Return I. Holcombe Papers.

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IN CAMP AGAIN AT FALMOUTH.

Upon returning to its former camping ground in the rear of Falmouth, practically in fair view of the Confederate positions still on the Marye's Heights ridge, the First Minnesota resumed the ordinary routine of camp duties. And for more than four months the Regiment was practically inactive, and so was the army to which it belonged--at least the few movements it made were ineffective.

There was a great deal of discontent in the army after Fredericksburg. Both officers and men were bitterly dissatisfied with Gen. Burnside. They blamed him wholly for the loss of the battle--blamed his ignorance, his lack of ability, and his want of tact. They clamored to have McClellan restored to command. They did not realize that Burnside's tactics at Fredericksburg were exactly those of McClellan--delay, delay, delay--and then, when an attack was made, make it with only one division, or possibly two, at a time, as McClellan fought at Antietam. Gen. Sumner said there was "a great deal of croaking" among the officers. The privates knew that they had not had a fair chance at Fredericksburg, and in their minds they had dismissed Gen. Burnside long before President Lincoln had.

A few days after the battle there was a grand review of the Second Corps at which both Gen. Burnside and Gen. Sumner were present. Had McClellan been at the main station, the troops would have yelled their heads off as they passed him; but they marched by Burnside in freezing silence. The situation was very embarrassing, and to relieve it Gen. Sumner directed Gen. Couch to call for "three cheers for Gen. Burnside!" The Corps and Division commanders and their staffs rode along the lines, waving their caps or swords, but from the ranks came only derisive cries and hootings.

Gen. Burnside began immediate preparations for crossing the Rappahannock again and giving battle to Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet. He meant to snatch victory out of defeat. But this time he would not cross directly at Fredericksburg--Oh, no! On the 29th of December his plans were prepared for crossing the river with a large force seven miles below Fredericksburg with a view of turning Lee's right position. At the same time he would send a cavalry expedition to the Confederate rear to cut the Richmond railroad. The latter movement had already begun when, December 30, the General received an order from the President directing him not to make a general movement of the army "without letting me know all about it." Surprised and demanding an explanation, Burnside hurried to Washington and learned that Gens. Newton and Cochrane had been there and told the President that the whole army, generals and all, was in such a state of demoralization and distrust of Gen. Burnside that his contemplated movement would result in great disaster. The cavalry was recalled and the entire movement abandoned.

GEN. BURNSIDE'S "MUD MARCH."

Gen. Burnside's position with the army at this time was certainly not a comfortable one. He knew that he did not have the confidence of either his officers or his men. He knew that he was universally regarded as a failure, and that many thought he was a fool. But he was a good loyal man and as frank and honest as he was true. He had protested that he was not able for the position when the command of the army was forced upon him, and he had earnestly said so. To please the many admirers of McClellan he adopted that general's tactics. He strove to please. Of Fredericksburg he frankly said:"For the failure of the attack I am responsible."

But at last Gen. Burnside prepared a plan for another movement on the enemy, and this time he let Lincoln "know all about it." He realized that if he was successful he would again have the confidence of the army; but he forgot that this confidence should be obtained first, for it was clearly essential to success. And this confidence was very hard to secure.

The General now essayed to go up the Rappahannock and cross it at Banks's Ford, six miles above Fredericksburg, and turn Lee's left flank and drive him upon the Atlantic coast. This was the crossing which Gen. Sumner wished to pass the preceding November. Banks's Ford was not then a ford, and must be passed by pontoon bridges. It would be difficult to make the necessary movements without detection, but the General tried to. He said that Sumner's Right Grand Division was in plain sight of Marye's Heights, and the Second Corps was to take no part in the movement, since it could not break camp without displaying its proceedings to the enemy's view. So the Second Corps, with Howard's Division and the First Minnesota,

was to stand fast. Burnside foolishly thought he could deceive Lee as to where he meant to cross, and made formidable feints at this place and that place, both above and below Fredericksburg.

The weather and roads had been in good condition generally since the battle, and on the 20th of January, 1863, the columns were put in motion for Banks's Ford with all the secrecy possible. The Grand Divisions of Hooker and Franklin had been selected for the movement, and they marched up the river on parallel raads and camped that night in the woods. Part of the Second Corps was moved below Fredericksburg to make feints there. A reserve Corps, commanded by Gen. Franz Sigel, had been added to the army, and it was sent to guard the communications with Acquia Creek Station. Preparations for crossing were pushed; artillery was put in position to cover the movement; the pontoons were brought up, and Burnside determined to make the passage on the morning of the 21st.

But on the night of the 20th a terrible storm of sleet and rain and wind came on and continued during the night and throughout the next day. The artillery wheels and the pontoon wagons soon turned the region into a series of almost impassable morasses of Virginia mud and beds of sticky clay. By daylight only 15 pontoon boats had been brought up, and 125 were needed. Everybody and everything was "stuck in the mud." The movement was intended to be a surprise, but on arriving at the Ford Burnside found a large division of Lee's army in position on the other side, while the remainder of the Confederate forces were massed, ready for business, only a mile or two in the rear.

All the day of the 21st the army labored to get its pontoons up to the river ready for launching. But the gigantic storm and down-pour had played havoc with the roads, whose bottoms

apparently had subsided several feet. All wagons sank to their axles. As many as fourteen horses and mules were hitched to one pontoon wagon, but although accomplished masters of the profane language swore at them, and cruel drivers lashed them unmercifully, they could not be made to draw the vehicle, with its ponderous boat, six feet. Then long stout ropes were attached to the wagons, and 150 infantry men detailed to pull each wagon along, but they could not budge it. Night arrived and not a boat had been put in. The Confederate pickets, with mocking symypathy, shouted across the river that it was "too bad that you fellows are having so much trouble to build your bridge; if you will wait till tomorrow we will come over and help you." Then they added, sarcastically and with malicious meaning:"If you will only come over and pay us another visit like you did at Fredericksburg, we will build the bridge all ourselves!"(See Swinton; also Eggleston's "Recollections.")

That night there was more bad weather and the next morning dawned upon another day of rain and storm. The ground had gone from bad to worse. An undescribable chaos of pontoons, ambulances, and wagons encumbered all the roads. Supply wagons were sunk to the beds and many upset by the roadside; batteries were stalled in the mud, ammunition wagons mired, and hundreds of horses and mules suffocated and buried in the liquid muck. The three days' rations were exhausted, and at last Gen. Burnside determined to abandon the expedition. Nearly the whole infantry force was put to work at corduroying the roads, and on the 22d, abandoning much property, the army started floundering and staggering, back to the old camps--and thus ended Gen. Burnside's "Mud March."

BURNSIDE IS REMOVED--REPLACED BY HOOKER.

Many of the officers of the army declared that the heavy storms overhead and the Virginia mud underneath which destroyed and prevented Burnside's movement might be attributed to Providence as a divine interference in behalf of the Union cause. They said that had the army succeeded in crossing the river, it would have been defeated in the rough country worse than it was at Fredericksburg. Gen. Hooker went swearing around that everything would soon go to the infernal regions; Gen. Brooks, commanding the First Division, declared that Gen. Burnside was incompetent, and that, if the Administration retained him in command, it, too, was incompetent. Other generals had "talked about" the commander volubly, openly, publicly, and, Gen. Burnside thought, disgracefully.

On the evening of the 23d, the next evening after his return from the Mud March, Gen. Burnside issued "General Orders No.8," dismissing from the service Gen. Hooker, as "unfit to hold a commission at a crisis like the present;" dismissing Gen. W. T. H. Brooks, for "complaining of the policy of the Government and for using language tending to demoralize his command," and dismissing Gens. John Newton and John Cochrane,"for going to the President with criticisms upon the plans of their commanding officer." The order also "relieved from duty" with the Army of the Potomac,(directing them to report to the Adjutant General for orders) Gens. Franklin,"Baldy" Smith, Sturgis, Ferrero, and Lieut.Col.J.H.Taylor, the Adjutant General of the Right Grand Division. The last named officers, he said, "can be of no farther use to this army."

Armed with this order and with his own letter of resignation from the command of the army and from the service, Gen. Burnside repaired to Washington on the 24th and demanded that President Lincoln

approve either the order or the letter. The President declined to endorse either in full. He would not remove the generals and he would not accept Burnside's resignation from the service. He promptly told Burnside, however, that he would relieve him from the command of the Army of the Potomac as soon as he could decide upon his successor, but that he was "too good a soldier" to lose entirely from the service.

The next day, by "General Orders No.29" the President relieved Gen. Burnside from command of the Army of the Potomac "at his own request." He also relieved Gen. Sumner from command in that army, also "at his own request." He relieved Gen. Franklin with no reason given. The same order directed,"That Maj.Gen. J. Hooker be assigned to the command of the Army of the Potomac." Both Sumner and Franklin outranked Hooker at the time, but both were willing to get out of the way, for they were tired of serving in that army. Franklin, however, was under a cloud of censure by the Congressional Committee and by some of his associates, who said that he did not do all that he could and should have done with his Left Grand Division at Fredericksburg. Not long after Franklin was sent to Louisiana and Sumner was given command of the Department of Missouri. Burnside was given a rest of 30 days and then Lincoln gave him command of the Department of Ohio, with headquarters at Cincinnati, so that he could keep watch over the rebels in Kentucky and at the same time repress Vallandigham and the other "Copperheads" of Ohio.

Burnside was loyal to the core. He unselfishly said to the President that Hooker's appointment was "the best solution of the problem possible," and that no one would be happier than himself if Gen. Hooker should lead the Army of the Potomac to victory.(Nic.& Hay.) His order taking leave of the army manfully and chivalrously commended the "brave and skillful general" who was to succeed him to that

"cordial support and co-operation" which he alleged he had always received--but which he and everybody else knew he had not.

Gen. Burnside had important commands in the army until the close of the war, but never distinguished himself except in his defense of Knoxville, Tenn., against Longstreet, in November, 1863. He was at all times in active service, and very faithful, but never highly efficient in it.

But he left behind him two inventions which will perpetuate his name if not his memory. He it was who invented a certain style of wearing whiskers, wherein the ends of the mustache are prolonged until they connect and unite with an area of beard on the rear of either jaw, producing a very picturesque effect in most instances. The Burnside whiskers--or "burnsides"-- are popular and much affected to this day. The other benefit which he left to mankind was the fashion of forming a longitudinal depression, resembling a little canyon, in a soft hat, which , when properly made, causes the headpiece to assume a rakish but somewhat graceful shape. The Burnside hat is well and favorably known, especially among Southerners.

GEN. HOOKER IN COMMAND.

The Army of the Potomac was in rather bad shape when Gen. Hooker took hold of it. Desertions were going on at the rate of about 200 a day, and at the time of his assuming command the official rolls showed an absence from this Army of the enormous number of above 80,000 men--"absent from causes unknown."(Cond.War,Vol.1,p.112.) Very few of these men were absent legitimately. An overwhelming majority of them were deserters, men shamming sickness or disabilities of one kind or another, alleged recruiting agents, or officers and men lurking about their ~~houses~~ homes on some frivolous pretext and protected by officers with whom they had influence. Many said they were dissatisfied with the President's proclamation emancipating the slaves in districts still in secession and rebellion; these said they "didn't enlist to free niggers," and would no longer peril their lives to accomplish that result. The true reason controlling all these malingerers was that they wished to avoid the dangers and hardships of a soldier's life themselves and let somebody else endure them. After the war was over they could lie about their records and pose as heroes just the same.

Gen. Hooker at once instituted and enforced vigorous measures of reform. He greatly checked desertion and absenteeism; he did away with the nuisance of the "Grand Divisions;" he infused vitality into the general administrative service; he instituted a system of granting furloughs for meritorious conduct; he consolidated the cavalry instead of leaving it scattered by brigades among the Grand Divisions, and he gave distinctive badges to the different Army Corps.

The badges were greatly admired by the men. They became general throughout the entire army and every good soldier was almost as devoted to his badge as to his flag. Gen. Couch says(Batts.&Leads)

that Gen. Dan Butterfield, who became Hooker's Chief of staff, originated the idea and devised the badges in detail; but Swinton says the germ of the badge designation was the happy thought of Phil Kearney, who, at Fair Oaks, ordered the soldiers of his Division to sew pieces of red flannel to their caps, so that he could recognize them in the tumult of battle. The badge of the Second Corps was a trefoil, or three-leaved clover, which came to be designated by other Corps as the shamrock, the ace of clubs, etc.

Gen. Hooker had been a fairly good officer under McClellan, although he did not manage well at Antietam, since he allowed Stonewall Jackson's 8,000 men to thrash his 14,000. Yet he was said to be a "dashing" general and he had somehow gained the sobriquet of "Fighting Joe." The latter title he always rejected. "It sounds as if I were a plug-ugly or a pirate," he said. He was really an affable man and made friends readily. Yet he had a petulant temper and indulged it frequently. He always seemed anxious to fight the Confederates, yet he tried to repress foraging by his soldiers, whom he reminded in a general order that "this is a war between fellow citizens of a common country and should be conducted accordingly; it will end in the triumph of the Union Cause and then our present foes will be our warm friends."

IN CAMP ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

The Army of the Potomac had a fairly comfortable season during its encampment on the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg during winter and spring of 1863. The troops constructed for themselves comfortable quarters, which were generally small log cabins with wedge-shaped tents for roofs, and each cabin had a fireplace which answered very well to warm the little room. All kinds of supplies came up regularly from Acquia Creek Station, mails were received, visitors came from the North, and although there were many cold days and nights they were easily endured, and the world went very well then.

On the 5th of February Gen. Hooker issued an order abolishing the Grand Divisions and adopted in its stead a Corps organization of the Army, as follows: First Corps, Gen. Reynolds; Second Corps, Gen. Couch; Third Corps, Gen. Sickles temporarily; Fifth Corps, Gen. Meade; Sixth Corps, Gen. Sedgwick; Eleventh Corps, Gen. Sigel; Twelfth Corps, Gen. Slocum. In April Gen. Howard, who had commanded the First Minnesota's Division (Second of the Second Corps) so long and so ably, was made a mojor general and given command of Gen. Sigel's Eleventh Corps. He was succeeded in the command of the Division by Gen. John Gibbon, from the First Corps, who had greatly distinguished himself on the left, under Franklin, at Fredericksburg. There were re-organizations from time to time.

January 27 President Lincoln and Mrs. Lincoln visited the army and spent a few days at Falmouth. Gen. Hooker gave them a dinner at the Lacy House. The Corps Commanders were present. The President confined the table talk chiefly to a discussion of getting the better of "those fellows on the other side of the river"--Lee and his army. When taking leave of Gens. Hooker and Couch, the President

said very earnestly:"Gentlemen, in your next fight don't send in a few at a time; put in all your men."(Couch in Batts.& Leads.) On the 8th of April the President again visited the army and had a long and earnest consultation with Hooker and Couch and again besought them to "put in all your men" in the next battle. On both visits there was a grand review of the Second Corps.

All the time the Confederate pickets were on the opposite bank of the river confronting the Union sentinels for several miles. For some time the personal relations of the two picket lines were not especially cordial; but as the weeks passed the men became somewhat acquainted and very friendly. Some of the men of the respective armies covertly carried on quite a trade with the enemy. The Union pickets exchanged "sure-enough" coffee for genuine Virginia leaf tobacco and swapped New York and Washington newspapers for those of Richmond and Charleston. Bits of news were freely exchanged, and some items were sent from each side that were not news! In April, while Lincoln was on a visit to the army, the Confederates hallooed across the river:"You all have taken Charleston!" The report was believed by many and caused some excitement. But finally calling across to the Confederates was forbidden under severe penalties, yet ~~but~~ the friendly intercourse did not entirely cease. Then was tried the device of making miniature boats and rafts, equipping them with sails and loading them with articles of barter. The sails would be properly set by experienced sailors, and quite often a kind breeze wafted the little crafts safely across to their destinations. But quite oftener the sail would slew around or the wind change and the craft drift away, and never be heard of afterward. became a lost ship,

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THE FIRST MINNESOTA ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

The First Minnesota encamped and waited for over four months on the east or left bank of the Rappahannock River on what are yet called the Stafford Heights, because in Stafford County. The experience was only the routine of camp life and was comparatively uneventfully. The drills were resumed and there was a dress parade every evening, as in the Regiment's first days. The weather was disagreeable. January 29, fully five inches of snow fell, but it all melted away in a few days. The coldest day was February 3, but five days later the weather was warm and springlike. A heavy guard was constantly kept out and picket duty along the river was kept up but under discomforts and difficulties.

Just across the river the Confederates were worse off. They did not have to drill, but they were indifferently supplied with provisions, clothing, and hospital stores. A ration consisted of a small piece of indifferent fat pork with an occasional scrap of fresh beef, tough and stringy, and a little cup full of flour or unbolted cornmeal. A gill or so of molasses and a little brown sugar were infrequently added to the ration, but salt was always scarce. Not a grain of coffee or leaf of tea and only one overcoat to every three men--and that commonly one taken from a dead Union soldier.

April 2 Gov. Ramsey paid the Regiment a visit, and was enthusiastically welcomed. He brought a new flag for the Regiment, presented by the ladies of Minnesota and inscribed upon it were the battles in which the First Minnesota had then been engaged. On the 8th when President Lincoln was on his visit to Gen. Hooker, he went through all the camps, not omitting the camp of the First Minnesota.

Gibbon's Division, to which the First Minnesota belonged, was in camp just below "Chatham," commonly called the Lacy House, which was

so often the headquarters of the Union generals. The camp was near the river and within direct range of the 300 Confederate cannon in battery along the Marye's House ridge, only a mile away. Just across the then narrow and fordable river were camps of Confederate infantry, within easy musket shot, and the opposing pickets were almost within a stone's throw of one another. Loud conversation was easily heard, and though talking was strictly forbidden by each side, there was a great deal of good natured badinage indulged in between these deadly enemies.

About the 1st of May the Thirty-Fourth New York, by its "conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline," caused a great tumult in Gibbon's Division. This regiment had long been in the same brigade withthe First Minnesota and was now regarded as a good comrade. It was a two-years' regiment, recruited in the early spring of 1861, and a majority of the men claimed that their term of service expired May 1,1863, and that date had now arrived.

So, on May 1, those of the regiment who had enlisted two years before, stacked their arms and refused to do any sort of duty, even to answer roll call. Gen. Sully tried to reason with them and induce them to continue on duty a few days longer, as a battle was imminent and the Brigade was under marching orders. But they would not heed the brigade commander and Gen. Sully reported to Gen. Gibbon.

"Can't you enforce discipline in your brigade?" indignantly demanded Gen. Gibbon. Gen. Sully answered that he could not in this case without proceeding to extreme measures which he did not wish to do. Gen. Gibbon at once ordered Gen. Sully to give up the command of his brigade, and appointed Col. Hudson in command in his stead. The order read that the removal was because Gen. Sully had "reported to the General commanding the Division that it was not in

his power to enforce discipline in his command." (War Recs.)

Gen. Gibbon then ordered the Fifteenth Massachusetts under arms and to surround the near mutinous Thirty-Fourth. This was done and then Gen. Gibbon addressed the regiment. He told the men that their conduct was most reprehensible; that even if they were entitled to their discharge it must come regularly and honorably; that they ought to resume their duties until the matter could be arranged and then go back to old Herkimer County in honor and glory, but that if they did not take up their arms again he would order the Fifteenth to fire into them. The men took up their arms. (History 15th Mass. p. 247-8.)

A court of inquiry demanded by Gen. Sully, ordered by Gen. Couch, and composed of Gens. Hancock and Zook and Col. Carroll, found that Gen. Sully "probably doubted his authority, under the existing circumstances, to order extreme measures" in the case of the Thirty-Fourth New York, and that he ought not to have been removed from command. Gen. Couch approved the finding, but Gen. Gibbon opposed Sully's restoration to command in ~~the Army of the Potomac~~ his division, and May 10 he was sent to Dakota to fight Indians. Lochren says he was the best beloved of all its colonels by the First Minnesota, whose members, a short time before he left his brigade, presented him with a fine dress sword that cost $1,000.

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THE BATTLES OF CHANCELLORSVILLE AND SECOND FREDERICKSBURG.

For five months the Rappahannock River was a line on either side of which a great army was stationed. Each army kept practically a standing challenge to the other to come across and fight, as is the manner of certain belligerent boys who draw a line on the ground and "dare" one another to cross it, a crossing being always followed by a fisticuff. In the first part of December,1862, Gen. Burnside accepted the Confederate "dare," crossed the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, and got badly whipped. Both the line and the challenge were still maintained until in May,1863. Gen. Lee steadily refused to cross and fight and at last, in the latter part of April Gen. Hooker accepted the standing challenge and crossed the line, and then there was fighting all along it.

A day or two after the first battle at Fredericksburg, Gen. Lee visited Richmond and Jeff Davis and his Cabinet informed him that the war was practically over, the North was discouraged, and the Southern Confederacy would probably be recognized and complete peace come within 60 days.(Batts. & Leads., Vol.2,p.84;Longstreet, Man. to Appo.,p.317,etc.) Davis directed Lee not to "harass the men" by hard duties, as they would soon be sent home. But peace did not come, and Gen. Lee was forced to "harass the men," by making them dig and build breastworks in freezing weather all along the right or south bank of the Rappahannock, from below Fredericksburg to the United States Ford, 25 miles above. The Confederate army was strung along this line.

The Confederate right flank, below Fredericksburg, was strongly fortified and defended, and Gen. Lee gave himself little concern about that end of his line. The Yankees might, however, turn his left flank if they passed far enough up the river. If this flank were turned, Lee's communications with Richmond via Orange C. H. and Gordonsville would be cut off. If the right flank were passed, the Union troops

would sieze the only line of communication on the east. This was the dirt road running southward via Bowling Green, the county seat of Caroline county, to Richmond, and this dirt road ran practically parallel with the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad, by which Lee's army received nearly all its supplies. This was why the right flank was so well defended.

But if either flank was turned, the Confederates would be forced to come out from behind their intrenchments and fight in the open; then, if they were defeated, it would be very bad for them, for there were no practicable lines of retreat between the Gordonsville and the Bowling Green routes.

Gen. Hooker had thorough knowledge of the situation and took an intelligent view of it. He determined to turn Lee's left flank by going far up the Rappahannock, above its confluence with the Rapidan, and crossing each stream separately, getting well around and in the rear of Lee and cutting him completely off from Gordonsville. He began operations as soon as spring opened. Fredericksburg is in the same latitude as St. Louis, and spring weather is established April 1. Prof. Lowe, in his fine war balloon, made successful daily ascensions above the Confederate camps and then made safe returns, reporting all conditions favorable.

The reports show that on April 1 Gen. Hooker had under his direct command 130,000 men of all arms, including 404 pieces of artillery. Lee had under his direct command 61,000 of all arms and 270 cannon. Longstreet, with Hood's and Pickett's Divisions(10,000) and Hampton's Cavalry(1,600) were down at Suffolk watching a meditated movement on Richmond by Gens. Dix and Peck, and did not return till May 10. Their forces are not included in ~~the~~ Lee's 61,000.

April 13, Gen. Hooker directed Gen. George Stoneman to cross the Rappahannock with 8,000 cavalry and go southward toward Richmond and cut off Lee's Gordonsville line of supply. Heavy rainstorms prevented this movement until April 29.

Gen. Hooker decided to accomplish his turning movement by sending a strong column which should go 27 miles up the river to Kelly's Ford, cross there and go south to Ely's and Germanna Fords over the Rapidan, cross them and go southeast to Chancellorsville. Now this famous "ville" was simply a fine two-story brick farmhouse, the residence of a farmer named Chancellor. It was on a fine macadamized turnpike road running west from Fredericksburg and ten miles west of that town. At this house there was an important cross roads, composed of the turnpike and a road running north to the U. S. Ford over the Rappahannock. All about the Chancellorville house--except immediately around it--were dense brush thickets, and to the south and west was that vast jungle of scrub-oaks and jack-pines called the Wilderness.

To conceal his movement up the river Gen. Hooker put three Corps--the First, (Reynolds), the Third (Sickles) and the Sixth (Sedgwick) under Gen. John Sedgwick, and directed him to cross <u>below</u> Fredericksburg and make a demonstration against the enemy's position as soon as the flanking force was well under way. Gibbon's Division, of the Second Corps, was to act under Sedgwick's orders, but because its camp was in plain sight of the Confederates it was not to move until the other troops crossed the river; for the Confederates could easily see them taking down their tents and marching out of camp and would know that "something" was going on."

The turning column left Falmouth, Monday, April 27. It was composed of three Corps--the Fifth,(Meade) the Eleventh,(Howard) and the Twelfth,(Slocum). It crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford on the night of the 28th and the morning of the 29th on a canvas-covered pontoon bridge; then it hurried on and crossed the Rapidan by the Germanna and Ely's Fords by wading, and reached Chancellorsville on the 30th, where Gen. Hooker established his headquarters that evening. French's and Hancock's Divisions of the Second Corps also came up that evening, having crossed the Rappahannock at the U. S. Ford; Gibbon's Division remained at Fredericksburg.

CHANCELLORSVILLE.

Gen. Hooker had succeeded admirably. He had marched an army of 50,000 men 37 miles in two days, had bridged and crossed two streams, was settled down now in a position that quite satisfied him, and had lost only half a dozen men, six mules, and one wagon. At such an accomplishment McClellan would have stood aghast and Burnside been overcome with wonder!

On Friday evening, May 1, Hooker had his battle line formed. It extended about five miles east and west along the turnpike and faced southward, except at the west end, at the Wilderness church and Dowdall's tavern, the latter kept by Rev. Melzi Chancellor, a brother of the owner of Chancellorsville. The line was fortified with dirt-and-log breastworks and brush abatis. All the roads, neighborhood and "wood" roads, that penetrated the brushy wilderness to the southward were commanded by artillery. A Confederate force assaulting this line from the south would fare badly, for it was defended by 50,000 men, with 30,000 in the rear "in reserve." Lincoln had adjured Hooker to "put in all your men in the next battle," but Hooker was keeping out 30,000.

That Friday Sickles's Third Corps came up from Fredericksburg and went into the battle line, and the same evening Reynolds's First Corps also came and was sent northward to the rear towards the U. S. Ford. Gen. Sedgwick no longer needed these Corps with him.

That Friday morning Too Gen. Hooker sent out a reconnoissance on three roads to the eastward under Gen. Couch, with Slocum's and Meade's Corps and Hancock's Division; Gen. Warren, chief engineer of the army, was along. Three miles east of Chancellorsville they found a splendid position. It was an an elevated ridge and commanded the country about Chancellorsville to the west and some fine open country,

splendid for a battle-field, to the east towards Fredericksburg. The left of the ridge uncovered Banks's Ford, four miles above Fredericksburg, and allowed easy communication with Gen. Sedgwick.

All the generals fairly begged Gen. Hooker to come out and examine the new position with a view to its adoption, but the stubborn general sent back word for them to return to Chancellorsville instantly. Gen. Warren protested to the last; Couch was so angry and disgusted that he swore like a pirate,*and all the other generals were greatly dissatisfied. Gen. Hooker said his position was good enough; that he did not intend to attack Lee, but to force Lee to attack him. The Confederates would be forced to attack his line from the south--and let them come!(Rep.Com. on Cond. War,Vol.1,p.112.) So the columns came back, and as they came the Confederates pounded the rear files with cannon balls fired from a battery on the very ridge which Hooker forced them to abandon!

Well, Lee came all right, but he did not endorse the plans which Hooker had made for him and did not fight in accordance with them. He refused to attack Hooker's lines squarely from the front, but made his assaults in his own way. As soon as his scouts informed him that a large Union army was going up the river, he sent R. H. Anderson's Division up from Fredericksburg to the U. S. Ford xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx to watch it. When the army went above U. S. Ford and crossed and came down to Chancellorsville, in his rear, Anderson fell back to a position on the turnpike road, three miles east of Chancellorsville, and fortified himself. Saturday morning his

*"Nothing was to be done but carry out the command, although Gen. Warren suggested that I should disobey."--Couch, in Batts.& Leads.,p.159.

Foot note

pickets and Slocum's began pecking away at one another.

Friday evening, May 1, Lee was very busy. He detailed Early's Division of Jackson's Corps and Barksdale's Brigade of McLaws's Division(Longstreet) to take care of Fredericksburg against Sedgwick, and he took the three other Divisions of Jackson's Corps under Jackson himself and the three other brigades of McLaws and went up and joined Anderson at the east end of the Union line. That night he and Jackson brooded over the situation and hatched out a plan.

Saturday morning, May 2, while Anderson and McLaws attracted and kept Hooker's attention by attacking with skirmishers the east end of his line, Stonewall Jackson took his Corps, now 28,000 strong, and set out, by a circuitous and concealed route, over obscure and poor roads, for the extreme west of the Union line, at Dowdall's tavern, ten miles from the starting point, at Zoar church. This west end was defended by Devens's and Schurz's Divisions of Howard's Eleventh Corps. The line here did not face south, but bent back northward and faced westward.

Jackson, after a march of 15 miles, "put in all his men" and at 5:30 P.M. struck Devens first and then Schurz and drove them, then struck Steinwehr and drove him, and began to roll up the entire Union line as a woman rolls up a ball of cotton. He took Hooker's powerful line of breatworks in reverse, easily driving out the defenders, and soon had the entire Union army in a panic. Oh, what a surprise to Hooker was that attack! He was quite unmanned, and did not attempt to control matters, but let every general fight to suit himself. There was some good fighting done too. The ground was piled with dead and

wounded Confederates and many prisoners were taken.

Yet the country was so covered with thickets and jungles (which Hooker considered elements of strength) that the Union forces could not be advantageously employed. Commands had to stand in column and let the enemy's artillery plow them from the front and the Confederate infantry slip up through the thickets and fire on them from the flank, and could not fight back. Finally so many Union troops had been driven from behind the breastworks by reverse and enfilading fires that the works themselves were easily carried in very many places. Darkness soon came but the fighting went on almost all night. Stonewall Jackson was mortally wounded at 10 o'clock by his own men, and his loss was equal to that of 50,000 ordinary warriors.

Saturday night Hooker's engineers traced out a new line of defense. The new position was three miles to the rear of Chancellorsville, on a Mr. Bullock's farm, and covered the roads to Ely's and the U. S. Fords, which were the only lines of retreat left open to Hooker. Defending the position was a breastwork, built that night, and which extended from the Rappahannock on the northeast around to the Rapidan on the northwest, and could not well be turned. Once inside this line the army was safe. Reynolds's First and Meade's Fifth Corps--32,642 men and 94 cannon--occupied this fortification. Only the Fifth had done any fighting and it had not been conspicuously engaged, although Lincoln had said, "Put in all your men."

Sunday morning, May 3, Jeb Stuart, who had succeeded to Stonewall Jackson's command, advanced against the Union line at daylight. He set 30 pieces of artillery on a hill and blew away everything about Gen. Hooker's headquarters at the Chancellorsville house, including Gen. Hooker himself. It was said that the general was leaning against a pillar in front of the house when one of Stuart's shells hit the pillar, tore it to pieces, and prostrated

Gen. Hooker.* But he soon got up and rode away, leaving Gen. Couch to take charge of the broken, dispirited, and badly defeated army, and directing him to withdraw it inside of the new position on the Bullock farm. Many of the Union troops fought like heroes that day when they could get a chance, but at last they all took refuge in the fortification, which was a sheltering harbor of refuge for them.

Gen. Lee "put in all his men" that day--no reserves. Even Fitzhugh Lee's brigade of cavalry had to dismount and fight as infantry. The great Confederate, believing that the Union troops would not fight well, although behind fortifications, was preparing to attack them with all his available force on Monday morning at daylight, when his movements were stopped by bad news from Fredericksburg.

The Union army held its ground within the fortifications until Tuesday evening May 5, when the various Corps re-crossed the Rappahannock, principally at the U. S. Ford, and went back to the old camps at Falmouth. Gen. Lee had filled all his artillery chests and cartridge boxes and meant to attack the fortifications the next morning. He believed he could carry the breastworks by assault, and that what Union troops he did not kill, wound, or capture would be driven into the Rappahannock.

This is an imperfect story of the great battle of Chancellors. It was indeed a great and a very bloody battle, but it was hardly important, for it did not decide or influence anything and neither hastened or delayed by an hour's time the end of the war. Neither the Union troops nor the Confederates were driven back a single inch from the positions they occupied before the battle, and the status quo was hardly disturbed.

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*This version of the accident was not universally believed, Stuart's shells burned and battered down the Chancellorsville house.

Although Gen. Hooker had 130,000 men under his direct command, in the entire region of country about Fredericksburg, yet only about 60,000 of them actually fought in the battle of Chancellorsville. The fighting was nearly all done by the Second, Third, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps, which, according to the reports for April 30(War Recs.,Vol.25,part 2,p.320) had "present for duty equipped," in the aggregate, 56,127 officers and men, infantry and artillery, and 146 pieces of artillery. The First and Fifth Corps, numbering 32,642 men and having 94 cannon, were on the field or a mile or so away; but the fighting of the First Corps was so slight that up to May 6 it had but 9 killed. The Fifth Corps, including nearly 250 prisoners, lost in all 700, while the other Corps counted their losses by thousands. Certainly not more than 4,000 of the two Corps were under fire, making 60,127 men. Gen. Walker says in his History, p.250:"There were 35,000 men within the fortification who had not fired a shot."

The Confederates that fought numbered nearly 45,000 men of all arms. Fitzhugh Lee's brigade of Stuart's Cavalry, 2,322, masked Jackson's march and fought in the battle, mounted and on foot; its two batteries lost 18 men. According to the records(Vol.25,part 2, p.696) Jackson's Corps in the fight numbered 27,681, with the artillery unreported; McLaws's Division, 5,718; Anderson's Division, 8,232; Stuart's Cavalry, 2,322; total 43,953, with Jackson's artillerymen uncounted, though Jackson had 14 batteries in action and Surgeon Guild reports that they had 26 men killed and 124 wounded. The artillerymen therefore probably numbered 60 men to the battery, making 840, which added to the number officially reported,43,953, makes 44,793 in the fight. Lee "put in all the men;" he had no reserves.

As part of the Union loss Major Generals Hiram G. Berry and Amiel W. Whipple, each a Division commander in Sickles's Third

Corps, were killed. Gen. Charles Devens, of the Eleventh Corps, was severely wounded and Gen. Wm. Hays, brigade commander in French's Division, was captured. Another very gallant officer, who had been with the First Minnesota in every battle where it ha d fought-- Lieut. Edmund Kirby, was mortally wounded. Less than three months after he graduated from West Point, he was second in command of Ricketts's Battery(I, 1st U.S.,) at Bull Run, where he was badly wounded. At Chancellorsville, May 3, Gen. Couch brought him up to command Leppien's Fifth Maine Battery, Capt. Leppien having been killed. While working the guns near the Chancellorsville house, Lieut. Kirby had his hip shattered by a two-ounce ball from a case shot. He refused to be taken from the field until every gun was safe. He was taken to Washington and died May 28, aged only 22. On his deathbed he was promoted from Lieutenant directly to brigadier general, to rank from May 3, the only instance of such a promotion on record

On the Confederate side, Gen. E. F. Paxton, of Jackson's Corps, was killed; Gen. Jackson himself was mortally wounded, dying May 10, at Guinies Station, eight miles south of Fredericksburg; Gens. McGowan, Ramseur, Nicholls, Heth, and Pender were severely wounded.

The greater part of the Union dead were left on the field to the disposition of the Confederates, and Stonewall Jackson's men had another opportunity to supply themselves with second-hand shoes. The Confederates captured 13 cannon, 17 flags, and claimed to have picked up on the field and taken from prisoners 15,000 muskets; at first Lee said "19,500 stand of arms."

On Sunday afternoon the woods to the west and south of the Chancellorsville house caught fire and many severely wounded

Union men were badly burned before they could be rescued. Many dead bodies were horribly charred. Col. Hamilton, who commanded Gen. McGowan's South Carolina brigade after McGowan was wounded, says in his report: "Throwing out skirmishers to the front eastward, we prepared to bivouac and obtain such rest as we might in a swamp, with dead, dying, and roasted Yankees around us, the woods having taken fire just after the battle of that day, the 3d instant."

Gen. Whipple was killed by a sharpshooter in a skirmish on Monday, the 4th, in front of the fortification.

A heavy rain fell during the afternoon and night of Tuesday, the 5th, and the storm concealed Hooker's withdrawal.

THE SECOND BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.

"The bad news from Fredericksburg" which Gen. Lee received at Chancellorsville at Sunday noon, May 3, was that Gen. Sedgwick had driven Early's Division and Barksdale's Brigade off from Marye's Heights, and that he was advancing westward toward Lee's position to help Hooker.

When on Saturday night, Gen. Hooker saw that his right wing was smashed and his whole army imperilled, he sent orders to Gen. Sedgwick, at Fredericksburg, to occupy the town, to seize Marye's Heights, move out over the turnpike road to Chancellorsville, and attack Lee from the east. Gen. Sedgwick now had under him his Sixth Corps and Gen. Gibbon's Division of the Second. The First and Fifth Corps, having fulfilled their mission at Fredericksburg, had gone up the river to re-enforce Hooker. But the Sixth Corps numbered of infantry, and artillery 23,563 men, "present for duty and equipped," and belonging to it were 54 pieces of artillery. Gibbon's Division had about 5,000 men; but "Paddy" Owen's Pennsylvania brigade was left on the north side of the river, and the two brigades in Fredericksburg numbered all told about 3,300; so that Sedgwick had nearly 27,000 men.

As has been stated Gen. Lee had left to defend Fredericksburg Early's Division of four brigades of Jackson and Barksdale's brigade of McLaws's Division of Longstreet. Gen. Wilcox's Alabama Brigade was four miles above, watching Banks's Ford. Early's Division had about 8,200 men, Barksdale's Mississippi Brigade(four regiments) about 1,200, and in the 20 or more batteries there were perhaps 1,200--or in all 10,600 men to fight Gen. Sedgwick's nearly 27,000. But then the Confederates were in those strong positions of awful memory, Marye's Heights and the stone wall at their base, which had resisted Burnside's mighty attacks the previous December.

Gen. Barksdale's Brigade occupied the heights immediately in rear of the town, including Marye's Hill and the stone wall at its base. Early's Division held the right, below town, where Franklin had attacked. Three companies of the Washington Artillery, from New Orleans, were stationed on the crest, and Sunday morning Gen. Early sent Harry Hays's Louisiana brigad e to re-enforce Barksdale. The noted Mississippi brigade of Gen. Barksdale was now to again show its fine fighting qualities in defending Fredericksburg which it exhibited in the previous December. The sunken road behind the stone wall was then successfully defended by Cobb's Georgia brigade and three other regiments, with later four more regiments to help, while the crest was held at its front by nine guns of the same Washington Artillery(that was now stronger here by four guns,) and it had Ransom's Brigade(under Cooke) and a part of Kershaw's on its right and left. Gen. Barksdale had no right to think that he coud defend Marye's Hill as successfully as it was defended in December; but he could (and did) put up a good fight, and let it go at that.

Gen. Sedgwick had learned something at Antietam about attacking an enemy in a strong position. This time he would be more careful. He first felt of the extreme lower end of Early's position with Howe's Division and found it strong. He had ordered Gibbon's two brigades across, and now he sent them cautiously and tentatively against the Confederate left or north. Gibbon took the brigades out to near Mary Washington's tomb, where they were stopped for a time by the greater canal. Then a "feeling" attack was made, and the result of the three investigations convinced Gen. Sedgwick that the heights could only be carried by direct assault, involving brave and gallant conduct on the part of a strong force.

About 11 o'clock(Sunday,May 3) Gen. Sedgwick began his

movement to carry the Heights of Fredericksburg, Marye's Hill, and the elevation to its south now called Lee's Hill, the latter defended by Early's three brigades. To carry the works held by Early, Howe's Division of the Sixth Corps was assigned; to take the sunken road and Marye's Hill, there were elaborate preparations.

The attack on Marye's was made under direction of Gen. John Newton and regiments from his Division made it. Two columns, each marching by fours, were formed on the Plank and Telegraph roads, and supporting them was "a line of battle" formed perpendicularly to and to the left of the left(or south) column. The right(or north) column was composed of the Forty-Third New York and the Sixty-First Pennsylvania and was under Col. Geo. C. Spear, of the latter regiment, and these two regiments belonged to Col. Burnham's brigade, or "light division," as it was called. Supporting Col. Spear's column were the Sixty-Seventh New York and Eighty-Second Pennsylvania, of Shaler's brigade and under Col. Shaler himself. The left column consisted of the Seventh Massachusetts and the Thirty-Sixth New York, of Browne's brigade, and was under Col. Johns, of the Seventh Massachusetts, and had no support. The "line of battle," commanded by Col . Burnham, was composed of the Fifth Wisconsin,(acting as skirmishers) the Sixth Maine, and the Twenty-Third Pennsylvania.

Howe's Division was posted south of Hazel Run and when its turn came behaved splendidly. Brooks's Division was posted along Deep Run,(south of Hazel Run) and was as far below as "Mansfield," Col. Bernard's fine house, which was destroyed in the first battle. Bartlett's brigade of Brooks, held the Richmond railroad crossing at Deep Run to guard against an attack on the flank of Howe's storming column.

The order to advance was given at 11 o'clock. Gens. Sedgwick and Newton watched the attack from the garden of a brick residence on the left of the Telegraph road on the outskirts of town. The Confederates repeated the tactics used in repelling the charges the previous December. The Washington Artillery opened as the column emerged from town, and the first fire killed Maj. Faxon, of the Thirty-Sixth New York, and badly wounded Col. Johns, of the Seventh Massachusetts, both of the left column. About the same time brave Col. Spear was killed and died gloriously at the head of the men of his right column, a sublime place for a commander to die.

Both columns and the "line of battle" now advanced at the double quick and without firing a shot. The Confederate artillery increased its fire and the roar of cannon was continuous. Barksdale's Mississippians, behind the stone wall, held their fire until the line and columns got up close, when they gave a murderous volley and the Washington Artillery poured a great storm of canister and grape upon the assailants. For a moment the heads of the columns and the front of the battle line wavered, and Sedgwick and Newton, back at the brick house, were greatly frightened. Indeed some of the officers of the Seventh Massachusetts called out wildly:"Get ready to retreat, men!" But the gallant men of the regiment(Hats off to them!) replied noisily: "No! No! Don't go back; we shan't get as close up as this if we try it again. Let us go on! Hurrah!"(Batts. & Leads.,p.229.)

And the noble spirits did "go on," though under a terrific, death-laden storm. The Seventh Massachusetts smashed squarely up against the terrible stone wall,deployed along it, and fell upon Col. Griffin's Eighteenth Mississippi and three companies of

the Twenty-First Mississippi. The Thirty-Sixth New York went around to the left flank and climbed the wall. Then there was a hand to hand fight for a few minutes when men were bayoneted and had their brains knocked out with musket butts and gun barrels; for the Seventh Massachusetts began that work when it first came up and fired its volley. Then it too climbed the wall and fought gun in hand and captured nearly all the officers and men of the Eighteenth Mississippi and their flag; but Col. Griffin and some of his men ran away, and so lived to fight another day.

Then the "line of battle" advanced towards the crest and the skirmish line of the Fifth Wisconsin was the first to reach that long coveted position. All three of the batteries of the Washington Artillery did not have time to get away, and Capt. Richardson's battery was captured, the captain surrendering and handing his sword to Col. Tom Allen, of the Fifth Wisconsin. Then the columns came up and the whole crest of Marye's Heights was occupied, after months of waiting and effort, by the Union troops. And mighty pleasant was the occupation while it lasted! What was left of Barksdale's Brigade and the Confederate artillery went kiting down the telegraph road southward, two miles, to the Cox house and farm, where they took up a new position. Barksdale reported that the losses in his brigade were 236 killed and wounded and about 300(chiefly of the 18th Mississippi) taken prisoners. On the Union side over 600 were killed and wounded in the direct assault; the Seventh Massachusetts lost in killed and wounded 150 out of 400; out of 500 in each regiment, the Fifth Wisconsin lost 123 and the Sixth Maine 167.

While the columns and the "battle line" from Newton's Division were carrying Marye's Hill, Howe's Division was busy driving off Early's Division from Lee's Hill and the heights below. Gen. Howe made the assault with three columns, nine regiments in all, and these

were led respectively by Gen. Thos. H. Neill, Col. Lewis A. Grant, Fifth Vermont, and Col. J. J. Seaver, Third Vermont. They had Early's three brigades and a lot of artillery to contend with, but they carried the heights in fine style, captured 200 prisoners and five cannon and all the camp equipment, and sent Early's brigades(John B. Gordon's, Wm. Smith's and Bob Hoke's) flying down the Telegraph road to the Cox farm, two miles. The Confederates were in great confusion and if Gen. Sedgwick could have sent in a regiment of cavalry he could have captured a thousand prisoners. But he did not have even a "four" of cavalry; what Pleasanton did not have up at Chancellorsville had gone towards Richmond on the Stoneman raid. Gen. Howe lost in killed and wounded about 700. Gen. Early reports that his loss (not counting Barksdale's and the artillery) was 136 killed, 838 wounded and "some 500" captured and missing; total, about 1,500. Within a few minutes after he had carried the heights of Fredericksburg and driven away the enemy, which was the first part of his order, Gen. Sedgwick set to work to execute the second part, which was to march his Corps to Chancellorsville and attack Lee so as to relieve the great pressure on Hooker. Brooks's Division soon came up from Hazel Run and took the advance; Newton's and Howe's followed. The three set out on the turnpike road for Chancellorsville at about 1:30 P. M. Some skirmishers from Wilcox's brigade which had been watching Banks's Ford(and also looking for an opportunity to make a flank attack on the forces preparing to assault Marye's Hill) now came forward and got on both sides of the road and impeded Brooks's advance all they could. At Salem Church, a red brick building, four miles west of Marye's Hill, Wilcox put his whole brigade, five Alabama regiments, in position astride the road in the brush and woods. At about 4:30 Brooks came up.

Now, when Lee received the bad news from Fredericksburg,

it was about Sunday noon and he was gathering up his Divisions to hurl them on Hooker's intrenchments at the Bullock farm. The news was really bad. If Sedgwick had carried Fredericksburg and routed Early and Barksdale, he would soon be up with 20,000 men and fighting Lee's wearied and battle-worn soldiers. Sedgwick must be checked before he got to the battle-field.

So Lee, feeling assured that Hooker would not take advantage of the Confederate withdrawal, sent forward with all speed towards Fredericksburg Mahone's Brigade of Anderson's Division and the three brigades of McLaws to join their comrade brigade of Barksdale and to help Wilcox check Sedgwick. They hurried down at quick time, notwithstanding they had been fighting hard the night before and all that morning, and when they came to where Wilcox's brigade was in line Mahone went to its left and Kershaw ~~xkx~~ on its right; then when Gen. McLaws came up he sent also Semmes's brigade to the left and Wofford's to the right, and then five good brigades were in line in the woods awaiting Sedgwick's approach and attack.

The attack was soon on. Brooks's Division came up about 5 P. M., and Brown's New Jersey and Bartlett's mixed brigade plunged at once into the thick brush copses on both sides of the road. Some writers are of the opinion that on this Sunday evening, May 3, at Salem Church, occurred the hardest and bravest fighting of the war. Frank Wheaton's brigade of Newton's Division went to the extreme right. These three brigades went bravely forward through the brush and thickets and actually drove back the Confederates to the crest of a hill in the rear where Salem Church stood and where there were some rifle pits. The crest was afterward called Salem Heights. The brush only served to conceal the Confederates; the tree growth was so

small that it was no protection from their well-delivered volleys, and the attacking forces lost heavily.

At the crest and rifle pits there was plenty of desperate and bloody fighting for some minutes. Then the Union troops were driven back. Again they rallied, advanced, fought, and were driven back; and yet again they rallied, advanced, and were driven back. Then darkness came on and they gave o'er; but it had taken five of the best brigades in Lee's army to make them do it. How they fought! The fighting did not last an hour, but in that time Bartlett's Brigade, out of 1,460 lost 612 officers and men, of whom 143 were prisoners and missing. The Sixteenth New York, within a few days of being mustered out, lost 142. Col. Seaver, in his report, says: "Immediately on our left flank stood Salem Church, a brick edifice, in which was posted a strong force of the enemy, that opened a harassing and deadly fire from its windows and from portholes in its sides."

The loss in Brown's New Jersey Brigade was like its fighting--very heavy. It took in 1,512 men and lost 511 of them. Col. Brown was badly wounded and carried off the field and Col. W. H. Penrose, who succeeded to the command of the brigade, reports: "I have the satisfaction of saying for my command that not a man left the line of battle except the wounded. When the action was ended and the rolls were called in the open field to which we retired, every man was present or properly accounted for except five missing, who were doubtless killed or wounded. My wounded were all brought off except the five mentioned above, who were not found on account of the dense undergrowth." Col. Collet, First New Jersey, was killed at the head of his regiment.

Frank Wheaton had it hot and heavy on the right of the

line, towards Banks's Ford, until dark. He encountered Semmes's Georgia Brigade, and in his report Gen. Semmes says:"The battle was the most severely ~~fxxxxx~~ contested of the war." The Fifty-Third Georgia captured the flag o f the Second Rhode Island. The two hostile brigades encamped on the field within musket shot of each other that night, and Wheaton's men were not fired on while gathering up their wounded between the lines.

Monday morning May 4, found each of the contending armies cut in two, and the opposing halves were deadlocked. Hooker had assumed the defensive, in his horseshoe formation on the Bullock farm, and Lee feared to attack him with less than the whole Confederate force, and this force could not be concentrated until Sedgwick was disposed of. Sedgwick felt able to hold his own, but not strong enough to now attack the enemy in his front. Willcox had been re-enforced by Early's Division and Barksdale's Mississippi and Harry Hays's Louisiana brigade, which had come up from the Cox farm and re-occupied the Fredericksburg heights and were demonstrating against the Union rear; they put hundreds of skirmishers in the streets of Fredericksburg.

Eearly that Monday morning, too, Gen. Lee came up from Chancellorsville, with R. H. Anderson's big Division, and took charge of movements designed to cut off Sedgwick from Banks's Ford and either capture or destroy him before he could re-cross the Rappahannock. Hooker was now confronted with only the three divisions of Stonewall Jackson's Corps(now commanded by Stuart) and in the aggregate they did not number more than 20,000. Hooker had about 75,000, but Lee was not afraid of anything he might do or attempt to do! Instead of sending down 25,000 men to help Sedgwick, in his perilous position, which Hooker should and could have easily done, he not only refused to help

him but sent him word to this effect:"You are on the ground and know what is best to do."

So the miserable Hooker, half delirious and half prostrated by his defeat, did not lift a finger to help Sedgwick, nor even shake his fist at Jeb Stuart, although the latter had less than one-third the force of the Union commander. The loyal and faithful Gen. Sedgwick obeyed every order ever sent him, and yet in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War Gen. Hooker laid the blame for his disaster at Chancellorsville to Sedgwick's failure to join him on Sunday morning. Gen. Sedgwick did not receive the order until near midnight of Saturday night, when his army lay asleep in the valley below Fredericksburg; then the order required that the Heights of Fredericksburg be carried by a bloody assault; and after this was done he must march twelve miles against Lee, a march certain to be resisted every step of the way. And Hooker swore that Sedgwick should have done all that by daylight of Sunday morning, six hours after the receipt of the order!*

Gen. Sedgwick, now with less than 20,000 men and nine batteries, fought his way to Banks's Ford against 24,000 Confederates (Early's, McLaws, and Anderson's) and 17 batteries which were in the presence and under command of Gen. Lee himself, and then did not recross the Rappahannock until he received Hooker's positive orders to do so; while Hooker, with 75,000 men,(35,000 of whom had not fought) slipped off and ran away from before Jeb Stuart's 20,000 without the snapping of a cap, and then re-crossed the river under cover of darkness and a heavy rain. These are the established and recorded facts.

"
*In my judgment Gen. Sedgwick did not obey the spirit of my order and made no sufficient effort to obey it. His movement was delayed too long."--Hooker's testimony.

Sedgwick formed his Corpsthat morning in this wise: Howe's Division was formed to the rear, facing eastward, toward Fredericksburg, to meet any attack from that direction; Newton's Division formed to the west, toward Chancellorsville, and Brooks's formed to the south, the right joining Newton's left and the left joining Howe's right; the north side, toward Banks's Ford, was left open. Newton's line had three batteries on it, the other Divisions two each, while two batteries were in the rear, in reserve.

There was skirmishing during that Monday all day, and in the evening the Confederate Divisions made formidable and determined attacks on Howe's and Brooks's Divisions, with the design of driving them off and cutting off Sedgwick from Banks's Ford, the only place where he could re-cross the river. The attack on Brooks was easily repulsed by the infantry and the two batteries, but the assault on Howe was of a more determined and protracted character. Grant's Vermonters fought hard and were very valorous. They caused great bloodshed and captured a number of prisoners, including 21 officers and nearly all the men of the Eighth Louisiana, of Harry Hays's Brigade of Early's Division. Three battle flags were also taken.

As soon as it was dark Newton's and Brooks's Division, with Burnham's Light Brigade, fell rapidly back upon Banks's Ford, took position on the heights and in the rifle pits there, and were ready to fight again. Howe's Division came back at 10:30 and every wagon, cannon carriage, and other wheeled vehicle was brought back. At 2 o'clock the next morning Hooker ordered Sedgwick to recross the river with all his force and then take up the bridge. The order was speedily obeyed, under a brisk shelling from the Confederate batteries, and everything was across in two hours but the last regiment of the rear guard, and it was on the bridge, when another order came from Gen. Hooker countermanding the

order to cross! It was then near daylight, the Confederates were crowding down to the river with their batteries, and it was impossible to obey the vacillating commander, who was incapable at the time of giving an intelligent military order, or even of making a sensible suggestion. So Sedgwick went into camp on the north side of the river in the vicinity of Banks's Ford, watching it and guarding it.

WHAT THE BATTLES COST.

The total Union loss in the main battle of Chancellorsville, from May 1 to May 6, was reported as 1,082 killed, 6,849 wounded, and 4,214 captured and missing; total 12,145. Of the missing probably 1/8 were killed and their ~~bodies~~ skeletons found in the jungles next spring, when the ground was fought over again. This would make the Union killed 1,200.

Sedgwick's loss at Fredericksburg, on Marye's and Salem Heights, and defending Banks's Ford, on May 3 and 4, was reported at 493 killed, 2,710 wounded, and 1,497 captured and missing; total,4,700; the killed probably amounted to 500. Thus the aggregate Union loss at Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg--each battle a part of the other--was 16,845. Then there were 22 killed and 166 wounded in the three river crossings--Franklin's, Fitzhugh's, and at Germanna Ford--although the loss at Germanna was but one killed and four wounded. Thus the total Union loss of the campaign--excluding Stoneman's raid--was 17,033, or in round numbers, 17,000.

The total loss of the Confederates, as imperfectly reported by regimental, brigade, and division commanders and Dr. Guild, the chief Medical Director, was 1,649 killed, 9,106 wounded, and 1,708 captured or missing; total, 12,463. This included both battles and the skirmishers, for Anderson's and McLaws's Divisions(except Barksdale's brigade) and Mahone's brigade fought both at Chancellorsville and Salem Heights. The actual loss in killed was about the same in each army, or 1,700. The Union officials claimed that they captured by actual count 2,026. The total loss for each side was about 17,000 Union to 12,700 Confederate. Why were 5,700 Union prisoners and only 2,000 Confederates taken?

Yet it was not the Union army that was beaten at Chancellorsville, but its commander, and his conduct on this occasion severely

and permanently injured his reputation. His officers despised and ridiculed his generalship; his rank and file swore at him, and tens of thousands of them could not understand how they had been defeated in a battle in which they had not fired a shot. His cruel if not cowardly conduct in trying to make Gen. Sedgwick the goat of the unfortunate battle was simply ignominious. Sedgwick's brilliant exploit in carrying Fredericksburg Heights, and his victorious defense of Banks's Ford, are yet the only bright places in the gloomy history of Hooker's hapless Rappahannock campaign.

THE FIRST MINNESOTA AT SECOND FREDERICKSBURG.

It was not until Saturday, May 2, when Gibbon's Division began its part of the Chancellorsville campaign. Then Owen's Pennsylvania Brigade was ordered up to Banks's Ford, to protect that crossing. That night Gen. Gibbon recei ved orders to cross the two remaining brigades of his Division and occupy Fredericksburg, and this involved laying pontoon bridges. The brigades appeared at division headquarters, near the Lacy House, at 1 A. M., Sunday, ready for work.

Gen. Sully had been removed from the command of the First Brigade and refused re-instatement. Col. Hudson, of the Eighty-Second New York, had commanded until the 2d, when he was succeeded by Col. Byron Laflin, of the Thirty-Fourth New York. Ever since April 29th the brigade had been kept ready to move, every soldier with eight days' rations and 140 rounds of ammunition. On the night of the 1st the Nineteenth Maine was ordered away to guard the military telegraph, from Falmouth up to the U. S. Ford, so that the Brigade now was composed of the four old regiments, First Minnesota, Fifteenth Massachusetts, and the Thirty-Fourth and Eighty-Second New York.

At the Lacy House a call was made for 100 volunteers from the Brigade--25 from each regiment--to cross the river as a storming party to dislodge the enemy in the town. It was supposed that this would be a very tough job, for it was well remembered what the experience of the Seventh Michigan and the other regiments of Hall's Brigade was when they performed a similar task the previous December. But now so many men volunteered from this brigade for the perilous duty that not one in fifteen could be accepted. There was really a great contention among the men for the distinction of going. The Minnesota contingent of 25 was led by Lieut. Hezekiah Bruce, of the Red Wing Company, a young officer of Scotch-Covenanter blood, and as brave as Balfour of Burleigh. Of the

Thirty-Fourth New York's 25, there were 18 of the "mutineers," who had said they would not serve longer than May 1. "There's going to be a fight now, and that's different," they explained;"we are willing to serve as long as there is fighting." Luckily the brave 100 had no serious fighting to do; the Confederate skirmish line retired before they could get across, after fighting with them and the bridge party for an hour or so. Then the 100 went forward to the skirmish line and fought the enemy all day under Col. Hall, of the Third Brigade.

It was after daylight on Sunday morning, May 3, before the brigade crossed on the pontoon. Col. Laflin moved forward and formed it on Princess Anne street, the third from the river, the left on the right of Hall's brigade. Gen. Sedgwick now ordered Gen. Gibbon to take the two brigades out, cross the mill race near Mary Washington's tomb, and attack the left of the enemy's works above the town and carry them, thus turning Marye's Heights. These works were occupied by Gen. Wilcox's brigadeof five Alabama regiments. Col. Hall at once moved out and Col. Laflin followed him with the First Brigade.

At half the distance from the river to the enemy's works a broad and deep canal lay at the foot of the hill on the crest of which Wilcox had his breastworks. Col. Hall, under direction of Gen. Warren, chief engineer, repaired a bridge over this canal, under the fire of two guns from Frank Huger's Confederate battery(See Wilcox's report). These were the same guns that cannonaded Sully's Brigade, near the mill race, in the December battle, and caused a panic in the One Hundred Twenty-Seventh Pennsylvania. The mill race ran from the canal, and the canal was a distinct work from the race.

The two brigades crossed the canal and Laflin's marched across an open field and went into position, with the left of the brigade connecting with Hall's and the right resting on the Rappahannock. Col. Laflin now sent out skirmishers up a road running back from the river

and they soon found Wilcox's brigade on the crest of the ridge in front of Dr. Taylor's house and behind strong fortifications. The entire movement was performed under constant fire from Lewis's and Huger's batteries. Wilcox was watching an opportunity to participate in the Confederate movements to keep Sedgwick from carrying Marye's Hill. But for the presence of Laflin's Brigade, he would have marched eastward and been under the hill, in the outskirts of the town, in a position to fall on the flank of Newton's columns when they were preparing to make their successful charge. The march of the brigade to the canal was a great surprise to Gen. Wilcox. In his report(War Recs.) he says:

> My command was being formed to march to Chancellorsville, when one of my pickets came running from the canal in front of Dr. Taylor's to report to me that the enemy were advancing up the road between the canal and the river. Gathering up my pickets I deployed them as skirmishers along the crest of the hill in front of Dr. Taylor's and near the canal. Two rifled pieces of Huger's battery were ordered into position in ~~the~~ battery across the road from Dr. Taylor's.***Huger's pieces opened with a fire of shell upon the enemy, who had halted in the road upon the display of our skirmishers.

After resting for a time in front of Wilcox's position, and under constant fire from it, the two brigades were ordered away. Newton's columns and the other assaulting Union forces were storming the Fredericksburg heights and Gibbon's brigades were needed as supports. Hall's brigade, being in the lead, marched first and going eastward soon reached the rear of the right charging column which it was ordered to support. At double quick the brigade advanced and crossed the stone wall position, but kept on toward the crest, which it reached just after the storming columns had driven the Confederates away.

At the stone wall Col. Hall sent forward the 100 men of the storming party of the First Brigade as skirmishers, and followed behind them with his brigade in line of battle. The gallant 100 were under command of Capt. Ryerson, of the Eighty-Second New York. They attacked the enemy's skirmishers to the right, charged them and drove them to the crest of the ridge and kept after them. They chased the

fleeing Confederates nearly a mile, and came back with 90 prisoners, nearly a "Johnny" for every man of the 100. And not a man of the gallant phalanx was killed and only a few wounded.

Laflin's Brigade followed Hall's from the canal to the second heights, where it remained in position for some time and then, under orders, returned to the streets of Fredericksburg, and from thence at about 4 P.M. re-crossed the river, half by the Lacy House pontoon and the other half by the lower bridge, with orders to protect both bridges until they were removed. In his report Col. Laflin compimented the entire brigade on its good conduct, saying among other things that there had been but four stragglers, and that only 16 men had been wounded. He made especial reference to Lieut. Josias R. King, of the First Minnesota, whose good services, he said, were highly appreciated and commended.

In the movements of Gibbon's Division and Laflin's First Brigade at Second Fredericksburg, the First Minnesota was commanded by Lieut. Col. Wm. Colville. Col. Morgan had tendered his resignation on account of ill health, and was not fit for duty; the resignation was accepted May 5 and Col. Morgan given a position in the Reserve Corps.

When the brigade crossed the canal and confronted Gen. Wilcox, Col. Colville observed the Confederates placing some of the guns of Lewis's Virginia Battery in position to enfilade not only the First Minnesota, but the Thirty-Fourth New York as well. Col. Laflin, the brigade commander, gave Colville permission to place the First Minnesota in the intrenchments constructed and abandoned by Wilcox's men, and which ran along and parallel with the Rappahannock. No sooner had the Minnesotians settled down in these rifle pits than Wilcox's batteries opened on them and gave them a vigorous shelling; but the protection was too good and the artillery fire was quite ineffective and in a few minutes

it was stopped. Of this incident Gen. Wilcox reports:

The enemy halted in the road upon the display of our skirmishers and our artillery fire. They advanced one of these regiments moved down the river in front of Falmouth and sought shelter from our artillery fire in the rifle pits along the river; the other regiments remained in the road, lying down; the stone knolls on either side of the road gave them good protection.

The Regiment bade good-bye to Wilcox's Brigade,(to meet it two months later) and marched with its own Brigade to the crest of Marye's Heights, then back to town, arriving at 3 P.M., and then re-crossed the river. Arriving on the north bank, it guarded the lower pontoon bridge that night and all day Monday; then it moved up and guarded the Lacy House bridge until Tuesday evening. Both bridges having been removed safely, the Regiment went into camp.

The First Minnesota had nine men wounded: Benj. Fenton, of the St. Anthony Company; Almeron Davis, of the Red Wing Company; Ed. P. Phillips, Albert Johnson, and _____Reed, of the Faribault Company; Greenhalt Hess, of the Hastings Company; C. B. Boardman and A. Shaw, of the Winona Company; Nicholas Guntzer, of Company A, St. Paul.

THE STONEMAN RAID.

It is said on a preceding page that prior to undertaking his gigantic flank movement a round Lee's army, Gen. Hooker ordered Gen. Stoneman to lead his cavalry around the Confederates to the westward and go South in the direction of Richmond, but that this movement, designed for the middle of April, had to be postponed on account of heavy and continuous rains.

On the 29th, when the infantry were crossing at Kelly's Ford, Gen. Stoneman's advance cavalry regiments crossed the upper Rappahannock. The whole Cavalry Corps numbered about 10,000 sabers, but Pleasanton's Division, numbering some 2,000, was retained with the army, so that Stoneman had under him 7,500 or 8,000 men. The command was divided into two columns. The west column, under Gen. Averell, was to go south to Culpeper C. H. and operate on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. The east column, which Gen. Stoneman accompanied in person, was under Gen. Gregg and was to operate along the line of the Richmond & Fredericksburg.

Gen. Averell got down within three miles of Orange C.H., on the morning of May 2, and was then recalled, by a message from Hooker, to Chancellorsville which he reached and rejoined the army on the 3d, the second day of the battle. Gens. Stoneman and Gregg kept on and finally got as far as Louisa C. H., where they proceeded to damage the Virginia Central Railroad. John Buford's brigade was divided into six detachments which were sent out in all directions to destroy railroad property, tear up the James River Canal, etc. This column got back to the army May 7.

The result of the raid was not very valuable. The campaign was well managed and wherever the troopers were called on to fight they did so very gallantly. But the only Confederate force to oppose them was two regiments of Virginia Cavalry under Gen. W. H. F. Lee, a son of the commander of the Confederate army, and they comprised only about

1,800 men. The total Union loss was 4 killed, 7 wounded, and 139(mostly stragglers) missing.

Some railroad bridges, depots, and water tanks were destroyed, but they were soon replaced. The Richmond & Fredericksburg road was not struck till May 3 and the damage done it was so slight that on the 5th Confederate wounded and Union prisoners from Chancellorsville were hauled over it to Richmond. Had one of Stoneman's brigades been left with Sedgwick, it could have done good service in chasing and picking up Early's and Barksdale's men as they were flying in confusion from Marye's Heights.

#553 = 558

AFTER CHANCELLORSVILLE.

The great army was now back in its old camps. Those who belonged to it and were disposed to be reflective were greatly depressed and cast down. Again the mighty army, with apparently everything in its favor, had been badly defeated. Chancellorsville had been worse than Fredericksburg. What would be the ending of the final battle?

Gen. Hooker was a great disappointment. "Fighting Joe" proved himself to be only a fighter, not a general. He had not improved since he had commanded a division; he was hardly a success as a corps leader. As a great brainy general, to plan a campaign involving the handling of a large army and imperiling the fate of an adversary like Lee or Jackson or Longstreet, he was a failure. The only xxxx strategic movement that he seemed capable of comprehending was that comprising the throwing of a portion of his force around one end of the enemy's line, an operation called flanking; but this is really an elementary device which every military student has among his first lessons and which every second lieutenant thoroughly understands. He failed to see the key-point at Antietam, although he passed very near it three times, and seemed not to appreciate key-points, else he would have occupied the one at Chancellorsville.

After great and magnificent preparation, gen. Hooker organized and executed a successful flanking operation of mighty proportions, but having executed it he knew not what to do next. He seemed to think he had done all that was necessary to defeat Gen. Lee and his army. On the evening of his arrival at Chancellorsville(April 30) he issued his notorious and ridiculous "Order No.47," in which he vain-gloriously said to his troops:"It is with heartfelt satisfaction that the Commanding General announces to the army that the operations of the last three days have determined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defenses and give us battle on our own ground,

where certain destruction awaits him."(War Recs.,Vol.25,p.171.)

Gen. Hooker was several weeks preparing his great flank movement; Gen. Lee, in conference with Jackson, was about 15 minutes in planning his flank movement which not only completely destroyed Hooker's, but imperiled the very existence of his army. No general ever had a monoply of flanking operations. Lee declined to "ingloriously fly", but came out from "behind his defenses," and gave Hooker battle on his "own ground," but "certain destruction" did not befall him.

With the army he had, Gen. Hooker should have been a general capable of leading it to a field in an aggressive movement. A wise general always prefers to attack rather than to defend. Then he has command of the situation. He knows what he is about to attempt; his adversary can only conjecture the bold leader's plans, and nearly always guesses wrong, makes wrong moves, loses confidence in himself, and then loses the battle. Had Hooker been able to justify the expectations of his friends, he would have occupied the ground chosen by Warren, Couch, Hancock, and the other generals. Then, without fear of what might happen, he could have forced Lee to come out of his intrenchments and either fight at a disadvantage on Hooker's "own ground," or "ingloriously fly" down the turnpike road via Bowling Green, with the Union army constantly assailing his west flank and pushing him towards the Atlantic. The great generals, like Gustavus Adolphus, Marlborough, Napoleon, Wellington, Grant, and Lee, always attacked when they possibly could, even if they had to take chances.

#555

ON STAFFORD HEIGHTS.

For a month the First Minnesota, with the rest of the army, remained in camp on Stafford Heights, immediately opposite Fredericksburg. Gibbon's Division encamped just below the Lacy House, ("Chatham") near the river. The camps were within a mile of Marye's Heights, now in possession of the enemy whose guns were stuck along the crest as thickly, almost, as pins in the original rows. If so disposed, the Confederates could easily send shells into the tents or down the streets of the Union camps. Confederate infantry, too, were encamped across the river within plain sight and easy musket range of the Union lines, and almost directly under the Union batteries on the heights.

The situation was somewhat curious. Here were deadly enemies within striking distance of one another, with all of the means and appliances of warfare, and yet no man offering to fire a shot. There was a tacit understanding between the soldiers of the respective armies that an armed truce was on. Lochren notes that the pickets on each side of the narrow river, then fordable, stood ~~picket~~ sentinel and were regularly relieved within a stone's throw. On both sides the men were mostly seasoned soldiers, who would have fought one another to the death in battle or under orders, but who now considered that to shoot a man in the opposite army would be practically an act of assassination, a species of warfare to which they were not inclined.

Lower down the river the Confederates made a seine, and as the Rappahannock was then shallow and fish were abundant, they had fine times seining the river and drawing out fine catches of shad, perch, and other fish. Nothing could prevent the Yankee soldiers from slipping across after dark and joining these fishing parties and sharing in the catch. This unauthorized communication with the enemy irritated Gen. Hooker to such an extent that he wrote Gen. Lee about it in protest, and saying that he must endeavor to "put a stop to the practice of seine

fishing fro m the south side of the river."(War Recs.,Vol.25,part 2, p.521.) But Gen. Lee paid no attention to the protest; the fish helped out the scanty rations of his men, and the seining parties were occasions of a peculiar enjoyment which did no harm to either army.

Up at the town, opposite Sophia street, communication between the two armies was more restricted and guarded. The soldiers were forbidden to talk to their enemies, or to halloo across to them. But Lochren says the Minnesota men constructed miniature boats and rafts out of juniper(red cedar) fitted them with sails and rudders and sent them safely over the river laden with Northern newspapers, coffee, and salt; the Confederates sent back similar crafts with cargoes of Richmond papers and Virginia leaf tobacco.

Although conversation between the hostile ranks was strictly forbidden, the men improved every opportunity to talk to one another, orders or no orders. The pickets were the most frequent violators of the rule."Say,Yanks," the Confederates would suddenly cry out/;"our officer of the day has gone up town; if yours is there, buck and gag him! How are you all this mawnin?" Then would follow a conversation on miscellaneous subjects. Quite often there was sharp badinage. It was a favorite theory of the Confederates that every Union soldier was a "black Abolitionist," or a "nigger lover," of various shades of ebony, in proportion to the intensity of his regard for the negro.

"What have you all done with McClellan? Why did you remove him? Wasn't he black enough for you?" This from the Confederates. The Yankee reply was:"Little Mac is all right; his only fault is that you like him too well."

"Hev ye got the nigger gal picked out that ye are goin' to marry and take back up Nawth?" "Well, I picked out a yaller gal the other day but she turned out to be your half-sister and I won't have her."

"When are you all comin' over to whup us agin?" (This very sarcastically.) "O, we will come some day, and when we do, you'll get your licking all right."

The Union boys asked questions, too, and often embarrassing queries. They delighted to confuse the "poor white" element of the Confederates by asking what they were fighting for--what rights of theirs were in danger, how many negro slaves they owned, or ever expected to own, etc.

Of course there had to be drills and reviews and fatigue duty and the other routine of a soldier's camp life; but the time passed very well. On the 10th of June Gen. Couch, the Second Corps' very excellent leader, was, after repeated requests, relieved from the command of that Corps and transferred to the head of the new Department of the Susquehanna, and Maj.Gen. Hancock, the superb soldier, so long in command of the First Division became the commander of the trefoil Corps. Gen. Couch hated Hooker ever after the latter insulted him at Fredericksburg, and upon and after the miserable failure at Chancellorsville he was simply disgusted with his commander and would no longer take his orders, even though his refusal necessitated his resignation.

Gen. Sully got a command in Dakota to fight the Sioux, and May 10 bade the First Regiment good bye and set out for his new field, followed by the good wishes of every man in the Regiment. Gen. Wm. Harrow succeeded to the command of the former Sully's Brigade. Gen. Harrow had been colonel of the Fourteenth Indiana and won his stars fairly under Shields in the Shenandoah Valley and in French's Division at Antietam.

Col. Morgan's resignation as Colonel of the First Minnesota became effective May 5 and Lieut.Col. Wm. Colvill became colonel in

his stead. Major Chas. Powell Adams became Lieutenant Colonel, and Capt. Mark Downie became Major. Col. Colvill had enlisted as captain of Company F, the Red Wing Company; Maj. Adams had started as captain of Company H, the Hastings Company, and Maj. Downie had enlisted as first lieutenant of Company B, the Stillwater Company. All the new field officers took rank from May 6, 1863.

#559 = 574

GEN LEE MOVES THE SEAT OF WAR NORTHWARD.

Gen. Lee always desired to carry the war into the enemy's country. He realized that the devastation and destruction unavoidably incident to military campaigns was hurting the South in more ways than one, and he wanted the loyal States to feel the full effect of the military occupation of their country by hostile armies. Lee had started for Pennsylvania the previous September, in two days after his crushing defeat of Pope, but got no farther than well into Maryland, where the losing of a copy of his order brought confusion upon his plans. McClellan's disconnected and badly ordered attacks saved the Southern general's army at Antietam, but no sooner did he have a large army under him again, than he longed to once more cross the Potomac and invade Pennsylvania, threatening Washington, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and the perpetuity of the Union. Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville had raised the morale of his army and given to himself a great self confidence and a sense of power in the presence of such generals as Burnside, Hooker, Howard, and others, for whom he had nothing but contempt. A few days after Chancellorsville he began preparations for spending the summer with his army in the North.

After Jackson's death Lee had reorganized his army by dividing it into three Corps. The First he left with his "old war horse," Longstreet; the Second, Jackson's old Corps, was given to Gen. R. S. Ewell, and the Third was created for Gen. A. P. Hill. Gen. Dan H. Hill was a better general than either Ewell or A. P. Hill, but Longstreet says "not being a Virginian he was not so well advertised," and not in so much favor with what was called "the Virginia ring," which always got Virginians promoted when possible. Both Ewell and A. P. Hill were Virginians.

There were three Divisions to the Corps and four brigades to the Division, except Richard H. Anderson's, Rodes's, and Pickett's,

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each of which had five brigades. Including batteries of reserve and the 30 guns of Stuart's horse artillery, the whole number of cannons in the army was 287. In the three Army Corps there were 39 brigades and each Corps had about 25,000 men. The cavalry under Jeb Stuart consisted of five brigades, under Wade Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee, W. H. F. Lee, Beverly Robertson and W. E. Jones. The whole number of men "present for duty equipped" on May 31st was 75,268.

In the Army of the Potomac there were 51 brigades of infantry, 8 brigades of cavalry and 370 pieces of artillery. The guns of the artillery and the muskets of the infantry were generally of the most improved styles. Compared with modern weapons of war, however, they would hardly be taken into account for efficiency. The total numerical "effective" strength of the army, infantry and cavalry, was 84,677.

Gen. Lee's preparations for his march northward were soon and silently made—at least so silently that Gen. Hooker was not aware that they were being prepared. Others, however, knew of them. Confederate sympathizers in Baltimore and elsewhere in Maryland, and even in New York City, knew, by the middle of May, that Gen. Lee was coming into Pennsylvania with a large army and expected to capture Philadelphia and then Baltimore and Washington (War Recs., Vol. 25, part 2, pp. 509-510, etc.). Gen. Hooker at this time said he believed the enemy was "meditating some movement", although he had not the slightest idea what that movement was.

It began June 3rd, when McLaws's Division marched from Fredericksburg and Hood's from Orange C. H., both for Culpeper Court House. Rodes's, Ed. Johnson's and Early's Divisions, composing Ewell's Corps, marched on the 5th, and Pickett's Division the same day.

McLaws, Hood, and Pickett belonged to Longstreet. A. P. Hill's Corps was left at Fredericksburg for the time to watch Hooker.

Hooker became aware that Lee was making a movement of some kind, but was unable to learn its precise nature. We may well wonder where his scouts and spies were and what they were doing all this time. The only information he could get conwerning Lee's army seems to have been from a few deserters who had been conscripted into the Confederate service and swam the Rappahannock to leave it; but their information was meager and unsatisfactory. He began to be real suspicious, however, when it was noted that some camps on Marye's Heights had been broken up and abandoned. On the 6th of June, with the idea of a closer reconnaissance, Gen. Hooker threw Sedgwick's Corps across the Rappahannock at Franklin's old crossing; but all that Sedgwick discovered was that the Confederates in large numbers were still on Fredericksburg heights. Gen. Hill made a counter demonstration and Sedgwick re-crossed the river.

Gen. Hooker now had a splendid chance to ~~run~~ ruin A. P. Hill's Corps and break up Lee's half-begun expedition. As certainly as fate, had he thrown two or three of his Corps across the Rappahannock at Banks's Ford, and then moved eastward on Hill, he would have disastrously defeated that leader before Longstreet and Ewell could have returned to help, and then Ewell and Longstreet could have been defeated.

But on June 5th, the day Ewell's Corps left Fredericksburg, Hooker telegraphed Lincoln that appearances indicated that Lee had "broken up a few of his camps and abandoned them." He then went on to say that if Lee marched northward, as the breaking up of camps indicated, he would leave a strong force in the rear at Fredericksburg, and Hooker said he thought it was his duty to cross the river and "pitch in-

to his rear." (War Recs., Vol. 27, part 1, p. 30). Halleck very promptly forbade such a movement and influenced Lincoln, who telegraphed Hooker: "I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or to kick the other."

Yet Hooker did not remind the President that in this case only the "front" end of the Union ox would be liable to attack, and that end was quite strong enough to "gore" the "dogs" to their complete defeat. At all events, it is very probable that on the 5th of June Hooker did not know A. P. Hill's exact situation; Sedgwick's reconnoissance the next day convinced him that the changes in the Confederate camps were caused by a "reorganization of their army"! (Ibid, p. 33) and that Longstreet's Corps was still there, when it had marched three days before!

Hooker at last ascertained, by the hard-fought cavalry engagements of Beverly Ford and Brandy Station, that the greater part of Lee's army had left Fredericksburg and was heading toward the Valley of Virginia. Nearly all of Jeb Stuart's cavalry had been concentrated at Culpeper before Lee began his movement. Hooker did not learn this until June 6th, the day Sedgwick was sent across the river. He thought that Stuart was preparing for a great raid, or "meant mischief" in some way, and he sent two divisions of cavalry under Pleasanton to disconcert the menacing Confederate. This brought on the fights at Beverly Ford and Brandy Station and developed Lee's purpose to go northward.

To check Lee's movement at its outset, Gen. Hooker, on the 11th, threw forward the Third Corps to Beverly Ford and the cavalry to the upper forks of the Rappahannock, to prevent a crossing of the stream; for Hooker concluded that if Lee went north he would take Jackson's

route of the previous fall and go through Eastern Virginia. But while Hooker was puttering about the Rappahannock, Lee made another leap forward by pushing Ewell's Corps west of the Blue Ridge into the Shenandoah Valley.

As early as the 10th Ewell's Corps had been put in motion. Gen. Ewell was an active general. He passed the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap on the 10th, then struck Front Royal, crossed the Shenandoah, and then broke out in the Valley. And yet on the 11th Hooker telegraphed Lincoln: "Early's Corps is still in the rear of Fredericksburg." (Ibid, p. 36.) Advancing rapidly he reached Winchester on the evening of the 13th, having marched 70 miles from Culpeper in three days. And it is a fact that while marching over the rough, stony roads, one-third of his men were wholly barefoot, more than half of them had no tents, and all were ragged and hungry.

Detaching Rodes's division to go to Berryville and prevent Gen. Milroy, at Winchester, from receiving re-enforcements from the east, Gen. Ewell attacked Milroy, crushing and destroying his force. Milroy had retreated from Winchester, but Gen. Ewell intercepted him, defeated him in a fight, captured 4,000 of his men, 29 cannon and large stores. With a handful of men, Milroy escaped across the Potomac. Gen. Rodes captured Berryville with 700 prisoners. The garrison at Harper's Ferry fell back to Maryland Heights, and now there was not a blue-coated soldier under arms in the Shenandoah Valley except Ewell's Confederates, many of whom were clad in full Federal uniforms captured at Winchester and Berryville.

HOOKER RETIRES FROM THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

Upon leaving the Confederate situation, which was not until June 11th, Gen. Hooker prepared to abandon the Rappahannock and fall back to near Washington and wait for the development of Lee's movements. On the 13th the camps were broken up and the march taken up for Washington by way of the Orange & Alexandria railroad. The first move was to Bealton, Warrenton and Catlett's Station on the 13th and 14th, and next to Fairfax Station and Manassas Junction, where the army sat down to wait and see what Lee would do.

A. P. HILL LEAVES, TOO.

When the Union army left Stafford Heights it gave the signal of removal to A. P. Hill's Corps, which immediately left Mary's Heights and marched to Culpeper and joined Longstreet. The latter general immediately moved northward, co-operating with but not directly following Ewell. He did not attempt to cross the Blue Ridge, but marched northward along the eastern side of that mountain range, taking position at Ashley's and Snicker's Gaps, and with Longstreet was Lee. Longstreet's Corps, which was strung out along the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, with Stuart's Cavalry still eastward, formed a secure cover for the movements of A. P. Hill, who slipped his Corps behind Longstreet's, moved it down the Shenandoah Valley, and took position at Winchester.

Lochren says that at this time Hooker wished to strike Lee's flank and rear but "was over-ruled by the ever baleful influence of Stanton and Halleck, in their morbid dread for the safety of Washington," and that they ordered his army to the vicinity of the capital. The facts are that Hooker on his own motion moved the army from Stafford Heights to Manassas. He proposed no flank movement until June 27th, and he wanted this made by the troops at Harper's Ferry. A movement against Lee's flank at Ashley's and Snicker's Gaps would have been preposterous and accompanied by overwhelming disaster. He sent only a detachment of cavalry toward the Gaps merely as a scouting party.

The truth is that Lincoln was anxious that Hooker move against Lee's flank at the proper time. Five days after Hooker proposed to cross at Fredericksburg and two weeks before he proposed the movement from Harper's Ferry, and when Lee's army was strung out from

Martinsburg on the north ~~and~~ to Fredericksburg on the south, a distance of more than a hundred miles, Lincoln wrote Hooker: "If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg and the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Can't you break him?" Of course, Lincoln's views were those of Stanton and Halleck, his advisers.

THE CONFEDERATES INVADE PENNSYLVANIA.

As soon as A. P. Hill was well in the Valley and prepared to care for it, Gen. Ewell resumed his march northward with his Corps. June 22nd he crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown and Williamsport and marched by way of the Antietam battleground to Hagerstown. He sent Gen. Imboden, with a brigade of cavalry, westward to destroy the Baltimore & Ohio railroad and the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal. Gen. A. G. Jenkins, with his brigade of Virginia cavalry, was pushed swiftly up to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, which he occupied on the 23rd. Nearly the whole of Western Pennsylvania, up to the Susquehanna, was now open to Ewell's men to come and go, to forage on the Yankees at will, to have the time of their lives, with none to molest them or make them afraid.

A majority of the Confederate soldiers were poor men, lived in poor districts, amid poor surroundings, and had never before traveled very far from home, and they were simply astounded at the prosperity and the magnificent bounties possessed and enjoyed by the Pennsylvania farmers. Col. John C. West, of the Fourth Texas, writes in his little book, "A Texan in Search of a Fight," "The pig-pens and hen-houses of the farmers of the region were far more stylish and more comfortable than the residence of the average Texas farmer, while I never saw finer private residences in any southern city than those of many of the Pennsylvania farmers. As to agricultural stores, live stock, etc., I never before thought that any region on earth could be made to produce so abundantly."

With no hostile force to interfere with him but the not very formidable "green" Pennsylvania militia, Gen. Ewell's movements were practically unrestricted. From Chambersburg he moved his Corps northward, sending Rodes's Division northeast to Carlisle and Early's Division eastward to York, by way of the South Mountain ridge and Get-

tysburg. Then from York Early dispatched Gordon's Brigade eastward to Wrightsville to sieze the fine bridge over the Susquehanna there. Wrightsville is on the west side and Columbia on the east side of the Susquehanna at that point. Early meant to cross the river, go eastward a few miles and capture Lancaster, then go up northward and capture Harrisburg, the state capitol.

But the battalion of Pennsylvania militia at Wrightsville won a great victory for the Union cause. They skirmished with Gordon's Brigade until they sustained a small loss, then they retreated across the bridge, having first set it on fire so thoroughly that it burned up despite Gen. Gordon's efforts to put out the fire. This saved Lancaster, Harrisburg, and we don't know what else.

Gen. Ewell's command spent several days in riotous living in Pennsylvania. They fairly reveled in good eating and drinking. They gathered up 3,000 head of good, fat cattle which they sent down to Longstreet and A. P. Hill's hungry men, and they informed them where in Maryland 5,000 barrels of flour could be had. (Longst. Man. to Appo., 345.) Gen. Jubal Early was a cheerful and very enterprising robber. He commanded a division of Ewell's Corps and made the most of his position and power. This is his report (War Recs.) of what he did to the town of York:

"I made a requisition on the authorities for 2,000 pairs of shoes, 1,000 hats, 1,000 pairs of socks, $100,000 in money and three days' rations of all kinds. Subsequently about 1,500 pairs of shoes, the hats, socks, and rations were furnished, but only $28,600 in money was furnished, the mayor and other authorities protesting their inability to get any more money, as it had all been run off previously. # # # I determined to cross over the Susquehanna, march upon Lancaster, and lay that town under contribution # # # but this prospect was thwarted by the destruction of the bridge over the Susquehanna."

The authorities of the town of York had the alternative of seeing their town burned in case they did not comply with Gen. Early's chivalrous requisition; he plainly told them so.

The Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania produced intense excitement and alarm throughout the north. The southern half of the Keystone State trembled through and through; bankers, merchants, and many others sent off their money and valuables for safe keeping; thousands of farmers, with their live stock and household goods, hastened to the north of the Susquehanna, yet leaving plenty behind; Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington were considered in extreme peril, and even New York City was not thought to be beyond the danger line.

As early as June 15th President Lincoln, foreseeing this invasion, had called out 100,000 militia from Pennsylvania, Ohio, Maryland, and West Virginia, to serve six months unless sooner discharged. The governors of all these states soon had their respective quotas at the places of rendezvous. Gov. Horatio Seymour, of New York, and Gov. Joel Parker, of New Jersey, both ardent War Democrats, voluntarily called upon the citizens of their states to go to the assistance of their neighbors. Cordially were these calls responded to and thousands of New York and New Jersey militia and unorganized citizens were soon swarming upon all railroad trains running to the Susquehanna, furnishing their own arms and rations.

GEN. HOOKER ORDERS THE ARMY ACROSS THE POTOMAC.

With their Corps, A. P. Hill and Longstreet crossed the Potomac into Maryland June 24th and 25th, Hill at Shepherdstown and Longstreet at Williamsport, and both followed Ewell's paths into Pennsylvania. No further danger to the National Capital being apprehended, Hooker gathered up the forces that had been protecting it—and which were distributed over a considerable region—and crossed his entire army over the Potomac at Edwards Ferry, on the 25th and 26th, and made a movement to concentrate his forces at Frederick.

From Frederick Gen. Hooker meditated a movement against Lee's rear and right flank. He ordered Slocum's Twelfth Corps to Harper's Ferry and he proposed to make the movement with that Corps and the 11,000 men at Harper's Ferry under Gen. French. On the 26th he telegraphed Halleck: "Is there any reason why Maryland Heights should not be abandoned after the public stores and property are removed?" The next day he again telegraphed Halleck giving some excellent reasons why Harper's Ferry should be abandoned and its garrison put into the field. Halleck answered that Maryland Heights (Harper's Ferry) had always been regarded as an important point, that much expense and labor had been spent in fortifying them, and that he would not approve their abandonment, "except in case of absolute necessity." Without assuring Halleck that the "case of absolute necessity" was present, Hooker did something else.

Gen. Hooker was not solely dependent on the troops at Harper's Ferry to make his contemplated movement on Lee's rear; he had plenty of others that were not needed elsewhere. So important was that movement that he should have made it at all hazards. There is not room here

to give all the reasons why it would have succeeded, but Gen. Longstreet, in his "Manassas to Appomattox," (p. 348) says:

"If Gen. Hooker had been granted the authority for which he applied, he would have struck ~~ours~~ our trains, which were wholly exposed from Chambersburg to the Potomac, without even a cavalryman to ride in and report the trouble. Gen. Stuart was riding around Hooker's army, Robertson was in Virginia, Imboden at Hancock, and Jenkins with Gen. Ewell. With our trains destroyed the army would have been in a ruinous condition."

But it cemed not be expicted that a general who had not sense enough to hold Lee and his army down in Central Virginia and prevent their coming into the North would be capable of destroying the Southern army as it was in retreat. It will always be a mortifying and humiliating thought to every Union man that, by the ignorance and mismanagement of McClellan in 1862 and Hooker in 1863, the Confederates were able to transfer the seat of war from their own country to the loyal North. After the fall of 1861 not a single armed Confederate soldier should ever have been allowed to go north of Mason and Dixon's line.

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC CHANGES COMMANDERS AGAIN.

An hour after sending his reasons why Harper's Ferry should be abandoned, Gen. Hooker, from Harper's Ferry, telegraphed Gen. Halleck that he wished to be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac. The President, who had appointed him, promptly accepted his resignation and appointed Gen. Meade, then at Frederick, to succeed him. Gen. Hooker did not allege in his telegram that his resignation was caused by Halleck's refusal to order the evacuation of Maryland Heights. The reasons that he gave were seemingly that his job had grown too big for him. He said:

"My original instructions require me to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy in my front of more than my number. I beg to be understood, respectfully but firmly, that I am unable to comply with this condition with the means at my disposal, and I earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the position I occupy."

Yet Hooker's friends have said, like Lochren, that Hooker's removal was due to the "baleful influence of Halleck and Stanton." In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, he attributed his resignation to the unreasonable demands of the loyal people. According to that Committee's printed report (Vol. 1, p. 173) he said:

It was expected of me by the country that I would not only whip the army of the enemy, but prevent it from escaping. This I considered too much to expect with the force I had. It may be very easy for one man to whip another of corresponding strength, but to prevent the defeated man from running away requires great superiority of the man that whipped him.

No, it was not the "baleful influence of Halleck and Stanton" that caused Hooker to resign.

Gen. Halleck's concern for Harper's Ferry was unwarranted. Its continued expensive defense was very damaging to the Union cause. Halleck regarded its possession as of about as much importance as that of Washington. But Harper's Ferry was twice captured without changing the

status of the Confederates with England and France, but had Washington been taken once, those nations would have recognized the Southern Confedacy, and it is not pleasant to contemplate what would have followed.

Ultimately a great part of the garrison was withdrawn. It should have been withdrawn when Lee crossed the Potomac and entered Maryland. It was considered "the key to Maryland;" but, if this were true, what was the use of hanging on to the key when the enemy had smashed in the door and was ravaging the premises?

For some time it was thought that Gen. Hooker would be removed, but it was believed that Gen. Reynolds would be his successor. Indeed Reynolds half expected this; but when the real commander was announced he put on his best uniform and rode over and took Meade's hand in both of his, congratulated him most heartily, and swore to serve him most loyally. Gen. Meade received the highest assurances from all the other generals. He had grown up, as it were, in the Army of the Potomac, having entered it in August, 1861, as a brigade commander, and had actually won the place by meritorious service.

Like Burnside, Gen. Meade protested against being given the command. He, too, alleged his own unfitness, and urged that it be given to Reynolds. The truth seemed to be that McClellan, Burnside, Hooker and Meade had what might be termed Leephobia; they all seemed afraid of Gen. Lee— afraid that they could not match his ability or equal his skill— afraid that they could not check his movements, or prevent him from utterly destroying theirs.

The only really dissatisfied man with Meade's appointment was Hooker. When Hooker was appointed in place of Burnside, it was gall and wormwood to Burnside, for he detested Hooker, as did other generals. Now Hooker was to drink from the cup which he had made so bitter for Gen.

Burnside; for his severest critic had been Gen. Meade, who, especially after Chancellorsville, had been denunciatory and outspoken in his strictures. But Hooker was generous and chivalrous, and in general orders he complimented Meade as, "a brave and accomplished officer, who has nobly earned the confidence and esteem of this Army on many a well-fought field."

Gen. Hooker tried to get a subordinate command under Meade, and Lincoln was anxious to give it to him, but Gen. Meade protested. (Nic. & Hay, Vol. 7, p. 227.) He was finally given command of the troops sent to Chattanooga after Chickamauga, and when the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were consolidated into the Twentieth he was given command of that Corps. The conceit now having been taken out of him, he made a fine soldier, for he was a loyal and patriotic man. He won great reputation at Lookout Mountain and on the Atlanta campaign; but when Gen. Howard was given command of the Army of the Tennessee by Gen. Sherman, Hooker got mad and asked to be relieved from command and his request was granted. Gen. Sherman never liked him—thought him conceited and shallow.

THE FIRST MINNESOTA GOES TO FREDERICK FROM FREDERICKSBURG.

All through the month of May and until in the second week of June the First Minnesota remained in its camp on Stafford Heights. Rumors of marching orders were circulated almost every day. And at last Marching day came. The Third, First, and Eleventh Corps began the movement of Hooker's army northward June 11th; these Corps constituted the Right Wing of the army, which was commanded by Gen. Reynolds, and they, with the Fifth, moved toward Manassas. On the 13th the three other Corps, the Sixth, Twelfth, and Second, began their march; the Second acted as rear guard and was the last to leave the camps.

The First Minnesota, with other regiments of Harrow's brigade, moved out on the evening of the 14th, marched a few miles, halted for an hour, faced about, marched back to the Rappahannock, arriving at midnight, and was sent out on picket. Early on the morning of the 15th the march was resumed, and, passing over the farm where George Washington spent his youth and early manhood, the brigade reached Stafford C. H. at about 9 A. M. Here the court house was in flames, having been fired by some wretches from the preceding column. At 2 o'clock, under an almost scorching sun, the march was resumed and continued northeast to a camp a mile beyond Acquia Creek, which empties into the lower Potomac. Particular mention is made of this day's march because it was probably the hottest that the First Minnesota ever underwent. Although the distance traveled was only about 18 miles, thousands of men in Gibbon's Division were completely exhausted. There were numerous cases of sunstroke and three deaths reported in the Division. Every regiment had more or less stragglers who fell by the wayside from heat prostration and came forward as best they could as soon as they recovered. The First Minnesota had its

quota of these. Gen. Gibbon was unduly stirred up about the inability of the men to undergo the unusual hardship and fatigue. Under date of June 15th he issued the following uncalled for harsh address to his Division:

There are occasions when a man is obliged to leave the ranks, but in the vast majority of cases the straggler is a skulking cowardly wretch who strives to shift his duties upon the shoulders of more honest men and better soldiers. The fact that such regiments as the 15th, 19th, and 20th Massachusetts arrive in camp with few less than they leave with in the morning is sufficient proof that straggling, even in the worst weather, is inexcusable, and the general commanding the Division regrets to notice such a vast contrast in some of the regiments of the Division. By order of John Gibbon, General Commanding.

Now, while the regiments named were as good as any that ever shouldered muskets, there was straggling among them that terrible torrid day. Adjutant Earle, of the Fifteenth Massachusetts, (See History 15th Mass.) says that when that staid old regiment, renowned for its discipline as well as its valor, came into camp that night, it "had only 53 men to stack arms; it was the hardest day's march we ever had." And yet Gen. Gibbon praised the Fifteenth for not straggling!

To avoid the intense heat the Brigade marched at 3 o' clock in the morning of the 16th and arrived at Dumfries, on Quantico Creek, at about 8 a. m. It was now out of Stafford and into Prince William county. Continuing northward, it marched to the Occoquan by 6 o'clock and the brigade bivouacked on its banks at the Wolf Run Shoals. The next day Sangster's Station, on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, was reached in the evening, after another hot march, during which several men were disabled by sunstroke. The regiment was now back on the scene of its first operations in July, 1861, near the Bull Run battle ground; it first saw Sangster's Station July 17th. June 19th

a march was made to Centerville, well known and not pleasantly remembered.

On the morning of the 20th there was an incident of an unpleasant character in the Division's camp. A lot of reckless scallawags from the Second Division, including a few from the First Minnesota, raided the sutler of Capt. Bigelow's Ninth Massachusetts Battery, completely stripping him of his stock in trade. There was a great tumult, and Gen. Hays of the Third Division, ordered out a regiment and two pieces of artillery to subdue it. But the men of the detail were loth to fire on their riotous comrades, who captured the cannon, ran the pieces down hill and overturned them. Then they dispersed to their respective regiments, and as the Division was practically falling in to march, they could not be arrested.

At noon that day the Brigade set out for Thoroughfare Gap. It passed over the Bull Run battlefield and saw abundant evidences of the fighting that had taken place there. Of Second Bull Run there were plenty of ghastly relics. In some places the ground was fairly strewn with the unsepultured bones of the poor soldiers who had fallen in the battle. Adjutant Earle says (Hist. 15th Mass.) he saw two whitened skulls which were being kicked about like foot-balls by some passing soldiers without fear of God or respect for humanity. Passing through the little hamlet of Gainesville, near where the hard battle of August 28th, 1862, was fought, the Brigade reached Thoroughfare Gap about midnight, and here it remained four days, watching the pass and furnishing details for train guards. Thoroughfare Gap is the pass through the Bull Run Mountains which (by withdrawing Rickett's Division) Gen. Pope left open for Lee and Longstreet to pass through and join Jackson just before the Second Bull Run.

JEB STUART'S ATTACK AT HAYMARKET.

In the forenoon of June 25th Gibbon's Division was the rear guard of the Second Corps which that day marched from Thoroughfare Gap towards Edwards Ferry, where it was to cross the Potomac. In front of the Division was the Corps' long train of supply wagons. This had to be carefully guarded, for Mosby's band and Stuart's Cavalry were in the neighborhood, very much in want of supplies and very bold and daring.

It chanced that, just as the Corps was withdrawing from the Gap, Gen. Stuart and his cavalry were passing through the hamlet of New Baltimore toward Gainesville. They were on the famous raid which caused them to be absent from Lee's army at a very critical period, and to this absence Gen. Lee attributed the disaster which befell him. At the little town of Haymarket, where Gen. Hancock turned his Corps northward, Stuart came upon Gibbon's Division and saw the train. At once he opened vigorously with his horse artillery, Breathed's and Chew's Batteries, and moved forward some cavalry skirmishes and captured some prisoners, including Capt. Johnson, Gen. Hancock's escort, and some couriers that Hancock had started to Gen. Zook, who with his brigade was at Gainesville. Gen. Zook was ordered to move up and join the Corps and told the route it would take, and Stuart read and mastered the dispatches. ¶ The exploding shells* put to flight and into a great panic a crowd of sutlers, chaplains, negroes, and other camp followers that were lingering in the rear of Gibbon's Division, and it is said that there were some ludicrous scenes. Col. Colvill had his horse killed under him by one of Stuart's shells, and several men of the Division were wounded. The forming of Harrow's brigade and the advance of Webb's caused Stuart to leave the field and retire towards the Occoquan.

Adjutant Earle, Fifteenth Massachusetts, says: "I never saw so hard shelling before."

Now, this little affair at Haymarket turned out to be of great influence on Lee's final defeat. Stuart was on a raid around that portion of Hooker's forces then in the vicinity of Bull Run, intending to cross the Potomac above Edwards Ferry and join Lee in Pennsylvania. Had he done so, he could have kept Lee informed of the movements and whereabouts of the Union armies, and it was the lack of information on this point which Lee says caused his defeat. At the Haymarket, from Hancock's dispatches to Zook and from the prisoners, Stuart learned that Hancock's Corps and other troops were to be westward of him, and would remain in that direction for some time, and so he could not cross the Patomac above Edwards Ferry, but must pass lower down. Then, after crossing, he must get to Lee's army--which was west of the Union line--the best way he could. Had he not stopped to fight at Haymarket, he could have got to the westward of Hancock's line of march, and soon been in communication with Lee.

Stuart crossed the Potomac at Rowser's Ford, opposite Dranesville, and then went to Rockville. Here, within sight of the spires of Washington, he captured 125 six-mule wagons laden with supplies for Meade's army. These wagons hindered his marching rapidly, and when he got into Pennsylvania he rode hard night and day trying to find Lee and connect with him, and once he parked the wagons, meaning to burn them. Then, June 30, he had a fight with Farnsworth's cavalry brigade near Hanover, Pa., four miles southeast of Gettysburg, and he came near being captured. He did not join Lee's army until the evening of July 2, and then connected with its left on the battlefield of Gettysburg. The next day Robertson's cavalry division came into Cashtown. Meanwhile Lee had been getting along the best he could with two small commands of cavalry, (Jenkins's brigade and White's battalion) but they were not nearly so good at obtaining information as was Stuart and his accomplished scouts. If Stuart

had not tried to capture Hancock's wagon train at Haymarket, Lee might have done better in Pennsylvania. (For a full understanding of this subject, see Lee's official report in the War Records; Longstreet's "Manassas to Appomattox," McClellan's History of Stuart's Cavalry, Cooke's Life of Lee, Jones's do, etc.)

FROM HAYMARKET TO FREDERICK.

At nightfall on the evening of the Haymarket affair, Harrow's Brigade went on to Gum Springs and went into bivouac in a drenching rain. Rains are usually disliked by soldiers on a march, but this one was welcomed. It cooled the air and made marching possible without seeing men prostrated by the heat all along the road, with occasionally the corpse of a man who had died from sunstroke.

At Gum Springs the Corps was re-enforced by Gen. Hays's New York Brigade under Col. Willard. Gen. Hays was now the commander of the Third Division, to which the new brigade was attached. These new regiments more than made up in numbers for the loss of the Thirty-Fourth New York, which had enlisted for only two years, its time expiring about June 1. It left the army at Stafford Heights, June 9. The First Minnesota escorted it to the railroad station, gave it three rousing cheers as the train moved, and parted with its old comrades with sincere regret.

Another change in the official make-up of the Division occurred at Thoroughfare Gap. Gen. J. T. Owen, who had been in command of the Pennsylvania Brigade for some time, was put under arrest by Gen. Gibbon. The vacancy so created was filled by the appointment of Gen. Alex. S. Webb, a most accomplished officer, who had been serving on staff duty and with the artillery, but who was destined to become an efficient commander. Old "Paddy" Owen went back to Philadelphia.

The Brigade crossed the Potomac at Edwards Ferry, June 26, and halted near the old camp. This was familiar ground to the First Minnesota. On the 27th Poolesville and Barnesville were passed and camp made at the base of Sugar Loaf Mountain. The First Minnesota had to send 160 men out on picket, but the Fifteenth Massachusetts and the Nineteenth did not have to send any, as a reward for good marching and little strag-

gling. June 28 Urbana was passed and camp made in the beautiful valley of Monocacy, within sight of Frederick. The great hosts of the Union army fairly filled the valley. Here the news was received that Gen. Meade had superseded Gen. Hooker in command of the army, and the news was not generally well received. The men had come to like "Fighting Joe."

MEADE MOVES AFTER LEE.

At the time Gen. Meade took command, the Army of the Potomac was lying around and near Frederick, Md., about four miles south of the Pennsylvania line and six miles south of Gettysburg. The General knew that Ewell's Corps had occupied the town of Carlisle, 12 miles north, and York, 10 miles northeast, and was threatening to cross the Susquehanna at Columbia and Harrisburg; he knew also that Longstreet and A. P. Hill's Corps were somewhere in Southwestern Pennsylvania, and that Gen. Lee was with them. At once Gen. Meade got busy to make the Confederates loose their hold on the Susquehanna, for if they succeeded in crossing that river, there would be serious trouble.

The very next morning after his appointment, Gen. Meade began gathering up his Corps, and the next day, the 29th, put his army in motion due northward in his endeavor to overhaul Lee. The army moved in three columns, all east of the South Mountain range, and covering completely Lee's possible approach to Baltimore and Washington. Hancock's Second Corps was sent to Frizzleburg, Md., a mile south of the Pennsylvania line and three miles southeast of Gettysburg. Meade spread out his Corps on different roads like the ribs of a fan, but kept them well in hand so that he could concentrate them in a short time. The rib of the fan on which the Second Corps moved was the extreme eastern one.

On the night of June 30, after his army had marched two days, Meade fully believed that Lee had loosed his hold on the Susquehanna and was coming to meet him, concentrating his forces the while. The Union general was convinced that the Confederates would attack him, and he set about selecting a position where he could best receive them. The selection he made was along the dividing ridge or watershed between the Monocacy, which flows south into the Potomac, and the waters running into

~~into~~ Chesapeake Bay. The line of defense ran parallel with Pipe Creek, a little stream wholly in Maryland, and which flows southwest into the Monocacy. It was a splendid line for defense, but Gen. Lee usually refused to attack his enemy in ~~his~~ *that enemy's* chosen position; he preferred to "pick his *own* ground." Gen. Hooker prepared a splendid line of works at Chancellorsville and invited Lee to attack them, but Lee made his own selection of the attacking line. So now he declined to attack Meade on the Pipe Creek line,# but chose his fighting ground two miles north, at Gettysburg. Orders were issued that night for the concentration of the Union Corps on and about the Pipe Creek line, the concentration to be the next day, July 1. Pursuant to these orders Gen. Reynolds was sent with the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps up to Gettysburg--not to fight a battle there, but to mask and conceal the concentration on Pipe Creek. The Second Corps and headquarters were sent to Taneytown, practically on the creek. The other Corps were within easy marching distance.

Owing to the absence of Stuart's Cavalry, with its sharp, news-gathering scouts, it was not until June 28 when Lee became aware that the Army of the Potomac had crossed into Maryland and was at Frederick. That day he was at Chambersburg, Pa., with Longstreet and A. P. Hill and Ewell's Corps was at York and Carlisle. He feared that Gen. Meade would move westward across the South Mountain range and cut off the Confederate communication with Virginia.

A Confederate war poem, on Gettysburg, a parody on ~~Jane Taylor's~~ *Mary Howitt's* "The Spider and the Fly," contains the following stanza referring to the failure of Gen. Lee to fight Gen. Meade behind his breastworks at Pipe Creek:

"Will you walk up to my breastworks?" said Gen. Meade to Lee;
"They are the nicest little breastworks that ever you did see."
"Thank you, kind sir," the Southron said, "but I have always found
That I can do much better by picking my own ground!"

He was, according to his report, upon the point of moving his whole force northward to cross the Susquehanna and strike Harrisburg, then defended by only a few thousand hastily levied militia under Gen. Couch. Harrisburg in his possession, he might move towards Philadelphia (100 miles distant) or Baltimore, or whither he pleased. But now this movement must be abandoned. To save his communication he must push his army eastward and draw Gen. Meade after him, away from his line of retreat. He thought Meade would follow him wherever he went.

So, instead of sending Longstreet and Hill to join Ewell on the intended invasion, Lee ordered them to march from Chambersburg eastward through the South Mountain range to Gettysburg, 20 miles distant. Then he instructed Ewell to countermarch southward with his Corps from York and Carlisle to Gettysburg also. These movements were begun Monday morning, June 29. The march was made very leisurely, for after two days of it Hill's Corps bivouacked six miles west, and Ewell's was at Heidlersburg, nine miles north of Gettysburg. Lee selected Gettysburg as his point of concentration, not to fight a battle there, but because there were more roads running southward to the Potomac from that town than from any other in the region.

GETTYSBURG.

The great battle of Gettysburg, the mightiest ever fought on the American continent, was not deliberately designed by either of the contending armies; it was brought on practically by accident. Gen. Lee set out for Gettysburg only to concentrate his army preparatory to moving and fighting somewhere else, and to establish a base of operations. Gen. Meade sent a portion of his army there merely to mask his concentration on Pipe Creek, where he expected--or at least hoped--that Lee would attack him. The gigantic conflict was brought on in the manner to be described.

While Meade's army was marching northward, Gen. John Buford's cavalry division was thrown well out to the left or west flank. June 29, the division passed through Gettysburg and pushed out reconnoissances west and north. That very morning Lee had put his columns in motion for the town.

But June 26, on the way to Wrightsville and Columbia, (where it was expected to cross the Susquehanna) Early's Division had occupied Gettysburg, after breaking up the Twenty-Sixth Pennsylvania militia, which made a pretense of defending the place. Gen. Early, of course, made a demand on the authorities for supplies, but they responded that they had nothing that he demanded. Whereupon this chivalric, high-minded leader proceeded to plunder the town. In his report, however, he regretfully says: "A search of the stores resulted in securing only a very small quantity of supplies, and only about 2,000 rations were found in a train of cars, and issued to Gordon's Brigade." The cars and a railroad bridge were burned, but no thought was given of fighting a battle there.

On the night of June 30 Buford's cavalry was at Gettysburg, with scouts well out to the west and north. Gen. Reynolds, with his own

Spell Emmitsburg

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First Corps, was bivouacked on Marsh Creek, four miles south of town, with orders to go into Gettysburg next morning. Howard's Eleventh was at Emmitsburg, ten miles southwest of town; Sickles's Third and Slocum's Twelfth Corps were within call; others, especially Sedgwick's Sixth, were further off. A. P. Hill's Confederate Corps was camped six miles to the west, and Ewell's was six or eight miles north, at Heidlersburg, both Corps headed for Gettysburg. A collision was certain and imminent. The two armies were two great storm-clouds, charged heavily with thunderbolts, and swiftly approaching each other. Their collision meant a dreadful and frightful convulsion.

Each storm-cloud meant to receive the assault of the other. Gen. Lee had promised Longstreet and Hill that he would be cautious and careful and not assault the Union forces if they were strong and in good position; but he did not keep his word! Gen. Meade was determined to place his army in such a way that Lee would be compelled to attack it; and so he had gone into position on the Pipe Creek line to meet his enemy. Lee had been greatly relieved when he learned that Meade was east of the South Mountain or Blue Ridge Range; he knew then that no attempt would be made to the west of that range to cut off the Confederate rear.

Neither Lee nor Meade (although the latter was a Pennsylvanian) knew anything about the topography of the land at Gettysburg. Gen. Meade expected, and really hoped, that Lee would occupy the town, for then, in a few days, he would be compelled to come down four miles and attack the strong Union breastworks on Pipe Creek. Lee determined to occupy and hold Gettysburg as a base, for that town was the meeting place of seven great roads coming in from as many different directions and important points--from Chambersburg, to the west; from Hagerstown and Harper's Ferry, to the southwest; from Carlisle and Harrisburg, to the north; from York to the east; from Emmitsburg and Washington City, to the south, and from Taneytown and Baltimore, on the southeast.

These roads were, like in effect, the spokes of a wheel, of which Gettysburg was the hub. The town had about 3,500 inhabitants, and was also, for that day, an important railroad center. Lee felt sure that, when he had established himself at Gettysburg, Meade would attack him. Each cloud, therefore, expected to stand still and let the other blow itself against it. The Southern cloud was coming up slowly, but none the less not pretentiously.

THE FIRST DAY'S BATTLE.

Unexpectedly to both commanders a great battle was precipitated at Gettysburg, July 1, 1863, by the contact the preceding day of some scouting Union cavalry, taking observations, and some marching Confederate infantry, en route to secure a thousand pairs of shoes.

On the evening of June 30 Buford, with his division of two brigades of cavalry, Gamble's and Devin's, came into Gettysburg in time to drive back some regiments of Pettigrew's brigade, of Heth's Confederate Division, that were just entering the town from the west. They had been sent to get some shoes said to be stored in a Gettysburg cellar. Buford drove them over the Chambersburg pike half way to Cashtown, which is on that pike, about eight miles northwest of Gettysburg. That night Buford's scouts were very busy, and at 10:40 he reported to Gen. Pleasanton and to Gen. Reynolds that Hill's Confederate Corps, composed of Anderson's, Heth's, and Pender's Divisions, was massed just back of Cashtown, and that Ewell's Corps was coming down over the mountains from Carlisle and York. That night the hostile pickets were nearly four miles west of Gettysburg and within gunshot of one another.

The next morning, at 5 o'clock, Gen. Heth's Division, with Pegram's five batteries, advanced against Buford's cavalry skirmishers, and at once became engaged with Gamble's brigade in a body of open timber called McPherson's woods. Heth's was followed by Pender's Division, with McIntosh's four batteries; Anderson's Division, with eleven batteries, was in the rear, but hurrying forward. Heth's Division had 17 regiments, Pender's 19, and Anderson's 17. Hill's Corps was rather long on artillery--20 batteries with 92 guns--and it was composed of 20,632 men of the two arms of service.

Buford's cavalry was of course driven back by the heavier force to the vicinity of Gettysburg in a brief time, but without any disorder. The Confederates had no cavalry against it, for Stuart was not up. When the firing had become rather sharp, Gen. Reynolds sent Gen. Wadsworth's Division forward to strengthen Buford. Telling Gen. Doubleday to bring forward his Division and Robinson's as soon as they could be made ready, Gen. Reynolds accompanied Wadsworth's Division to the field.

Now, on June 30, Reynolds's First Corps had 10,355 men of all arms present for duty and 28 cannon. Gen. Reynolds must fight A. P. Hill, who had twice as many infantry and more than three times as much artillery. Wadsworth's Division had 11 regiments, Robinson's 11, and Doubleday's 12--or 34 regiments against Hill's 53. Howard's Eleventh Corps came up about 12 o'clock; it had 10,500 men, but just then Ewell's Corps came down with 19,764 men and the two Confederate Corps, with over 40,000, were able by 4 o'clock to cause the retreat of the two Union Corps with their 20,000, not considering the immense disparagement in artillery, of which Wadsworth's Division had but one battery, Hall's Second Maine.* The old saying of Napoleon was as true in 1863 as when he made it, that, "in war Providence is usually on the side that has the most artillery." The Union troops retreated through the town and went into position a mile or so east of the eastern limits along a high ridge, near the northern end of which was the public cemetery and the ridge was called Cemetery Ridge. The cause of the retreat may be briefly stated.

At 10 o'clock in the day, before the battle had scarcely commenced, Gen. Reynolds was killed by a Confederate sharpshooter, and his death was considered a great loss to the Union cause. Gen. Howard now assumed command of the right wing composed of the First and the Eleventh Corps. Gen. Doubleday took command of the first and Gen. Schurz of

* As a whole the Union army in the field always outnumbered the Confederate. But how was it then that on so many occasions, when there was fighting the Confederates were able to "git the most men thar first?"

the Eleventh. Gen. Howard was never either a fortunate or a skillful commander. On this occasion, desiring to keep the Confederates from coming far forward at any point, he attempted to stretch out the First and Eleventh Corps, with their 20,000, over a half circle which enclosed the northern and a great deal of the western part of the district immediately around Gettysburg. But to do this he stretched his line until it was very thin, and at one place it parted; this parted place constituted a gap between the right of the First Corps and the left or south of the Eleventh.

When Early's troops came down from the north, Rodes's Division went into position opposite Barlow's Division of the Eleventh Corps, but it extended the right of the line until it connected with Hill's troops; no gap between Ewell and Hill. In making the connection Gen. Rodes discovered the key-point to the field on Oak Hill, which is between the Carlisle road to the north and Mummasburg to the northwest. It commanded the right flank of the Union First Corps and the left flank of the Eleventh, where the gap was.

At 3:30 Rodes's and Early's Divisions, with Pender's and Heth's Divisions of Hill's Corps, advanced against the thin blue line. There was desperate fighting for an hour or more. Iverson's North Carolina brigade, of Rodes's, was shattered to pieces, three of its four regiments being captured; Daniel's and O'Neal's brigades were badly cut up by the heroes of Doubleday's, and Robinson's Divisions. At last the Confederates succeeded in breaking the thin line at several points, and Rodes pushed through the gap and with Early's Division and some of Hill's troops drove the Union forces in disorder back into the town. Gordon's brigade of six regiments routed Barlow's Division of seven regiments, wounding and capturing Gen. Barlow. Even the right of the First Corps gave way and became entangled with the disordered mass. Early and Rodes's swept around

the fleeing Union regiments became a panic stricken #592

and when the mob had captured about 2,500 prisoners.

In the earlier hours, however, before Reynolds was killed, Meredith's Iron Brigade, of Wadsworth's, did some fine fighting. It charged upon Archer's brigade of Heth in the McPherson woods and routed it, capturing Gen. Archer and a large part of his brigade and driving the remainder off the field. Gen. Archer was captured by Patrick Maloney, of Company G, Second Wisconsin, but the gallent Irish soldier turned over his prisoner and went on with his work, and unfortunately, was killed in the fighting later in the day. The old Fourteenth New York ("14th Brooklyn,") which was such a failure at the first Bull Run, redeemed itself this forenoon; with the Sixth Wisconsin (Iron Brigade) and Nine-Fifth New York, it charged Joe Davis's brigade, captured two regiments in a railroad cut, and drove the other two away.

Of course there was more, much more, gallant fighting that day, but it cannot here be described. It may suffice to say that at the close of day the two Union Corps, the First and Eleventh, had been driven back through Gettysburg to the east side of the town. The Confederates were badly torn by the conflicts, but Lee had Longstreet's big fresh Corps to throw in and felt very confident of victory on the morrow. Some of the Union troops were greatly depressed at the result, and this affected the next day's fighting. Many of them said: "We are in for another thrashing; this is to be another Chancellorsville."

ENTER THE MAN THAT SAVED THE BATTLE.

Gen. Meade was at Taneytown, Md., 12 miles south of Gettysburg, when he heard that Gen. Reynolds was killed. Immediately he dispatched Gen. Hancock, of the Second Corps, to "represent me on the field" (Meade's report) and take charge of the Union interests at Gettysburg. Meade himself did not leave Taneytown until 1 o'clock that night and reached Gettysburg at 1 o'clock on the morning of the 2d.

The gallant Hancock came galloping up to Gettysburg just as the shattered and confused troops of the defeated First and Eleventh Corps were coming through the eastern part of town. Steinwehr's Division, of Howard, on Cemetery Hill, and Buford's cavalry, on the northern outskirts, were the only sound and stable forces to rally upon. Two duties were now upon Hancock, to halt and straighten up the demoralized troops and to select a safe position for them. By riding among the men and letting them see him, (and contrast him with their commander, Gen. Howard,) he soon had them in fairly good order. Then with his good military eyes he saw where to place them--along Cemetery Ridge.

THE UNION LINE ON CEMETERY RIDGE.

Now, this noted ridge is an irregular, interrupted line of heights of ground running southward from Gettysburg. Right at the town the ridge bends back eastward and southward in a sort of crotch or hook formed by Cemetery and Culp's Hills. The line has been compared to a fish-hook with the hook at the north end and the shaft extending down along Cemetery Ridge. Cemetery Hill commands the country to the north and northwest. Culp's Hill, the north big knob of the line, is in wooded, rough, and rocky ground, hard to get artillery upon. Along the eastern base of this hill and of the ridge, from north to south, runs Rock Creek, which finally empties into the Monocacy.

From Cemetery Hill the ridge runs southward nearly three miles. Its southern termination is at a high, wooded, and rocky peak, its crest covered with huge boulders, and this is called Round Top; north of it a little distance is a similar knob, though not so elevated or formidable, and this is called Little Round Top. Like Culp's Hill, it is very difficult to get artillery on Round Top, or to place it after it is there. But with the Union army strung along Cemetery Ridge, facing in a general direction to the west, and Round Top for its southern end, the big knob became important. For if the Confederates should get a force around to the south and east of it, they would have the Union left flank turned and cut off, and dreadful would be the result. Culp's Hill could be held, for the Union line here, and on Cemetery Hill, where Steinwehr was, faced north, and just before where the barb of the fish-hook begins it faces southeast.

The crest of this long ridge had been fairly well cleared of boulders and there were many cultivated plots upon it. It had, with occasional fringes of timber, a good slope to the eastward, and on the

east side of the ridge, in the Rock Creek valley, were fine grounds for the trains and the reserve artillery. To the westward the ridge slopes down upon a cultivated and undulating valley. A mile to the west from the foot of the slope is a parallel ridge called Seminary Ridge, because at its northern extremity was a Lutheran Seminary. Along this ridge was the main Confederate line after the battle commenced. In the valley, between the two ridges, were well cultivated fields, orchards, and substantial farm houses. Midway between the Ridges and running to the southwest, starting at Gettysburg, was the road to Emmitsburg; running almost due south from the town, along the eastern base of Cemetery Ridge, was the Taneytown road.

HANCOCK FORMS THE BATTLE LINE.

Gen. Hancock selected the Cemetery Ridge line in a few minutes; but if he had taken a day in its selection he could not have decided upon a better. At once he began the disposition of his troops then on the field. Howard's Corps was nearly all on Cemetery Hill, and Hancock put Wadsworth's Division of the First on Culp's Hill, expecting the two forces to keep back Ewell, who was threatening to come down from the north. Then he strung Doubleday's and Robinson's Divisions along on the ridge to the south of Howard's Eleventh, and Geary's Division of the Twelfth, (Slocum's) having just come up, was put to the left of Robinson's. Later Slocum's other Division (Williams) arrived and was put with Geary's. Ordering the trains that were up to the rear, and leaving Slocum in charge, Hancock rode down to Taneytown to report to Gen. Meade, whom he reached at about 9 o'clock.

Gen. Hancock at once informed Meade that there must be a general battle fought at Gettysburg; that matters had gone too far to avoid it; part of it had already been fought, and he had partially prepared to fight the remainder by putting troops on a portion of the position he had selected for the fighting ground; that this position was a good one, but could be turned, and the whole army ought to be hurried to it. Gen. Meade was sorry that the battle could not be fought on Pipe Creek; but he accepted the situation, issued orders to all the Corps to hurry forward to Gettysburg, and that all trains should be sent to Westminster, Md., 25 miles to the southeast of the battle ground; but the last order was not enforced and the trains were parked in Rock Creek valley. Then at 10 o'clock that night he broke up his headquarters at Taneytown and moved them to Gettysburg, where he arrived at 1 o'clock A. M.

Meanwhile the van of the Third Corps (Sickles) had come up just after sunset, and the remainder of the Corps got up during the night and early the next morning. Hancock's Second Corps, now commanded by Gen. Gibbon, had only 13 miles to march from Taneytown, and when Hancock was returning from his interview with Meade, he found it near Gettysburg, and put it in position two miles south of town to cover communications. The Fifth Corps (Sykes) was at Union Mills, Md., nearly 25 miles southeast, while the Sixth (Sedgwick) was at Manchester, Md., 35 miles to the southeast. The message that was sent to the king of Denmark--"Hurry!"--was sent to Gen. Sykes and Gen. Sedgwick.

THE CONFEDERATES PREPARE TO FIGHT.

Meanwhile the Confederates were getting ready. Gen. Lee was disappointed to the extent of chagrin, that he would probably be forced to attack before he was ready--that is to say, before he was in a fortified position. Gen. Pettigrew, whose brigade, in its quest for shoes, brought on the fight, had been particularly instructed not to bring on a general engagement, and other Confederate generals were greatly astonished when one was precipitated. Their troops, like those of Gen. Meade, were scattered over the country, miles distant from Gettysburg, and had to be brought up and prepared with all possible haste.

The Confederates believed in few Corps and big ones; the Union commanders liked many Corps and little ones. There were seven Union infantry Corps and but three Confederate, yet in the aggregate of fighting men the Union army was not much larger than the Confederate. Longstreet's entire Corps was absent several miles when the fighting began and some of the troops of A. P. Hill and Ewell were behind; but the word "hurry!" was sent to all of them, and by daylight of the 2d nearly all of Lee's brigades were on or in the vicinity of Seminary Ridge confronting Meade's troops to the east, on the Cemetery range.

Longstreet, with the divisions of Hood and McLaws--Pickett's Division being still at Chambersburg--held the right or south of the line, facing eastward toward Round Top and a considerable extent of Cemetery Ridge, whereon Sickles's Third and Hancock's Second Corps were placed. A. P. Hill's three divisions connected with the north end of Longstreet's line and extended northward around Seminary Ridge, fronting eastward, the remainder of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. Ewell's three divisions held from the Lutheran Seminary through the town around the curved part of the fish-hook, sweeping past the base of Cemetery Hill

See Copy

and terminating in front of Culp's Hill, where Gen. Slocum's Twelfth Corps was placed. The Confederate line was about five miles in length, was a mile west of the Union line, and in great part was concealed by a fringe of woods. Each army had in position a powerful array of artillery.

The main part of the field may be compared to a long box lying north and south with the south end open. The north or closed end is at Cemetery and Culp's Hills and the southern part of Gettysburg. The sides are the ridges on which stand the armies, the Union on the east. The battle is to be across the valley or bottom of the box.

GEN. SICKLES TAKES A BAD POSITION.

As stated, Gen. Sickles, with the Third Corps, was placed by Hancock on Cemetery Ridge, near Round Top, and his position constituted the extreme left or south of the Union line. A part of the ridge where he was is not very elevated, and the ground falls off to the west into a considerable hollow. But 500 yards to the west, across a wheat field, a peach orchard, etc., the ground rises again and forms quite a ridge running north and south, and along the crest of this ridge runs the Emmitsburg road.

Now, Gen. Sickles thought that if the Confederates should come forward and occupy this ridge along the Emmitsburg road, it would be very bad for him. So he concluded to occupy it first. His Corps was not put in position until about daylight of the 2d, and at noon he advanced it to the ridge mentioned. The Corps had two divisions, Humphrey's and Birney's, each with three large Brigades.

Gen. Sickles joined his two divisions in the shape of a letter A, (minus the crossbar) with the apex on the Emmitsburg pike, pointing toward the Confederates. Humphrey's Division formed the right or north leg and Birney's the left leg, although the extreme left of Birney's was "refused," or bent backward through a low ground of woods, a wheatfield, and then another piece of woods, towards Round Top. The angle of this letter A was Sherfy's peach orchard on the Emmitsburg road, and from here Birney's "refused" line began to run back eastward toward Round Top, near which elevation and in front, in a rocky ravine, the left flank rested. The angle, apex, or salient in the peach orchard was the key to Sickles's weak line.

Gen. Sickles thought he had a fine position, but it was really very weak. He thought its extended wings, the legs of the letter

A, would enable him to successfully resist an attack on either or both of them. He did not make strong his salient or key point. If this were broken in, the enemy would pour through between the wings and be able to defeat him utterly. This was exactly what happened. A salient or projecting point in a line or a fortification is always weak, because any fire against it becomes enfilading on one or the other of its parts.* Gen. Lee saw the weak salient of Sickles's position and determined to attack it; "for," as he says in his report, "it appeared that if the position held by it could be carried, its possession would give us facilities for assailing and carrying the more elevated ground and crest beyond."

But for this faulty position of Gen. Sickles, every hour of the fighting on July 2 would have been in favor of the Union side. It was the only weak point in the Union line, and when it was broken, the Union army--and perhaps the great Union cause--was saved from great disaster only by some of the bravest and best fighting ever done on a battle-field. To the averting of this disaster the First Minnesota contributed its full share. Neither Gen. Meade nor any other of the Corps generals knew of the bad break in the line until 4 o'clock in the afternoon of July 2, when Meade came upon the ground. It was then too late to order Sickles back, for the Confederates had begun the attack; all that could be done was to support and re-enforce him.

* In one of the first battles in the Wilderness campaign, 1864, the Confederate general, Edward Johnson, placed his division within a salient which had good strong breastworks on either flank. Gen. Hancock saw his advantage and threw a portion of his corps against the position, smashed the apex, rushed his men between the flanks and captured Johnson's Division, with 4,000 prisoners, including Gens. Johnson, Stewart, and others. Later Hancock occupied and tried to hold this same salient, but was driven out by a counter Confederate assault!

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THE FIRST MINNESOTA FROM FREDERICK TO GETTYSBURG.

The rear divisions of Meade's Army of the Potomac scarcely halted at Frederick. On the morning of June 29 Hancock's Second Corps began to cross the Monocacy. Gibbon's Division, to which the First Minnesota belonged, had the advance. Its brigade, Harrow's, had been commanded for some days by Col. Ward, of the Fifteenth Massachusetts, while Gen. Harrow was sick in the ambulance. Col. Ward had his leg shot off at Ball's Bluff and the wounded limb was still unhealed; but he declared he would stay no longer in the rear, and he had been with his regiment since in February. He continued to command the First Brigade until the night of July 1.

The Corps set out for Uniontown and Frizzelburg, 30 miles to the northeast. A late start was made; the First Brigade did not break camp until 8 o'clock. This necessitated a long, hard march, which was not ended until 10 that night. The extreme advance went two miles beyond Uniontown, making the distance traveled that day 32 miles. Camp was made between Uniontown and Westminster, the latter the county seat of Carroll County, and 20 miles northeast of Frederick; Westminster was also the point where Gen. Meade had ordered his trains, although the greater part of them remained at Gettysburg.

COL. COLVILL UNDER ARREST.

Three hours' march out from Monocacy, the First Minnesota had a disagreeable adventure which the men afterward well remembered. Col. Colvill was placed under arrest. Corps and Division orders were that on the march the men should not break ranks or leave the line for any cause unless specially ordered, and staff officers were continually riding back and forward to see that the orders were obeyed. At the time mentioned, the regiment came to a small creek called the Linganore, a tributary of the Monocacy. The water was not much more than knee deep, but yet that depth was enough to soak the men's feet, and the hot day would scald and blister them when the march was continued. On either side of the route through the creek was thrown a big log, with a hewn surface, over which the footmen might cross the stream dry shod; this primitive bridge was called a foot-log.

At the ford, sitting on his horse, was Col. Charles H. Morgan, Gen. Hancock's inspector general, who was watching to see that the men plunged into and waded the Linganore without using the bridges. If a stone wall crossed the road, doubtless he would have made the men butt their way through it. At any rate, when the First Minnesota came up, Colvill at its head, Morgan called out: "Colonel, keep your files closed up and march through the water; don't let the men straggle." Colvill turned in his saddle and gave the command, "Close order--march!"

But some of the men, and even some of the line officers, would not "close order." Leaving the ranks, they skipped nimbly over the foot-logs, rejoined the ranks on the other side of the stream with dry feet and footwear and without delaying the march a second or confusing the line a "bobble." But Col. Morgan was very wrathy. He demanded sarcastically of Colvill: "Is that the way your men obey orders? Is that the way you

enforce discipline?" The impassive Colvill replied that the infraction of orders and discipline was "a very small matter to make a fuss about," and let it go at that.

Col. Morgan was a strict disciplinarian and delighted to catch commanding officers off their duty. Straightway he reported to Gen. Gibbon and induced that officer to place the First Minnesota's Colonel in arrest on the charge of "conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline."

Lochren says that Col. Morgan was provoked at Colvill for another reason. The Fifteenth Massachusetts was marching just behind the Minnesotans. Morgan had trouble to make them "bulge" through the stream. Later the brigade halted and while the men were resting on either side of the road the irate staff officer trotted between the lines. The Massachusetts boys groaned him somewhat vociferously. He thought the groans came from the First Minnesota, and he galloped forward, indignant and mortified, and had Colvill placed in arrest and deprived of command. Lieut. Col. Adams then assumed command of the Regiment until ~~the morning of~~ July 2.

The Regiment lay in camp near Uniontown, six or seven miles southeast of Taneytown, all day of June 30. The bi-monthly pay rolls were made out ready for the paymaster when he should be encountered. The people of Uniontown and vicinity were nearly all Unionists, and Meade's men were heartily welcomed. Refreshments and words of good cheer were offered the men from many a gate and doorway, and thus lifted their hearts and did them good.

Early on the morning of July 1, when Reynolds and Hill began their fighting on the Cashtown road, the Second Corps was ordered forward to Taneytown, seven miles to the northeast. Gibbon's Division turned back to Uniontown and then took the road to Taneytown, which place was reached about noon. En route the distant booming of cannon could be plainly heard from the field at McPherson's woods, west of Gettysburg. Taneytown is five miles

south of the Pennsylvania and Maryland boundry--the old Mason and Dixon's line--and 13 miles south of Gettysburg, which is about eight miles north of the Maryland line.

The march was continued steadily and rapidly, and at 4 o' clock stragglers from Howard's Eleventh Corps were met, being readily recognized by their Crescent Corps badges. As these were the fellows that first broke at Chancellorsville, their tales of woe and horror were received with jeers and hootings--and even with epithets and bitter words--by the Second Corps boys.

On marched the First Brigade, halting occasionally as regiments do when they approach a battlefield, until about 9 o'clock, when it halted on March Run, three miles south of Gettysburg, near the Taneytown road, and went into bivouac behind some hastily constructed rail and brush breastworks.

THE SECOND DAY'S BATTLE.

It was nearly 4 o'clock in the afternoon of July 2 (Thursday) when Gen. Lee had completed his dispositions for a formidable attack upon the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. By 7 o'clock of the evening of July 1 it was evident that the Confederates would be the aggressors the next day. They had served Howard's Eleventh Corps as they served it at Chancellorsville, and along with it they had defeated the fine old First Corps and driven both of these organizations in panic and disorder from the field. They were confident that they could repeat the performance the following day upon the other Union Corps.

Early in the morning it was apparent that Lee meant to use Ewell's Corps in the capture of Culp's Hill at the north end of the Union line. To defend these positions was the unreliable Eleventh Corps and the broken divisions of the First Corps. Gen. Meade proposed that Gen. Slocum, with his Twelfth Corps, should attack the Confederates that were threatening the hills, but Slocum reported that their position was too strong--let them do the attacking. Lee's idea was that Ewell should attack, or at least demonstrate, against the north end of the Union line, and thus prevent re-enforcements from being sent to the south end, where he proposed to make his main attack. Of course, if Ewell could carry the two hills and then roll back the right of the Second Corps, so much the better. Lee meant to assault Cemetery Ridge as McClellan designed his attempts on the Hagerstown pike at Antietam, and "play both ends against the middle."

But Gen. Ewell reports that he was not to make his attack until Longstreet on the right, or south, should make his, and so it was nearly 5 o'clock before Ewell's Divisions, Early's and Johnson's, began their assaults; Rodes's Division was left in reserve.

Meanwhile Sedgwick's good Sixth Corps arrived, after a long hard march from Manchester, 35 miles to the southeast, and this arrival was of great help to the Union Line. The Fifth Corps (Sykes) had been in reserve on the Union right, but Gen. Meade now took it and placed it on the left, in reserve, to help defend the Round Tops, and Sedgwick's Corps took its place to help defend the big hills. Thus the Union left was re-enforced without weakening the right. Of course all this while, the skirmishers of both sides, infantry, artillery, and cavalry, had been very busy.

LONGSTREET ATTACKS SICKLES.

About 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Longstreet's two divisions, those of Hood and McLaws, descended from the west side of the box and began moving across the bottom to attack the salient of Sickles's position in Sherfy's peach orchard. It was soon smashed in. Then the greater part of Hood's Division fell upon the left leg of Sickles's letter A, Birney's Division, that part of his Corps line which stretched back eastward from the Peach Orchard to the Round Tops. Hood's line now faced northeast and began the demolition of the left leg; but at the same time he was thrusting his extreme right between Sickles's extreme left and Round Top.

The situation was of great peril to the Union line--and indeed to the Union cause. The Confederate possession of the Round Tops would have taken Meade's line in reverse--that is to say, in the rear--and ordinarily this would mean its destruction. Big Round Top had a small Union force upon it, but Little Round Top, a hundred yards to the north, was unoccupied, save by a few men of the Union Signal Corps and Gen. G. K. Warren, the army's chief engineer. Had Gen. Hood known the nakedness of this rocky hill at this time and pushed his whole division for it, breaking down the well nigh shattered brigades of Sickles as he came, he would have almost ended the battle. Swinton says: "He would have grasped in his hand the key of the battle ground, and Gettysburg might have been one of those fields that decide the issues of wars."

Gen. Warren saved Little Round Top; what else he saved cannot certainly be said. Seeing that Hood's men were fast advancing, and fearing that they would soon be surrounded, the signal men began to fold up their flags preparatory to leaving. But Gen. Warren bade them continue the waiving of the signals, as if the summit were occupied, while he went for help. It has been said that Sykes's Fifth Corps hadbeen ordered from near Culp's Hill to re-enforce the Union left. Gen. Warren met the Corps not very far

away. He hastily detached Vincent's Brigade and Hazlett's Battery with them to Little Round Top.

He reached the little mount just in time. As Vincent's men ascended to its summit Hood's Texans were coming against its rugged side on the west. Hazlett's Battery, guns, caissons and all, had to be dragged by hand to the crest; the horses were left in the rear. Then ensued a most terrible and savage fight between Robertson's Brigade of three Texas and one Arkansas regiment and Law's five Alabama regiments that fought against Vincent's four (Sixteenth Michigan, Forty-Fourth New York, Eighty-Third Pennsylvania, and Twentieth Maine) though after a time Vincent's Brigade was re-enforced by Gen. Weed's. The Confederates were re-enforced on their left or north by "Tige" Anderson's and Benning's Brigades.

In the end the main forces of the Confederates were driven back to the Emmitsburg road, where they remained, still keeping up a skirmish line until the evening of the 3d. Weed's and Vincent's Union brigades lost 523 killed and wounded and 29 missing. Gen. Weed, Col. Vincent, Capt. Hazlitt, and Col. O'Rorke were all killed; but Little Round Top was safe in Union hands. The Confederate loss was also heavy. Gen. Hood had his right arm shot off, and a number of officers were killed.

SICKLE'S NORTH WING SMASHED.

When Hood's Division broke in the salient of the letter A of Sickles at Sherfy's Peach Orchard, fractured the left leg of Birney's Division, and pushed on for Little Round Top, a part of the division, aided by McLaws's Division, fell upon the right leg, composed of Humphreys's Division. Really this attack was made against the center and left (or south) of the Third Corps as well as upon the left of Humphreys's Division. Longstreet had extended his line too far to the south to cover the entire north front of Sickles's Corps and his extreme right lapped over Birney's extreme left and enabled the Confederates to hold the base of Big Round Top, including the gorge called the Devil's Den, which is between the two Tops. Connecting with the left of Longstreet's line, and prolonging it to the north, was A. P. Hill's Corps, and Humphreys had a part of this Corps in his front.

When Hood and McLaws were crushing Ward's and De Trobriand's brigades of Birney's Division, Barnes's Division of Sykes's Fifth Corps came to their assistance, as did Burling's Brigade, sent by Gen. Humphreys. All were defeated and driven by the Confederates. Burling's regiments were distributed among the other brigades.

And now the heaviest attack was made upon the Sherfy Peach Orchard, and upon Abraham Trostle's premises, just east of it. Here were Graham's Brigade of Birney and a portion of Humphreys's Division. They were assailed by Kershaw's and Semmes's brigades of McLaws and two brigades (Perry's and Wright's) of Anderson's Division of Hill's Corps. The Union troops fought well, but they did not have an equal chance, and were driven back. The entire salient was now smashed in and the Confederates held and maintained the key point.

Now, the faultiness of Sickles's advanced position was thoroughly demonstrated. The original front of Birney's Division had disap-

peared. The Confederates burst through the center of the Third Corps and fairly rioted in assailing the disrupted wings of Sickles's Divisions (the legs of the letter A) in detail. Bigelow's Ninth Massachusetts Battery, at the Trostle farm house, was, after a gallant defense, captured and three of its guns permanently retained. The brigades of Tilton and Sweitzer of Barnes (Fifth Corps), which had been sent to help Birney, were driven back.

Then Gen. Hancock sent in Gen. Caldwell's good First Division (formerly Hancock's own) of the Second Corps to check the Confederates. It had four fine brigades, Col. Cross's, Col. Kelly's, Gen. Zook's, and Col. Brooke's. The Division met the fate of its comrades. Col. Brooke drove Kershaw's Brigade away from the base of the Round Tops and along Plum Run, which was a rocky stream, but he could not keep them away. Gen. Ayres, with two brigades of regulars, (of Sykes's Fifth Corps), was sent to check Hood's men who were occupying the ground originally held by the left of Birney, not far east of the Emmitsburg road.

But now Hood's and Anderson's Brigades--Wilcox's of Anderson having come up--had penetrated the wide interval made by the bursting open of Sickles's center at the Peach Orchard, thus dividing the Union forces, and had them at their mercy. They enveloped Caldwell's right and penetrated almost to his rear, and this soon forced him back after the awful sacrifice of one-half his division. Gen. Zook and the intrepid Col. Cross, of the Fifth New Hampshire, were killed and Col. Brooke seriously wounded. Then Hood's men threw back Sweitzer's Brigade; and Ayres's two brigades of regulars, being struck on their right and rear, had to fight very hard to cut their way through the enemy to safety.

Graham's Brigade had been holding the Peach Orchard, but, as has been said, at the Confederate onset the orchard was captured and its defenders chased away. Gen. Graham was seriously wounded simultaneously by a bullet and a piece of shell and fell into Confederate hands. Almost at

the same time, or about 6 o'clock, Gen. Sickles, while trying to encourage his shaken men, had his right leg shot off. He dismounted from his horse, had his leg tightly bound above his knee with a handkerchief, and left the battle field on a litter, and the command of the Third Corps now fell to Gen. Birney.

The fight in which Gen. Sickles lost his leg was that made by Longstreet against Humphrey's Division, and the confederate commands participating were the four brigades (of Kershaw, Barksdale, Semmes, and Wofford) of McLaws's Division of Longstreet and three brigades (of Wilcox, Perry, and Wright) of Anderson's Division of A. P. Hill. These advanced against Gen. Humphrey, who says he had 5,000 men, and soon routed him.

THE OLD GORMAN BRIGADE COMES TO HELP.

Before he was attacked Gen. Humphreys had called for re-enforcements, and to support his flank Gen. Hancock had sent from his Second Corps two regiments from Harrow's Brigade, the Fifteenth Massachusetts, under Col. Ward, and the Eighty-Second New York, under Col. Huston. These regiments fought well, as they always did, but were pushed back with the regiments of Humphreys, though the Eighty-Second rallied, came back and did most gallant work. Both colonels were mortally wounded, dying the next day. To cover a gap on the left of Humphreys' line, Hancock sent Willard's New York brigade, of Hays's Third Division. Later he sent two regiments of Hall's Brigade (of Gibbon) the Nineteenth Massachusetts under Col. Devereux and the Forty-Second New York (Tammany) under Col. Mallon. They hardly reached the field when they met Humphreys's men running in disorder to the rear. They formed a line and fought for ten minutes against overwhelming odds and then retired.

The Confederate advance in front of the Second Corps line continued. The Third Corps, since the wounding of Sickles, had been added to Hancock's command and Gen. Gibbon now directly commanded the Second Corps. Gen. Harrow commanded the division and Col. Heath, of the Nineteenth Maine, was temporarily in command of the old Gorman Brigade.

THE CONFEDERATES FIGHT UP TO THE UNION LINE.

The Confederates followed those they had driven from the field and soon began to beat against the walls of the main Union position on Cemetery Ridge. In front of Gibbon's (or Harrow's) Division the attack was menacing. Hall and Webb and Willard straightened up their brigade lines, determined that the big ridge should fly as soon as they. Barksdale's Mississippi brigade confronted Hall's and a part of Willard's. Semmes's stood face to face with Webb's.

There was great fighting. The Confederates seemed determined to take the ridge. In waves of brigades they dashed up against the Union rocks and broke into sprays of disorganized squads. Gen. Barksdale led his brigade square against Willard's and Hall's and when within 20 yards of the line of the Seventh Michigan was shot from his saddle and mortally wounded, dying on the third day. (See Col. Hall's report.) His body was picked up, and near it two Confederate flags, and eventually was taken charge of by a former acquaintance, Col. C. E. Livingston, of Gen. Doubleday's staff. "His dying speech and last messages for his family, together with the valuables about his person, were entrusted by him to Col. Livingston." (Doubleday's report.)#

#Gen. Wm. Barksdale was a prominent Southerner and Confederate. His home was at Columbus, Miss. Before the war he was a member of Congress for three terms and known as a radical pro-slavery man. He was a private soldier in the Mexican War and entered the Confederate army in 1861 as colonel of the Thirteenth Mississippi, its first fight being against the First Minnesota at Edwards Ferry. As regimental or brigade commander he confronted the Minnesotans at Savage's Station, Antietam, Fredericksburg, (twice) and was always a hard fighter. The claim of Lochren and others that he was probably killed by some one of the First Minnesota cannot be substantiated. He was shot down and picked up in front of the Seventh Michigan, as has been conclusively proven, and no Minnesotan was within gunshot at the time. He was taken to Doubleday's headquarters, which were not far away, but to the right rear.

Gen. Paul Semmes, who had so long commanded a Georgia brigade of McLaws, was mortally wounded about the same time his comrade commander, Gen. Barksdale, fell; but his command was to the scuth of Barksdale's. Gen. Semmes died a few days later.

Col. Willard bravely charged the enemy as they came towards him, but he too was killed and the brigade checked. Gen. Hancock now rode along the line straightening it up and putting it in order. At one point (which, as near as can be now determined,was to the north of Willard's position and the south of a part of Humphreys's disordered line) he saw an unprotected interval towards which the Confederates of Wilcox's Brigade were advancing, with Barksdale's Brigade on their south. The First Minnesota chanced to be near by on the hillside, and, throwing it into the breach, the Confederate onset was checked, although at frightful loss to the little regiment. (See subsequent pages.)

Then Hancock hurried up to the line Stannard's three Vermont regiments of the First Corps, and the Thirteenth Vermont filled the vacancy occasioned by the retirement of the First Minnesota. Gen. Meade led up two regiments of Lockwood's Maryland brigade and put them on the left down by the Round Tops; afterward they came up to the north end of the line. It was now sundown. Though victorious so far, the Confederates were nearly "all in." They too had lost heavily, especially in officers. But their losses did not serve to dispirit them until they sat down and began to look things over; whereas many Union troops seemed appalled and demoralized every time a comrade was shot.

HANCOCK DRIVES BACK THE CONFEDERATES.

Gathering up the broken forces that had been defeated on the field and the detachments from different Corps that had come up to their assistance, Gen. Hancock ordered a counter-charge on the Confederates, who had dropped down into Plum Run, a rocky, brush-fringed little brook or ravine, or had sheltered themselves otherwise and elsewhere. Even Humphreys's men, badly whipped as they had been, got new courage and joined enthusiastically in the charge. It was a great success; the Confederates were soon routed; they fled in disorder; Hancock's men chased some of them back to the Emmitsburg pike, which they were glad to hide behind. And, glory be! Gen. Humphreys's north division got back all the cannons it had lost, every one! And a lot of prisoners and a big cluster of Confederate flags were taken, which was some satisfaction.

And to help matters for the Union side, just as Longstreet's and Anderson's men were feeling badly, here came Crawford's six regiments of Pennsylvania Reserves upon them. After fighting pluckily to hold a stone wall and failing, the last of the Confederates hastily retreated through the woods beyond or west of Plum Run near Round Top, and this stream and Trostle's wheatfield separated the skirmish lines of the two armies in this quarter that night.

EWELL GETS A HOLD ON CULP'S HILL.

Lee's plan of battle contemplated that Longstreet should attack vigorously the south or left of the Union line; then Union re-enforcements would be sent from the north or right, at Culp's and Cemetery Hills, thus weakening the defensive ~~faces~~ forces of these commanding points and rendering it comparitively easy for Gen. Ewell, with his Corps, to carry them. When Longstreet and Ewell were both well engaged, A. P. Hill was to advance upon the Union center.

Gen. Longstreet did not attack until after 4 o'clock, and as soon as his guns were heard Ewell moved. He sent Johnson's Division around to assault the barb or point of the fish hook, Culp's Hill, and he sent Early's Division against Cemetery Hill, where Howard's Eleventh Corps were. Howard's men were of course "shaken" (because it was easy to set them vibrating) and they were about to run away from the hill, when Hancock, from his Third Division, rushed Carroll's Brigade up just in time to repel Early's right assault. The two batteries of Ricketts and Wildrick helped greatly in driving off the Confederates, though at one time the artillery men had to knock them on the head with rammers, trail spikes, and even stones.

But Johnson's Division had better success. So many of Slocum's Twelfth Corps had been taken away from Culp's Hill to re-enforce down towards the Round Tops, that only Greene's Brigade of Geary was left on the hill to defend it. But old Gen. Geo. S. Greene, though 62 years of age and grizzled and wrinkled, was a brave fighter, and like general like brigade. Master and men fought as the heroes they were, and with the help of some of Wadsworth's troops drove Early from the hill and kept him off. But the farthest right or north section of the Union line was vacant; its defenders had been sent down to help the Third and Fifth Corps, and Greene could not stretch his line enough to cover it. Stuart's Confederate bri-

gade of Johnson soon occupied the blank space and (behind the breastworks Slocum's men had built) held it until noon the next day.

This latter movement really made Johnson's effort a success. It was not made till nearly dark, and it was too late to do anything more that day; but if Stuart held the captured works, and other troops co-operated, the Union line could be taken in reverse and it would be possible to roll it up, the same as if the Round Tops had been taken.

THE FIGHT A DRAW.

The second day's fight at Gettysburg was a drawn battle. The Union army had lost 20,000 men, and the hearts of some of the men failed them. But no substantial Confederate success had been gained when the sun went down. Longstreet had failed to capture the Round Tops or to turn the south end of the Union line. Longstreet and A. P. Hill had failed to break the Union center or to gain the crest of Cemetery Ridge in that quarter. Sickles's Third Corps had been smashed and driven back, but it was better off now than at first; for at first it was in a false position--in a triangle with its apex in Sherfy's peach orchard--but now it was on Cemetery Ridge, where it ought to have been all the time. The only part of the Union line in real jeopardy was that part ~~held~~ threatened by Stuart's Confederates at Culp's Hill.

But Gen. Lee had the supremest confidence that next day he would win a great victory. With his contempt for the Yankee fighters he felt sure that he would carry Culp's Hill the next morning, assault and capture Cemetery Ridge during the forenoon, and ruin Meade's army by nightfall. However, that night Meade and his generals met in council and voted unanimously to fight next day, and fight hard, and not retreat until they had to--and honor and glory be to them! It has been charged, however, that before he called the council Gen. Meade had determined to retreat.

THE OLD GORMAN BRIGADE DOES ITS PART.

The old First Brigade, to which the First Minnesota belonged, while nominally under command of Gen. Harrow, had for some days, during the General's illness, been commanded by Col. Ward, of the Fifteenth Massachusetts. But this morning, just as the brigade got into position on ~~County~~ Cemetery Ridge, Gen. Harrow came back and resumed command and Col. Ward went back to his regiment. The General was not a well man, by any means, but he said he would not "play sick" in a fight. Col. Ward, with the stump of his amputated leg still unhealed, went into the hottest of the fight later in the day and fell mortally wounded on the battle field, while trying to help Sickles's men down by the Codori house.

Harrow's Brigade was pulled to pieces that day in efforts to relieve different commands and portions of the Union line. In the afternoon Capt. Berger's (formerly Russell's) Minnesota Sharpshooters (attached to the First Minnesota and often called Company L) was sent up to the north, near the cemetery, to support the old Ricketts-Kirby battery, now commanded by Lieut. Geo. A. Woodruff, who lost his noble life the third day of the battle. Later Company F, the ~~Hastings~~ Red Wing Company, under Capt. John Ball, was sent as a skirmishing force down in the vicinity of the Round Tops. Company C, of St. Paul, under Capt. Wilson B. Farrell, was serving as Division provost guard, and so the regiment had three companies less than its ordinary strength and only eight companies in line of the regular organization.

The Brigade lay in reserve just over the east side of the ridge for several hours, being under an almost constant artillery fire. The shells of the enemy killed one man of the First Minnesota and severely wounded Sergt. O. M. Knight, of the Winona company. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon Gen. Hancock pulled out the Fifteenth Massachusetts and Eighty-Second New York and sent them westward to the right or north of Humphreys' Division, fronting the Emmitsburg pike. In the aggregate the two regiments

had about 700 men. They formed a line, with the Eighty-Second on the left, near the Coddori house, and the Fifteenth on the north or right of the Eighty-Second. Then Hancock drew out the Nineteenth Maine and sent it to the left front in the bottom to support Lieut. Fred Brown's battery, B, First Rhode Island. The First Minnesota was all that was left in line of the First Brigade, and at 5 P. M. it was sent to the center of the line (from north to south) to support Lieut. Evan Thomas's Battery, C, Fourth U. S.

Early in the morning, just after the First Minnesota reached the battle field, Col. Colvill was released from arrest and resumed command of the regiment, relieving Lieut. Col. Adams; This is the statement of Lochren, who was acting Adjutant at the time, it is uncorroborated but is accepted as true In the support of Thomas's battery the regiment was on the high ground of Cemetery Ridge, a short distance to the left or south of Gibbon's Division line of battle, a mile west of Power's Hill.

The other regiments of the brigade fought well in their respective positions. In the advance of the Confederates on the Third Corps, portions of the brigades of Wright and Perry attacked the right of Humphreys' Division and fell upon the Fifteenth Massachusetts and Eighty-Second New York. As has been said, these regiments were to the north and west of the First Minnesota, with the left or south of the Fifteenth connecting with the Coddori house, on the Emmitsburg house. The two regiments fought well, as usual, but the superior force against them and the fact that the right of the Eighty-Second was "in the air," making a turning movement easy, caused them to be driven back with heavy loss.

The Fifteenth was not able to return to the fight, but the Eighty-Second was. At the first line, half way up the ridge, it reformed under fire, charged down again upon Wright's Brigade, which was in sad plight, and actually drove its four regiments from the field. It captured the colors of the Forty-Eighth Georgia and recaptured one or two batteries

which the Confederates had seized from Humphreys' men. Wright's Georgia brigade fought against three regiments of the old Gorman Brigade, the Fifteenth, the Eighty-Second, and the Nineteenth Maine. Gen. Wright says in his report that in his fighting that evening he lost 688 men. In this day's fight the Eighty-Second New York lost 153 officers and men.

Out of not more than 600 officers and men in the aggregate the Fifteenth and Eighty-Second lost 250; the latter lost 153 out of 358 and the Fifteenth about 100 out of 239. Both regimental commanders, Col. Ward, of the Fifteenth, and Lieut. Col. Huston, of the Eighty-Second, were mortally wounded.

The Nineteenth Maine, Col. Francis E. Heath, went down to the left to support Brown's Rhode Island battery, which belonged to Hays's Division. At a little past 6 that evening the Twenty-Second Georgia attacked Col. Heath. After firing ten roundSon the defense, the Maineites charged and everlastingly smashed the Georgians, chasing them away and capturing a number of prisoners. They also re-captured a battery of 12-pound Napoleons which had been siezed and was being temporarily ~~being~~ held by the Georgians.

#623 - 639

THE CHARGE THAT MADE MINNESOTA FAMOUS.

It is now due to mention and imperfectly describe the memorable charge of the First Minnesota at Gettysburg, which made the regiment renowned and rendered the Union soldiery of the state famous.

The eight companies (C and F absent) ~~aggregating 262 officers and men,~~ went to the hillside in support of Thomas's battery about 4 P. M.# Here they remained in comparative safety until well nigh sundown, which that day was at 7:34. They were on the west of the open boulder-strewn slope of Cemetery Ridge and had an unobstructed view of the broad battle field below them and to their front, and of all the terrible fighting upon it.

Seldom has the opportunity been presented to soldiers to view such a spectacle as the bloody battle fought by Sickles and his supports against Longstreet and the re-enforcements that came to his left flank. But the men of the First Minnesota saw it all. They saw the Confederate advance which smashed the salient of Gen. Sickles's letter A in Sherfy's peach orchard at the Emmitsburg pike. They saw both legs of the latter receive compound fractures from the assaults of Hood and McLaws. They saw their comrades of Caldwell's brave division when they descended the slope and went down into that Valley of Death, and shuddered and sighed when they saw them swallowed up by hundreds as by the yawn of an earthquake. They saw their comrade regiments, the Fifteenth, the Nineteenth, and the Eighty-Second, when they went out to fight and behaved so gallantly. And then many a soldier said to his comrade: "I suppose it will be our turn next."

Many a former member of the Regiment who was in and survived the battle of Gettysburg has said that when so many bloody struggles had taken place in the valley-field before them, and each endeavor, no matter how splendid, had proven a disaster to the Union side, he felt a solemnity and foreboding which he had never felt before. He realized that Hancock was determined to hold that ridge and would put in every man. The eight Min-

According to Capt. Coates's report, Lochren says they went "some time after noon."

nesota companies had not fired a shot yet; surely they must do their part.

This feeling came as a conviction, and with it a realization of the peril involved. When such men as Caldwell's were being driven, there must be something almost supernatural in the savage fighting of the Confederates, and great would be the danger in encountering them. For hours the men sat about, viewing the terrible battle-panorama before them, stirred at the terrible tragedies being enacted in their presence, and realizing that they must soon take their places on the stage. Yet not a man sought to slip away, nor even shrank at the prospect before him. There was on no countenance an expression of fear. Upon most faces there was a look of stern resolve; but many seemed impatient, while a few appeared indifferent and even amused.

Humphreys' Division of Sickles had been driven back; Caldwell's Division of Hancock had been driven back and two brigade commanders killed; Willard's Brigade, Hays's Division of Hancock, had been driven back and Willard killed; two regiments of Hall's Brigade and three of Harrow's had been sent out and very roughly handled, and still the battle went on, with the Confederates advancing. Longstreet and Lee were determined to put their troops on Cemetery Ridge that night.

The broken and demoralized remnants of Burling's Brigade of Humphreys came straying up the slope, to the left or south of the Minnesotans, pursued by regiments of Barksdale's and Wilcox's Brigades. Directly in front of the Minnesota regiment there were no Union troops, and nothing but a line of charging Confederates, Wilcox's Alabama brigade, (five regiments) of Anderson's Division, A. P. Hill's Corps. From the best information now to be had the Tenth Alabama, Col. W. H. Forney, was in the advance. On they came towards the base of the ridge, along which ran a small dry brook southward; this little brook formed a branch of Plum Creek.

Thomas's Battery, six 12-pounders, did fine work on the Con-

of the Minnesotans
#625
when they had nearly reached the base

federates as they came forward over the bottom, but the front lines were so much under the ridge that Thomas could not depress his guns enough to reach them. There was not a Union man or gun near to the right or left or front of the terribly perilous gap but the men and muskets of the eight companies of Minnesotans. The Confederates were rushing towards the gap and were at its mouth. If they passed through and reached the top of the ridge, there might be serious trouble.

The situation was most alarming and critical. Though only a portion of one Confederate brigade was squarely in front of the Minnesotans, the whole of Wilcox's and a part of Barksdale's were where they could contribute to the attack and do great harm. Not much time to think about such matters or anything else, for now the skirmish line of Wilcox's Brigade was nearing the dry brook. Instinctively every man of the First Minnesota rose to his feet and grasped his gun or his sword.

HANCOCK SETS THE TASK.

Suddenly, with not a second to lose, Hancock came dashing up. Hancock, who should have been the Army's Commander! Hancock, the First Minnesota's Corps Commander! Hancock, who had planned the battle on the Union side and was now fighting it. Hancock, the most gallant soldier of them all! At once his sharp eyes saw the yawning gap in the Union lines and the Confederates rushing to fill it. At once, too, he saw the ~~363~~ Minnesota men alert and ready! Dashing up to them he called out to ~~Col. Colville:~~ the Commander:

"What regiment is this?"

"First Minnesota," was the prompt answer.

Then, pointing to the front and the great gray mass which was heaving forward to grapple with and mount Cemetery Ridge, came the sharp emphatic command: "Charge those lines!" #

At once ~~Colville~~ the Colonel gave the necessary commands for "attention," to "fix bayonets," to "right-shoulder-shift arms," and then to "forward--double quick--march!" Away went the Minnesotans, Hancock, with a single staff officer in the rear, watching them.

They had scarcely started down the hill when the Alabama skirmish line began firing and men began to drop. Every officer and man was on foot; a mounted man could not have lived two seconds. The double-quick increased to a wild dash which nothing could check save the deaths of those

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#There are many versions of Hancock's challenge and command and ~~Colville's~~ the Colonel's reply. The above from Lochren seems to be now the accepted version. One writer has it: "What troops are these?" "First Minnesota, Gibbon's Division." "Do you see those colors?" "Yes." "Then charge and take them." Another gives this: "What command is this?" "First Minnesota, Sir." "Well, don't you see the enemy? Charge the lines." Another has it: "What regiment is this?" "First Minnesota." "Take those colors--charge!" And one writer says that Hancock first asked: "Who commands here?" Before he could be answered he added, "What regiment is it?" "First Minnesota." "Well, don't you see that?" (pointing toward the advancing Confederates) "Charge those lines." There are other versions.

Indianians
Pennsylvanians
South Carolinians

Nearly all of Wilcox's men had their guns loaded when the Regiment began the charge, having encountered no enemy for some time, and they fired [illegible] volleys #627 [illegible] Minnesotans, but without checking them.

making it, but they were dying fast. On they went till they reached the base of the ridge, and the momentum acquired by running down hill carried them up against the enemy's front lines that were ~~now~~ soon in great trepidation and beginning to break.

MINNESOTIANS AGAINST ALABAMIANS.

"Charge!" roared out Col. Colvill like a trumpet blast. Instantly the men lowered their guns to a "charge bayonets" and sprang forward. The advanced line of the Alabamians had just passed over the little empty branch heretofore mentioned. Seeing the line of sharp bayonets approaching, at once they turned and ran away from the death-threatening points, falling into disorder as they re-crossed the little brook by leaping or scrambling over it, and breaking through their second line. Col. Forney and some of his men remained behind; he was badly wounded.

The Minnesotians had not discharged a musket, and now those of them in condition to fight opened a deadly fire into the ranks of the enemy. But by this time there were only about 150 Minnesota men able to fight! So many had fallen in the deadly advance, lasting but a few seconds. The hillside was well strewn with the stricken. The Tenth and Eleventh Alabama regiments--if not all five of Wilcox's Brigade--had fired upon the advancing phalanx at short range.

Capt. Louis Müller, of the St. Anthony company, was killed; Lieut. Waldo Farrar, of the Wabasha company, was killed; Capt. Jos. Perriam, of the Winona company, had his death wound; Col. Colvill was down at the brink of the brook with his foot and shoulder shattered; Lieut. Col. Adams was down with a grisly wound through the chest and two bullet holes through his leg; Maj. Downie was disabled with two wounds in his arm; Adjutant Pell was down; and well nigh 150 of their comrade officers and men were killed or grievously wounded. And all these had fallen within a few seconds.

There was not a field officer to take command of those that were left, and the duty fell upon Capt. Nathan S. Messick, of the Faribault company, (G) and no other officer was better fitted for the place. He ordered the men into the little dry brook which ran north and south and made an excellent rifle pit. From this vantage point the little band essayed

to drive back that entire Alabama brigade, or at least keep it at bay!

Very soon all the Alabamians within range concentrated their fire on the phalanx of Minnesotians in the brook. From front and flank came volleys and showers of bullets upon the little band. Brave and defiant came its responsive fire, but fainter and fainter, as fewer and fewer became its numbers. At last, after perhaps fifteen minutes of this terrible ordeal, the Confederates got an enfilading fire upon the right or north end of the Minnesota line and began sending deadly volleys down it. This ended matters. Capt. Messick now saw he had not many men alive and unhurt, but that if he kept them in that little ditch a few minutes longer there would not be any.

WELL DONE, FIRST MINNESOTA!

So the captain ordered his little command out of the ditch and to the rear. There was such a tumult and so much noise and confusion that the few men on the left of the line did not hear the order and they held the ground a minute or two. Lieut. Chris Heffelfinger stood up to see what the matter was and saw Capt. Messick and ~~two~~ the other men retiring and so he ordered Company D, ~~now and~~ now a mere squad, to follow their comrades. He was upon his feet but a second when an enfilading bullet passed across his body making a painful but not a serious wound, and he never left his company.

In a short time the pitiful remnant of the force that a few minutes before had gone down the hill, marched in order up the hill to its former position. On this part of the field all that was left for duty of the First Minnesota Regiment numbered less than what was required for a standard company! But praise be! Every man of the Regiment was "present or accounted for." Not one had been taken prisoner. And when the two companies temporarily absent--C and F--came up, there would be enough of the First Minnesota for another fight and another killing!

VALIANT VERMONTERS TO THE RESCUE.

In a little time came the Thirteenth Vermont, Col. Francis V. Randall, to the help of the fragment called the First Minnesota. The Vermont regiment was newly recruited for short service, but its men behaved like veterans and heroes. It belonged to Stannard's Vermont brigade (five regiments, but only three on the field) of Doubleday's Division of the First Corps. It had been sent for by Hancock, Gen. Doubleday acting as the messenger. The men were told that they were wanted to re-capture a battery which the Confederates had taken and were making off with.

This was its first battle and the regiment was big and strong, nearly 700 officers and men; no wonder ~~they~~ it was thought a brigade. It double-quicked to the ground in controversy, and going to the right or north of the First Minnesota and Thomas's Battery, it charged down the slope of the ridge against Willcox's Brigade. At the foot of the ridge a Confederate detachment (Tenth Alabama?) debouched from the woods to the south and fired, but Col. Randall charged it and captured many, including Col. W. H. Forney, Tenth Alabama.# Then he pressed on, driving the rear guard of Willcox's Brigade before him to the Emmitsburg pike.

Consider what grand work this "green" regiment did. It caused the Alabama brigade to fall further back; it captured from it near the base of the ridge sixty prisoners; it re-captured four guns of Lieut. Weir's Battery, C, Fifth U. S., which the Alabamians had taken on their advance against Burling's men and were dragging off, and the capture included six

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Col. Forney was a brave officer. According to Gen. Willcox's report he was not well of a wound received at Williamsburg more than a year before when he entered the battle of Gettysburg at the head of his regiment. On that 2d of July he was wounded in the arm and chest at the turnpike; continuing in the fight his right arm was shattered; still leading his regiment he was shot through the foot, perhaps by the First Minnesota, near the dry brook, or what Willcox calls the ravine; then he was captured. by the Vermonters.

of the draggers; it captured two guns that were shelling it from the Emmitsburg road, and it made prisoners of three officers and eighty men of the Confederate picket reserve that were concealed in a house near the pike. (See Randall's report.) Then it fell back to the line of battle, for it was now quite dark. Col. Randall's loss was light, but just as he reached the base of Cemetery Ridge on the charge his horse was killed.

Of this service of the Thirteenth Vermont Gen. Morgan in his "Narative of the Twentieth Army Corps," says:

> One of the Vermont regiments afterward advanced upon the right of the First Minnesota, and recaptured the guns of the reserved batteries. The Vermont troops behaved with great spirit during the entire battle.

THE ALABAMA SIDE OF THE STORY

According to Gen. Wilcox's report, his brigade had been very busy that day. In the forenoon it had fought Ward's Brigade of Birney of Sickles and the Tenth Alabama had defeated the Third Maine (210) and a detachment ~~(160)~~ of Berdan's U. S. Sharpshooters, capturing the Maine regiment's flag. It skirmished until 6:20, when it advanced in line with Barksdale's and Semmes's Brigades and carried the Emmitsburg pike and helped smash Humphreys' Division, and then it kept on until it reached Cemetery Ridge in front of the First Minnesota. En route it helped capture two of Bigelow's guns near Trostle's house, and by itself it captured and drove away the supports of four guns (Gen. Wilcox says six) of Weir's Fifth U. S. Battery. Of the latter portion of his movements Gen. Wilcox reports:

> Before reaching the ravine, two lines of the enemy's infantry were met and broken and driven pell mell across the ravine. A second battery of six pieces here fell into our hands. From the batteries on the ridge above referred to, grape and canister were poured into our ranks. This stronghold of the enemy and his batteries were almost won, when still another line of infantry descended the slope in our front at a double-quick to the support of their fleeing comrades and for the defense of the batteries.
>
> Seeing this contest so unequal I dispatched my adjutant general to the Division Commander (Gen. Anderson) to ask that support be sent to my men, but no support came. Three several times did this last of the enemy's lines attempt to drive my men back, and were as often repulsed. This struggle at the foot of the hill on which were the enemy's batteries, was continued for some thirty minutes. With a second supporting line the heights could have been carried. Without support on either my right or my left, my men were withdrawn to prevent their entire destruction or capture. The enemy did not pursue, but my men retired under a heavy artillery fire and returned to their original position in line and bivouacked for the night, pickets being left on the pike.

Gen. Wilcox's report may be explained. The "two lines of the enemy's infantry" which he says his men drove "pell mell across the ravine" were of Humphreys' Division. The battery captured was Weir's Fifth U. S., though but four pieces were taken. The "ravine" is the dry brook

~~brook~~ near the western base of the Ridge. The "still another line of infantry," which he says "descended the slope in our front at a double quick" was the First Minnesota.

Gen. Willcox believed that this "last of the enemy's lines" attempted "three several times" to drive his men back and were as often repulsed. The truth is that all of the time the Minnesotians were in the dry brook they tried to drive back the Confederates, and at last they succeeded. Willcox says "the struggle # # # was continued for thirty minutes." The Minnesotians estimate the time at from fifteen to twenty minutes, but it may have seemed longer to Gen. Willcox!

WHAT THE MINNESOTIANS REALLY DID.

A careful study of Gen. Wilcox's and the other reports is convincing that as a result of the fighting of the First Minnesota at the base of the Ridge and its presence on the field, Gen. Wilcox actually ordered his brigade to retreat!

The Regiment was certainly the "still another line" which came down the Ridge at the double quick and convinced Gen. Wilcox that to him the contest was "unequal" and induced him to withdraw his men "to prevent their entire destruction or capture." How they must have fought!

True, the greater part of Wilcox's men were under the fire of three batteries, Thomas's, Woodruff's, and Brown's, but there was no stop to their advance until they came to the dry brook, or "ravine," and met the "still another line" composed of the First Minnesota. Then, after thirty minutes of desperate encounter, Wilcox ordered his men to the rear, and they never stopped until they crossed the Emmitsburg pike and reached their "original position," their camping ground of the previous night. The wounded Col. Forney and the 40 or 50 men (presumably from his regiment) that were left behind, hid themselves in the thicket to the south of where the Minnesotians lay, and were captured by Col. Randall and his Vermonters when they came up.

It was not Col. Randall and his Thirteenth Vermont that composed the "still another line." Save for the 40 or so men they captured at the ravine, they encountered no Confederates in their march across the valley to the Emmitsburg pike, except the rear guard and the party engaged in dragging off Weir's cannons. Wilcox was right when he wrote that "the enemy did not pursue" him. Randall came after Wilcox had withdrawn.

In the tumult and hurley-burley of the infantry fighting and the cannonading, the Confederates did not notice that the First Minnesota was about wiped out, nor did they observe amid the smoke and the twilight

survivors of the charge

when the ~~1st men~~ withdrew. If these circumstances had been observed, the effect would have been different. Willcox took 1,600 men into the battle that day and when he retired he had lost about 500. With 1,100 he could have carried the ridge--but he could not have held it without strong support.

The simultaneous retirement of the First Minnesota and of Willcox's Brigade was ~~particular~~ peculiar. A company of men was retiring before 1,100, and at the same time the 1,100 were retiring before less than 100. And though a retirement in battle is always to be regretted, it is often justified. In this case could 90 men fight with 1,100? As for Willcox's Brigade, though half of its men were conscripts, it had fought from 9 o' clock in the morning and fought hard and successfully. It had lost one-third of its number and the remainder were hungry, thirsty, tired and battle-weary. The commander believed, from what he could see, (luckily he could not see everything) that either its "entire destruction or capture" was imminent, and he did his duty when he ordered it away.

A SAD BUT GLORIOUS RECORD.

Within the few minutes required to "charge those lines" at Gettysburg, the First Minnesota lost heavily. Lochren says: "of the 262 men who made the charge 215 lay upon the field, stricken down by rebel bullets; 47 were still in line, and not a man was missing." After Lieut. Pell was wounded, Lochren was acting adjutant of the Regiment for some time and had superior opportunities for knowing itsstrength, and he twice states that the eight companies making the charge had 262 men--of course he means officers and men, the fighting strength. His figures do not agree with the records and his own reports, but they have been accepted, and it may be said that they are now established by the rule of adverse possession.

THE NIGHT AFTER THE BATTLE.

The remnants of the First Minnesota left after the gallant charge, resumed their former position on the Ridge near Thomas's Battery, in such moods as can neither be correctly imagined or well described. They were greatly shocked and grief-stricken over the loss of so many of their comrades, but they were not demoralized. Camping on the field that night, not a man attempted to slip away to the rear or avoid his duty in any particular, though it was apparent that the battle would be resumed the next morning and fought out during the day, and that they would be called upon to fight again.

Ever since Bull Run, the Regiment had complained that in all of the many battles in which it had been engaged its position had not been prominent and conspicuous enough, so that it might achieve more distinction and win greater glory. By reason of its seniority, its place in the brigade line was first, on the right, and in line of battle it was on the extreme right flank. And so at Fair Oaks, Antietam, and Fredericksburg, its three greatest battles before Gettysburg, it was out on the flank and had nothing but an oblique fire on the enemy, while it was not within its main line of fire; therefore its losses were light, which might indicate that it had not taken a very active part in the battle. But in the charge at Gettysburg there was prominence of position and losses enough to satisfy the most exacting! There could be no criticism that the Regiment had been inconspicuously engaged.

After nightfall very many of the men temporarily joined the ambulance corps to assist their wounded comrades. A beautiful full moon shone over the battlefield in the earlier part of the night, and it was comparitively easy to find the stricken heroes; they were all found and gathered up but six, and sent to the Leitner house and orchard and the other field

hospitals over east of Cemetery Ridge. The six men ~~were~~ reported by Capt. Coates as missing, ~~but they~~ were finally found where they had crawled into thickets and other retreats and become unconscious or fallen asleep. Then their records were changed from "missing" to "wounded." Nearly every dead man was left on the field where he fell until July 4; a few were buried by company comrades before morning,

"Neath the struggling moonbeams' misty light."

And near where they fell, in the beautiful National Cemetery, are still the last bivouacs of those of the First Minnesota who, when the roll of the regiment was called on the morning of July 3, were recorded as

"Dead on the Field of Honor."

During the night orders were sent out by Captain Messick, under instructions from the brigade commander, calling back to the Regiment all out-serving detachments, except the company of Sharpshooters. Those on extra duty were called in from their soft snaps and furnished with muskets and cartridge boxes. Early the next morning Capt. Ball brought Company F, the Red Wing Company, back from down Little Round Top way, where it had been on the skirmish line nearly all day of the 2d and had three men badly wounded. Company C, one of the St. Paul Companies, and commanded by Capt. Wilson B. Farrell, was considered a "crack" company in point of drill, discipline and general efficiency. For some time it had been on duty at Division headquarters as provost guard, and Capt. Farrell had been serving as Division Provost Marshall. It was brought back to the firing line the next day. Company L, the Sharpshooters, was absent from the regiment until after the battle.

#640 to 643

THE THIRD DAY AT GETTYSBURG.

In part the Confederates had lost the battle of the 2d of July at Gettysburg. They had driven Sickles's Corps from its illy-chosen advanced position at the Peach Orchard, but they had failed in attempting to turn the Union south flank, failed in their attempt to carry the Round Tops, failed to carry and hold any part of Cemetery Ridge proper, the position of the main Union line, and they had lost heavily, including some of their best generals.

But Gen. Lee was satisfied, and very confident of an overwhelming victory. He knew that the Union losses had been heavy, (20,000 in fact) and he thought the Union generals were discouraged and their men in the ranks demoralized and afraid. A resolute, stout, and fierce attack upon them and they would give way and run from the field in disorder. Gen. Ewells troops had a good broad lodgment inside of the Union works on Culp's Hill, which was the Union right or north end of the line. Gen. Lee determined to capture the whole of Culp's Hill, and thus break the Union right and roll back the entire line. Gen. Edward Johnson's Confederate Division was holding the captured portion of the Hill, and on the night of the 2d and early morning of the 3d Lee re-enforced it and demanded that it carry the uncaptured portion of the hill at daylight.

But gallant Gen. Harry Slocum, with his two divisions of the Twelfth Corps, was looking after Culp's Hill for the Union side. He did not sleep a wink that night. He had returned from helping Sickles down on the left and prepared to help old Gen. Greene, one of his best brigade commanders, out of his perilous predicament. When the mist began to fall he brought up 14 pieces of cannon and put Geary's Division in shape to assault, with Williams in support, and Shaler's Brigade of Sedgwick afterward came up. At 3:30 in the murky morning the artillery opened and at 4 Geary charged, and

the fighting continued until 10:30. The result was that the Confederates were driven completely away and every effort made by them to re-occupy the ground was repulsed with great loss to them. So that at last Gen. Slocum held tight hold of the curve of the fishhook, barb and all. And he had about 500 unwounded prisoners, including a great part of the old Stonewall Brigade, originally commanded by Jackson, and he had the Stonewall Brigade flag and other flags and 1,800 wounded Confederates on his hands besides. Gen. Ewell sent Rodes's and Early's Divisions to help Johnson's, but Gen. Slocum's men licked them all.

Gen. Lee was greatly disappointed at the result of the fighting for Culp's Hill. He was confident that the Hill would be carried by Ewell's men, and then he would quickly assault the Union center and break through it. Now, his first attempt failing, he at first thought of attacking the Union left (down by the Round Tops) and center, but soon gave over this idea and determined to attack the center--or rather the right center. His movements were somewhat like Napoleon's at Wagram. Napoleon at first assailed the Austrian army under the Archduke Charles on its right flank, but was repulsed. The Archduke followed up the repulse by attacking the French left flank, which he broke and crushed, taking 7,000 prisoners. Then Napoleon quickly made a counter-charge on the Austrian left and center, Macdonald leading with 30,000 men, with the result that the Archduke retreated.

After about 11 A. M., when the fighting ceased at Culp's Hill, there was a deep silence on the Confederate side. And because it was deep it was suspicious. The Union generals divined what it meant. Lee was preparing to charge the Union line on Cemetery Ridge, and before he charged he would cannonade heavily, and now he was getting his cannon ready. The generals were military men and Lee was a military man, so that they knew he would assault a favorable point. They thought they knew where that point

was and they prepared to protect it. And so when at noon Gen. Alexander and Gen. Pendleton had placed 145 cannons in position on Seminary Ridge pointing directly eastward toward Cemetery Ridge, a mile away, Gen. Hunt, the Union chief of artillery, had 80 guns ready to answer them, and Gen. Hancock had gathered up a lot of infantry and stationed them, some on either side and some behind the guns, to meet a charge when it should come.

At 1 o'clock the ominous silence was broken by a terrible outburst from the Confederate artillery, 180 guns, none less than a 12-pounder, all roaring at once. Imagine 180 peals of thunder from a storm cloud only a mile away! The Confederates were not very well supplied with artillery amunition, but they made a great bluff that they were, and used their stock lavishly and recklessly. The line of fire was somewhat concentrated, the center of the objective being a point west of Gen. Meade's headquarters (on the Taneytown road) a mile south of Gettysburg.

The firing was incessant, at least three guns per second, and nothing but shells, case shot, and cannon balls was used. The effect was distressing. The gunners soon got the range and landed their death-dealing missiles fairly among the Union troops crouched behind low stone walls, improvised breastworks, and boulders, or in natural depressions of the ground.

Gen. Hunt did not order his batteries to reply until the first hostile demonstration had spent itself. While he had but 80 guns in battery, he had plenty more belonging to the Reserve Artillery, which was just to the rear, or under Cemetery Ridge. In the Cemetery itself, near the north end of the Ridge, he had six batteries; on the Ridge to the south of the Cemetery, he had five of the Second Corps batteries, Woodruff's, Arnold's, Cushing's, Brown's, and Rorty's. At about 1:30 Gen. Hunt gave the signal and all his 80 guns opened with the explosion of a volcano. Then ensued an artillery combat such as was never before or since seen on the American con-

tinent. The solid hills seemed to shake; the air was filled with flashes of lurid and crimson fire and rolling clouds of sulphurous smoke; the thundering and crashing of the engines of battle and the bursting of the missiles they hurled were deafening and appalling.

During this frightful outburst the infantry of both sides crouched behind such cover as they could find; but every man tightly grasped his musket, for he knew what was coming--a less noisy but more deadly shock of men of his arm ofthe service. The Confederate knew that he must soon charge and the Union soldier knew that he must soon be charged upon.

Gen. Lee determined to make the assault with fresh troops. Pickett's Division of Longstreet had been back at Chambersburg, and had just reached the battlefield that morning; Heth's old Division (now under Gen. Pettigrew, for Heth was wounded) and Pender's old Division (now under Gen. Trimble, for Pender was mortally wounded) both of A. P. Hill, had not been much hurt by the fighting of the preceding days, and the commander determined to send them with Pickett's men. Pickett's Division had three brigades and 5,000 men; each of the other two divisions had four brigades and at least 5,000 men in each division. In "Battles and Leaders," page 342, Gen. Longstreet says that at 12 o'clock that day Gen. Lee said to him:

"I want you to take Pickett's division and make the attack. I will re-enforce you with two divisions, Heth's and Pender's, of the Third Corps." "That will give me 15,000 men," I replied. Then I continued: "I have been a soldier, I may say, from the ranks up to the position I now hold. I have been in pretty much all kinds of skirmishes, from those of two or three soldiers up to those of an Army Corps, and I think I can safely say that never was a body of 15,000 men who could make that attack successfully."

The General seemed a little impatient at my remarks, so I said nothing more. As he showed no indication of changing his plan, I went to work at once to arrange the troops for the attack.

Subsequently Willcox's Brigade, the First Minnesota's antagonist of the previous day, was ordered to support and assist in the charge, first as a support to the artillery, and afterward to participate in the assault proper.

THE CHARGE OF PICKETT AND PETTIGREW.

The terrible incident of the third day's battle of Gettysburg, when the Confederate divisions of Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble and the brigade of Willcox, assailed the Union position on Cemetery Ridge, is commonly known as "Pickett's Charge." The inference would naturally be that the charge was made by Pickett's Division alone. The truth is that the cold facts and unimpassioned records show that only about one-third of the bloody and disastrous work was performed by Pickett's Virginians, and only a little more than one-third of the loss was sustained by them. Pettigrew's North Carolinians went farthest and his division sustained within 36 the loss of as many men as Pickett's. The total loss of Pickett's Division was 2,863, and of the rest of the assaulting force 4,955, viz: Pettigrew's, 2,827; Trimble's, 1,924, and Willcox's Brigade, 204. The total strength of the three divisions and one brigade in officers and men when they entered on the charge was about 16,500. Willcox says he took in 1,200 and lost 204. He lost July 2, 573, making his total loss in the battle 777, or 65 per cent of his force.

After nearly two hours of the terrific ~~commanding~~ cannonading, when Gen. Lee thought the Union lines were sufficiently shaken and unstable by the severe pounding they had received, and when the artillery ammunition had run very low, the Confederate fire slackened until finally it almost ceased. Gen. Hunt found that his ammunition was nearly run out, save for what was in the Reserve, and he ordered his batteries to cease firing and some of them to be replaced from that reserve. While this was being done the Confederates were seen forming for the charge in the edge of the woods on Cemetery Ridge.

The great Confederate assault has been often described. As has been stated, the attacking force numbered (according to Confederate authorities) more than 16,000 men. The distance charged over was about three-fourths of a mile, from the east side of Seminary Ridge down to the level

ground. across the valley or "bottom of the box" to the foot of Cemetery Ridge, then up the western slope of that ridge to its crest. Intervening between the bases of the two ridges were stone walls, farm fences, little pastures, a corn field, a wheat field, and other enclosures, a little swale running down the valley, and some little ravines or "washes."

The charge began about 3 P. M. Pickett's and Pettigrew's Divisions were in the front, with Pettigrew's to the north or left of Pickett's. Behind them came Pender's Division, now Trimble's. Pickett had two Brigades (Garnett's and Kemper's) for his front line, with Armstead's in their center rear. Pettigrew had his old brigade of North Carolinians (now under Col. Marshall) and Archer's (now under Col. Fry) in his front line, with Brockenbrough's Virginia behind Marshall's and Jo Davis's Mississippi behind Fry's Brigade. Trimble's command was only half a division and composed of Lane's and Scales's North Carolina brigades, which stretched across the entire rear of both Pickett and Pettigrew. The columns were well and compactly formed and the entire force was a magnificent battle array.

GIBBON'S DIVISION BEARS THE BRUNT.

As the line advanced, it directed its center toward a clump of trees on the crest of Cemetery Ridge where Webb's Second and Hall's Third Brigade of Gibbon's Division were posted. Harrow's First Brigade, to which the Minnesotians belonged, was to the south and rear of them at first. The whole length of the Union line charged upon was about half a mile. Gen. Gibbon had been commanding the Corps, Gen. Harrow the Division, and Col. Heath, of the Nineteenth Maine, had temporary command of the brigade, but at 1 o'clock Gen. Hancock resumed command of the Second Corps, Gen. Gibbon came back to the Second Division, and Gen. Harrow to the First Brigade. Later in the day, when Hancock was wounded, the commanders again exchanged. The Confederate charging front covered the line of Gibbon's Second and Hays's Third Divisions of the Second Corps.

THE CONFEDERATES RUN THE DEATH GAUNTLET.

When the charging Confederates had come within easy reach of case shot the Union artillery opened on them a terrible volley which cut down the ranks fearfully but did not stop them. The survivors came on all the faster, but now they were obliquing to the left or north in an instinctive effort to avoid the fierce fire of McGilvray's eight batteries, in front of and Rittenhouse's guns on Round Top, and of some of Stannard's Vermonters, who had been posted in a small grove to the left of the Second Corps in front of and at a considerable angle to the Union main line.

When the hostile lines were within 200 or 300 yards of each other, the infantry of Hays's and Gibbon's Divisions would no longer hold their fire but delivered a volley upon the enemy that cut down the front lines as if by the sweep of great sabres; and this volley was repeated again and again. A charge in the face of such deadly volleys is a fire which tries every soldier's work "of what sort it is," and tests him whether he is iron or whether he is clay. The majority of the men composing the Confederate charging column that day proved to be iron.

When the half-mile front of Hay's and Gibbon's Divisions burst into a sheet of fierce flame and the carnage among their assailants was redoubled, the desperate southerners seemed to receive the new disaster as a signal and every man of them rushed forward. Their ranks became blended and soon formed a raging mass of men, running, rolling, and tumbling forward, and through which the Union cannon opened lanes and avenues. Still the survivers came crowding on, with their peculiar "rebel yell," "Ya-a-a-ah! Ya-a-a-a-ah!" fierce as an Indian war whoop and uncanny as the cry of a banshee. The yells were heard above the noise of the artillery and musketry and were more inspiring than the shouts of loved commanders, the flutter of flags, and the strains of martial music.

PETTIGREW'S DIVISION ASSAULTS HAYS'S.

It is probable that Pettigrew's North Carolina brigade first reached the Union position at Hays's Division line, where Hays had but two brigades, Smith's and Willard's. Willard had been killed the day before, and Col. Sherrill was in command that morning, but he, too, was killed a few minutes after Pettigrew's men came up, and Lieut. Col. Bull then commanded the brigade during the remainder of the battle. Col. Smyth was wounded by Pettigrew's men and Col. Pierce commanded the Second Brigade thereafter. Carroll's, the First Brigade of Hays, was still stationed up about Culp's Hill. There were no better troops in the Second Corps than the Smith and Willard Brigades. Pettigrew's men had been told that they would have nothing but green Pennsylvania militia to fight when they reached the crest, but no sooner did they see Hays's seasoned veterans with their stars and stripes and trefoil badges, than they cried out in consternation: "The Army of the Potomac! See the old ace of clubs on their flag!" In a little while the two gallant brigades had routed Pettigrew's entire division of four brigades and sent it flying back down Cemetery Ridge, and held in their hands 2,000 Confederate prisoners and 15 Confederate battle flags.

PICKETT'S DIVISION FALLS ON WEBB'S BRIGADE.

Now came Pickett's charging force, to the south of Hays's line and against the clump of trees. This force was a great battle-bolt, all of Virginia iron, which had been tempered in the fires of many battles until it was considered as invincible as a thunderbolt of Jupiter. It first struck Webb's Brigade of Gibbon, and Gibbon's Division was to be very prominent in this day's fight; but it had first aimed at the old Gorman Brigade (now Harrow's) lying behind hastily built and very ineffective low walls of dirt and scraps, to the south of Webb's men. It had been turned from its course by a flank fire of Stannard's Vermonters who were stationed down there for that purpose.

Pickett's men struck Webb's head on and such was the momentum of the Virginians that they thrust themselves through the Union line. Webb's was the old Burns' Pennsylvania brigade and now had but three regiments, the Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania, and the California Regiment (Seventy-First) in the front line and Baxter's Fire Zouaves (Seventy-Second) in reserve.

Garnett's and Kemper's Brigades struck the two Pennsylvania regiments so hard that the Union line was broken; the two weak regiments were pushed back; Cushing's battery was taken after Cushing was killed; Gen. Gibbon was down, badly wounded; but Hancock was there, for he was always where he ought to be, and Webb stood by, and the Pennsylvanians were doing well. Baxter's Zouaves used to be shaky and flexible under fire, but now they were as brave and steady as the Old Guard. They came charging up with bayonets on their guns to help their two hard beset comrade regiments; and the Keystone men were in no panic, but rallied on the Zouaves and went to fighting harder than ever.

At this time Pickett's front brigades were about played out. Two-thirds of them were killed and wounded; Gen. Garnett was killed, Kemper was down and the men were fighting every fellow on his own hook and for him-

self. And so Armistead's Brigade came forward, and it was Gen. Armistead with his cap on his sword and his men with their wild rebel yells that crossed the Union lines, on "the high tide of the Rebellion" and set up the Confederate flags and the Virginia State banners almost even with the colors planted by Pettigrew and his men. And dreadful and sickening had been the killing.

A thousand fell with Garnett, dead;
A thousand fell where Kemper bled;
Through blinding flame and strangling smoke,
The remnants thro' the batteries broke,
And crossed the works with Armistead.

But just as they reached the blood-soaked goal for which they had striven so hard, Gen. Armistead and scores of his men fell dead and mortally wounded and hundreds of their comrades were grievously wounded and became prisoners.

Gen. Pickett now threw in Trimble's (Pender's) Division of North Carolinians and a portion of Joe Davis's and Brockenbrough's Brigades that had not been engaged. He thought to hold the ground that Armistead had gained. Oh, no, Gen. Pickett! Gen. Hancock is bossing Cemetery Ridge today! Just as fast as they could run Hancock sent Harrow's Brigade, which was to the south, and Hall's Brigade, which was to the north, to help Webb's three Pennsylvania regiments against half a dozen Confederate brigades.

THE OLD GORMAN BRIGADE GOES IN.

Here they come, those gallant veterans of the old Gorman and Dana Brigades, not a coward among them, but every man eager for the fray. So earnest were the troops that many of them broke ranks and rushed by the nearest routes upon their foes. Then there ensued some of the hardest and bravest fighting ever done by soldiers. It was any sort of fighting that would kill an enemy--shoot him, bayonet him, cut his throat, knock out his brains with a musket butt or a cobble stone--any way to get at his blood.

The Southern palm swung against the Northern oak, and woe to the palm! The fighting was decided by grit and muscle, but it was won by great endeavor. Hurrah for the American soldier, Northern and Southern, Eastern and Western! He always fights well, but never so well as when he meets his equal, a foeman worthy of his steel and proper for his prowess, and that was the situation that day on Gettysburg Heights. Even the officers fought! Gen. Hunt, the Chief of Artillery, rode up to the struggling Confederates and emptied his big revolver into them. Gen Webb was in the thickest of the press, cutting and slashing with his sword, and his staff officers were all fighting hand to hand. Many other officers were cutting and carving like gladiators. Such fighting counts. Every field officer in Pickett's Division had fallen except Maj. C. S. Peyton, Fifteenth Virginia, and Pickett himself--and that daring leader rode into and out of the charge on horseback and never got a scratch. Gen. Pettigrew was badly wounded, but sat in his saddle until he got the remnants of his division off the field.

VICTORY! GLORIOUS VICTORY! FAIRLY WON VICTORY!

The losses among the Confederates were very heavy, but they were not all on that side. While so many of them were going down the Union ranks were bleeding. Gen. Hancock was wounded, but would not leave the field; Gen. Gibbon and Gen. Webb were wounded and had to be carried off. Of the five commanders of the Second Corps batteries, Woodruff, Cushing, and Rorty were killed, Brown was wounded, and Arnold alone was unhit.

But in a little time the fighting was nearly over. Gibbon's and Hays's Divisions fell upon the Confederates so fiercely that a majority of those not killed or wounded threw themselves upon the ground in their terror and cried out for quarter. Those who escaped death, disability, or capture fled wildly down the hill in an effort to regain their former position on Seminary Ridge. They were not permitted to retreat undisturbed. They were fired at by Hays's and Gibbon's men as long as they were in gunshot. Stannard's Vermonters gave them withering volleys from the flank, and the Second Corps batteries, now re-enforced by Weir's, Wheeler's, and Kinzie's, rained case-shot and canister among their shattered and scattered ranks. Of the 15,000 that left Seminary Ridge on the charge hardly 5,000 returned.

The two divisions of the Second Corps had something to show for their hard fighting and their victory. They gathered battle flags by armfuls and took prisoners by the thousands. By actual count they took 33 flags (of which Gibbon's Division got 16) and 3,876 unwounded prisoners. But they had won something better, greater, nobler. They had won great glory and honor and the approval of their consciences and the unperishable gratitude of the loyal American people.

GEN. WILLCOX TRIES TO HELP PICKETT.

Gen. Willcox's Alabama brigade had been stationed behind the Confederate batteries that were supporting Pickett's charge, and had witnessed the proceedings of that afternoon. Half an hour after Pickett and Pettigrew had started up the ridge, and when they were being pounded to pieces on the crest, Gen. Willcox was ordered to take up his brigade and "support" them. He started with 1,200 men and Perry's little Florida brigade, of only three regiments and 300 men, accompanied the Alabamians. No sooner did they get out into the open than the Union batteries on the Ridge opened on them; and when they got up opposite where the Vermonters were they got into serious trouble. Stannard turned loose his Green Mountain boys upon them and when they advanced against Willcox's flank the southern ~~gentlemen~~ general ordered a retreat, and he and only 1,000 men went back where they had started from. The Vermonters too knocked Perry's little brigade to fragments, capturing 50 prisoners and the flag of the Second Florida. They also ran into some of Pickett's fleeing Virginians and captured more prisoners and the flag of the Eighth Virginia. Willcox left behind 204 killed and wounded out of his brigade. He said he retreated because he had no chance to do anything else. His men he said "accomplished but little" in trying to fight, and as for supporting Pickett, he said when he came up near the crest he saw there was nothing there to support!

During the morning of the 3d there were affairs between the cavalry on both flanks of the lines. Jeb Stuart had come up to help Lee, but too late to do much good. That little affair near Haymarket, when his artillery killed Col. Colvill's horse, had been the means of diverting him from his true course and keeping him from rendering important assistance at the right time. Gen. Lee is reported to have attributed the failure of his Gettysburg campaign to the absence of Jeb Stuart and his cavalry when they were most needed.

Stuart had come in from the north and advanced against Gregg's and Custer's cavalry to the east of Culp's Hill, on the Union right. There was a sharp combat, resulting in a draw, each side claiming a victory because it was holding to what it held at the beginning of the fight; about 40 were killed on each side.

At 8 o'clock that morning Gen. Meade ordered Gen. Kilpatrick to move with his whole cavalry division, three brigades, from Culp's Hill to down below the Round Tops, on the extreme Union left, and attack the enemy's right and rear. Kilpatrick had already sent Custer's Brigade to join Gregg's Division, and had only Gen. Wesley Merritt's (regulars) and Gen. Elon J. Farnsworth's Brigades to make the movement. Gen. Farnsworth's commission as brigadier had been issued, but he had not yet received it; he had been promoted from captain in the Eighth Illinois Cavalry, a great honor but a deserved one.

Kilpatrick moved down below Round Top and got ready for his work. However, he was too weak for it. ~~Lacking Custer's~~ Longstreet had been careful to protect the Confederate right flank. Lying along the west base of the Round Tops from north to south he had Benning's, Robertson's, and Law's Brigades and a strong skirmish line ran perpendicular to this line from east to west connecting it with the Emmitsburg pike. A cavalry force from the north that could break this skirmish line and keep on would work great havoc upon the Confederates. Two brigades were hardly strong enough; it was unfortunate that Custer's Brigade had been sent to Gregg. That eminent Confederate strategist, Gen. E. P. Alexander, who had charge of Longstreet's artillery, says in his "Memoirs:"

> Had Kilpatrick come with three brigades upon our right flank, he could not have failed to discover an immense opportunity open to him. Behind the mask of our videttes were wide fields, stretching along the valleys of Willoughby Run and Marsh Creek for miles to the north and west, containing all our trains, practically unguarded. The bulk of our cavalry was engaging Gregg's Division about two miles east

of Gettysburg. He had only 100 cavalry on this flank at the time. Once through our skirmish line, Kilpatrick would have had great scope before any adequate force could be brought against him. As it was, we had a narrow escape. Merritt's dismounted men found the flank of our videttes and were driving them rapidly to the rear when Geo. T. Anderson's Brigade was brought to the rescue and Merritt was driven back.

Meanwhile Kilpatrick had ordered Farnsworth to charge with a small force through the Confederate pickett and skirmish line and thus cut off Longstreet's three brigades from the main force. Farnsworth at first remonstrated and then charged at the head of 300 men of the First West Virginia and First Vermont Cavalry. They broke through the skirmish line of Gen. Robertson's Texans all right, but soon found themselves surrounded by four brigades of infantry and had to cut their way out. The gallant Farnsworth, only 28 years old, fell dead with five wounds in front of the Fifteenth Alabama, Law's Brigade. The total Union loss was 65. The failure of the Cavalry charges ended the fighting in this quarter, Had they succeeded, it is more than probable that Lee's great wagon train would have been utterly destroyed or captured and a great amount of other damage done to the Confederate interest.

THE FINAL FIGHTING.

Soon after Kilpatrick's effort had failed, Gen. Saml. W. Crawford's two brigades of Pennsylvania Reserves, of Sykes's Fifth Corps, went down to the Round Tops to deal with Longstreet's infantry that was responsible for the failure. The old fighting brigades of Hood's Division had lost their grip and were easily disposed of. They were still in position when the cavalry found them--and left them--at the base of the Round Tops. Gen. Crawford sent McCandless's Brigade in the advance, with Nevins's following. Gen. "Tige" Anderson's Brigade was first encountered and smashed, though it was posted behind a stone wall, and McCandless had to lead his men under fire across the Trostle wheat field to get at it. Benning's Brigade was next hit, and nearly half (101) of the Fifteenth Georgia and its flag captured. According to Crawford's report, Robertson's Texas brigade actually ran without firing a shot, and the "wild and wooly" Texans must certainly have been feeling badly, for it was not their usual custom to act that way. Law's old brigade (now Sheffield's) went back with the rest of the division across the Emmitsburg pike, where the batteries protected them.

Gen. Crawford's gallant Keystone brigades really won a victory. They chased away the Confederates; re-captured all the ground taken from Sickles the day before; took 215 unwounded prisoners, recovered all the Union wounded that lay within the Confederate line in that quarter, together with the Confederate wounded that had been shot on the 2d and not moved; and they captured a 12-lb. brass cannon, three caissons, and over 7,000 muskets complete or stands of arms. Large piles of these arms were found on brush heaps ready to be burned. And the two brigades lost but 20 killed and 190 wounded.

The easy repulse of Hood's Brigades showed that they were demoralized by the terrible punishment they had received the previous day and by the crushing defeat of Pickett and Pettigrew that afternoon, which disastrous event they had seen plainly. The fighting was out of them. Had Kilpatrick's cavalry force been stronger by Custer's Brigade, they would have been cut off from the rest of their army and either made prisoners or destroyed. Their condition was typical of that of Lee's army in general at dusk on the evening of July 3. And had Sheridan commanded the Union army, or had Hancock's advice been taken--!

A GREAT OPPORTUNITY MISSED.

Under cover of night Gen. Lee's army took a defensive line on Seminary Ridge, with its right or south flank retired westward behind Willoughby Run, a mile west of the Ridge. This bending back of Longstreet's Corps was to better defend the Confederate right flank in case of attack, and also to protect Lee's trains, which during the night were pushed back of the protecting brigades. In this position the Confederates stood all that day of the 4th, the glorious Independence Day, a great day for Union soldiers to win a victory.

And, while they thus stood, apparently defying attack, their generals were heart-sick at the fear of one. And, while they thus stood, a thousand miles to the westward Gen. Grant was receiving the surrender of Vicksburg and its 32,000 defenders; the Mississippi from source to mouth was back in the Union again; the Southern Confederacy was cut in two, and its independence made impossible. Had Meade's army moved and crushed Lee's that 4th of July, the war might have closed in thirty days.

But Gen. Meade and his generals thought it best to let well enough alone. It would be dangerous, they thought, to attack the enemy in position--as dangerous and probably as disastrous as when the enemy had attacked them in position. Surely they had no idea of the enemy's condition. The only stubborn resistance to be feared from any division of Lee's command was what might come from Stuart's cavalry and Imboden's which had just come. But the Union cavalry could have been trusted to take care of them, backed by 25,000 infantry not otherwise engaged. The views of leading officers of both sides and of military critics generally upon Meade's failure may be considered as comprised in the following expression of Gen. E. P. Alexander, who was Longstreet's Chief of Artillery, and also a renowned military authority. In his "Military Memoirs" he says:

It must ever be held a colossal mistake that Gen. Meade did not organize a counter stroke as soon as he discovered that the Confederate attack had been repulsed. He lost here an opportunity as great as McClellan lost at Sharpsburg. Our ammunition was so low, and our diminished forces were so widely dispersed along our extended line, that an advance upon us by a single fresh Corps--the Sixth, for instance--could have cut us in two. He at least had everything to gain by making the effort.

THE LOSSES AT GETTYSBURG.

There is always a discrepancy in the statements of the losses in a great battle. At first each army is disposed to minimize its own casualties and greatly exaggerrate those of its enemy. This seems to be an effort to prove what brave fighters are those making the statement and how weak and cowardly are their antagonists! Af ter a lapse of time the survivors are wont to exaggerate the losses of their command, in an effort to show to the world what sacrifices it made in the performance of duty. Then often colonels, adjutants, and others are careless in the compilation of the casualty statistics of their regiments. These imperfect scurces of information give great trouble to a historian that is desirous of stating the truth. Gettysburg is a frightful example of the imperfection of battle statistics.

According to certain subordinate commanders' reports, which have been printed and accepted as records, the total loss of the Confederate army at Gettysburg was 2,592 killed, 12,709 wounded, and 5,150 captured and missing; of the last designated, 10 per cent, or 515, are estimated to have been killed, making the number of killed 3,007 and the number of captured, 4,635; total killed, wounded, and missing, 20,451. The rolls on file at Washington show 12,227 wounded and unwounded captured by the Union troops at Gettysburg from July 1 to July 5. Medical Director Letterman of Meade's army reported 6,802 wounded Confederates left in his charge, showing 5,425 unwounded or "missing." The Confederate records are palpably unauthentic, due of course to the circumstances under which they are kept and compiled.

According to the official records the Union loss was 3,072 killed, 14,491 wounded, and 5,434 captured or missing, a total of 23,003. These figures show about 500 more killed, 1,800 more wounded, and 300 more

captured or missing in the Union army than in the Confederate, a difference in the total loss of 2,552 in favor of the Confederates.

But according to Col. Livermore's recently published "Numbers and Losses in the Civil War," a work very carefully prepared and which has been accepted as authoritative and well nigh conclusive by both sides, the respective losses were: Union--killed, 3,155; wounded, 14,529; captured, 5,365; total 23,049. Confederate-- killed, 3,903; wounded, 18,735; captured, 5,425; total 26,703.

On the retreat of the Confederates to the Potomac they had 316 killed and wounded and 1,360 captured; Union loss 462 killed and wounded and 516 captured. These figures are not included here in the Gettysburg casualties, although they sometimes are by other writers.

The Union army had Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds, Brig. Gens. Elon J. Farnsworth, Stephen H. Weed, and Saml. K. Zook killed and Brig. Gen. Strong Vincent mortally wounded. The Confederates had killed or mortally wounded Maj. Gen. Wm. D. Pender, Brig. Gens. Lewis A. Armistead, R. B. Garnett, Wm. Barksdale, and Paul J. Semmes. Each side had a proportionate number killed of colonels commanding brigades, lieutenant colonels and majors commanding regiments, etc.

RELATIVE STRENGTH OF THE ARMIES

The consolidated morning reports of June 30, 1863, embodied in the monthly returns for that date show that the Union army had present effective for duty, 93,369 officers and men of all arms. (The Sixth Corps had 15,679). Within the next three days it received re-enforcements to the number of 4,310, making a maximum of 101,679. As only 94 per cent of the effective for duty are estimated to be actually engaged in a battle, the Union troops might have had 95,502 engaged at Gettysburg. But not more than 3,679 of the Sixth Corps was actually under fire or endured any service; the total loss of the Corps was but 242. Deduct the 12,000 of Sedgwick's Sixth Corps that never fired a shot, and there were but 83,502 of the Union army left to fight. The 6 per cent deducted from the effectives includes teamsters, musicians, cooks, surgeons, and hospital attendants, quartermasters and commissioners and their assistants, clerks, officers' attendants, and men on special duty. The Government's official records give only the figures of the morning reports of June 30. Based on these, "Battles and Leaders" estimates the Union strength on the battlefieldat 93,500; but this estimate includes the Sixth Corps at 12,832. Col. Livermore estimates the total number of Union fighters at 88,289. The Comte de Paris puts it at 82,000.

The Confederate strength is difficult to estimate because of the absence of complete and reliable data. The latest monthly report of that army prior to Gettysburg is that for the month ending May 31; there was no report made for June. The May report shows 75,268 officers and men present and effective for duty. To this number was added a net re-enforcement of 2,250, making a maximum of 77,518. The losses in killed and wounded at Winchester (252) and in skirmishes en route to Gettysburg was 280; estimated losses by straggling and deaths en route, say 720; total en route

1,000, leaving 76,518 effective for duty July 1. Gen. Lee had no reserves or men standing idly by; as Lincoln advised his generals to do, he "put in all" his men. Nor did 6 per cent of his men escape the firing line by being detailed elsewhere. The Confederates had but few musicians or special duty men. Not more than 4 per cent, or 3,000, were exempt or spared from fighting, and it seems reasonable that from the first to the third day of the battle of Gettysburg the Confederates had 73,000 men engaged on the field, against 83,000 Union troops. "Battles and Leaders" estimates the Confederate strength at "at least 70,000 men of all arms." Col. Livermore's estimate is 75,000. But the latest official accounts, resurrected by the Confederates, and adopted by Gen. Longstreet in his history, "Manassas to Appomattox," give the aggregate strength of the Confederate army at Gettysburg as 75,568 "engaged."