



Max M. Kampelman Papers

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REMARKS BY

MAX M. KAMPELMAN

BELGIAN-AMERICAN ASSOCIATION

Brussels, Belgium

September 17, 1986

I have had the privilege, since 1980, of heading two separate American negotiating delegations under two Presidents. The task common to each was to negotiate with the Soviet Union. I have found the Soviets to be skilled negotiators with a keen understanding of the political pressures to which Western democratic institutions are sometimes susceptible. They are relentless in trying to create such pressures in hopes these can be converted into concessions at the negotiating table without the need to make reciprocal concessions. A key to dealing with Soviet negotiators is patiently to be prepared to stay at the bargaining table one day longer than the Soviets are prepared to stay.

There is another principle to keep in mind -- a fundamental one. The differences of values and objectives between the West and the Soviet Union are profound. The challenge posed by the Soviet Union does not relate to the character and culture of the Russian people, or of the other peoples who have been

forcefully incorporated into the Soviet empire. Government policy is made by governments; and that of the Soviet Union is a dictatorship controlled by the Communist Party. It has survived longer than many anticipated; and it continues, apparently, to be bolstered by a Marxist-Leninist faith which takes comfort in the historic inevitability of its destiny, an inevitability which justifies violence as necessary to hurry history along.

Yet, we must appreciate that in spite of these realities, the imperatives for survival in the nuclear age require us to persist in the search for understanding, agreement, peace. Our Geneva negotiations are one aspect of this search.

The United States in Geneva seeks massive reductions in nuclear armaments, particularly in those highly accurate, destructive and fast-flying ballistic missiles. We have urged 50% reductions. We have also proposed the elimination of all intermediate range missiles. We are prepared to start with lesser reductions, if that is the Soviet preference, so long as they are equitable and stabilizing. We would like ^{RADICAL} [even greater] reductions -- toward zero -- and we aim for a relationship that will make that possible. We are pressing, therefore, for political solutions to the areas of tension between us. Our goal of a safer world also motivates us to extensive

explorations of how technology can help us achieve that goal. The United States Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) can be best understood in that context.

~~The author of the following sentences will not be evident to you:~~

LET ME QUOTE A STATEMENT:

"When the security of a state is based only on mutual deterrence with the aid of powerful nuclear missiles, it is directly dependent on the good will and designs of the other side, which is a highly subjective and indefinite factor...."

"The creation of an effective anti-missile system enables the state to make its defenses dependent chiefly on its own possibilities and not only on mutual deterrence...."

These sentences are not from a spokesman for the American Government. The author is a Soviet military thinker and planner, Major General Talenskiy. It accurately states the goals and the objectives of the American SDI Program.


Western security today relies on the principle of deterrence. [Our premise has been that] If each side can credibly threaten nuclear retaliation against an attack by the other, it can deter the attack by threatening the aggressor with costs that are greater than the potential gains from the aggression. This form of deterrence, based on mutual vulnerability, a balance of terror, has been successful, so far, in preventing war [between the East and the West]. But it has not discouraged a massive threatening Soviet military buildup.

[Deterrence remains indispensable to our security and to the preservation of peace. Would it not, however, be better to base deterrence on an increased ability to deny the aggressor his objectives than to rely solely on our ability to punish him for his aggression. } ^{KUDERKUD} Our people ask of our governments that they be protected from attack, rather than that we ~~only be able to~~ avenge them after the attack. It is this prospect of a more effective deterrence that research on strategic defenses offers. We are investigating, fully within the bounds of existing arms control agreements, the possibility that defensive technologies, preferably non-nuclear ones, will persuade the aggressor that his attack cannot gain his objectives.

[[A sober analysis of the strategic problems we face today must recognize that] Since 1972, when we entered into SALT I and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union has launched the largest military build-up in history. In that time, the Soviet Union has deployed three new types and eight improved versions of Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), five new types of nuclear ballistic submarines, four new types and five improved versions of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and a new intercontinental bomber. By contrast, the United States has

deployed no new types of ICBMs, one new type of nuclear submarine, one new type of submarine-launched ballistic missile, and no new types of heavy bombers.

This is the harsh reality. Another is that the Soviet Union has not complied with the ABM Treaty. The Soviets have built an enormous radar near Krasnoyarsk, Siberia, in flat violation of the Treaty. We have cause to believe that they may be actively preparing a nationwide defense against ballistic missiles, in spite of their agreement in 1972 not to do so.



The Soviet Union has for many years been extremely active in building up its defensive capabilities. It possesses the only operational ABM system in the world; and has just modernized it. It possesses the only operational anti-satellite system in the world and was the first to destroy a satellite in space. It is estimated that only 10 percent of all Soviet satellites are free of a military function; and that perhaps half of all Soviet military satellites are involved in targeting U.S. naval forces. It has the most comprehensive air defense system in the world. And it has spent enormous resources on passive defenses to protect its leadership, command and control systems, industry and population.

Furthermore, the Soviets are proceeding with an intensified program of research on their own version of SDI. In many cases this research starts from an advanced technological base. Their research in lasers is highly sophisticated; indeed, an American and two Soviet scientists shared a Nobel Prize for the invention of the laser. It is thus ironic and, of course, unacceptable to us that the Soviet Union is devoting its top priority to banning our SDI research while allowing Soviet research to proceed.

~~These~~ realities -- the Soviet buildup, Soviet ~~cheating~~, ^{NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SOME} ^{REGULATIONS}, massive Soviet defense strength, and a Soviet SDI program -- are at the base of President Reagan's decision to intensify research on strategic defenses. It would be highly imprudent for any American President not to pursue such research.

[What we are undertaking is at present only a research program. A decision on whether to move ahead with the deployment of strategic defenses is probably years away; it might be made by President Reagan's successor, but it will surely not be ready to be made by President Reagan himself. Nor is the decision foreordained. There are ample examples of weapons systems for which research was completed but which were not deployed or maintained. (The B-70 bomber and our own ABM system are two such examples.) We will not decide on SDI

without additional thorough discussions and consultations with our Allies. We believe firmly in the strategic unity of the Western Alliance. SDI must be a factor which strengthens that unity.

In a recent article in Pravda, Soviet Marshal Akhromeyev asserted that SDI is "incompatible with the principles forming the foundation of the ABM Treaty." Let me set against this charge the clear and unambiguous statement of a man for whom Marshal Akhromeyev once worked. In 1972, Defense Minister Grechko said that the ABM Treaty "imposes no limitations on the performance of research and experimental work aimed at resolving the problem of defending the country against nuclear missile attack." Our program is by no means a violation of the ABM Treaty or of any other international obligation we have assumed.

Finally, what if we decide--some years from now, after our research is completed, in consultation with our Allies--that strategic defenses are feasible and would make for a safer world? We would want to negotiate with the Soviet Union on how deterrence for both of us might be strengthened through a mutual sharing of the benefits of technology and through the phased introduction of defensive systems into the force structures of both sides. We have, in fact, offered to begin discussions on this subject now.

Some hold that the application of science and technology to the development of weapon systems is a threat to peace; that we are building up arsenals of ever larger and more destructive weapons. In fact, technology has permitted us to replace large and wildly destructive weapons with small and discriminating ones. During the past twenty years, the U.S. has eliminated more than 8000 weapons from our arsenal; we have removed more than 2000 nuclear tactical warheads from Europe. We have reduced the actual deliverable explosive capacity of our nuclear bombs and missiles by more than 50 percent. We have practically eliminated the risk of a coincidental detonation of any of our nuclear weapons; there is today less danger that a terrorist could detonate a bomb even if he got hold of it. This would not have been possible without nuclear testing and evolving technology. Indeed, had we entered into a testing ban or moratorium twenty-five years ago, we would today be less secure and nuclear stockpiles would still consist of the vulnerable, inaccurate and grossly destructive weaponry of that era.

We see our Strategic Defense Initiative and our proposals in Geneva as designed to help us all move toward peaceful and stable cooperation in space. Our objective, indeed, must be "mutual security." Understanding both the opportunities and

the dangers of space, we must look for a way of fundamentally altering the dynamics of international tensions. The United States seeks to stress the common security ingredients of its program. We look for a changed relationship between the U.S. and the USSR. Our effort is to leap over the limitations of traditional arms control.

We know that unilateral security can no longer be achieved, either by unilateral withdrawal from the world or by unilateral attempts to achieve impregnability. We need to reach toward an agreement in which there is an acceptance of mutual responsibility for the lives of people in all of our countries. We seek the development of capabilities that could help protect all of us from nuclear attack. We are not talking about mutual "trust." We are looking for an alteration in the framework of our relationship. *WITHIN THAT FRAMEWORK,*

[The picture I have painted for you is not a revolutionary picture. True, it is a picture of revolutionary technologies -- technologies which excite scientists and laymen alike about the expanding frontier for man's genius. But it is not a picture of revolutionary objectives. Our objective remains a safer and more stable world. Nor is it a picture of revolutionary strategies -- the strategy behind SDI remains NATO's accepted strategy of deterrence. And it is not a

picture of revolutionary relationships -- } our partnership with
 our Allies remains the cornerstone, [of our efforts in SDI, as in
 all other elements of our strategic policies.]

It is appropriate here in Brussels, to reaffirm the importance of NATO to Western security and to security in the world. Because of NATO and because of its strategy of deterrence, Europe has enjoyed the longest period of peace in its modern history. The realities, our common experience, and, perhaps most important, our cherished common human values keep us in NATO and keep NATO strong. We know that the strength of our unity is our best chance for achieving the peace with dignity that all peoples seek.

In seeking peace we cannot ignore the basic causes of tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The shameful hostage taking of Mr. Daniloff, Soviet cruelty to Dr. Sakharov, increased signs of Soviet anti-semitism -- all these remind us of the nature of the Soviet regime and its dependence on brute power rather than consent to govern. We are prepared to compete with one another. We want it to be a competition for hearts and minds. We must avoid a competition that brings the world to the edge of catastrophe.

Henry Kissinger recently defined the fundamental challenge to the free world as "the ground rules" governing Soviet international behavior, that "everything that has become Communist remains forever inviolate" and "everything that is not Communist is open to change by pressure, by subversion, by guerilla action and, if necessary, by terror." Gorbachev recently reaffirmed this dangerous Soviet principle in his Warsaw speech, where he proclaimed that "socialist gains are irreversible" and warned that an effort to "undermine" their "international...socialist community" would threaten peace.

The democratic peoples and governments of the world cannot accept and must reject a Soviet doctrine which claims for itself the right to use force against states if there are groups within those states who seek to turn those regimes into Communist ones. We similarly reject the related Soviet doctrine that it has the right to use force to keep so-called "socialist" countries within its ideological and practical control. We reject the claim that the Soviet regime can propagate its faith with the sword. The so-called Brezhnev Doctrine is reminiscent of the 19th Century Russian czars who were notorious for their forceful suppression of all nationalist stirrings in Eastern Europe. Lenin called the Russian empire "a prison of nations." Lenin's heirs now call

it "a socialist community." It is the same. The fact that the Soviet Union is a self-proclaimed Leninist state does concern us. A centerpiece of Leninist doctrine has been the "irreconcilability" of the two systems and the "inevitability" of war and violence as the instrument to achieve their new society. As long as that theology influences the behavior of ~~the Soviet Union~~^{LENINISM}, we must recognize ~~its~~^{THE} threat to our values and our security.

The Soviet Union is the last remaining empire of our day. Its empire consists of former states now absorbed within Soviet geopolitical boundaries; contiguous Eastern European states plus other states it would like to add; and states in different parts of the world over which it exercises control. In the latter group, Vietnam, Cuba, and potentially Nicaragua are particularly important to the empire, because they provide bases for Soviet forces in the China Sea, Indian Ocean and Atlantic. Afghanistan is important because of the strategically significant air bases it provides; while Ethiopia and South Yemen provide vital staging areas of value to the Soviet Air Force.

Imperialism has a high price tag associated with it. The West learned that the price is too high. That conclusion has

apparently not yet been reached by the Soviet elite, although the Rand Corporation estimates that in 1981, that financial price reached a height of 44 billion dollars.

The costs of empire are high. The Soviet economy is not working well. Nevertheless, it would be foolhardy to underestimate the strength of the Soviet Union ^{ITS WILL} or its threat to peace. Its economy is working well enough so as to permit the Soviet Union to have a functioning society, massive military power, an awesome internal police force, and a presence that reaches all parts of the world.

We hope the time will soon come when Soviet authorities comprehend that repressive societies in our day cannot achieve inner stability or true security. ^{THAT REPRESSION WILL INEVITABLY BE OUTFLANKED BY THE COMMUNICATIONS REVOLUTION.} We hope the leadership of the Soviet Union will come to accept that it is in its best interest to permit a humanizing process to take place within its society. We hope they will come to understand the need to show the rest of us that cruelty is not indispensable to their system. We hope they will come to realize that the Leninist aim of achieving Communism through violence has no place in this nuclear age. We hope Soviet authorities will join us in the commitment that our survival as a civilization depends on the mutual realization that we must live under rules of responsible international behavior. We hope, but we cannot trust.

Our military strength will help deter the use of military force until such time as our strategic defenses will fill that role. A profound faith that our human values represent the aspirations of all people adds immeasurably to our strength.

Our own activities and behavior as free governments and peoples can help influence the Soviet elite to change its agenda. Democratic societies are, after all, those by which the Soviet Union measures itself. They not only seek our technology, but also take our terminology and try to cloak themselves with words of "democracy" and "human rights." We have long been aware of a love-hate fascination that the Soviets have had with Western culture. Our task, therefore, is, through our actions and statements, to attempt to modify and resist external Soviet power at the same time as we try to encourage the inner emergence of the fuller, freer, civil society, one that indeed satisfies the deepest aspirations of the Russian peoples.

Our message must be that neither we nor the Soviets can accept today's reality of tension and threatening instability without seeking to change it. The task of the democracies of the world is to exercise the leadership necessary to develop alternative forms of conflict resolution. We need to develop a

sense of international political community. We need a way of resolving regional problems. We need a cooperative effort to eliminate hunger from the world and to foster economic development. We need vitally and profoundly to assure basic human dignity and human rights for peoples all over the world.

[Milovan Djilas, the outstanding Yugoslavian thinker, writer and dissident, recently gave an interview in Belgrade in which he said:

"Peace will only be preserved as long as the free democratic nations are militarily strong and determined enough to resist the expansionistic drive of Soviet imperialism....The West must be strong in the military sense all the time but also in the field of ideas.... We need to be stronger in every way, not aggressive, nor provocative, but stronger. We must negotiate, but without any illusion.... The West has forgotten that Molotov was always dressed in the latest European fashion and Stalin was smoking his Dunhill pipe!"

We all remember that Andrei Sakharov, in the 1975 Nobel Prize speech that he was not permitted to present in person, said:

"I am convinced that international trust, mutual understanding, disarmament, and international security are inconceivable without an open society with freedom of information, freedom of conscience, the right to publish, and the right to travel and choose the country in which one wishes to live."]

To negotiate is risky. It is, [in the words of Hubert Humphrey] something like crossing a river by walking on

slippery rocks. The possibility of disaster is on every side, but it is the only way to get across. The object of diplomacy in a democratic society, indeed the supreme achievement of statesmanship, is patiently, through negotiation, to pursue the peace we seek at the same time as we protect our vital national interests and values.

We trust our negotiating efforts will produce results. By the nature and complexity of the issues we face, however, we must also appreciate that even with agreement, we will still be nearer to the beginning than to the end of our pursuit. Our effort must be to persuade those who today lead the Soviet Union that just as the two sides of the human brain, the right and the left, adjust their individual roles within the body to make a coordinated and functioning whole, so must hemispheres of the body-politic, north and south, east and west, right and left, learn to harmonize their contributions to a whole that is healthy and constructive and coordinated in the search for peace with liberty.

That is the commitment of the United States.

Thank you.

APPENDIX A

Today, with the decline of oil prices and the growing economic difficulties of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the following data is most relevant to this problem:

- a. Eastern Europe pays 15 billion dollars annually for debt servicing and the repayment of loans;
- b. International market prices for the traditional export products of the Soviet Union have dropped. This reduces the Soviet Union's hard currency earnings and forces it to increase its exports.
- c. The unsatisfactory performance of agriculture, the most visible shortcoming of the planned economy, forces the Soviet Union alone to import wheat and meat to the value of 15 billion dollars annually.
- d. Considerable expenditures are also due to foreign political involvement: in 1984 alone, Cuba and Central America received 4 billion, Afghanistan 3.5 billion, Vietnam 2 billion and Ethiopia 1.5 billion dollars. This list does not cover all the countries which receive substantial amounts of Soviet aid, or the costs for the Soviet infrastructure in foreign countries.

To these economic handicaps, the following political problems have to be added:

- e. Marxism-Leninism has lost a considerable amount of prestige in the world. It is no secret that prior to the Soviet revolution, Russia had one of the most rapidly advancing economies of any nation in the world; and its farmers were efficient exporters, including butter to Denmark and Britain.

- f. The war in Afghanistan constitutes the longest the Soviet Union has conducted so far. It has resulted in an important loss of prestige for the Red Army, which also has negative implications for the perception of Soviet power in general.
- g. Destabilizing Soviet military intervention in the Third World has been corrosive of its legitimacy and damaging. In Afghanistan, there are 118,000 Soviet troops; in Cambodia, 140,000 Soviet-backed Vietnamese soldiers wage a war of occupation; in Ethiopia, 1,700 Soviet advisers are involved in military planning and support operations along with 2,500 Cuban combat troops; in Angola, 1,200 Soviet military advisors are involved in planning and supervising combat operations, along with 35,000 Cuban troops; and in Nicaragua, some 8,000 Soviet Bloc and Cuban personnel, including about 3,500 military and secret police personnel, keep that regime afloat. These interventions have not been successful and cannot be successfully concluded.
- h. There is growing concern and awareness in the world over the increased militarization of Soviet society. All ninth and tenth grade pupils in the Soviet Union today take a compulsory course in military affairs, part of a military patriotic educational system which begins with kindergarten. Boys and girls learn how to assemble and disassemble and use a Kalashnikov assault rifle. They receive instruction about the role of armored units and the firing of anti-tank weapons. They learn how to use hand grenades and other explosives. They learn how to carry out reconnaissance missions. The government also has war games arranged for Soviet youngsters every summer, involving roughly 30 million children.
- i. Relations between the Soviet Union and its Eastern satellites have become extremely complex. Economic reconstruction and political consolidation in Poland have become a long drawn-out process. The positive results of the reforms in Hungary represent an ideological challenge. In spite of its economic difficulties, Rumania has been able to preserve a certain room for maneuver for its foreign policy. In the GDR the scars stemming from the prevention of Honecker's visit to Bonn have not yet healed. Opposition is beginning to manifest itself in Bulgaria. The dissident movement in Czechoslovakia is far from being silenced.

ANNEX B

The London Economist recently emphasized the importance of NATO to all of us in the West with a very clear analysis of the cost to Europe should the United States withdraw. Not only would Western Europe have to find replacements for the American armies, nearly six divisions, stationed in West Germany; replace the American Air Force's 700 fighting aircraft in Europe; and expand their navies to replace the American Second Fleet in the Atlantic and the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. Europeans, the magazine continued, would have to equip themselves with a substitute for American nuclear protection with missile-carrying submarines large enough to have the Germans, the Italians and the Beneluxians feel protected by that arsenal. Whether all of this could be done for less than double the present European defense budget is quite questionable, more likely treble, considering the context that the Warsaw Pact has a 2.5 to 1 lead in tanks, three to one in anti-tank weapons, three to one in artillery, two to one in aircraft, and six to one in anti-aircraft missiles.

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SUBJECT: BELGIAN MEDIA REACTION: KAMPELMAN BRUSSELS
SPEECH

1. BRT TV, CN ITS MAIN EVENING NEWSCAST, CARRIED A LONG EXCERPT OF AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN'S AMERICAN-BELGIAN ASSOCIATION SPEECH AS PART OF A REPORT ON THE RESUMPTION OF THE GENEVA TALKS. THE REPORT ALSO INCLUDED AN ACTUALITY FROM GENEVA OF THE TWO DELEGATIONS SITTING AT THE NEGOTIATIONS TABLE.

2. BRT TV NOTED THAT THE PREVIOUS FIVE ROUNDS HAD YIELDED NOTHING, BUT THAT NEVERTHELESS "SUBSTANTIAL ARMS REDUCTION REMAINS THE PRIMARY GOAL OF THE AMERICANS, WHILE THE RUSSIANS ALSO REITERATE THEIR DETERMINATION TO MAKE PROGRESS....KAMPELMAN REPORTEDLY HAS A COMPROMISE PLAN IN HIS POCKET FOR A REDUCTION BY ONE-THIRD -- RATHER THAN FIFTY PERCENT -- OF HEAVY NUCLEAR WEAPONS WITH WHICH THE SUPERPOWERS ARE DIRECTLY THREATENING EACH OTHER. KAMPELMAN WOULD NOT REVEAL ANY DETAILS IN BRUSSELS. TO KAMPELMAN, INTERCONTINENTAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS REMAIN THE PRIMARY NEGOTIATION GOAL. WITH REGARD TO SDI RESEARCH HE IS NOT WILLING TO MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS.

3. THE STATION CARRIED A CLIP OF KAMPELMAN SAYING: "THE UNITED STATES IN GENEVA SEEKS MASSIVE REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS" AND "OUR GOAL OF A SAFER WORLD ALSO MOTIVATES US TO EXTENSIVE EXPLORATION OF HOW TECHNOLOGY CAN HELP US ACHIEVE THAT GOAL. THE U.S. STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE CAN BEST BE UNDERSTOOD IN THAT CONTEXT."

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Brussels, the 17th September, 1986.

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BRUSSE 13141 01 OF 06 181431Z

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ACTION EUR-08

INFO LOG-08 COPY-01 INR-10 SS-00 10-19 PM-10 PA-02
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BRUSSELS 13141

USIA

USIA FOR P/PFE (KONIG)

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: TEXT OF AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN'S SPEECH TO THE
BELGIAN AMERICAN ASSOCIATION, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM,
SEPTEMBER 17

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE "AS PREPARED FOR
DELIVERY" SPEECH BY AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN TO THE BELGIAN
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM, SEPTEMBER 17,
1986. THE ACTUAL ADDRESS VARIED VERY LITTLE FROM THE
TEXT PREPARED FOR DELIVERY. AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN HAS
CLEARED THE TEXT.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

I HAVE HAD THE PRIVILEGE, SINCE 1980, OF HEADING TWO
SEPARATE AMERICAN NEGOTIATING DELEGATIONS UNDER TWO
PRESIDENTS. THE TASK COMMON TO EACH WAS TO NEGOTIATE
WITH THE SOVIET UNION. I HAVE FOUND THE SOVIETS TO BE
SKILLED NEGOTIATORS WITH A KEEN UNDERSTANDING OF THE
POLITICAL PRESSURES TO WHICH WESTERN DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS ARE SOMETIMES SUSCEPTIBLE. THEY ARE
RELENTLESS IN TRYING TO CREATE SUCH PRESSURES IN HOPES
THESE CAN BE CONVERTED INTO CONCESSIONS AT THE
NEGOTIATING TABLE WITHOUT THE NEED TO MAKE RECIPROCAL
CONCESSIONS. A KEY TO DEALING WITH SOVIET NEGOTIATORS
IS PATIENTLY TO BE PREPARED TO STAY AT THE BARGAINING
TABLE ONE DAY LONGER THAN THE SOVIETS ARE PREPARED TO
STAY.

THERE IS ANOTHER PRINCIPLE TO KEEP IN MIND -- A
FUNDAMENTAL ONE. THE DIFFERENCES OF VALUES AND
OBJECTIVES BETWEEN THE WEST AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE
PROFOUND. THE CHALLENGE POSED BY THE SOVIET UNION DOES
NOT RELATE TO THE CHARACTER AND CULTURE OF THE RUSSIAN
PEOPLE, OR OF THE OTHER PEOPLES WHO HAVE BEEN
FORCEFULLY INCORPORATED INTO THE SOVIET EMPIRE.
GOVERNMENT POLICY IS MADE BY GOVERNMENTS; AND THAT OF
THE SOVIET UNION IS A DICTATORSHIP CONTROLLED BY THE
COMMUNIST PARTY. IT HAS SURVIVED LONGER THAN MANY
ANTICIPATED; AND IT CONTINUES, APPARENTLY, TO BE
BOLSTERED BY A MARXIST-LENINIST FAITH WHICH TAKES
COMFORT IN THE HISTORIC INEVITABILITY OF ITS DESTINY, AN
INEVITABILITY WHICH JUSTIFIES VIOLENCE AS NECESSARY TO
HURRY HISTORY ALONG.

YET, WE MUST APPRECIATE THAT IN SPITE OF THESE
REALITIES, THE IMPERATIVES FOR SURVIVAL IN THE NUCLEAR
AGE REQUIRE US TO PERSIST IN THE SEARCH FOR
UNDERSTANDING, AGREEMENT, PEACE. OUR GENEVA
NEGOTIATIONS ARE ONE ASPECT OF THIS SEARCH.

THE UNITED STATES IN GENEVA SEEKS MASSIVE REDUCTIONS IN
NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, PARTICULARLY IN THOSE HIGHLY

ACCURATE, DESTRUCTIVE AND FAST-FLYING BALLISTIC
MISSILES. WE HAVE URGED 50 REDUCTIONS. WE HAVE ALSO
PROPOSED THE ELIMINATION OF ALL INTERMEDIATE RANGE
MISSILES. WE ARE PREPARED TO START WITH LESSER
REDUCTIONS, IF THAT IS THE SOVIET PREFERENCE, SO LONG AS
THEY ARE EQUITABLE AND STABILIZING. WE WOULD LIKE EVEN
GREATER REDUCTIONS -- TOWARD ZERO -- AND WE AIM FOR A
RELATIONSHIP THAT WILL MAKE THAT POSSIBLE. WE ARE
PRESSING, THEREFORE, FOR POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE
AREAS OF TENSION BETWEEN US. OUR GOAL OF A SAFER WORLD
ALSO MOTIVATES US TO EXTENSIVE EXPLORATIONS OF HOW
TECHNOLOGY CAN HELP US ACHIEVE THAT GOAL. THE UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE (SDI) CAN BE BEST
UNDERSTOOD IN THAT CONTEXT.

THE AUTHOR OF THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES WILL NOT BE
EVIDENT TO YOU:

"WHEN THE SECURITY OF A STATE IS BASED ONLY ON MUTUAL
DETERRENCE WITH THE AID OF POWERFUL NUCLEAR MISSILES, IT
IS DIRECTLY DEPENDENT ON THE GOOD WILL AND DESIGNS OF
THE OTHER SIDE, WHICH IS A HIGHLY SUBJECTIVE AND
INDEFINITE FACTOR..."

"THE CREATION OF AN EFFECTIVE ANTI-MISSILE SYSTEM
ENABLES THE STATE TO MAKE ITS DEFENSES DEPENDENT CHIEFLY
ON ITS OWN POSSIBILITIES AND NOT ONLY ON MUTUAL
DETERRENCE..."

THESE SENTENCES ARE NOT FROM A SPOKESMAN FOR THE
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. THE AUTHOR IS A SOVIET MILITARY
THINKER AND PLANNER, MAJOR GENERAL TALENSKIY. IT

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UNCLASSIFIED
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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BRUSSE. 13141 02 OF 06 181435Z
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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 06 BRUSSELS 13141

USIA

USIA FOR P/PFE (KONIG)

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: TEXT OF AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN'S SPEECH TO THE

ACCURATELY STATES THE GOALS AND THE OBJECTIVES OF THE
AMERICAN SDI PROGRAM.

WESTERN SECURITY TODAY RELIES ON THE PRINCIPLE OF
DETERRENCE. OUR PREMISE HAS BEEN THAT IF EACH SIDE CAN
CREDIBLY THREATEN NUCLEAR RETALIATION AGAINST AN ATTACK
BY THE OTHER, IT CAN DETER THE ATTACK BY THREATENING THE
AGGRESSOR WITH COSTS THAT ARE GREATER THAN THE POTENTIAL
GAINS FROM THE AGGRESSION. THIS FORM OF DETERRENCE,
BASED ON MUTUAL VULNERABILITY, A BALANCE OF TERROR, HAS
BEEN SUCCESSFUL, SO FAR, IN PREVENTING WAR BETWEEN THE
EAST AND THE WEST. BUT IT HAS NOT DISCOURAGED A MASSIVE
THREATENING SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP.

DETERRENCE REMAINS INDISPENSABLE TO OUR SECURITY AND TO
THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE. WOULD IT NOT, HOWEVER, BE
BETTER TO BASE DETERRENCE ON AN INCREASED ABILITY TO
DENY THE AGGRESSOR HIS OBJECTIVES THAN TO RELY SOLELY ON
OUR ABILITY TO PUNISH HIM FOR HIS AGGRESSION. OUR
PEOPLE ASK OF OUR GOVERNMENTS THAT THEY BE PROTECTED
FROM ATTACK, RATHER THAN THAT WE ONLY BE ABLE TO AVENGE
THEM AFTER THE ATTACK. IT IS THIS PROSPECT OF A MORE
EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE THAT RESEARCH ON STRATEGIC DEFENSES
OFFERS. WE ARE INVESTIGATING, FULLY WITHIN THE BOUNDS
OF EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS, THE POSSIBILITY
THAT DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES, PREFERABLY NON-NUCLEAR
ONES, WILL PERSUADE THE AGGRESSOR THAT HIS ATTACK CANNOT
GAIN HIS OBJECTIVES.

A SOBER ANALYSIS OF THE STRATEGIC PROBLEMS WE FACE TODAY
MUST RECOGNIZE THAT SINCE 1972, WHEN WE ENTERED INTO
SALT I AND THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) TREATY WITH
THE SOVIET UNION, THE SOVIET UNION HAS LAUNCHED THE
LARGEST MILITARY BUILD-UP IN HISTORY. IN THAT TIME, THE
SOVIET UNION HAS DEPLOYED THREE NEW TYPES AND EIGHT
IMPROVED VERSIONS OF INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC
MISSILES (ICBM), FIVE NEW TYPES OF NUCLEAR BALLISTIC
SUBMARINES, FOUR NEW TYPES AND FIVE IMPROVED VERSIONS OF
SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES (SLBMS), AND A NEW
INTERCONTINENTAL BOMBER. BY CONTRAST, THE UNITED STATES
HAS DEPLOYED NO NEW TYPES OF ICBMS, ONE NEW TYPE OF
NUCLEAR SUBMARINE, ONE NEW TYPE OF SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED
BALLISTIC MISSILE, AND NO NEW TYPES OF HEAVY BOMBERS.

THIS IS THE HARSH REALITY. ANOTHER IS THAT THE SOVIET
UNION HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH THE ABM TREATY. THE SOVIETS
HAVE BUILT AN ENORMOUS RADAR NEAR KRASNOYARSK, SIBERIA,
IN FLAT VIOLATION OF THE TREATY. WE HAVE CAUSE TO
BELIEVE THAT THEY MAY BE ACTIVELY PREPARING A NATIONWIDE
DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES, IN SPITE OF THEIR

AGREEMENT IN 1972 NOT TO DO SO.

THE SOVIET UNION HAS FOR MANY YEARS BEEN EXTREMELY
ACTIVE IN BUILDING UP ITS DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES. IT
POSSESSES THE ONLY OPERATIONAL ABM SYSTEM IN THE WORLD;
AND HAS JUST MODERNIZED IT. IT POSSESSES THE ONLY
OPERATIONAL ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEM IN THE WORLD AND WAS
THE FIRST TO DESTROY A SATELLITE IN SPACE. IT IS
ESTIMATED THAT ONLY 10 PERCENT OF ALL SOVIET SATELLITES
ARE FREE OF A MILITARY FUNCTION; AND THAT PERHAPS HALF
OF ALL SOVIET MILITARY SATELLITES ARE INVOLVED IN
TARGETING U.S. NAVAL FORCES. IT HAS THE MOST
COMPREHENSIVE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM IN THE WORLD. AND IT
HAS SPENT ENORMOUS RESOURCES ON PASSIVE DEFENSES TO
PROTECT ITS LEADERSHIP, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS,
INDUSTRY AND POPULATION.

FURTHERMORE, THE SOVIETS ARE PROCEEDING WITH AN
INTENSIFIED PROGRAM OF RESEARCH ON THEIR OWN VERSION OF
SDI. IN MANY CASES THIS RESEARCH STARTS FROM AN
ADVANCED TECHNOLOGICAL BASE. THEIR RESEARCH IN LASERS
IS HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED; INDEED, AN AMERICAN AND TWO
SOVIET SCIENTISTS SHARED A NOBEL PRIZE FOR THE INVENTION
OF THE LASER. IT IS THUS IRONIC AND, OF COURSE,
UNACCEPTABLE TO US THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS DEVOTING ITS
TOP PRIORITY TO BANNING OUR SDI RESEARCH WHILE ALLOWING
SOVIET RESEARCH TO PROCEED.

THESE REALITIES -- THE SOVIET BUILDUP, SOVIET CHEATING,
MASSIVE SOVIET DEFENSE STRENGTH, AND A SOVIET SDI
PROGRAM -- ARE AT THE BASE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S
DECISION TO INTENSIFY RESEARCH ON STRATEGIC DEFENSES.
IT WOULD BE HIGHLY IMPRUDENT FOR ANY AMERICAN PRESIDENT

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BRUSSE 13141 03 OF 06 181438Z
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UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 06 BRUSSELS 13141

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED SECSTATE TO ADDRESSEES)

USIA

USIA FOR P/PFE (KONIG)

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: TEXT OF AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN'S SPEECH TO THE

NOT TO PURSUE SUCH RESEARCH.

WHAT WE ARE UNDERTAKING IS AT PRESENT ONLY A RESEARCH PROGRAM. A DECISION ON WHETHER TO MOVE AHEAD WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC DEFENSES IS PROBABLY YEARS AWAY; IT MIGHT BE MADE BY PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SUCCESSOR, BUT IT WILL SURELY NOT BE READY TO BE MADE BY PRESIDENT REAGAN HIMSELF. NOR IS THE DECISION FOREORDAINED. THERE ARE AMPLE EXAMPLES OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS FOR WHICH RESEARCH WAS COMPLETED BUT WHICH WERE NOT DEPLOYED OR MAINTAINED. (THE B-70 BOMBER AND OUR OWN ABM SYSTEM ARE TWO SUCH EXAMPLES.) WE WILL NOT DECIDE ON SDI WITHOUT ADDITIONAL THOROUGH DISCUSSIONS AND CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES. WE BELIEVE FIRMLY IN THE STRATEGIC UNITY OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. SDI MUST BE A FACTOR WHICH STRENGTHENS THAT UNITY.

IN A RECENT ARTICLE IN PRAVDA, SOVIET MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV ASSERTED THAT SDI IS "INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE PRINCIPLES FORMING THE FOUNDATION OF THE ABM TREATY." LET ME SET AGAINST THIS CHARGE THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS STATEMENT OF A MAN FOR WHOM MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV ONCE WORKED. IN 1972, DEFENSE MINISTER GRECHKO SAID THAT THE ABM TREATY "IMPOSES NO LIMITATIONS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTAL WORK AIMED AT RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF DEFENDING THE COUNTRY AGAINST NUCLEAR MISSILE ATTACK." OUR PROGRAM IS BY NO MEANS A VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY OR OF ANY OTHER INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION WE HAVE ASSUMED.

FINALLY, WHAT IF WE DECIDE -- SOME YEARS FROM NOW, AFTER OUR RESEARCH IS COMPLETED, IN CONSULTATION WITH OUR ALLIES -- THAT STRATEGIC DEFENSES ARE FEASIBLE AND WOULD MAKE FOR A SAFER WORLD? WE WOULD WANT TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON HOW DETERRENCE FOR BOTH OF US MIGHT BE STRENGTHENED THROUGH A MUTUAL SHARING OF THE BENEFITS OF TECHNOLOGY AND THROUGH THE PHASED INTRODUCTION OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS INTO THE FORCE STRUCTURES OF BOTH SIDES. WE HAVE, IN FACT, OFFERED TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT NOW.

SOME HOLD THAT THE APPLICATION OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPON SYSTEMS IS A THREAT TO PEACE; THAT WE ARE BUILDING UP ARSENALS OF EVER LARGER AND MORE DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS. IN FACT, TECHNOLOGY HAS PERMITTED US TO REPLACE LARGE AND WIDELY DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS WITH SMALL AND DISCRIMINATING ONES. DURING THE PAST TWENTY YEARS, THE U.S. HAS ELIMINATED MORE THAN 8000 WEAPONS FROM OUR ARSENAL. WE HAVE REMOVED MORE THAN

2000 NUCLEAR TACTICAL WARHEADS FROM EUROPE. WE HAVE REDUCED THE ACTUAL DELIVERABLE EXPLOSIVE CAPACITY OF OUR NUCLEAR BOMBS AND MISSILES BY MORE THAN 50 PERCENT. WE HAVE PRACTICALLY ELIMINATED THE RISK OF A COINCIDENTAL DETONATION OF ANY OF OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS; THERE IS TODAY LESS DANGER THAT A TERRORIST COULD DETONATE A BOMB EVEN IF HE GOT HOLD OF IT. THIS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WITHOUT NUCLEAR TESTING AND EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY. INDEED, HAD WE ENTERED INTO A TESTING BAN OR MORATORIUM TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AGO, WE WOULD TODAY BE LESS SECURE AND NUCLEAR STOCKPILES WOULD STILL CONSIST OF THE VULNERABLE, INACCURATE AND GROSSLY DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONRY OF THAT ERA.

WE SEE OUR STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE AND OUR PROPOSALS IN GENEVA AS DESIGNED TO HELP US ALL MOVE TOWARD PEACEFUL AND STABLE COOPERATION IN SPACE. OUR OBJECTIVE, INDEED, MUST BE "MUTUAL SECURITY." UNDERSTANDING BOTH THE OPPORTUNITIES AND THE DANGERS OF SPACE, WE MUST LOOK FOR A WAY OF FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERING THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS. THE UNITED STATES SEEKS TO STRESS THE COMMON SECURITY INGREDIENTS OF ITS PROGRAM. WE LOOK FOR A CHANGED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR. OUR EFFORT IS TO LEAP OVER THE LIMITATIONS OF TRADITIONAL ARMS CONTROL.

WE KNOW THAT UNILATERAL SECURITY CAN NO LONGER BE ACHIEVED, EITHER BY UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WORLD OR BY UNILATERAL ATTEMPTS TO ACHIEVE IMPREGNABILITY. WE NEED TO REACH TOWARD AN AGREEMENT IN WHICH THERE IS AN ACCEPTANCE OF MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE LIVES OF PEOPLE IN ALL OF OUR COUNTRIES. WE SEEK THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPABILITIES THAT COULD HELP PROTECT ALL OF US FROM NUCLEAR ATTACK. WE ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT MUTUAL "TRUST." WE ARE LOOKING FOR AN ALTERATION IN THE

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BRUSSE 13141 04 OF 06 181441Z
ACTION EUR-00

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INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 INR-10 SS-00 IO-19 PM-10 PA-02
ACDA-12 SARN-01 SDEL-03 SART-01 /059 W
-----017330 181455Z /41

O 171845Z SEP 86 ZEL
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0116
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
SECSTATE WASHDC 4693

UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 06 BRUSSELS 13141

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED SECSTATE TO ADDRESSEES)

USIA

USIA FOR P/PFE (KONIG)

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: TEXT OF AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN'S SPEECH TO THE

FRAMEWORK OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

THE PICTURE I HAVE PAINTED FOR YOU IS NOT A
REVOLUTIONARY PICTURE. TRUE, IT IS A PICTURE OF
REVOLUTIONARY TECHNOLOGIES -- TECHNOLOGIES WHICH EXCITE
SCIENTISTS AND LAYMEN ALIKE ABOUT THE EXPANDING FRONTIER
FOR MAN'S GENIUS. BUT IT IS NOT A PICTURE OF
REVOLUTIONARY OBJECTIVES. OUR OBJECTIVE REMAINS A SAFER
AND MORE STABLE WORLD. NOR IS IT A PICTURE OF
REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGIES -- THE STRATEGY SDI REMAINS
NATO'S ACCEPTED STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE. AND IT IS NOT A
PICTURE OF REVOLUTIONARY RELATIONSHIPS -- OUR
PARTNERSHIP WITH OUR ALLIES REMAINS THE CORNERSTONE OF
OUR EFFORTS IN SDI, AS IN ALL OTHER ELEMENTS OF OUR
STRATEGIC POLICIES.

IT IS APPROPRIATE HERE IN BRUSSELS, TO REAFFIRM THE
IMPORTANCE OF NATO TO WESTERN SECURITY AND TO SECURITY
IN THE WORLD. BECAUSE OF NATO AND BECAUSE OF ITS
STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE, EUROPE HAS ENJOYED THE LONGEST
PERIOD OF PEACE IN ITS MODERN HISTORY. THE REALITIES,
OUR COMMON EXPERIENCE, AND, PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, OUR
CHERISHED COMMON HUMAN VALUES KEEP US IN NATO AND KEEP
NATO STRONG. WE KNOW THAT THE STRENGTH OF OUR UNITY IS
OUR BEST CHANCE FOR ACHIEVING THE PEACE WITH DIGNITY
THAT ALL PEOPLES SEEK.

IN SEEKING PEACE WE CANNOT IGNORE THE BASIC CAUSES OF
TENSIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE
SHAMEFUL HOSTAGE TAKING OF MR. DANILOFF, SOVIET CRUELTY
TO DR. SAKHAROV, INCREASED SIGNS OF SOVIET ANTI-SEMITISM
-- ALL THESE REMIND US OF THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET
REGIME AND ITS DEPENDENCE ON BRUTE POWER RATHER THAN
CONSENT TO GOVERN. WE ARE PREPARED TO COMPETE WITH ONE
ANOTHER. WE WANT IT TO BE A COMPETITION FOR HEARTS AND
MINDS. WE MUST AVOID A COMPETITION THAT BRINGS THE
WORLD TO THE EDGE OF CATASTROPHE.

HENRY KISSINGER RECENTLY DEFINED THE FUNDAMENTAL
CHALLENGE TO THE FREE WORLD AS "THE GROUND RULES"
GOVERNING SOVIET INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR, THAT
"EVERYTHING THAT HAS BECOME COMMUNIST REMAINS FOREVER
INVIOLENT" AND "EVERYTHING THAT IS NOT COMMUNIST IS OPEN
TO CHANGE BY PRESSURE, BY SUBVERSION, BY GUERRILLA
ACTION AND, IF NECESSARY, BY TERROR." GORBACHEV
RECENTLY REAFFIRMED THIS DANGEROUS SOVIET PRINCIPLE IN
HIS WARSAW SPEECH, WHERE HE PROCLAIMED THAT "SOCIALIST
GAINS ARE IRREVERSIBLE" AND WARNED THAT AN EFFORT TO

"UNDERMINE" THEIR "INTERNATIONAL... SOCIALIST COMMUNITY"
WOULD THREATEN PEACE.

THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES AND GOVERNMENTS OF THE WORLD
CANNOT ACCEPT AND MUST REJECT A SOVIET DOCTRINE WHICH
CLAIMS FOR ITSELF THE RIGHT TO USE FORCE AGAINST STATES
IF THERE ARE GROUPS WITHIN THOSE STATES WHO SEEK TO TURN
THOSE REGIMES INTO COMMUNIST ONES. WE SIMILARLY REJECT
THE RELATED SOVIET DOCTRINE THAT IT HAS THE RIGHT TO USE
FORCE TO KEEP SO-CALLED "SOCIALIST" COUNTRIES WITHIN ITS
IDEOLOGICAL AND PRACTICAL CONTROL. WE REJECT THE CLAIM
THAT THE SOVIET REGIME CAN PROPAGATE ITS FAITH WITH THE
SWORD. THE SO-CALLED BREZHNEV DOCTRINE IS REMINISCENT
OF THE 19TH CENTURY RUSSIAN CZARS WHO WERE NOTORIOUS FOR
THEIR FORCEFUL SUPPRESSION OF ALL NATIONALIST STIRRINGS
IN EASTERN EUROPE. LENIN CALLED THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE "A
PRISON OF NATIONS." LENIN'S HEIRS NOW CALL IT "A
SOCIALIST COMMUNITY." IT IS THE SAME. THE FACT THAT
THE SOVIET UNION IS A SELF-PROCLAIMED LENINIST STATE
DOES CONCERN US. A CENTERPIECE OF LENINIST DOCTRINE HAS
BEEN THE "IRRECONCILABILITY" OF THE TWO SYSTEMS AND THE
"INEVITABILITY" OF WAR AND VIOLENCE AS THE INSTRUMENT TO
ACHIEVE THEIR NEW SOCIETY. AS LONG AS THAT THEOLOGY
INFLUENCES THE BEHAVIOR OF THE SOVIET UNION, WE MUST
RECOGNIZE ITS THREAT TO OUR VALUES AND OUR SECURITY.

THE SOVIET UNION IS THE LAST REMAINING EMPIRE OF OUR
DAY. ITS EMPIRE CONSISTS OF FORMER STATES NOW ABSORBED
WITHIN SOVIET GEOPOLITICAL BOUNDARIES; CONTIGUOUS
EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES PLUS OTHER STATES IT WOULD LIKE
TO ADD; AND STATES IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE WORLD OVER
WHICH IT EXERCISES CONTROL. IN THE LATTER GROUP,
VIETNAM, CUBA, AND POTENTIALLY NICARAGUA ARE
PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO THE EMPIRE, BECAUSE THEY
PROVIDE BASES FOR SOVIET FORCES IN THE CHINA SEA, INDIAN

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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BRUSSE 13141 05 OF 06 181443Z
ACTION EUR-00

5824

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 INR-10 SS-00 IO-19 PM-10 PA-02
ACDA-12 SARN-01 SDEL-03 SART-01 /059 W
-----017405 181456Z /41

O 171845Z SEP 86 ZEL
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0117
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
SECSTATE WASHDC 4694

UNCLAS SECTION 05 OF 06 BRUSSELS 13141

USIA

USIA FOR P/PFE (KONIG)

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: TEXT OF AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN'S SPEECH TO THE

OCEAN AND ATLANTIC. AFGHANISTAN IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF
THE STRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT AIR BASES IT PROVIDES;
WHILE ETHIOPIA AND SOUTH YEMEN PROVIDE VITAL STAGING
AREAS OF VALUE TO THE SOVIET AIR FORCE.

IMPERIALISM HAS A HIGH PRICE TAG ASSOCIATED WITH IT.
THE WEST LEARNED THAT THE PRICE IS TOO HIGH. THAT
CONCLUSION HAS APPARENTLY NOT YET BEEN REACHED BY THE
SOVIET ELITE, ALTHOUGH THE RAND CORPORATION ESTIMATES
THAT IN 1981, THAT FINANCIAL PRICE REACHED A HEIGHT OF
44 BILLION DOLLARS.

THE COSTS OF EMPIRE ARE HIGH. THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS NOT
WORKING WELL. NEVERTHELESS, IT WOULD BE FOOLHARDY TO
UNDERESTIMATE THE STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET UNION OR ITS
THREAT TO PEACE. ITS ECONOMY IS WORKING WELL ENOUGH SO
AS TO PERMIT THE SOVIET UNION TO HAVE A FUNCTIONING
SOCIETY, MASSIVE MILITARY POWER, AN AWESOME INTERNAL
POLICE FORCE, AND A PRESENCE THAT REACHES ALL PARTS OF
THE WORLD.

WE HOPE THE TIME WILL SOON COME WHEN SOVIET AUTHORITIES
COMPREHEND THAT REPRESSIVE SOCIETIES IN OUR DAY CANNOT
ACHIEVE INNER STABILITY OR TRUE SECURITY. WE HOPE THE
LEADERSHIP OF THE SOVIET UNION WILL COME TO ACCEPT THAT
IT IS IN ITS BEST INTEREST TO PERMIT A HUMANIZING
PROCESS TO TAKE PLACE WITHIN ITS SOCIETY. WE HOPE THEY
WILL COME TO UNDERSTAND THE NEED TO SHOW THE REST OF US
THAT CRUELTY IS NOT INDISPENSABLE TO THEIR SYSTEM. WE
HOPE THEY WILL COME TO REALIZE THAT THE LENINIST AIM OF
ACHIEVING COMMUNISM THROUGH VIOLENCE HAS NO PLACE IN
THIS NUCLEAR AGE. WE HOPE SOVIET AUTHORITIES WILL JOIN
US IN THE COMMITMENT THAT OUR SURVIVAL AS A CIVILIZATION
DEPENDS ON THE MUTUAL REALIZATION THAT WE MUST LIVE
UNDER RULES OF RESPONSIBLE INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR. WE
HOPE, BUT WE CANNOT TRUST.

OUR MILITARY STRENGTH WILL HELP DETER THE USE OF
MILITARY FORCE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS OUR STRATEGIC DEFENSES
WILL FILL THAT ROLE. A PROFOUND FAITH THAT OUR HUMAN
VALUES REPRESENT THE ASPIRATIONS OF ALL PEOPLE ADDS
IMMEASURABLY TO OUR STRENGTH.

OUR OWN ACTIVITIES AND BEHAVIOR AS FREE GOVERNMENTS AND
PEOPLE CAN HELP INFLUENCE THE SOVIET ELITE TO CHANGE ITS
AGENDA. DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES ARE AFTER ALL, THOSE BY
WHICH THE SOVIET UNION MEASURES ITSELF. THEY NOT ONLY
SEEK OUR TECHNOLOGY, BUT ALSO TAKE OUR TERMINOLOGY AND
TRY TO CLOAK THEMSELVES WITH WORDS OF "DEMOCRACY" AND

"HUMAN RIGHTS." WE HAVE LONG BEEN AWARE OF A LOVE-HATE
FASCINATION THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD WITH WESTERN
CULTURE. OUR TASK, THEREFORE, IS, THROUGH OUR ACTIONS
AND STATEMENTS, TO ATTEMPT TO MODIFY AND RESIST EXTERNAL
SOVIET POWER AT THE SAME TIME AS WE TRY TO ENCOURAGE THE
INNER EMERGENCE OF THE FULLER, FREER, CIVIL SOCIETY, ONE
THAT INDEED SATISFIES THE DEEPEST ASPIRATIONS OF THE
RUSSIAN PEOPLES.

OUR MESSAGE MUST BE THAT NEITHER WE NOR THE SOVIETS CAN
ACCEPT TODAY'S REALITY OF TENSION AND THREATENING
INSTABILITY WITHOUT SEEKING TO CHANGE IT. THE TASK OF
THE DEMOCRACIES OF THE WORLD IS TO EXERCISE THE
LEADERSHIP NECESSARY TO DEVELOP ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF
CONFLICT RESOLUTION. WE NEED TO DEVELOP A SENSE OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMUNITY. WE NEED A WAY OF
RESOLVING REGIONAL PROBLEMS. WE NEED A COOPERATIVE
EFFORT TO ELIMINATE HUNGER FROM THE WORLD AND TO FOSTER
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. WE NEED VITALLY AND PROFOUNDLY TO
ASSURE BASIC HUMAN DIGNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR PEOPLES
ALL OVER THE WORLD.

MILOVAN DJILAS, THE OUTSTANDING YUGOSLAVIAN THINKER,
WRITER AND DISSIDENT, RECENTLY GAVE AN INTERVIEW IN
BELGRADE IN WHICH HE SAID:

"PEACE WILL ONLY BE PRESERVED AS LONG AS THE FREE
DEMOCRATIC NATIONS ARE MILITARILY STRONG AND DETERMINED
ENOUGH TO RESIST THE EXPANSIONISTIC DRIVE OF SOVIET
IMPERIALISM... THE WEST MUST BE STRONG IN THE MILITARY
SENSE ALL THE TIME BUT ALSO IN THE FIELD OF IDEAS... WE
NEED TO BE STRONGER IN EVERY WAY, NOT AGGRESSIVE, NOR
PROVOCATIVE, BUT STRONGER. WE MUST NEGOTIATE, BUT
WITHOUT ANY ILLUSION... THE WEST HAS FORGOTTEN THAT

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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 BRUSSE 13141 06 OF 06 181444Z
ACTION EUR-00

5833

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 INR-10 SS-00 IO-19 PM-10 PA-02
ACDA-12 SARN-01 SDEL-03 SART-01 /059 W
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O 171845Z SEP 86 ZEL
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0118
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
SECSTATE WASHDC 4695

UNCLAS SECTION 06 OF 06 BRUSSELS 13141

USIA

USIA FOR P/PFE (KONIG)

E. O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: TEXT OF AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN'S SPEECH TO THE

MOLOTOV WAS ALWAYS DRESSED IN THE LATEST EUROPEAN
FASHION AND STALIN WAS SMOKING HIS DUNHILL PIPE!"

WE ALL REMEMBER THAT ANDREI SAKHAROV, IN THE 1975 NOBEL
PRIZE SPEECH THAT HE WAS NOT PERMITTED TO PRESENT IN
PERSON, SAID:

"I AM CONVINCED THAT INTERNATIONAL TRUST, MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING, DISARMAMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
ARE INCONCEIVABLE WITHOUT AN OPEN SOCIETY WITH FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION, FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE, THE RIGHT TO
PUBLISH, AND THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND CHOOSE THE COUNTRY
IN WHICH ONE WISHES TO LIVE."

TO NEGOTIATE IS RISKY. IT IS, IN THE WORDS OF HUBERT
HUMPHREY, SOMETHING LIKE CROSSING A RIVER BY WALKING ON
SLIPPERY ROCKS. THE POSSIBILITY OF DISASTER IS ON EVERY
SIDE, BUT IT IS THE ONLY WAY TO GET ACROSS. THE OBJECT
OF DIPLOMACY IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, INDEED THE SUPREME
ACHIEVEMENT OF STATESMANSHIP, IS PATIENTLY, THROUGH
NEGOTIATION, TO PURSUE THE PEACE WE SEEK AT THE SAME
TIME AS WE PROTECT OUR VITAL NATIONAL INTERESTS AND
VALUES.

WE TRUST OUR NEGOTIATING EFFORTS WILL PRODUCE RESULTS.
BY THE NATURE AND COMPLEXITY OF THE ISSUES WE FACE,
HOWEVER, WE MUST ALSO APPRECIATE THAT EVEN WITH
AGREEMENT, WE WILL STILL BE NEARER TO THE BEGINNING THAN
TO THE END OF OUR PURSUIT. OUR EFFORT MUST BE TO
PERSUADE THOSE WHO TODAY LEAD THE SOVIET UNION THAT JUST
AS THE TWO SIDES OF THE HUMAN BRAIN, THE RIGHT AND THE
LEFT, ADJUST THEIR INDIVIDUAL ROLES WITHIN THE BODY TO
MAKE A COORDINATED AND FUNCTIONING WHOLE, SO MUST
HEMISPHERES OF THE BODY-POLITIC, NORTH AND SOUTH, EAST
AND WEST, RIGHT AND LEFT, LEARN TO HARMONIZE THEIR
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A WHOLE THAT IS HEALTHY AND
CONSTRUCTIVE AND COORDINATED IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE
WITH LIBERTY.

THAT IS THE COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

THANK YOU.

3. END TEXT

SNOW

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