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THE FIRST MINNESOTA ON THE THIRD DAY.

From under their bloody encounter with the Alabama brigade on July 2 the remnants of the First Minnesota came out in fine form and fettle. Capt. Messick soon had the men in a line which he called a regiment, but as a regiment it was a most melancholy sight.

The monthly report of the Regiment for the month of May, still on file in the State Adjutant General's office, shows that on May 31 the Regiment had "present for duty" 24 officers and 318 men in the regular organizations; Capt. Berger's company of Sharpshooters had 3 officers and 28 men; total in the Regiment and Sharpshooters, 373. The report for June, when the Regiment mustered for pay near Uniontown showed that, excluding the Sharpshooters, the Regiment had "present for duty" the day before the battle began, 27 officers and 358 men, a total of 385. And yet in his report of the battle Capt. Coates says the Regiment had "less than 330 men and officers engaged." At the end of July there were present for duty 14 officers and 130 men, total 144 in the Regiment proper. Capt. Coates says there were 232 officers and men killed and wounded in the two days of battle and this number deducted from 385, the strength June 30, leaves 153, with but nine men unaccounted for; deducting the loss stated in the nominal list in the Adjutant General's office (237) leaves 148, or only four unaccounted for.

Early on the morning of Friday, July 3, Capt. Messick mustered his little band on Cemetery Ridge, ready for the work of the day. Company F, the Red Wing company, returned from skirmishing down towards Round Top, and some special duty men were called in and given muskets to handle; but with all these, the once formidable First Minnesota now had but about 140 officers and men. Company C, Capt. Farrell's St. Paul company, did not come from division headquarters until a few hours later.

The day's work began with sharp fighting on the right, while the moon and stars were shining, and when about 3 o'clock Harry Slocum's Twelfth and Shaler's Brigade of Sixth Corps men moved to drive off the Confederates from Culp's Hill. The fighting lasted some hours, or until 10 o'clock, and as has been stated, Ewell's men were driven away, to Lee's great sorrow and disappointment.

Soon after sunrise the little battalion, called by courtesy the First Minnesota Regiment, was moved up to its place in Harrow's Brigade line. In appearance it resembled one of the many skeleton Confederate regiments after the battle of Antietam. Gibbon's Division was formed to the south of Hays's along the Ridge with Webb's Brigade next to Hays, Hall next to Webb, and Harrow next to Hall. In Harrow's Brigade the Nineteenth Maine was first, then in order came the Fifteenth Massachusetts, the First Minnesota, and the Eighty-Second New York.

The Regiment's position was on the crest of the Ridge--the line running north and south--a little south of the clump of trees, the "high water mark," where the proud waves of the Rebellion ~~was~~ were stayed. Upon their arrival the men set to work to erect a little line of miniature breastworks behind which they might find some shelter from the storm which they knew would soon burst upon them. They had no regular intrenching tools, and made a slight barricade of loose stones and fence rails picked up near by. Some of the men emptied knapsacks and filled them with dirt and set them up for head-shields, as they were sandbags.

As the Regiment came up it found Stannard's Vermonters under the enemy's artillery fire and came under that fire itself. Col. Randall's Thirteenth Vermont, which had taken the place of the First Minnesota in the fight against the Alabamians the previous evening, was one of these regiments. Only three of them were in position here, but they were new and very large, as regiments were then, and were strong enough for Gen. Hancock's

purpose. Their flank fire on Pickett's Division was somewhat like that of Ransom's North Carolinians on Sedgwick's Division at Antietam, and caused the Confederate force to give way or oblique to the north, so that instead of striking Harrow's Brigade as they set out to do, they fell against Webb's. Two regiments of Stannard, the Fourteenth and Sixteenth, drove back Wilcox's Brigade when it came up later.

Gen. Hancock was wounded* while instructing Col. Randall about fighting his regiment. In his report Col. Randall says:

Gen Hancock was wounded while sitting on his horse giving me some directions. I was standing very near him and assisted him from his horse. Gen. Stannard was also wounded soon after and compelled reluctantly to leave the field, since which time I have been in command of the brigade.

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* #In Mrs. Hancock's "Reminiscences" it is stated by Gen. C. H. Morgan that Gen. Hancock was wounded by "a wrought-iron ten-penny nail bent double, which entered the leg near the groin." The surgeons extracted several pieces of wood splinters from the saddle which had been driven into the wound.

Single Spear

RESISTING AND REPELLING PICKETT'S CHARGE.

During the forenoon, while the Regiment lay behind the mole-hill line which passed for a barricade, there was skirmishing on the hillside to the front. Some scattered farm buildings, deserted by the owners, had been occupied by the Confederate skirmishers that were making it unpleasant for some of Hays's Division. A charge upon the buildings by the Union skirmishers drove the Confederates away; the buildings were then burned, and the trouble they caused was not repeated. During the racket this incident created, most of the Minnesotians lay behind their frail little wall sound asleep under the hot sunshine and dreaming, perhaps, of peaceful scenes and conditions far away in their beautiful young North Star State.

When the tremendous cannonading began at 1 o'clock, the men sat up and took notice. Heavens! what a cannonading that was! The men thought they heard such cannonading at Antietam and Fredericksburg as they would never hear again, but that noise would have been smothered by the volume of sound created by Hunt's and Alexander's cannons at Gettysburg. It seemed that nothing four feet from the ground could live in the pathway of the rushing battle-bolts, the screaming shells, the hurtling shot, the whirring grape. And yet the Lord of Battles put up His shield in front of many a man on the Union line and turned the deadly missiles aside. The men were somewhat discouraged when it was plain that the Confederate firing was the heavier, and when a Union caisson full of ammunition was struck and exploded with a frightful shock. But occasionally they heard to the west a great explosion and saw a big bunch of smoke arise, and then they knew that caissons were being blown up on both sides.

After an hour or so the Union cannons stopped firing, while the Confederate batteries still flamed and roared. The boys were frightened for a few moments, until they were told that the Union batteries were

out of ammunition, and were going to the rear to replenish, while fresh batteries were galloping up. At last the Confederate batteries were silent, and then over to the west, on Seminary Ridge, regiments and brigades were seen aligning, gun barrels and bayonets gleaming, and red flags emblazoned with blue crosses waving over them, as Pickett's and Pettigrew's Divisions with their supports formed for the charge.

Then the gray columns moved and soon debouched from the woods, three-fourths of a mile away, into the Valley of Death. The force had nearly half a mile of front and it was in fine order, notwithstanding it had to leap across ditches and climb over stone fences and pass rough ground. It certainly seemed very determined and very formidable. But not a man of Harrow's Brigade, and especially of the First Minnesota, shrank from contact with it, but on the contrary awaited the onset impatiently and eagerly, as if certain of victorious results.

At first the center of the charging force aimed like the head of a great arrow straight for the position held by Harrow's Brigade; but when the column came up opposite Stannard's Brigade, to its right or south, the Vermonters poured such a heavy volley into its flanks as to push it out of its course and make it oblique towards the north against Webb's Brigade. All the while, too, as it crossed the valley and ascended the lower part of the Ridge, it was under the terrible fire of the Union batteries on the crest,* which had been saving their ammunition for just such an emergency. They rained case shot, shells, and canister upon the assailants in a fiery shower that burned and blew out great holes and gaps in their columns as if lava and thunderbolts were being hurled upon them. A few Confederate batteries having rifled guns and expert gunners kept up a fire on the Union position until the Confederates came close to it. The gunners had the range well and burst their shells squarely over the Union barricades.

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* #The batteries of Gibbon's Division did the greater part of this firing. They were Woodruff's (formerly Kirby's) in Ziegler's Grove, at the north of the Corps line; Arnold's with Smyth's Brigade of Hays; Cushing's, with Webb's Brigade; Brown's with Hall's Brigade, and Rorty's (N. Y.) with Harrow's Brigade. At 2 p. m. Cowan's New York replaced Brown's.

Firing their muskets as they came up, the Confederates "like wild-cats mad with wounds" sprang at the Union defenders. Then ensued the hand-to-hand fighting between the desperate Southerners and the sturdy, heroic Northerners--one as brave and as willing to fight as the other.

FIRST MINNESOTA TO THE RESCUE.

Hays's Division, with Smyth's and Willard's Brigades, easily took care of Pettigrew's force, notwithstanding it crossed the Union wall and that the North Carolinians came "farthest north;"*# but Pickett's three brigades largely outnumbered Webb's three regiments (Sixty-Ninth, Seventy-First, and Seventy-Second) and two companies (of the One Hundred and Sixth) of Pennsylvanians. Webb's was the old Burns' Brigade, with the familiar "California Regiment" (Seventy-First) and "Baxter's Fire Zouaves", the Seventy-Second.

To repel the charge Gen. Webb had placed the "California Regiment" and three guns of Cushing's Battery at the stone wall, to the right or north of the Sixty-Ninth, which was an Irish regiment, (Col. Dennis O' Kane) and which lay behind an improvised fence like that built by the First Minnesota. The Fire Zouaves were held in reserve just over the crest of the hill. Could three regiments, even if one of them was Irish, be expected to drive back an entire Confederate division?

Pickett's Division of Virginians now came up and drove against the wall behind which was the "California Regiment" and Cushing's three guns. Gen. Armistead's Brigade now had the advance and Armistead led it.** The other brigade commanders were stretched on the hillside. Armistead had only about 500 men with him when he came up to the wall. He put his cap on his sword and held it up high as a sort of gonfalon for his men to follow.

*#On the monument at Raleigh to the Confederate North Carolina troops is this inscription: "First at Big Bethel, farthest at Gettysburg, last at Appomattox."

** As a captain in the Tenth U. S. Infantry before the war, Armistead served for some years in the Northwest. He was a member of the garrison of Fort Ridgely for about two years, and for a time was stationed at Fort Snelling. It is said that he had no real sympathy with the Southern rebellion, but fought because of regard for his family and his State, Virginia.

They did not lack flags, for it was pathetic to note that of the hundred men that "crossed the works with Armistead" half of them seemed to be color-bearers. No matter how many others were shot down, there must be a color-bearer, and he must keep up the flag!

When the Virginians came near the wall the greater part of the "California Regiment" broke and fled to the rear, back to the Fire Zouaves. The Irish regiment stood by its little barricade and was soon fighting as merrily as though this were Donnybrook Fair, for whenever they encountered a Confederate head they hit it either with a bullet, a musket butt, or a cobble-stone.# Gen. Armistead leaped the wall and a hundred of his men followed him. Most of them had held their fire, and now they opened on the defenders of the crest. They shot brave young Capt. Cushing through the body and then through the mouth and killed him. He had fought his three guns to the last, pouring canister into the Virginians as they were climbing the wall. Five of his men were also killed and 32 wounded.

A number of Kemper's and Trimble's men came to the re-enforcement of Armistead's, but Baxter's Zouaves rushed up and with them some of the "Californians." Then, too, came the First Minnesota "to the help of the Lord against the mighty," and with it came the other three regiments of Harrow's Brigade.

As soon as the Confederates came within 60 yards, and as they were toiling up the hill, the First Minnesota and the rest of Gibbon's Division opened on them. The fire of the Vermonters and that of Harrow's Brigade, as has been said, caused them to veer or oblique to the northward on Hall's and Webb's Brigades. Therefore the Virginians ran athwart Harrow's line and received a deadly fire on their flank as they passed. Very soon they were seen to be

This regiment was very gallant. Its colonel and lieutenant colonel were both killed, and it lost 121 killed and wounded that day.

at work on Webb's little force, and at once Gen. Gibbon ordered Harrow to take his brigade by the "double quick" to the help of his comrade.

In two seconds the brigade was making its way to the right on a dead run. It passed along in the rear of Hall's Brigade, which was already busy, and almost immediately after the Confederates had killed Cushing and taken his guns the men of the First Minnesota were helping Webb's Pennsylvanians in the fight against the common enemy.

Gen. Gibbon ordered into the fight every armed man he could find. He sent in Capt. Farrell and Company C, his provost guard, and they were lying to the right of the Regiment when Pickett came. At once brave Capt. Farrell sprang up and ordered his men forward, but just as he arose a shot tore open his throat and he fell mortally wounded. And just as Capt. Messick led the little Minnesota battalion into the thick of the fight, he was struck instantly dead. Nobler souls than those of these officers never soared to Paradise. To paraphrase Napier's eulogy of Ridge, it may be said that of all the deaths on Gettysburg field none were more glorious than theirs, and many died and there was much glory.

The fighting was hot and deadly. As the little band of Minnesotians ran into the thickest of it, a company of newly arrived Confederates fired a concerted volley into them. The volley shattered the hand of Corporal John Dehn, (a St. Paul man, of Company A) as he was bearing the flag, and actually cut the flagstaff in two. At the same time a dozen men were stricken down.

"Don't let the flag touch the ground!" Oh, no! Corporal Harry D. O'Brien, of the St. Anthony company, at once sprang forward and siezed the stump of the flagstaff and waived the ragged and tattered banner above his head. Lochren says that just then somebody called out "Charge!" O'Brien, with his characteristic bravery, leaped with the broken staff and tatters of the flag to the front and rushed squarely into the faces of the

Virginians. It was as when James the Earl of Douglas flung the silver casket holding Robert Bruce's heart far forward among the ranks of the Saracens and cried out: "Lead on, Heart of Bruce, as thou wast ever wont, and we will follow thee!" Lead on, Flag of Minnesota, and the Minnesotians will follow you!

Every man above ground in the little battalion rushed after the colors and upon the enemy. O'Brien was soon prostrated with a grievous wound and Corporal W. N. Irvine, of the Minneapolis company, snatched the flag from his hands and bore it until victory came. This was the same gallant Corporal Irvine that had the perilous adventure at Fredericksburg.

Of course the Virginians fought bravely and desperately, but the Minnesotians were more than their match. There was no time to reload and fire the muskets, and so the naked barrels and the bayonets were used. Those in the rear who could not get close enough to use their implements picked up cobble-stones and hurled them over the heads of comrades upon the sconces of the enemy, as hand-grenades are thrown over a breastwork. It resembled the fighting of two mobs or factions in a holy war. A large majority of the Minnesotians were very young men, from 20 to 23, while many of the Confederates (especially among the conscripts) were men from 35 to 45, with long beards and matured physiques. The younger men proved their superiority as fighters, perhaps not in simple bravery but certainly in prowess.

Many gallent exploits were performed. As has been said, there were many Confederate flags among the assailants. The future ownership of these glaring red symbols, with their blue star-emblazoned St. Andrew's crosses, depended upon the issue of personal contests involving the survival of the fittest. Gibbon's and Hays's Divisions captured 33 of these flags and with them 3,186 prisoners. Harrow's Brigade got four flags.

Marshall Sherman, a St. Paul man, (Company C) took from its bearer the flag of the Twenty-Eighth Virginia, of Garnett's Brigade of Pickett. Gen. Garnett, commanding the brigade, and Col. R. C. Allen, commanding the regiment, were both killed. The flag is now in the Minnesota State Capitol building.

In a few seconds Gen. Armistead had been mortally wounded and 42 of his 150 followers lay dead within the Union lines. Nearly all of the remainder of the 150 were wounded or prisoners. The Union loss was not so large, but it was large enough. This state of affairs could not last long. The work of death could not go on much longer, for the supply of material to work upon was fast being exhausted. The Confederates that had not cared to cross the walls but stood on the outside, soon stopped shooting and yelling. Many lay down dead or wounded and many others prostrated themselves and feigned death because they wanted to be taken prisoners.

The remainder of the assaulting force--probably one-third of that which started from Seminary Ridge--retreated hurriedly, and in great heart-sickness and distress, down the slope, across the valley, and back to Seminary Ridge. But one-third of this one-third never reached safety. Stormed at with shot and shell and musketry as they ran, hundreds of them were prostrated in death or by wounds; others, overcome by fear and horror, dropped in sheltered places and were as easily gathered up as if they had been children.

Nearing their former positions they came upon Gen. Lee, sitting on his horse and reviewing them as they passed by him. For their comfort he kept calling out: "It is all my fault, men; you are not to blame. It is all my fault; but we will do better next time." He had persisted in ordering the assault. Longstreet and the other generals opposed it--except Pickett, who was a madcap sort of fellow and delighted in daring deeds. But when he was ready for the charge, Pickett asked Longstreet: "Shall I move forward now, sir?" and Longstreet could utter no word of reply, but only bowed his head slightly. Then Pickett called out cheerily: "I shall move

forward at once," and galloped away.

Longstreet was Lee's second in command; Lee called him "my old war horse." Longstreet wanted to move against Meade's line below the Round Tops, where the ground was level and the defenders few; but Lee thought the capture of the Union right would be more destructive of Meade's army. He believed he could take any part of the line he wished from the "cowardly Yankees," no matter how many they were or how well they were protected. He seemed stunned, astonished, and dismayed when the flower of his army failed to establish his theories, and his "mea culpa" did not pay for the hundreds of his dead men lying out in the valley and along the hillside and on the crest of Seminary Ridge.

THE REGIMENT'S LOSS JULY 3.

In the fighting on July 3, the First Minnesota had in all perhaps 150 men. Its loss was 3 officers (Capt. Messick, Capt. Farrell, and Lieut. Mason) and 23 men killed or mortally wounded; three officers, (Lieuts. Harmon, Heffelfinger, and May) and 29 men wounded not mortally. Total killed and mortally wounded, 23; total wounded, 32; grand total killed and wounded, 55. This is what the nominal list shows, as it is still preserved and of record. Yet in his historical sketch Lochren says the total killed and wounded was but 17. He seems to have reached this conclusion after stating that the Regiment's loss in both days was 232, and that 215 were lost July 2. He forgot that a few days after the battle he made a different report which is still on file in his own writing. One man of Company L (Sylvester Brown) was killed away from the regiment July 3. The Sharpshooters were generally accounted separately from the Regiment; but if their loss at Gettysburg is included, the Regiment had one officer, Capt. messick, and 11 men killed outright July 3.

Capt. Farrell died in the evening of July 4. In his report dated July 5, the report written by Adjt. Lochren, but signed by Capt. Coates, states: "Capt. W. B. Farrell, Company C, was mortally wounded and died last night." The date of the gallant officer's death is well established; yet in his historical sketch Lochren says that "every survivor of the Regiment knows" that Capt. Farrell--like Capts. Muller and Messick and Lieut. Farrar--"died on the field." Lieut. Mason had his arm amputated and died from the shock at Harrisburg, August 18th. Both Capt. Messick and Capt. Farrell were members of Gen. Gorman's Indiana regiment in the Mexican War.

The stricken of the Regiment were ~~called~~ cared for by their surviving comrades as well as possible. The dead were gathered together and July 4 given decent burial on the field which they had so greatly glorified.

The wounded were conveyed to the hospitals on the Baltimore pike, the Taneytown road, and in the valley of Rock Creek. Afterward they were distributed among the great general hospitals at Harrisburg, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and some were sent to New York City.

THE NIGHT AFTER THE BATTLE.

No sooner had the Confederates passed beyond musket shot on their retreat than the regiments were drawn up ready to follow them. And they were eager, too, for the pursuit. Their blood was stirred and it would not settle until quieted by the complete overthrow of the enemy. Every soldier realized that in their demoralized condition the Confederates would be easily overcome, and nothing else was considered but a forward movement upon them. Darkness fell while the troops were momentarily expecting the order to advance, and they lay down to sleep with accoutrements on, expecting to be called up to fight at any moment.

After nightfall there was still danger. The moon had changed and with it the weather. The sky soon became overcast. From Harrow's Brigade the entire Fifteenth Massachusetts was sent forward on pickett duty, or rather on the skirmish line, for they and the "rebs" kept picking away at one another all night, and until noon of the next day. On their way to the skirmish line the Massachusetts boys picked up about 50 Confederate prisoners, many of them unwounded. Some of them said they had been conscripted and had no real sympathy with the Confederate cause. Then, overcome by fatigue and terror from the dangers through which they had passed, they were only too willing to yield themselves up.

Toward morning came on a terrible rain storm, another instance where a rain followed a battle. In this case the downpour was proportioned to the tremendous cannonade of the previous afternoon. Only a very few of the troops were in tents and the soldiers were drenched in an instant. Sudden torrents swept over the hills and poured down the hillsides. The field hospital of Hays's Division was in a valley on a level with Rock Creek. It was flooded in a few minutes. Hundreds of Confederate wounded had been collected there, and some of them were really saved from drowning by being has-

tily carried to higher ground.

Out on the battle-field lay hundreds of the dead, the downpour washing their bloody wounds and stark faces, as if preparing them for sepulture. The superstitious might well believe that over these sacred corpses floated many a disembodied spirit crying: "Blessed be the name of Him who hath given this glorious victory to my country, but woe is me whose duty it was to die!"

Among the dead lay thousands of wounded, in agony from their hurts, which the pouring rain aggravated and intensified. They were calling pitifully for help, and it was rendered to all possible extent; yet many a man lost a valuable life for the lack of a little bandage, a drink of cool water, or a simple act of surgery.

> But things like that, you know, must be
> After a famous victory.

The morning of July 4 was still rainy. It was Independence Day. The Union soldiers celebrated it by caring for the dead and wounded and by gathering up the muskets and accoutrements left on the field by the dead, the wounded, and the prisoners. The bayonets were fixed on the muskets and then stuck in the ground, and in a little time there were acres of muskets as thick as young trees in a nursery. The First Minnesota, Fifteenth Massachusetts, and Nineteenth Maine, gathered up 1,740 guns and 600 sets of accoutrements, according to Gen. Harrow's report.

The Confederates over on Seminary Ridge observed the day by building good breastworks, which extended clear around the north end of the Ridge, and by preparing as best they knew how to resist a confidently expected attack from the Yankees. But the repulse of Pickett's and Pettigrew's charge virtually ended the three days' battle of Gettysburg. There was a little skirmishing and artillery firing on the 4th, but it amounted to nothing. Lee was busy all the afternoon in sending off his trains and prisoners and that night the army followed, taking the Cashtown and Fairfield roads towards Harper's Ferry.

THE FIGHTING DESCRIBED BY A PARTICIPANT.

A correspondent of the Pioneer Press signing himself "Sergeant," wrote a graphic account of the two days' fighting, which is worthy of reproduction. The account appeared in the issue of the paper August 9, 1863, and is reproduced in Neill's History of Minnesota, (3d and 4th editions), page 740, as follows:

Gen. Hancock rode up to Colonel Colvill, and, pointing to the smoke-covered masses of the advancing foe, said: "Colonel, advance and take their colors." Then "forward!" shouted our colonel, and as one man we commenced to move down the slope towards a little run at its foot, which the enemy evidently wished to gain. Now their cannon were pointed toward us and round shot, grape, and shrapnel tore fearfully through our ranks and the more deadly Enfield rifles were directed to us alone.

Great Heavens! How fast our men fell! I was marching as a file-closer, and it seemed as if every step was over some fallen comrade. Yet no man wavers;every gap is filled up, and, bringing down their bayonets, the boys press shoulder to shoulder. Disdaining the fictitious courage proceeding from noise and excitement, without a word or cheer, but with silent, desperate determination, they stepped firmly forward in unbroken line, within a hundred--yes, within fifty--steps of the foe.

Three times our colors were shot down, and three times they rise and go forward. One-fourth of the men have fallen, and yet no shot has been fired at the enemy, who paused a moment to look upon that line of leveled bayonets, and then, panic stricken, turned and ran. But another line came up and poured murderous volleys into us, not thirty yards distant.

Then "Charge!" cried Colonel Colvill, and with a wild cheer we ran at them. We fire away three, four, five irregular volleys, and but little ammunition is wasted when the muzzles of opposing guns almost meet. The enemy seemed to sink in the ground. They are checked and staggered. Re-enforcements came up at this instant, and before we recovered from the bewilderment of the shock, the rebels are swept back over the plain.

But Good God! where was the First Minnesota? Our flag was carried back to the battery, and <u>seventy men</u>, scarce one of them without scratches or bullet holes through his clothing, were all that formed around it; the other 200, alas! lay bleeding under it. Our field officers, rendered conspicuous by their great personal statures and cool and dashing gallantry, had all fallen, each pierced by several balls, and the command devolved upon Captain Messick. Tired and weary, we might not sleep, or even build fires to make coffee, but rested on our arms all the long damp, drizzling night, in wakeful anticipation of an attack.

Red and fiery through the morning mists at length rose the sun on the 3d of July. The forenoon passed as did the previous one. About noon two guns were fired as a sort of signal, and immediately after 180 pieces of cannon opened on our line. When you remember what our formation was

(and that of the enemy conformed to it) you will see that their cannon were on three sides of us, and that their converging lines of fire crossed each other in all directions over us. Many of their shot fired from batteries to the west of us passed clear over our horse-shoe formation and fell among their own men facing us from the northeast. Imagine our position in the center! Our artillery opened vigorously in return, and then the scene became sublime. Two long weary hours of this tremendous thundering and then came a lull in the storm. We knew their infantry was advancing and we rose for the death struggle with a feeling of relief, for at the worst it was but man to man, and we could give as well as take.

And now they emerged from the woods, nearly 20,000 of them. Gen. Pickett's Division, fresh from the rear, was in front, and advanced upon our shattered division of less than 4,000. We had reserves behind, however, to come to our assistance if needed.

Over the plain, still covered with the dead and wounded of yesterday, in three beautiful lines of battle, preceded by skirmishers, with their arms at right shoulder shift, and with double-quick step, right gallantly they came on. What was left of our artillery opened, but they never seemed to give it any attention. Calmly we awaited the onset, and when within 200 yards we opened fire. Their front line went down like grass before the scythe; again they charged and went down; again they charged and this time changed direction and followed a small ravine up towards our right. To the right we went also, marching parallel with them and firing continually, and no man seemed to shrink from his duty.

Three or four brigades of the enemy closed together near a cave, when, charging again, they rushed forward and planted their colors on one of our batteries. Our brigade rushed at them. The tattered colors of the First, in advance, were now shot down, the ball passing through the right hand of the color bearer, John Dehn, and cutting the staff in two where he grasped it. Corporal O'Brien raised the flag and bore it on. Gens. Hancock and Gibbon were both wounded here while cheering us on, but their orders were unnecessary. The fight had become a perfect melee, and every man fought for himself with an occasional direction from a company officer.

Here that noble soldier, Capt. Messick, was killed and Capt. Farrell, who had gallantly brought up the provost guard (Company C) to reenforce the shattered regiment, was mortally wounded. The enemy had halted and were firing on us from behind some bushes. We pushed on; they fired at us until we reached the muzzles of their guns, but they could not stand the bayonet and broke in disorder and dismay.

Our Division took more colors than it had regiments. Marshall Sherman, of Company C, took those of the Twenty-Eighth Virginia. Not daring to run, their officers and men surrendered by scores and hundreds. At this moment of victory Corporal O'Brien was shot down and the colors fell. Corporal Irvine immediately raised that tattered but sacred flag of Minnesota and again it waved in glorious triumph over her gallant dead, while the ringing shouts of victory along the front of our line proclaimed that the day was won.

The reserves were not called upon and did not fire a gun. Twenty-eight battle flags were added to the trophies gathered at the Peninsula and Antietam by our glorious old Second Corps, which in the words of brave old Sumner "never lost a gun or a color."

NOTES ON THE REGIMENT AND THE BATTLE.

General Hancock made a singularly incorrect report of the conduct of the First Minnesota on July 2, and his statement has been made the basis of and the authority for many incorrect versions of the experience of the Regiment on that day. The General dictated his official report some weeks after the battle, before his wound had entirely healed, and perhaps did not remember the incidents of the day very clearly. At all events, when he came to describe what the First Minnesota did, he wrote:

> Proceeding along the line, I met a regiment of the enemy, the head of whose column was about passing through an unprotected interval in our line. A fringe of undergrowth in front of the line offered facilities for it to approach very close to our lines without being observed. It was advancing firing and had already twice wounded my aide, Capt. Miller. The First Minnesota Regiment, coming up at this moment, charged the regiment in handsome style, capturing its colors and driving it back in disorder. I cannot speak too highly of this regiment and its commander in its attack, as well as in its subsequent advance against the enemy, in which it lost three-fourths of the officers and men engaged. One of the regiments of the Vermont Brigade afterward advanced upon its (the First Minnesota's) right, and retook the guns of one of the reserve batteries, from which the cannoneers and supports had been driven.

Gen. Hancock evidently did not see all of Wilcox's Brigade, which was "advancing firing," or he would not have called it "a regiment." The brigade numbered, according to Gen. Wilcox, 1,200 men. The First Minnesota was not "coming up" when it prepared to charge; it had been "up" for some time. It did not capture any colors at the time of its charge or on that day. Evidently Gen. Hancock had in mind the work of the Regiment on July 3, when he mentions its "subsequent advance against the enemy," although it did not lose "three-fourths of the officers and men engaged" on that day, which was the day when it captured the flag. The General has given the Regiment deserved praise for the work it performed, even if his itemized statement as to when the work was done is lamentably confused.

In Mrs. Hancock's "Reminiscences" of her husband there is a "Narative of the Second Army Corps," written by Gen. Chas. H. Morgan, who was first Inspector General and later Chief of Staff of the Corps. He it was who had Col. Colvill placed in arrest on the march to Gettysburg. Gen. Morgan thus describes the incident of the entrance of the First Minnesota on the historic charge:

While Gen. Hancock was riding along the line he observed a rebel regiment about penetrating an interval in our lines and firing as it advanced, Capt. Miller, of the General's staff, being wounded by the fire. Turning to a regiment standing near, in column of fours, Gen. Hancock said to the Colonel, pointing to the rebel standard, "Do you see those colors?" "Yes, sir." "Well, capture them." The regiment charged as it was, formed in column of fours, in the most brilliant style, capturing the colors and a number of prisoners.

While Gen. Hancock was absent, wounded, he wrote to one of his staff (Col. W. G. Mitchell) desiring him to ascertain what regiment this was, as he desired to recommend the colonel for appointment as brigadier general. Knowing that several Corps were represented at or near the spot, a circular was sent to the Corps commanders to get the required information. In his letter Gen. Hancock described the man and stated that he rode a black horse. Strange to say, several claimants were found for the honor; but the regiment was in truth one of the General's own command, the heroic First Minnesota.

The General was somewhat reluctant to come to a conclusion, on account of the number and pertinacity of the claimants, but some weeks after he met the Colonel (Adams) in Harrisburg and recognized him at once. The Colonel had been several times wounded and had been in hospital at Harrisburg ever since the battle. In this attack and in the subsequent advance of the enemy, the First Minnesota lost 75 per cent of its members.

Describing the engagement of his brigade after the defeat of Sickles's Corps, Gen. Harrow, who commanded the old German Brigade, reported:

The Nineteenth Maine, Colonel Heath commanding, were moved to the left and front of the division line.and placed to the right of Lieut. Brown's Battery. # # # As the enemy advanced, the first of the division to become engaged were the Eighty-Second New York and the Fifteenth Massachusetts, in the aggregate not more than 700 strong and without support. # # # They were forced to retire after heavy losses, including their respective Colonels, Huston and Ward, both of whom were mortally wounded and each since dead; also many line officers killed and wounded. The enemy continued to advance until they attacked with great fury the commands of Colonels Colvill and Heath, endeavoring to take the batteries under their protection. In this assault Col. Colvill, Lieut. Col. Adams, and Maj. Downie, of the First Minnesota, were shot down, the two former severely, and I fear mortally, wounded; but the command maintained its position until supplanted by the arrival of other troops.

Gen. Gibbon reported that in his Division seven colonels and lieutenant-colonels commanding regiments were killed, and two colonels, three lieutenant-colonels, and two majors were wounded, including among the wounded the First Minnesota's principal field officers.

In his report of the part taken by the Third Brigade in repelling Pickett's charge, Col. Norman J. Hall, the brigade commander, says: "During this time the 15th Massachusetts, 1st Minnesota, and 19th Maine, from the First Brigade (Harrow's) of this Division, had joined the line and are entitled to a full share in the credit of the final repulse."

Maj. Edmund Rice, Nineteenth Massachusetts, of Hall's Brigade, and who was a friend of the lamented Captain Farrell, writes in "Battles and Leaders" (Vol. 3, p.389)of the part taken by his regiment and the Forty-Second New York (Tammany) in repelling Pickett's fool-hardy attempt: "Our two regiments were ordered forward to the clump of trees. The advance was rapidly thinned by the hostile fire on the flank and in the clump of trees as we came to the line. Captain Farrell, of the First Minnesota, with his company, came in on my left. As we greeted each other, he received his death wound and fell in front of his men, who now began firing."

While lying under Confederate artillery fire just before the great charge on the 3rd, the Fifteenth Massachusetts was in line to the right of the First Minnesota. A Confederate shot passed just under a Fifteenth man, and in plain view of the Minnesotians threw him into the air and backward in a somersault. As he alighted an officer of the Fifteenth walked over where he lay and on his return sententiously remarked: "He has passed over." Gen. Hunt, the Union Chief of Artillery, was riding along at the time, saw the incident, and thus (in "Battles and Leaders") narrates it:

> As I passed along, a bolt from a rifle-gun struck the ground just in front of a man of the front rank, penetrated the surface and passed under him, throwing him over and over. He fell behind the rear rank, apparently dead; a ridge of earth where he had been lying made the incident remind me of the backwoods men's practice of "barking" squirrels.

During and after Pickett's assault the First Minnesota captured no fewer than three times its number of Confederate prisoners. In his report Capt. Coates says: "Our regiment took about 500 prisoners." Lochren says: "Our men were most kind to the captured Confederates, giving them refreshments from camteens and haversacks."

The immense loss of the Union army in prisoners made Gettysburg almost a Confederate victory. More than 5,000 were taken, kept in the vicinity of their capture for three days, and then carried away in triumph hundreds of miles, through loyal Pennsylvania and Maryland, across the Potomac, down the valley of Virginia, and on to Richmond. That the men made no effort to gain their liberty explains why so many of them were made prisoners so easily. The more than 5,100 Confederate prisoners taken did not compensate for the mortification of the capturing and carrying away of 5,000 Union troops, or even alleviate the humiliation. But remember, people of Minnesota, not a single one of your State's soldiers was made prisoner and carried into ~~activity~~ captivity at Gettysburg.

RE-FORMING THE RANKS.

On the morning of July 4 the ranks of the shattered First Minnesota were straightened up and it was made ready for the next battle, which it was believed was only a day or so away. The first thing to do was to mend the shot-severed flag-staff, and the color guard at once undertook the work of repair. The lower part had been lost, and the upper was only two feet long below the ragged, bullet-rent banner. Corporal Newell Irvine, of Company D, was now in charge of the flag, having received it on the battle-field from Harry O'Brien, then staggering under two cruel wounds. Somebody brought a piece of Confederate flag-staff that belonged to a captured flag, and Irvine said: "We can use this all right enough, for it has been captured from the 'rebs' and is now a Union stick." And so the Union piece and the Confederate piece were spliced and formed an indissoluble union, and thus united held aloft the Union colors thereafter, and still hold them in their place of honor in Minnesota's new Capitol. And this splicing of the pieces of flagstaff fore-shadowed the time when Union and Confederate should unite in upholding the colors of the old Union forever.

Then when the flagstaff was mended and ready to go forward again, there had to be an official re-organization of the Regiment. All the field officers were flat on their backs with bad wounds, and with Col. Colvill and Lieut. Col. Adams it was touch-and-go whether or not they would ever get up. Capt. Harry C. Coates, of one of the St. Paul companies (Company A) became, by virtue of the seniority of his commission, (dated Sept. 18, 1861) acting colonel of the First Minnesota. He appointed as adjutant Lieut. Wm. Lochren, of the St. Anthony company, in place of Lieut. John Peller, who had also been wounded when so many others were, on July 2. On the 5th Capt. Coates made his report to Gov. Ramsey of the part taken by the Regiment in the battle on both days, (See Minnesota in Civil and Indian Wars,

Vol. 2, p. 372) signing himself "Captain Commanding First Regiment Minnesota Volunteers," though Lochren says that he, as adjutant, made out the document.

In his report of the services of the Regiment in the two days fighting at Gettysburg, Capt. Coates says it lost 4 commissioned officers and 47 men killed, 13 officers and 162 men wounded, and 6 missing, a total loss of 232, which he says was "out of less than 330 men and officers engaged;" this report was made July 5. The nominal list made out Aug. 31 to accompany the monthly report shows however that there were 7 officers and 88 men killed and mortally wounded, and 9 officers and 141 men wounded not mortally, a total of killed, mortally wounded and wounded of 245; missing none.

#689 = 7/14

LEE RETREATS FROM GETTYSBURG.

Of course after the repulse of Pickett's and Pettigrew's charge Gen. Lee retreated just as soon as he could do so with chances in his favor that he would not be seriously interfered with. His fortifying and parading about in the rain on the 4th of July was a "bluff" that he would stand his ground, and that if the Yankees did not attack him pretty soon he would attack the Yankees, and then, as Gen. Imboden facetiously said, he would "whip 'em agin!"

And all the time he was in fact retreating. He was starting away his trains and prisoners and gathering up all his wounded that were able to be moved and for which he had transportation. He left several thousand wounded prisoners to the care of the "brutal Yankee"--and they had cause to bless him for that! Those that were cared for by their own surgeons and nurses did not thrive very well.* His artillery ammunition was well nigh exhausted, the musketry supplies were not in much better condition, and there was no supply north of the Potomac, 50 miles to the southwest, through a hilly and mountainous region and a hostile population all the way. A vigorous pressure upon his unsubstantial army and it would be shattered. It was too bad that the Union army did not have a commander that knew just how to make that pressure.

Immediately after noon on the 4th Lee's trains began assembling in the fields along the road from Gettysburg to Cashtown, preparatory to setting out for Williamsport, on the Potomac. Lee had ordered great stores of ammunition and other supplies to be sent up from Richmond, via Winchester, to Williamsport, and he had a good pontoon bridge across the Potomac at the last named town. Nearly all the trains were put under the care of Gen. John D. Imboden, with his brigade of 2,100 good cavalry and 23 pieces of artillery. Gen. Imboden says that when the train was strung

* Of the wounded of McLaws's Division 576 were left within the Union lines in charge of ten surgeons and 70 nurses and cooks of their own. Of the 576 thus left 113 died of their wounds. (See War Recs., Vol. 27, part 2, p. 365).

out it was 17 miles long. Wagons not containing supplies were filled with wounded men, who suffered greatly as they were jolted over the rough stony roads. It was claimed that Gens. Pender and Semmes, who were badly wounded at Gettysburg, both died from the effects of the jolting.

Gen. Imboden was a very active and enterprising officer. At the first Bull Run he commanded the battery attached to Gen. Bee's Brigade and fought the First Minnesota. In charge of Lee's train he pushed forward through the rain and the darkness and over rough roads, not stopping for anything--the cries of the wounded and dying, the breaking of wagons, the exhaustion of mules and horses, or what not. He left the rear of Seminary Ridge at 4 o'clock July 4, and at daylight the next morning the head of his column was at Greencastle, 15 miles north of Williamsport. Nearly the whole of the train got to Williamsport that afternoon.

July 6, near Hagerstown, the Union cavalry, under Gens. Buford and Kilpatrick, with a brigade of Gregg's Division, attacked Imboden. The Confederate situation was critical. Gen. Imboden says: "We had probably 10,000 animals and nearly all the wagons of Gen. Lee's army under our charge, and all the wounded, to the number of several thousand, that could be brought from Gettysburg, with 2,500 men to defend them." Gen. Imboden armed many of his teamsters and fought as best he could, and he was a good fighter. He was outnumbered but not outgeneraled. He swaggered about on the hills, in plain sight of the Union generals, with all his cavalry parading at one point, then he would withdraw the same troops to another part and show them as if they were another division, and so swaggering and apparently bullying and defying the Union armies, he held Kilpatrick and Buford until Jeb Stuart and Fitzhugh Lee came to his assistance with their divisions.

There was but little fighting, the losses being about 125 Confederates and 250 Union cavalry. After the fight Gen. Imboden kept two ferryboats running night and day crossing the prisoners and wagons

over the Potomac. The rains had raised the river so that it could not be forded and the Union troops from Harper's Ferry had destroyed Gen. Lee's pontoon bridge. Had Kilpatrick and Buford not been deceived by Imboden's parading, they might have gained a great victory. Gen. Imboden (in Battles and Leaders) says:

> By extraordinary good fortune we thus saved all of Gen. Lee's trains. A bold charge on us at any time before sunset would have broken our feeble lines and then we should all have fallen an easy prey to the Federals. The next day our army arrived from Gettysburg.

One division of the trains in advance had been attacked in crossing the South Mountains by Kilpatrick, and 100 wagons and ambulances, with a lot of wounded, secured, but the capture was unimportant. Had Grant commanded the army and Sheridan the cavalry on the pursuit of Lee, the result would have been different.

Gen. Lee began moving his army away from Gettysburg on the night of the 4th of July. The rear guard left after daylight on the 5th. The retreat was over two roads to the southwest, the Fairfax road and the Cashtown road. After an arduous march, the Confederates reached Hagerstown on the afternoon of July 6th and the morning of the 7th. Getting down to Williamsport, by way of Antietam battle ground, Gen. Lee found to his alarm that the Potomac was so swollen as to be unfordable and that French's troops from Harper's Ferry had nearly destroyed his pontoon bridge. Here he was, with 40,000 defeated troops and 2,000 wagons, huddled up on the banks of an impassable river, with the angry roar of a great hostile and victorious army in his immediate rear!

GEN. MEADE MAKES AN INEFFECTIVE PURSUIT.

Gen. Meade has often been censured for slowness in his pursuit of Lee's retreating and badly shattered army. The truth is that Gen. Meade did the best he could; that this best was not very good waa not his fault. As early as the morning of the 4th, when it was uncertain whether or not the battle was really over, he telegraphed Gen. French, then at Frederick, Md., to re-occupy Harper's Ferry and to sieze and hold the lower passes of the South Mountain, so as to intercept Lee's possible retreat. Then he put all his cavalry but two brigades in motion to harass Lee's movement to the rear, and to destroy his trains and his pontoon bridge at Williamsport.

On the 5th he sent a column in direct pursuit of the Confederates as soon as he learned that they had retreated. During the great battle, the good war horses of Sedgwick's Sixth Corps ~~was~~ were the last Union troops to come up, and during the fighting they scarcely "sweat a hair," as the horsemen say. So the Sixth Corps was selected to lead the pursuit. It marched out to the southwest over the Fairfield road, and ten miles from Gettysburg, where the road breaks through a pass in the South Mountain range, it overtook the Confederate rear guard. Gen. Sedgwick was about to begin a fight when he was recalled by an order from Gen. Meade, who had concluded to abandon the direct pursuit of Lee, and make a flank march by Middleton and along the east side of South Mountain to the lower passes of that range, down by Boonsborough, Turner's and Crampton's Gap, etc. This was why he had ordered Gen. French to occupy the passes, so that Meade would not have to fight for them when he reached them.

At the same time Gen. Meade sent a cavalry column on the Cashtown road and Kilpatrick by the Emmitsburg and Monteray passes to try to capture Lee's train. Kilpatrick, with his brigade, attacked the train at the South Mountain pass near Smithsburg, east of Hagerstown, and captured the wagons, ambulances and prisoners heretofore mentioned.

On July 6 a large part of the army moved from Gettysburg toward Emmitsburg, and the remainder followed the next day. July 7, Meade's headquarters were at Frederick, on the 8th at Middleton, on the 9th at the South Mountain House, and on the 10th at Antietam Creek, three miles north of the battleground, where they should have been on the 8th. On the 11th a new bridge was put over Antietam Creek, and on the 13th Gen. Meade had his forces in front of the position taken up by Lee at Williamsport to cover his passage over the Potomac.

But in the meantime Lee's army had reached Williamsport on the evening of the 7th, had been there six days, waiting for the high water in the river to fall, and Lee had fortified himself with a strong line of breastworks. The usual thing had happened. The Confederates had outmarched the Union troops. Gen Meade and others said that the weather was so bad their troops could not march fast; but the Confederates marched every day in the same weather and under worse conditions, and in a 50-mile race from Gettysburg to Williamsport they beat Gen. Meade's army by six days!

Gen. Meade was making an honest effort to overhaul the Confederates and bring them to battle in their unfit condition. He did not, however, seem to realize that to do this he must outmarch them and either head them off or come up so as to attack them heavily on their flank. They had the start of him by six hours, it is true, but his men could and would have made up this difference if they had been appealed to. The same rains that fell on them descended on the Confederates, and it was easier for Union soldiers to march, well supplied as they were, than for the Confederates, on their empty stomachs, in their ragged and tattered uniforms, without tents at night.

Had Gen. Meade shown the same diligence and energy shown by Gen. grant when he pursued Lee from Petersburg and overtook him at Appomattox, the war might not have lasted so long. But on his pursuit of Lee,

Gen. Meade made a false start. He sent his pursuing column on what naval men call a stern chase; that is to say, to follow directly after the enemy. Then when, as has been said, they had gotten twelve miles out and ran against the Confederates at the mountain gap, the General amended his unmilitary move, and recalled his troops and sent them down the east side of the South Mountain range, in an effort to overtake the fleeing Southern hosts. Lincoln almost implored him to come up with and attack Lee and destroy him before the now despondent Confederate leader could reach the Potomac, and at all events be sure to not let him take his army across the river.

But Gen. Meade developed strong symptoms of having contracted Leephobia, and was wary of the Confederate leader. His marches were like those of McClellan, covering but a few miles a day, and uniformly straggling and involved. And at this juncture it seemed that Divine Providence had taken an "unprejudiced view" of the situation and determined to help the Union commander; for when Gen. Lee reached Williamsport he found the Potomac too swollen to cross, and the rain was still pouring as if to keep the river still swelling until Meade could come up and with his hosts demolish the whole Southern army. The time seemed like that when, for the benefit of Joshua and his pursuing army, the sun stood still upon Gibeon and the moon was held back in the valley of Ajalon. But in the modern instance the Confederate Amorites were not exterminated, and not even scorched, for Gen. Meade was not as energetic a commander in pursuing his enemies as Gen. Joshua.

When Gen. Meade's army came up with Lee's the latter had been at Williamsport for six days. He had rigged up a rope ferry by which he crossed his prisoners into Virginia and brought back supply wagons. The Confederate ammunition and other supplies had come up, and that helped a great deal; for the chiefs report that after Gettysburg, for four days there was not artillery ammunition enough in the army to furnish half a

dozen rounds to the gun. Gen. Lee fortified himself behind good breast works in the Southern angle formed by the confluence of the Conococheague and the Potomac, the south end of his line resting on the Potomac near Downsville, covering Falling Waters, three miles below Williamsport. The position was a strong one. It could have been turned had Meade moved his right or north wing around to the north of the little stream with the big Indian name and put "in battery" plenty of artillery. This position not only overlapped Lee's left wing as it faced north, but enfiladed his rear, and also commanded the ford over the Potomac at Williamsport, by which the Confederates meant to cross. There was danger, however, that infantry in crossing the creek to attack would be thrown into confusion, thus weakening the force of their assault.

But Lincoln and Halleck were punching up Meade so incessantly and earnestly in their desire to have him attack and beat Lee, that at last he got angry and determined to vanquish his enemy by main strength and bravery, without recourse to tactics or strategy. He arrayed his army in front of Lee's breastworks on July 12, and the next morning called a council of his generals to decide whether or not the enemy should be attacked. It is a military saying that "councils of war never fight," and on this occasion a majority of Meade's generals voted that it was better not to attack; and under the circumstances they were right. Owing to the nature of the ground in their front an attack on Lee's breastworks at Williamsport would probably have resulted as did Burnside's assaults on the Confederate leader's works at Marye's Heights. (See Meade's report, War. Recs.)

But after Meade's council had adjourned, he received another dispatch from Lincoln. Then he tore around and swore around for awhile#,* and on the night of the 13th declared that he would attack the next morning,

* #Though nominally a Christian, Gen. Meade was a man of violent temper and very profane and vituperative when angry.

anyhow, let hap what might hap, and he made his preparations accordingly. But the next morning when the skirmishers advanced, it was discovered that the Confederate army, bag and baggage, had re-crossed the Potomac and all except a few cavalry of the rear guard were now safe in "old Virginia!"

Five miles down the Potomac from Williamsport are the "Falling Waters," as the Indians called them, and here Gen. Lee had laid his pontoon bridge when he passed up in June. French's cavalry only partially destroyed this bridge; they simply cut the boats loose and let them drift away, instead of punching holes in them and sinking them. Many of the boats drifted to the shores and Lee's men gathered them up. Then Col. Harmon, Gen. Ewell's quartermaster, tore down some houses and built other boats, and the bridge was soon reconstructed. Then as soon as it was in place began the crossing. The prisoners had already crossed in ferries; now came the wagons with the wounded and finally the other wagons, the artillery and all of Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's Corps. Gen. Ewell's men, except Hays's Brigade, waded the river at the Williamsport ford, "the water coming up to their armpits the whole way across and sometimes deeper," Gen. Ewell says. Hays's Brigade escorted the artillery by way of Falling Waters.

On the Maryland side, near Falling Waters, was a modest little seminary called St. James College, and near it and about it was a sharp cavalry fight. Just as the Confederate crossing began, came another heavy rain. It was now the dark of the moon and the night was very black. Fires were built at the ends of the bridge so that the way could be seen; but one wagonload of wounded went into the river in spite of all care to prevent such a thing. The crossing was not completed until 1 P. M. of the next day.

The crossing was being covered by what was left of Pettigrew's Division after its famous charge at Gettysburg. At 11 o'clock Gen. Custer's Michigan cavalry brigade came upon this part of the Confederate line near Downsville, or St. James College. Two companies of the Sixth

Michigan, under a Major Weber (killed), charged the Confederates, who were behind breastworks. Gen. Pettigrew chanced to be present; his left hand was wounded at Gettysburg and he carried it in a sling. His horse was shot, reared and fell; he was rising when a Union lieutenant who had ridden up against the breastworks fired upon him with a dragoon's revolver and so wounded him that he died within a few days. He was wounded and made a prisoner at Fair Oaks, where the First Minnesota encountered him, and having been in many other battles and led one division of the celebrated charge at Gettysburg with great distinction, he had to die as the result of an insignificant skirmish. He fell into the hands of the men that wounded him at Williamsport, but Custer sent him to his friends and he died near Winchester, July 17th, from the effects of the rough jolting he received while being transported in an ambulance. The jolting kept his wounds agape and the blood running.

For the second time Lee's army had been in a close place near the mouth of Antietam Creek, for Williamsport is only a few miles above the Dunker church, and for the second time that army had escaped and slipped safely away into old Virginia, thus eluding a Union general who had a superior force. For Gen. Meade's failure at Williamsport, however, there is an explanation, if not an excuse; but for McClellan's failure after Antietam there is nothing but a single explanation--the commanding general had neither the courage nor the ability to accomplish anything but a failure. The Union cavalry did about all the fighting in Gen. Meade's pursuit of Lee. As a result of the various skirmishes between July 5 and 16, the total loss of the cavalry was 1,025 officers and men, of whom 117 were killed.

THE FIRST MINNESOTA IN THE PURSUIT OF LEE.

The good Second Corps marched up to Gettysburg July 1 with 12,896 officers and men "present and ready for duty." On July 5 it marched out in the pursuit of Lee with about 8,000; the monthly report for July 31 showed 7,681. Its total loss in the battle was 4,350, the largest Corps loss, but only 368 were counted missing. Gibbon's sustained the greatest division loss, 1,634; Caldwell's was 1,269, and Hays's 1,291; the artillery lost 149 and headquarters 7. Gibbon's (Second) Division had but 95 missing and most of these returned in a day or so. The Corps captured about 4,000 prisoners.

Harrow's First had the largest brigade loss in Gibbon's Division and in the Second Corps, 768; next was Willard's (Third) of Hays, 714, and Webb's (Second) of Gibbon, 491. Harrow sustained the greatest percentage (61) of loss of any brigade in any one action during the war. The four regiments took 1,246 officers and men into battle.

The First Minnesota had the largest regimental loss in Harrow's Brigade; as printed in the official war records (Vol. 27, part 1, page 176) its total loss was 224; but the nominal list, with the name of every officer and man killed and wounded, shows ____. Lochren's manuscript report (in State Adjutant General's office) made as acting adjutant of the Regiment after the battle, shows 222; Capt. Coates (and Adj. Lochren) reported on July 5 that the loss was 232, but August 3 Capt. Coates said it was 224, and these were the figures adopted by the War Department in printing the records.

Both Lochren and Capt. Coates reported one man missing, but this was a mistake. The man they named was Michael Devlin, a plucky young Irishman of St. Paul, in Company A. He was badly wounded on the 3d and reached another division hospital and so was lost for some time. He re-

joined his company as soon as he could, and when his time was about up he re-enlisted in the First Battalion for three years more, and finally died in a St. Louis hospital a few days before Lee surrendered. With not a man missing, it was no wonder the people of Minnesota were proud of the men who represented them at Gettysburg.

The Second Corps started with the rest of the army in pursuit of Lee on the afternoon of July 5 while the trail was fresh. Hancock and Gibbon were both wounded, and the Union army was about out of major generals, and so Brigadier General Wm. Hays, of the Third Division, had to command the Corps; he was senior to Gen. Caldwell, whom Hancock had selected. Gen. Harrow took command of the division. The only colonel in the old Gorman Brigade was Col. Francis E. Heath, of the Nineteenth Maine, and he assumed its command. Two captains were regimental commanders now in the brigade. Capt. Harry Coates led the First Minnesota and Capt. John Darrow commanded the Eighty-Second New York.

The First Minnesota marched out of Gettysburg on the pursuit of Lee 's army with about 150 officers and men equipped and ready to fight. Less than a week before it had marched bravely and gaily up to the field with 27 officers and 358 men, a total of 385,--Company L, the Sharpshooters, not included. Its loss of 237 in the great battle had cut it down to practically a frazzle of a regiment--about 15 to the company. It was a small regiment, yet a proud one, for two strenuous trials in the hot, red fires of battle had demonstrated that it was all good steel, without a particle of dross--not a man "captured or missing in action." Think of it! not a man "missing!" Plenty killed--oh, yes; a great plenty wounded--oh, yes; but not a man captured or missing!

And you can't make a record like that without great cost; but if you can get the record, no matter about the cost. So every Minnesota soldier held up his head and bore himself proudly as his regiment marched

away from Gettysburg on the Baltimore pike, behind Hays's Division band which was merrily playing the tune to the old Irish soldier's song:

O, there's not a trade worth knowing,
Or going,
Or showing,
Like that from glory flowing,
Says the bould sojer boy.

The evening of the first day's march a place called the Two Taverns was reached, and here the troops spent the 6th; the next day they marched to Taneytown, Md., 15 miles southeast of Gettysburg. Mighty slow marching for a pursuit--15 miles in two days and a half. The next day, however, the distance compassed was something more respectable, 24 miles from Taneytown southwest to Frederick. Lochren notes that on this day's march they passed the aristocratic Seventh New York militia regiment resting by the side of the road. Its officers and men were of the wealthy classes of New York City. It was said that the wealth owned by one company alone aggregated $20,000,000. The regiment was of the New York militia and only sent out of the state on extraordinary occasions, such as the big scare caused by Lee's invasion. Lochren says the dandy soldiers had to undergo all manner of jibes and jeers from the lines of the dusty and rough-and-ready veterans that marched by them.

On the 9th the command marched through the South Mountains to Rohrersville and Keedysville, near the Antietam battle-ground, and on the 10th to the hamlet of Tighlmanton. It was now near Lee's army at Williamsport. On the 11th the Corps made a short march and took position on the left or south of the Fifth Corps. During the 12th slight changes of position were made in expectation of the anticipated assault on Lee's breastworks.

When on the 14th the skirmishers went out to open the way for the proposed grand charge, they found that the Confederates had sked-

addled without a fight. Caldwell's Division of the Second Corps was sent in pursuit and followed Custer's cavalry to the pontoon bridge at Falling Waters. Lee made a very clean retreat. The Confederates did not have much property to spare and at Williamsport and Falling Waters they did not leave much. Perhaps 250 muskets, two pieces of artillery, two ambulances stalled in the mud and one wagon broken down were gathered up. A singular thing was that about 350 prisoners, asleep in barns and other outbuildings and in the woods, were made. The poor "rebs" were tired and played out from digging breastworks and almost incessant guard and picket duty for three days; they were also in the normal condition of Confederate soldiers, for they were ravenously hungry.

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BACK TO THE RAPPAHANNOCK AGAIN.

The expulsion of Lee and his army from the loyal north freed all Union people from a great dread. At the same time there were many who were greatly dissatisfied with the incomplete termination of the campaign. Lincoln was one of the dissatisfied. He wrote Gen. Meade a scorching letter, severely censuring him for not having torn the Confederate army to pieces after Gettysburg, and especially for allowing it to re-cross the Potomac practically unscathed and dragging away to a dreadful captivity all those prisoners. (See Nic. & Hay). This letter, however, Gen. ~~Hancock~~ Halleck persuaded the President not to send, but sent a telegraphic dispatch himself dated July 14, saying that the President was greatly dissatisfied at the"escape of Lee's army without another battle," and demanding a more active and energetic pursuit of that army.

When Gen. Meade received this dispatch, which was practically the President's, he at once sent in his resignation and demanded that it be accepted. Lincoln refused to accept it, saying what he had said to Meade "was not intended as a censure but as a stimulus to an active pursuit." (War Recs., Vol. 27, part 1, p. 93-94.)

On re-crossing the Potomac, Gen. Lee fell back into that well-known Confederate harbor of refuge, the Shenandoah Valley, placing his army on the line of Opequan Creek. This was the same position his forces had occupied after their retreat from Antietam the previous year. Here he soon revictualed his men and secured for them other supplies, so that in a short time they were comparatively comfortable. He also added to his army several thousand volunteers and conscripts. The latter class, strangely enough, were proving brave soldiers; see how they fought at Gettysburg.

Meade's plan of advance into Virginia was simply to follow along after Lee; not directly after him, but to keep in his wake. He had no definite design. He expected to fight Lee if he came in contact with

him, but he had no idea where the point of contact would be. A skilful general would have marched so as to head off his enemy at a certain point where a defeat would be most destructive, or attack him on the flank at a certain other point of like character. But Gen. Meade seemed content to trail along after the Confederates; wherever they went he would follow; he would conform his movements to theirs. He did not know where he was going, but he was on his way!

One thing was certain: He would not follow directly after Lee, but on a parallel line, and so he marched over the old McClellan route, up the Loudoun Valley, the region of fat sheep and other good foraging. He thought that by keeping his army close up along the eastern side of the Blue Ridge he would some day find a chance to break through a gap and then, having the advantage, fall upon Lee and worst him badly; and he knew he must do this before Lee found a good chance to break through a gap and come over and fall upon him. And while this was a hap-hazard way of campaigning, which no great general would sanction, such a chance actually came to Gen. Meade.

The army crossed the Potomac on pontoon bridges at Harper's Ferry and Berlin, July 17 and 18, and followed southward, skirting the Blue Ridge on the eastern side. Lee, conforming to this movement, fell back still further up the Shenandoah, passing Winchester and Kernstown, and sending Longstreet on ahead with his Corps to Culpeper. Mindful of Lincoln's scolding, Gen. Meade was now "stimulated to an active pursuit" of Lee. By the 22d he had reached the Manassas Gap in the Blue Ridge when the long Confederate column was passing on the other side of the mountain range. The two armies, in marching along on either side of the Blue Ridge mountain range, had been acting somewhat like two hostile dogs trotting along on either side of a fence, glaring and growling at each other and occasionally stopping to snap and bite. Now here was an opening in the fence!

Gen. Meade acted promptly. Longstreet had sent a small

force into Manassas Gap to hold it; but Meade's skirmishers soon attacked this force. On the 22d Meade sent Sickles's Third Corps, now under Gen. French, into the Gap to clean it out. Gen. Meade had determined to attack the Confederates. He directed all five of his Corps upon Manassas Gap, intending to use them all if necessary. Gen. French, with his Third Corps, was to have the advance and bring on the fight. The Confederates, a part of Longstreet's Corps, were known to be in position on the west side of the Gap, near Front Royal, a little town on the Shenandoah, a few miles west of Manassas Gap. It must be borne in mind that Manassas Gap is 50 miles westward from Manassas Station, near Bull Run.

Gen. French proved distressingly inadequate for his job. He was personally brave and would fight hard, but he did not know enough to conduct a movement of any considerable proportions. With an entire division he puttered about a whole day in Manassas Gap, deceived by the vigor with which Hood's skirmishers fought. Gen. Spinola's New York Excelsior Brigade chiefly represented the Union force at the front. It succeeded in driving out the Confederates to near Front Royal only after sundown, and the army, in battle array, lay down in bivouac to resume the fight the next morning. But when morning came and the Union dog rose up, shook himself, and limbered his muscles for the conflict, he found that during the night the Confederate dog had slipped away and was then running as fast as he could for Culpeper!

Gen. Meade was greatly disappointed and even incensed at Gen. French's failure. It was openly charged that Gen. French was drunk that day, (See Gen. De Trobriand's "Four Years"), and that this was his usual condition. Gen. Meade fairly foamed with rage; he might have taken violent measures if he and Gen. French had not been warm personal friends. Gen. Meade had five army Corps available for battle at Front Royal; the Confederates had but Longstreet's Corps. A Union victory here would have ruined

Lee's two other Corps as well as Longstreet's. But it seemed that something always prevented the Army of the Potomac from winning a decided and complete victory.

Longstreet pushed on rapidly for Culpeper, leaving Benning's Brigade to keep open the road for A. P. Hill's Corps, which was coming from the north. Hill followed Longstreet to Culpeper, where they both were on the 27th. Wright's Brigade was left at Front Royal to hold open Manassas Gap for Ewell's Corps, which was far behind. When Ewell's advance got up it found Wright skirmishing at the Gap with the Union cavalry, and Ewell sent a strong re-enforcement to help keep them in check, which was done. Then Ewell ran off down the valley and passed the Blue Ridge to the east through Thornton's Gap, 20 miles below Front Royal, and went on to Madison, 15 miles southwest of Culpeper. Early's Division of Ewell was in the rear and it was ordered to march west of Front Royal and avoid contact with the Union forces. It reached Madison C. H. July 29. In the skirmishing near Manassas Gap, called the action at Wapping Heights, French's force engaged lost 103 killed and wounded. Gen. Meade pulled away the Third Corps from Front Royal and sent it into camp 12 miles east, between Salem and Warrenton. Why Gen. Meade did not move to attack A. P. Hill's Corps, after he had failed to get Longstreet to fight, cannot be explained.

By August 3 Gen. Ewell had been called down from Madison C. H., and all three of the Confederate Corps were strung out along the south side of the Rapidan from Orange C. H. on the west to Germanna Ford on the east, in the vicinity of Chancellorsville. Meade's army was on the Rappahannock, a few miles north of Lee's.

As soon as he had his army fixed in good quarters, Gen. Lee tendered his resignation of the command of the Confederate army and urged its acceptance. He said he was in ill health, suffering from sciatic rheumatism; that he was worn out; that he believed the Confederate people did

not like him or have confidence in him any longer, and that there were two generals of his rank--Joe Johnston and Beauregard--better qualified for the command. But Jeff Davis would not accept the resignation. Longstreet says: "He was jealous of Johnston, and nourished prejudice against Beauregard."

THE FIRST MINNESOTA BACK ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

July 15, the next day after the Confederates crossed the Potomac, the Second Corps marched to Sandy Hook, near Harper's Ferry. This was familiar ground to the First Minnesota. The Regiment had first visited it two years before, when the war was new, and it had repeated the visit in the fall of 1862, after Antietam. Now it was here for the third time. On the 16th the march was continued five miles through Sandy Hook into Pleasant Valley, and here the command rested for two days and drew new clothing, which was badly needed.

On the 18th the Regiment crossed the Potomac over a pontoon bridge to Harper's Ferry, but without stopping went on and crossed the Shenandoah on a new wire bridge, and kept on down the Loudoun Valley for about eight miles. The next day it marched eight miles to near Wood Grove. On the 20th it went about 12 miles to near Snicker's Gap and Bloomfield and then halted for another two days' rest.

The men always remembered the Snicker's Gap district and the others on the line of this march for the abundance and lusciousness of the blackberries, now ripe and to be found almost anywhere. The weather was hot, the roads dusty, the rations were stale and not suited to the occasion, and the frequent change of water was not health promoting. Diarrhoea broke out among the men and promised to become a serious matter, when the blackberry patches were encountered. In a few days there was no diarrhoea. The berries, sweetened with the army's brown sugar, constituted a cordial which was a sovereign remedy. The manna and the quails were not more heartily welcomed by the Israelites when they were traveling through the wilderness than was this luscious fruit by men of the Army of the Potomac when they were toiling down the Loudoun Valley in July, 1863.

On the 22d the command marched from the Snicker's Gap, where it had served in November, 1862. The next day it marched in all 17 miles.

It first reached Markham Station, on the Manassas Gap Railroad (running between the Shenandoah Valley and Manassas Junction, near Bull Run,) and after a brief halt was ordered on to Manassas Gap, preparatory to being engaged in Gen. Meade's anticipated battle with Longstreet. The road was rough and it was midnight before the Gap was reached. The men made coffee and bivouacked. The next evening occurred the action at Wapping Heights. The command expected to be ordered through the Gap the next morning and take part in a great battle, but Longstreet retreated the night of the 23d and the next day the division returned to Markham Station, five miles from the Gap. On the 25th the march was resumed for 20 miles to White Plains, and on the 26th it was continued for 20 miles to Warrenton. At Warrenton, a town well known to the Army of the Potomac, the Regiment remained in camp until July 30.

July 31 the Second Corps marched from its camp on Elk Run to Morrisville, which is 18 miles south of Warrenton, a few miles north of the North Fork of the Rappahannock, and 20 miles northeast of Fredericksburg. Here in camp, which was moved a few times hither and thither in the woods, the First Minnesota remained until August 15.

The Regimental monthly returns for July (made on the 31st) showed "present for duty equipped" 14 officers and 130 men in the Regiment proper, a total of 144. The company of Sharpshooters attached to the Regiment numbered 2 officers and 22 men, making a total of the Regiment's strength of 168. Capt. Coates was still in command.

ENFORCING THE DRAFT IN NEW YORK CITY.

After Gettysburg both the Union and the Confederate authorities were very active in enforcing their respective conscript laws and orders and drafting men for their armies. The Confederates had been making conscripts since the early spring of 1862, and by the summer of 1863 had a most sweeping drafting system. By this means, largely, they were able to replenish their depleted ranks; there were very few volunteers.

The Union authorities avoided this harsh method of raising soldiers for a long time after the Confederates had adopted it. They substituted the offer of liberal bounties and other inducements, but at last they had to resort to drafting. The President had issued his proclamation from time to time, calling for volunteers, a certain quota proportioned to the military population of each state. Several states, and districts inside the state, had failed to furnish their quotas under the proclamations, and March 3, 1863, Congress passed the conscription act. Lists of able-bodied males over 18 and under 45 residing in the delinquent districts were made out and the names, written on slips, put into boxes. Then a number of slips corresponding to the number of men required were drawn out, and the men whose names were on the list, if found eligible, were required to report for duty as soldiers. Each man so drafted, however, was allowed to furnish an altogether acceptable substitute in his stead.

The draft was generally well enforced throughout the northern states except in a few of the large cities. Boston and New York were notable exceptions. In these cities, especially in New York, there were many foreign-born citizens, who were generally willing enough to vote and hold office, but did not want to fight. They had been naturalized almost solely by the influence of politicians who wanted their votes. They were without any real love for America and republican institutions, and in the great war then raging hardly cared which side should win; at least they did not

care enough to go out and fight and turn the scale in favor of the Union.

These men were practically all of them in association with an element of the Democratic party called "Copperheads."# A sub-element of these men was out of all sympathy with the war for the Union; another sub-element was opposed to disunion and justified the war, but wanted it stopped at the earliest period possible by negotiation and compromise with the Confederates. Another sub-element, composed largely of lawyers, reprobated and condemned secession and the establishment of the Southern Confederacy, but objected to the war. They were great sticklers for the forms of law, and seemed to want the Confederates suppressed by the force of the Civil law. Probably they thought it practicable that indictments should be found against the Confederates by U. S. grand juries, and then U. S. marshals sent down south to arrest Lee and the other generals and their soldiers and put them in jail, and finally try them in open court and punish them for their offenses!

The men in the cities that objected most strenuously to being drafted were, nine-tenths of them, foreign born and most of them lived by their daily labor. They were opposed to the abolition of slavery, because they believed that the freed negroes would come up north and take their jobs. They were told that the negroes caused the war and they hated the poor black people intensely. These misguided men finally declared in mass meetings and otherwise that they would "not fight to free the niggers," that they would not be "dragged off into the nigger war," etc., and that they would fight to the death against conscription.

On Monday, July 13, the drawing was resumed in New York and a great riot broke out, The rioters included most of the scum of the city and the undesirable citizens, nearly all foreigners. The most desperate characters

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In the southern states there is a venomous yellowish snake called a copperhead. It conceals itself in the grass and brush and strikes without warning. The Republicans likened the political element above described to the copperhead snakes.

joined and came from their dens armed for fire, pillage, and murder. The offices of the conscription officers were attacked, sacked, and burned, and those in charge beaten up and a few killed. The rioters seemed transformed into savages. They swarmed through the streets, beating or murdering every negro they caught, assaulting and chasing the conscript officers and others, and went on from bad to worse. They broke open and plundered fine mansions and houses and also robbed many stores. They burned some public buildings, among which was an asylum for colored orphan children. For three days the city was given over to a terrible condition of things, a series of riots in which at last women, and some children, engaged in every disorderly crime from thieving to murder.

The police of the city charged the rioters everywhere and as far as was possible protected deserving persons and their property. At the inception of the riots the militia organizations of the city were absent in Pennsylvania and Maryland, being sent thither to resist Lee's invasion. They were sent for and hurried back to the city, and soon after their arrival the rioting and the rioters were suppressed. Col. Robert Nugent, formerly colonel of the Tammany Regiment, was provost marshal of the city and knew how to handle troops. In two days, by the killing and wounding of 1,000 or 1,200 rioters, order was restored. Only a few of the militia were killed. The most prominent victim of the insanity of the rioters was a Col. O'Brien who was knocked down in the street and beaten and trampled to death; a priest administered the last sacrament of the church to him as he lay dying on the sidewalk. A company of U. S. marines was set upon, their arms taken from them, and several of them killed.

One provision of the first conscription law exempted a drafted man from service upon payment of $300. This provision was borrowed from the Confederate law, which exempted a conscript who could pay $200. It caused great dissatisfaction among the poor men who were drafted and were un-

able to pay the exemption fee. In the south the poor men said: "This is a rich man's war but a poor man's fight," and the northern poor men endorsed the sentiment. Finally the draft was suspended and the City Council agreed to pay the $300 exemption fee for every drafted man unable to pay it. The city also had to pay afterwards about $1,500,000 for the property destroyed by the rioters. In time the cash exemption was abolished. A drafted man then in a loyal state must either serve himself or furnish an acceptable substitute at his own expense. In the south every fighting man--at last from 16 to 60--was forced out and made to enter the military service; no substitute and no bounties.

The draft worked real hardship in many instances, especially in the eastern states. Even many Republicans and other loyal people were opposed to it. The poor conscript did not receive proper consideration; he was as unable to hire a substitute as he was to pay the $300, and everybody was sorry for him. When the drawing in New York was ordered resumed, August 19, there was apprehension of further trouble. The New York militia, and even the New York regiments in the army, were believed to be in such sympathy with the drafted men that they could hardly be depended upon to fire on their fellow citizens that should resist the conscription. Regiments from the Army of the Potomac, but from other states, were to be used to keep the peace and enforce the law if necessary.

July 30 Gen. Halleck ordered Gen. Meade to send four regiments of infantry--emphasizing the fact that they must be "not New York or Pennsylvania"-- to New York to report to Gen. Canby, to help enforce the draft. Gen. Meade sent the First and Thirty-Second Massachusetts, Fifth Wisconsin, and Twentieth Indiana. (See War. Recs., vol. 27, part 1, pp. 107-108). Afterward other regiments, all to be from western states, were ordered to re-enforce those at New York, and two of those sent were the Third and Fifth Michigan, of De Trobriand's Brigade, of the Third Corps.

August 15, while the Second Corps was in its camps north of the Rappahannock, near Morrisville and Elk Run, three regiments were ordered sent to New York. These were the First Minnesota and Seventh Michigan, of Hancock's Division, and the Eighth Ohio, of Hays's Division. The regiments named marched the same afternoon to Bealeton Station, on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad, took the cars after nightfall, and reached Alexandria very early on the morning of the 16th. Col. S. S. Carroll, of the Eighth Ohio, was in command of the three regiments; for some time he had commanded a brigade in the Third (Hays's) Division. Lieut. Myron Shepard, then of the Hastings company (H), was a member of Col. Carroll's staff.

The First lay at Alexandria, with its comrade regiments, until August 20, when the draft had begun. It then went on board the ocean steamer "Atlantic," and the next morning sailed for New York. During the night, in some unknown manner, Lieut. August Kreuger, of Company A, of St. Paul, fell from the ship into the Potomac and was drowned. The ship was greatly crowded, and the officer was not missed until the vessel was well under way. The body was recovered, easily identified, and subsequently cared for by Chaplain Conwell, who was sent back from New York City on that duty.

On the 22d the Regiment was sailing on the great Atlantic. The sea was rolling and the ship rolled with it, and nearly every land lubber was seasick. To the great relief of everybody the transport entered New York harbor on the morning of the 23d. The First Minnesota was landed and encamped on Governor's Island, and here it remained for five enjoyable days. Truly its lines had fallen in pleasant places. It was not called out to shoot anybody, for the draft proceeded quietly; and it had fine quarters, the boys had a little money to spend, and Capt. Coates, the regimental commander, was very liberal in the matter of passes, and allowing the boys to go out and "see the town." On the 28th the Regiment crossed over Buttermilk

Channel to Brooklyn and encamped in a beautiful square called Washington Park, now "the Plaza," where the soldiers' and sailors' monumental arch stands.

The good record of the Regiment seemed to be known to many people in Brooklyn. Its frtghtful but gallant experience at Gettysburg was fresh in their minds, for the newspapers had told of it. They showed the Minnesotians many flattering attentions. September 4 the ladies of Carlton Avenue M. E. church gave them a sumptuous temperance banquet and feasted and feted them in admirable style. Carlton Avenue runs between the two largest thoroughfares in Brooklyn, Flatbush and Atlantic Avenues, and the church was not very far from camp.

September 6 the command crossed on the ferry to New York City proper, but only marched through a part of the city to a ship wharf. Here it embarked on the steamship "Empire City" for its return to old Virginia and the field of duty and glory. After a very pleasant little ocean voyage the First Minnesota returned to Alexandria and disembarked on the 8th. Here it remained until the 12th, when it set out for its proper place in the old Gorman Brigade, which it found in camp west of Culpeper C. H., on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. It joined the brigade on the 16th and went into camp about 12 miles west of its former station. Its excursion to New York had been practically a pleasant picnic from start to finish.

THE CAMPAIGN OF MANEUVERS.

The First Minnesota returned to its place in the Army of the Potomac September 16. Gen. Hancock was still in the hospital from his Gettysburg wound and the terrible and dangerous surgical operations following it, and Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, the great army engineer, was now in command of the Second Corps. Gen. Gibbon was also still laid up with the wounds he received at the time of Pickett's charge, and Gen. Harrow was still in command of the Second Division. The old Gorman First Brigade was now commanded by Col. DeWitt Clinton Baxter, of the well-known Baxter's Fire Zouaves. Later Col. Baxter took command of the Second Brigade, to which his regiment, ~~the~~ 2 Zouaves, (Seventy-Second Pennsylvania) belonged, and Col. Francis E. Heath, of the Nineteenth Maine, commanded the First Brigade. Capt. Coates continued in command of the First Minnesota until October 4, when Maj. Mark W. Downie returned from the hospital and relieved him. October 3d Gen. Harrow's resignation from the service was accepted, and Gen. Alexander S. Webb, of the Second Brigade, assumed command of the division.

The campaign that followed the occupation of the upper Rappahannock country by the armies of Gen. Meade and Gen. Lee was practically a series of maneuvers by each army. Gen. Lee soon realized that in Gen. Meade he had a foeman worthy of his steel. The southern commander frankly told his generals, when they were planning the Mine Run campaign, that of all the Federal commanders that had led the Army of the Potomac Gen. Meade was the ablest. As the southern writers quote him (see Maj. Stiles's "Four Years Under Marse Robert," p. 228, Geo. C. Eggleston's "Rebel's Recollections," etc.) Gen. Lee said:

> Gen. Meade is the most troublesome Federal commander we have yet met. He is not only a general of courage, intellligence, and ability, but conscientious and careful. He is not afraid to fight upon an equal chance, and is constantly looking for an opportunity. If we make any mistake in his front, he will be certain to take advantage of it.

Gen. Longstreet says that before Grant came Gen. Lee, in referring to the Union generals he had contended against, said: "Meade gives me more trouble and uneasiness than any of them." To Prof. Dabney, Lee said of Meade: "He was the ablest commander of the Army of the Potomac." Asked about McClellan, he smiled significantly and said: "He is a very good military engineer;" of Burnside and Hooker, he said: "You know their records." (Dabney's Life of Jackson).

If Gen. Meade had only destroyed Lee's army after Gettysburg, as it seems he might have done, the opinion that he was a great general would have been unanimous throughout the country. Pemberton had handed over the keys of the Mississippi River to Grant at Vicksburg that July 4, and the surrender ~~defeat~~ of Lee would probably have resulted in the delivery of a title deed to the city of Richmond to Gen. Meade. The loyal people of the country would have bestowed upon him every honor but the presidency; it was claimed that, because he was not a "natural born citizen," he could not, under the constitution, be president, notwithstanding the Federal law of 1855. He was born in 1815, at Cadiz, Spain, where his father was U. S. naval agent. Both his parents were American citizens and his birth was under the American flag.

Lee and Meade now sat down to watch each other. A considerable period of repose followed. Scouts were sent slily out, but no important movements were made for some time. Each army was soon largely recruited by conscripts. On the Union side a majority of this element made good, brave, and faithful soldiers. A few, however, were only "food for powder." Of the worthless element half deserted within twenty days after they reached the army. This evil of desertion grew so great that to check it several offenders, when arrested, were sentenced by courts martial to be shot, and the sentences carried out. Others were sent to the Dry Tortugas, etc. The Fifteenth Massachusetts had one deserting conscript shot October 30, and the whole brigade was called out to witness the unpleasant spectacle of the

shooting. There were a dozen or more of such executions in the army that fall. The First Minnesota had no deserters at this time.

As the armies were doing nothing but watching and waiting, they did not need all their men. Out in the west, however, near Chattanooga, Gen. Bragg, of the Confederates, like McClellan, was "hollering his head off" for reenforcements, saying that if he did not get them he would be overwhelmed by the Union forces under Gen. Rosecrans. So about the middle of September, Gen. Longstreet, with Hood's and McLaws's Divisions (nine brigades) of his Corps were sent by railroad to help Gen. Bragg; Pickett's Division was sent to Petersburg, because after its famous charge it did not have enough men left for a respectable killing, and some time was required to make it big again. Longstreet and his two divisions got to Gen. Bragg the very day the battle of Chickamauga began, September 18. Their presence and work were largely responsible for the defeat of Gen. Rosecrans in that great battle. About the first week in November, Longstreet and his command were sent to demolish Gen. Burnside and his little force at Knoxville, Tenn., but the attempt failed disastrously for the Confederates. Gen. Longstreet and his two divisions did not return to Lee's army until in April, 1864.

After Chickamauga, when Gen. Rosecrans had been disastrously defeated and retired to Chattanooga, he too called for help from the Union army in Virginia, whose troops were not working very hard. Two Corps, the Eleventh (8,000) and the Twelfth (10,600) were sent from Meade's army to Chattanooga in the last week of September. The first shipment started from Washington September 25, and went by rail all the way. After arriving at Chattanooga the two Corps were consolidated and formed the Twentieth Corps, commanded by Gen. Joe Hooker. The Corps did splendid work in the battles about Chattanooga and on the Atlantic and Savannah campaigns, as well as on Sherman's campaign through the Carolinas, and the regiments that failed at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg nobly and fully atoned for their

shortcomings in those actions when they were put to work under the renowned "Cump" Sherman, who could always get fight out of a man if there was any in him.

Gen. Meade's army was now composed of the First, Second, Third, Fifth, and Sixth Army Corps. On the 10th of October he had "present for duty equipped" or available for the line of battle, 59,019 infantry, 11,419 cavalry, 6,009 artillery men, a total of 76,446 officers and men ready to fight. He had 299 pieces of cannon of all calibers.

October 20, after he had lost 3,000 men on the Bristoe campaign, Gen. Lee had in his army A. P. Hill's and Ewell's Corps and Cooke's Brigade, in all 37,413 infantry, 7,429 cavalry, and 3,844 artillery men, a grand total of 48,686 officers and men prepared for the firing line. He had 182 pieces of cannon. Thus Gen. Meade's actual fighting force was superior to Gen. Lee's by 25,000 men and 117 pieces of cannon. Surely the national administration and the loyal element of the country had a right to expect quick and valuable results from Gen. Meade.

THE FIRST MANEUVER.

But though he was the stronger and was equal in courage, Gen. Meade hesitated to take the aggressive against Lee. He sent out his cavalry to operate after he learned that Longstreet had taken away his Corps. September 13 the cavalry, supported by the Second Corps, crossed the Rappahannock and attacked Lee's cavalry, driving it to the Rapidan and capturing three cannons and a lot of prisoners. The Second Corps occupied Culpeper C. H., taking no part in the fighting but ready to advance the moment the cavalry cleared the fords over the Rapidan. It must be remembered that the Rapidan is virtually the south fork of the Rappahannock, uniting with the north fork about 12 or 15 miles west of Fredericksburg. Culpeper is on the peninsula between the two streams and seven or eight miles north of the Rapidan. The cavalry could not clear the Rapidan fords.

Then September 16 Gen. Meade crossed his entire army to the south side of the Rappahannock and took up positions around Culpeper C. H., with two Corps (the First and Sixth) advanced to the Rapidan. He meant to cross the latter stream and attack Lee, whose army was strung along the south bank, but he found that all crossings were commanded from Lee's side of the river by higher ground and by fortifications, and were impassable; the works were being made stronger every hour. Gen Meade then planned a great flanking movement to the west part of the stream where the crossings were practicable; but just as he was about to put this movement into execution the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps were taken away from him, and he feared to undertake it with his diminished force.

Had Gen. McClellan been in command of the army when these Corps were taken away, he would have filled the air with protests and yelled and yelled for re-enforcements ever after, and in the meantime would have retreated after another Savage's Station affair. But Gen. Meade stood his ground. He did not go into hysterics over the situation, and in a little

time, by the arrival of conscripts and out-serving detachments, his army, in point of numbers, was considerably the superior of Lee's again. In a few days the administration, unsolicited, made good the withdrawal of the two Corps.

Gen. Meade essayed again his contemplated flank movement. October 10 he sent Gen. Buford with his cavalry division to the westward to uncover the upper fords of the Rapidan. He then expected to move a large force across these fords and attack the enemy in the rear, when the First and Sixth Corps would force the passages in their fronts.

But to Gen. Meade's astonishment, when Gen. Buford reached those upper fords he found that Gen. Lee, with his army, had already passed them on his way north with the intention of turning Meade's right or north flank! The advance of the Confederates was well across Robinson's River, (a northern tributary of the Rapidan, flowing southeastwardly through Madison county,) and indeed was driving Meade's cavalry from Madison C. H., which is 18 miles west of Culpeper.

To meet this new danger Gen Meade, October 11, hastily withdrew his army north of the Rappahannock, abandoning the town of Culpeper. The next day, however, learning that the Confederates were in Culpeper, Gen. Meade determined to go back and attack them. Accordingly he took the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps and re-crossed the Rappahannock, en route for Culpeper. The infantry got as far as Brandy Station (which is in Culpeper County, on the Orange & Alexandria, five miles southwest of the north fork and ten miles northeast of Culpeper) and Buford's cavalry drove the cavalry scouts of the enemy back into Culpeper. Meade intended moving to the attack the next morning; but during the night he received a dispatch from Gen. Gregg, commanding a cavalry division which had been guarding the upper fords of the Rappahannock and Hazel Rivers, and this dispatch said that Gregg and his division had been "forced back" early in the morning from Hazel River

and in the afternoon from the Rappahannock (North Fork) and that the Confederates were crossing the latter stream at Fauquier Sulphur Springs and Waterloo, 15 miles north of Culpeper. Look out, Gen. Meade!

The Union commander now realized that his right flank had been turned by Lee, who might possibly go on to Washington City before he could be stopped. For Culpeper is only 60 miles southwest of Washington, and Lee, having escaped Meade's forces, and continuing to escape them, could easily reach the capitol city in three days. Meade also realized that Lee would beat him to Warrenton, northeast of Culpeper, if he attempted to march for that important point. The military thing for him to do was to move the army in all haste for Washington along the interior line of the Orange & Alexandria Railroad. By that route, though it was longer than Lee's, he could, by hard marching, beat Lee to Washington--where there was now great excitement, of course--and insure the safety of the national capital.

So on the 13th Meade blew up the railroad bridge over the North Fork, withdrew his army along ~~and broke~~ and broke it the railroad, burning bridges and depots, to Catlett's Station, which is in ~~Farquir~~ Fauquier County, 20 miles northeast of Brandy Station and 15 miles southwest of Manassas Junction, near the Bull Run battle-ground. The next day the advance of the army reached Centerville, 20 miles from Washington, and the capital was safe. On the morning of that day, near the hamlet of Auburn, Jeb Stuart's cavalry skirmished with Caldwell's Division, of the Second Corps, suddenly firing shells among Caldwell's men when they had halted and were making coffee for breakfast; they had made a night march.

Stuart and two brigades of his cavalry, Funsten's and Gordon's, had spent the previous night cowering and trembling in their saddles in a body of timber between the hamlet of Auburn and Catlett's Station. They were also between the Fifth and the Second Corps of Meade's army, about half a mile from the Fifth and 400 yards from Caldwell's Division of the Second, and

snugly enclosed! The whole command would have been captured had its presence been discovered. It was released the next morning by the moving of Gen. Caldwell's Division; when it marched it left a wide space which Stuart soon passed. The audacious Confederate then followed Caldwell's men and coming upon them gave them a volley or two from one of his batteries. (See McClellan's Campaigns of Stuart, p. 90.) One of his shells killed seven of Caldwell's men. (Warren's report.)

THE BATTLE OF BRISTOE STATION.

The same day, October 14, but later, A. P. Hill threw Heth's Division and Cook'e Brigade against the line of Webb's and Hays's Divisions at Bristoe Station. This station, on the Orange & Alexandria, is in Prince William County, eight miles southwest of Manassas Junction and 35 miles southwest of Washington. The Second Corps alone was in the vicinity of Broad Run and Bristoe; the Third was near Bull Run, and the Fifth was a few miles in advance and both were hurrying on towards Centerville. Gen. Hill reports that this day he picked up as ~~visitors~~ prisoners 150 men of the Third Corps.

The attack was almost wholly on the First (the old Gorman) and Third Brigades of Webb's Division and the Third Brigade of Hays's Division. It was most handsomely repulsed. The Union troops were behind a good railroad embankment, and the affair was a miniature Marye's Heights, with the position of the hostile armies reversed. The Confederates lost heavily. Gen. Heth reported that out of the four brigades he had in the fight he had 143 killed, 773 wounded, and 445 captured, a total of 1,361; artillery loss 34 additional. In addition he lost two regimental flags and a five-gun battery, the Second Rockbridge (Virginia) Artillery. The total loss of the three Union brigades engaged was 28 killed, 192 wounded, and 37 missing, an aggregate of 257.

The object of the Confederate attack on Bristoe Station was the destruction of Warren's Second Corps, and this great peril was avoided only by the intelligent and brave conduct of Gen. Warren and his officers and men of the three brigades that did the fighting under him. The First, Third, Fifth and Sixth Corps of Meade's army were in front, to the north, and the extreme advance was nearing Washington. The Second Corps was bringing up the rear. If it got into trouble, it was too far behind to be helped by the other Corps. The Confederate line of march was parallel with but to the north or left of the Union route, but only a few miles away.

Stuart's cavalry, which had narrowly escaped capture the night before, and which fired into Caldwell's rear division the next morning, had reported the situation to Lee. The Southern commander now thought he had a fine opportunity to cut Meade's line in two and capture the historic Second Corps with its "three-leafed clover" badges--and the opportunity really was present. The reports for October 10 showed that the whole strength of the Corps present for duty was 8,830 infantry, 553 artillerymen, a total of 9,383, with 32 pieces of artillery, "and no cavalry." (See Warren's report, War Recs.)

Hill's Confederate Corps had, October 1, present for duty, 16,297 infantry. On the 14th, at Bristoe, he must have had 16,000 of these, and he also had in his movement Cooke's independent North Carolina brigade of 2,300, or 18,300 infantry and McIntosh's and Poague's battalions of artillery, eight batteries, with at least 500 more men. Then to help him he had Fitz Hugh Lee's Division of cavalry. (See vol. 29, part 1, War Recs.) In all A. P. Hill had more than 20,000 fighting men to Gen. Warren's 9,000. True, one-tenth of his infantry men were stark barefoot, short of blankets, and all of them were ragged and dirty and hungry, and the weather that week was extraordinarily cold; but these discomforts did not interfere with their fighting qualities. A hungry and destitute soldier becomes desperate and fights harder than one that is well-fed and content.

Had Gen. Hill thrown his whole Corps against Gen. Warren at Bristoe, the effect would have been very bad for the Union army; but he chose McClellan's and Burnside's tactics of sending in one division of his force at a time. The one division he sent in was enough for him; it got licked so badly that he didn't want to send in another. Gen. Lee was greatly disappointed and chagrined at the result of the fight. He felt that the defeat virtually destroyed his plans against Meade. His best biographer, Col. Cooke who was on his staff at the time, says in his Life of Lee (p. 354) that the

General had been anxious for a fight with Meade while he had him on the march; now--

He had come up only with his rear guard, under circumstances which seemed to seal the fate of that detached force, and that small rear guard had repulsed him completely, killing and wounding large numbers of his men, capturing prisoners and artillery from him, and retiring in triumph with but slight loss to themselves. The fight he was anxious for had come off on the banks of Broad Run, and the victory was overwhelmingly for the Federal troops. # # # Gen. Lee rode forward to the field upon which Gen. Hill had sustained his bloody repulse, and Hill, depressed and mortified at the mishap, endeavored to explain the contretemps and vindicate himself from censure. Lee listened in silence as they rode among the dead bodies, and at length replied gravely and sadly: "Well, well, general; bury these poor men and let us say no more about it."

The little battle is more particularly described on subsequent pages.

CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST MANEUVERING.

After the fighting stopped at Bristoe, Gen. Lee hurried forward the divisions of Ewell's Corps to assist Hill in overwhelming Warren with his 9,000. But night came on before Lee could make his dispositions for attack, and Warren's skirmishers having discovered what was afoot, the Second Corps was put in motion at once, marched all night, carrying along its 450 prisoners and the captured cannon, and the next morning joined the main army at Centerville. So Lee lost a lot of valuable time at Bristoe and this proved bad for his enterprise.

Had Gen. Meade used the diligence in pursuing Lee after Gettysburg that he did in checking his maneuvers on the Bristoe campaign, how differently things would have turned out! On the maneuvers of the Bristoe campaign he was all energy and industry. He marched the men night and day, giving them but a few hours' sleep out of the twenty-four, and he worked them harder than they had ever been worked before. And they submitted loyally, even cheerfully, to every hardship and every requirement. Their conduct proved what they could have been made to do on other occasions. Compare Meade's march from the Rappahannock to Centerville, 63 miles in three days, to McClellan's snail-like movement from Frederick to Antietam, 18 miles, during the three days preceding the great battle!

Lee pushed his advance columns as far north as Bull Run and skirmished with the Union pickets at Blackburn's Ford, the Stone bridge, and other historic points connected with the Bull Run battlefield. Gen. Meade thought he meant to cross Bull Run and attack him; "and if he does," said Gen. Meade, "he will never get back." Meade's scouts and spies made him believe that nothing was more certain than a Confederate attack upon him in his Centerville position, and that the Confederate generals confidently expected to drive him back into the Potomac and under the inner defenses of Washington.

Lee had really intended to march clear up to the walls of Washington, but Bristoe Station and Meade's reaching the Capital City ahead of him, though traveling over a longer line, made him pause and consider, and then he changed his mind. On the 17th he ordered his army at the front to commence retiring, but to burn everything inflammable on the Orange & Alexandria Railroad as they retired. This the Confederates did. They burned every tie, heated and twisted every rail, demolished every water tank, and destroyed every bridge and trestle that Meade had not ruined from Cub Run to the Rappahannock. This was practically a piece of spite work done in revenge for the failure of the campaign. It cut no figure towards securing the independence of the Southern Confederacy, for Col. McCallum, the Chief Engineer of the Department, had the road in fine running order, bridges and all, in 26 days.

It is perhaps true, as is claimed, that Gen. Meade fully intended to draw Lee and his army across Bull Run and induce them to attack him in his defenses near Centerville. His fortified line extended practically from Sangster's station to and through Chantilly battle-ground. Neither of his flanks was "in the air." If Lee attacked him, Meade would throw every man under his control--including 15,000 men that were in the Washington forts--against his assailants. Or if they would only cross Bull Run to the east side at any section of the stream, and come a mile or so out from it, he would sally out from his defenses upon them and see to it that they "never got back."

Gen. Lee's demonstrations at Blackburn's and Mitchell's Fords, Chantilly, and elsewhere on Bull Run completely deceived Gen. Meade. He thought they were preludes to the crossing of the Confederates, and his heart rejoiced at the thought. The truth was Lee was merely demonstrating to cover his retreat or retirement. He divined Meade's purpose, which was to induce him to assault the Union works, or even the Union army, in a practically im-

pregnable position, made so by siege guns from the Washington forts and a strong force of infantry behind them, with plenty of cavalry on the flanks, and Bull Run in his rear to break up his retreating ranks. On the 18th his army began its retirement from Bull Run and in a few days was back again behind the Rappahannock. For the second time the great Lee had retired before Meade, declining another battle.

Gen. Meade stormed and swore dreadfully at his cavalry because they did not discover on the 17th that Lee had begun his retreat and was himself as far south as Bristoe. To add to the Union general's troubles, Bull Run came to Lee's help. If ever a water course possessed political sentiments, that insignificant stream was heartily pro-Confederate. It always fought against the Union. This time just as Lee began his retreat, it rose so rapidly and to such an extent that Meade's forces could not hurriedly pursue him, though they started the next day. It was bank full and could not be forded except far above the Sudley Springs Ford, and the cavalry were sent in pursuit by that roundabout course. Pontoons had to be brought up and bridges constructed over Bull Run at Blackburn's and the other fords west of Centerville, involving much exasperating delay.

Meade again marched his men night and day, but Lee also marched his men night and day, and as they had 24 hours the start, they could not be overtaken. Stuart with his cavalry covered the retrograde movement by deploying and displaying his mounted men clear across Lee's rear. Kilpatrick's Union cavalry defeated Hampton's Brigade at Broad Run, but Stuart and Fitz Hugh Lee put up a job on Kilpatrick and badly worsted him just below Buckland. Gen. Meade pushedthe Army of the Potomac as far as Warrenton, but could not overtake Lee or bring him to battle. Then Meade could go no further without providing for a line over which to bring supplies, and he halted at Warrenton to await the repair of the Orange & Alexandria, which was accomplished early in November.

BRISTOE STATION, THE FIRST MINNESOTA'S LAST BATTLE.

The First Minnesota was with its good Second Corps every step during the first maneuver of Gen. Meade on the Bristoe campaign. It was in the Virginia-reel movements of "forward and back," when Gen. Meade crossed the Rapidan, October 11, and went northward to the Rappahannock, then the next day turned about and went to Culpeper, and then the next day, on the 13th, turned about again and again went northward, crossing the North Fork of the Rappahannock.

On the 13th the Regiment marched with the division to Bealeton, a station on the Orange & Alexandria, a few miles northeast of the North Fork. After resting an hour it fell in again and tramped steadily but slowly the rest of the day along the railroad in a northeasterly direction towards Washington. It could not move very fast, because the road was fairly blocked ahead with the trains and the rear guard of Gen. Sykes's Fifth Corps. The Second Corps was the smallest in the army, and on this march it was the rear guard. Caldwell's Division was in the advance, Webb's was in the center, and Hays's was rear guard.

Baxter's (the old Burns') Brigade, of Webb's Division, was now guarding the long wagon train, and Gen. Webb had but two brigades for fighting. The First (the old Gorman) was now commanded by Col. Francis E. Heath, of the Nineteenth Maine, and the Third (the old Dana) by Col. James E. Mallon, of the Forty-Second New York, the Tammany regiment. So that on the 14th Gen. Webb's fighting strength, including that of two batteries, was only about 2,000 men. Heath's Brigade had probably 1,000 men.

The division marched slowly but protractedly. It did not go into bivouac until 9 o'clock the night of October 13. Gen. Meade was marching now as a general that means business should march. He roused up Webb's men at 3 o'clock the next morning, having allowed them but six hours' rest and repose. They went several miles through a dense chilly fog be-

fore daylight. They were marching along the railway to cross Cedar Run--and pass successively Catlett's, Bristoe, and Manassas Junction, and so reach Blackburn's Ford of Bull Run. The marching orders for the Second Corps, issued by Gen. Meade the night before, read:

6. General Warren, Second Corps, will move to the railroad, passing by Catlett's house; keep on the south side of the railroad; cross Bull Run at Blackburn Ford, and mass in rear of Centerville, looking towards Warrenton.

The divisions had now changed places. Hays's was in the advance, Caldwell's in the center, and Webb's to the rear. But just across Cedar Run, north of the railroad, occurred the affair near Auburn between Stuart's cavalry and Caldwell's men. The divisions were so disposed that Stuart's shot and shells passed over the heads of Hays's men and landed among Caldwell's. Hays's Division was the nearer to Stuart, but the morning was so foggy that the Confederates did not see it. Hays instantly sent two regiments against them. These were received by Col. Thos. Ruffin and his First North Carolina cavalry. In the skirmish that resulted, the cavalry were driven off and Col. Ruffin mortally wounded and made prisoner.

No sooner did Hays report the way clear than Webb, with the Second Division, took the advance to Catlett's; Hays fell in behind; Caldwell brought up the rear with his division "en potence"--which is to say that it was in the form of a gibbet, or rather a capital letter T, with the shaft representing a column of fours marching up the road and the arms of the top cross-bar representing a regiment marching in line on either side of the road and in the rear so as to be ready for attack. Gregg's two cavalry brigades were with the cross-bar regiments and one on each side of the road to guard the flanks.

Gen. Meade was proving not only a sagacious commander, but a wide-awake one. The head of his column, by hard marching, had passed

Lee's. He knew it was the military thing to do for Lee to march swiftly across and cut the Army of the Potomac in two, and he knew that Lee had a habit of doing military things. So Meade, on the morning of the 14th, sent a dispatch to Gen. Warren, then commanding the Second Corps, and besides other directions and information the dispatch contained this warning instruction: "Move forward as rapidly as you can, as they may send out a column from Gainesville to Bristoe."

Gen. Warren was also instructed that Gen. Sykes would wait his arrival at Bristoe before moving forward with the Fifth Corps. But Gen. Sykes was impatient to move, because he was determined to reach Centerville with his Corps that night. He was half a mile east of Broad Run, where, at the railroad crossing of that stream, was what had been the station called Bristoe, but which was now a small area of fire-blackened chimneys, monuments to perpetuate the memories of the horrors of civil war. Sykes had an aide-de-camp on Broad Run heights, with instructions to let him know the moment the head of Warren's Corps came in sight. A company of Massachusetts cavalry, riding miles ahead of Warren, deceived the aid, and he told Gen. Sykes that he had sighted the Second Corps. Thereupon Sykes abandoned Bristoe and set out for Centerville as fast as his men could march.

At Catlett's the Corps line of march was re-formed. Webb's Division, with two batteries, was put on the northwest side of the railroad. Hays's took the southeast side (the railroad running northeast), the ambulances and artillery and Gregg's cavalry followed, and Caldwell's Division brought up the rear, still "en potence" in formation. The Corps trains and Gregg's wagons had passed on for Centerville, via Wolf Run Shoals, and guarded by Col. Baxter's Second Brigade. As soon as Caldwell came up, the whole Corps set out for Bristoe.

TROUBLE IN FRONT.

The greater part of the Corps had crossed Kettle Run, a mile and a half west of Bristoe, the men trudging along at a good gait, though foot-sore and very leg weary, when cannonading was heard, apparently two miles to the front. Gens. Warren and Webb at once galloped forward to see what the trouble was, feeling certain that Gen. Sykes had been attacked in position while waiting for the Second Corps to come up.

The trouble was this: Gen. Lee had sent A. P. Hill across to cut Meade's column in two, and Hill was trying to obey his orders. He sent forward Heth's Division to do the work. Heth's was the old Pettigrew Division that charged with Pickett on Cemetery Ridge. Its shrunken ranks had been recruited and distended, until now it had some 7,000 men, with the four brigades of Gen. W. W. Kirkland (Pettigrew's old brigade), Gen. John R. Cooke, Gen. H. H. Walker, and Gen. Joe R. Davis, besides Maj. D. G. McIntosh's and Maj. W. F. Pogue's battalions of eight batteries.

Heth came into the big gap in Meade's line at Bristoe and saw a mile to the northeast the rear guard of Sykes's Fifth Corps. He at once concluded that he was too late on the ground--the Second Corps had escaped; that was its rear which he could see a mile to the east. Disappointed and angry, Heth brought up Maj. Poague's four batteries and began bombarding Sykes's rear, thinking he was firing into the Second Corps. As Meade feared he would do, Lee had "sent out a column from Gainesville to Bristoe."

Gen. Heth had deployed his infantry, three brigades (Kirkland's, Cooke's, and Walker's), with Joe Davis's in the rear, and was advancing toward the southeast on the fire-blackened chimneys and Dodd's empty house, which constituted Bristoe. Walker's Brigade was on the north flank nearest Broad Run. Heth waited for a few minutes and then Gen. Hill ordered him to rush the retiring Union forces, jump on their rear, and hold them until he (Hill) could bring the rest of his Corps upon their flank. Heth's

skirmish line was near the railroad track, and Walker's Brigade was hastening to cross Broad Run, when fire was opened on the south end of his skirmish line.

Webb's Division, by the absence of Baxter's, now reduced to two brigades--Heath's and Mallon's--was crossing Kettle Run, a mile and a half back, when Poague's batteries opened. The men, weighed down with unusually heavy baggage (five days' rations included), sadly worn from toilsome marching, loss of sleep, and the almost total lack of cooked food for two days, were laboring along in good temper and spirits, and when they heard the firing sprang forward like athletes. Gen. Webb hurried back from the front and at once sent out the First Minnesota, under Major Mark Downie, as skirmishers to the north side of the road, in a scrub-pine thicket, and at the same time turned both his brigades to the road on the south side of the railroad, so that they could have the advantage of the railroad embankment in case of a fight. Hays's Division had been pursuing the route on the south side, and now Webb's men were in front of Hays's.

The woods and pine thickets into which the First Minnesota entered came clear down to the roadway on the north side of the railroad track, but did not extend very far eastward. When the remainder of Heath's Brigade cleared the woods to the east, one of McIntosh's Confederate batteries came into position on the left or north and commanded the open ground about Bristoe. This was the Second Rockbridge Battery, under Lieut. Sam Wallace, and it was the second Confederate battery to come ~~into~~ from Rockbridge County, Va.

THE MINNESOTIANS BEGIN THE FIGHT.

Just as the Rockbridge battery came into position, the sharp rattle of musketry in the pine woods was heard. The First Minnesota had struck Gen. Kirkland's skirmishers and the two parties were "at it." At once Gen. Heth recalled Walker's Brigade and directed Cooke's and Kirkland's to advance in line.

Gen. Warren was now on the field, but he told Gen. Webb to "hurry up and fight." It was good to see the gallant young Gen. Webb, only 27 years old, obey his orders with the activity and bravery of Lannes or Sheridan. He hurried Heath's three regiments by the double-quick into position behind the railroad track, facing north, the Eighty-Second New York to the right on Broad Run, having been recalled from across the stream. The Fifteenth Massachusetts was on the left of the Eighty-Second, and the Nineteenth Maine on the left of the Fifteenth. The First Minnesota was out in front skirmishing when the brigade first took position, but it soon came back. Mallon's Brigade was on the left of Heath's, the Tammany Regiment connecting with the Nineteenth Maine, and next to Mallon's line was Gen. Owen's Brigade, of Hays's Division; Carroll's Brigade came later on the left of Owen's, but took only a secondary part in the fighting.

Webb first decided to put his two brigades behind a ridge a few yards south of the railroad track, but soon saw that behind the track was a better position and he hurried them to it. Hays was ordered by Gen. Warren to double-quick his division to a railroad cut to the left of Webb, and at once sent Gen. Owen's Brigade, which came up and occupied the cut, which in effect was a great ditch with walls from two to ten feet high.

Webb's preparations were not made too soon. It was well that before they were completed Fred Brown, whose Gettysburg wound was hardly healed, dashed up with his good battery (B, First Rhode Island, four 12-lb. howitzers) splashed across Broad Run, and went upon an elevation into

a position from which he could hit any portion of Hill's army, from Poague's Batteries on the northeast to the skirmishers of Anderson's Division on the southwest; and as soon as his guns were "in battery" they were flaming and roaring and killing.

Mark Downie had his Minnesotians lying down in a sort of dead furrow, peppering away at Kirkland's skirmishers for about five minutes, when he saw behind them Gen. Kirkland's formidable line of battle advancing directly upon him--five big regiments against practically a small battalion. The major saw, too, on the right of Kirkland's men, Gen. Cooke's North Carolina brigade, of four heavy regiments, also in motion toward the Union troops at Bristoe. He immediately gave the order for the Regiment to fall back, keeping its skirmish formation, to its comrade regiments behind the railroad track. The movement was made under a heavy fire, which prevented the formation of the Regiment in a compact line, and it took its position on the firing line in skirmishing order, the men a few feet apart, so that they stretched along the greater part of Webb's Division and of Owen's Brigade, and Maj. Downie reports that the men fought in that position during the rest of the battle.# *

As soon as Cooke's and Kirkland's yelling brigades came within gunshot, Webb's Division and Brown's Battery opened on them, and the Confederates returned the fire. Faster and better firing was not done in any other battle during the war than Webb's men did. The Confederates dropped faster than did Magher's Irishmen when they went up against the stone wall at Marye's Heights. Gen Kirkland was a gallant soldier and led his brigade

* # "The flankers of Gen. Webb's Division, composed of the First Minnesota and Seventh Michigan [the latter of Mallon's Brigade] encountered the first advance of the enemy's line at Bristoe. Properly appreciating his position, the commanding officer [Capt. Maginnis] of this line withdrew his men rapidly to the left of the division as it faced the enemy, and opened space for its fire. It occasioned a temporary separation from his command, but it was in accordance with the military rules in such emergencies."--Gen. Warren's report, War Recs., Vol. 29, part 1, p. 244.

instead of driving it. He had not gone far, however, when a musket ball crushed his leg, and he fell from his horse, and was carried from the field. A few minutes later Gen. Cooke, who was also leading his brigade, had his thigh crushed, and he too fell from his horse and was carried from the field, and Col. E. D. Hall, Forty-Sixth North Carolina, commanded the brigade during the remainder of the battle.

CANNONEERS IN ACTION.

Just before the heavy firing began, Capt. R. B. Ricketts' First Pennsylvania Battery, of six 3-inch rifles, came lumbering up and plunged through Webb's line to the ridge mentioned as south of the railroad track, and went into "battery". It was on an elevation high enough so that it could overshoot Webb's recumbent infantry and at the same time smash the North Carolinians in their faces with case-shot and percussion shells, and if necessary could deluge them with projectiles. A few minutes later Arnold's Battery, (A, First Rhode Island), the horses covered with sweat and foam from a long run, broke through the pine thicket to the west and came into position and with six more 3-inch rifles went into action behind Owen's Brigade, to the left of Mallon's.

And now the little battle began in dead earnest. Heath's and Mallon's regiments had a regular fighting picnic. They were under cover and the North Carolinians were in the open. The usual positions were reversed; nearly always before the Confederates were behind stone walls or breastworks and the Union troops were wholly exposed. It seemed that each of Webb's regiments was trying to fire faster and deadlier than any other. The few score Minnesotians were doing nobly. As Mark Downie strode bravely along behind their elongated but scattered line, he kept calling out: "Keep down, boys; don't expose yourselves, and give it to them!"

The Union batteries were hard at work. Fred Brown flung case-shot and canister among the charging ranks of the brave North Carolinians and sent dozens of them into eternity. Bruce Ricketts, with his battery in the rear of Heath's Brigade, showered them with shells. Capt. Arnold, behind Owen's Brigade, made it terrible for Kirkland's men. But on and on came the brave North Carolinians, and the closer they came to the Union line the wilder they yelled and the braver they seemed. And the closer they came the harder fought the Union troops, and the braver they

seemed. There was no sign of breaking ranks except on one occasion in only one part of the line.

This exception was in Mallon's Brigade, as the charging, yelling Confederates neared it. In three regiments of this brigade, the Nineteenth and Twentieth Massachusetts and Forty-Second New York (Tammany Regiment) there was a large number of drafted men, and this was the first time they were under fire. The Massachusetts conscripts stood well, and their brigade commander, Lieut. Col. Wass, said their conduct "was all that could be desired." In the Tammany Regiment, however, some of the conscripts began to break for the rear. Col. Mallon was commanding the brigade, but this was his old regiment. He rushed among the men and implored them not to disgrace "the old Tammany." He sprang forward, mounted the railroad embankment, and called out: "Come back to your places, men; you see there is no danger." The men were coming back and he was about to descend among them, when a North Carolina musket ball passed through his body near the heart and he pitched forward into their arms. They bore him to the rear into a gully where other wounded men were, and the surgeon tried his best to save him, but he died within an hour.

But when the Confederates of Cooke's Brigade had come within thirty yards of the railroad embankment, the Union fire was too much for them and they turned and ran back as fast as they could go. On the left of Mallon's and Hays's brigades, fronting the cut in the railway line, Kirkland's men were being killed and wounded at a frightful rate, and the unhurt felt that they could not return the way they had come without the greatest peril. The railroad cut before them, filled with Owen's Third Division men, seemed a volcanic fissure vomiting hot bullets into them. Fred Brown's Battery and two guns of Bruce Ricketts's had them in direct range and opened dreadful volleys upon them. The poor fellows were soon being slaughtered in a horrible manner. They were in a death trap from which they could not escape.

They called out as loud as they could: "We surrender! We surrender!" and some of them fairly shrieked in their terror and distress, as the bodies of their comrades were torn to fragments by the murderous shot and shell poured upon them by Ricketts' and Brown's batteries. In his report of the affari Gen. Heth says:

> As Kirkland moved forward, his left struck the enemy in the railroad cut near Broad Run. He drove everything in his front along the ~~line of the~~ line of the railroad before him, but was unable to carry the second line of works in his front. When at the railroad cut his men were exposed to an enfilading fire from his right, in addition to a severe fire from a battery on the north side of Broad Run. The position was untenable. He was compelled to fall back. A number of his men, unwilling to expose themselves, remained in the railroad cut and were captured.

Many of Kirkland's men threw themselves on the ground and lay till they were picked up as prisoners, but the majority soon fled to the rear. As stated, Cooke's men turned back when within 40 yards of the railroad, though a few came farther forward and mounted the embankment of the Nineteenth Maine; Sergeant Small, Company I of the Nineteenth, shot one bold Confederate that was trying to cross the embankment and ran another through with his bayonet. They came close up to the First Minnesota, too--close enough to stick a bayonet into Sam Pitkin, of Company A, St. Paul. Capt. John Ball, of the Red Wing Company (F), was wounded as he was standing on the embankment firing his revolver into the faces of the enemy. Many of Cooke's command threw down their guns and surrendered.

As soon as the Confederates began to retreat, Major Downie called out to his Minnesotians and sent a detachment under Capt. Martin Maginnis, of the Winona Company, in pursuit. Skirmishers from other regiments were also advanced, and chased the North Carolinians clear back to their reserves, Walker's and Joe Davis's brigades.

Lieut. Wallace, with his three 3-inch rifles and two 12-pound Napoleons of Hurt's Alabama Battery, had bad luck. He was ordered into position 500 yards west of the railroad and opposite the connection

between Kirkland's and Cooke's brigades. The Napoleons (under Lieut. Crenshaw) had fired about 25 rounds, when Brown's and Ricketts' guns knocked them out; both had their axles broken and the "cheek" of one was shivered. Wallace's 3-inch rifles fired 204 rounds,# which mostly went wild. After losing 42 of his battery men killed and wounded and 44 horses killed and disabled, he abandoned his guns and went to the rear with the fugitives of Cooke and Kirkland. In his report Maj. McIntosh, who commanded the artillery battalion to which the Rockbridge and Hurt's battery belonged, says:

> Returning to the first position, I observed that the fire had ceased. On inquiring the reason of Lieut. Wallace, then in command, he replied that he had not men enough left to work the guns; that the enemy were advancing and he had just been to look for infantry support. I at once ordered the guns to be dragged back down the hill by hand, and some men who were lying in the bushes (!) started forward; but at that instant a body of the enemy, apparently skirmishers, appeared stealing over the crest of the hill and in a moment more were among the guns. I saw it was too late to remove them and directed the limbers and caissons, which were in the rear, to be drawn off in the edge of the woods, and the men to retire without noise.

The skirmishers that "appeared stealing over the crest of the hill," and who, "in a moment more were among the guns," were Capt. Maginnis's detachment of the First Minnesota. There were other detachments mixed up with the guns, but the Minnesota men certainly saw them first and first laid hands on them. The skirmish line was somewhat thin, and Capt. Maginnis did not have men enough at that point to drag away but two of the heavy guns with their ponderous carriages. Sending the men along with these, the captain ran to Owen's Brigade, of Hays's Division, stated the circumstances to Col. Owen, and asked for men to go out and bring in the other guns. Col. Owen readily assented and sent out ten men from each of his four regiments, cooly saying, "My brigade will get the credit of the capture."

By its advance among its demoralized enemies, the First Minnesota captured and carried away 322 unwounded prisoners, including two field officers and five line officers. This number was greater than the

Lochren says the 5 guns were abandoned "before firing a shot." But see McIntosh's report.

number of men in the Regiment--but no matter about that. The prisoners were divided into three companies and each company placed in charge of a Minnesota lieutenant; Lieut. Lochren (author of the Regiment's historical sketch) was one of these lieutenants. He says the prisoners were made to carry off their own muskets and accoutrements a mile away, to the division provost guard, and that the only escort they had on the way was the three lieutenants in charge of them.

Two Confederate regimental flags were captured, one by the Nineteenth Maine and one by the Eighty-Second, New York. Both colors were taken in front of the respective capturing regiments. In their reports the regimental commanders make singular statements regarding these flags. Maj. Baird, of the Eighty-Second New York, says that the flag his regiment took was "the colors of the Twenty-Eighth North Carolina Regiment." Now, that regiment at the time belonged to Lane's Brigade, of Wilcox's Division, and was not at the battle of Bristoe Station, or near it. Lieut. Col. Cunningham says that the regimental flag captured by the Nineteenth Maine was that of the Twenty-Second North Carolina, and the records show that this regiment belonged to Scales's Brigade, also of Wilcox's Division, and was not near Bristoe Station that day. All the Confederate regiments actively in the battle were from North Carolina, but the identity of the regiments losing their colors cannot here be definitely stated.

Of the cannon secured, the First Minnesota brought in two, and some other skirmishers brought in the other two. The fifth piece, a heavy bronze Napoleon, was dismounted and the axle crushed by Fred Brown and could not be brought in; it was abandoned and the Confederates recovered it. It is certain that there were but five pieces in all and only four brought in, although Gen. Webb, in his report made two days later, says:

As the fire of the Corps artillery had driven the enemy from the battery in my front, Lieut. Col. Wass, 19th Massachusetts, was sent out

with a line of skirmishers to sieze the guns, five of which were brought in. The sixth gun could not be brought off, since its carriage had been broken and the enemy's fire was severe at this point.

But Col. Wass reports:

Upon the crest was a battery of five guns. The skirmishers from this (Third) brigade, under Lieut. Thompson, of the 19th Massachusetts, drew four of these guns into our lines. The fifth gun, being dismounted, it was not thought advisable to attempt to bring it off, as the enemy was delivering a sharp fire upon those who brought away the others. A large number of prisoners were also brought in.

And Col. Owen, Third Brigade, Hays's Division, says:

Owing to Capt. Arnold's Battery being posted in my rear and firing over my men, and my not receiving any orders to do so, I did not move forward to take advantage of the enemy's plight. Some skirmishers were deployed to the front, who took and brought back to our lines four of the enemy's forsaken cannon and a number of prisoners.

Col. Heath, the brigade's commander, says, however, in his report: "The First Minnesota Volunteers were deployed as skirmishers in our front and during the engagement captured and brought off two guns."

With the retreat of the North Carolinians the battle of Bristoe Station ended. Walker's and Davis's Confederates blusteringly demonstrated to cover the retirement, but were careful not to come too close to Webb's and Hays's Divisions. Anderson's Division and some of Ewell's Corps pressed up and attacked Caldwell's Division tentatively, but Gen. Caldwell shook them off as easily as a dog shakes off the flies from his ears. One of Caldwell's shells broke ~~open~~ the head of Gen. Carnot Posey, of the Mississippi brigade, and that made three Confederate generals put hors de combat at Bristoe Station.

Gen. Warren wanted the Corps ahead of him to turn around and come back to Bristoe and fight the big battle of the campaign there, but they would not do it, and so when darkness came he buried his 31 dead, loaded up all of his 192 wounded able to be moved, took his prisoners and captured cannon, and set out to join his comrade generals at Bull Run.

NOTES OF THE BATTLE OF BRISTOE.

The battle of Bristoe Station was in many respects the most important in which the First Minnesota was engaged. The Regiment accomplished more in that engagement than in any other. It certainly inflicted great loss on the enemy in killed and wounded; it captured and corralled 322 unwounded prisoners; it siezed and brought in two fine pieces of cannon, and it did all this at a loss (according to the records) of only 1 killed and 15 wounded.

The wounded were Capt. John Ball, of Company F, severely in the groin; Lieut. James De Gray, of Company G, transferred to Invalid Corps, because of this wound; Samuel J. Pitkin, Company A, bayonet thrust; Fred L. Bernds, Company B; Henry Ghostly, Company C; Leonard B. Carter and August A. Goeppinger, Company D; Edwin B. Lowell and Sergeant Major John W. Pride, Company E; Chas. A. Berdan and Edrick J. Frary, Company F; Charles Leathers and Henry A. Low, Company H; Balthasar Best and John Thorpe, Company K. The soldier who had the glorious distinction of being killed on the field was Hans Peterson, a noble young Scandinavian-American, of the Red Wing Company.

Lee's movement against Bristoe was intended to cut off and crush the Second Corps. The movement was a complete failure, and no other regiment did more to make it so than the First Minnesota. It did its great work at an insignificant loss, and yet it had more of the visible fruits of victory to show after Bristoe than it could display after its disastrous losses at Antietam and Gettysburg. So, if the test of the real merit of a command is to inflict the most possible damage upon its enemies with the least injury to itself, then Bristoe station was the First Minnesota's greatest battle, its most brilliant victory. The record of a Union loss of but 257 men to a Confederate casualty list of 1,361, four cannon and two flags is at least most gratifying.

When a fragment of the North Carolinians succeeded in climbing upon the embankment defended by Heath's and Mallon's brigades, they were

nearly all killed or taken prisoners. About 20 of them, however, ran back and took refuge in a ruined building to the front and within 100 feet of Mallon's line and pluckily opened fire. Fifty men of the Tammany Regiment dashed out and surrounded the building, captured all the North Carolinians in it, and marched them within the Union lines. The previous year Bristoe had been occupied by both Union and Confederate garrisons, and there was a number of deserted huts, the remains of former camps, which were occupied during the battle by a number of Confederate skirmishers, many of whom were captured.

There were numerous claimants to the honor of dragging away the captured cannon. The best evidence, almost conclusive in its character, is that two of the guns were taken away by Capt. Maginnis's detachment of the First Minnesota, and the other two by Lieut. Thompson's detail of the Nineteenth Massachusetts; only four were taken away.

To the agreeable surprise of everyone, the larger portion of the Union conscripts and substitutes that had recently been pressed into service behaved bravely before the enemy. Col. Cunningham reported that the 250 conscripts which had been with the Nineteenth Maine only about a month, and had never been under fire before, "behaved with great steadiness and gallantry, justly winning from all that observed them equal praise with our veteran volunteers."

A large number of the men in the Forty-Second New York and the Nineteenth and Twentieth Massachusetts, of Mallon's Brigade, were conscripts and under fire for the first time. Col. Wass, who commanded the brigade after Col. Mallon was killed, reports: "Their conduct was all that could be desired, and they showed themselves worthy to rank with the veterans of their regiments."

Capt. Wright, commanding the Forty-Second New York (Tammany) reports: "Most of the men of this regiment were conscripts and substitutes, having joined but a few days previous to the engagement, but in coolness and

bravery they surpassed all expectation."

The average conscript, whether Southern or Northern, fought as well generally as his volunteer comrade. If a man is shot at, he will usually return the shot.

THE END OF THE BRISTOE CAMPAIGN.

Gen. Warren was greatly relieved when night put an end to the battle of Bristoe Station. If only the Corps in his front, toward Washington, would return and help him, he would go into position and hold his ground to the last, and the decisive battle of the year would be fought right there, and he sent a dispatch to Gen. Meade with that word. But the commanding general had other plans. He thought he could induce Gen. Lee to offer battle north of Bull Run, and he had already laid out a line of entrenchments to fight behind, and he said if Lee fought with his army east of Bull Run he would be very lucky if he got back. So Gen. Warren was curtly ordered to abandon Bristoe and go with his Corps to the main army with all speed.

And he was glad to go. If the army wasn't coming back to him, the sooner he left Bristoe the better. The Confederate leaders were in a terrible rage over the way things had gone in the battle, and they let the sun go down on their wrath. It was hardly dark before there was a great angry buzzing to the west and south of Bristoe, as the Confederate legions swarmed up and about Meade's outposts. Anderson's brigades of Hill and all of Ewell's men came up and joined Heth's, and they planned to swoop down on Gen. Warren at daylight and take ample satisfaction for the way he had used the North Carolina brigades. And they had five men and four cannons to his one man and one cannon.

But when darkness had fallen good and black and covered the entire scene with a sable blanket, Warren began leading his men out of their perilous position. Never did the First Minnesota forget its strict instructions as to its withdrawal from the railroad embankment and the cut. Until the men were well across Broad Run, no light was to be made, not even a match struck or a ~~cigar~~ pipe lighted; no word of command was to be spoken

above a whisper. Each man was to keep his hand on his bayonet socket and canteen and cup to prevent a rattling; and thus in stealthy silence the Regiment, and in fact the entire Corps, crept away, marching by the flank across the enemy's long front, within plain sight of their twinkling camp fires, within 300 yards of their skirmishers, and within half cannon range of their artillery in position. The captured guns were not left or forgotten. Col. Morgan, Inspector ~~Guard~~ General, furnished horses for them and they were hauled away with Hazard's artillery battalion.

Crossing Broad Run, partly by the ford and partly by the railroad, the infantry regiments of Warren's Corps made their way over the great sterile plain stretching from Bristoe to Manassas. At between 2 and 4 o'clock on the morning of the 15th the wearied and jaded men threw themselves on the ground on a part of the battlefield of Bull Run, near Blackburn's Ford, and at once fell asleep. Think what they had endured! Of the 69 hours which had elapsed since they left Bealeton, on the 12th, they had been 60 hours either in column marching in the road, or in line of battle, or skirmishing with the enemy--only 9 hours for rest and sleep in three days. And when they marched, Gen. Walker says, "they carried the heaviest loads I have ever known troops to carry on a campaign."

The First Minnesota never forgot that march. But the men did not whine or whimper over it. They were proud of it. If it had been ordered, they would have made similar marches many times before, when instead, pursuant to the commands of incompetent generals, they had well nigh destroyed the ~~enemy~~ army and greatly imperiled the Union cause, by creeping along at a snail's pace and making only three or four miles a day.

The tired and exhausted men were encamped on the left bank or east side of Bull Run, near enough to Gen. Meade's fortified line. They were here but four days, during which time nothing very eventful happened. On the day of their arrival, the 15th, Stuart's cavalry made some showy de-

monstrations from the west side of Bull Run. A battery of Beckham's horse artillery, attached to Fitzhugh Lee's Division, came up within cannon shot and threw some infernal Hotchkiss shells into the Second Corps camps, but did no particular damage. The idea was to make Gen. Meade think that this demonstration was but the prelude to a general attack upon him by Gen. Lee--and it half succeeded, too.

The old Gorman Brigade was getting rather feeble in point of numbers, and while it was in camp it received another regiment, the One Hundred and Fifty-Second New York, then commanded by Major Timothy O'Brien, later by Lieut. Col. Geo. W. Thompson. Col. DeWitt C. Baxter, of the old Pennsylvania Zouaves, again took command of the ~~old Gorman~~ Brigade.

At Bull Run, too, the old brigade lost its time-tried and fire-tested battery--the old Ricketts Battery, which first fought with the First Minnesota at Bull Run. Its official title was Battery I, First U. S. Artillery, but it was better known as Kirby's Battery, from its gallant young commander, Lieut. Edmond Kirby, who directed it so skillfully and efficiently at Fair Oaks and elsewhere in front of Virginia, and also at Antietam and Fredericksburg. As has been stated, He was mortally wounded at Chancellorsville, and then Lieut. Geo. A. Woodruff commanded it until he was killed at Gettysburg. Then Lieut. Frank S. French assumed command, which he held until the battery was transferred to the Artillery Reserve, just before the Mine Run campaign, and Capt. Alanson M. Randol given command. A number of men from the First Minnesota and other regiments of the brigade had been transferred to Kirby's Battery, and the Minnesotians had a strong affection for it.

October 19, in a drenching rain, Meade took his army out of its intrenchments and hurried after Lee, who had left the day before, declining to fight on either side of Bull Run. The Gorman Brigade marched by way of Manassas Junction to a point back near Bristoe Station, and bivouacked for the night. When it rained on the Peninsula, Gen. McClellan

would sit down in the mud and wait until the showering was over, saying that his men couldn't march in the rain; but Gen. Meade had thousands of the same men, and under him they marched many a mile over sticky Virginia mud roads and under a heavy downpour. The morning of the 20th the brigade moved over its recent battlefield, crossed Broad Run twice and Kettle Run once, and then marched westward towards Warrenton, passing through the hamlet of Greenwich and encamping that night near the other hamlet of Auburn, in the locality where Jeb Stuart passed his bad night on the 13th, and the next morning suddenly shelled Caldwell's Division.

Now, this Auburn, in 1863, was altogether unlike the little Irish town immortalized by Goldsmith as the "loveliest village of the plain." As described by McClellan, in his "History of Stuart's Cavalry Campaigns," it was "five miles east of Warrenton, on the road to Catlett's Station, at the crossing of Cedar Run, and consists of a post-office, a blacksmith shop, and the residence of Stephen McCormick." But it was a ~~strategic~~ point of some consequence, ~~importance~~, all the same, by reason of three roads which crossed there and which led to prominent places. In certain contingencies Auburn would have been a point of great strategic importance. Here the brigade rested three days.

On the 23d it broke camp at 7 A. M. and went five miles westward to the "plug" or branch railroad (of the Orange & Alexandria) running between Warrenton Junction and Warrenton C. H., and camped near the bridge over Turkey Run. Here the report became current that the army was going into winter quarters. Many of the men began the construction of little log cabins in which they expected to pass the winter in comfort, and some of them completed their houses in quite elaborate fashion. But alas! the rumor was false and baseless. Gen. Meade was simply waiting to reconstruct and repair the Orange & Alexandria, so that he could supply his army from Washington. He proposed to follow Burnside's first movement and march to

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Fredericksburg and pass the winter there, bringing his supplies from Washington, via Acquia Creek; but Halleck and Lincoln forbade that movement, for they had a horror of sending another army to Fredericksburg!

The railroad was again in running order November 7, and Gen. Meade (without shrieking for re-enforcements, for horses, for hospital tents, and what not, a la McClellan) moved his army against Lee's. The latter was now south of the north fork of the Rappahannock, between that stream and the Rapidan. Gen. Meade had divided his army into wings. The right wing, composed of Sykes's Fifth and Wright's Sixth Corps, was commanded by Gen. Sedgwick, and was to cross the north fork at Rappahannock Station, where the Orange & Alexandria crossed the river, a few miles from Warrenton Junction. The left wing was composed of Newton's First, Warren's Second, and Birney's Third Corps, was commanded by Gen. ~~Sedgwick~~ French, and was to cross the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford, three miles below Rappahannock Station. The crossings were well defended by fortifications and two brigades of Ewell's Corps.

Now when Gen. Lee, in the first week of October, started to turn the flank of Gen. Meade he had at least 48,000 officers and men "present for duty," September 30, according to the War Records, he had 48,167. At the same time Meade had between the Rappahannock and Washington, including railroad guards, engineer troops, sundry garrisons, and the army in the field, 77,947 officers and men of all arms. Lee reported nothing but his army in the field. And of the armies in the field the officers and men who were prepared and likely to fight amounted probably to 70,000 Union troops and 48,000 Confederates. This was not a great disproportion, all things considered--not nearly so large as that when McClellan confronted Lee before Richmond or fought him at Antietam.

In moving northward Lee intended to get far enough behind Meade to force him to withdraw from the Rappahannock and then attack the disjointed Union forces somewhere in the vicinity of Washington. Gen. Meade

thwarted this scheme by marching in Stonewall Jackson's style, and in the race for Washington conducting his army in Gen. Forrest's style, by out-marching his antagonist and "gettin' the most men thar fust." En route, too, a detachment of his army had, with a loss not worth mentioning, defeated one of Lee's best divisions with great casualties, causing great consternation among the Confederate generals, and at least disturbing Gen. Lee's peaceof mind.

These things gave Gen. Lee pause. He did not even carry his entire army up to Bull Run, and the detachments that did go so far were recalled as soon as they had rested, and then the entire Confederate army was hurried back to the Rappahannock with Meade's troops at ~~his~~ its heels.

In his report to Jefferson Davis of the Bristoe campaign, (War Recs., Vol. 29, part 1, p. 407) Gen. Lee says that he marched on the 9th of October to the northward, "with the view of bringing on an engagement with the army of Gen. Meade," etc. But he certainly avoided many excellent opportunities for such an "engagement," although they were freely offered him by the aforesaid Gen. Meade. He gave as an excuse for retiring from Bull Run without a battle with Meade that he "did not deem it advisable to attack him in his entrenchments." But on his retreat from Bull Run to the Rapidan, 60 miles, all he had to do to bring about the "engagement" which he says he sought was to halt and display a line of battle, and the pursuing Union forces would very soon have accommodated him.

THE BATTLES ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK.

Gen. Meade ~~probably~~ may have had Leephobia just after Gettysburg, but if so he soon recovered from it and pitched after the really great Southern general as if the latter had been a mere army Corps commander. So, on the 7th of November, just as soon as the first engine over the newly repaired railroad sounded its whistle at Warrenton Junction, Gen. Meade set out again after his renowned antagonist--70,000 against 45,000, but the 45,000 behind rivers and fortifications.

And that 7th of November was a day full of glory for Meade and his army. It was a pleasant morning when the army started for the enemy, only a few miles away. An Austerlitz sun rose and brightened the ranks of blue and cheered the men as they marched. The two wings set out to cross the Rappahannock at points which they knew would be disputed. The left column, with which was the Second Corps and the First Minnesota, marched for Kelly's Ford.

As stated, this ford was three miles down the river from the railroad bridge. A little after noon the advance of Birney's Third Corps reached the crossing. It was defended by the Second and Thirtieth North Carolina regiments of Ramseur's Brigade, Rodes's Division, Ewell's Corps, with four other brigades of the division in support. All of the defensive troops were on the south bank of the river, and many of them were about Kelly's mill, which was near by. On reaching the bank opposite the ford, Gen. Birney, without waiting for a pontoon to be laid, crossed over his old division by making his men wade the river at a shallow crossing above the main ford. Then with five regiments from Ward's and De Trobriand's Brigades he swooped down on the two North Carolina regiments, and what he did not kill and wound of them he gathered in as prisoners. The Confederate loss, as nearly as could be determined, was about 15 killed and mortally wounded, 50 wounded, and 356 taken prisoner, a total of 421. Among the badly wounded

were the colonels of the two North Carolina regiments. The Union loss was 6 killed and 36 wounded, a total of 42. The Union batteries prevented the supporting brigades from coming to the help of the North Carolinians.

While the left column was thus passing at Kelly's Ford, the right wing, under Sedgwick, was having a hard time in forcing the crossing at Rappahannock Station. Here the Confederates occupied a series of works on the north bank of the river, and these works had been built by the Union troops some time before. They consisted of a fort, two redoubts, and several lines of breastworks and rifle pits. The works were defended by Gen. Harry Hays's Louisiana brigade, of Early's Division of Ewell's Corps, and Hoke's North Carolina brigade of the same division came to its assistance. The defenders numbered in all about 2,000.

Sedgwick's, now Wright's, Sixth Corps was to bring on the attempt to capture the position. The Union troops demonstrated from noon until after dark. Then, in the black night, pierced by neither moonbeam or starlight, and illumined only by the flashes of Confederate muskets and cannon, the gallant brigades of Upton and Ellmaker, of Russell's Division, charged the formidable defenses. The assaulting soldiers were forbidden to fire a shot until they had climbed the walls and were among their enemies. The Confederates poured murderous volleys of canister and musketry into the Union ranks as they came up, but in spite of all, they captured the position and nearly all of its defenders.

As the Union troops were practically forbidden to hurt anybody, the Confederate loss in killed and wounded was very slight, 5 killed and 35 wounded. But 1,630 prisoners were taken, 928 from the North Carolina brigade and 702 of Hays's Louisianians. About 350, among whom were Gen. Hays and the North Carolina commander, "slipped out the back way" and escaped. Four fine cannon of Green's Louisiana Guard Battery, with caissons and limbers complete, and eight regimental flags were taken. Among

the prisoners were 103 commissioned officers. The Union loss was in killed and wounded only, and was 69 killed and 257 wounded, a total of 326. And ~~not allowed~~ forbidden to fire a shot!

Thus the total Confederate loss in the two engagements that day was 2,091; total Union loss, 368. Another glorious victory!

Gen. Lee was both astonished and depressed at the turn of events. At last here was a commander of the Army of the Potomac that would fight, and even go out and hunt for one--the only commander that ever looked for trouble. In three weeks this commander had accepted every gage of battle offered him and had tendered battle himself; and, besides, in that time he had put out of the Confederate fighting 1,361 men and five cannon at Bristoe and 2,091 men and five cannon at the Rappahannock crossings, a total of 3,452 men and ten cannon. Moreover, this aggressive Yankee general had leaped over the Rappahannock into Culpeper county, on the peninsula between the north fork and the Rapidan, and was pushing things. Gen. Lee's action before Meade at this juncture is thus described by Col. Cooke in his Life of Lee, p. 359:

> Gen. Lee retired before him with a heavy heart and a deep melancholy, which, in spite of his great control over himself, was visible in his countenance. The infantry fighting of the campaign had begun, and ended in disaster for him. In the thirty days he had lost at least 3,000 men and was back again in his old camps, having achieved absolutely nothing.

THE MINE RUN CAMPAIGN.

Gen. Meade expected that Lee would give him battle in the country about Brandy Station, which is on the railroad a few miles southwest of Rappahannock, but the Southern commander hastened to put his army behind, or south, of the Rapidan. To do this his men had to abandon their rather comfortable quarters on the Rapidan peninsula, and to stand not on the order of their going, for Meade was moving his army against them and seemed in fighting mood.

To cross the Rapidan and fight involved some preparation and preliminary movements, which Meade halted on the Rapidan peninsula to make.

The Second Corps, with the First Minnesota, went into camp in the vicinity of Berry Hill, near Stevensburg, a small village in Culpeper County, five miles southeast of Culpeper C. H., five miles west of the north fork, and the same distance north of the Rapidan. The men went at once to work in putting up log cabins and other structures suitable for winter quarters, for it had turned unusually cold. November 8, the next day after the two battles, was a dark, rainy day, and the next day it snowed and that night water froze in the canteens. Lee's men were in a bad way. They had comfortable quarters which they had built themselves, but the majority of them were destitute of clothing and blankets and had very little to eat. Re-enforcements were received, however, every day.

Gen. Meade did not stand at gaze before Lee's army of 48,000 for six long weeks, as did McClellan before Magruder's 10,000 at Yorktown. As soon as he had his army in condition for winter fighting, he got busy. He sought every opportunity to learn the position and condition of Lee's forces, with the view of attacking them. His army was kept ready to move in an hour. Daily demonstrations were made, hoping to develop something. The Confederate cavalry was busy, too, in raiding the rear and troubling the Union communications.

After Kelly's Ford and Rappahannock, the Washington authorities did not interfere very much with Gen. Meade and his plans; they virtually gave him carte blanche to do as he pleased with his army. But ten days before these events, Gen. Halleck butted in to say that he was certain Gen. Ewell's Corps had gone to Tennessee to re-enforce Bragg, and only one Corps, A. P. Hill's, was left with Lee, and he ordered Meade to attack Lee at once and raid Lynchburg, and make other movements. The idea of Lee's sending away half of his army at that time was preposterous. Gen. Meade denied at once that Ewell had gone to Tennessee. He also said, in effect, that he knew his duty and would do it, and did not have to be urged to. In a few days came the twin victories, and after that Halleck let Meade alone.

At last Gen. Meade ascertained Lee's position. It was south of the Rapidan, almost wholly within Orange County, and east of Orange C. H. The right or north end of this line rested on the Rapidan, near Morton's Ford, which was up the river from Ely's, Culpeper Mine, Germanna, and Jacobs' Fords, down near Chancellorsville battle ground. Thus these lower fords were uncovered and could be passed. The line ran from north to south along the west bank of a small stream called Mine Run, which rises south of Orange C. H. and the Chancellorsville plank road, flows due northward between hills and amid woods, and empties into the Rapidan a few miles above the Germanna Ford.

The Confederate army was to the west of Mine Run, with its left or north wing, the one nearest the river, behind breastworks, and the right undefended, though works could be raised in front of it in a few hours. The troops were ~~quarantined~~ quartered in little log cabins, some of which were canvas-covered, although tents and canvas were scarce in Lee's army. The cabins were constructed of small pine logs with puncheon floors and rough stone fire places.

The position selected by Lee along Mine Creek, as the place

where he would meet Meade, was somewhat like the position selected just before Gettysburg by Meade along Pipe Creek, as the line where he would meet Lee. Each position was, or could be made, fairly impregnable. And therefore each general finally rejected the meeting place prepared for him by the other!

Lee seemed entirely confident that the right or south end of his line would not be disturbed. He thought his left might be in danger and he detached several brigades of A. P. Hill's Corps to various points in the west or northwest to prevent a turning of his left flank.

By the 24th (November) Meade had prepared a plan for attacking Lee and he was confident of victory. The weather was cold, but his well-clad soldiers could stand a campaign if Lee's ragged and barefoot men could. He planned to leave a good division behind and with the rest of his army cross the Rapidan by the lower fords mentioned, go on and turn the Confederate right, and then march rapidly westward toward Orange C. H. over the plank and turnpike roads which connect that place with Fredericksburg. Then he would be between Lee and Ewell's Corps and A. P. Hill's scattered brigades, and he could demolish them all in detail.

The Union general planned to leave behind the greater part of his trains, to cut entirely loose from his base of supplies, and take with him only ambulances and enough wagons to haul seven days' rations; the troops were to cary three days' more in their haversacks. If he succeeded, he would establish a new base and open new lines of communication.

The orders were to start at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 24th and be at the Rapidan by daylight. But at the hour mentioned a cold rain was pouring heavily, and the march was postponed. The night of the 25th the ground froze hard and it wasthought that the frozen crust would bear up the artillery and the wagons. So the orders were to start at 3 A. M. of the 26th, and at this hour a start was made for the Rapidan.

According to the order of march Sykes's Fifth Corps, followed by Newton's First, was to cross the river at the Culpeper Mine Ford and go south eight miles to Parker's store, on the Pleasanton road to Orange C. H. The Second Corps, with the First Minnesota, was to cross at the Germanna Ford, four miles above the Mine Ford, and go eight miles a little west of south to Robertson's Tavern, on the Orange and Fredericksburg turnpike, three miles north of Parker's store, on the plank road. This would put the Second Corps in a line facing Mine Run to the west and connecting with Sykes and Newton. French's Third Corps, followed by Sedgwick's Sixth, were to cross at the Jacob's Mill Ford, three miles above the Germanna, and march six miles south to Robertson's Tavern and connect with the right of the Second Corps. Thus, when these movements were completed all the Corps would be in line facing west towards Mine Creek and Ewell's Corps and ready for the attack. It was known that the Confederate breastworks lacked a mile of extending southward to Robertson's Tavern, and Warren's Second and the Fifth and First would have unimpeded ground before them, and be clear around Lee's line besides.

Gen. Meade calculated that the march, only 20 miles at the farthest, would be completed by noon of the 27th at the latest, and this would give time to demolish Lee, with Ewell, before Hill could come up. But his well devised and meritorious plans miscarried, though they were worthy of Frederic the Great, Napoleon, or Charles of Sweden. They failed because of delays.

The main failure was the tardiness of Gen. French with the Third Corps. That general's convivial habits have heretofore been alluded to in connection with his failure at Front Royal and Manassas Gap. On this occasion it is said he was in his cups; Gen. Meade bluntly said he was drunk. His Corps had a somewhat longer distance to march than the others, but it did not reach the Rapidan until three hours after the others had come up.

The commanding general would not allow any of the others to cross until the Third came up, for he did not know just how things were on the other side of the river. Finally the Third Corps came up and the crossings began.

Now another obstacle to rapid marching was encountered by all the Corps. The river crossing was to be by pontoon bridges, and it was supposed that a sufficient number of these boats had been brought along. But when the fords were reached--either because the river had raised, as some claimed, or because the engineers had miscalculated the distance--it was found that not enough boats had been brought to bridge the stream clear across. The vacancies had to be filled with trestles, and this was a difficult job. The frozen ground would not bear the vehicles and they broke through and the wheels sank in the sticky mud. It was noon of the 26th when the columns got to the river, and it was daylight on the morning of the 27th before all had crossed. The Second Corps, however, was across on the evening of the 26th.

Then Gen. French had another trouble. He said the bank opposite the south end of his bridge was so steep that he could not get his artillery carriages up it. So, instead of getting a hundred men to work digging a roadway, which they could have completed in twenty minutes, he sent his cannons and their caissons and battery wagons around by Robin Hood's barn and the Germanna Ford, a detour of eight miles, and only two batteries had come up to the Corps by the morning of the 27th.

Then Gen. French had another trouble. Soon after his infantry had crossed the Rapidan at the Jacobs Mill and was marching toward Robertson's Tavern, he blundered upon the wrong road, which carried him too far to his right. He had crossed the river in the evening, and night found his Corps all balled up, with the Sixth Corps not much better. He had to march back in the darkness.

Then Gen. French had another trouble. When on the morning of the 27th he had found the right road and was pursuing it, he had not gone

far until he encountered Ed. Johnson's and Rodes's Divisions, of Ewell's Corps, sent out to meet him. At once a brisk little battle opened on Payne's farm, near that of Widow Morris, and it lasted nearly all day. Gen. French was no coward and would always fight, even when full of "Dutch courage." Though he defeated the Confederates and finally drove them from his path, yet before he could extricate himself and open communications with Robertson's Tavern and the Second Corps, it was dark. Gen. French's loss in the fighting was 125 killed, 747 wounded, and 71 missing--943. The Confederates reported their loss in the two Divisions of Johnson and Rodes as 83 killed, 518 wounded, 110 missing--711. Only a part of the losses in Rodes's Division was reported. In the haversacks of the prisoners and of the Confederate dead on the field little else was found but some shelled and parched corn, on which the wretched soldiers said they had mainly subsisted for several days; as to their clothing, there was much to be desired.

By the evening of the 26th Gen. Meade's intentions were fully apparent to Gen. Lee. The miserable delays of certain of the organizations were responsible. The Confederate commander at once recalled A. P. Hill's brigades in the vicinity of Orange C. H., 30 miles to the westward, and posted Stuart's cavalry on his front and flanks. Ewell's men not engaged with French were divided into picket lines and breastwork builders; His fighters were taken from the north, where they were checking French, and sent to the south to confront Warren. Gen. Meade's plans for a sudden and unexpected attack were spoiled; yet he could do nothing but swear.

Lee threw out a force beyond his line under Rodes and Early, and covered by cavalry this force moved rapidly against Warren, down near Robertson's Tavern. Some spirited fighting took place between the infantry and cavalry of both sides in Warren's front, Webb's Division and the old Gorman Brigade being engaged, and the result was that the Confederates retired. This fighting was in the woods, for the Confederstes had no breastworks then in that quarter, and the time was between 11 and 12 o'clock. Warren had ex-

pected to be joined at Robertson's Tavern by French, but French being otherwise engaged, Warren moved his line westward along the turnpike towards old Verdierville.

Hays's Division, in the advance, struck the Confederate skirmishers at Robertson's and drove them back westward along the Orange turnpike. Webb's Division came up rapidly, deployed to the right of the road and pushed them back to the northwest over the road leading northwest to Raccoon Ford, over the Rapidan. Lieut. Col. Hesser, of Baxter's Zouaves (Seventy-Second Pennsylvania) was killed in this movement. Col. Baxter was commanding the Gorman Brigade.

Gen. Warren kept demonstrating, but became greatly disturbed as the day wore on and he could not tell how strong the force was in front of him, nor why Franch's or some other Corps did not join him. He was greatly relieved when black night came and hid him from the enemy. But glory be! Just at dark Newton's First Corps joined him, and later went into line of battle on his right. Then during the night Sedgwick's Sixth Corps came up and before daylight took possession on the right also. Now everything was safe.

On the morning of the 28th at sunrise the three Corps--the First, Second, and Sixth--moved gallantly forward, determined to smash to pieces the Confederates, supposed to be in battle array in the woods just in front. But for the delays mentioned, this movement would have been made 24 hours before, or early in the forenoon of the 27th. But when they had advanced a mile without interference, the three Corps discovered that the Confederates had fallen back two miles west of Robertson's Tavern and gone into position on the west side of Mine Run, where they had thrown up fortifications which they were still enlarging, extending, and strengthening. By marching night and day Hill's Corps was now up and also in position. Lee is ready for you now, Gen. Meade!

Warren and the other generals, Meade included, under cover of a skirmish line, went up within half a mile of the Confederate position and

through their field glasses took a good look at it. The Confederate line was drawn along a prominent ridge, or rather a series of heights, and extending north and south for six miles, with a "fish hook" on either end. The abrupt heights or hills formed all of the essential angles and salients of a fort. The center had four or five facings, covering a distance of two miles, and these facings enabled the placing of batteries that could enfilade and sweep every avenue of approach over the half mile of open ground directly in front. The breastworks on this ridge were composed of narrow cribs of big logs filled with wet dirt packed down, and were five feet high; they were strong enough to resist any cannon likely to be fired against them. In their front, trees and brush had been cut down and with the tops pointing outward, making a formidable and almost impassable abatis. Still farther to the front, from a quarter to half a mile, flowed Mine Run, a stream of no great width, but with steep banks bordered with brush and undergrowth. Recent heavy rains had converted its valleys into swamps and marshes covered with thin ice. The position was stronger than Missionary Ridge, and indeed more formidable than any other constructed during the war.

Gen. Meade was greatly disconcerted at the unfavorable turn in his affairs. He had come to fight, and he determined to make every effort to do so if he could without making a Fredericksburg or Cemetery Ridge slaughter of his men. He put in all of the 28th in reconnoitering and trying to find a weak place in the armor in which Lee had enclosed himself and which might be attacked with some show of success.

It was especially up to Gen. Warren and the Second Corps on the extreme Union left, and opposite the extreme Confederate right, to find the weak place, or at least one weak place; Gen. Sedgwick, on the extreme Union right, was depended upon to find another. A heavy and cold rain fell early in the day and somewhat interfered with Gen. Warren's observations; but he went out with some skirmishers and had 20 of them killed and wounded before he saw all he wanted to see. Yet he failed to discover, he says, "a

promising point of attack."

In the evening Gen. Warren, to serve his country and to mollify Gen. Meade, who was in a towering rage because he was likely to have to retire without a battle, proposed to the general a movement on the enemy's extreme right, beyond his fortified line. This movement, Gen. Warren said, he would lead with the Second Corps, re-enforced properly by infantry and some cavalry. Meade approved the proposition warmly, sent Warren Terry's (Gen.) Division (6,000 men) of the Sixth Corps, and 300 of Gregg's best cavalry, and assured ~~Warren~~ him that he would give him further support if he needed it.

It was past noon when the movement was decided upon. Gen. Warren busied himself and his subordinate officers with preparations for it until in the evening, when another heavy storm came up. He stripped himself to fight. He prepared to give his men three days' rations, to leave behind nearly all his ambulances and half his artillery, and move lightly and swiftly. The dark rainy night determined him to put off the beginning of the movement until the next morning.

At daylight on the 29th the movement began. The march was made over bad roads, through the woods, about two miles below Robertson's, and then westward. Coming upon Gen. Gregg, that officer showed Gen. Warren what he thought was a formidable breastwork in front, but which proved to be the embankment of a projected railroad, well noted on the Chancellorsville battle ground, and which afterward became the roadbed of the Potomac, Fredericksburg & Piedmont. Gen. Warren meant to go clear down and around the "fish hook" of Lee's right flank, thus turning it and forcing the Confederates to come out from behind their heavy entrenchments and fight in the open ground and in a fair field.

But Lee was watching for such a movement and sent cavalry, infantry and artillery down from the left of his line to meet it. His skirmishers met Warren's almost at the outset. Warren drove them three miles and at the head of Mine Run, below the Orange turnpike, the Orange plank

road, and the railroad embankment, he found the regiments they belonged to in trenches. Warren had lost only 50 in killed and wounded, but the route through the timber had been so hard to travel that it was dark before he could get his troops in position for assault. He rode as fast as he could to Meade's headquarters at Robertson's for instructions, and when he arrived he was told that a general assault had been planned for the next morning and he was ordered to go back to his Corps and prepare for it.

Gen. Warren was to make the first attack from his position, and two more divisions were sent him to make it stronger. He was to assault vigorously, and this would doubtless draw troops from Lee's left, and thus weaken that end of the line so that Gen. Sedgwick, with the First and Sixth Corps, could break it and destroy it. Gen. Wright, of Sedgwick's First Division, said he was confident he could make a flying wedge of his division and send it through the line in his front. Gen. French said an assault in his front, in the center, was impracticable, and so he was left with one division to stand still and watch things.

Gen. Warren was to begin the assault at 8 o'clock the next morning (30th) and Sedgwick would make his an hour later. But when the sun rose Warren saw to his consternation that the Confederates had moved down large re-enforcements; that they had worked all night enlarging and extending their breastworks, supplying them with abatis, etc., until now they were as strong as any other part of their line along Mine Run; moreover, it would r equire about seven minutes to go from the Union position to the Confederate works and during all this time a charging force on a naked plain would be exposed to every species of fire. Gen. Warren suspended his attack until he looked over the situation very carefully and then sent for Gen. Meade. When the commanding general came, he soon decided that an assault was impracticable--or rather that it was impossible--and he countermanded the orders for it. By his orders, too, the army lay quiet during the rest of the day November 30 and all day of December 1, and the next day abandoned the movement

and re-crossed the Rapidan.

That the assault on the 30th was indefinitely postponed was of credit to Gen. Meade's sound judgment over his strenuous determination to fight. An assault on an almost impregnable position of the Confederates would have probably failed, entailed woeful slaughter, and produced no good results. The men would have made the charge all right, though they knew its frightful perils. They were very cheerful about it; but while they were brightening up their bayonets and girding up their loins for it, they pinned upon their breasts pieces of cardboard and paper bearing their names, their companies and regiments, and their home addresses--for the information of possible burial parties!

The total loss of Meade's army on the Mine Run campaign was 173 killed, 1,099 wounded, and 381 captured and missing; a total of 1,653, of which 224 were in the cavalry. The Second Corps was engaged Nov. 27, 28, and 29, and lost 12 killed, 152 wounded, and 118 missing; total 282. Webb's Division lost 5 killed, 39 wounded, and 13 missing; total 57. The loss in Baxter's Brigade was none killed, 14 wounded, and 5 missing; the First Minnesota of this brigade sustained no loss. Col. Joslin, Fifteenth Massachusetts, and four of his men were captured and ten wounded.

The Confederates reported their losses only partially. Ewell's Corps, with returns lacking from two brigades, reported 711 casualties in the fighting at Payne's farm with Gen. French. No report from Gen. A. P. Hill's Corps or Stuart's cavalry can be found. The Confederate loss in the aggregate was probably about 1,000.

If Gen. Lee pursued the retiring Union forces a single rod, nobody in Meade's army was aware of it. A few of Stuart's cavalry came slowly and cautiously behind as far as Parker's Store, but their movement was in no sense a pursuit. McClellan in his "Stuart's Cavalry," p. 398, and Cooke in his "Life of Lee," p. 369, claim that when Meade retired Meade moved his army "immediately in pursuit," going around Meade's or Warren's left flank. How glad Warren and Meade would have been to know this at the

time! Gen. Warren had 16,000 good men and 14 batteries, and he would have been greatly delighted had Lee come out from behind his unassailable position and attacked the old Second Corps and Terry's Division in the open country.

The failure of Gen. Meade's campaign was attributed by Gen. Meade and his chief of staff, Gen. Humphreys, to the delays and misconduct of Gen. French. That officer tried to excuse himself by saying that his delays could not be avoided. Gen. Meade would not let Gen. Warren attack until French came up and joined him; but Gen. French, regarding this, said: "That was all nonsense; Warren should have been fighting the south end of the rebel line while I was fighting the north end." As to his being intoxicated, Gen. French said: "That was a lie. I had a flask of brandy which the surgeon had fixed up for me, and I occasionally took a swig from it to keep out the cold, but I was not intoxicated in the slightest degree." However, largely owing to the insistence of Meade and Humphreys, Gen. French was removed from the command of the Third Corps in March after Mine Run and a little later had his commission of major general of volunteers taken away from him by being mustered out of the volunteer service and returned to his former rank of lieutenant colonel in the regular army. In 1877, aged 62, he was retired as brigadier general and died in Washington in 1881.

Meade's and Lee's operations in the late autumn of 1863 inaugurated a new system of military defense. Theretofore when an army fought in the field it did so in the open without breastworks, unless they had been previously erected. But, when, early in October, 1863, Meade marched his army to near Washington, he threw up breastworks as soon as he stopped and prepared to fight behind them. At Mine Run Lee built strong entrenchments to shelter his men in a single night, and whenever he moved them he built new ones. This new feature he carried forward in the Wilderness Campaign; every night and sometimes every day he built new works. Grant soon adopted this plan, and so did Sherman and Joe Johnston in the West. The two Bull

Runs, Antietam, Gettysburg, Shiloh, and other great battles before October, 1863, were fought in the open, except when stone walls and rail~~roads~~ fences could be utilized.