



## Max M. Kampelman Papers

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STATEMENT BY  
MAX M. KAMPELMAN  
BEFORE THE  
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE  
MAY 18, 1989

Thank you Mr. Chairman. It is a privilege for me to accept your invitation to testify before this Committee today on the important subject of arms control and the direction it should take. My testimony will be based on my experiences. It will be brief, serve as a foundation for our discussion, and I would welcome any questions that it may suggest. My appearances, both formal and informal, before your Committee have always been stimulating and constructive. I have no hesitation in stating that the frequent visits to Geneva by you and your colleagues, Mr. Chairman, were of significant value to me and to my associates there.

I am pleased to note that the President and Secretary of State are going forward with the negotiations that were underway when they assumed office on January 20. In the Nuclear and Space talks, we had completed, with the assistance of the Senate, an INF Treaty which reduced to zero all nuclear missiles having a range of 500-5500 kilometers. In the

strategic area covering ranges above 5500 kilometers, we had arrived at a joint draft text of a treaty that was more than 300 pages long with a fair amount of significantly agreed language and with brackets reflecting differences.. It is my understanding that when these negotiations renew in late June, the joint draft text will continue to be the basis for the talks, which I consider to be a tribute to the intensive care and work that went into its writing.

In Geneva, there were additional talks underway dealing with nuclear testing. It is my understanding that these talks, which may well be near conclusion, will also be continued. It is my hope that they will, in the near future, result in a text which will permit the Senate to ratify the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET) and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT).

It is not my intent to discuss here the issue of ballistic missile proliferation, chemical weapons or conventional forces other than to note with approval that these talks are proceeding as well.

There has been some criticism of the Administration because of the delay in renewing the Geneva talks. I do not share that criticism, although I obviously would have preferred an earlier start to keep a momentum going. It is important

that the new administration be firmly committed to every aspect of the proposed START Treaty that we began drafting in 1985. The issues are complicated; many are novel. In the main, we were dealing with security problems that no nation ever had to face before. John Tower, Ron Lehman, Reed Hanmer and the rest of us who worked on the Treaty believed that what we were producing was in our national interest and reflected the judgments of President Reagan and the recommendations of his advisors. It is President Bush and Secretaries Baker and Cheney, however, who will have to defend that Treaty before this Committee should one evolve out of the negotiations. That Treaty must, therefore, reflect their views and convictions so that they can speak with certainty as they defend their recommendations to the Senate. There was no need for haste. There was a need for care and I have every reason to believe that the Administration's review proceeded conscientiously and responsibly.

The present text of the proposed START Treaty Agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union provides for approximately 50% reductions in the most destabilizing of our weapon systems together with the throw weight associated with them. The negotiations produced a series of significantly intrusive verification, inspection, and data exchange provisions which were in our interest. That

process was not completed and will be a primary subject of the negotiations that are continuing. That which has been completed is a product of full inter-agency participation, close consultation with the Congress, and serious discussion with our Allies. I do not believe that the provisions already agreed upon need to be significantly revised and to do so would invite a Soviet reexamination of other provisions and a pressure for concessions not in our interest to make.

The key remaining areas to be negotiated in Geneva will deal primarily with mobility, air launched cruise missiles (ACLM), and further verification specificity. The Soviets would add sea-launched cruise missiles to the list of outstanding issues. We all, I believe, understand the need to permit and limit land mobile ICBMs accompanied by a reasonable verification regime. Our objective is to encourage movement on both sides toward less vulnerable systems. It is urgent that the Senate, the House and the President come to an agreement on what the American land based mobile ICBM system will be and how to improve its survivability. In the ALCM field, we look for reasonable and equitable counting rules which will protect our ability to choose options for slower air breathing deterrent systems.

Let me say a word here about verification. Our goal should be to balance and reconcile necessary verification with

operational costs as we evaluate our national security interests. We need mutually reinforcing constraints to insure that no cheating of a militarily significant scale could occur without detection and adequate lead time for appropriate response. This is attainable.

In Geneva, the United States informed the Soviets that we could not conclude a strategic arms reduction agreement without a satisfactory resolution of the Krasnoyarsk radar problem. I hope and believe this policy will continue.

It is my opinion that a START agreement is desirable and obtainable within the next year without crippling the ability of our country to proceed with its strategic defense initiative study, research and exploration. It will, however, probably be necessary for us to agree not to deploy any SDI system for a designated period of time. The real problem in this area of defense, in my opinion, is not the SDI program. The fundamental question is much wider in scope and must be addressed. New technologies will continue to emerge and it is essential that we and the U.S.S.R. find mechanisms to deal with these new developments in a stabilizing fashion. Talks in this direction require broad exchanges on the political, military, technological and scientific levels of our two countries. They will take time. The START Treaty should stand on its own merit and should not be held hostage to those essential talks

dealing with strategic defenses and the impact of new technologies on our respective military forces.

In this connection, let me also say that a START Treaty with the reductions being contemplated should not be held hostage to the conventional arms reduction talks now underway in Vienna. I would, however, not wish to proceed with START reductions deeper than the 50% reductions now on the table without first being assured of greater conventional parity at reduced levels on the European continent.

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SENATE  
TETTER

STATEMENT BY PAUL H. NITZE  
May 17, 1989

before the  
Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science  
and the  
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East

The Honorable Paul H. Nitze,  
The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies  
of the Johns Hopkins University

Mr. Chairman:

It is a pleasure to appear before your Committee. Rather than prepare a separate statement, it seemed to me best to utilize an article by me which appeared last Sunday in the Outlook Section of The Washington Post. It covered my views on the subject matter in which I understand your Committee is interested. In my oral remarks I will summarize some of the material, but for the record I submit it in its entirety.

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From the early days of NATO forty years ago, it has often been charged that NATO was an alliance in disarray. And often the charge appeared to be well-founded, particularly when Gen. Charles de Gaulle withdrew France from the NATO military organization (though not from the North Atlantic Treaty). But these differences, though serious, could in time be worked out and did not result in a shattering of the alliance.

Today's controversy with the German government concerning negotiations with the Soviets on "short-range nuclear missiles" could be much more serious. The continental European countries are backing Germany against the Anglo-Saxons -- President Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker III, prodded by an adamant British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

There has long been a tension in U.S. policy toward Europe between the special relationship between England and America developed by Churchill and Roosevelt during World War II and the fact that the sector crucial to the defense of NATO is the central front on the continent of Europe. Partially as a result of the latter fact, Germany and France have been at the heart of our European policy during the post-war years.



When England and the United States join in hectoring demands for action by the continental NATO countries, this is taken as unwarranted pressure by the Anglo-Saxons, who are not viewed by the continentals as being true Europeans. Furthermore, the uncompromising position of the Anglo-Saxons against any negotiations with the Soviets about short-range missiles -- while concurrently demanding that West Germany some time in the future agree to modernization of our Lance missiles in Germany -- is politically unacceptable to the German government. The Germans are being backed by the other NATO continental European powers. Unless a compromise can be found, those relationships can split the alliance with the serious consequences to NATO unity Gorbachev has long hoped would drop into his lap.

What should be done about all this? At the beginning of this administration, I outlined to Secretary of State Baker an approach that I thought could give us the initiative in working out a solution. My suggestion was that we talk to the German government, specifically to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and propose the following course of action:

Rather than refuse to negotiate with the Soviets on the subject of the zero-to-300-mile nuclear missiles deployed in Germany, I suggested we tell Kohl we would be prepared to ask the Soviets to participate in such negotiations under certain conditions. The first condition would be that Kohl and his government agree to stick to their long-standing position that they are firmly opposed to the total elimination of short-range nuclear ballistic missiles; second, that his government back us in seeking equal ceilings with the Soviets on such missiles at a level substantially above zero (preferably in the 200- to 300-missile range); and thirdly, that NATO as a whole support this initiative.

I emphasized that the current U.S. position of insisting on German agreement to modernize Lance while adamantly refusing to consider negotiations with the Soviets on the subject could not today be agreed to by any conceivable German government.

It has been argued, principally by Henry Kissinger, that to enter into a negotiation with the Soviets will inevitably result in agreeing to their possible demand for the total elimination of short-range missiles in Germany. To enter into a negotiation does not mean that we have to concur in the other side's demands. We have had twenty years of experience in demonstrating the reverse. It is true that a segment of German political opinion favors the unilateral dismantling of the short-range missiles on German soil and will continue to do so even if we enter into negotiations with the Soviets on the subject. But it is also true that a majority of Germans favor maintaining the alliance and remaining useful partners with the rest of NATO including the United States. It should be the objective of U.S. policy to

assist that majority, through our conduct, to prevail over the more politically active opposed groups.

There is another dimension to this issue -- the military dimension. The Soviets have a large number of short-range missile launchers; it is estimated that the number of their launchers capable of launching this type of missile is 1,400; by contrast, the United States is generally estimated to have about 88 such launchers. The Soviet launchers can launch a variety of missiles, some armed with high explosives, some with chemical weapons, some with nuclear weapons. (One estimate is that the Soviets can deploy some 3,000 such nuclear-armed missiles of a significantly longer range than our present Lance missiles.) And in the absence of any agreed limitation, the Soviets are in a position to increase their inventory to any level they may consider necessary. Is it really wise to allow the Soviets to retain an immense ratio of advantage in this category of weaponry?

(Gorbachev's offer last week to Secretary of State Baker to unilaterally reduce the number of Soviet short-range missiles by 284 will somewhat reduce the existing imbalance; but it does not negate the desirability of a negotiated equal solution to this problem.)

It is argued that a U.S. ability to initiate an exchange of nuclear weapons, however *even if disastrous if responded to with similar weapons* militarily ineffective, will add a necessary rung to the ladder of graduated nuclear deterrence. But is it not possible to use other nuclear weapons of any range desired, if all that is required is to be able to initiate a nuclear exchange? We have an inventory of such weapons of every conceivable range. The principal deterrent to war with the Soviet Union, including both conventional and nuclear war, must in the end rest on our diverse and survivable panoply of strategic forces.

Would not we and NATO be more secure with a low but equal ceiling on the short-range missiles of both sides? The Soviets may not agree to this, but why refuse negotiations aimed at such an outcome?

A further question has been raised by Sen. Sam Nunn, Rep. Les Aspin and others, concerning the timing of stabilizing conventional-force reductions relative to negotiation on the limitation of short-range nuclear missiles. They are correct in arguing that the principal reason NATO needs short-range nuclear weapons is the great superiority of Warsaw Pact conventional forces over NATO conventional forces. The argument over whether to negotiate reduced equal ceilings on short-range nuclear forces would disappear if Warsaw Pact and NATO conventional forces were reduced to equal levels. But if we were able to achieve agreement on equal levels of short-range nuclear missiles in

Europe at about the level I suggest we aim at, I see no reason why we should deny ourselves the benefit of the one-sided Soviet reductions implied by such an outcome until we have achieved a more ambitious (and I believe time-consuming) goal of conventional-force reductions.

Achieving "stabilizing reductions in conventional forces" is an important -- I believe the most important -- of NATO goals. We have spent years negotiating a mandate for such talks in the framework of the Helsinki process. Negotiations between NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact countries are about to begin. These negotiations are properly multilateral -- not bilateral between Washington and Moscow. On the NATO side, most of the conventional forces are non-U.S. forces; it would be improper for us to take over the negotiations from our NATO allies; they would resent any such American action.

Multilateral negotiations have historically taken much time. The Soviets some months ago announced a target of significant unilateral conventional-force reductions. But those reductions, if carried out, would still have left the Soviet Union with a dangerous superiority in tanks, self-propelled artillery and other important items. In Moscow last week during Baker's visit, Gorbachev announced a proposal for much deeper multilateral reductions in Europe. Whether this opens a prospect for a prompt resolution of these difficult problems will require intense study by NATO.

Behind the short-range missile issue is the question of whether the Soviet Union has really changed its spots. Should we try to encourage what appears to be constructive change in the Soviet Union, or should we be cautious until we know more? Will Gorbachev survive as the unquestioned arbiter of political decisions in the Soviet Communist Party and thus in the Soviet Union? If so, what will his objectives be, and if not, what direction will the Soviet Union take?

I doubt that this set of questions presents us with a real issue. We can both be cautious, not letting down our guard, and at the same time explore with the Soviets whether they are prepared to negotiate agreements which would, on balance, be helpful to us and acceptable to Gorbachev. Caution and exploration of the possible are not necessarily contradictory aims.

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Points on Gorbachev's Conventional/SNF Initiatives

-- This week's Soviet initiatives on conventional arms and SNF suggest that the Soviets are continuing to move in our direction -- although the initiatives differ considerably in terms of their constructiveness.

-- Until yesterday, the Warsaw Pact had not yet assigned specific numbers to the CFE proposal they made two months ago. It is good that they have now joined NATO in making a specific proposal.

-- The proposal still needs substantial clarification, and we need to analyze it carefully. But at first glance, it appears that the numbers they are proposing for tanks and infantry fighting vehicles look fairly close to numbers advanced by NATO. This apparent convergence in numbers is constructive. Their number for artillery is higher than NATO's. (Of course, the counting methods of both sides may differ quite a lot, and we must work to reconcile our approaches.)

-- Unfortunately, the Soviets still include categories in their proposal (manpower, helicopters, aircraft) that are not essential to CFE's objective of reducing capabilities best suited for seizing and holding territory.

-- In SNF, we have long maintained that the Soviets could contribute to stability by reducing their enormous advantages in this area. So their announcement of a withdrawal of 500 weapons is a step in the right direction.

-- In reality, however, the step is a very modest one. To put this in perspective, NATO has over the last decade unilaterally reduced its nuclear weapons by over 2400.

-- Also, it is worth noting that the Soviets have indicated an intention, at least so far, only to withdraw those 500 weapons from the territory of their allies, not to destroy them or even to remove them from the Atlantic-to-Urals area.

-- Moreover, the Soviet offer to withdraw all their tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of their allies is conditioned upon a step they know full well that NATO cannot accept -- the removal of all U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe (not just ground-based missiles -- the so-called third zero -- but all U.S. nuclear weapons).

-- So in contrast to the Soviet CFE proposal, which appears designed to find some common ground, the Soviet offer to remove all U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons from the territories of their allies seems designed only to appeal to public opinion.

**KEN ADELMAN**

The Washington Times

April 17, 1989

For  
SENATE  
TESTIMONY  
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