

## Max M. Kampelman Papers

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## **Grumman Corporation**

Bethpage, New York 11714

ROBERT A. NAFIS
vice president
and
essistant to the chairman of the board

November 8, 1984

Ambasssador Max M. Kampelman Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman Suite 1000 600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 10037

Dear Ambassador Kampelman,

We are pleased that you will be with us on Tuesday, November 20th and look forward to your talk on East-West Relations.

Some years ago Mr. Bierwirth initiated our Grumman Guest Lecture Series as a vehicle to introduce our senior management to the points of view of persons whose training and experience influence and benefit our national life and contribute to a broader understanding of the forces at work in the world today. Some of our past Guest Lecturers have included Ambassadors Donald B. Easum, Edwin O. Reischauer, William E. Schaufele, Jr., Richard Helms and others; former U.S. State Department Under Secretaries George W. Ball and Joseph J. Sisco; journalists such as Harrison E. Salisbury; admirals; economists; astrophysicists; climatologists; geologists; and other men and women eminent in their fields.

I would like to thank you for your biography and confirm a few items that were discussed with your secretary. As November 20th nears, we will call to ascertain whether you will be coming to Grumman from Washington or New York. If you will be leaving from Washington, Mr. Carr will make travel arrangements for the trip and a Grumman driver will be at the airport in New York to take you both to Grumman. If your schedule finds you in New York on the 20th, we will have a driver call for you, wherever you designate, at approximately 11:15. Upon your arrival at Grumman, if time permits and you are interested, you will be escorted on a brief tour of one of our plants. Mr. Bierwirth would like you to join a very small group for lunch around 12:45 p.m. You could begin your talk of some 40 minutes at about 2:00 p.m., to be followed by a question and answer period of approximately one half hour. Your audience will number about 80 persons,

OK

YE

OK



and neither the press nor anyone outside the company will be present. We should be finished about 3:30, at which time you and Mr. Carr will be transported to the airport or, if need be, you could be returned to New York.

A few days before the 20th Mr. Carr's office will be in touch to confirm final arrangements for transportation. We understand you will not require any audio-visual aids during your talk.

If you have any questions about these arrangements please call either Mr. Carr's secretary (703/276-4901) or my office (516/575-7668).

Sincerely,

Robert A. Nafis

11/20/84 REMARKS BY MAX M. KAMPELMAN THE GRUMMAN CORPORATION November 20, 1984 Bethpage, New York It is now fourteen months since Madrid ended. During this period, I have shifted my focus away from the fascinating details and intricacies of negotiating with the Soviet Union during three years in Europe to the more significant issue of which Madrid was a part, the intensely troubling East-West relation. When the Helsinki Final Act was signed in 1975, the 33 European signatory countries plus the United States and Canada acted on the assumption that the Agreement reflected a condition of "detente," a process toward peace and cooperation. The military, economic, cultural, scientific, and humanitarian provisions of that Agreement were designed to cover the totality of East-West relations. The Madrid meeting was a follow-up meeting whose original purpose was to carry forward that process of "detente". But by the time Madrid began, there was no "detente". invasion of Afghanistan exacerbated tensions as it became clear

that the Soviets behaved as if they never signed the Helsinki

Accords.

negotiating process must, however, also be used to communicate concerns where they exist, so as to lessen the likelihood of ambiguity. Absent this clarity, there is no reason for the other side to take seriously the depth of our commitments and perceptions.

I spoke of a united Western group in Madrid. This is an indispensable condition for maximum effectiveness. We should understand that our super-power strategy does not give us super-wisdom. We and our friends should think of ourselves as an orchestra -- someone must bang the drums and blow the trumpet, while somebody else plays the harp or touches the piano keys softly. What is important is that we make music together.

This requires effort. Our NATO group in Madrid met three and four times a week, and sometimes three and four times a day. We worked closely with our neutral friends who shared our values. The West is stronger in dealing with the Soviet Union when it speaks with one voice and gives a consistent message.

There is today sensitivity within the NATO alliance.

Crises are ever present. There is always the potential for divisiveness when sixteen free and sovereign states, governed by democratic principles and with differing histories and cultural backgrounds, attempt to formulate common policy.

What is necessary is constantly to keep in mind that it is our values that tie us together and that it is those values that are under attack. In a real sense our task is to raise the vision of the West above the minutiae of our relations, important as they may appear to be at any moment. It is vital we prevail in that effort in the face of a massive Soviet onslaught to divide and weaken the alliance.

Let me now make an assertion about dealing with the Soviet
Union that is based on conviction and on my experience. The
Soviet Union respects military strength. Its incentive for
negotiating an agreement is greater when the positions taken by
its negotiating partner have the added dignity of being supported
by that strength. Diplomacy without arms is like music without
instruments.

The Soviet Union is an aggressive society seeking, with its massive military and police power, to expand its influence; and a repressive society determined to defend its totalitarian power, whatever the human cost. We know it is a major challenge to our security and values. How do we constructively face this reality? I suspect that we and our friends who value freedom will pay a heavy price and suffer great anguish as we come to grips with this challenge. The integrity and character and strength of our society and of our people will undergo the greatest challenge of our history as we learn how to live with Soviet military power, meet it, challenge it, and simultaneously strive to maintain the peace as we remain constant in our ideals.

We still look upon ourselves as a young and developing society, even though we are now one of the oldest, stable systems in the world. We did not seek the role of world leadership, and our people today still tend to shy away from it. By the end of the war, we were somewhat like a young giant among nations. And, being a giant is not easy. It is not easy living with a giant, and our friends are learning that. It is hard to find shoes to fit if you are a giant; and the bed is always too short. Being strong, the giant can afford to be gentle, but he is also, at times, awkward. His good intentions are not always so interpreted by others.

We make mistakes because we are hesitant about the responsibilities of leadership. As a result, our behavior is at times one of fits and starts and frequently tends to confuse.

We talk a great deal about values and about liberty. Some of our more sophisticated friends see this linkage of values with world <a href="real-politik">real-politik</a> as a form of naivete. We, of course, talk about the values of liberty because, to us, they are not abstract. We also know they are not abstract to those unable to enjoy them.

Our founding fathers, by cool calculation, informed by history, and inspired by a passion for liberty, knew that idealism

and realism were a tightly woven warp and woof. They made a sturdy constitutional fabric. We must again treat both idealism and realism as mutually reinforcing. Our values distinguish us from the totalitarians and authoritarians of the world.

They are our strength. [indispensable to consensus in our democracy]

As we reaffirm our faith, however, we must understand that we thereby implicitly threaten the Soviet Union. Like any dictatorship, the Soviet ruling class is deeply concerned about the subversion of its power -- power accumulated not by consent but by military and police force alone. Where there is no legitimacy; where there is repression coupled with traditional national and cultural differences; where there is an obvious failure of the system to meet the needs of its peoples -- these obviously contribute to Leadership insecurity. The very fact that there are neighboring free societies creates a powerful draw and attraction for those who live under totalitarian rule. By example, democracies inevitably tend to subvert Soviet authority.

Thus, the challenge. There are some who respond to the danger to us represented by Soviet military power and theology by ignoring or denying its existence. That would be fatal for us. There are others who are so overwhelmed by the difficulties as to place all of their trust in military power and its use alone. That view can be fatal to us as well.

We dare not and cannot blow the Soviet Union away. We cannot wish it away. It is here and it is militarily power-ful. We share the same globe. We must try to find a formula under which we can live together in dignity.

We must engage in the pursuit of peace without illusion, but with persistence, regardless of provocation. Thus, in Madrid, we attended, talked, debated, negotiated, argued, dined, condemned, talked some more [3 years -- 400 hours]. We achieved some results in words. We have not yet achieved a change in deeds. That will only come, if it ever does come, when the Soviet Union concludes that it is in its interest to change, and when its leadership decides that the change is necessary to keep itself in power.

The Soviet Union is not likely soon to undergo what

Jonathan Edwards called "a great awakening," or see a blinding
light on the road to Damascus. Yet, the imperatives for survival in the nuclear age require us to persist -- through the
deterrence that comes from military strength, through dialogue,
through criticism, through negotiation -- to persist in the
search for understanding, agreement, peace.

Today, the prospects for understanding are not bright.

Soviet leadership appears somewhat disorganized. Threats,
coupled with infrequent smiles, are techniques of traditional
Soviet political offensives. They are now engaged in a

massive and frantic program to intimidate the world half to death.

I understand that. The "correlation of forces" has moved against the Soviet Union. The credibility of its system as a viable alternative has collapsed for sensible people.

The growing military strength of the United States is of further concern to an aging and unstable Soviet elite.

The totalitarian cause would be a lost one, considering the added burden of its economic and social failures, were it not for the Soviet belief that the West is divided, lazy, comfortable and increasingly pacifist. They doubt the will of the West to resist the intimidating power of its military bluster. Soviet submarines enter Swedish waters to warn and scare as well as gain intelligence. They train and finance terrorists all over the world to destabilize the rest of us. The deep involvement of the Bulgarian secret police in the attempted assassination of the Pope, which would not have been possible without KGB complicity, is an illustration of that criminal irresponsibility.

They move to test us in our own hemisphere as well. In Central America, Soviet money, guns and personnel, operating directly and through Cuban and Nicaraguan proxies, seek further

We must be bona fide negotiators in good faith; anything less is transparent and damaging to our political credibility. With patience, persistance, strength, confidence and faith, we need have no fear of negotiating. Our case is the superior one.

The true peacemakers of this world are those who stand up openly and honestly against totalitarian repression and aggression. The true peacemakers are those who strive for peace with human dignity. We can take great pride in being among the peacemakers of the world.

Thank you.