



Max M. Kampelman Papers

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REMARKS BY
MAX M. KAMPELMAN
ALISTAIR BUCHAN CLUB
OXFORD UNIVERSITY

Oxford, England

June 6, 1986

Mr. Chairman -

Thank you for inviting me to these halls. This is my first formal appearance at Oxford University. I congratulate all of you on the opportunity that is yours to prepare yourselves for new dimensions of personal maturity and career development at this extraordinarily fine institution of higher learning.

Each generation faces its own unique challenges. But through the ages they appear to have one common characteristic. Men and women seem capable of mobilizing their talents to unravel the mysteries of their physical environment. We have learned to fly through space like birds and move in deep waters like fish. But how to live and love on this small planet as brothers and sisters still eludes us. In every age, that has been the essence of the challenge.

The immense challenge to this generation is to find the basis for lasting peace among the peoples of the world that they might live in dignity. In this nuclear age, the significance of that goal is overwhelming. To achieve that goal will require our inner strength, understanding and faith; and, most particularly, it will require the energy and intelligence of your generation.

There is a 19th Century Yiddish tale of a man who went to the tailor in his small village and ordered a pair of trousers for himself. He was measured; he returned a week later and learned that the pants were not ready. He returned the next week and they were not ready. He returned the third week and the same story. There was growing exasperation. And a repeat during the fourth and fifth weeks. Finally, after six weeks, the pants were ready. The customer, irritated but now philosophical, turned to the tailor and said, "Listen, it took God only six days to make the whole world. Why did it take you six weeks to make just this one pair of pants?" The tailor patiently took his customer to the window of his shop, pointed outside and explained, "Yes, but look at that world, and then look at this fine pair of pants!"

As you and I look at this world, it falls seriously

short of our hopes. In my younger years, "One World" was our expectation, and we thought it to be a realistic expectation. It was required, we thought, by technology and the communications revolution. The United States had learned as a nation, it was said, of our error in not joining the League of Nations. We, therefore, helped create the United Nations, which would bring us to a world community in peace.

Today there is no world community. The people of Switzerland in a recent referendum overwhelmingly said they would not join the United Nations. Many others, even in my own country, if given the choice, would say, "Stop the world--I want to get off!" There seem to be disappointingly fewer values universally shared by all governments.

From the beginning, the United Nations included states that rejected the humanitarian values that permeated the Charter of the United Nations. The United Nations cannot preserve values not shared and supported by a vast number of its member states. Hijackers and terrorists, furthermore, and those who support them challenge conceptions of a natural harmony of interest among governments.

You have heard that I have had the privilege, since 1980, of heading two separate American delegations international negotiations, under two Presidents. The task common to each was to negotiate with the Soviet Union. (It is relevant here to bring to your attention a comment by one of my country's most distinguished ambassadors to the Soviet Union, Chip Bohlen. He said there were two kinds of people he knew were lying--the person who said whiskey did not affect him and the person who said he knew how to negotiate with the Russians.)

Six years ago, I was asked by President Carter to head the American Delegation to a meeting in Madrid taking place pursuant to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. This responsibility, renewed in 1981 when I was reappointed by President Reagan, led to three intensive years of negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The 1975 agreement was based on the assumption that "detente" was the governing principle of East-West relations. But "detente" turned out to be an illusion. Soviet repression of human rights was and is taking place on a massive scale; political and religious dissidents were and are imprisoned; incarceration in psychiatric hospitals was and is a frequent form of political

punishment; government-sponsored anti-Semitism was and is highly evident; emigration has declined to its lowest levels; 120,000 Soviet troops continue to brutalize Afghanistan and its people; and Soviet support and training of terrorists conspicuously continues unabated.

And sixteen months ago, President Reagan asked me to head up the United States arms reduction negotiating effort in Geneva. A tale here comes to mind of the lion, the eagle, the bull and the bear who came to a meeting to discuss disarmament. The lion, looking at the bull, proposed the abolition of horns. The bull, looking at the eagle, urged that wings be abolished. The eagle, examining the lion's anatomy, called for a universal removal of claws. The bear, listening to all of these proposals, took a more conceptual view: "Let us abolish all those things that represent the militarization of our society and let us instead have one big global hug," he urged.

The integrity and strength of our free societies and of our people will undergo an immense test as we learn how to live with Soviet military power, challenge it, and simultaneously strive to maintain the peace with human liberty that we seek. We look upon ourselves as peoples

committed to the values of freedom. Liberty to us is not abstract. We know it is not abstract to those unable to enjoy it.

But let us explore for a moment whether our "rights of man" values, which we look upon as a source of our strength, may not complicate our pursuit of peace. What are the implications of injecting morality considerations into Western foreign policy? Is there not a tension created when we engage in moral condemnation of totalitarian and authoritarian societies and then undertake to negotiate toward understanding with those we condemn? The recent visit to us of the courageous Yelena Bonner has dramatized this dilemma for many of us.

The alternative, of course, is silence. But is silence not a form of acquiescence? And if silence is morally unacceptable, is verbal condemnation adequate when we know it is likely to be ineffectual? Is "action" by us then called for? If so, what kind?

Do we have the moral right to encourage people who seek to change their conditions living under repressive regimes? Is there a moral duty to intervene? Would this not be in conflict with other international

responsibilities? Or does intervention depend on whether it will work and at what cost?

I am aware of the assertion that the best way to help those who are victims of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes is to set a fine example. I suspect this fudges the question. The example we set, no matter how noble, will do little to alleviate the condition of those victimized by repression. We should also understand that even setting an example may produce increased tension. The good example set by West Germany only led to a wall of concrete and fire around Communist Germany. A good example may well be perceived as a threat. That threat, in turn, could produce fears on the part of those who rule totalitarian societies and lead to increased repression.

The peoples of the Soviet Union, who comprise hundreds of different nationalities, share the same values of human dignity that we proclaim. They are as dedicated to the elimination of war as any other peoples. They have grown accustomed to being rigidly ruled, but they have no wish to be isolated from their neighbors and from the forward movement of civilization. This creates an insecurity on the part of their authorities, who then go to extraordinary lengths to fence in their own citizens.

There is a related set of questions. Are we consistent with our values if we have Allies who do not share them? The American founding fathers accepted an alliance with a France governed by a tyrannical monarch, at the same time as we forcefully expressed our detestation of absolute monarchies. During World War II we entered into an alliance with Stalin, whom history will record as perhaps the most brutal human butcher of the Twentieth Century, certainly a close competitor of Hitler for that title.

Must we be consistent? Some would have us seek to improve our relations with Castro's Cuba, increase our trade with Communist Russia, and apply sanctions against racist South Africa--and vice versa.

To raise these questions in this academic environment is not to undermine the legitimacy of morality in our foreign policy. Morality must be a major component of our foreign policy. It may be an indispensable ingredient for the domestic consensus that is required if any foreign policy in a democracy is to be effective. But strategic self-interest must also be a major consideration of an effective and desirable foreign policy.

There are some who respond to the danger to us

represented by Soviet military power and theology by ignoring or denying its existence. That would be fatal for us. There are others who are so overwhelmed by the difficulties as to place all of their trust in military power and its use alone. That view carries with it the seeds of tragedy as well.

We dare not and cannot blow the Soviet Union away. We cannot wish it away. It is here and it is militarily powerful. We share the same globe. We must try to find a formula under which we can live together in dignity.

All responsible people understand that we must define our objectives consistent with Hobbes' first law of nature: "To seek peace and follow it." We must engage in that pursuit of peace without illusion, but with persistence, regardless of provocation.

Some writers tell us that the Russians are inscrutable Orientals, products of a mysterious culture we can never hope to understand. Others refer to the root cunning of Russian peasants as explanation for their government's behavior. Still others portray the Russians as innocent, unsophisticated peasants, suspicious of foreigners, whose land has been overrun in the course of history by

bloodthirsty invaders. The Swedish economist, Gunnar Myrdal, predicted that the West would make a mess of its diplomacy with the Russians because we would assume they are gentlemen and they would make agreements they had no intention of carrying out.

Sir William Hayter, a former British Ambassador to Moscow, once remarked that negotiating with the Soviet Union was like dealing with a recalcitrant vending machine. Sometimes it helps to put in another coin. Occasionally, it is useful to check the machine or even to kick it hard. But the one procedure which never seemed to do any good, he said, was to talk to it.

The fact of the matter, of course, is that all and none of the above are true. The Russian culture is a strong and distinct one, and we should do our best to understand it. The Russian people are a gifted people who have made an extraordinarily rich contribution to literature, art, music, and learning. The Russian community is historically a deeply moral and religious one. The old-fashioned Russian thinkers did not suffer from inferiority complexes and neither does the modern Soviet. Furthermore, the Soviet diplomat is a highly intelligent and well trained professional.

The issue in the forefront of the international crisis is not the character and culture of the Russian people, or of the other people who have been forcefully incorporated into the Soviet empire. Government policy is made by governments; and that of the Soviet Union is a dictatorship controlled by the Communist Party, with conspiratorial anti-democratic roots and experiences. It has survived longer than its neighbors anticipated; and it continues apparently to be bolstered by a Marxist-Leninist faith which takes comfort in the historic inevitability of its destiny, an inevitability which justifies violence as necessary to hurry history along.

The Soviet Union is not likely soon to undergo what Jonathan Edwards called "a great awakening," or see a blinding light on the road to Damascus. Yet, the imperatives for survival in the nuclear age require us to persist -- through the deterrence that comes from military strength, through direct honest talk, through negotiation -- to persist in the search for understanding, agreement, peace.

We trust our negotiating efforts will produce results, and we are working for results. By the nature and complexity of the issues we face, however, we must also

appreciate that even with agreement, we will still be nearer to the beginning than to the end of our pursuit.

We hope the time will soon come when Soviet authorities comprehend that repressive societies in our day cannot achieve inner stability or true security. We hope the leadership of the Soviet Union will come to accept that it is in its best interest to permit a humanizing process to take place within its society. We hope they will come to understand the need to show the rest of us that cruelty is not indispensable to their system. We hope they will come to realize that the Leninist aim of achieving Communism through violence is an anachronism in this nuclear age. We hope Soviet authorities will join us in the understanding that our survival as a civilization depends on the mutual realization that we must live under rules of responsible international behavior. We hope, but we cannot trust.

Our effort must be to persuade those who today lead the Soviet Union that just as the two sides of the human brain, the right and the left, adjust their individual roles within the body to make a coordinated and functioning whole, so must hemispheres of the body-politic, north and south, east and west, right and left, learn to harmonize their contributions to a whole that is healthy and constructive and coordinated in the search for peace with liberty.

To negotiate is risky. It is, in the words of Hubert Humphrey, something like crossing a river by walking on slippery rocks. The possibility of disaster is on every side, but it is the only way to get across. A strong nation can always afford to be considerate. A strong people can always afford to seek peace. Only the weak are arrogant and petulant. The object of diplomacy in a democratic society, indeed the supreme achievement of statesmanship, is patiently, through negotiation, to pursue the peace we seek at the same time as we protect our vital national interests and values.

Both we and the Soviet Union must appreciate that negotiation means more than talking. It means listening as well. It is particularly important for us both to understand that our super-power status does not necessarily confer on us super wisdom. A major difficulty in such a negotiation is a feeling by both of us that the other is not listening. They want us to listen to their security needs. We want them to appreciate ours and to appreciate as well that no country's national security interests can be fostered through aggression and through a lack of respect for the sovereignty of neighbors.

Finally, we of the West must understand that policy in

a democracy requires public support; and that must encompass the understanding that military strength is indispensable to the preservation of our values and to our successful pursuit of peace with dignity. Diplomacy today must include the deterrence of military power as one of its essential ingredients. If the possession of power, furthermore, is to be effective as a deterrent, perhaps its most vital function in foreign policy, there cannot be a renunciation of its use in the pursuit of our national interests and values. We are entering a period in which this may well be the ultimate determinant in whether we can achieve the peace with dignity which we seek.

We will come closer to our goal to the extent that we understand that our values are at the center of it all. Our quest for peace is to preserve the human being and the civilization he is continuing to build so that the evolutionary process of which we are an integral part can continue to strengthen that which our religious teachers call the God-like within us.

All of us and our societies fall short of our aspirations. We grow by stretching to reach them. As we do so, however, let us be reassured by the conviction that the future lies with freedom, because there can be no

lasting stability in societies that would deny it. Only freedom can release the constructive energies of men and women to work toward reaching new heights. A human being has the capacity to aspire, to achieve, to dream, and to do. We seek these values, within the limits of what the great Protestant theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, called "moral realism," for all the children of God. Our task is to stretch ourselves to come closer to that realization.

Thank you.



HOUSE OF COMMONS

LONDON SW1A 0AA

01- 219 4166

From:

The Rt. Hon. James Callaghan, M.P.

27 June 1986

Sen Max,

Many thanks for your letter of 10 June and for enclosing your address to the Alistair Buchan Club. I read it with great interest and, of course, agree with much that you say. You raise a number of very important questions about our relationship with people who live under repressive regimes and with the regimes themselves. I must confess that I am not always entirely clear what the answers should be. I have one difference with you, as with many other Americans, namely, your charge that detente turned out to be an illusion. I cannot agree with you. From the point of view of the West, I do not accept that we became relatively weaker as a result of the Helsinki agreements, nor do I believe that Soviet repression of human rights is greater now than it was before. Is it not also true that the permitted emigration of Soviet Jews rose during the period of detente, even though, as you rightly say, it has since declined to its lowest level? Of course, the Soviet regime gained certain benefits from the period of detente but, overall, detente was not the cause of the West losing any ground.

It does not seem likely that I shall be in Geneva in the near future but I shall certainly let you know when I do come and I hope you will always visit me when you are in London.

Yours sincerely

Jim Callaghan

James ~~Callaghan~~

Mr M M Kampelman
Head of Delegation
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union
Geneva
Switzerland

TELEPHONE

(0865) 248451

NEW COLLEGE
OXFORD

OX1 3BN

May 26th 1986

Dear Ambassador,

Thank you for your letter. I have arranged to attend your talk, and hope to make contact with you then.

I very much look forward to hearing you.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Alex de Jonge', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Alex de Jonge



UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Geneva, Switzerland

Please respond to:

U.S. Mission
11 route de Pregny
1292 Chambesy, Geneve

May 21, 1986


Mr. Alex de Jonge
New College Oxford
OX1 3BN
ENGLAND

Dear Mr. de Jonge:

I appreciate your letter of May 15. I do hope we will be able to meet.

My schedule calls for me to leave Geneva on Friday morning, June 6 and to arrive at Oxford sometime before noon. My talk is scheduled for 12:30. This schedule leads me to believe that the best time for us to meet would be after my luncheon speech. It is my understanding that it will take approximately 45 minutes to drive from Oxford to Ditchley, so that, if your schedule permits, it might be a good idea to spend a little time together before I am due at Ditchley, which I believe to be 4:30. If this is not convenient, please let me know.

Sincerely,



Max M. Kampelman
Head of Delegation

TELEPHONE

(0865) 248451

NEW COLLEGE

OXFORD

OX13BN

May 15 1986

Dear Ambassador Kampelman,

Thank you so much for your letter, and for your kind words about the book.

Bill had warned me that you would be coming to Ditchley, and I had planned to leave a letter for you there in the hope that we might be able to meet.

I realise that you are going to have a crowded schedule, so that it is in hope, rather than expectation that I offer you dinner in New College on the evening of the 6th. Alternatively I am making no commitments for that week-end, in the hope that you might find some time when we could get together.

Thank you again for the letter, and I look forward to our meeting.

Yours sincerely,



Alex de Jonge.

cc to await arrival at Ditchley.

TELEPHONE

(0865) 248451

NEW COLLEGE

OXFORD

OX1 3BN

May 15 1986

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Yours sincerely,



Alex de Jonge.

cc to await arrival at Ditchley.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY ALASTAIR BUCHAN CLUB

Trinity Term 1986

Meeting on Friday, 6 June 1986 (Sixth Week) from 12.30 to 2.30 p.m. in St. Giles House, St. John's College, when the Hon. Max Kampelman will speak on "Negotiating with the Soviet Union".

EXPECTED TO ATTEND

Archie Brown
Włodimierz Brus
Martin Ceadel
John Dumbabin
Sir Reginald Hibbert
Michael Kaser
Anthony Kemp-Welch
Cyril Lin
Judith Pallott
Daphne Park
Peter Pulzer
Adam Roberts
Mary McAuley
Leslie Macfarlane
Richard Davy
David Young
Prof. Z. Zeman
Prof. W. Madelung
Richard Kindersley
Jack Scarr
Sir Geoffrey Wilson
Prof. A. Nachmani
Mrs. J. Deng
Mrs. T. Houbenova
T. Tiisanen
~~Dr. R. Nützel~~
Edmond Lons
R. Allison
G. Alston
E. Brimmer
J. Cable
A. Chinvanno
D. Filkins
J. Gwozdziowski
B. Heuser
J. Holzgrefe
B. Kingsbury
K. Krause
I. Lesser
D. Markwell
S. Mixer
A. Poensgen
C. Skran
J. Elliott
S. Korman
S. Sewall
J. Siddiqi
W. Stock
H. Vlavianos
P. Walker
A. Walter
H. Wilson
J. Wood
F. Wyman
Y. Zhang

P. Gellman
K. Lepor
W. Buchanan
N. Paske
L. Gearing
M. Almond
J. Kleeberg
M. Yakutiel

A. Aslund
H E. Thorsten Oren } Guests of
J. Hutton } R. Kaser
M. Mendras
H. Shokman
Anthony Moncrieff