(or Allen's Farm) was not very serious on the Union side. In two hours Gen. Sumner was on his way to Savage's Station and Magruder was closing up his ranks to follow.

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THE BATTLE OF SAVAGE'S STATION.

It must be understood that at noon on that Sunday, June 29, all the Union Corps were retreating toward McClellan's new base. Porter's and Keyes's were across White Oak Swamp and well on their way. Sumner's, Franklin's, and Heintzelman's were marching toward the Swamp.

Gen. Franklin first suggested that the three Corps should unite at Savage's Station. It was evident that there would be a battle before they could cross White Oak Swamp, and Franklin thought that about Savage's Station was good fighting ground. He sent a dispatch to Sumner stating that he would bring Smith's Division to the Station and urging Sumner to join him with the Second Corps. When he received this dispatch, Sumner was busy at the Peach Orchard, but answered that he would come to the Station "as soon as things are quiet here." Gen. Heintzelman also promised Franklin that he would come up with his Corps and then there would be a strong force that could defy the Confederates. But Gen. Heintzelman changed his mind, and instead of stopping at the Station with his Corps he marched it off toward White Oak Bridge and the swamp. He said the whole ppen space at Savage's was crowded with troops, more than was necessary. Gen. Sumner was greatly displeased with Gen. Heintzelman for the latter's action.

Sumner's Second Corps, with the First Minnesota, arrived at Savage's Station at about 2 P.M. The situation topographically cannot well be described without a map. On the north side of the railroad there was a cleared field full of hospital tents, laid out in rows, each tent containing 15 to 20 men on comfortable clean cots, with the necessary surgeons and attendants. (All these were

abandoned to the Confederates.)

South of the railroad and between it and the Williamsburg stage road was another clearing. East of this clearing was a ravine running obliquely across the railroad, its edges skirted by trees, and the ravine itself filled with undergrowth. This latter clearing was nearly square and nearly half a mile in length and breadth. In front of the brushy ravine were some small hills which made fine shelter for the troops. West of the clearing was more timber, and here Sumner and Franklin thought (for some time) that Heintzelman was lying with his Corps. On the left or south of the Williamsburg road was timber also and here was Gen. "Baldy" Smith, of Franklin's Corps, in position; Gen. Franklin's other Division, Gen. Slocum's, was across White Oak Swamp.

Sumner's Corps took position in the clearing between the Williamsburg road and the railroad. Burns's Brigade, of Sedgwick, was in front, Sully's and Dana's behind it. Richardson's three brigades were farther to the rear but more to the right. Pettit's, Hazzard's, and Osborn's batteries were posted towards the left, near the front of the brushy ravine.(War Recs.)

It rained a little at intervals, but generally the day was hot and sultry and wore away slowly but e xcitedly as the men waited either to be attacked by Magruder's forces during the day, or when night came to start for the White Oak Bridge. Up at the Station large quantities of quartermasters' and other stores, part of them in cars, were burning, and at intervals there would be terrific explosions of ordnance supplies, which was somewhat jarring to the nerves of the tired and expectant men. To all the soldiers that would take them the officers in charge of the destruction were giving away blankets, clothing, rations, and commissary stores

of all kinds, and burning the remainder.

Capt. Alexander and other officers testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War that they saw at Savage Station an order signed by McClellan directing that officers and soldiers should burn their knapsacks and other personal property to facilitate their progress on the retreat, calling upon them to make the "sacrifice" for the good of"the cause." Gen. Porter and others induced Gen. McClellan to revoke the order.(See Nicolay & Hay's Life of Lincoln.)

THE BATTLE BEGINS.

All the Seven Days' battles began after noon: Seven Pines or Fair Oaks, at 1 o'clock; Mechanicsville, 3 to 4; Gaines's Mill, 12:30; Savage's Station, about 4:30; White Oak Swamp, 12 to 1; Glendale, 2 to 3; Malvern Hill, after 1.

About 4:30 Magruder's advance appeared in front of the Union pickets at Savage's Station. It pushed Kemper's Alexandria (Va.) Battery well forward and opened on the Union position suddenly and savagely. The artillery car halted in a cut of the railroad, a little distance from the station, and began to shell Sumner's Corps in the clearing. Gen. Franklin relates(Batts. and Leads. p.373.) that he and Gen. Sedgwick were looking for Gen. Heintzelman when the Confederate guns opened on them so startlingly that they had great difficulty in riding away with the dignity and deliberation due ~~to brigadiers~~ major generals. The infantry soon were in support of the artillery.

The Confederate force was commanded by Gen. Magruder and Gen. Lafayette McLaws in person. It consisted of five brigades. Those that did the fighting were Kershaw's, Sumner's, and the Seventeenth and Twenty-First Mississippi of Barksdale's,(formerly Griffith's) brigade. The artillery consisted of Capt. Del. Kemper's Alexandria Battery, of Kershaw's Brigade; Moody's Louisiana, of Toombs's Brigade, and Brown's Wise (Va.) Artillery, and Hart's Washington (S.C.) Artillery, of Col. Anderson's Brigade. Toombs's, Cobb's, and Anderson's infantry were in line north of the railroad but took no part in the battle.

Gen. Semmes had in action the Fifth Louisiana, Tenth Georgia, and Thirty-Second Virginia, in all, he says, 755 men. Gen. Kershaw had four South Carolina regiments--the Second, xxxxxxxxx

Third, Seventh, and Eighth--and Capt. Del Kemper's Battery,(which had fought at Bull Run) in all, 1,496 men. The two regiments (Seventeenth and Twenty-First Mississippi) of Barksdale's Brigade numbered about 600; total 2,851 excluding artillery.

The Union troops engaged were Sedgwick's three brigades--Sully's, Burns's, and a part of Dana's--and Brooks's Vermont brigade of W. F. Smith's Division of the Sixth Corps. Their total strength cannot be given, but it must have largely exceeded that of the enemy. Yet nearly all the fighting was done by Sully's, and Burns's Brigades and the three Batteries, so that it was a fair fight, with the actual contending forces about equal.

Old Gen. Sumner had been up nearly all the night before and had been very busy during that Sunday morning. About 3:30 P.M. he lay down for a little rest at the Station and was soon sound asleep. He was "dead to the world" when the firing began and Gen. Franklin so found him and awakened him. The old warrior, accustomed to all sorts of surprises and always ready for any emergency, sprang to his feet, called for his horse, and in less than five minutes was galloping to the firing line.

Kershaw's South Carolinians were advancing and peppering away at the Union skirmishers. Gen. Sumner rode into Burns's Brigade and quickly sent two of its regiments forward nearly half a mile to hold the woods between the Williamsburg road and the rail-road. Kershaw's men were advancing through these woods. Gen. Burns saw that his two regiments were in danger of being flanked and he called for another to protect his left.

Attention, First Minnesota! Here is work for you! Gen. Burns had sent back for the two other regiments of his brigade.

The First Minnesota was in front of them. "Take the Minnesota men up first and let the Pennsylvania regiments follow, " ordered Sumner.* Right gallantly did "Old Steve" Miller take the Regiment into the fight. It arrived in good time, before the enemy attacked him formidably, says Gen. Burns. It was thrown into the woods across the Williamsburg road, with the left companies retired a little to protect the flank.

Gen. Burns saw that, even with the Minnesotians, his line was not long enough to confront the enemy. So he hurried up his two reserve regiments. He had Baxter's Fire Zouaves, (the Seventy-Second Pennsylvania) back near the railroad to fire upon "the Monitor," as the railroad battery was nick-named, and the rest of his line was only two regiments long.

Before these regiments could get up, the firing began, Kershaw's infantry opening in good style. The Confederate batteries had been at work playing with shot and shell on the field as the troops crossed it. Right merrily did the First Minnesota "buckle down" to its work. The men kept well in line, loaded and fired rapidly, and did good execution. No thought of giving way now. Sumner's Brigade had been at work on the extreme left of the Union line, where Brooks's Vermonters were, but it was now moved up to help Kershaw's.

The Seventeenth and Twenty-First Mississippi, of Barksdale's Brigade were sent down to hold back the Vermonters. The

*"The First Minnesota, of Gorman's Brigade, being most handy, was first sent, my two reserve regiments following."--Gen. Burns in Batts. and Leads.,Vol.2,p.374.)

Fifth Vermont, under Lieut-Col. Lewis A. Grant, now of Minneapolis, was very roughly handled. Barksdale's Mississippians gave it all their fire and Kemper's Battery poured into its ranks grape and canister with deadly effect, yet it held its ground and never offered to give way. ~~XXXXXXXXX~~ Semmes's Confederate Brigade also took part in the fight against ~~Brooks's~~ the Vermonters, and Gen. Semmes was of the opinion that it performed prodigies of valor and perpetrated a great massacre of Yankees. In his report he says:

> Much of the time the enemy were engaged at a distance of 40 yards. Their heavy comparative loss doubtless resulted mainly from the greater efficiency of our smooth-bore muskets, loaded with buck and ball, at short range, and the superior steadiness of our men and the precision of their fire.

It is a fact that during the Seven Days' Battles fully one-third of the Confederates were armed with smooth-bore muskets, which ~~fired~~ fired a cartridge composed of a round ball and three buckshot, a most effective weapon at short range. Nearly all the rifled muskets they had were Enfields, imported from England, and Union Springfields picked up on battlefields. There were two weak points in Gen. Burns's position, the center and the Williamsburg road. Two more regiments were needed to fill these gaps and they were sent for. Before they could come Kershaw charged the center with the Second, Third, and Seventh South Carolina. They shot Gen. Burns in the face with a minie ball, killed Capt. McGonigle, of Baxter's Seventy-Second Pennsylvania, forced through to the fence surrounding the cleared fields, and waved their flags across the rail panels. But neither Burns's regiments or the First Minnesota offered to run, though their line was cut in two, but kept on fighting.

Thank the Lord for Old Gen. Sumner! Here he comes to the rescue. He is a second Blucher, the old "Marshal Forwarts," who, at

71, in 1813, led the charge of the Prussian cavalry that defeated Macdonald with the French chasseurs at the Katzbach. When Burns sent the third time for help, the old hero seized the first two regiments he saw, and they happened to be Col. Baker's Eighty-Eighth New York, of Meagher's Brigade, and the Fifth New Hampshire, of Caldwell's. These he led forward in person, waving his hat as a flag, his good gray head held proudly, his eyes full of battle light, his gray hair and beard blowing backward in the wind.* How those Irish in the Eighty-Eighth New York did yell! Arriving at the firing line, the two fresh regiments, by Gen. Sumner's shouted order, charged into the woods and speedily drove back the picked troops of the Palmetto State, the chivalry of Charleston, the ~~darlings~~ codlings of Columbia, the very first troops of the State to volunteer in the unholy cause. At the same time Kemper's battery went back with a rush.

Then here came the remaining regiments of Sully's Brigade. The good Fifteenth Massachusetts relieved the One-Hundred-Sixth Pennsylvania and the Twentieth Massachusetts replaced Baxter's Seventy-Second. Col. Hudson's Eighty-Second New York was the first to arrive and it was sent to fill the gap in the line. But it wouldn't stay behind, and rushed on with its comrade regiments as long as it could see a "Johnny," with a gun in his hand.

The Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania was sent to the left of the First Minnesota, though it was all over now but the shouting and a great deal of that was being done! Semmes's Brigade seemed to

*See Franklin's article, Batts. and Leads., Vol.2, p.373.)

want a share of what Kershaw's was receiving, so it came up in front of the First Minnesota and the Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania and got it! Then it went off after Kershaw's Brigade.

Gen. Magruder always knew when he had enough. He saw that he could accomplish nothing towards defeating a fighter like Sumner with his fighting Divisions, and so he ordered Gen. McLaws to withdraw the brigades which had been in the battle and done the fighting, as well as those which had stood off and looked on. He knew that the Union forces would soon leave Savage's Station and he could occupy the place peaceably, and then claim that he had captured it!

In truth the Confederates did a great deal of blowing and "gasing" about the battle of Savage's Station. Most of the officers claimed it as a Confederate victory, though Gen. E. M.Law (Southern Bivouac,May,1887,) says: "The battle of Savage's Station, although a 'drawn fight' as far as the possession of the field was concerned, was practically a victory for the Federals."

The fight closed between 7:45 and 8, or, as some say, 8:30; at least it was near dark. The Confederates retired a mile from the battle ground. The Union troops went back to the Station, preparatory to moving south across White Oak Swamp that night.

As officially reported the Confederates lost in Semmes's Brigade, of three regiments, in killed and wounded, 64; in Kershaw's Brigade, 48 killed, 236 wounded, and 9 missing; Barksdale's two regiments did not report their loss separately from the other battles. Hart's Battery lost 3 killed, 2 wounded, and 7 horses killed, all by the Union batteries. Moody's Battery lost 1 man and several horses. Kemper's Battery lost 2 killed, 2 wounded and 9 horses.

Thus the total Confederate loss, not counting that in Barksdale's Brigade, was 65 killed and 294 wounded.

It is greatly to be regretted that the Union loss cannot be definitely given. Many regimental commanders failed to make any reports. The others consolidated their losses sustained in all the Seven Days' battles. Even Lieut-Col. Miller did this in the case of the First Minnesota, but he said(Vol.2,Minn.in Civ. and Ind. Wars,p.107.) in his report: "With a few exceptions our entire loss occurred at Savage Station." The figures he presents are:Killed, 6, wounded, 47; missing,37;total,90. The nominal list, however, shows 10 killed and mortally wounded, 47 wounded, 28 missing; total 85.

There were but 14 Union regiments that fought at Savage Station, and of these only 10 were conspicuously engaged. The losses of some of these were trifling. During the whole Seven Days' battles the Eighty-Eighth New York lost but 8 killed and 57 wounded; Fifth New Hampshire, 7 killed and 45 wounded; Eighty-Second New York, 2 killed and 10 wounded; Fifteenth Massachusetts none killed and 11 wounded. But the Fifth Vermont lost heavily at Savage's Station--31 killed, 143 wounded, and 31 missing; total 205.

And yet some of the Confederate officers in their reports gave wonderful exaggerations of the "Yankee loss," the wish being father to the thought. Gen. Kershaw said there were "500 dead of the enemy left on the field." Gen. Semmes notes that,"no less than 400 of the enemy's dead were found on the field next morning," in front of his three regiments. Gens. Magruder and McLaws did not write such nonsense. All the Union forces engaged after Gaines's Mill did not lose 400 dead in all the ~~Seven Days' battles~~ battles from Allen's Farm to Malvern. At Savage's Station the Fifth Vermont must have lost as many as all the other regiments together. The total Union loss at Savage's Station did not exceed 400.

A PARTICIPANT DESCRIBES THE FIGHT.

Sergeant Wm. Harmon, of the Minneapolis company--afterwards a lieutenant--wrote the following account of the fight at Savage's Station, a few days after it occurred:

> About 4 P.M. the rebels came upon us and commenced shelling us. Several of the boys in our regiment were wounded by them. We laid down on the ground. Andres McCausland, of Company C, had his knapsack torn from his back by a piece of shell. We moved forward to the left into the woods, out of range of the battery in that direction, to spport another regiment that was fighting on the left. The fight lasted here until after dark, the whole Division being engaged, besides the Vermont Brigade in Smith's Division. The rebels got driven back. We lost out of our Regiment in this fight about thirty killed and wounded.
>
> Sergeant Geo. N. Burgess, of Company K, the colorbearer, was shot dead; he was the man that brought the colors off at Bull Run; he was a fine fellow, as well as brave. Every man in the Regiment was his friend. He was shot by a minie ball through the lungs and killed instantly, and the colors fell to the ground; they were raised by one of the guard.
>
> Our company was very fortunate not to lose any one. Joseph McDonald, of Company C, a son of McDonald that lives opposite Elk River, was wounded, but not seriously.
>
> This was Sunday's fight at Savage's Station. About 10 P.M., we started on the march, leaving the wounded that could not walk in old buildings; surgeons and hospital stewards stopped with them.

After the sad but glorious death of Sergt. Geo. N. Burgess, the color-bearer of the First Minnesota, the Regiment came near losing its flag. Sergt. Sam Bloomer, of Company B, one of the color guard, relates the circumstances in his Scrap Book, page 94.

He says that after the Regiment took its position across the Williamsburg (or Bottom's Bridge) road, the enemy's fire down the road became so hot "that nothing could stand in it a minute." Then occurred an opening in the Regiment, the companies falling to the right and left of the road. The colors and a part of their guard remained on the left of the road, to the right of the left wing. At this juncture, Sergt. Bloomer says:

A regiment of the Vermont Brigade came up behind us and were allowed to pass through our line, and they formed in front of us. The command "forward" being given by the colonel of the Vermont regiment, Sergt. Burgess thought the order meant us. With three of the guard he advanced with the Vermont boys, thus leaving the Regiment without its colors.

This was about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. We had advanced about fifty yards when the Sergeant's attention was called to the fact that we were not with our Regiment. Instantly he "about faced" and ran to the rear to join our own Regiment. Having arrived at the place he thought it was, but not finding it--for it had changed its position(?)--he again "about faced" intending to rejoin the Vermont regiment. In these movements Geo. L. Smith, of Company C, of St.Paul, was mortally wounded, leaving only Sergt. Burgess, Frank Walden, Lucius F. Walden, of the Winona Company and myself.

On arriving where we supposed we had left the Vermont regiment, Burgess was instantly killed and I took charge of the colors. We then started toward the Rebels on a run, supposing we were behind the Vermont boys, but ran into a line of Rebel infantry. We turned and ran, followed by hissing bullets. The bullets now began to come both from the front and rear, for we were between the Vermont regiment and the rebels. We soon joined the Vermont regiment and told the colonel we wanted to stay with his line until after the battle, and if we fell we wanted him to preserve our flag.

We stepped into line with our flag by the Vermont flag, and remained until we thought the battle was over, when we went to the rear in search of the Regiment. We ran into another Vermont regiment--I think the Sixth--commanded that day by Capt. Spaulding, an old Stillwater acquaintance, and firing began again, although it was after dark. Here we remained until the battle was over and about 10 o'clock that night joined o r Regiment after an absence of five hours or more.

The records make it difficult to identify the "Vermont regiment," that Sergt. Bloomer says was " allowed to pass" through the First Minnesota during the battle. The Fifth Vermont, of Brooks's Brigade was the only regiment from the Green Mountain State in the action at Savage's Station, and, as has been already stated, it was far to the left of the Union line. Colonel L. A. Grant, its commander, makes no mention in his report of having passed through any other Union regiment on his way to the front. The Eighty-Second New York, by General Sumner's order, did pass through the Minnesota position, near the close of the fight. The Sixth Vermont was commanded by Col. Nathan ~~Lorel~~ Lord. It took no very active part in the battle, but lost 1 killed and 6 wounded (War Recs. Vol. 11, part 2, p.

THE RETREAT ACROSS WHITE OAK SWAMP.

Half an hour after the fight was over at Savage's Station and darkness had settled down thick and black over the scene, Gen. Franklin went to Gen. Sumner and said that he would now proceed to carry out Gen. McClellan's instructions and cross the White Oak Swamp with Gen. Smith's Division. The conversation took place on a part of the battlefiled.

Gen. Sumner was astounded and greatly indignant."What!" he said loudly;"Run away from a victory? We have whipped them and can do it again. We have run far engugh. No, General, you shall not go, nor will I go. I never leave a victorious field. Why! If I had 20,000 more men I could crush the whole rebel army right here." Franklin then said he would show the old hero a dispatch from McClellan directing that all the troops should cross the Swamp that night. With some difficulty a candle was found and the General read the dispatch. But after reading it he exclaimed, with excitement:"Gen. McClellan did not know the circumstances when he wrote that note. He did not know that we would fight a battle and gain a victory. We will stay right here." Let Franklin finish the story as he tells it in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,"(Vol.2,p.375) and elsewhere:

I was at my wit's end. I knew that unless our whole force was on the other side of the Swamp by the next morning Gen. McClellan's movement might be seriously delayed. Moreover, I believed that if we staid where we were, the enemy would be upon us in force enough to defeat us utterly the next morning, endangering the remainder of the army. Yet, by all military usage, I was under Gen. Sumner's orders.

At this juncture Gen. Smith asked me to introduce his aide-de-camp, Lieut. Matt. Berry, to Gen. Sumner. Lieut. Berry told Gen. Sumner that he had seen Gen. McClellan, only a little time before, and that he knew there had been a battle and a victory, yet he fully expected that all of the troops on the north side would

cross White Oak Swamp that night. Gen. Sumner then yielded as one who surrenders cherished opinions, and reluctantly permitted Gen. Franklin to continue the movement toward the Swamp with Smith's Division. Gen. Sumner followed immediately after with the Second Corps.

The Compte de Paris, in his History, says: "It required a positive order from Gen. McClellan to determine Sumner to cross the White Oak Swamp. Gen. Walker, in his "History of the Second Army Corps," p.70, says: "The approach of night on the 29th found Sumner victorious and happy, Magruder having been completely repulsed and driven off the ground. The old general was well content with his position and would have been willing to stay there a week. His blood was up, and of his own motion he was little likely to take a backward step."

The First Minnesota never forgot that night march across White Oak Swamp. Gen. Smith's Division, of Franklin's Sixth Corps, crossed the White Oak Bridge about 3 o'clock on the morning of ~~the~~ June 30, and went into position on the left of the road leading from the bridge toward the James River. Here it stayed to protect the bridge while Sumner's Corps was crossing.

Richardson's Division was rear guard of Sumner's Corps and did not cross the bridge until 10 o'clock in the morning. The rear guard was busy destroying the bridge when here came Hazzard's Fourth Regular Battery on the gallop. It had been in position in the woods and had received no orders to retire. The reveille calls in the Confederate camps told Capt. Hazzard the fix he was in and he hastened to get out of it. A few hours later he was mortally wounded while in action on the south side of White Oak Swamp. After destroying the bridge Richardson's Division went into camp along side of Smith's and both Divisions guarded the crossing to hold back their

pursuers as long as possible.

Had Gen. Heintzelman been in the woods South of the Williamsburg road at the time of the fighting, Gen. Magruder would not only have been repulsed--as he was--but in his repulse he would have found the Union lines wrapped around his flanks so that the extrication of his forces would have been very difficult. He could not have gotten his troops out without their great confusion and severe loss. The farther he was driven back toward Richmond, the farther he would have been from Stonewall Jackson who alone could bring him relief, and who did not get to Savage's until late that night — or rather early the next morning.

It was all arranged that Stonewall Jackson should come from Gaines's Mill, on the north side of the Chickahominy, and join Magruder in an attack on the Union force at Savage's Station. If this had been done, and only the three Divisions that fought the battle ben engaged, they would probably have been defeated; but if Heintzelman's Corps had been present the Union troops could have won the victory.

Luckily Stonewall Jackson was delayed nearly all day, he said, in rebuilding the bridges over the Chickahominy which the Union troops had destroyed. So difficult and toilsome was this work, he reported, that it was not completed until after dark; and thoughthe Chickahominy was only three to six miles from Savage's, the roads were so bad that the five strong Divisions of Jackson did not get to the Station proper until after daylight on Monday morning, the 30th, when Sumner was across the Swamp. After the campaign was over Certain Confederate generals reported that at this time Gen Jackson had a "fit," during which he was listless inactive and almost inert and not at all in his normal condition. Gen Alexander says this "fit" lasted till after Malvern Hill.

Although this was the only instance where Gen. Heintzelman ever failed to perform his whole duty, Gen. Sumner never forgave him for this exception.

The worst visible feature of the retreat from Savage's

Station was the abandonment of the 2,500 sick and wounded Union soldiers in the field hospital north of the Station. These poor fellows all became prisoners of the Confederates with all of the horrible features that such a fate implied. No wonder Gen. Sumner said it was "a d___ disgrace" to leave them. If only Gen. McClellan had been like Gen. Sumner! When McClellan knew that he ~~was going~~ ordered ~~to~~ retreat, the York River railroad was in running order to West Point, and three trains would have sufficed to bear his sick and wounded away.

Near the White Oak Swamp was another Union hospital wherein were 500 sick and woundedsoldiers. These too were abandoned. McClellan's orders made it necessary.

His orders made necessary, too, the destruction of vast quantities of military stores and the abandonment of others to the enemy. In his "Life of Stonewall Jackson," the author, Maj. Dabney, Jackson's adjutant at one time, gives this description of a portion of the scene at Savage's Station when Jackson's troops reached the place:

> The whole country was full of deserted plunder. There were army wagons and pontoon trains partially burned or crippled; mounds of grain and rice and hillocks of mess beef smoldering; thousands of axes, picks, and shovels; camp kettles gashed with hatchets; medicine chests with their drugs stirred to a foul medley, and all the apparatus of a vast and wealthy army. The mire under foot was mixed with blankets lately new and with torn overcoats and other clothing. For weeks afterward agents of our army were busy gathering in the spoil. Great stores of fixed ammunition were saved, but more were destroyed. More than 3,000 Federal muskets in good order were gathered up and sent to Richmond.

That there was no real excuse for the retreat is now generally admitted; the reasons against it are numerous, and the most important is that nearly 85,000 Union troops were, by the orders of their commander, running away from 60,000 Confederates.

THE ACTION AT WHITE OAK BRIDGE.

After crossing the swamp at White Oak Bridge, the First Minnesota marched about two miles and halted. The night march was attended with casualties. Stragglers! For some unaccountable reason many of the Union soldiers fell out of ranks in the darkness and cast themselves down by the roadsides, where they were picked up the next morning by the pursuing Confederates. Gen. Dan Hill says his Division picked up 1,000 of these stragglers and skulkers, and they had to spend long terms in Confederate prisons for their physical weakness and mental and moral delinquency. On the muster rolls the orderly sergeants kindly recorded these fellows as "missing in action at Savage's Station," along with their faithful comrades who were really captured against their will.

Stonewall Jackson came up to White Oak Bridge about 11 o'clock and essayed to cross it to the south side. As stated, on that side were the Divisions of "Baldy" Smith and Sedgwick with Gen. Franklin in command of the position.

The situation now was this: Jackson, Ewell, and Dan Hill were following directly after McClellan's retreating army. Longstreet and A. P. Hill--and with them Gen. Lee--were coming down the Union right flank over the Charles City road; they had come to the west of the White Oak Swamp, and had not been troubled by crossing that great morass, having kept it to their left flank all the way down. They were straining every nerve to cut in two McClellan's retreating line--which was now the Quaker road--and capture the rear half, Sumner's and Franklin's Corps and part of Heintzelman's, To this end they strove to throw themselves across the Quaker road at a locality called Glendale and intercept the three Corps named,

while Jackson and Hill should come up in the rear and help effect their capture and destruction. The First Minnesota did its full share in preventing this casualty.

Jackson came up to the north end of White Oak Bridge and sent Munford with the cavalry to see if the swamp could be crossed elsewhere. The jaded Union troops had been massed on the ground beyond the Swamp without any attempt at concealment or to form them in order. All, fairly numb with fatigue, had thrown themselves on the ground and had fallen soundly asleep.

Suddenly 31 pieces of cannon opened on them from the Confederate side of the Swamp. For awhile there was a scene of dire confusion, enlivened, however, by some ridiculous and laughable incidents, resulting from the big scare. The fighting at White Oak Swamp was almost altogether by the artillery. It was hot and heavy for half an hour, and was resumed at intervals during the day.

Up the stream, perhaps two miles, from White Oak Bridge was Brackett's ford, where the Swamp was crossable sometimes, but was not in very good condition now. Munford's Virginia cavalry, hunting for other crossings than the White Oak Bridge, came upon Brackett's ford, which some of them crossed, though Gen. Franklin says they "retired much faster than they advanced." Gen. Franklin at once saw the perilous condition at Brackett's Ford. Jackson might cross a part of his force there, join Longstreet and Hill, and turn the Union right flank. So Franklin sent to Gen. Sumner for re-enforcements and Sumner sent him Sully's and Dana's Brigades. Gen. Sully was sick and stayed behind, but his brigade, including the First Minnesota, was temporarily in charge of Gen. Dana. When the two brigades got up to command Brackett's Ford, the Confederates made no further attempt

"Spell." Nearly half the time he sat at the foot of a tree with his cap over his eyes, speaking to no one, and seemingly in a state of coma. He could have easily sent a brigade of infantry across the swamp than Munford's cavalry, and then the way would have been clear for his entire corps. Gen. Alexander makes this point.

to cross. Southern critics have scored Stonewall Jackson because he didn't push across, ~~at all hazards.~~ "spell" or no "spell."

There was nothing for the First Minnesota to do at Brackett's but to keep in line and ready to spring to action in a moment. But this was enough. The Confederates with their field glasses could see the situation, ~~and knew~~ but believed that if they attempted to cross, the attempt would be a bloody failure. So they sat down and rested and listened to Longstreet and A. P. Hill fighting McCall and the other Union generals at Glendale. The fighting was only five miles away, but they ~~were powerless~~ did not try to help, although their help was badly needed. Had Jackson ~~been able~~ that day ~~to~~ joined Longstreet and A. P. Hill, half of McClellan's army might have been prisoners and there would have been no Malvern Hill.

As reported by the Confederate subordinate commanders, Gen Jackson seemed as one demented. Col. Munford and Wade Hampton found two crossings where the swamp could be passed and a union effected with Longstreet and they so reported. Jackson asked Hampton if he could make a bridge across the stream for infantry, and Hampton said he could. Jackson then ordered him to make it, and ~~he did~~ Hampton made the bridge ~~and~~ in a few minutes and so reported to Jackson. He found the great general seated on a pine log with his eyes closed. Hampton began telling him how that the bridge was completed, but Jackson pulled his cap down over his closed eyes and spoke no word and made no sign for several minutes. Then he rose suddenly and walked away, still silent and mysterious, and striking like a sleep-walker.

THE BATTLE OF GLENDALE.

While Gen. Jackson was apparently trying to cross White Oak Swamp and Gen. Franklin(the First Minnesota helping) was preventing him, there was "something doing" about two miles to the southeast. Longstreet and A. P. Hill had come up over the Charles City road, running southeast from Richmond to Charles City, where that road was crossed by the Quaker road running southward from Glendale, southwest of White Oak Bridge. The road from New Market northeast to Glendale also crossed here. The cross roads was on the farm of a Mr. Frayser, but just south of his farm, on the Quaker road, and near the Willis Southern Methodist Church, was the farm of a Mr. Nelson. The battle fought here this day appears in history by at least five names--Glendale, Frayser' s Farm, Nelson's Farm, Charles City Cross Roads, and the Quaker Road; ~~xxxxxx~~ rarely it is called the "action near Willis's Church."

The position at the cross roads was defended by the Union Divisions of McCall, of Porter's Corps, and Kearney's of Heintzelman's. McCall was in the center and Kearney was at his right. Sumner's Corps was at some distance to McCall's left and rear. Hooker's Division of Heintzelman was on Sumner's left. McCall's Division(Pennsylvania Reserves) was formed at right angles, facing west, across the New Market road and parallel, or north and south, with the Quaker road. This Division had to sustain the brunt of the attack, which was a very formidable and determined one.

Longstreet and Hill opened the attack at about 3 P.M., while Jackson was booming away ~~trying~~ praying to cross White Oak Swamp. Longstreet was on the right and Hill in reserve on the left. Gen. Lee directed the battle, and Jeff Davis was also on the field during the fight. Each Division had six strong brigades with plenty of

artillery. The fight lasted until after dark. The Union forces managed to hold the position, but it was a hard job. McCall's Division suffered severely. Its loss in killed and wounded, and even prisoners, was heavy. Cooper's Pennsylvania and Randol's First U. S. Batteries were captured; Gen. Geo. G. Meade was severely wounded. Just after dark Gen. McCall wan into some Confederates in a road in a fine wood."What troops are these?" asked the general. "Gen. Fields?," was the answer."Gen. Field? I don't know him," returned the general."Quite likely, mister; he don't belong to your side!" In another moment Gen. McCall was a prisoner. His staff tried to ride away, but were fired on and Capt. Biddle, who was McCall's adjutant general, was killed.

The result of the battle of Glendale,--or Frayser's Farm, or by whatever name the battle may be called-- was favorable to the Union army. Longstreet and Hill failed to cut it in two. Its rear guard was safe and could keep on running to the James River, where the commanding general already was safe and snug under the protection of the gunboats. True, it had lost two good batteries and hundreds of good men; but its regiments had fought bravely, even desperately and gloriously, and much honor was theirs.

What did the First Minnesota have to do with the battle of Glendale? It heard all the firing and was nervously expectant throughout. The Regiment now had its fighting clothes on and was always ready. Its year of service had seasoned and experienced it and it was most effective. It s two fights at Fair Oaks and Savage's Station had tried it in the fire and it had come forth tempered for work.

About 5 o'clock in the afternoon, when the Regiment, with Sully's and Dana's Brigades, was lying at Brackett's keeping

back Jackson and Dan Hill, things were going badly with the Union forces that were contending with Longstreet and A. P. Hill. Gen. Sumner sent for Sully's and Dana's Brigades and directed that they march at quick time to the rescue. The march of a mile and a half was made in good time, a part of the way at the "double quick."

Arriving on the field, Sully's Brigade was put on the extreme right of Sedgwick's Division, in the rear of the center of McCall and Kearney's line, and almost directly behind Taylor's Brigade, of Franklin. The Confederate commands directly confronting were the brigades of Wilcox and Featherston. Heavy firing was in progress and the First Minnesota, exhausted by its long hot running, lay down to recover breath and to avoid the swarms of bullets passing over the heads of the men. They could not return the fire, for their comrades of Taylor's Brigade were between them and the enemy.

Finally the men were given a chance. A portion of Mc Call's line had been receiving the concentrated fire of Wilcox's Alabamians and Featherston's Mississippians, and being nearly out of ammunition was retiring. The men of Seymour's Pennsylvania Brigade were retreating in disorder and fast going to pieces. Col. Sully, who had remained on the field all day, tried hard to rally them. Gen. Sumner was raging around as mad as a hornet because Union soldiers were running from the enemy. Col. Sully encountered him and asked him."What can I do, General?" Instantly the old general answered:"Do? There'll be plenty for you to do in a minute, Colonel. I've sent for your Brigade and it's coming on the double quick, and it is near here now. I want you to put it into that gap and drive back the rebels. Leave your First Minnesota in reserve in case it is needed."

Then came the Minnesotians, the last in the line, and as soon as they had "recovered their wind," Gen. Dana took charge of them and led them forward to fill up the gap, saying to Gen. Sumner: "I will place my old regiment, General." As the men passed the old general he called out: "Boys, I may not see all of you again, but I know you will hold that line." (Lochren.)

And they did hold it. Luckily it was not a very hard job. Wilcox's and Featherston's men were about "all in," and Kearney and Hooker made a flank attack upon Longstreet and made him pause and order A. P. Hill, with a reserve, to the rescue. Very soon the firing slackened on their part, and then the Minnesotians ceased, and darkness closed the conflict. Gen. Longstreet, in "Battles and Leaders," p.401: "The battle was continued until we encountered succor from the corps of Generals Sumner and Heintzelman.***Finally McCall's Division was driven off, but fresh troops came in to their relief***We did not occupy all the field until we advanced in pursuit the next day."

Leeson Robert M. Leeson, of Company F, Red Wing, was the only man in the Regiment Killed outright at Glendale.

Only a few men of the First Minnesota were wounded, ~~at Glendale~~. Among them was Capt. Wm. Colville, of the Red Wing Company. He was shot in the left breast, and the wound was severe; but he was such a Spartan that according to Lochren he gave no sign of being hurt. He quietly turned over the command of his company to his senior lieutenant, saying he would be absent for a few minutes. Nobody knew he was hurt until the next morning, when he was heard from in the field hospital at Malvern Hill, whither he had walked, unaided, the evening before. Chas. W. Haskell, of Company C, St. Paul, was severely wounded and eventually died in the hospital.

So far as it was separately reported the Confederate loss at Glendale was 457 killed, 2,052 wounded, and 290 missing. The loss

in A. P. Hill's three brigades was aggregated for the Seven Day's battles--2,338. A reasonable estimate of their loss at Glendale cannot be made, but they were actively engaged.

In one important respect the battle of Glendale was a Union victory. Longstreet and Hill failed to cut the line of the retreating forces, to destroy their trains, or to bring general confusion upon them. They captured two Union batteries, but their loss in killed and wounded alone was the equal of the entire Union loss. That night and early the next morning Sumner's and Heintzelman's Corps and Franklin's single Division(Smith's) of his Corps, and all the trains passed on unmolested and in due time reached Malvern Hill.

Of course,as was his usual bent, Gen. Sumner did not want to run away from the victorious field at Glendale. In his report he says:

> At 9 P.M. I received intelligence that Gen. Franklin had retreated and that Gen. Heintzelman was going to do it. This of course compelled me to retire at once, which I would not have done without orders from the commanding general if these generals had not fallen back and entirely uncovered my right flank.

In his "History of the Second Army Corps,"p.79,Gen. Walker says:

> Any battlefield on which Gen. Sumner ever fought was endeared to him. The clearing at Nelson's Farm had become lovely in his eyes since Longstreet's troops had exchanged volleys across it with the men of the Second Corps. Like the disciple of old, he felt that it was good to be there. Nothing would have been more soothing to his sensibilities than the thought of getting up in the morning and fighting Longstreet and A. P. Hill over again, and engaging Magruder, Huger, and Stonewall Jackson in the bargain, for all of them would have been there.

But with only his 20,000 could he fight 65,000?

#285 = 302

THE BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL.

A description of the battle of Malvern Hill resembles that of one of the bloody encounters between the Greeks and Persians, many centuries ago, when the killing was nearly all on ~~one~~ the Persian side. Or perhaps it ~~is~~ more nearly ~~like~~ resembles one of the series of terrible conflicts which took place in front of Port Arthur, in 1904, during the war between Japan and Russia, ~~when~~ in which war the greatest and most terrible battles known to history were fought. In every assault on the outer walls of Port Arthur, the Japanese loss was far greater than that of the Russians.

When Gen. McClellan began his retreat from in front of Richmond, he directed Gen. Couch, of Keyes's Corps, and Gen. Fitz John Porter, then just across the Chickahominy from Gaines's Mill, to repair to the lower James and select a defensive point behind which the army could retire in safety to Harrison's Landing. The point selected by Gen. Pater was Malvern Hill. At nearly the same time Gen. Lee concluded that McClellan needed Malvern Hill and had designs upon it, and the Confederate commander at once dispatched Gen. Holmes with 6,000 men to seize and occupy the Hill in advance of the Union forces.

McClellan himself galloped ahead of everybody to Harrison's Landing and went aboard a gunboat, leaving his generals in charge of all field movements.

The advance of Gen. Porter's command did not reach Turkey Creek, just below Malvern Hill, until 9 o'clock on the morning of the 30th. At 3 o'clock that day the battle of Glendale commenced, and McCall's Division, of Porter's Corps, which had been left to defend the valuable cross roads, bore the brunt of the fighting and the loss. Porter was up in good time, but had not much to spare.

At 11 o'clock Gen. Holmes came up. He might have taken the Hill then, for only 1,500 Union troops were upon it; but he hung around until 3 o'clock, when he attacked Warren's Brigade and

the 11th U. S., in all 1,500 men, with 30 pieces of artillery. The latter were under Col. Hunt, chief of artillery, who had not attempted to mask them but had placed them where Gen. Holmes did not see them. Gen. Dan Hill says (Batts. and Leads.) that Holmes attacked because he was informed that the Federal army was passing over Malvern Hill in a "demoralized condition." He opened upon the supposed fugitives with six pieces of artillery. Right speedily was he undeceived about the demoralization of that part of the Army of the Potomac. Hunt's 30 pieces thundered a reply. Holmes's entire force went into confusion and retreated up the James River road, leaving two of their cannon and all of the caissons. This was the action of Turkey Bridge or Malvern Cliff.

Gen. Porter was an accomplished engineer, and his selection of Malvern Hill as a defensive position has always been approved by both Union and Confederate commanders. Gen. Lee knew the character of the position, and, as has been said, sent a force to keep the Union troops away from it. Porter now put upon and around the hill, at points where they would do the most good, the three Divisions of his own Corps, McCall's(now commanded by Gen. Seymour) Morell's, and Sykes's, Hunt's 100 pieces of reserve artillery, including Tyler's Connecticut siege guns; and also Couch's Division, which was sent two miles below to Haxall's, on the James. At dark, however, Couch was sent back to Glendale, seven miles, to reenforce the retiring troops under Sumner and Franklin. At 2 o'clock on the morning of July 1 Couch returned to Malvern Hill and later was given charge of the Union firing line. McCall's Division was in reserve in front of the Malvern House.

Malvern Hill was named for the estate to which it belonged.

The Malvern House(or simply Malvern) was a story-and-a-half dwelling erected in Colonial times. It was built of imported English brick of a dark but vivid red. A frame addition on the west end of the building was placed in about 1820. The house is upon the crest of a hill facing south. North of the house for half a mile is the plateau called Malvern Hill. At the north end of this table land the hill dips down into a meadow or flat land. On the crest of this latter hill and part way down its north side the Union batteries were placed. The infantry was partly behind them and partly between them. Back, just north of the Malvern House, were the ten big Connecticut siege guns. The Confeder tes assaulted the Union position at the north end, coming over the meadow, the wheat fields, and the flat lands and trying to climb the hills where the batteries were.

At the extreme left of the Union battery line, just west of the Quaker road, was the Crew House; directly west from Crew's, just across the Quaker road, on the east side, was the West House. On the extreme right of the Union battery line was the house of J. W. Binford; half a mile south was the house of his brother, G. Binford.

On the morning of July 1 came Sumner's two and Heintzelman's two Divisions and went into position in the rear of Porter's battle line. The line was being formed as the First Minnesota came up to Turkey Creek. The position of Sully's Brigade and that of the Regiment was changed several times. At first it was well up to the front and near the center of the Union line, when the enemy was shelling the position--"feeling it," is the expression. This was about 10 o'clock. The shells burst well over the Brigade and the

fragments wounded a few of the men. At noon Sully's Brigade was moved to the rear and marched some distance to the right of the Malvern plateau, to the right-rear of the battle line and of Smith's Division. The Minnesota station was in G. Binford's oatfield and northeast of his house.

The advance of the Confederate army came up on the Quaker or Willis Church Road, and also on the Richmond branch of the Long Bridge road, at about 9:30 o'clock. After reconnoitering the field Gen. Lee determined at once to attack. He had but little doubt of success. He knew that McClellan was badly demoralized and he thought his army was as badly off as its commander. He had nothing but contempt for his enemies. So confident was he of success that he kept the greater part of Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's commands back on the Richmond road and they took little part in the fight.*

Gen. Dan Hill gave him a description of Malvern Hill as related to him by a citizen of the neighborhood, a Mr. Allen, and said: "If McClellan is there in force, we had better let him alone." But Gen. Longstreet, who was present, laughed and said:"O, don't get scared, now that we have got him whipped."

The Union position was held by Porter's two Divisions, Morell's and Sykes's, on the left or west; then came Couch's Division, three brigades; then Kearney's Division to the right rear of Couch's, and Hooker's to the right of Kearney's. Back or to the south of the last two Divisions, which constituted Heintzelman's

*"It was his belief in the demoralization of the Federal army that made our leader risk the attack."--D.H.Hill,in Batts. and Leads.

Corps, were Sumner's two, Sedgwick's and Richardson's, and to the right and rear of Sumner were Franklin's two, Smith's and Slocum's.

The fighting was done by Morell's, Sykes's, and Couch's Divisions; Meagher's Irish Brigade and Caldwell's, of Richardson's, and Sickles's of Hooker's, and the artillery.

The Confederates cannonaded the Union position for a time and late in the afternoon assaulted. The assault was bravely made by Stonewall Jackson's command, and by D. H. Hill's, Magruder's, and Huger's Divisions. It was a horribly bloody failure. The Union artillery blew the assaulting lines to pieces at a distance, and when they came closer the Union infantry shot the pieces to fragments. The Confederates estimated their loss at fully 6,000. Gen. Longstreet writes: "We were repulsed at all points with fearful slaughter, losing 6,000 men and accomplishing nothing."(Batts. and Leads.)

The Union loss was never definitely ascertained. From partial reports it was estimated to be about 1,500 in killed, wounded, and missing. Gen. Lee made the mistake that he repeated at Gettysburg and that Burnside made at Fredericksburg in attacking a naturally difficult position which is amply and well defended.

The victory was Fitz John Porter's. He placed his men and guns and commanded generally in the fight; his lieutenant, Gen. Couch, took charge of the firing line. He rode among the men who were lying in reserve behind the front lines and were getting killed and wounded without being able to fire a shot, and he encouraged them to hold on a little longer. He even rode among the batteries when they were working. Bullets passed through his clothes but he was unhit. Before the fight began Sumner conferred

with him and just as it commenced brought up Caldwell's Brigade saying to Porter: "You may need it; and there are more where it came from."

Later in the fight, when it seemed that his extreme left under Morell, near the Crew house, would be driven back, Porter asked Sumner for another brigade, and the "Old Bull" sent him Meagher's Irish, who went up at a double quick. While riding rapidly to meet them and show them where to go, Gen. Porter's horse was wounded, stumbled, and fell, throwing its rider over its head. Those who saw the fall thought the general was killed, and great was the cheering when he rose and waved his cap.

Mounting the horse of an orderly, this handsome, black-bearded typical leader placed himself at the head of Meagher's Brigade and led it rapidly to the Crew house. ~~Arriving~~ When it arrived at the critical place Gen. Dan Butterfield, whose brigade was sore beset, ran out and grasped the green flag of the Sixty-Ninth New York and insisted on being its color bearer in the fight.(Meagher's report.)

Finding that Griffin and Butterfield had at last checked the enemy, Gen. Porter took the Irish Brigade and charged into the Confederate lines. Before starting he tore up his diary and dispatch book, lest he and they be captured--and this hasty action he long lamented. Fifty yards away the Brigade halted and received a terrific volley. It returned one of equal destructiveness. In a few minutes the Sixty-Ninth and Eighty-Eighth New York charged again, broke up Semmes's Brigade, captured Lieut-Col. Waggaman, of the Tenth Louisiana, and a lot of his men, and drove the rest of the Brigade clear away. Meagher then held his position till midnight,

a quarter of a mile ahead of the Union line, as the maps of the battle show.

Old Gen. Sumner had to "butt in" when Meagher was advancing. He was present, too, when the Irish Brigade entered the fight. In his report Gen. Meagher says:

> A few minutes previous to our entering upon the immediate scene of action, my brigade had the good fortune to meet you, General, accompanied by your staff, and you will permit me to say that your presence and directions were such as to increase the ardor and render still more efficient the men of my regiments.

O, then for more generals like Sumner and Porter!

The Confederates were wont to attribute the success of the Union defense at Malvern Hill to the co-operation of the gunboats in the James river, only two miles away. The truth is the gunboats did more harm to the Union side than good. At the crisis of affairs on the Union left, when Meagher and Sickles were sent for, the gunboats--with the good intent of aiding Gen. Porter, no doubt--opened fire on Malvern Hill. But their shot all landed among or close to Tyler's big guns near the Malvern House, killing and wounding some of Tyler's men. Probably the guns of the boats could not throw their projectiles farther, or the gunners may have thought Tyler's guns were the enemy's. At any rate the signal men dispatched the boats: "For God's sake stop firing," or there is no telling the damage they would have done. The large projectiles, which the Confederates called "lamp posts," and of which they complained, must have been thrown by Col. Tyler's heavy guns.

After the battle had ended so disastrously for the Confederates, Gen. Porter, Gen. Sumner, and Gen. Couch wanted to hold the ground and not run any farther. By Col. Colburn of McClellan's staff, Gen. Porter sent word to Gen. McClellan saying that he hoped the withdrawal of the army had ended, and that it

should hold Malvern Hill for a few days and then advance upon the enemy.(Batts. and Leads.) But an hour after sending this brave message, Porter received an order from McClellan to withdraw his own Corps and to tell Sumner and Heintzelman to withdraw theirs, and to direct Couch to retire his Division and all move south to Harrison's Landing. The order contained this remarkable direction: "In case you should find great difficulty in moving your artillery, you are to spike the guns and destroy the carriages." In his report Gen. Couch says:"Both armies retreated; the one because it was beaten, and the other because it was a part of the plans of our general."

Harrison's Landing was only eight miles from Malvern and the Confederates had retired some miles to the northward; they were ~~xxxx~~ astonished when the scouts of Stuart's Cavalry brought word that the Federals had run away. Yet McClellan deliberately abandoned his dead and wounded and a quantity of stores and hurried his uninjured men to the "new base." The Confederates came back to the battlefield,gathered up prisoners, arms, and other spoil, and Lee followed McClellan to within sight of his new position.

Gen. Dan Hill says they found on the battle-field evidences of Union demoralization instead of warranted pride and jubilation: "Wagons and ambulances were abandoned; knapsacks, cartridge boxes, rifles, and suits of clothing by the thousand were thrown away by the Federals. Col. Nance, 3d South Carolina, gathered 925 rifles in fine condition that had been thrown away in the wheat field at Shirley, a farm between Malvern and Haxall's." It seemed that whether Gen. McClellan's army either lost or won a battle, it was forced by the orders of its commander to retreat from the field and leave its dead and wounded. Peach Orchard,

Beaver Dam, Savage's Station, White Oak Swamp, Glendale, Malvern Cliff, and Malvern Hill were all Union victories, yet from every one, by McClellan's orders, the victorious force retreated. Fair Oaks was the only victory where it was allowed to keep the field. Gaines's Mill and Seven Pines were the only defeats.

It is but the truth, as history and official records contain it, that all of the battles of Gen. McClellan's Richmond campaign were fought, as he admitted, by his subordinate generals.* He was never present on a field while the battle was in progress. He never came on one after the fight was over except at Beaver Dam creek.

Gen. Joe Johnston was always to the front in his battles, and at last wounded in one. Gen. Lee was often on the firing line and his men had to order him back. Stonewall Jackson was killed under fire. So was Phil Kearney. Gen. Sumner was always in the mix-up, swinging his hat and shouting. Fitz John Porter liked to be under fire. Gen. McClellan never heard a bullet whistle in all his Richmond campaign!

All during the lightnings and thunders of that fearful death storm at Malvern Hill the First Minnesota lay in Binford's oatfield. Though the men were quite out of danger, they were

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*In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War Gen. McClellan was frank and clear on this point. When asked, "Did you yourself direct the movements of the troops, or were they directed by the Corps commanders?" his answer was: "I had given general orders for the movements of the troops, but the fighting was done under the direct orders of the Corps commanders."--Rep. Cond. War, Part 1, p.436.)

nervous and excited and expected every minute to be called into the fight. They were ready and willing to go, and fully expected to be called upon. They were doing their duty faithfully, for "they also serve who stand and wait."

Sedgwick's Division was on the extreme right of the Union line. To this point Gen. McClellan rode up from Haxall's during the afternoon. Lochren says he came along the line in the afternoon,"infusing that enthusiasm which his presence always brought on a battle-field." It seems the men always gave McClellan credit for fixing things, when he seldom fixed anything. He never arranged a battle. He never set a squadron in a field nor posted a battery. Malvern Hill was the only battle-field of the campaign where he ever showed himself during a battle, and on this occasion he was a mile from real danger. His presence at a battle was so rare that when he made his appearance, far in the rear, at Malvern Hill, it is no wonder that he "infused enthusiasm" and it might be believed that he caused intense excitement as well. Fitz John Porter planned Malvern Hill alone, and he and Gen. Couch fought it, aided by Sumner and Heintzelman. McClellan had no more to do with it than he had with Gaines's Mill.

Toward morning the ~~Regiment~~ First Minnesota was withdrawn and with the rest of Sedgwick's Division ascended to the Malvern plateau. Nobody there. Nobody anywhere on the field but the dead and wounded and their attendants. The rest had gone on to Harrison's Landing. The First Minnesota followed. It descended Malvern Hill down its steep face to the low ground along the James river. Then it set out to the southward over an indescribable roadway. Naturally it was a good road, but a drenching rain had been falling since midnight

and the preceding passage of so many troops, artillery, and wagons had reduced it to a great river of mud paste through which the men plunged and wallowed all the way to Harrison's Landing, the new base.

During the Seven Days' Battles from June 25 to July 1, both inclusive, the losses of the Union army, as reported and verified, and as they have been corroborated since the war, were 1,734 killed, 8,062 wounded, and 6,053 captured or missing; total, 15,849.

The Confederate loss, incomplete, with all cavalry reports and returns from several infantry commands lacking, but with all other returns carefully compiled by the best authorities was 3,286 killed, 15,909 wounded and 940 captured or missing; total, 20,135. The Confederates lost in killed and wounded nearly 20,000; the Unionists less than 10,000. In these enumerations the losses at the ^Twin battle of ^Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, for either side, are not included. Total Union loss at ^Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, 5,031. Confederate, 6,134; but these actions occurred long before the Seven Days' Battles began.

The strength of the Confederate army cannot be definitely stated. On the 20th of June, including the cavalry and the home guards at Richmond, it was reported at 64,762. Stonewall Jackson was reported to have added 16,000 men on the 26th, making the full strength 80,762.

The "present for duty" equipped force of Gen. McClellan's army June 20--not counting Gen. Dix's command at Fortress Monroe--was 1,511 engineers, 6,513 cavalry, 6,446 artillery, and 90,975 infantry, in all 105,445 men ready for duty.(See War Recs.,Vol.11, part 3, p.238.)

AT HARRISON'S LANDING.

During the night of July 1 and on July 2 a copious rain fell throughout the lower James region, and when the columns arrived at Harrison's Landing all the ground was well soaked. Sedgwick's Division encamped in a wheat field in which the wheat was yet standing. This field was near the old mansion house called Berkeley,(local pronunciation Barkly) the historic home of the Harrison family. The house was built by Benjamin Harrison, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, and here was born his son William Henry Harrison, afterwards President and grandfather of Benjamin Harrison, who also became President. The boat landing was named for Benj. Harrison, the first of the name. Gen. McClellan established his headquarters in Berkeley, a great and ample two-story brick, then more than a hundred years old. Harrison's Landing was, in a direct line, about twenty miles southeast of Richmond; bythe wagon roads it was farther.

The growing wheat was soon trampled into the soil, or cut and used as bedding to keep the men from the wet ground. Neither wood or boards were to be had, and the men were very uncomfortable and many became diseased. One thing lightened the gloom. The men had been without food for 24 hours, and the transports in the James landed plenty of good rations, which were speedily issued.

The rain continued all night and the flimsy wheat floors were soon fairly afloat in pools of water. The soil was so soft that it would not hold the tent pins, and in the morning many of the tents were down, exposing the men to the pelting rain when

already their beds were half sunk in the mud. At about 8 o'clock, while some of the men were yet asleep, and the others went growling and grumbling about, attempting to get some sort of a breakfast, the whole camp was startled by a sudden outburst of artillery fire, and shells came whistling over some of the Divisions. Jeb Stuart, the bold rebel raider, had slipped up and planted a howitzer of his battery(Pelham's) near Westover Church, across Herring Creek, which flowed north of Harrison's Landing. The howitzer banged away till 2 o'clock, when it had exhausted its ammunition and a Union battery was in position to knock it out. Stuart retired, taking with him 30 mules and 134 prisoners, stragglers, which were coming up towards camp from the rear.(McClellan's Stuart's Campaigns,p.83.)

At 7 o'clock on the evening of June 30, when the Union troops had won the battle of Glendale, Gen. McClellan telegraphed the War Department from Turkey Bridge:"Another day of desperate fighting. We are hard pressed by superior numbers. I fear I shall be forced to abandon my material to save my men under cover of the gunboats. I shall do my best to save the army. Send more gunboats." (War Recs;,Vol.11,part 3,p.280.)

On the morning of July 1, the day Malvern Hill was fought and won, he telegraphed:"I dread the result if we are attacked today. I now pray for time." (Ibid,p.282.) The same day he asked:"I need 50,000 more men and with them I will retrieve our fortunes." (Ibid,p.281.) On July 3, two days after Malvern Hill, he despatched the President the condition of his army, saying:"I doubt whether there are today more than 50,000 men with their colors." About this time Gen. R. B. Marcy, his father-in-law

(who was also his adjutant general) went to Washington and told the President that it was possible that Gen. McClellan would surrender his army to Lee "within two or three days."(Life of S.P.Chase, p.447; Nic. & Hay, Linc.,Vol.5,p.443.)

But July 5 Gen. McClellan admitted that he had 88,665 "with the colors," and said if he had 30,000 more men he would go back and take Richmond. A few days later he promised to do the job if 20,000 were sent him; at least he would "take the chance." A few days later, he succeeded in obtaining a half promise that Burnside's army would be sent him from North Carolina.

Gen. McClellan had a strong position at Harrison's Landing. It was elevated, well fortified, between two creeks; and Herring Creek, to the south and east, was a good ditch and breastwork in itself. The big deep James River was in front, well filled with gunboats and transports. Just above the mouth of Herring Creek was Westover, another fine old manor house, built by the Byrds before the ~~XVIII~~ 18th century. Fitz John Porter had his headquarters in the Westover House. Lee and his generals reconnoitered the position and concluded that they would not try to attack it.

The Army of the Potomac spent five rather uneventful weeks at Harrison's Landing, from the 2d of July forward. The Fourth of July was celebrated by a parade and review of the army and Gen. McClellan thanked the soldiers for their gallant and good conduct throughout the campaign which had just closed.

On the 8th President Lincoln visited the army at Harrison's Landing and spent some time in examining the situation for himself and in conference with McClellan. On the 9th he, with Gens. McClellan, Sumner, Sedgwick, and others, rode along the

lines reviewing the troops.

On the 22d Sumner's Corps was formally reviewed by Gen. McClellan, and the regiments in line carefully inspected. The next day Gen. Sumner, in orders, complimented the First Minnesota and the Nineteenth Massachusetts, of Dana's Brigade, as the two model regiments of the Corps.

On the 28th Gen. Lee sent Gen. Dan H. Hill down the west side of the James to reconnoiter Gen. McClellan's position at Harrison's Landing, across the river. As a result of his reconnoissance, Gen. Hill put French's Confederate Division, with 41 pieces of artillery, in position at Coggins's Point, opposite Harrison's, and at midnight on the 31st all these cannon opened on the Union shipping and McClellan's camp. In the darkness the cannonading awakened everybody and caused a lot of ridiculous fright and consternation to the soldiers among whom the shells fell. A few were wounded, still fewer killed, and some horses were killed. The shipping was not much hurt. The gunboats returned the fire and soon drove the Confederates away. Gen. French reported one man killed and three men wounded. The next morning Gen. McClellan sent a force across the river, occupied and fortified Coggins's Point, which he ought to have done weeks before, and thereafter was not troubled from that quarter.

From August 2 to the 8th reconnoissances were made by Hooker's Division, of the Third Corps, Sedgwick's, of the Second, and other commands to and beyond Malvern Hill. Emory's Cavalry went back to the White Oak Swamp and skirmished with Wade Hampton's troopers.

Monday, Aug. 5, Sedgwick's Division, including the First Minnesota, and Hooker's, Kearney's, and Birney's Divisions, with Emory's Cavalry, went up on a big reconnoissance. The next morning they were on Malvern Hill battle ground, and Lee sent down Longstreet's, McLaw's, Ripley's, and D. R. Jones's Divisions and Hampton's Cavalry to meet them. Gen. Lee at first thought McClellan was advancing on Richmond, but McClellan said he was only trying to ascertain whether or not the Confederates had left Richmond and gone north against Pope's new army. There was some skirmishing, with very slight damage to either side; unfortunately the Confederates captured a few prisoners, who informed Lee what Union divisions were present. Baker's First North Carolina Cavalry and Young's Georgia Legion skirmished on Malvern Hill, but the important work was done with artillery. McClellan xxxx said he was satisfied that Richmond was "not evacuated." Lochren gives this account:

> On August 4, our Division and some other infantry, with cavalry and artillery moved by a circuitous route to the rear of Malvern Hill and advanced to that field the next day over the same road as when coming from Glendale. The rebels, after brief resistance, were driven from the field and we bivouacked on that part of the battle-field where the severest fighting between Porter's and Magruder's forces had taken place. The pits where the dead had been buried in piles had sunk and bones were protruding. We now hoped that this movement was the beginning of a new advance on Richmond.

On the 11th of July Gen. Henry W. Halleck, then at Corinth, Miss., was placed in chief command of the armies of the United States and on the 23d, at Washington, assumed his authority. On the 25th Gen. Halleck too came to Harrison's Landing, saw the situation, talked with McClellan, and returned to Washington, "fully convinced," he said, that the Army of the Potomac had not

done, and under Gen. McClellan would not do, any good in front of Richmond, and that it should be brought away and its command given to another general.

Sickness broke out among the soldiers soon after their arrival at Harrison's Landing. The malaria of the Chickahominy swamps and the region about Richmond, and the malaria and miasm of the lower James, the midsummer heat, and the natural unhealthiness of army life, prostrated thousands. According to the report of Medical Director Letterman,(War Recs.,Vol.11,part 1,pp.210--220) about 6,000 sick were sent away soon after the army reached Harrison's Landing, leaving 12,795 other sick in camp. July 30 there were 12,000 on the sick list, but of these 2,000 could do light duty in a few days and might be returned to their regiments.

THE ARMY LEAVES HARRISON'S LANDING.

On the 3d of August Gen. Halleck telegraphed Gen. McClellan: "It is determined to withdraw your army from the Peninsula to Acquia Creek. You will take immediate measures to effect this, covering the movement the the best you can." Of course Gen. McClellan protested, asking for re-enforcements that he might take Richmond. He had told Halleck that he had contemplated a movement on the capital by way of Petersburg and the right bank of the James River--the line Grant eventually followed two years later. But the order was not revoked.

So away went McClellan's army from a field where it might have done most invaluable services and won the greatest and proudest glories, if its commander had been competent and capable. Striking across the country, the army got into the Williamsburg road, then passed down over Heintzelman's and Keyes's route of three months before to old historic Williamsburg. From Williamsburg back to Yorktown, and from Yorktown to Newport News and Fortress Monroe. Here ships were taken for Acquia Creek and Alexandria. The Fifth and Third Corps embarked August 20 and 21; the Sixth three days later, and the Second (the First Minnesota's Corps) and the Fourth (except Peck's Division) August 26.

Before evacuating Harrison's Landing Gen. McClellan copied Gen. Johnston's ruse when the latter evacuated Manassas Junction, and placed "Quaker guns" and dummy soldiers in the fortifications. The Confederates were not long deceived, however.

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There must have been one consoling thought to Gen. McClellan on leaving the lower James. For some time at least, he could sleep without being terrified by that horrible phantasm and nightmare of Gen. Lee with 200,000 well armed and ferocious Confederate soldiers at Richmond ready to set upon him!

Leave out

Gen. Pope's Ill-Fated Campaign.

Just before the commencement of Lee's onslaught on McClellan, the Union authorities at Washington gathered together the disjointed and badly wrecked commands of McDowell, Banks, and Fremont, which Stonewall Jackson had been handling in his usual rough manner, and consolidated them into what was called "the Army of Virginia." The command of the new army was given to Maj. Gen. John Pope, a West Pointer, a member of an aristocratic Kentucky family, who wore a No.6 boot, and of whom great things were expected.

Gen. Halleck had commanded Pope in the West and knew that he had captured 8,000 men at Island No.10 and chased the Confederates when they evacuated Corinth. Halleck, now General-in-chief of the army, could select whom he pleased to command the "Army of Virginia" and he picked out Gen. Pope, who was appointed June 26, the day before the battle of Gaines's Mill.

Over Gen. Pope's bombastic and nonsensical proclamations and promulgations when he assumed command, we may draw a veil; enough has been said about them.

About the middle of July Gen. Pope began to demonstrate against Richmond by an overland route, via Culpeper C. H. and Gordonsville. Knowing that there was no danger to be feared from McClellan, and that he could safely spare the men,

Gen. Lee sent Stonewall Jackson and Ewell with their commands up to Gordonsville. July 29, he sent up A. P. Hill with his Corps. Lee's army at Richmond was now so weak that McClellan, with his 80,000, could have gone from Harrison's Landing and in two days easily smashed it to pieces and captured Richmond itself.

On the 9th of August Stonewall Jackson and Banks fought the battle of Cedar Mountain, eight miles south of Culpeper, near the Rapidan. In this action Gen. Banks got the better of it, for after it was over Jackson retired several miles south to Gordonsville.

John S. Mosby, the noted Confederate partisan leader, had been a prisoner in the hands of the Union authorities for some time, but about the 1st of August, 1862, he, with other prisoners, was sent up the James River to City Point and exchanged. On the vessel he overheard the Union officers say that McClellan's army would soon be withdrawn from the James, taken to Washington and united with Pope's; that 20,000 men were to be brought up from North Carolina and South Carolina and joined with the consolidation, and that Burnside's fleet was to move to the Rappahannock. He hastened to Richmond and told his story to the authorities. It was soon in part, and finally fully, corroborated. Gen. Lee then prepared to withdraw his entire army, except a small garrison, and go to Gen. Jackson. It seemed to him that the best way to relieve Richmond from any danger of attack was to re-enforce Stonewall Jackson and then advance against Pope.

August 13 Gen. Lee, with Longstreet's Division, went to Gordonsville. On the 19th he issued an order for a general advance, with Longstreet in command of the right wing and Stonewall Jackson the left. Notwithstanding his declaration that there should be no more retreating, Pope withdrew to the Rappahannock. Lee advanced

to that stream. Pope was guarding the crossings very securely. Lee put Longstreet in front of them to attract Pope's attention and sent Jackson off on a turning movement towards Warrenton to get behind Pope's army and cut it off from Washington. Meanwhile Pope, imitating McClellan, was calling loudly for reenforcements, although his army outnumbered the Confederate at least 25 percent.

Pope discovered Jackson's "turning movement," and as Jackson went up the ~~north or~~ west bank of the Rappahannock Pope sent Sigel, Banks, and Reno up the ~~south or~~ east bank, and on the 24th these three Divisions encamped opposite Jackson's main command. But on the 25th Jackson struck out still further to the left and by marching his men half to death--a distance of 35 miles on a hot day--he crossed the upper Rappahannock, turned Pope's right and camped that night at Salem, midway between Manassas Gap and Thoroughfare Gap, the latter near the Bull Run battlefield. The Union troops had fallen away behind in this race. Look out, Gen. Pope!

On the 22d Jeb Stuart, with 1,500 cavalry, made a raid on Pope's rear. He captured Catlett's Station, on the Orange & Alexandria, in the night, took 300 prisoners, and burned their camp. In the darkness he did not burn the railroad bridge over Cedar Run, and did not know that Pope's big army train was there. Gen. Pope chanced then to have his headquarters at Catlett's instead of "in the saddle," and Stuart pillaged them, carrying off the General's official papers and his baggage. Fitz Hugh Lee came strutting out from Pope's quarters wearing the General's fine, velvet dressing gown, and a negro servant of one of the other raiders was dressed in one of Pope's resplendent uniforms!

Jackson turned eastward from Salem on the 26th and made another hard march, passing the Bull Run Mountains through Thoroughfare Gap, marching through Gainesville, and at sunset reaching Bristol Station, on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, about 35 miles south of Washington. He destroyed the station and sent Stuart, with his cavalry and a force of infantry, to Manassas Junction, seven miles nearer Washington. At the Junction Stuart took 8 cannons, several hundred prisoners, and immense supplies of Pope's quartermaster's and commissary stores, which the Confederates much appreciated. Lee had ordered Jackson to "throw his command between Washington City and the army of Gen. Pope and to break up his railroad communications with the Federal capital." Jackson had carried out his orders.

While Jackson was executing his flank movement, Lee brought up the rest of his army from Richmond. Jackson's march was duly reported every day to Gen. Pope, but he could not tell what it meant. He was absolutely bewildered by the wily Stonewall's movements and maneuvers. At last, on the 26th, he determined to fall back nearer to Washington, to keep Jackson from his rear; but while marching that day he learned that Jackson was already at Manassas Junction quite in the rear and had cut his railway communications with Washington!

Pope now had an opportunity to execute a great military movement and he tried it. Lee and Jackson, with the two wings of the Confederate army, were 35 miles apart, Lee to the south and west and Jackson to the north. Pope was between them, and his army largely outnumbered either wing and he was free to move on them separately and beat them in detail. This he tried to do, but failed. Lee had seemingly made a rash movement, but he and his generals had rightly estimated Pope and did not fear him. Lee said of him: "He does not appear to be aware of the situation."

Stonewall Jackson was at Manassas Junction and Gen. Pope sought to envelope and crush him there. Lee was coming up along the road over which Jackson had come, and McDowell, with 30,000 or 40,000 men, was dispatched to Thoroughfare Gap, the only route by which Lee could hope to come in order to unite his force with Jackson's. McDowell was sent up the night of the 27th to hold the Gap and keep back Lee. Gen. Pope with the main army was coming up the Orange & Alexandria with Hooker's Division, now up from Harrison's Landing. Kearney's Division, also of Heintzelman's Corps, was up, too, but it was sent in support of McDowell. On the morning of the 28th, Pope ordered Hooker, Kearney, and Reno to advance northward from Bristoe Station to Jackson's position at Manassas Junction. Look out, Stonewall!

But, horrors! That morning of the 28th Gen. Pope ordered McDowell to come back from Thoroughfare Gap and march south to Manassas Junction and help "bag" Jackson and his "whole crowd." A portion of the order read: "If you will march promptly and rapidly at the earliest dawn on Manassas Junction, we shall bag the whole crowd."

McDowell, of course obeyed the order, started southward toward Manassas and left the road to the north wide open for Jackson to march up, ~~giving McDowell the slip,~~ and join Lee as soon as the latter and Longstreet should come through Thoroughfare Gap, which event he knew would not long be deferred. At once Stonewall escaped from Manassas Junction, marched northward over the Bull Run battlefield some miles, by the Sudley Springs road, and went into line that night facing south, with his left at Sudley Springs and his right near Groveton, on the Warrenton Pike, west of the Bull Run battlefield. Here he waited for Lee and Longstreet to come up and join him, and they soon came.

Pope, with Hooker, Kearney, and Reno, came up to Manassas Junction and there was not a "reb" there! Pope then tried to recall McDowell from his march to Manassas and send him east to Centerville, and to Centerville he ordered Hooker, Kearney, Reno, and afterward Fitz John Porter. He soon had the generals and their commands all balled up, going hither and thither on the wrong roads, and everything was in confusion. Late that afternoon Gen. Rufus King's Division, of McDowell, marching toward Manassas, as it was ordered, marched athwart Jackson's position near Groveton, and Jackson at once dashed out, assaulted it viciously and badly worsted it, though King and his man fought well, and a Confederate Gen. Ewell had his leg shot off and a Confederate Gen. Taliaferro was badly wounded.

When dark came Gen. King kept on in obedience to his orders, to Manassas Junction, uncovering the Warrenton turnpike so that Jackson could withdraw over it, or Longstreet and Lee come up over it. That same night Gen. Ricketts withdrew from Thoroughfare Gap, leaving the way entirely clear for Lee and Longstreet to come through and by a fifteen-mile march unite with Jackson. Thus under his own management matters went on from bad to worse for Gen. Pope. Gen. Ricketts belonged to McDowell's Corps, which Pope had ordered to Manassas Junction. Ricketts thought the order included him, and so on the night of the 28th he left the Gap, and the next morning Lee and Longstreet came through it!

Every reader of war history knows what resulted, and it is painful and humiliating to tell the story. Lee and Jackson got Pope between them and August 29 and 30 totally and disastrously defeated him and drove his army in great confusion from the field. The battle, called the Second Battle of Bull Run and the Second Battle of

Manassas, was fought generally west and a little northwest of, and a part of it directly on, the first battlefield of the name. A great part of Pope's forces retreated to Centerville over the Warrenton pike and the Stone bridge, the old inglorious route of July 21, 1861. During the battle Pope had his headquarters on Buck Hill; again there were bloody contests on the Henry house plateau, and all about the Henry house; Ricketts, now a general, was stationed with his Division near the plateau where, thirteen months before, he had lost his battery and been wounded and captured; the Sudley Church was again used as a hospital, etc.

The losses of the Union army in the battles of August 29 and 30 at Second Bull Run are not separately reported. In all the combats from the Rappahannock to the Potomac, from August 5 to September 1, the casualties amounted to 1,747 killed, 8,452 wounded, and 4,263 captured and missing; total, 14,462. The total Confederate loss was reported at 1,553 killed, 7,812 wounded, and 109 missing, a grand total of 9,474. The loss in killed and wounded was about equal, but the Confederates captured more than 4,000 prisoners more than did the Union army. The strength of the respective armies cannot be precisely given; but from the best information available to both Confederate and Union tabulators it is estimated at from 49,000 to 54,000 Confederates and 63,000 to 70,000 Union troops under Pope.

Gen. Pope, a fugitive from the field, got to Centerville the night of August 30 and was then with the Corps of Franklin and Sumner. Here he remained during the whole of the 31st. But Lee was not satisfied with his victory and wanted more of it. He sent

Jackson by a wide detour to the right to Fairfax Court House, to intercept, if possible, Pope's retreat to Washington. Fortunately a heavy storm commenced on the 31st (for always after a big battle there was a heavy storm) and continued during September 1, so that Jackson's march was retarded and Pope had time to fall back to positions covering Fairfax C.H. and Germantown.

On the evening of Sept. 1 Jackson struck Pope's right at Ox Hill, near Germantown. The attack fell on Reno's Ninth, Hooker's and Kearney's Divisions of Heintzelman's Third, and a part of Franklin's Sixth Corps. In the end, Jackson was checked, but Gen. Isaac I. Stevens, of Reno's Corps, was killed, and in reconnoitering a br-ak in his line gallant Phil Kearney rode into the enemy's lines and in endeavoring to escape was killed. He was brave to a fault and the Union cause never lost a stauncher supporter nor the army a knightlier soldier. He fell near the hamlet of Chantilly three miles north of Centerville.

On the following day, September 2, the army was, by order of Gen. Halleck, drawn back within the lines of Washington and Lee and Jackson, abandoning further efforts in that direction, began to look about for other and fairer fields.

Gen. Pope took the first opportunity on his return to Washington to vacate his command. His "Army of Virginia" passed out of existence and its Corps were united with the Army of the Potomac. Gen. Pope was sent to the Northwest to put down the great Sioux Indian uprising in Minnesota. He never took the field, but finally made his headquarters at Milwaukee and conducted the campaign by letter writing. Gen. Sibley and the Minnesota volunteers put down the Indians and drove them from the State, while Gen. Pope claimed credit for having managed the campaign.

Gen. Pope tried to escape the responsibility for his crushing and somewhat ignominious defeat at the Second Bull Run by throwing it upon that true, courageous, and ever faithful soldier, Gen. Fitz John Porter, the hero of Beaver Dam Creek, Gaines's Mill, and Malvern Hill. Gen. Pope charged that Gen. Porter failed to obey the orders given him to attack the enemy's (Jackson's) right flank and rear at 4:30 in the afternoon of the 29th, and that he had not obeyed a previous order to march at a certain time. But Porter claimed that had he obeyed the order to attack with his 9,000 men he would have gone against Longstreet, who had 30,000, and not against Jackson's right flank. Pope was Halleck's and Stanton's favorite and they backed him up in his infamous charges against Porter, because they claimed there was a conspiracy among all the generals of the Army of the Potomac to discredit Pope, and that Porter's disobedience, which caused the loss of a great battle and imperiled Washington City was a part of this conspiracy! Ridiculous and unjust as this charge was, a military commission, convened by Halleck and Stanton and perhaps "ordered to convict," believed it and found this loyal, heroic, and most serviceable Union commander guilty of disobedience and sentenced him to be cashiered and dismissed from the army. In 1878, fully 16 years afterward, by the influence of Gen. Grant and Sherman, another commission consisting of Gens. Schofield, Terry, and Getty, who were appointed by President Hayes, reversed the judgment of the war-time commission. Gen. Porter was fully exonerated and finally restored to his old position of colonel in the regular army. This was an act of justice too long delayed, because this noble and patriotic ~~soldier~~ officer had long been considered entirely innocent by an overwhelming majority of the American people, and one of their most deserving soldiers as well.

THE FIRST MINNESOTA AFTER BULL RUN.

As fast as the first two Corps of the Army of the Potomac reached Washington they were pushed out to Gen. Pope and placed under his command. Reynolds's Division, of McCall's Corps, joined him at Rappahannock Station as early as August 23, and Heintzelman's Third and Fitz John Porter's Fifth were at Warrenton Junction on the 26th and 27th. McClellan himself was retained at Washington with no other duties than to dispatch his troops to Pope.

Sumner's Second and Franklin's Sixth Corps arrived at Alexandria on the 27th and 28th. Sedgwick's Division of the Second, with the First Minnesota, arrived on the morning of the 28th and marched out about three miles in the direction of Fairfax Court House. Franklin's Corps was soon up, and both Sumner and Franklin ought to have been rushed out to Bull Run battlefield to help Gen. Pope.

Judge Lochren, in his historical sketch, blames Gen. Halleck for keeping Sumner and Franklin from the field; but this is a mistake. Gen. McClellan had charge of the dispatching of his troops to Gen. Pope. Gen. Halleck ordered McClellan on the 27th, to send out Franklin to Manassas "by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions", and that he should move "as soon as possible." McClellan answered that he had given Franklin orders to "prepare to march." Later in the afternoon he questioned whether Washington were safe and indicated his belief that Franklin ought not to go to Bull Run at all. Late in the evening he recommneded positively to Halleck that "the troops in hand be held for the defense of the Capital." (War Recs., Vol.11, part 1, pp.94-5-6-7;)

Early on the 28th Halleck telegraphed from Washington to

McClellan, who was at Alexandria, an order to Franklin to move toward Manassas "immediately;" but at 1 o'clock McClellan replied: "The moment Franklin can be started with a reasonable amount of artillery he shall go." (War Recs.,Vol.12,part 3, p.707.) At 4:10 that afternoon he telegraphed Halleck: "We are not yet in condition to move; maybe by tomorrow morning." (War Recs.,Vol.11, part 1, p.97.) At 3:30 that afternoon Halleck had telegraphed: "Not a moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible towards Manassas so as to communicate with Pope before the enemy is re-enforced." After an hour or so McClellan answered:"Your dispatch received. Neither Franklin's nor Sumner's Corps is in condition to move and fight a battle now. It would be a sacrifice to send them out now." (War Recs., Vol. 12, part 3, p.709.) The records show that Halleck was not to blame for the delay in sending either of the two Corps to the front. Franklin finally started late on the 29th, but when he got to Centerville the battle had been fought and lost.

Gen. Sumner was indignant at McClellan's dispatch that his (Sumner's) Corps was not in condition to move and fight. In his testimony on this point before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, he said:"If I had been ordered to advance right on, from Alexandria to the Little River turnpike, I should have been in that Second Bull Run battle with my whole force."

Gen. Sumner was made to waste 48 hours in camp at Alexandria and in a fruitless march. On the 29th, when Pope was having it hot and heavy, Sedgwick's Division marched back through Alexandria to the Washington aqueduct, and then to the Chain Bridge, over the Potomac. On the 30th, as if it were threading the mazes of a Virginia reel, it marched forward again, and then went to within six miles of Fairfax Court House. The next day it went to

Centerville and met the stragglers from Second Bull Run.

Gen. Franklin arrived near the battlefield east of Bull Run at 6 o'clock on the evening of the 30th. The road was filled with fleeing men, artillery, and wagons, as it had been after the first battle, and all were rushing along in a panic. He threw a line across the road and attempted to stop and form the stragglers, but it was impossible. He said the number accumulated to over 7,000 in half an hour and was still increasing. Then he moved back to Centerville.(War Recs.,Vol. 12, part 2,p.536.)

Monday, September 1, when Pope's army was retreating from Centerville to Washington, Sumner's Corps was placed in the rear to cover the retreat. The First Minnesota was the extreme rear guard of that division of the retreating force which was retiring to Washington by way of Vienna. Now, Vienna is 15 miles west of Washington, six miles north of Fairfax Court House, and ten miles northeast of Centerville. It was not the nearest road to Washington but was followed to protect the left flank of the Union army.

The First Minnesota followed the army after dark and through the thick, sticky mud. The march was made through the night, and so slow was the progress that at daylight the command had not proceeded but about four miles and was near Chantilly,(only three miles north of Centerville) where the battle had been fought and where Kearney and Stevens had fallen the preceding evening. Gen. Stevens was well known ~~in~~ to early Minnesotans. He surveyed the first route of the Northern Pacific and spent considerable time in St. Paul, St. Cloud, and other points in the State. The county of Stevens was named in his honor.

The regiment spent Tuesday, Sept.2, with other troops, in camp near Chantilly. A cold rain had fallen the previous Sunday, while the battle was in progress, and the roads were simply terrible. But all the same the main part of the army marched away for Washington and with it went such of the First Minnesota as were unable for duty. Lochren says the Regiment was now reduced to 300 men. Two pieces of Tompkin's Battery, A, First Rhode Island, constituted the artillery of the rear guard.

Stuart's cavalry was hovering about the position and riding over the country generally. Detachments of these troopers, from Hampton's Brigade, swarmed about the position, firing at long range. Near sunset Hampton drove in the Minnesota pickets. The position was an exposed one, with nobody to defend it but the First Regiment and the two Rhode Island cannon. Col. Sully retired the command some distance to the cover of a wood, where he took another position and threw out a strong line of skirmishers.

Hampton's cavalry followed and went into line in front of the wood. Pelham's Battery--the Stuart Horse Artillery--came into position and opened with grape and canister. It was now dark and Col. Sully realized that he was in danger. He directed the Rhode Island Artillery section to retreat as noiselessly as possible to a locality called Flint Hill, half a mile to the rear, and there take position in the road. Holding back the enemy until he thought the guns were in battery, the Colonel directed the men to break ranks and run as fast as they could until they reached them, and then reform, with the guns as a center.

In the darkness this movement was executed with celerity and in silence. The guns were planted in the middle of the road, near the crest of Flint Hill, and the wings of the Regiment were on either

side, thrown forward like the letter V, with the opening towards the enemy, so as to partly envelop the troopers when they came up. In a little time the Confederates approached. Let Lochren complete the story:

> Silently we waited, but not long, for the rebel cavalry and artillery, finding the road clear, hurried on in pursuit, not discovering us until the advance was nearly at the muzzles of the two guns. Sully's challenge, "Who comes there?" and the surprised response, "Who the devil are you?" and a pistol shot from the rebel leader directed at Sully brought a volley of canister from the two pieces and musketry from the First Minnesota, which must have done fearful execution, judging from the cries, groans, curses, and commands, as those who were able dashed madly to the rear, hastened by a second volley from the guns and the Regiment, and during that night they troubled us no more.

Leave out

In this affair Lochren reports that the First Minnesota had five men seriously wounded, among them Lieut. Charles Zierenberg, of Company A, one of the St. Paul companies. He died of his wounds in the Georgetown Hospital on the 13th, or ten days later. Another of the wounded was Reuben M. Mayo, of Company E, whose thigh was shattered and broken by a bullet which afterward worked out through the lower part of his leg. Edward C. Hoff, Company A, died Oct. 14 of wounds received in this affair. Wm. Strasinger, Company D, was discharged for wounds received here.

Having repulsed the Confederate pursuit, the Regiment resumed its march, and at this time it was a considerable distance behind the other troops. Near Vienna it met the Nineteenth Massachusetts, of Dana's Brigade, which had heard the firing at Flint Hill and was hastening back to help, good regiment that it was. Learning that the danger was over, it turned about, and the two regiments began again the march toward Washington.

Having passed through the little village of Vienna--now(1912) a railroad station of 300 inhabitants--the two regiments were jogging along in the darkness, when suddenly there came a

cavalry charge from the rear.* It struck the Nineteenth Massachusetts first and that regiment sprang to the sides of the road, both receiving and returning shots. When the troopers struck the Minnesotians, the latter did as the Massachusetts men--fell away to the sides of the road. Lochren says the Regiment lost two men killed and "seven more" wounded--that is, seven wounded in addition to those struck at Flint Hill. This action was another of the blunders during the Second Bull Run campaign. ~~The charge was made by a detachment of New York Cavalry who were scouting about the country and thought the two Union regiments constituted a Confederate force~~.

No official report was ever made of the services of the First Minnesota in guarding the rear of Pope's retreating army, nor of the skirmish at Flint Hill, nor of the affair with the New York Cavalry near Vienna. Neither Col. Sully or Gen. Gorman ever put either of these incidents upon record. The only particular description of them, or either of them, by Union participants has been made many years afterward and based upon the treacherous memories of men after so long a lapse of time. On the Confederate side, Gen. "Jeb" Stuart reported the Flint Hill affair, but not until in February, 1864.

It seems quite probable that the command that made the blundering charge on the Massachusetts regiment and the First Minnesota was the Ninth New York Cavalry, then commanded by Maj. Chas. McLean Knox. This regiment was in the neighborhood assisting in guarding the Union retreat. Maj. Knox reported (War Recs.,Vol.12, part 2,p.275) that he had an affair with "the enemy" which occurred

*Lochren says the charge came "from the front."

on the date and in the locality of xxx an "incomplete railroad," the Loudoun & Hampshire, when the night charge was made. Col. Beardsley, of the Ninth, then commanding the cavalry brigade, corroborates Maj. Knox,(ibid p.272) apparently, but not distinctly and clearly. He says that in the engagement "at midnight" in the "thick wood at the cross roads" north and east of Vienna, his cavalry had "several" killed and 20 wounded.

The portion of "Jeb" Stuart's report (ibid p.744) relating to the skirmish at Flint Hill reads:

> The next day, Sept. 2, the enemy having retired, Fairfax Court House was occupied by Fitz Hugh Lee's Brigade, and I sent Hampton's Brigade to attack the enemy at Flint Hill. Getting several pieces of the Stuart Horse Artillery in position, Gen. Hampton opened on the enemy at that point, and our sharpshooters advancing about the same time, the enemy hastily retired after a brief engagement. They were immediately pursued and Capt. Pelham, having chosen a new position, again opened upon them with telling effect, scattering them in every direction. They were pursued by Hampton's Brigade, which took a few prisoners [?] but owing to the darkness, and the fact that the enemy had opened fire upon us with infantry and artillery from the woods, he considered it prudent to retire, which was done with the loss of only one man. This proved to be the rear guard of Sumner's column retreating toward Vienna, and I afterwards learned that they were thrown into considerable confusion by this attack of Gen. Hampton.

Capt. W. F. Russell's Company of the Second Minnesota Sharpshooters--known as Company L, First Minnesota--had been xxxxxxxxxx attached to the Regiment since Fair Oaks, and was present at Flint Hill. In the affair with the New York Cavalry, Capt. Russell reported that Lawrence White, of the Sharpshooters, was mortally wounded and "died later," and that Edward D. Rinhart had an eye shot out.

In a communication to the National Tribune, of Nov.26, 1908, Myron E. Billings, then of Calistoga, California, but who was a sergeant in the Sharpshooters and subsequently a lieutenant colonel of volunteers, described the operations of the First Minnesota near Vienna, Sept. 2, 1862, as he remembered them. In part he wrote:

After falling back to Fairfax Court House, the First Minnesota lay under the shade of the pines, on the west side of an old tobacco field, about half a mile north of Fairfax C. H., awaiting all day the advance of the rebels. About sundown the enemy came out of the pines from the west and formed a fine line of cavalry. They prepared to charge our brigade which, with two pieces of artillery and a squadron of New York Cavalry, brought up the rear guard, Gen. Gorman commanding the shole. The First Minnesota was next the rebels and in the center of the old field formed square to receive the onset, while the rest of the Brigade went on and laid an ambush for the rebels at Flint Hill, a short distance towards Washington.

The rebels saw that the Regiment was ready for them, and ran out a couple of mountain howitzers and commenced to shell the square.

Col. Billings goes on to describe a charge of the enemy's cavalry on the square occupied by the First Minnesota, and the Sharpshooters. This charge, he says, was repulsed and the enemy "left many men and horses on the ground around the square." Continuing, he describes the retirement of the Regiment across the field to the woods, marching by double files of four, substantially by platoons of 16. The enemy's shells burst over the men as they were retiring, knocking some of them down. Crossing a little creek, "orders were given to tear up the bridge, and we did it with a will."

Then we marched up the sunken road amid the timber and found the two pieces of artillery in the road at the top. Here Lieut. Col. Stephen Miller took command, placed one-half the Regiment on the west side of the road, and the other half on the east. Each half was instructed to be careful and not shoot across to where their comrades were crouched in the bushes. It was shispered to us that Col. Sully was going to act as an outpost down at the bridge, an and we were to notice carefully and wait until he rode up past the artillery and when he blew his whistle then to fire upon the rebels in the sunken road one volley and then retreat again.

Soon the dense mass of the advance guard of rebels came down the opposite hill, unlimbering two brass howitzers near the top, when Col. Sully called out: "Halt! Who comes there?" A rebel officer called back:"Come in here, Yank." Sully challenged again, then turned his gray mare up the road with the speed of the wind, rushed throught the artillery, followed by a shower of rebel bullets, blew his whistle, and such a volley was never delivered before. There was one single roar with our rifles and the two pieces of artillery. The rebels broke; their officers could not halt them, and they ran like rabbits over the hill, leaving their two howitzers.

Col. Billings further says that after repulsing the enemy on this occasion, the First Minnesota again ran off towards Washington, the artillery ahead. He says that by order of Lieut. Col. Miller he and Sergt. Evans Goodrich took some rat-tail files from their cartridge boxes and went back and spiked the enemy's abandoned howitzers; that they were chased by "all the mounted rebels there," and had narrow escapes.

We must have run for more than a mile, when we met Col. Miller with a company waiting for us. When the rebel horsemen again came up they were met with a volley which again sent them back, and again we ran to catch up with the Regiment.

Of the thundering charge of the careless New York cavalry, Col. Billings writes:

When we were again with the Regiment, Col. Sully ordered the major commanding the New York Cavalry squadron to fall behind and act as rear guard. Then came one of those mistakes, amid the darkness, which seldom happened in the army. We had crossed the Loudoun & Hampshire Railway, near Vienna Church, and were marching just as we had been, the regiment doubled together, so as to make the same eight files. We marched into one of those dense masses of pine grubs which grew up all over old tobacco fields. We occupied all the spaces between the bushes, which made a dense copse. We were not anticipating any more attacks, when with a wild yell a cavalry charge "en echelon," drove directly into our rear, scattering the men like chaff. Sabers whistled through the air, hewing down our men, who fell off the grade under the bushes on each side of the road and began to empty the saddles of the cavalry with great rapidity. Many bit the dust from saber strokes, pistol shots, and the Sharp's rifles. The earth was soon piled [?] with dead and wounded men and horses.

But the mistake was soon discovered and the New York major and Col. Miller both roared out: "Cease firing." Col. Sully came back and demanded of the major if he had seen no rebels to kill that he must kill his own friends. Sully, in terrific rage, ordered the major to be bound and thrown into an ambulance and told him he should suffer for his gross carelessness. In vain the major assured the colonel that he supposed he had been cut off by the advance guard of the rebels and had resolved to hew his way through. Sully would have none of it. I have never known the extent of damage done by this encounter. Neither have I any knowledge as to what was done with the New York major, if anything.

White, with whom I was locked arms in marching, was killed and fell on me. I fell onto the Captain and we arr rolled down into

Edward C. Hoff

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the bushes. Lieut. Zierenberg was shot and mortally wounded, and many another good soldier fell by the hands of his comrades. It was with sad hearts that we recommenced our retreat to Chain Bridge, over the Potomac, just opposite Tenallytown, D. C., a short distance above Washington.

According to Lochren's sketch the casualties in the Regiment that night of Sept. 1, in the affair with Hampton's cavalry near Fleet Hill were "five men seriously wounded, among them Lieut. Charles Zierenberg." Col. Billings says this officer was mortally wounded in the affair with the New York Cavalry. Lieut. Zierenberg was a resident of St. Paul and attached to Company A. He died of his wound in the Georgetown Hospital, September 13. It is difficult to tell from the records now available just what were the casualties in the First Minnesota that night of September 1 and early morning of September 2, and it seems impossible to determine in which of the two affairs they occurred.

Lochren says five men were wounded near Vienna in the fight with Hampton's cavalry, and "two men killed and seven more wounded" by the blunder of the New York Cavalry. This would make a loss of two killed and 12 wounded, 14 in all, that night. The nominal list available shows, however, that during that night in both affairs the Regiment lost one man killed outright — Wm. B. Winchell of Winona, Company K — three mortally wounded, Lieut Zierenberg, Company A, and Edward C. Hoff, Company D, Minneapolis. The wounded were John D. Whittemore, Company D, Warren Warner, Company K, Winona, discharged thereon; Reuben M. Mayo, Company C, Andrew Bayer and Almeron Davis, Company D, Red Wing. Total, 4 killed and mortally wounded, and five severely wounded. It is probable that more were wounded, but their names have not been found. Reuben M. Mayo, of the St. Anthony company, had his thigh broken and shattered by a bullet which afterward worked out through the lower part of his leg.

and Wm. Bladinger, Company F, Red Wing.

THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN.

On the 2d of September Gen. Halleck appointed Gen. McClellan to the "command of all the fortifications of Washington and of all the troops for the defense of the Capital." The same day, according to Gen. McClellan's statement,(Own Story,p.535) President Lincoln told McClellan that he considered Washington as lost, and asked him, as a personal favor, to "resume command and do the best that could be done." McClellan says he at once accepted and "staked his life" that he would save the city.

Pope had made such a mess of things that any change of commanders was welcomed. McClellan was a fine organizer, and an organizer was badly needed then to put 30,000 stragglers, deserters, and skulkers lying around Washington into line and lick all of the distracted commands into fighting shape again. McClellan was an inefficient commander, and Lincoln said he had "the slows awfully bad," but for the time being he was the best that could be had.* It would not do to appoint any one of the Corps commanders, for so many of them would feel cruelly slighted and resign in a huff and disorganize things. It would not do to appoint Bull Sumner, for he was nearing 70, and was disposed to do nothing but fight and make everybody else fight, ~~and he could not construe a Latin sentence~~

* Nicolay & Hay, who were Lincoln's private secretaries, say(N&c. & Hay's Linc.,Vol.6,p.21) that "the restoration of McClellan to command was Mr. Lincoln's own act; the majority of the cabinet were strongly opposed to it." The President's reasons, as recorded by John Hay,(ibid p.23) were: "There is no one in the army that can man these fortifications and lick these troops of ours into shape half as well as he can. If he can't fight himself, he excels in making others ready to fight."

~~or solve a problem in trigonometry to save his life.~~

Such a large proportion of the Army of the Potomac had been sent away to Pope and put under his command, that McClellan had been left with only two Corps, Sumner's and Franklin's, and these he was ordered to send out to guard Pope's retreat. Placing him in command of the defense of Washington was his only "restoration" to the leadership of his old army ever made of record. Thereafter he held command of the Army of the Potomac only, as it were, by tolerance and the rule of adverse possession, but the rule was ample in its scope.

The army was not in as bad a shape as Gen. Pope and others thought. At least, it was soon re-organized, and its morning returns showed on the 5th of September an aggregate present for duty at Washington of more than 100,000 men, plenty for two or three more "killings," like that of Second Bull Run.

The greater part of this army, with McClellan in command, was soon in pursuit of Lee. As he says, (War Recs., Vol.19, part 1, p.25) Gen. McClellan had been, on September 2, "verbally instructed by the President and General-in-chief (Halleck) to assume command of General Pope's troops (including my own Army of the Potomac) as soon as they approached the vicinity of Washington," etc. It was under this verbal authority that he led the forces in the field, and it was quite sufficient.

Everybody recognized his authority. It was nonsense for him to say, as he afterwards frequently did, that he commanded the army with his "head in a halter." September 7 he wrote to his wife: "I leave here this afternoon to take command of the troops in the field. The feeling of the Government towards me, I am sure, is kind and trusting." (Own Story, p.567.)

General Lee's ~~His~~ great victory over Pope had made ~~Gen. Lee~~ him very confident. He had learned to despise Pope and he never was afraid of McClellan. He thought he could pick his own ground for future operations, and he selected Maryland. It had long been the belief of the Confederate people that the Union authority over Maryland was a "despot's heel;" that the people were held in a military subjection which they were waiting to throw off; that they would rapturously welcome an invading Confederate force and join it by thousands.

This nonsense Gen. Lee honestly believed ~~(this nonsense)~~ and he declared his belief in a widely distributed proclamation. (See Cooke's Life of Lee, p.127; War Recs., Vol.19, part 2, p.601.) He also knew that if he marched his army into Maryland the movement would threaten Washington and Baltimore and force the Union commanders to withdraw all their forces from the south bank of the Potomac to follow him; and eventually he would draw them up into Southern Pennsylvania and allow a Confederate force to come from Southern and western Virginia and work its will on Washington City.

Between the 4th and 7th of September, Gen. Lee crossed his army over the Potomac, chiefly by the fords near Leesburg, and on the latter date he sat down at Frederick and began spreading his proclamations telling the people that he had come to "restore their liberties," and this he would speedily do if they would exchange all kinds of army supplies for Confederate shinplasters and enlist their able-bodied men in his ranks.

To the great and mortifying astonishment of Gen. Lee and Jeff Davis and every other Confederate that had been weeping over the "wrongs of down-trodden Maryland," the people of that State

did not receive ~~Lee's~~ the invaders with enthusiasm. They did not seem to have lost many "liberties," and they were apparently perfectly happy under the "yoke of the oppressor." They welcomed the Confederates with Union flags and marble hearts. Apparently the whole Frederick district was as loyal to the stars and stripes as old Vermont or "bleeding Kansas."

The Confederates simply couldn't understand it. Then they levied freely on the barns, stables, smoke-houses, pig pens, mills, stores, corn fields, orchards, and granaries of the people, cussed them for being condemned Yankees, and ~~wanted~~ longed to go back to "Ole Virginny," where they could get sympathy and love if not bread and meat.

But with all their foraging in Maryland, Lee's army started to leave the State a weary, ragged, hungry, and wretched crowd, yet hating the Yankees worse than ever, since they had learned that thousands of Marylanders, including many wealthy slave-owners, were radical Union men and many of them in the Union army.* Gen. Lee says his army, "lacked much of the material of war, was feeble in transportation, the troops poorly provided with clothing, and thousands of them destitute of shoes."

On the 10th, realizing that McClellan was behind him with a large army, Gen. Lee closed up his Maryland recruiting offices and moved from Frederick to Hagerstown. Stonewall Jackson started for Harper's Ferry, and Longstreet and Dan Hill crossed the South Mountain and moved towards Boonesborough. The soldiers were greatly dispirited at the turn in their affairs, and marched with hearts full of sadness and stomachs full of half ripe apples and green corn.

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*Maryland furnished to the Union army 46,638 ~~Union~~ soldiers who served one year or more, and perhaps 20,000 Confederates. The State also furnished several thousand Union Militia for home defense.

Whatever may have been his lack of real military ability and capacity, Gen. McClellan's re-appearance at the head of the army had a most beneficial effect upon it. Its morale immediately underwent an astonishing change for the better. His name had a magical effect upon the men, and every time he reviewed them, or even showed himself among them, they cheered him wildly. When Lincoln said sternly to him, "You must find and hurt the enemy now," (Nic. & Hay) Gen. McClellan was stirred to action as much by his confidence in his army as by his respect for the mandate of his chief.

As soon as it became known that Lee had crossed the Potomac and gone into the fine field of Maryland--

> Fair as a garden of the Lord
> To the eyes of the famished rebel horde--

Gen. McClellan was out and after him. The advance was made by five parallel roads, and the columns were so disposed as to cover both Washington and Baltimore; for the left flank rested on the Potomac and the right on the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. The right wing consisted of the First and Ninth Corps, under Gen. Burnside; the center, of the Second and Twelfth Corps, under Gen. Sumner; the left wing, of the Sixth Corps, under Gen. Franklin.

There had been a general reorganization of the Corps. The First--McDowell's old command--had been placed under Gen. Joe Hooker. The Ninth--of Gen. Burnside's old force--was under Gen. Reno. Sumner continued to command the Second, and also controlled the Twelfth--Banks's old command--which was under Gen. Mansfield. The Sixth was under Gen. Franklin and composed of the Divisions of "Baldy" (W.F.) Smith, Slocum, and Couch. Fitz John Porter's Fifth

Corps was left at Washington until Sept. 12, and joined the army at Antietam. When it set out from Washington the army had 85,000 men of all arms.

The Second and Twelfth Corps, under Gen. Sumner and Gen. A. S. Williams respectively, started Sept. 6 from Tenallytown, just outside of Washington, and the Second marched to Rockville, and thence by Middlebrook and Urbana to Frederick; the Twelfth moved by a lateral road between Urbana and New Market.

The Second Corps, now had three Divisions,--in order, Richardson's, Sedgwick's, and Gen. Wm. H. French's. The First Minnesota still belonged to Gorman's Brigade (the First) of Sedgwick's (Second) Division, and the Brigade was composed of the old time-tried and fire-tested regiments, the Minnesota First, the Massachusetts Fifteenth, and the New York Thirty-Fourth and Eighty-Second. At this time there also belonged to the Brigade two companies of sharpshooters, Capt. Russell's Second Minnesota and Capt. Saunders's First Massachusetts. The battery was Kirby's (I, First U. S.) now commanded by Lieut. Geo. A. Woodruff.

The van of McClellan's army, Hooker's Corps, entered Frederick (Sept.) 12, driving away Stuart's cavalry and receiving a hearty welcome at the hands and from the hearts of the people. The next day McClellan came. The Confederates had sent Jackson and McLaws to capture Harper's Ferry, 25 miles to the southwest, where Gen. Dixon Miles had 12,000 men; the rest of Lee's army was following after. Gen. Halleck would not allow Harper's Ferry to be evacuated, although Gen. McClellan assured him that it would be captured.

Lochren notes that at Frederick, Gen. McClellan received a telegram from Halleck cautioning him against "uncovering the Capital,"

and repeating the caution the next day. What Gen. Halleck really advised was that McClellan should, "keep more upon the Potomac, and press forward his left, so as more readily to relieve Harper's Ferry, the point then in most danger." Of course there was danger that if McClellan did not take care of his left flank the Confederates might move on Washington. (Com. on Cond. War, part 1, p.452.)

Lochren and others that make light of the Administration's concern for Washington City do not seem to realize what its capture would have meant. In addition to other important and really vital reasons, there was always during the war a danger of foreign intervention. England and France stood ready to recognize the Confederacy the moment it would seem to have the ~~best~~ better of the situation. If Washington had been captured, that condition would have appeared to warrant recognition on the part of the nations named. The Confederate agents in London and Paris were so informed by those who spoke by the card. Then the humiliation of having the capital of the country in the hands of the enemy! It was always in danger. Gen. Early came perilously near capturing it in the summer of 1864 with less than 10,000 men.

McClellan had proceeded but a few miles away from Washington when his old habit overcame him and he began to call for re-enforcements! We now know that at the time McClellan had at least 87,164 men, and that Lee had less than 50,000. But all the same McClellan begged first for Keyes's Corps, at Washington, and part of it was sent him. Then he begged for Fitz John Porter's Corps and all of it (17,000) was sent him. Then he sent back for the rest of Keyes's Corps! He said the capture of Washington by the

enemy "would not bear comparison with the ruin and disaster which would follow a defeat of this army." (War Recs.,Vol. 19, part 2, pp.254-55.) At this time he said Lee had 120,000 at Frederick, (ibid) when the Southern general had only a little more than 40,000; he claimed that nearly 10,000 of his army straggled and deserted on his Maryland campaign, many never to return.

The day McClellan reached Fredercik City a soldier of the 27th Indiana picked up in an abandoned Confederate camp a piece of paper wrapped about three cigars. The paper was found to be a genuine copy of Lee's orders of march to his generals, and dated September 9. Stonewall Jackson was to march westward by way of Sharpsburg; cross the Potomac and the Baltimore & Ohio near there, and go on ten miles to Martinsburg, which is 15 miles northwest of Harper's Ferry, and "intercept" such as may attempt to escape from Harper's Ferry." Longstreet was to move to Boonesborough, which is 20 miles nearly northwest of Frederick and 10 miles due north of Harper's Ferry. McLaws and R. H. Anderson were to go straight to Harper's Ferry and endeavor to capture the place, first occupying Maryland Heights. Walker's Division was to march to Loudoun Heights, opposite Harper's Ferry, and co-operate with McLaws and Jackson. Gen. D. H. Hill was to have command of his Division as the rear guard.

The paper which the soldier found, and had sense enough to see was important, was virtually a message from the God of Battles, which ~~virtually~~ delivered Lee's army into Gen. McClellan's hands. After he had read it, had he moved promptly, a battle between him and Lee would have been like a fight between a man with two good eyes and another man blindfolded.

The Union commander now knew, to his surprise, that Lee's army was far inferior in numbers to his own; that it was divided and somewhat scattered; that one great part was at Boonsborough and another great part west of Harper's Ferry, the two 20 miles apart. He had only to march swiftly between them to ruin both of them. He knew when and where Lee's trains, rear guard, and cavalry were to march, and when and where the detached commands were to join the main body. A skillful commander would have utterly destroyed the Confederates by piecemeal within ten days.

Gen. McClellan seemed to realize the importance of the paper the soldier found, for he telegraphed Lincoln: "I have all the plans of the rebels, and will catch them in their own trap, if my men are equal to the emergency." He always had an "if" in his propositions; if he failed now, he could blame the failure to his men, as not being "equal to the emergency."

But again McClellan threw another great opportunity away. His inherent affliction, which Lincoln called "the slows" again beset him, as it had at Washington, on the Peninsula, in front of Richmond, at Harrison's Landing--everywhere. The roads were good and the weather fine. Franklin with his Corps, which two weeks later had 22,568 men present for duty,(War Recs.,Vol.19,part 2, p.374) was at Buckeystown, 12 miles east of South Mountain, six miles south of Frederick City, and 20 miles east of Harper's Ferry.

Instead of ordering Franklin to march instantly and with all possible speed to Harper's Ferry, so as to save that place and isolate McLaws and Walker, making them easy subjects for capture, McClellan wrote at his leisure a long instruction to

Franklin directing him to march "tomorrow." Franklin would have to proceed by Crampton's Gap through the Blue Ridge, only five miles northeast of Harper's Ferry, and McClellan knew that there was not a ~~xxxx~~ rebel between Buckeystown and that Gap. On this ~~xxxxxxx~~ point Swinton, always an apologist for McClellan, says:

> If he had thrown forward his army with the vigor used by Jackson in his advance on Harper's Ferry, the passes of South Mountain would have been carried the evening of Sept. 13, at which time they were feebly guarded; and then, debouching into Pleasant Valley, he might next morning have fallen upon the rear of McLaws at Maryland Heights and relieved Harper's Ferry, which did not surrender until the 15th. But he did not arrive at South Mountain until the 14th, and by that time the Confederates had recalled a considerable force to dispute the passage.--Camps. Arm.Potomac, p.202.

A precious opportunity was neglected and it was noon of September 14, when Gen. Franklin, with his two Divisions of Slocum and Smith, stormed the crest of the mountain at Crampton's Gap and drove away Cobb's and Semmes's Brigades, of McLaws's, Mahone's Brigade of Anderson's Division, and two regiments of Stuart's Cavalry, which were guarding the pass. Franklin lost in killed and wounded 531; the Confederate loss, including 300 prisoners, was about 800, for Cobb alone lost 690 and Semmes 69.

The same date the Union right wing, commanded by Gen. Burnside, fought all day in what the Unionists call the battle of South Mountain, and the Confederates Boonsboro, although that village is three miles away, to the northeast. This was for the possession of Turner's and Fox's Gaps through the South Mountain division of the Blue Ridge Range. These Gaps were six miles north of Crampton's. Turner's Gap was as strong naturally as Thermopylae.

The mountain had precipitous sides, the passes were stoutly defended, and there was a great deal of hard fighting and many gallant deeds done that day.

On the Confederate side the fighting at first was done mainly by Dan H. Hill's Division with Colquett's and Garland's Brigades. Later his other two Brigades, Rodes's and Geo. B. Anderson's, became involved. In the afternoon Geo. T. Anderson's, Kemper's, Drayton's, and Jenkins's Brigade, of Longstreet's Division, joined the defenders. Longstreet's entire Corps had now come up and was in reserve.

On the Union side the fighting was by Gen. Jesse L. Reno's Ninth Corps, of four Divisions, until 3 P.M., when Hooker arrived and Meade's and Hatch's Divisions were sent in. With Hatch's Division was Capt. Chase's First Minnesota Sharpshooters, which received honorable mention as the first Union troops to "reach the top of the mountain." Gen. Burnside was in general command of the forces engaged.

At night the Union troops held the crest of the hill and the rest of the army was up and the next morning the Confederates had retreated! The Union loss was estimated at 1,500, killed and wounded with but few missing; among the killed was Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno; among the wounded was Col. R. B. Hayes, Twenty-Third Ohio, afterwards President. Gen. Samuel Garland, commanding brigade, was the principal Confederate killed. The total Confederate loss was estimated by the Union authorities at 2,000; ~~although Swinton puts it at 3,000, "where of 1,500 were prisoners."~~ The Confederates claim that it was only about 1,500 all told.

Gen. Reno was an old army officer(a native Virginian) and had served at Fort Snelling. In 1853-54 he surveyed the old "military road" from the mouth of the Big Sioux River to Mankato and Mendota, and this was the first regularly surveyed road through Southwestern Minnesota. He died in the arms of Gen. S. D. Sturgis, one of his Division Commanders, who died twenty years ago, in St. Paul, where he then resided.

Had Reno's attack at Turner's Gap been pushed vigorously in the morning, when Hill's Confederates numbered but 5,000 men, the pass would have been carried in time to relieve Harper's Ferry. But it was not fully occupied until Monday, the 15th, and at 9 o'clock that morning the bungled, bewildered, and cowardly "defense" of Harper's Ferry ceased by its surrender to the Confederates. The commander, Col. Dixon S. Miles, who was in command at Centerville during the battle of Bull Run, was mortally wounded after he had raised a white flag. An exploding shell tore all the flesh from the calf of his left leg and he was wounded in the other leg also. He died the next day at 4 P.M., aged 58. He was buried at Sweet Air, Md., his birthplace.

The surrender included 12,584 unwounded and 153 wounded prisoners, 47 pieces of artillery, and a large quantity of military stores. The Union loss in killed was 44. The Union prisoners were released on parole and went to Annapolis.

The First Minnesota left its camp near Frederick on the morning of September 14, and with Sedgwick's Division marched about 12 miles northeast, via Middletown, to the South Mountain at Turner's Gap. In the afternoon the Regiment came within earshot of the fighting at the Gaps. The sound of the guns at Turner's 02

Fox's, directly in front, became plainer and plainer as the men advanced, for the contending forces did not cease their striving until dark--and then did not, but only slackened it. At sunset the Regiment came up to the fighting ground and was at once pushed to the front up the mountain side to strengthen the Union force, though it needed no strengthening.

The battle was over, although there was picket firing nearly all night between the contending forces. The last Confederates did not get away until nearly daylight. Both Hill's and Longstreet's troops hurried to the westward to join Lee, near Sharpsburg, eight miles away.

Lee realized that he would have to fight and had picked his ground. All his outlying divisions were hurrying to it. Longstreet's and Hill's were coming from Turner's Gap; McLaws's and Anderson's were marching from Crampton's; Stonewall Jackson's were running up from Harper's Ferry, to be followed soon by the other brigades of McLaws and R. H. Anderson, with A. P. Hill's to come close upon their heels. And to think that at this time a proper degree of activity on the part of McClellan would have rendered all their efforts useless and in vain!

The muster place was the west side of Antietam Creek, a little stream which rises in the northern part of Washington county, Maryland, flows southward, "winds about and in and out" for eighteen miles, and finally falls into the Potomac seven miles or so up stream from Harper's Ferry. Southwest of the village of Sharpsburg, which is ~~two miles~~ a mile or so west of Antietam Creek and about the same distance east of the Potomac, was to be the field of glory.

Here the little creek's banks were steep and difficult of passage, and the Union troops must cross them to effect anything. There were from north to south four good stout stone bridges across it, and Lee did not tear them down. Any place on the upper portion of the stream could be easily crossed by infantry anyhow. The only bridge whose destruction would really be an impediment to crossing was No.4, the lowest one, exactly where the extreme Confederate right flank rested on Antietam Creek. Lee left this bridge for a death trap. The extreme of his left flank was the Potomac.

The Confederate line was on the east side of the Hagerstown turnpike, a good thoroughfare running north and south from Hagerstown to Sharpsburg, a distance of about twelve miles. The line was parallel with the road, and on the 15th was composed of about 10,000 men of Longstreet's Corps and 5,000 of D. H. Hill's Division, and extended for about a mile and a half. When all the Confederate forces were up, the line was strung out to nearly four miles. Except on the extreme right flank, where it touched Antietam Creek, it was from half a mile to two miles east of that stream. Stuart's three cavalry brigades were here and there.

The main line ran through copses and patches of woods; behind fences, some of them of stone; in the rear of corn fields, farms, and farm buildings, and over lands well strewn with large granite boulders, and altogether Lee's position constituted splendid fighting ground for a force on the defensive.

From Hagerstown down to Sharpsburg the country was the same. There were plenty of farms and they were fairly good ones. The soil was naturally not very productive but the owners kept their fields well fertilized and harvested good crops. A

great many of the people ~~were~~ belonged to the primitive German Baptist Church, the members of which are called Tunkers or Dunkers, or Dunkards. They resemble somewhat the Quakers. They do not go to war or to law, and they work industriously and live plainly, honestly, and at peace with all the world. A mile north of Sharpsburg, on the west side of the Hagerstown pike, the Dunkers had a church. It was a plain, modest, and unpretentious, like the people that worshipped in it. The walls were of brick and painted white. It had no steeple or belfry, for the Dunkers don't believe in such "vanities" on their churches. Many of the soldiers that saw it came away from the battlefield believing that it was a country school house, and a frame one at that.

The church stood on the land of Sanford Mumma, (pronounced Moo-maw) whose house was a little more than a quarter of a mile east of the church; the Mumma house was burned by D. H. Hill's troops at the beginning of the fight. Mr. Mumma gave the land for the site and was active in building the church. He was commonly called "Sant" Mumma, and this led to a somewhat ludicrous error. The Confederate generals Hood, Law, and some other commanders, hearing some of the country people call the building "Sant" Mumma's church, and knowing more about military matters than the Saints' Calendar, concluded that the little church, like many another, had been named for a canonized worthy; therefore, they corrected the pronunciation, and in their reports style it "Saint Mumma's" and "St. Mumma's Church."

On the morning of the 15th, leaving the burial parties and hospital attendants with their hands full of work at Turner's Gep, the First Minnesota, with its Brigade and Division, crossed

the South Mountain, and marched three miles northeast through Boonsborough, now a village of 700 people, then turned southwest and bivouacked that night between that village and Keedysville (present pop.520) which villages are about four miles apart. The next morning the Regiment marched early, still to the southwest, and in a few hours came to the vicinity of Lee's position across the Antietam.

Had McClellan been a general of action and judgment, he would on that 15th day of September moved swiftly forward and with his overwhelming force attacked the little army under Lee, and crushed it completely or whipped it to a frazzle. McClellan could have put 60,000 men into the fight--and then some--and Lee, with so many of his troops absent,(though hurrying up) did not have above 20,000. And the two armies only seven miles apart!

Gen. Lee's astonishing audacity in determining to stand and fight McClellan only a mile or so from the north bank of the Potomac cannot, even yet, be entirely justified. The Union forces in men outnumbered his on the morning of September 15 at least five to one; on the morning of the 17th the proportion was at least two to one. In effective artillery McClellan was five times as strong every hour of the time. Then the Union soldiers were all well clad well armed and well fed. The infantry carried rifled muskets of the latest pattern. As a whole the Confederate army was composed of ragamuffins and sans culottes, one-third of them armed with archaic smooth-bore muskets, and all of them with no more invigorating or inspiriting food to fight on than green corn and greener apples.

On the morning of the 15th Lee's forces were so scattered that it was clearly his duty to retreat across the Potomac with the small force under him. There was but one road to the only ford across the river by which he could retreat and this road might be closed any hour. Longstreet urged Lee to retreat while he could. Lee said, "Wait until Gen. Jackson returns." When Jackson came he said: "Let us fight here." He and Lee said McClellan was not to be feared, no matter how many men he had. Longstreet finally thought it best to fight.