



Max M. Kampelman Papers

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY NEWSLETTER

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Professor Hans J. Morgenthau
Founder

Professor George Schwab
Editor

To commemorate the seminal contributions made by Professor Morgenthau to the theory and the practice of American foreign policy, the National Committee on American Foreign Policy presents the Hans J. Morgenthau Memorial Award each year. The person to be so honored is one whose intellectual attainments and/or practical contributions to United States foreign policy have been judged so exemplary in the tradition of Professor Morgenthau as to merit this singular award.

The Presentation of the
Fourth Hans J. Morgenthau Memorial Award
by
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER and SUSANNA MORGENTHAU
to
AMBASSADOR JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK
Address by
AMBASSADOR MAX M. KAMPELMAN
OCTOBER 1, 1984 — The Waldorf-Astoria, New York

Remarks by
Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
in Accepting the Fourth
Hans J. Morgenthau Memorial Award

Thank you Miss Morgenthau; thank you Dr. Kissinger.

It is a surrealistic evening, and no one has a sharper sense of this than I. I feel rather awed to be in this room this evening in this company. I also feel an enormous embarrassment in having to correct Henry Kissinger about the circumstances of our first meeting. Actually, I wasn't scheduled to chair that meeting. Our mutual

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Address by the
Honorable Max M. Kampelman
to the National Committee on American
Foreign Policy on the Occasion of the
Presentation of the Fourth Hans J.
Morgenthau Memorial Award to
Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
Human Rights and Foreign Policy

It is a privilege to be participating tonight in this tribute to Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. Henry Kissinger's words and sentiments have defined

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Remarks by
The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
on the Occasion of the Presentation
of the Fourth Hans J. Morgenthau
Memorial Award to Ambassador
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

I'm here to say a few words about Jeane Kirkpatrick. The capacity to admire people is not my most highly developed trait, but in this case it is very profound. I had never heard of Jeane Kirkpatrick until she wrote an article in *Commentary* about the human rights policy of previous administrations. And as one remarks every once in a while after reading something, I exclaimed, "Well, of course," after reading "Dictatorships and Double Standards," except that I had never thought of it myself. Sometime later I was invited to speak at a forum that Jeane was supposed to chair and was told that she had been selected to introduce me, I looked forward eagerly to that occasion. That was before I knew that Jeane does not take prisoners. She had developed doubts, shall we say, about the policy that was then called detente, a word that has been banished, though not its substance, and she let me know in no uncertain terms that her introducing me in no sense constituted the slightest degree of moral approbation.

Be that as it may, one of the achievements of which she should be most proud is that from this

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**Remarks by Susanna Morgenthau
on the Occasion of the Presentation of the Fourth
Hans J. Morgenthau Memorial Award to Ambassador
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick**

I feel extremely moved that my father's work has been perpetuated not only in the world of ideas and academic discourse but also in the real world of politics among nations, as exemplified in the distinguished career of the scholar-diplomat whom we are honoring this evening, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick.

Even though my father did not subscribe to any concept that exaggerates the role of the individual in world affairs, he knew that statesmen who made a difference balanced passionate commitments to a just world with a profound knowledge of how such an order can be brought into being.

I am grateful to the National Committee on American Foreign Policy for commemorating my father's work by choosing Ambassador Kirkpatrick as this year's recipient of the Hans J. Morgenthau Award.

Canada, NATO, the United States, and the Mulroney Mandate

by

Klaus H. Pringsheim

President Reagan's landslide victory in the U.S. elections of November 6, 1984, followed by two months the election victory of the Progressive Conservative party of Canada (Tories). Led by Brian Mulroney, the Tories now dominate delegations in the House of Commons from all of Canada's ten provinces and two territories. The 211 Tories are faced by an emasculated opposition of only 40 Liberals (they lost 107 seats) and 30 New Democrats.

There can be little doubt in anyone's mind that the massive turnaround of the Canadian electorate signaled by these figures constitutes a solid mandate for Prime Minister Mulroney's Tories to implement those changes in policy that the party leader and his supporters so persuasively advanced during the campaign. Yet it has been argued that the Tory campaign was strong on rhetoric and short on the specifics of policy and that the Tory victory can be attributed less to the advocacy of specific new policies than to the prospect of throwing out the Liberals brought to power sixteen years earlier by Pierre Trudeau. The failure of John Turner, the recently elected Liberal leader, to dissociate himself from the Trudeau record and cabal was perhaps the final straw in a set of circumstances that ended the long reign of the Liberal establishment.

The Downgrading of Defense and NATO Commitments: An Election Issue

Apart from attacking the competence of the Liberals and blaming them for the economic

malaise that has afflicted Canada in recent years, Brian Mulroney campaigned on a platform that included a series of economic and political measures that, it was claimed, would cost Canadian taxpayers twenty billion Canadian dollars to implement. Among the more attractive of his promises was the assurance that he would restore harmonious relations with the United States and the pledge that he would reaffirm the Canadian commitment to NATO and would restore strength to Canada's defense establishment that had been reduced to a shambles by sixteen years of deliberate neglect.

Klaus H. Pringsheim is a professor of political science at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. Born in Berlin, Mr. Pringsheim spent the war years in Japan and later served as a press censor at General MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo. During the fifties he studied comparative and international politics at UCLA and Columbia and graduated from Columbia's East Asian Institute. He has taught at the University of Kansas, the University of Hong Kong, and in the California State University system, moving to Canada in 1966. His most recent book is entitled *Neighbors Across the Pacific: A History of Diplomatic and Trade Relations Between Canada and Japan*.

The views of Professor Pringsheim do not necessarily reflect those of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy.

Canada and NATO Under Trudeau: The Sixties and the Seventies

When Pierre Trudeau became prime minister in April 1968, he ordered a major review of Canadian foreign policy to be carried out by the bureaucracy and parliament and invited participation in this review both by politicians and academics, including those whose views differed from current policy and from his own views. In effect Trudeau encouraged the development of a national debate on foreign policy, and in the designated elite circles such a debate did indeed take place.¹ It can be argued that the Trudeau administration orchestrated what appeared to be an open debate for the purpose of validating the foreign and defense policy views of the prime minister and his close advisers. There is no doubt that Trudeau's views and those of his principal advisers were formed long before the so-called review was completed and the foreign policy white paper (later called the Trudeau Doctrine) was finally published. As a rule, politicians come to office with some ideas about what they wish to accomplish, and Trudeau was no exception. Nevertheless, Trudeau probably went further than others would have gone in listening to a variety of views, and the final decisions that he made, although not inconsistent with his original predilections, had been significantly tempered by the consensual process, which the long-time minister of external affairs, Mitchell Sharp, characterized as exhaustive.

I remember the discussion of NATO, which had not been attempted that way before by any government. The prime minister insisted that we examine all the options—nonalignment, neutrality, membership without contributing forces, membership with forces committed but not in Europe, membership with forces in Europe, and all the options on how many troops in Europe. We went through that whole exercise, step by step; it drove us up the wall and took days and days. But no one could say we hadn't studied all the options.²

The Defense Policy Review

On April 3, 1969, Prime Minister Trudeau released a statement entitled "A Defence Policy for Canada." The statement rejected nonalignment and neutrality and reaffirmed that Canada would remain in NATO in order to influence its development toward detente and arms reduction with the East.³ The Trudeau administration not only hoped to influence NATO for the furtherance of Canada's interests but it also had decided to bring about a phased reduction of the size of the Canadian forces in Europe. The scope of this reduction would be decided in consultation with Canada's allies. The Canadian cutback, moreover, was unilateral and thus was not motivated by a desire to achieve a reciprocal reduction of Warsaw Pact forces. It was simply the administra-

tion's view that its armed forces could be better used in Canada than in Europe. In reference to NORAD (the North American Aerospace Defense Agreement of 1957), which established an integrated air defense system for Canada and the United States, the prime minister stated that Canada would continue to cooperate with the United States in defending North America, the details being subject to consultation with the United States.⁴

The size of the reduction was announced in September 1969: The Canadian forces in Europe were cut in half from 10,000 to approximately 5,000. Although no further cuts have been made since then, the Canadian contingent is usually 58% of strength. It consists of the Fourth Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group stationed in Lahr and Baden and three squadrons of CF104s. The air contingent, which had been assigned as a nuclear armed strike force against Warsaw Pact targets, was denuclearized in 1969 and assigned to a tactical support role.

Canada's European allies were shocked and disappointed at the Canadian decision and regarded it as a defection if not a betrayal. Ambassador Ross Campbell, Canada's chief delegate to NATO, noted that the announcement had been made at a private reception in his apartment in Brussels by Minister of National Defense Leo Cadieux. "I have never been at a more emotional scene in all my life," he commented.⁵

The rationale behind the decision reflected the views of Pierre Trudeau and his advisers, which were spelled out in the *White Paper on Defence: Defence in the 70s*,⁶ published in August 1971 under the name of Minister of National Defense Donald S. MacDonald. The beginning section refers to a loosening of the bipolar international system, the emergence of China as a nuclear power, and the poor prospects for international peacekeeping. It also mentions the threat of internal revolution in Canada and the extension of Canada's territorial sea and lists four Canadian priorities in the defense policy.

- (a) the surveillance of our own territory and coastlines, i.e., the protection of our sovereignty;
- (b) the defence of North America in cooperation with U.S. forces;
- (c) the fulfillment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed upon; and
- (d) the performance of such international peacekeeping roles as we may from time to time assume.⁷

The white paper spells out the major arguments for assigning Canada's role in NATO such a relatively low priority.

Canada is one of only two partners in the NATO Alliance which station forces outside of their own continent. It is also one of only six of the 15 member nations which station forces outside their national borders for NATO purposes. It is apparent from these facts that NATO's collective defence rests primarily on defence of national homelands. An understanding of this situation . . . will

also dispel a widespread misconception that only the stationing of Canadian forces in Western Europe constitutes a contribution to NATO's collective defence.

There were two main reasons for the decision. . . . Economic circumstances in Europe had undergone a marked change in the nearly twenty years since Canada first stationed peacetime forces in Europe. Under the protective shield of NATO, Western Europe had succeeded in transforming the shattered economies of 1945. Since then its GNP has grown to about \$600 billion per year for a population which exceeds 300 million people, and in many countries there is a high level of employment. In considering the defence implications of this phenomenal recovery, Canada concluded that its European partners were now able to provide a greater proportion of the conventional forces needed for the defence of their own region of the Alliance.

The second reason for review was that other national aims—fostering economic growth and safeguarding sovereignty and independence—dictated increased emphasis on the protection of Canadian interests at home. In addition, Government-wide financial restraints, and the resulting need for compatibility of roles and equipment for our home and overseas-based Armed Forces, dictated the need for some adjustment.

The Government reaffirmed Canada's adherence to the concept of collective security, and announced that Canada would continue to station significant though reduced forces in Europe as part of the NATO integrated force structure. Forces based in Canada for emergency deployment to Europe were not reduced. The Government reached its decision after an exhaustive examination of all factors bearing on national security. The decision did not suggest an overall reduction in NATO-wide defence, although Canada hopes that East-West negotiation will render this possible in the future. What Canada was seeking was a redistribution of effort for the defence of the European part of the Treaty area. The reductions were preceded by full consultations and implemented over a two-year period to permit internal adjustments to be made by members of the Alliance.⁸

The Foreign Policy Review and the Third Option

The publication of the defense policy white paper in August 1971 followed the two-year review of foreign policy and the publication (on June 25, 1970) of six multicolored booklets of approxi-

mately thirty pages each. Collectively called *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, these publications propounded the rationale for Canada's foreign policy for the seventies (and, as it turned out, into the eighties) in booklets devoted to general policy, Europe, international development, Latin America, the Pacific, and the United Nations.⁹ The Trudeau Doctrine, as Professor Peyton Lyon christened this new bible for the practitioners of foreign policy, provided a theoretical framework for most of the foreign policy initiatives implemented by the Trudeau administration. Canada's role as a "helpful fixer" in international affairs (exemplified by Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson who collected a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts) was to be downgraded, and close identification with U.S. foreign policy (Vietnam) and excessive dependence on economic relations with the United States were to be avoided.¹⁰ Instead, the emphasis was to be put on independence, nationalism, and the rational pursuit of Canadian interests. External activities were to be directly related to national policies pursued within Canada and were to foster economic growth, safeguard sovereignty and independence, pursue peace and security, promote social justice, enhance the quality of life, and ensure a harmonious natural environment.

The decision to give more emphasis to Pacific affairs, which envisaged "expanding activities in the Pacific Basin and Latin America," followed from the objective of safeguarding sovereignty and independence.¹¹ Moreover, the Pacific section focused on the search for a balance of power among the United States, China, the Soviet Union, and Japan in the Pacific area and was based on the expectation that Japan would surge ahead and play a more active role in trade, aid, political influence, and possibly even security, particularly in Southeast Asia. Turning to Canada's role as a Pacific power, the following realistic assessment was made. "In the Pacific, as elsewhere, Canada is not a great power, not a prime mover. At the moment it does not appear to be in the Canadian interest to seek to participate in the various multilateral or bilateral security agreements in the Pacific."¹²

Because the Trudeau Doctrine had failed by omission to deal with Canada's most important special relationship, that with the United States, an attempt was undertaken to put some distance between the United States and Canada, a move perhaps propelled by the apparent momentum of Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik in Europe (another Nobel prize performance) and various manifestations of detente between the superpowers. The Canadian version of Ostpolitik began to take shape with the acceleration of negotiations to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (brought to fruition in October 1970) and moves toward rapprochement with the Soviet Union as well as the attempt to stimulate closer ties with countries located along the Pacific Rim, Latin America, and the European Economic Community. The postwar supremacy of the United States was recognized to be in decline as its inability to prevail in Vietnam became evident. Meanwhile, the imposition of a 10 percent surcharge on dutiable goods sold to the United

States, which was announced by President Richard Nixon on August 15, 1971, made a reexamination of Canada-United States relations seem desirable. Canadians were clearly disappointed that their special relationship had not exempted them from the surcharge.

This reexamination led in the fall of 1972 to the publication of one of the most important foreign policy documents of the Trudeau era, Mitchell Sharp's article, "Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future," which in a thorough fashion looked at Canada's relationship with the United States and posed some agonizing questions.

The real question facing Canadians is one of direction. In practice three broad options are open to us:

- a. We can seek to maintain more or less our present relationship with the United States, with a minimum of policy adjustments.
- b. We can move deliberately towards closer integration with the U.S.
- c. We can pursue a comprehensive long-term strategy to develop and strengthen the Canadian economy and other aspects of our national life, and in the process to reduce the present Canadian vulnerability.¹³

Rejecting both the first and the second options as less advantageous or viable from the Canadian viewpoint, Sharp clearly indicated a preference for the third option of strengthening Canada and reducing its vulnerability, adding that this option was in no sense anti-American. The basic aim of the third option would be "over time to lessen the vulnerability of the Canadian economy to external factors, including in particular, the impact of the U.S., . . . and develop a more confident sense of national identity."¹⁴ In this connection, the comment of Bruce I. Rankin, Canada's ambassador to Japan from 1976 to 1981, is noteworthy: "Canadians dealing with Japanese affairs think of Japan as the other pillar, along with Europe, of the Third Option Policy."¹⁵

The word *vulnerability* in the third option paper is clearly a reference to Canada's excessive dependence on the U.S. economy, making Canada subject to such actions as Nixon's 10 percent surcharge, limitations on oil shipments, possible changes in the auto pact, and to measures affecting the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC). The option paper clearly suggested that reducing vulnerability meant seeking alternative markets and political relationships.

The Nixon Doctrine Condones the Trudeau Doctrine

President Richard Nixon visited Canada in April 1972, and in an address to a joint session of parliament signaled that he understood Canada's aspirations in the Trudeau era.

Our policy toward Canada reflects the new approach we are taking in all our foreign relations—an approach which

has been called the Nixon Doctrine. That doctrine rests on the premise that mature partners must have autonomous independent policies:

- Each nation must define the nature of its own interests;
- each nation must decide the requirements of its own security;
- each nation must determine the path of its own progress.

Later, Nixon added:

The fact of our mutual interdependence and our mutual desire for independence need not be inconsistent traits. No self-respecting nation can or should accept the proposition that it should always be economically dependent upon another nation. Let us recognize once and for all that the only basis for a sound and healthy relationship between our two proud peoples is to find a pattern of economic interaction which is beneficial to both our countries and which respects Canada's right to chart its own economic course. . . .¹⁶

Those remarks seemed to open the door for the third option, the Trudeau Doctrine, and even the NATO cutbacks ordered by Prime Minister Trudeau. Not all Canadians, however, agreed with those initiatives, and then, as well as now, issues in U.S.-Canadian relations and defense policies were among the most controversial, complex, and intractable of policy dilemmas. Dr. John W. Holmes, a distinguished Canadian diplomat and scholar and a former director general of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs in Toronto, has written about the intricacies of Canadian-U.S. relations and has demonstrated that there is no simple approach to understanding the ambivalences and ramifications of how Canadians feel about the United States. "Genuine anti-Americans," he points out, "are a shrill but small minority."¹⁷

My own conviction, after almost twenty years in Canada, is that empathy and fondness for the United States outweigh any negative feelings in Canada. Canada depends on the United States for a great many things, economic, military, industrial, and cultural, and Canadians know it—sometimes resent it a little—and are generally willing to pay the price by being good neighbors. The saturation of Canada's airwaves by the U.S. media and the fact that many Canadians read *The New York Times*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *Time*, *Fortune*, and even *U.S.A. Today* along with their local Canadian publications contribute to Canadians' thinking like Americans. Had President Reagan been running in Canada this fall, he would in all likelihood have been reelected, although possibly by a slightly lesser margin. Prime Minister Trudeau's attitudes on foreign policy and defense during the late seventies therefore probably no longer reflect a Canadian consensus. For this and other reasons, his Liberal party lost much of its popular support.

Canada's Neglect of its Defense Establishment

During the twelve years that have elapsed since the third option paper was published and the NATO cutback was ordered, the Canadian government has reflected Prime Minister Trudeau's lack of interest in maintaining an even superficially credible defense structure. In 1963, when the Liberals under Lester Pearson (Trudeau's predecessor) came to power, which they finally relinquished twenty-one years later, Canada had 215,000 men in uniform (regular forces and reserves) and spent 4 percent of GNP on defense. By 1983 those figures were 106,000 and 1.8 percent.¹⁸ That was the Pearson/Trudeau impact on defense in the age of detente, which the Soviet Union used to arm itself to the teeth in conventional as well as nuclear weaponry. Initially Canada cut its NATO forces in half, denuclearized the Canadian NATO air force units, and slapped a three-year budget freeze on the Department of National Defense. Another body blow to the effectiveness and the morale of the Canadian armed forces was the decision made by Paul Hellyer, Lester Pearson's minister of national defense, to "integrate the armed forces of Canada under a single chief of defence staff" as a first step "toward a single unified defense force."¹⁹ Rear Admiral William Landymore, chief of Maritime Command in Halifax, Nova Scotia, spelled out some of the objections to this new policy.

Within the services, the threat of this single force is devastating. The single force threatens the psychological basis of military life. The confusion and insecurity already caused among career conscious officers and men is the immediate reason why so many more are leaving the service and not being replaced by recruits. The concept of the single force is based on a naive and limited view of the armed services—not as forces to defend the nation in time of war, but primarily as a special peacetime force to undertake small police actions in foreign countries.²⁰

Rear Admiral William Hughes, who was fired for saying so, made the following comment:

We're facing fifteen years of benign neglect. In those years there has been tremendous technological change and tremendous change in the operational capability of the potential opposition. If somebody gave me total power to go to Russia and destroy their armed forces, I'd order the Russian forces unified, put them into green uniforms, place them on a fixed budget, and leave.²¹

As detente declined, a target of 3 percent real growth for the defense budget was set, and Canada, along with the United States, France, and West Germany, became one of only four countries in NATO to meet that goal. The total defense budget for 1984-1985 was set at \$8.8 billion dollars, which was a 73 percent rise, including inflation, over the 1980-1981 budget figure. It was

the equivalent of approximately 2 percent of GNP as compared to the NATO average of 4.7 percent. Canada is one of five NATO countries that does not have conscription. It does have, however, the largest sovereign territory in the alliance, which would normally require a very large military force to protect. Nevertheless, the perception that there is no direct military threat to Canada and the United States with its massive nuclear deterrent power effectively protects Canada from a potential Soviet attack has induced contradictory attitudes. Canada wants to be independent and make its own defense decisions, and yet it relies primarily on the United States to defend its territory. Under the NORAD Agreement with the United States, Canada pays 11 percent of the 4.7 billion dollar annual NORAD budget and now has full responsibility for the surveillance of Canadian airspace. By 1989 Canada is scheduled to take delivery of 138 McDonnell Douglas CF18 fighters, 84 of which will be assigned to NATO by 1985 and the balance to NORAD.²²

The Lamentable Shape of the Canadian Navy

Of the three services, the Canadian Navy is in the most perilous state. Once the third largest navy in the world, with 428 ships, including 2 aircraft carriers, the Canadian Navy today has nothing larger than a destroyer escort. All but four of its twenty destroyer escorts and frigates are more than twenty years old and thus obsolete if not downright unable to get up steam. It has three old diesel submarines, eighteen long-range patrol planes, eighteen short-range patrol aircraft, and thirty-five helicopters. There is general agreement that this tiny, antiquated naval force is unable to fulfill even Canada's peacetime commitments, which include patrolling the world's longest coastline comprised of arctic waters where Soviet submarine flotillas cruise under the ice. The Trudeau government finally took note of this situation and in the summer of 1983 ordered the construction of six 4,200-ton patrol frigates at an estimated cost of 3.8 billion dollars. The first of these frigates will not be delivered until 1989 and the last in 1992. By that time the cost overrun is likely to be very large.

Another disturbing fact is that Canada does not have a single minesweeper. (It had 85 during World War II.) Nor does it have an icebreaker, and the 8.7 million square kilometers of the Canadian arctic region stretching from Davis Strait to the Beaufort Sea remain virtually unprotected. There is only one Canadian military base in the far north (at Alert on Ellesmere Island) that can be reached by Canadian aircraft if they refuel at the Thule U.S. Air Force Base in Dundas (formerly Thule), Greenland. Despite the fact that there are some Canadian gravel air strips in such places as Cape Dorset, Eskimo Point, Pond Inlet, Frobisher Bay, and Spence Bay, the area is in effect unattended and undefended. Only a solitary patrol flies over the area every three weeks or so from bases as far away as southern British Columbia. Not only does this constitute no defense, but it is hardly enough

to warrant Canadian claims to continued sovereignty over the area.

Dew Line Improvements and the Need for AWACS

The DEW (Distant Early Warning) Line built by the United States in 1955 is still in place on Jeny Lind Island in Cambridge Bay, Foxe Inlet, and Cape Dyer. It was updated to some extent in 1983. Canada pays roughly one-seventh of the 3.4 billion dollar annual cost for maintenance and new equipment. The Pinetree Radar line, which runs farther south (roughly between Holberg and Vancouver Island and Goose Bay, Labrador), is badly in need of updating; much of its equipment is now more than thirty years old.²³

Senator Paul Lafond, chairman of the Senate Committee on Territorial Air Defense, recently revealed that he will recommend in December 1984 that the DEW Line be replaced at a cost of approximately 10 billion dollars, of which Canada would pay 10 percent. Senator Lafond said that the current DEW system is so outdated that Soviet bombers that regularly fly along the East Coast can penetrate Canadian airspace without detection. "We don't know if they are entering our air space around Labrador, . . . but we recognize that they could if they wanted to, and we would not even know about it. . . . During a massive air strike, the United States would have to protect large parts of the East Coast. . . . We simply do not have the resources."²⁴

It has been suggested that Canada purchase half a dozen AWACS aircraft to be based along the northern periphery in such places as Frobisher Bay, Cold Lake, Goose Bay, and White Horse. Such a purchase would make surveillance of the DEW Line area possible, but it would cost Canada close to 1 billion dollars.²⁵

The Purchase of New Equipment: The Dilemma of Choices

Beginning in the late 1970s a number of steps to remedy the lamentable state of Canadian defense equipment were taken by the Trudeau administration. Such decisions, however, were unenthusiastic concessions to glaring needs. They lacked the logic of long-range planning because Prime Minister Trudeau's basic view that Canada, as the immediate neighbor of the U.S. superpower, needs only token forces had not changed. Nevertheless, 128 Leopard tanks were purchased in 1978, 42 of which are now situated in Canada. One might ask whether the Leopard was the best choice or whether Canada would have been better off with the M1 Abrams tank. Similarly, Canada decided to replace the F101 Voodoos with the CF18 Hornets, which are currently on order, but, again, there are those who believe that the F16 might have been a better choice and that politics and economics rather than military considerations may have played a bigger role in the actual choice made.²⁶ Finally, the decision to build six frigates was taken after

214 million dollars had been expended on the so-called destroyer life extension program and in spite of claims made that the new frigates will be obsolete when the last one is delivered in 1992.

Canada has so far failed to provide a follow-up program for taking obsolescent equipment out of service, and it is therefore doubtful that the country's capacity to discharge its naval commitments to NATO or along its own coastlines will improve much. In the navy's case, the failure to provide minesweepers and icebreakers is now considered a mistake, and it has been suggested that a number of nuclear submarines should be purchased to improve Canada's capacity to monitor Soviet movements under the arctic ice. A single Soviet nuclear-missile-launching submarine of the Typhoon class could proceed from Archangelsk or Murmansk or one of several ports on the Laptev Seacoast, travel under the arctic ice-cap along the Pole Abyssal Plain or the Nansen Fracture Zone, enter the Lincoln Sea, proceed along the Robeson and Kennedy channels between Ellesmere Island and Greenland to Northern Baffin Bay, and, from an area such as Jones Sound, fire nuclear missiles at most of the cities in North America from a distance of 3,000 to 4,000 miles. During the 1984 election campaign last August, Jean Jacques Blais, the Liberal defense minister, revealed that Canada was in fact considering the acquisition of a nuclear submarine: "We must make a serious analysis about acquiring a nuclear submarine to protect our sovereignty." He added that he made a proposal to the cabinet for an unspecified number of frigates to supplement the six already ordered. His remarks were made in reply to the criticism of the Canadian Navy made by Captain John Moore, editor of *Jane's Fighting Ships*, who had said that Canada's small and outdated navy could not defend its shoreline or live up to its NATO and UN obligations.²⁷

Recommendations and Promises

Responsible officials in government, members of parliament, and the community of defense intellectuals have long been aware of the conditions described in this article, and an elite-level debate on the subject has been going on for years, although it has usually been couched in general and philosophical terms. Nevertheless, decisions in this area are highly political, and positive action could not be expected until a change of government had occurred and a new overall policy that could serve as a guideline for actions on defense policy had been elaborated.

In the summer of 1982 the Atlantic Council of Canada published a study entitled *Canada and Western Security: The Search for New Options*,²⁸ which contained a number of basic recommendations both for the alliance and for Canada. For the alliance it proposed that a high-level review of the challenges posed by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact be conducted by a working group of ministers. Although the council advocated the retention of the strategy of flexible response, it also advocated a new emphasis on conventional

deterrent forces in Europe. The specific recommendations for Canada were

that the Prime Minister and other Canadian leaders and officials give a much higher priority to security policy; that the Canadian government should, as soon as possible, issue a green paper on security policy, outlining its objectives, priorities and manpower and equipment programs for the 1980s and the early 1990s;

that the Canadian government present Canada's views on security matters more publicly and pursue Canada's interests more aggressively within the alliance;

that Canada's military contribution to the Atlantic alliance be increased and be substantially revised to consist of three elements:

1. An expanded sea and air maritime force for use in the North Atlantic
2. A fully manned mechanized land brigade for the European central front and
3. An augmented Air Defense for the North American continent.²⁹

I would add three other vital considerations.

1. It must be made clear in unequivocal terms that the Canadian government and the Canadian people are firmly committed to the preservation and the defense of the open societies in Europe, North America, Central America, and South America and East Asia and Southeast Asia and that we are not prepared to withdraw into neutralism or suffer Finlandization.

2. We must be prepared to maintain a military establishment that at least has the capacity to monitor our territories, coastlines, and territorial waters. This means that military manpower must exceed the level of 80,000 service personnel currently in uniform (of whom fewer than 18,000 are combat soldiers). With one and a half million unemployed, the recruits will not be hard to find.

3. By whatever means appears most appropriate and economical, the Canadian arctic area must be made less vulnerable to penetration by Soviet nuclear-missile submarines and other strike forces. If this means the purchase of nuclear submarines for the Canadian Navy or the building of a major antisubmarine warfare base in the Queen Elizabeth Island, such undertakings should be considered. If Canada is not prepared to defend its sovereignty in that area, its leaders should consult with their American counterparts to ascertain on what terms the United States might be disposed to take over the defense of an area that might well become a launching point for an attack on the continental United States and Canada. Under no circumstances should Canadian territory be allowed to be a weak link in the NATO defense perimeter. The argument that Canada lacks the resources simply will not wash. What Canadians have lacked to date is the resolve.

Prospects for Improvements Under Mulroney's Leadership

Both during and after the 1984 election campaign, Brian Mulroney, Canada's new prime minister, has spoken about his administration's intention to move toward closer relations with the United States, to increase defense spending, and to meet Canada's commitments to NATO. Speaking in Nova Scotia three weeks after his election victory he said:

Canada is not a superpower, nor are we neutral in the struggle between freedom and totalitarianism. Canada is a member of the western alliance, and our government is determined to enhance our contribution to that alliance. Pulling our weight fully in the field, we will expect always to be consulted fully on the policy of that alliance.

We have a unique relationship with the United States, a relationship which will continue to improve, to the benefit of both countries. The relationship to the United States is a vital dimension of our foreign policy, but it is not the only dimension.³⁰

I see no reason to doubt that Prime Minister Mulroney meant every word that he said. Initially there was talk of a six percent increase in defense outlays (four percent in real terms) and an increase in the size of the armed forces by 8,000 men within a period of three years.

During October Robert Coates, Canada's new minister of defense, visited both U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in Washington and Sir Geoffrey Howe and Michael Heseltine, the British foreign and defense secretaries, as well as NATO's new secretary general, Lord Carrington, stressing his intention to strengthen Canada's commitment to both NATO and NORAD. The armed forces will be increased in size and re-equipped, he said, but the extent of the increases will be "constrained by the unfortunate financial situation we find ourselves in."³¹

Given the positive expectations raised by Coates's statements, it was a disappointment when Michael Wilson, Mulroney's minister of finance, announced in the House of Commons on November 8, 1984, that instead of increasing the defense budget by 190 million dollars, as promised, he would be cutting it by 154 million dollars.³² This means the omission of 344 million dollars from next year's defense budget, and it places in doubt Canada's ability to meet its commitment to NATO to increase defense spending by three percent. The revised Tory budget stands at 9.37 billion dollars for 1985-1986, which is an increase of less than two percent in real terms.³³

Some officials in Ottawa have argued that the announced "cut" reflects reduced prices for equipment purchases stemming from the reduced rate of inflation in the United States where 25 percent of the defense equipment is purchased. This explanation, however, has not been entirely con-

vincing to Reagan administration officials, who were understandably miffed by the Wilson announcement, which caught them by surprise.³⁴

At best, the Mulroney administration has bungled. One does not send one's defense minister to Washington to tell President Reagan and Defense Secretary Weinberger one thing, then repeat the performance in London and at NATO headquarters and, finally, a few weeks later, designate the minister of finance to speak in the House of Commons and contradict both the prime minister and the minister of defense. To call such behavior inexperience would be a euphemism. Prime Minister Mulroney's reputation at the White House, 10 Downing Street and NATO headquarters has not been enhanced by this incident. One can only hope that it is an inaccurate reflection of his reliability as a partner in NATO and that he and his officials in Ottawa will act with greater circumspection in the future. Pierre Elliott Trudeau had a reputation for saying one thing, doing the opposite, and then thumbing his nose at the world. I hope that we can expect much better things from the Mulroney administration in the months and years to come.

NOTES:

1. Four accounts of the events surrounding the foreign policy review stand out.
 1. Bruce Thordarson, *Trudeau and Foreign Policy—A Study in Decision-making* (Toronto, 1972), pp. 121-143.
 2. John W. Holmes, *Canada, A Middle-Aged Power*, The Carleton Library, no. 98 (Toronto, 1976).
 3. John W. Holmes et al., "Canada's Foreign Policy," in *International Journal*, vol. XXVI, no. 1, Winter 1970-71.
 4. Edelgard E. Mahant and Graeme S. Mount, *An Introduction to Canadian-American Relations* (Toronto, 1984).
2. George Radwanski, *Trudeau* (Toronto, 1978), pp. 162-163.
3. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, *A Defence Policy for Canada, Statements and Speeches*, no. 69/7, April 3, 1969.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
5. Peter C. Newman, *True North: Not Strong and Free, Defending the Peaceable Kingdom in the Nuclear Age* (Toronto, 1983), pp. 144-145.
6. Donald S. MacDonald, *White Paper on Defence: Defence in the 70s*, Information Canada (Ottawa, 1971), 50 pages.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.
9. Mitchell Sharp, *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, Queens Printer for Canada (Ottawa, 1970).
10. It is interesting to note in this connection that some thirteen years later, during the dying days of his administration, Mr. Trudeau had come full circle and galloped around the world full speed in a do-or-die effort to become a "helpful fixer" to Reagan-Andropov-Chernenko and summitry for nuclear arms limitation, for which he may have hoped to collect his own Nobel Peace Prize and for which he did in fact collect the Albert Einstein Memorial Peace Award in Washington, D.C.
11. Sharp, *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, booklet 1, p. 39, quoted in Klaus Pringsheim, *Neighbors Across the Pacific* (Westport, Conn., 1983), pp. 149-150.
12. *Ibid.*, booklet 5 (Pacific), p. 11, quoted in Pringsheim, *Neighbors Across the Pacific*, p. 150.
13. Mitchell Sharp, "Canada-U.S. Relations: Options for the Future," *International Perspectives*, Special Issue, autumn 1972, Information Canada, Ottawa, p. 13.
14. *Globe and Mail*, October 18, 1972, p. 2.
15. Address by Bruce I. Rankin, Empire Club of Toronto, March 10, 1977, Canada, Department of External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, no. 77/2, p. 7.
16. John W. Holmes, "Focus on the Constant Dilemma of U.S.-Canadian Relationships," *International Perspectives*, May-June, 1972, pp. 10-11. See also his *Life with Uncle: The Canadian-American Relationship* (Toronto, 1981).
17. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
18. James Bagnall, "Deteriorating Defences," *Financial Post Magazine*, Report on the Nation, November 1983, p. 88.
19. Peter C. Newman, *True North: Not Strong and Free*, pp. 40-44.
20. As quoted in *ibid.*, p. 42.
21. As quoted in *ibid.*, p. 51.
22. James Bagnall, "Deteriorating Defences," p. 88.
23. Peter C. Newman, *True North: Not Strong and Free*, pp. 151-160.
24. "Ten Billion Dollar Replacement of DEW Line Urged," *Hamilton Spectator*, November 17, 1984.
25. Peter C. Newman, *True North: Not Strong and Free*, pp. 68-69.
26. Admiral Carroll, USN, who commanded the aircraft carrier *Midway* in Vietnam, contends that designing *The Hornet* for the dual missions of both fighter and bomber weakened its ability to fulfill either, its range and endurance being sacrificed to make it effective as a fighter. Moreover, the recent discovery of cracks in the tail section have raised further doubt. See Michael Berryhill, "The Leading Edge," *The New York Times Magazine*, November 25, 1984, p. 113.
27. *Globe and Mail*, Toronto, August 25, 1984, p. 11.
28. R. B. Byers et al., *Canada and Western Security, The Search for New Options*, (Toronto, 1982), pp. 38-39.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
30. Notes for an Address by The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney, P.C., M.P., Prime Minister of Canada, at St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, Nova Scotia, September 28, 1984, p. 4.
31. *The Spectator*, Hamilton, Ontario, "Green Sailors Go Blue, July 1985," October 17, 1984, p. A5.
32. *Globe and Mail*, Toronto, "Reversal of Policy Squeezes Defence," November 9, 1984, p. 11.
33. *Financial Post*, Toronto, "These Cuts Will Hurt Twice," November 17, 1984, p. 6.
34. *Financial Post*, Toronto, "Washington Weekly Report," November 24, 1984, p. 7.

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Kirkpatrick Remarks (continued from page 1)

friend, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, was scheduled to chair that meeting. Fifteen minutes in advance of the meeting I was told that "Pat can't make it. We need someone to introduce Henry Kissinger. We think you should do it." And I said, "I don't have anything planned to say on such an occasion; surely someone else could do it better than I." And they said, "Well, not actually; there are a thousand people here, and they're all

waiting to hear him; and somebody's got to introduce him; and, it's got to be you." And I said, "Well, I don't really know anything about Henry Kissinger, except that I've read his books." And they said, "Well, that's what's really important." I took that theme, and I thought a little bit about what I had learned from reading Henry Kissinger's books, which is a very great deal. I also may have said something that wasn't entirely respectful about that policy that he invented. He used to claim that *they* called it detente, with the third syllable pronounced, as in a foreign word. It was really that foreign name that bothered me. And I know that Henry is going to feel good to know that we're not only vigorously reinventing it, but we're giving it a good American name: We're calling it constructive disengagement. Anyway, it's nice to be here, and I thank you.

Hans Morgenthau was a scholar whose books I also read and for whom I developed enormous respect: He was an immigrant with a better understanding of the American tradition than most of us ever gain, a student of power who, better than most moralists, understood the effects of morality in politics, an extraordinary theorist of the practice of international affairs. A prize bearing his name is a very particular pleasure for one who values very particularly, as I do, accomplishments in scholarship. And to receive this prize from the greatest scholar-diplomat of this century is really too much. Ladies and gentlemen, you're exaggerating. I appreciate your compliment; I reproach your judgment; and I thought, as I thought about this, that saying that would doubtless remind Henry that he had once described me as a woman who wouldn't take yes for an answer. (You did say that, Henry.) It would be an understatement to say that I have come in the past four years to more deeply appreciate in more complex ways the work of both Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger.

Experiencing at first hand our country's very particular problems with power and morality and the national interest and foreign policy and the very special problems of trying to deal with all those factors in the United Nations is enough to make anyone reevaluate her judgments about how difficult everything is. Hans Morgenthau noted in one of his most famous books on foreign policy that "The illusion that a nation can escape if it wants to from power politics into a realm where action is guided by moral principle rather than by considerations of power is deeply rooted in the American mind." We all know that's true. The search for a society that is innocent of power, for politics free of self-interest, for international relations from which force has been purged continues to occupy an extraordinary amount of our time and our effort. In thinking about Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger and that search by Billy Budd and by Woodrow Wilson and the internationalist mode, I remembered a passage in one of Wilson's essays called "Patriotism and the Sailor." The sailor that he was talking about could easily have been Billy Budd. And I would like to read that passage to you to remind us all about the nature of the problem. Wilson wrote:

Washington saw it when he wrote his

Farewell Address. It was not merely because of passing and transient circumstances that Washington said that we must keep free from entangling alliances. It was because he saw no country had yet set its face in the same direction in which America had set her face. We cannot form alliances with those who are not going our way; and in might and majesty and in the confidence and definitiveness of our own purpose, we need not and we should not form alliances with any nation in the world. Those who are right, those who study their consciences in determining their policies, those who hold their honor higher than their advantage, do not need alliances. You need alliances when you are not strong, and you are weak only when you are not true to yourself. You are weak only when you are in the wrong; you are weak only when you are afraid to do the right; you are weak only when you doubt your cause and the majesty of a nation's might asserted.

I must say, in reflecting on passages like this, I, too, in the last four years, with regard particularly to the United Nations, have warned against entangling alliances. If that is true, then we surely are not being true to ourselves; we surely are in the wrong; we surely are not doing the right thing. Only I don't believe that all those things are so. To reflect on Billy Budd and our national quest, on that sort of wisdom of Woodrow Wilson's (he was much better on domestic politics), is to realize that we have much to learn about how to think and how to feel about international politics, about how to respect our national interest without feeling selfish in our sentiment, how to understand and respect and accept the relation between national interest and our moral tradition without succumbing either to messianism, which is one of our national temptations, or to isolationism, which is another. It reminded me of how deeply we need great teachers, great practitioners, such precisely as Hans Morgenthau, and the greatest diplomat of our century, Henry Kissinger. I thank the National Committee; I thank the unknown citizens of the world. I thank all of you for being here. And I say that whatever we may learn, it is because we have very good teachers.

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Kampelman Address (continued from page 1)

her splendidly evolving role in American public life. Her comments tonight clearly justify your decision. I add a personal note.

I know Jeane as a cherished personal and family friend of more than thirty years. Her husband was my teacher and adviser when I received my doctorate from the University of Minnesota. I know her as a warm human being and as a political scientist, author, professor, and intellectual of distinction. We worked together in the cause of liberal democracy under the banner of Hubert

Humphrey. But Ambassador Kirkpatrick has become more than a human being of distinction and quality. She has become a symbol of American high principles and of unvarnished strength of dedication to American values. Having applied the clarity of her perceptive mind to public service, she has demonstrated that nobility in democratic political leadership is synonymous with honesty and directness of speech, clarity of thought and position, and a stubborn determination to champion the cause of liberty. I am honored that you have invited me to participate in this tribute to her.

In the spring of last year, while still able to function, Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, urged his Communist party cadres to remember that there was a vital battle underway "for the hearts and minds of billions of people on this planet." We, too, must never forget that reality. Part of that reality includes the fact that the Soviet Union is today the major threat to our security and values — an aggressive society seeking to expand its influence with its massive military and police power. It is also a repressive society that is determined to defend its totalitarian power whatever the human cost.

It is not useful to deny this reality. Instead, it should be faced constructively. I suspect that we and our friends who value freedom will pay a heavy price and suffer great anguish as we come to grips with this hard fact. The integrity and the strength of our society and of our people will perhaps be subjected to the most serious challenge of our history as we learn how to live with Soviet military power, meet it, and challenge it while we strive to obtain the peace with liberty that we seek.

The object of diplomacy in a democratic society is to preserve peace and protect and pursue vital national values and interests. This is the supreme challenge to statesmanship. In the nuclear age, its significance is overwhelming.

History has demonstrated that diplomacy has failed frequently. The price of that failure has too often been a loss of human life, the destruction of property, and the erosion of human values. However tragic the losses of the past, they did not pose direct threats to our civilization and perhaps to our planet, the ultimate cost that could well be exacted if diplomacy fails today or tomorrow. Despite the awesome threat, diplomacy today is weaker in the resources that it can command to meet awesome responsibilities. It is undermined by skepticism on the part of the body politic and, more important, by the threat of internal divisiveness posed by partisanship, which leads to excesses in language and in the formulation of policy.

We still think of ourselves as a young and developing nation even though we are now one of the oldest, most stable political systems in the world. We did not seek the role of world leadership, and our people still tend to shy away from it. At the end of the Second World War, our relative geographic isolation, our democracy, our bountiful natural resources, and our productive people made us strong. We were somewhat like a young giant among nations, and being a giant is not

easy. It is not easy living with a giant, and our friends have experienced that. It is hard to find shoes to fit a giant, and his bed is always too short. Being strong, a giant can afford to be gentle, but he is also awkward at times. His good intentions are not always interpreted as such by others.

We make mistakes because we are unaccustomed to and hesitant about the responsibilities of leadership. As a result, our behavior has at times resembled fits and starts that have frequently bedeviled our foreign policy and confused both friends and foes.

We think of ourselves as a nation committed to the values of liberty. Some of our more sophisticated friends, modern-day Metternichs, see this linkage of American values with world *Realpolitik* as a form of naiveté. But liberty to us is not an abstract value. We believe that it is not abstract to those unable to enjoy it. Our values, in fact, distinguish us from the totalitarians and the authoritarians of the world.

Let us explore for a moment whether our values concerning the "rights of man," which we consider a source of our strength, complicate our pursuit of peace and international stability. What are the implications of injecting considerations of morality into American foreign policy? Is there a tension created when we engage in moral condemnation of totalitarian societies and then undertake to negotiate with those we condemn?

The charge has been heard that raising issues involving human rights is a form of "confrontation" that is contrary to the spirit necessary for serious negotiation. I respectfully suggest that negotiation without confrontation, when the objective facts require blunt talk, is not a serious negotiation at all. It is a charade. The purpose of negotiation, obviously, is to reach agreement. When difficult issues are involved, however, agreement may not be possible in the short run. The negotiating process must therefore be used to illuminate differences, lessen ambiguity, and develop a framework for later agreement. Otherwise there would be no reason for the other side to take seriously the depth of our concerns.

The alternative is silence. But can we be silent when silence, in effect, becomes acquiescence and even complicity? If silence is morally unacceptable, is verbal condemnation adequate when we know that it is likely to be ineffective? Is "action" called for? If so, what kind? Do we have the moral right to encourage people who live under repressive regimes to seek to change their conditions? Do we have the moral duty to help such people change their conditions when they ask for help? Is intervention ever a legitimate response? If so, what kind? Or does intervention depend on whether the tactic will work and at what cost?

I am aware of the assertion that the best way to help those who are victims of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes is to set a fine example. I suspect that this sweeping generalization avoids the issue. The example that we set, no matter how noble, will do little to alleviate the plight of those victimized by repression. We should also understand that even setting an example can produce

international tension. The good example set by West Germany only led to a wall of concrete and firepower around Communist Germany. The existence of a good example is, in effect, perceived as a threat to those who control repressive regimes. That threat, in turn, accentuates fears and frequently leads to increased repression and more police and armed force. The examples set by free societies may well be perceived by totalitarian leaders as subversive of their authority.

The peoples of the Soviet Union, who constitute hundreds of nationalities, subscribe to the same values of human dignity that we proclaim. They are as dedicated to the elimination of war as any other people. They have no wish to be isolated from their neighbors and from the movement of civilization. But their desire to participate in the community of nations creates an insecurity on the part of their rulers, who then go to great lengths to restrain, punish, and fence in their citizens.

There is a related set of questions. Are we true to our values if we support allies who do not share them? Our founding fathers accepted an alliance with France, which was governed by a tyrannical monarch, at the time that we forcefully expressed our detestation of absolute monarchies. During World War II we entered into an alliance with Stalin, whom history will record as a close competitor of Hitler for the title of the most brutal butcher of the twentieth century.

Must we be consistent? Some would have us seek to improve our relations with Castro's Cuba, increase our trade with the totalitarian Soviet Union, and apply sanctions against racist South Africa.

I raise these questions not to undermine the legitimacy of injecting morality into our foreign policy. Morality must be a major component of American foreign policy. It may well be an indispensable ingredient for generating the domestic consensus that is required to conduct an effective foreign policy in a democracy. But strategic self-interest must also be a major consideration in formulating an effective and desirable foreign policy and thus the dilemma and the opportunity. There are some who may respond to the danger represented by Soviet military power and theology by ignoring or minimizing its existence. That would be fatal for us. There are others who are so overwhelmed by the potential of Soviet might that they have placed all their trust in increasing military power as the only appropriate response. That view also carries the seeds of tragedy.

We dare not blow the Soviet Union away. Nor can we wish it away. It is here, and it is militarily powerful. We share the same globe. We must try to find a means that will enable us to live together in dignity.

The Soviet Union is not likely to undergo what Jonathan Edwards called a great awakening or see a blinding light on the road to Damascus. Yet the imperatives for survival in the nuclear age require us to persist through the deterrence that comes from credible military strength, through critical dialogue, and through negotiation in the search for understanding, agreement, and peace.

We hope that the time will soon come when the Soviet leaders comprehend that repression can-

not achieve stability or security. We hope that they will feel the need to show the rest of us that cruelty is not only not an indispensable part of their system but is, instead, counterproductive to their interests. Just as the Leninist aim of achieving world communism through violence is an anachronism in this nuclear age, so must it be understood by the Soviet leadership that it cannot survive without humanizing its controls. Included in our message must also be the affirmation that cooperation on all levels is possible if Moscow lives up to the international responsibilities that it undertook to discharge in the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act, and the Madrid Concluding Document.

We hope, but if we are to be prudent, we cannot trust. We must negotiate, and negotiating means more than talking. It means listening as well. We must also be politically, economically, socially, and militarily strong. The Soviet Union respects military power. Its incentive for negotiating an agreement has always been greater when the positions taken by its negotiating adversary have been supported by the weight of military strength.

We must understand that diplomacy in a democracy requires public support, particularly when the use of force is an option. We are entering a period in which public support may well be the ultimate determinant of whether we will be able to achieve the peace with dignity that we seek. No democracy can achieve the broad domestic consensus required for the conduct of its foreign policy unless that policy is grounded in moral principles as well as vital national interests. That is certainly true of ours.

The problems that divide us are numerous and serious. Even though we trust that our negotiating efforts will produce results, we must appreciate that even with agreement, we will still be closer to the beginning than to the end of our pursuit of peace. We need patience. We must be prepared to remain in any negotiation with the Soviets for one day longer than they. We must be bona fide negotiators; anything less would be transparent and damaging to our national interests. We must always be reasonable in what we seek, realizing that superpower status does not confer superwisdom. But we must also be clear and consistent. It is important to be direct and candid and even sharply critical, for softening or minimizing our real concerns in order not to offend or inject a discordant note would undermine our interests.

The Soviet leadership, in attempting to obscure the depth of their responsibility for destroying the detente that we all hoped to achieve, continues to demand deeds rather than words. If we are to achieve understanding, it is essential that we remind them that Soviet deeds undermine stability in the world: 120,000 Soviet troops are brutalizing the innocent people of Afghanistan, the use of psychiatric hospitals to punish political dissidents, Soviet-sponsored anti-Semitism, and the Soviet persecution of Evangelical Christians, Baptists, Seventh Day Adventists, Pentecostals, and Catholics; the Soviet refusal to permit the reunification of families by restricting emigration; the Soviet harassment of Andrei Sakharov and Elena Bonner; the Soviet violation of agreements against

the use of chemical and biological weapons.

"Yes," our government must constantly assert as it negotiates. "Deeds rather than words count with us. The deeds to which we object are violations of international agreements and rules governing civilized international behavior."

It is time for our genius as a people to rise to the challenge. We can find a revitalized American consensus in support of our values and our national security. We must lift ourselves above the polarity and divisiveness that too frequently become characteristic of partisan politics. The primary task of leadership today is to rebuild the vital American political center that James Madison argued for in the *Federalist Papers*. Such a consensus will unite us in the face of our adversaries.

Forging a consensus guided by the values that distinguish us as a government and as a people will generate the strength that comes from the respect, admiration, and affection of the peoples of the world, which is ready to be expressed and channeled in our direction. It remains for us to provide the leadership.

The "correlation of forces" has moved against the Soviet Union. The credibility of its system as a viable alternative has collapsed for sensible people. The gas has practically escaped from its ideological balloon. The future lies with freedom. There can be no lasting stability in societies that deny liberty. Only freedom can release the constructive energies of men and women to work toward reaching greater heights. Human beings have the capacity to dream, to aspire, to achieve, and to do. They cannot be permanently prevented from exercising their human rights in order to attain goals for themselves and freedom for their children, thereby fulfilling their potential as human beings. That is our strength. Human rights are our strength.

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Kissinger Remarks (continued from page 1)

article she has crafted so strong a career as a diplomat. I admired the article before I knew the person. And now I admire the statesman that I have grown to like as a person. She is absolutely correct about the dilemma of American policy. We can never make up our mind whether foreign policy is a subdivision of psychiatry or a subdivision of theology. We find it very difficult to think in terms of a national interest that has to be pursued over an extended period of time and that is subject to the whims of individual leaders. We have a moralistic streak, while foreign policy forces us to act on the basis of assessments that one cannot prove when one makes them. And by the time that one can prove them, it is too late to act. We have seen in recent days an absolute orgy of media attention whether President Reagan succeeded in removing the distrust of Andrei Gromyko of American purposes. But the essence of this United States - Soviet problem is that the distrust is congenital and it cannot be removed by any one meeting. And to base policy on that assumption

defeats the very real prospects that for a variety of reasons unconnected with their personal liking of individual Americans, the Soviets seem ready to enter into negotiations.

I had the privilege of having Jeane as my tutor when I was chairman of the Central American Commission. You can believe me, ladies and gentlemen, when I admit that I don't know something about a subject: It is sincere. I found that all her judgments turned out to be correct. But the distinguishing quality of an outstanding statesman is not intelligence or analytical ability; it is courage. It is the willingness to walk alone. It is the perseverance to stick to a course in ambiguous circumstances and not take refuge in making the most favorable assumptions about the future or the most convenient explanations at any time. Jeane has all of these qualities of courage and vision, and I hope that her role in shaping our foreign policy will grow. I consider it an enormous privilege to have been given this opportunity to present an award named after a noble and a fine teacher of mine who contributed so greatly to our nation's understanding and the world's understanding of foreign policy. And as for Jeane, all I can repeat is what a German philosopher once said: "In the face of superiority, the only defense is love."

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National Committee News

The Committee is pleased to announce that the volume titled *Power and Policy in Transition: Essays Presented on the Tenth Anniversary of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy in Honor of Its Founder, Hans J. Morgenthau*, and edited by Vojtech Mastny is now available to members and friends of the Committee for the special price of \$20. The contributors of the volume, which was published for the Committee by Greenwood Press of Westport, Connecticut, and London, England, are Howard Adelson, Bernard E. Brown, Viola Herms Drath, Seymour M. Finger, John H. Herz, Rael Jean Isaac, Vojtech Mastny, Stephanie Neuman, Dankwart A. Rustow, George Schwab, David Sidorsky, G. L. Ulmen, and Kenneth W. Thompson. For further information, please telephone the office: (212) 687-9332.

The U.S. Army War College has once again requested permission to reproduce 400 copies of Caesar D. Sereseres's article titled "The Central American Policy Conundrum," which appeared in the *Newsletter* of August 1983.

On November 26 the NCAFP held a book party at the Princeton Club in honor of Professor Richard Pipes, the author of *Survival Is Not Enough*.

On October 24 the ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, Guenther van Well, addressed an NCAFP audience at the Princeton Club. Speaking on "The Two Germanys in the Context of the Western Alliance," Ambassador van Well assured the audience that notwithstand-

ing closer cooperation with East Germany, the foreign policy articulated by the Federal Republic must not be interpreted as being counterproductive to the overall policies pursued by the West vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

On October 24, 1984, the National Committee held its annual meeting at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. In the course of the evening the following were elected officers for 1985:

<i>President</i> Ambassador Francis L. Kellogg	<i>Senior Vice President</i> Joanne Cummings
<i>Honorary Chairman for Intergovernmental Relations</i> Hon. Arnold A. Saltzman	<i>Vice President</i> Joan Peters
<i>Senior Vice President Policy Issues and Publications</i> Professor George Schwab	<i>Vice President</i> William Pickens III
<i>Senior Vice President Administrative Affairs</i> Harold S. Ames	<i>Secretary</i> Ambassador Warren D. Manshel
	<i>Treasurer</i> Anthony E. Rapp

The following were elected to the executive committee for 1985:

Chairman of the Executive Committee
Ambassador Francis L. Kellogg
Honorary Director
Ambassador Angier Biddle Duke

Morris Abram, Esq.	Professor Vojtech Mastny
Floyd Abrams, Esq.	Ambassador Maxwell Rabb
Professor Howard Adelson	(on leave while serving as U.S. ambassador)
Mrs. Herbert Gussman	Dr. Candace de Russey
Frederick I. Haber	Professor David Sidorsky
Viola Herms Drath	Oliver Sterling
Gilbert Katten	Maurice Sonnenberg
Harriette Levine	Gerald Wetzler, Esq.
Professor F. H. Littell	

The following were elected to the board of directors for 1985:

Professor Gil Carl AlRoy	Helen Lange
Cleveland Amory	Hon. John Loeb, Jr.
Henry H. Arnhold	Dean John M. Lowe
Professor Kenneth J. Arrow	Winston McGuire
Saul Bellow	Robert Myers
Dr. Bruno Bettelheim	Dr. Stephanie Neuman
Professor Albert P. Blaustein	Msgr. John M. Oesterreicher
Professor Bernard E. Brown	Professor Richard Pipes
Hon. Harlan Cleveland	Professor John P. Roche
Hon. Guilford Dudley, Jr.	Dean Henry Rosovsky
Dr. A. Roy Eckhardt	Bayard Rustin
Sheldon H. Elsen, Esq.	Robert W. Sarnoff
Jeffrey Endersvelt	Professor Paul Seabury
Steven R. Fenster	Herbert Singer
Dr. J. S. Feynman	Professor S. Fred Singer
Professor Seymour M. Finger	Dr. Arnold Soloway
Lawrence P. Fraiberg	Jacob Stein
Samuel Givelber	Mrs. Alan V. Tishman
Fitzhugh Green	Terence Todman, Jr.
Professor Franz B. Gross	Professor Robert W. Tucker
Dean Edmund A. Gullion	G. L. Ulmen
Joseph Gurwin	Jay Wells
Hon. Roger Hillsman	Elie Wiesel
Hon. Ira Hirschmann	Professor Eugene P. Wigner
Dr. Rael Jean Isaac	William Woodward
Leon I. Jacobson, Esq.	<i>Acting Executive Director</i>
Eric M. Javits, Esq.	Jeffrey Kraus
Hon. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick	

Notes on Members

Viola Herms Drath's discussion of the probability of President Reagan's chances of implementing his foreign policy goals appeared in *Handelsblatt* on the day following the election. Herms Drath concluded that it is doubtful because of the fact that he is a "lame duck" leader.

Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick was awarded the *Prix politique internationale—Hachette 1984*. In her acceptance speech in Paris on October 16, Dr. Kirkpatrick lauded France as an open-society country and ascribed the strength of French democracy to the vigor of French intellectual life. She also painted a surrealist picture of the United Nations. In the case of Israel, the ambassador related, among other happenings, what transpired when Israel was accused of having poisoned 1,000 Palestinian schoolgirls. Said Kirkpatrick: "A letter was actually circulated to all members of the Security Council charging that 'without question a new phase in Israel's campaign of genocide against the Palestinian people had been launched,' and a formal meeting of the Security Council was held at which no one except the Israelis themselves suggested that the charges were on their face so implausible as to be absurd. Instead, a formal resolution was adopted, which called for an independent investigation of these 'poisonings' by the Secretary-General." The results of the investigation, which "failed to confirm the 'poisonings,'" were greeted by silence.

Professor Vojtech Mastny recently discussed the new role of East Germany in intra-German relations at the Seminar on European Society and Western Security at Harvard.

Joan Peters's celebrated study titled *From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict Over Palestine*, originally published in May 1984, is in its eighth printing.

Professor Richard Pipes is the author of *Survival Is Not Enough*, which has just been published by Simon & Schuster (see above, National Committee News).

Dr. Candace de Russey's review of *After Brezhnev: Sources of Soviet Conduct in the 1980s*, edited by Robert F. Byrnes, has just appeared in *Defense Science 2002+*. In Part 1 of a three-part review, Dr. de Russey reiterated Seweryn Bialer's concern regarding the implications that the interplay of ideology and nationalism in Soviet communist ideology will have on international politics. In quoting Bialer that this interplay "limits the scope of bilateral agreements and makes balance of power policies and long-range solutions inherently unstable," de Russey argued that because there is no evidence of movement within the USSR to bring about "difficult but salutary change(s)," one can expect "dramatically increased tension between the superpowers." The position taken that the proper response to the Soviet challenge must be for the West to coordinate more effectively its military and economic policies is rational and in accord with the national security interests of the United States.

FOR THE RECORD

On Terrorism

Galvanized by terrorist attacks directed at American and other world leaders and at American strategic interests around the world, the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) is pleased to note that the United States government has finally outlined a policy of dealing with terrorism which accords with the security interests of the country.

Anticipating further terrorist attacks, Secretary of State George P. Shultz acknowledged that our inaction in Lebanon has encouraged terrorism. Concerned that continued indecision and inaction will brand the United States the "Hamlet of nations," the secretary of state asserted that "If we truly believe in the values of our civilization, we have a duty to defend them." Open-society countries, he continued, "must have the self-confidence to tackle this menacing problem or else they will not be in much of a position to tackle other kinds of problems."

Since this country's security interests dictate that America's goal "must be to prevent and deter future terrorist acts and (because) experience has taught us . . . that one of the best deterrents to terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be taken against those who engage in it," we have no choice, said Secretary Shultz, but to "use military force," including preemptive attacks. Given the nature of terrorist warfare, Mr. Shultz aptly pointed out, "fighting terrorism will not be a clean or pleasant conflict."

In view of the fact that Secretary Shultz's proposed policy parallels NCAFP thinking, the National Committee is deeply disturbed by press reports that this politically realistic proposal is being undermined by a "senior White House official." According to the reports of comments made by this official, Mr. Shultz's "eye for an eye" policy of retaliation is rooted in the Old Testament, and since the United States is "not an Old Testament society, . . . we do not go on the basis of an eye for an eye. We've got a New Testament in this country."

Apart from the obvious dangers of injecting theological considerations into the formulation of a country's security interests, the theology that the official did inject is based on fantasy. Had this official read and understood the meaning of the oft quoted "Love your enemies" in the New Testament, especially in Matthew 5:44 and Luke 6:27, he would have discovered that "Love your enemies" reads "*diligite inimicos vestros*," ἀγαπάτε τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑμῶν, love your private enemies, not *diligite hostes vestros*, love your public foes. Had this senior White House official read and understood Matthew 10:34, where Jesus said "I came not to send peace, but a sword," he would also have discovered why in the thousand-year conflict between Christians and Moslems it never occurred to a Christian to surrender Europe out of love for the Saracens or the Turks.

The senior White House official's misunderstanding of the New Testament and the history of Christian Europe is compounded by his ignorance of the realities and logic of politics. Evidently he does not realize that his blatantly uninformed remarks constitute an invitation to terrorists around the world to strike without fear of retaliation, no matter how destructive of human lives and materiel such strikes may be. If indeed this senior White House official considers this country's security interests to converge with the interests of terrorists, namely, that our common interests would be best served by terrorists attacking America's strategic interests, then Americans really have reason to pray to God and hope that He will protect us from the consequences of the fantasies of some of His humble creations, especially from this senior official of the White House.

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From the Pen of a Political Realist

"It would be a mistake to believe that a nation could eliminate the distinction of friend and enemy by declaring its friendship for the entire world or by voluntarily disarming itself. The world will not thereby become depoliticalized, and it will not be transplanted into a condition of pure morality, pure justice, or pure economics. If a people is afraid of the trials and risks implied by existing in the sphere of politics, then another people will appear which will assume these trials by protecting it against foreign enemies and thereby taking over political rule. The protector will then decide who the enemy is by virtue of the eternal relation of protection and obedience."

Carl Schmitt

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AS READ

"HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY"

REMARKS BY
MAX M. KAMPELMAN
TO THE

NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

OCTOBER 1, 1984

WALDORF ASTORIA HOTEL
NEW YORK, NEW YORK

IT IS A PRIVILEGE TO BE PARTICIPATING TONIGHT IN THIS TRIBUTE TO AMBASSADOR JEANE KIRKPATRICK. HENRY KISSINGER'S WORDS AND SENTIMENTS SPLENDIDLY DEFINED HER DRAMATICALLY EVOLVING ROLE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE. HER COMMENTS TONIGHT CLEARLY JUSTIFY YOUR DECISION. I ADD A PERSONAL NOTE.

I KNOW JEANE AS A CHERISHED PERSONAL AND FAMILY FRIEND OF MORE THAN THIRTY YEARS. HER HUSBAND WAS MY TEACHER AND ADVISER WHEN I RECEIVED MY DOCTORATE FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA. I KNOW HER AS A WARM HUMAN BEING, AND AS A POLITICAL SCIENTIST, AUTHOR, PROFESSOR AND INTELLECT OF SIGNIFICANT DISTINCTION. WE WORKED TOGETHER IN THE CAUSE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY UNDER THE BANNER OF HUBERT HUMPHREY.

BUT AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK HAS BECOME MORE THAN THAT HUMAN BEING OF DISTINCTION AND QUALITY. SHE HAS BECOME A SYMBOL OF AMERICAN HIGH PRINCIPLES AND OF UNVARISHED STRENGTH OF DEDICATION TO AMERICAN VALUES. HAVING APPLIED THE CLARITY OF HER PERCEPTIVE MIND TO PUBLIC SERVICE, SHE HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT THE TEST OF NOBILITY IN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

IS HONESTY AND DIRECTNESS OF SPEECH, CLARITY OF THOUGHT AND POSITION, AND A STUBBORN DETERMINATION TO CHAMPION THE CAUSE OF LIBERTY. I AM HONORED THAT YOU HAVE INVITED ME TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS TRIBUTE TO HER.

IN THE SPRING OF LAST YEAR, WHILE PHYSICALLY STILL ABLE TO FUNCTION, SOVIET LEADER YURI ANDROPOV, IN ADDRESSING HIS COMMUNIST PARTY CADRES, URGED THEM TO REMEMBER THAT THERE WAS A VITAL BATTLE UNDERWAY "FOR THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF BILLIONS OF PEOPLE ON THIS PLANET." WE, TOO, MUST NEVER FORGET THAT REALITY. IT IS ALSO A PART OF THAT REALITY THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS TODAY THE MAJOR THREAT TO OUR SECURITY AND VALUES -- AN AGGRESSIVE SOCIETY SEEKING, WITH ITS MASSIVE MILITARY AND POLICE POWER, TO EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE; AND A REPRESSIVE SOCIETY DETERMINED TO DEFEND ITS TOTALITARIAN POWER, WHATEVER THE HUMAN COST.

IT IS NOT USEFUL TO DENY THIS REALITY. THE TASK IS, RATHER, HOW CONSTRUCTIVELY TO FACE IT. I SUSPECT THAT WE AND OUR FRIENDS WHO VALUE FREEDOM WILL PAY A HEAVY PRICE AND SUFFER GREAT ANGUISH AS WE COME TO GRIPS WITH THIS HARD FACT AND SEEK TO DO SO CONSTRUCTIVELY. THE INTEGRITY AND STRENGTH OF OUR SOCIETY AND OF OUR PEOPLE WILL UNDERGO PERHAPS THE MOST SERIOUS CHALLENGE OF OUR HISTORY AS WE LEARN HOW TO LIVE WITH SOVIET MILITARY POWER, MEET IT, CHALLENGE IT, AND SIMULTANEOUSLY STRIVE TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE WITH LIBERTY THAT WE SEEK.

THE OBJECT OF DIPLOMACY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY IS TO PRESERVE PEACE AT THE SAME TIME AS IT PROTECTS AND PURSUES VITAL NATIONAL VALUES AND INTERESTS. THIS IS THE SUPREME CHALLENGE TO STATESMANSHIP. IN OUR NUCLEAR AGE, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE WORDS IS OVERWHELMING.

HISTORY HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT DIPLOMACY CAN FAIL AND FREQUENTLY HAS FAILED. THE PRICE OF THAT FAILURE IN THE PAST HAS TOO OFTEN BEEN A LOSS OF HUMAN LIFE, THE DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY, AND THE EROSION OF HUMAN VALUES. BUT THAT PRICE, TRAGIC AS IT WAS, DID NOT INCLUDE THE DIRECT THREAT TO OUR CIVILIZATION, AND PERHAPS TO OUR PLANET, COSTS THAT COULD WELL BE EXACTED FOR THE FAILURES OF DIPLOMACY TODAY AND TOMORROW. AND YET TODAY, DIPLOMACY IS WEAKER IN THE RESOURCES THAT IT CAN COMMAND TO MEET ITS AWESOME RESPONSIBILITIES. IT IS UNDERMINED BY SKEPTICISM ON THE PART OF THE BODY POLITIC; AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, BY THE THREAT OF INTERNAL DIVISIVENESS AS PARTISANSHIP AND ITS TEMPTATIONS LEAD TO EXCESSES IN LANGUAGE AND IN POLICY CONCEPTIONS.

WE STILL LOOK UPON OURSELVES AS A YOUNG AND DEVELOPING NATION, EVEN THOUGH WE ARE NOW ONE OF THE OLDEST, STABLE SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD. WE DID NOT SEEK THE ROLE OF WORLD LEADERSHIP, AND OUR PEOPLE TODAY STILL TEND TO SHY AWAY FROM IT. AT THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, OUR RELATIVE GEOGRAPHIC ISOLATION, OUR DEMOCRACY, OUR BOUNTIFUL NATURAL

RESOURCES, AND OUR PRODUCTIVE PEOPLE MADE US STRONG. WE WERE SOMEWHAT LIKE A YOUNG GIANT AMONG NATIONS AND BEING A GIANT IS NOT EASY. IT IS NOT EASY LIVING WITH A GIANT AND OUR FRIENDS ARE AWARE OF THAT. IT IS HARD TO FIND SHOES TO FIT IF YOU ARE A GIANT; AND THE BED IS ALWAYS TOO SHORT. BEING STRONG, THE GIANT CAN AFFORD TO BE GENTLE, BUT HE IS ALSO, AT TIMES, AWKWARD. HIS GOOD INTENTIONS ARE NOT ALWAYS SO INTERPRETED BY OTHERS.

WE MAKE MISTAKES BECAUSE WE ARE UNACCUSTOMED TO AND HESITANT ABOUT THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF LEADERSHIP. AS A RESULT, OUR BEHAVIOR IS AT TIMES ONE OF FITS AND STARTS THAT FREQUENTLY BEDEVIL OUR FOREIGN POLICY AND CONFUSE BOTH FRIENDS AND FOE.

WE LOOK UPON OURSELVES AS A NATION COMMITTED TO THE VALUES OF LIBERTY. SOME OF OUR MORE SOPHISTICATED FRIENDS, MODERN-DAY METTERNICHs, SEE THIS LINKAGE OF VALUES WITH WORLD REAL-POLITIK AS A FORM OF NAIVETE. BUT LIBERTY TO US IS NOT AN ABSTRACT VALUE. WE ALSO KNOW IT IS NOT ABSTRACT TO THOSE UNABLE TO ENJOY IT. THESE VALUES, IN FACT, DISTINGUISH US FROM THE TOTALITARIANS AND AUTHORITARIANS OF THE WORLD.

BUT LET US EXPLORE FOR A MOMENT WHETHER OUR "RIGHTS OF MAN" VALUES, WHICH WE LOOK UPON AS A SOURCE OF OUR STRENGTH, MAY NOT COMPLICATE OUR PURSUIT OF PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF INJECTING MORALITY CONSIDERATIONS INTO AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY? IS THERE NOT A

TENSION CREATED WHEN WE ENGAGE IN MORAL CONDEMNATION OF TOTALITARIAN SOCIETIES AND THEN UNDERTAKE TO NEGOTIATE TOWARD UNDERSTANDING WITH THOSE WE CONDEMN?

THE CHARGE HAS BEEN HEARD THAT RAISING HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IS A FORM OF "CONFRONTATION" WHICH RUNS CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT NECESSARY FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATION. I RESPECTFULLY SUGGEST THAT NEGOTIATION WITHOUT CONFRONTATION, WHERE THE OBJECTIVE FACTS REQUIRE BLUNT TALK, IS NOT A SERIOUS NEGOTIATION AT ALL. IT IS A CHARADE. A PURPOSE OF NEGOTIATION IS OBVIOUSLY TO REACH AGREEMENT. WHERE DIFFICULT ISSUES ARE INVOLVED, HOWEVER, THAT AGREEMENT MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE IN THE SHORT RUN. THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS MUST, THEREFORE, BE USED TO ILLUMINATE THE DIFFERENCES, LESSEN THE AMBIGUITY AND, IN TIME, POSSIBLY LEAD TO LATER AGREEMENT. ABSENT THIS CLARITY, THERE IS NO REASON FOR THE OTHER SIDE TO TAKE SERIOUSLY THE DEPTH OF OUR CONCERNS.

THE ALTERNATIVE, FURTHERMORE, IS SILENCE. BUT CAN WE BE SILENT WHEN SILENCE, IN EFFECT, BECOMES ACQUIESCENCE AND EVEN COMPLICITY? AND IF SILENCE IS MORALLY UNACCEPTABLE, IS VERBAL CONDEMNATION ADEQUATE WHEN WE KNOW IT IS LIKELY TO BE INEFFECTIVE? IS "ACTION" BY US THEN CALLED FOR? IF SO, WHAT KIND? DO WE HAVE THE MORAL RIGHT TO ENCOURAGE PEOPLE WHO LIVE UNDER REPRESSIVE REGIMES TO SEEK TO CHANGE THEIR CONDITIONS? IS IT POSSIBLE WE HAVE THE MORAL DUTY TO HELP THEM

CHANGE THEIR CONDITIONS WHEN THEY ASK FOR HELP? IS INTERVENTION EVER CALLED FOR? IF SO, WHAT KIND? OR DOES THIS DEPEND ON WHETHER THE INTERVENTION WILL WORK AND AT WHAT COST?

I AM AWARE OF THE ASSERTION THAT THE BEST WAY TO HELP THOSE WHO ARE VICTIMS OF AUTHORITARIAN OR TOTALITARIAN REGIMES IS TO SET A FINE EXAMPLE. I SUSPECT THIS AVOIDS THE ISSUE. THE EXAMPLE WE SET, NO MATTER HOW NOBLE, WILL DO LITTLE TO ALLEVIATE THE CONDITION OF THOSE VICTIMIZED BY REPRESSION. WE SHOULD ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT EVEN SETTING AN EXAMPLE CAN PRODUCE INTERNATIONAL TENSION. THE GOOD EXAMPLE SET BY WEST GERMANY ONLY LED TO A WALL OF CONCRETE AND FIRE AROUND COMMUNIST GERMANY. THE EXISTENCE OF A GOOD EXAMPLE IS, IN EFFECT, A THREAT IN THE EYES OF THOSE WHO CONTROL REPRESSIVE REGIMES. THAT THREAT, IN TURN, PRODUCES FEARS AND FREQUENTLY LEADS TO INCREASED REPRESSION AND MORE POLICE AND ARMED FORCE. THE EXAMPLE SET BY FREE SOCIETIES MAY WELL BE PERCEIVED BY TOTALITARIAN LEADERS AS SUBVERSIVE OF THEIR AUTHORITY.

THE PEOPLES OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHO COMPRISE HUNDREDS OF DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES, SHARE THE SAME VALUES OF HUMAN DIGNITY THAT WE PROCLAIM. THEY ARE AS DEDICATED TO THE ELIMINATION OF WAR AS ANY OTHER PEOPLES. THEY HAVE NO WISH TO BE ISOLATED FROM THEIR NEIGHBORS AND FROM THE FORWARD MOVEMENT OF CIVILIZATION. BUT THIS CREATES AN INSECURITY ON

THE PART OF THEIR AUTHORITIES, WHO THEN GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO RESTRAIN, PUNISH, FENCE IN THEIR CITIZENS.

THERE IS A RELATED SET OF QUESTIONS. ARE WE CONSISTENT WITH OUR VALUES IF WE HAVE AND SUPPORT ALLIES WHO DO NOT SHARE THEM? OUR FOUNDING FATHERS ACCEPTED AN ALLIANCE WITH A FRANCE GOVERNED BY A TYRANNICAL MONARCH, AT THE SAME TIME AS WE FORCEFULLY EXPRESSED OUR DETESTATION OF ABSOLUTE MONARCHIES. DURING WORLD WAR II WE ENTERED INTO AN ALLIANCE WITH STALIN, WHOM HISTORY WILL RECORD AS PERHAPS THE MOST BRUTAL HUMAN BUTCHER OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, CERTAINLY A CLOSE COMPETITOR WITH HITLER FOR THAT TITLE.

MUST WE BE CONSISTENT? SOME WOULD HAVE US SEEK TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS WITH CASTRO'S CUBA, INCREASE OUR TRADE WITH TOTALITARIAN SOVIET UNION, AND ALSO APPLY SANCTIONS AGAINST RACIST SOUTH AFRICA.

I RAISE THESE QUESTIONS NOT TO UNDERMINE THE LEGITIMACY OF INJECTING MORALITY INTO OUR FOREIGN POLICY. MORALITY MUST BE A MAJOR COMPONENT OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. IT MAY WELL BE AN INDISPENSABLE INGREDIENT FOR THE DOMESTIC CONSENSUS THAT IS REQUIRED IF ANY FOREIGN POLICY IN A DEMOCRACY IS TO BE EFFECTIVE. BUT STRATEGIC SELF INTEREST MUST ALSO BE A MAJOR CONSIDERATION OF AN EFFECTIVE AND DESIRABLE FOREIGN POLICY.

THUS, THE DILEMMA AND THE OPPORTUNITY. THERE ARE SOME WHO MAY RESPOND TO THE DANGER TO US REPRESENTED BY SOVIET MILITARY POWER AND THEOLOGY BY IGNORING OR MINIMIZING ITS EXISTENCE. THAT WOULD BE FATAL FOR US. THERE ARE OTHERS WHO ARE SO OVERWHELMED BY THE DIFFICULTIES AS TO PLACE ALL OF THEIR TRUST IN MILITARY POWER AND ITS USE ALONE. THAT VIEW CARRIES WITH IT THE SEEDS OF TRAGEDY AS WELL.

WE DARE NOT AND CANNOT BLOW THE SOVIET UNION AWAY. WE CANNOT WISH IT AWAY. IT IS HERE AND IT IS MILITARILY POWERFUL. WE SHARE THE SAME GLOBE. WE MUST TRY TO FIND A MEANS UNDER WHICH WE CAN LIVE TOGETHER IN DIGNITY.

THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT LIKELY SOON TO UNDERGO WHAT JONATHAN EDWARDS CALLED "A GREAT AWAKENING," OR SEE A BLINDING LIGHT ON THE ROAD TO DAMASCUS. YET, THE IMPERATIVES FOR SURVIVAL IN THE NUCLEAR AGE REQUIRE US TO PERSIST -- THROUGH THE DETERRENCE THAT COMES FROM CREDIBLE MILITARY STRENGTH, THROUGH CRITICAL DIALOGUE, THROUGH NEGOTIATION -- TO PERSIST IN THE SEARCH FOR UNDERSTANDING, AGREEMENT, PEACE.

WE HOPE THE TIME WILL SOON COME WHEN SOVIET AUTHORITIES COMPREHEND THAT REPRESSIVE SOCIETIES IN OUR DAY CANNOT ACHIEVE INNER STABILITY OR SECURITY. WE HOPE THEY WILL COME TO FEEL THE NEED TO SHOW THE REST OF US THAT CRUELTY IS NOT AN INDISPENSABLE PART OF THEIR SYSTEM AND IS, INDEED, THOROUGHLY COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO THEIR INTERESTS. JUST AS THE LENINIST

AIM OF ACHIEVING WORLD COMMUNISM THROUGH VIOLENCE IS AN ANACHRONISM IN THIS NUCLEAR AGE, SO MUST IT BE UNDERSTOOD BY AN EVOLVING SOVIET LEADERSHIP THAT IN THE LONG RUN IT CANNOT SURVIVE WITHOUT HUMANIZING ITS CONTROLS. INCLUDED IN OUR MESSAGE MUST ALSO BE THE UNDERSTANDING THAT NEW OPPORTUNITIES EXIST FOR COOPERATION WITH US ON ALL LEVELS IF MOSCOW WILL LIVE UP TO ITS INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES SO CLEARLY DELINEATED IN THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, AND IN THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT, ALL OF WHOSE WORDS THEY ACCEPTED.

WE HOPE, BUT IF WE ARE TO BE PRUDENT, WE CANNOT TRUST. WE MUST NEGOTIATE; AND NEGOTIATING MEANS MORE THAN TALKING. IT MEANS LISTENING AS WELL. WE MUST ALSO BE POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY, SOCIALLY AND MILITARILY STRONG. THE SOVIET UNION RESPECTS MILITARY POWER. ITS INCENTIVE FOR NEGOTIATING AN AGREEMENT IS GREATER WHEN THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY ITS NEGOTIATING ADVERSARY HAVE THE ADDED DIGNITY OF BEING SUPPORTED BY MILITARY STRENGTH.

BUT, WE MUST UNDERSTAND THAT DIPLOMACY IN A DEMOCRACY REQUIRES PUBLIC SUPPORT, PARTICULARLY WHERE THE USE OF FORCE IS AN OPTION. WE ARE ENTERING A PERIOD IN WHICH THIS PUBLIC SUPPORT MAY WELL BE THE ULTIMATE DETERMINANT IN WHETHER WE ARE ABLE TO ACHIEVE THE PEACE WITH DIGNITY THAT WE SEEK. NO DEMOCRACY CAN ACHIEVE THE BROAD DOMESTIC CONSENSUS REQUIRED

FOR ITS FOREIGN POLICY TO PROCEED UNLESS THAT POLICY IS GROUNDED IN MORAL PRINCIPLES AS WELL AS VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS. THAT IS CERTAINLY TRUE OF OURS.

THE PROBLEMS THAT DIVIDE US ARE REAL, SERIOUS AND NUMEROUS. WE TRUST OUR NEGOTIATING EFFORTS WILL PRODUCE RESULTS. BY THE NATURE OF THINGS, HOWEVER, WE MUST APPRECIATE THAT EVEN WITH AGREEMENT WE WILL STILL BE NEARER TO THE BEGINNING THAN TO THE END OF OUR PURSUIT OF PEACE. WE NEED PATIENCE.

PATIENCE IS INDISPENSABLE. WE MUST BE PREPARED TO REMAIN IN ANY NEGOTIATION WITH THE SOVIETS FOR ONE DAY LONGER THAN THEY. WE MUST BE BONA FIDE NEGOTIATORS IN GOOD FAITH; ANYTHING LESS IS TRANSPARENT AND DAMAGING TO OUR POLITICAL INTEREST. WE MUST ALWAYS BE REASONABLE AND ALSO APPEAR TO BE REASONABLE IN WHAT WE SEEK. WE SHOULD APPRECIATE THAT SUPERPOWER STATUS DOES NOT ALWAYS BRING WITH IT SUPER WISDOM. BUT WE MUST BE CLEAR, UNAMBIGUOUS, CONSISTENT. IT IS MORE IMPORTANT TO BE DIRECT AND CANDID AND EVEN SHARPLY CRITICAL WHEN CALLED FOR. IT IS RISKY TO SOFTEN OR MINIMIZE OUR REAL CONCERNS SO AS NOT TO OFFEND OR INJECT A DISCORDANT NOTE.

SOVIET LEADERSHIP, ATTEMPTING TO OBSCURE THE DEPTH OF THEIR OWN RESPONSIBILITY FOR DESTROYING THE "DETENTE" WE ALL HOPED TO ACHIEVE, LOUDLY CALLS ON US FOR DEEDS RATHER THAN

WORDS. IT IS ESSENTIAL, IF WE ARE EVER TO ACHIEVE UNDERSTANDING, THAT WE REMIND THEM IT IS SOVIET DEEDS THAT UNDERMINE STABILITY IN THE WORLD: 120,000 SOVIET INVADING TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN BRUTALIZING AN INNOCENT PEOPLE; SOVIET USE OF PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS AS A FORM OF POLITICAL PUNISHMENT; SOVIET-SPONSORED ANTI-SEMITISM; SOVIET PERSECUTION OF EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANS, BAPTISTS, SEVENTH DAY ADVENTISTS, PENTECOSTALS, CATHOLICS; SOVIET REFUSAL TO PERMIT THE REUNIFICATION OF FAMILIES BY CRUELLY RESTRICTING EMIGRATION; SOVIET HARRASSMENT OF ANDREI SAKHAROV AND ELENA BONNER; SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF AGREEMENTS AGAINST THE USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.

"YES," OUR GOVERNMENT MUST CONSTANTLY ASSERT AS WE NEGOTIATE, "IT IS DEEDS RATHER THAN WORDS THAT COUNT WITH US." THE DEEDS TO WHICH WE OBJECT ARE DEEDS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND AGREED UPON RULES FOR CIVILIZED INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR.

IT IS TIME FOR OUR GENIUS AS A PEOPLE TO RISE TO THE CHALLENGE. WE CAN FIND A REVITALIZED AMERICAN CONSENSUS IN SUPPORT OF OUR VALUES AND OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. WE MUST LIFT OURSELVES ABOVE THE POLARITY AND DIVISIVENESS THAT TOO FREQUENTLY BECOMES A CHARACTERISTIC OF PARTISAN POLITICS. THE PRIMARY TASK OF LEADERSHIP TODAY IS TO REBUILD THE VITAL AMERICAN POLITICAL CENTER WHICH JAMES MADISON ARGUED FOR IN THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND WHICH HAS KEPT US UNITED IN THE FACE OF OUR ADVERSARIES.

AS WE DO SO, GUIDED BY THE VALUES THAT UNITE US AS A GOVERNMENT AND AS A PEOPLE, WE WILL HAVE THE ADDED STRENGTH THAT COMES FROM THE RESPECT, ADMIRATION AND AFFECTION OF THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD. THAT STRENGTH IS THERE READY TO BE EXPRESSED AND WARMLY CHANNELLED IN OUR DIRECTION. IT REMAINS FOR US TO PROVIDE THE LEADERSHIP.

THE "CORRELATION OF FORCES" HAS MOVED AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. THE CREDIBILITY OF ITS SYSTEM AS A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE HAS COLLAPSED FOR SENSIBLE PEOPLE. THE GAS HAS LARGELY ESCAPED FROM ITS IDEOLOGICAL BALLOON. THE FUTURE LIES WITH FREEDOM. THERE CAN BE NO LASTING STABILITY IN SOCIETIES THAT WOULD DENY LIBERTY. ONLY FREEDOM CAN RELEASE THE CONSTRUCTIVE ENERGIES OF MEN AND WOMEN TO WORK TOWARD REACHING NEW HEIGHTS. A HUMAN BEING HAS THE CAPACITY TO ASPIRE, TO ACHIEVE, TO DREAM, AND TO DO. HE CANNOT BE PERMANENTLY PREVENTED FROM STRETCHING HIS MUSCLES TO EXERCISE HIS HUMAN RIGHT TO ATTAIN AMBITIONS FOR HIMSELF AND HIS CHILDREN AND THEREBY FULFILL HIS EVOLUTIONARY DESTINY. THAT IS OUR STRENGTH. HUMAN RIGHTS IS OUR STRENGTH.

THANK YOU.

9/20/84

REMARKS BY MAX M. KAMPELMAN
WORLD CONFERENCE ON SOVIET JEWRY

LONDON, ENGLAND

September 20, 1984

Thank you very much for the opportunity to address you today and for the opportunity to identify myself once again with your noble objectives. I will be guided by the advice given by the Shamos to the new rabbi of his synagogue: "We do not have time limits on our sermons," he said, "but we feel very few souls are ever saved after the first 20 minutes."

The issue of Soviet Jewry cannot, I believe, be considered or discussed as separate from the total framework of international relations, particularly East-West relations. This is not to say that Jewish emigration must always be a symptom of that broader condition. I can conceive of a situation where its improvement may well be a signal rather than a symptom, a condition that would be much more significant. But the inter-relationship is real. The Soviet Union would far prefer to develop a "detente" with the West which does not call for it to link its behavior in any way to that harmony, but this would be shortsighted and counter-productive to Western values and interests.

These are dangerous times. They will require our inner strength, understanding and faith. I pray that our generation has the necessary strength, understanding, faith, leadership,

energy, and intelligence to fulfill the demands upon us in the years ahead as we search for peace and human dignity.

In the final months of his life, while he was still functioning, Yuri Andropov, in addressing his Communist Party cadres, urged them to remember that there was a vital battle underway "for the hearts and minds of billions of people on this planet." Madrid, where I had the honor to represent the United States at a 35 state conference on European security and cooperation for three years, was a serious battlefield in that struggle. We were able in that forum, working with a united West, to demonstrate that Soviet violations of the Helsinki standards were threatening the peace and stability of Europe.

Standards were established by the Helsinki accords, humanitarian ones as well as military, political and economic ones. These were designed to achieve responsible, civilized international behavior. But we came to Madrid in 1980 aware that there was no "detente." The Soviet Union had acted, particularly in the humanitarian area and with the invasion of Afghanistan, as if it had never signed the 1975 agreement.

The West could have ignored that irresponsible Soviet behavior pattern in the interest of avoiding tension. We chose not to do so. We also chose to ignore the advice to boycott Madrid as a means of demonstrating our deep dissatisfaction

with Soviet behavior. Instead, we appeared, we talked, we negotiated, we argued, we dined, we argued some more. We did so because we were persuaded that dialogue was important. But we did so on the assumption that dialogue is meaningless unless it is frank, precise, and candid.

We and our Western friends, therefore, talked about the brutal presence of 110,000 troops in Afghanistan. We protested the imposition of martial law in Poland. We described in painful detail the abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union through the use of psychiatric hospitals as a form of political punishment. We demonstrated that Soviet anti-Semitism was rampant and government-sponsored. We protested the curtailment of emigration. We described the totalitarian nature of the Soviet system as cruel. And we emphasized that if the world was to reach the goal of peace with liberty that the peoples of the world so fervently pray for, it is necessary for the unanimously agreed upon Helsinki standards to be taken seriously and lived up to.

We bolstered that appeal by explaining to Soviet authorities, privately and at our official sessions, that no Soviet promise in any area could be believed, including that of arms control, if they reserved the right to decide which of the agreements they sign they are prepared to respect.

In spite of this candid and direct talk, in spite of the verbal confrontation which permeated the Madrid meeting -- or perhaps because of it -- we were able to come to an agreement in Madrid whose words strengthened the standards of Helsinki. Words are clearly not enough where they are blatantly contradicted by behavior, but words are important. Like religious standards, which are also sinned against, so are political principles indispensable in their own right in defining standards toward which to aspire and by which to judge.

During the year since the end of the Madrid meetings, I frequently have been led to ponder what prospects exist for East-West understanding. No question is more important.

The question has been raised by some experts as to whether confrontation is consistent with serious negotiations. Our side has not always been clear on this question. When the American Delegation, at Belgrade in 1977, under the leadership of our illustrious, Arthur Goldberg, mentioned the names of six victims of Soviet repression, there was great concern as to the propriety and desirability of such an approach. In Madrid, very much flowing from Justice Goldberg's pioneering and heroic efforts, the United States was not alone. We were among 14 states to mention the names of dissidents; and a total of 131 victims of repression were mentioned at our meetings. The first state to mention the name of a victim was Sweden, which mentioned Raoul Wallenberg. The first state to highlight Soviet anti-semitism was Belgium.

Negotiation without confrontation, where the objective facts require blunt talk, is not a serious negotiation at all; it is a charade. A purpose of negotiation is obviously to reach agreement. Where difficult issues are involved, however, that agreement may not be possible in the short run. Equally important, therefore, the negotiating process must be used to communicate concerns where they exist, so as to increase the likelihood of agreement in the future. Absent firmness, there is no reason for the other side to take seriously the message we are attempting to convey.

Let me also now say after an adult lifetime of studying and teaching Communist theory and practice, and after three years of negotiating with a high-level Soviet delegation, and after more than 350 hours of personal meetings and negotiations with the leadership of that delegation outside of the meeting halls -- I am convinced that no successful negotiation with the Soviet leadership is possible without decisive military power.

This is not an easy lesson for us to accept. Some equate their dedication to peace with a pacifist philosophy. For some, our commendable yearning for peace brings with it a reluctance to accept unpleasant facts which make the attainment of that goal more difficult. Since we also know that the peoples of the Soviet Union desire peace just as much as we do, it is easy to be absorbed by that realization at the expense of the equal reality that it is the Bolshevik party elite

which we face and not the peoples of the Soviet Union, whom that elite rules over without the legitimacy of consent.

Furthermore, it is an elite committed to an ideology in which violence plays a central role. Lenin wrote (The Proletarian Revolution):

"The revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is rule won and maintained by the use of violence by the proletariat . . . rule that is unrestricted by any laws."

This violence, says Lenin, is not only to be used against the "bourgeoise," but also against the "centrists" and the "defenders of democracy" whom he accused of "collaboration" with the "bourgeoise."

And Pravda, in 1968 (September 26) shortly after the Soviet invasion, stated that "Laws and the norms of law are subordinated to the laws of the class struggle and the laws of social development . . . The class approach to the matter cannot be discarded in the name of legalistic considerations."

This application of totalitarian principles to international law accords to the Soviet Union absolute rights but no obligations to respect the rights of others, while it accords to all other states no rights at all but an absolute obligation to respect the rights of the Soviet Union. This violence and lawlessness represents a direct threat to world peace. These principles,

so damaging to our civilization, are serious barriers to understanding and stability.

This leads me to digress into an area in which I am much less competent than many of you, the area of our religious beliefs.

The ancient Hebrew sages told us that there is in each one of us that in the heart and soul which is good and noble and Godlike; and that there is also in each one of us that which is evil -- "yaitzer hatov" and "yaitzer hara." The great Protestant theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, called it "Children of Light and Children of Darkness." Freud and modern psychology built on this truth. This dichotomy is not only a part of the human being, it is also a part of the societies which the human being creates.

The responsibility of those who would contribute to the onward evolutionary development of the human being is to defend and extend that which is Godlike in us as we strive to overwhelm those primitive and negative instincts that are within us as well.

Democracy is the political expression of the "yaitzer hatov" within us. It is based on the religious notion of human brotherhood. This, after all, is the great contribution made by the ancient Hebrew tribes who, challenging the belief of their day, proclaimed there is only one God. If there is

only one God, then we are all of us His children and thus brothers and sisters to one another. Here is the root of our political democracy, of our system of jurisprudence.

But there is also a "yaitzer hara" in us and in the societies that we are capable of creating. Totalitarianism is an expression of that destructive drive. This explains the Nazi phenomenon. To all of us familiar with the brutalities of the Soviet system, its repression and its aggression, it explains that aspect of the Communist phenomenon as well.

The failure of an earlier generation timely to recognize the Hitler threat to peace and to our values led to a tragic war. Our task today is to avoid that error of avoidance and misperception. Our task is face reality intelligently, consistently and courageously. Our military strength is necessary to deter and discourage irresponsible use of force. It is also to give us the time for dialogue and determination as we seek ways to persuade the Soviet system to humanize itself in its own interest. Peace depends on the success of those undertakings.

The leadership of the Soviet Union is serious. Its diplomats are serious and well-trained. Their response in a negotiation is motivated by one primary consideration: their perceived national self-interest.

The totalitarian cause would be a lost one, considering the added burden of economic and social failure, were it not for the belief that the West is divided, lazy, comfortable, and increasingly pacifist. The Soviets have doubted the will of the West to resist the intimidating power of its military bluster. Soviet submarines enter Swedish waters to warn and scare as well as gain intelligence. They train and finance terrorists all over the world to destabilize the rest of us. The apparent deep involvement of the Bulgarian secret police in the attempted assassination of the Pope, which would not have been possible without KGB complicity, is an illustration of that criminal irresponsibility.

I suspect that we and our friends who value freedom will pay a heavy price and suffer great anguish as we come to grips with this challenge. The integrity and character and strength of our society and of our people will undergo the greatest challenge of our history as we learn how to live with Soviet military power, meet it, challenge it, and simultaneously strive to maintain peace and freedom.

Soviet insecurity and fear, coupled with its aggressive and hostile ideology, present us with a dilemma, danger, and opportunity. There are some who may respond to the threat to us represented by Soviet military power and theology by ignoring or denying its importance. That would be fatal for us. There

are others who are so overwhelmed by the difficulties as to place all of their trust in military power and its use alone. That view can be fatal to us as well.

We dare not and cannot blow the Soviet Union away. We cannot wish it away. It is here and it is militarily powerful. We share the same globe. We must try to find a formula under which we can live together in dignity.

The Soviet Union is not likely soon to undergo what Jonathan Edwards called "a great awakening". Yet, the imperatives for survival in the nuclear age require us to persist -- through the deterrence that comes from military strength, through dialogue, through criticism, through negotiation -- to persist in the search for understanding and peace.

Our objectives are clear. How to realize them is less so. How do we persuade Soviet authorities, who have a stake in stability, to comprehend that repressive societies in our day cannot achieve inner stability? Will they come to understand the need to demonstrate that cruelty is not an indispensable part of their system? Are they capable of understanding that the Leninist aim of achieving world Communism has no relevance in this nuclear age? Dare we hope that evolving Soviet leadership will in the long run see that it cannot survive without humanizing its controls and its image in the world?

Included in our message must be the promise that new opportunities for cooperation with us on all levels can open widely if Moscow will live up to its international responsibilities so clearly delineated in the Helsinki Final Act and in the Madrid Concluding Document, whose words they accepted. What we made clear to the Soviets in Madrid, and what I trust they are pondering, is that just as their deeds undermined our confidence in their intentions, so must their deeds, and not just their words, begin to restore that confidence.

Today, the prospects for understanding seem remote. Soviet leadership, ridden by illness, appears uncertain and disorganized. Threats, coupled with infrequent smiles, are traditional techniques of Soviet power plays. Repression continues. An intensive crackdown on Jewish activists and other dissidents is underway. I just returned last night from the USSR and that is evident. There is evidence of a major drive for greater ideological conformity and vigilance.

In a letter smuggled to the West from his exile in Gorky, where his own life and that of his wife Ilene Bonner remain in jeopardy, Andrei Sakharov warned that "the world is facing very difficult times and cruel cataclysms if the West and the developing countries trying to find their place in the world do not now show the required firmness, unity and consistency in resisting the totalitarian challenge. . . It is important,"

he wrote, "that the common danger be fully understood -- everything else will then fall into place." With this kind of understanding, free societies will be able to survive the multiple assaults of totalitarianism and establish the conditions for genuine peace.

The peace we seek, indeed the peace we require in this nuclear age, is a stable peace. It is the peace inherent in the Hebrew word "Sholom," which means more than the temporary absence of war. "Sholom" means rather the making whole. It conveys a peace which encompasses the totality of relationships. We do not seek the peace of a Munich, or of the graveyard.

In recent weeks, a group of American Congressmen nominated Anatoly Scharansky for the 1984 Nobel Peace Prize. His courageous, public and peaceful battle for the human rights principles of the Helsinki Final Act for which he was sentenced to prison by the Soviet authorities, was listed as his eminent qualification for that Prize.

The true peacemakers of this world are those who stand up openly and honestly against totalitarian cruelty and aggression. It is the Scharanskys and the Sakharovs of this world toward whom we must look if we are to move the human being forward in his stretching toward attaining more God-like dimensions. It is these men of conviction ready to fight

against tyranny and for human dignity who are the true peacemakers of this world. Let us join them so that they are not alone. Our values, our security, our lives, our civilization depend on it.

Thank you.

London SPEECH FILE

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9/19 - 20

August 8, 1984

Mr. Arye L. Dulzin
Chairman
World Zionist Organization
P.O.B. 92
Jerusalem 91920
ISRAEL

Dear Mr. Dulzin:

Mr. Kampelman is out of the city but has asked me to write to you in his absence to give you his tentative schedule for the World Conference on Soviet Jewry to be held in London on September 19th and 20th.

As Mr. Kampelman indicated to you in his letter of July 26, he has other commitments in Europe during that period. We have arranged his schedule, however, so that he will arrive in London on Thursday, September 20th, on Lufthansa Flight 30 at 9:10 a.m. He would then be available to attend the Conference that day.

I hope this information will help you in planning the Conference.

Sincerely,

Nancy C. Tackett
Secretary to Max M. Kampelman

9/19-20

July 26, 1984

Mr. Arye L. Dulzin
Chairman
World Zionist Organization
P.O.B. 92
Jerusalem 91920
ISRAEL

Dear Arye:

Thank you very much for your most gracious invitation of July 6. I would like to attend the September 19 and 20 session of the International Council of the World Conference on Soviet Jewry in London and I do appreciate your invitation that I speak on that occasion. There remains one problem before I commit myself which relates to some other engagements in Europe during that period. I believe I can rearrange matters so as to clear my calendar satisfactorily.

All my best.

Sincerely,

Max M. Kampelman

MMK:nct



WORLD ZIONIST ORGANIZATION

July 6, 1984

Arye L. Dulzin,
Chairman of the Executive

Mr. Max Kampelman,
U.S. Government Representative for
Helsinki Negotiations in Madrid,
Washington D.C.
U. S. A.

Dear Mr. Kampelman:

On September 19th and 20th the International Council (formerly the Presidium) of the World Conference on Soviet Jewry will be meeting in London.

This will be a critical meeting because of the freeze in East/West relations, which has a direct bearing on the conditions of Jews in the Soviet Union, and because of the domestic situation in the Soviet Union at the present time.

As you are well aware, emigration of Jews is at an all-time low and has come to a virtual stop. At the same time, the harassment of Jews who desire to leave and who are engaged in Jewish cultural activities continues and is intensifying. Soviet Jewry is being cut off from the world. Communication with them is becoming more difficult from day to day, as are attempts to reach them. The latest outrage against former President Professor Katzir is a case in point.


In London we will examine the situation thoroughly and we will be looking for new ways in our struggle.

As Chairman of the World Conference, I am writing to invite you to attend and to address our meeting. We would like to have the benefit of your thinking and of your analysis as you see it from your special vantage point on the international scene, as well as your experience in dealing with human rights.

Please let me know at your earliest convenience whether you can accept my invitation.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely yours,


Arye L. Dulzin,
Chairman

cc: Prof. Yehuda Lapidot, Foreign Office.
Dr. Shlomo Tadmor, Director General, The Jewish Agency.

10/1

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JEFFREY KRAUS

September 13, 1984

Max M. Kampelman, Esq.
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver
and Kampelman
Suite 1000
600 New Hampshire Ave, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20037

Dear Mr. Kampelman:

This is to remind you that the fourth Hans J. Morgenthau Award will be presented to Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick on Monday, October 1st at the Waldorf Astoria. This black tie event will begin with cocktails at 7:30 P.M. in the Palm Room on the fourth floor of the Waldorf, followed by dinner at 8:30 P.M. The tickets for you and Mrs. Kampelman will be mailed in two weeks.

As the program is taking shape, the committee envisions that you will speak for about 20 minutes on "Human Rights and Foreign Policy." Your remarks follow the presentation of the award to Jeane Kirkpatrick and will conclude the evening's program.

We also hope that you will make your remarks available for inclusion in the forthcoming issue of the National Committee's newsletter.

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**Nobel laureate

Mr. Kampelman
Page 2.
September 13, 1984

Guy de Rothschild, our dinner chairman, and we
look forward to seeing you on October 1st.

If you have any questions about the evening,
please call Tricia Donovan at (212) 874-2390.

Best Wishes,


Joanne Toor Cummings


Francis L. Kellogg

10/1

May 30, 1984

Ambassador Francis L. Kellogg
President
National Committee on American
Foreign Policy, Inc.
Suite 303 East
200 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10166

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you very much for your letter of May 23. I would be pleased to accept your invitation and speak at the October 1 Award Ceremony to honor Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. Thank you for asking me.

All my best.

Sincerely,

Max M. Kampelman

MMK:nct

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May 23, 1984

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DOROTHY WEBER

Mr. Max Kampelman, Esq.
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver, and Kampelman
Suite 1000
600 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20037

Dear Mr. Kampelman:

The NCAFP has granted the Morgenthau Award for the current year, 1984, to the distinguished representative of the United States to the United Nations, Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick. The Award Ceremony will take place at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, on October 1, 1984.

Professor Howard Adelson, of our Executive Committee, has told me that he has discussed the event with you. On behalf of the NCAFP's Executive Committee, I would like to extend our invitation to you to be the principle speaker that evening. We would suggest a speech of approximately 20 minutes in length and, of course, on a foreign policy subject of interest to our membership. I do know that we would be particularly pleased if you were to undertake this task. Our Executive Committee would be delighted if you would reserve this date and be with us to honor Ambassador Kirkpatrick by participating in this ceremony.

We would appreciate confirmation from you sometime in the relatively near future.

Very Truly Yours,

Francis L. Kellogg
Ambassador Francis L. Kellogg
President

FLK: jk

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**Nobel laureate

OK

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10/1
5:00-
6:30

TWO ADDITIONAL OCTOBER MEETINGS

You are cordially invited to attend
A meeting in honor of

THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Secretary of State

//

A CONVERSATION WITH THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Monday, October 1, 1984
5:00 - 6:30 p.m.

David Rockefeller
Chairman, Council on Foreign Relations
will preside

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(F)

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September 24, 1984

Nancy Tackett
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Suite 1000
600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Nancy,

We received the biography today. Thank you for your
prompt and courteous help.

With best wishes.

Sincerely

Chris Burrows
Asst. Exec. Dir./NCAFP

P.S. I hope I've spelled your name correctly? Sorry if not.

cb/mc

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**Nobel laureate



Fourth Annual Hans J. Morgenthau
Award Dinner

October 1, 1984
The Waldorf-Astoria Hotel

THE HONORABLE JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK

Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick was born in Duncan, Oklahoma, in 1926 and received most of her higher education at Barnard College and Columbia University. Columbia granted her the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 1968.

A Democrat who participated in party politics as the vice chairman of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, Dr. Kirkpatrick also served as a member of the Democratic National Commission on Party Structure and Presidential Nomination from 1975 to 1978. Notwithstanding her party affiliation, in 1981, Dr. Kirkpatrick was appointed United States permanent representative to the United Nations by President Ronald Reagan, making her the first woman to serve as chief United States representative to the world body.

A noted academic who is currently on leave from Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., where she is Leavey University Professor, Ambassador Kirkpatrick is a prolific writer and researcher. The author and the editor of numerous books, including *Dictatorships and Double Standards*, *Political Woman* and *The New Presidential Elite*, Dr. Kirkpatrick has also contributed articles and book reviews to *Commentary*, *The American Political Science Review*, and the *American Foreign Policy Newsletter*, among other publications.

A board member of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Ambassador Kirkpatrick has lectured at numerous conferences and forums on a broad range of national and international issues. A member of President Reagan's cabinet, Ambassador Kirkpatrick is the recipient of a number of honorary degrees, including one from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick is married to Dr. Evron Kirkpatrick. They have three sons, Douglas, John, and Stuart.

MENU

Pasta Fusilli

Selle d'Agneau Roti Tarragon
Bouquetiere de legumes

Salade

Baron Larose
1981

Charlotte aux Pommes
Amaretto Sabayon

Truffles au chocolat

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Presentation of the Hans J. Morgenthau Award to
The Honorable Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations
in recognition of her exemplary contributions
to the foreign policy of the United States

The Honorable Francis L. Kellogg
WELCOME

Baron Guy de Rothschild
INTRODUCTION OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Susanna Morgenthau
AWARD PRESENTATION

The Honorable Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
RESPONSE

Charles A. Whittingham
INTRODUCTION OF GUEST SPEAKER

The Honorable Max M. Kampelman
GUEST SPEAKER

The Honorable Francis L. Kellogg
CONCLUSION

October 1, 1984
The Waldorf-Astoria Hotel

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The National Committee on American Foreign Policy was founded in 1974 under the chairmanship of the late Professor Hans J. Morgenthau. The committee is a broadly-based organization of individuals whose purpose is to stimulate interest in American foreign policy, especially with respect to the immediate and long-range national interests of the United States of America.

To commemorate the contributions made by Professor Morgenthau to the theory and the practice of American foreign policy, the Committee presents the Hans J. Morgenthau Memorial Award each year. The person to be so honored is one whose intellectual attainments and contributions to United States foreign policy have been judged so exemplary in the tradition of Professor Morgenthau as to merit this award.

The National Committee on American Foreign Policy
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