



## Max M. Kampelman Papers

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TESTIMONY OF MAX M. KAMPELMAN  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS  
U.S. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Washington, D.C.

May 10, 1991

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before your Committee this morning and I am grateful for your invitation. I appear before you in my individual capacity and not as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the United Nations Association.

The Middle East presents a troublesome set of challenges and it is appropriate that you seek to explore them within the context of the United Nations and its potential role. I regret to say that I believe the United Nations has, (I hope only temporarily), disqualified itself from playing a constructive role in those crucial challenges as they involve Israel. Its decision to follow the leadership of the Soviet Union in 1975 and declare that Zionism is racism was a clear demonstration of its bias and lack of reliability as either a mediating or conciliating force in that tense part of the world. It is fully understandable that Israel is suspicious of the U.N. role and strenuously resists its influence.

Efforts continue to be made to use the United Nations as an instrument of coercion designed to pressure Israel into acting in a manner which it reasonably perceives is contrary to its

security interests. The most recent such effort is to compare the presence of Israel in the West Bank with Iraq's forceful occupation and annexation of Kuwait. This effort is wrong as a matter of fact, policy and morality. It is also wrong as a matter of international law.

The prevailing international doctrine which defines disputes between the Palestinian Jews living in Israel and the Palestinian Arabs now living in the West Bank is Resolution 242 adopted by the Security Council after the 1967 Six Day War and reaffirmed by Resolution 338 adopted by the Security Council after the October 1973 war against Israel by its Arab neighbors. These resolutions are totally different in spirit, motivation and substance from the language of recently adopted Resolution 660 which called upon Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The Security Council in 1967 and in 1973 did not and had no reason to "condemn" Israel, or refer to an Israeli "invasion", or "demand" withdrawal from the West Bank, words and concepts that were correctly applied to Iraq.

The reason is that Israel had not, in 1967, invaded or committed an armed attack upon its neighbors. It was, in fact, itself at the time the victim of aggression by the Arab states. What 242 did was express Israel's right to "live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force" as a fundamental basis for a negotiation designed to bring peace to the area.

Israel, the Security Council implicitly recognized, had become in effect the legitimate administrator of the West Bank since it was holding that area as a result of acquiring it in a defensive war. We should remember that the war followed Egypt's demand that the United Nations remove its peace keeping forces from the armistice line established in 1949, a demand which the U.N. complied with, thereby further undermining Israel's confidence in that international body as a bona fide peace keeping force. Israel's Arab neighbors were not satisfied with that armistice line of 1949 and resorted to violence just as they earlier refused to accept the fact of Israel's recognition as a state by the United Nations and then launched a military attack against Israel in an effort to destroy it.

When some experts and sloganeers call for a return to the pre-1967 borders, it is this 1949 armistice line which they have in mind. Yet, being within those borders from 1949 to 1967 did not bring Israel peace, only war and threats of war. Furthermore, that 1949 armistice line was just that, a temporary line to hold a temporary truce while more serious negotiations were to establish permanent political borders. That limited area, we should note, is substantially less than 20% of the land originally designated by the League of Nations to serve as the Jewish national homeland. Jordan today occupies 80% of that originally designated area; and Jordan is today populated by a majority of Palestinian Arabs.

This understanding of 242 was publicly affirmed by Secretary of State William Rogers on a number of occasions when he specifically stated that the 1949 armistice lines were not final political boundaries. Final borders had to be established by negotiation. That was and remains the case. Until that negotiation is completed and Israel's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats is realized, Israel has every right under international law to administer, as it is doing, the West Bank and Gaza areas, the land taken in 1967.

Resolution 242 specifically provides that as part of the peace process evolving from the anticipated negotiations, Israel should withdraw "from territories occupied in the recent conflict" to "secure and recognized borders." A strenuous effort was made at the time to have the resolution refer to "all the territories." After a long debate, the words "all" and "the" were omitted from the formulation, so that at no time does that resolution require Israel to withdraw from "all the" territories. The timing and extent of any such withdrawal was to depend on the negotiation to take place. Thus, the slogan "territory for peace" is not mentioned in 242 and is not a principle or requirement of that resolution. It is an option that might or might not result from the negotiation. Israel has, of course, already withdrawn from about 90% of the territory when it withdrew from the Sinai after successful

negotiations with Egypt. Whether it withdraws from any more or all or none of the remaining area depends on further negotiations on the question and on the assurances Israel does or does not receive that it can live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats of force.

Let me add a further brief word of history with respect to the area of the West Bank and Gaza. I realize that facts sometimes get in the way of rhetoric, but fantasy is not likely to solve this problem and there has been too much of it. There is today no recognized legitimate sovereign over the territory. The last recognized sovereign was the Ottoman Empire. Jordan made an attempt at annexation in 1951, but the world community rejected that effort and Jordan no longer makes the claim. The area in no sense can be characterized as "Arab land" any more than it can be characterized today legally as "Jewish land". Both Arabs and Jews reside there.

Israel, as the only democracy in the area, finds itself subject to democratic restraints not shared by its neighbors and potential negotiating partners. Its political system is highly sensitive to public opinion and its prime minister and cabinet can never be free from considering the political implications of decisions it must make or abstain from making.

The permeating influence within Israel is that of its insecurity. The public, for example, is deeply divided on the slogan of "land for peace" not because there is any difference of opinion on the desirability of peace, but because there is a difference of opinion as to whether Israel's withdrawal from land would produce peace or simply produce a military advantage to its adversaries. All of this inhibits flexibility on the part of Israel's leadership.

There is apparently an agreement on the part of all major forces within Israel that it must have enough military superiority to defend itself from attack. It seeks to create buffer zones and it resists proposals, for example, to return the Golan Heights to Syria, or to establish an independent Palestinian state within a part or all of the West Bank and Gaza, or to permit Syria to extend its control in Lebanon to that part of southern Lebanon which borders Israel.

We have here a complex problem surrounded by historical contradictions, legal ambiguities and political aspirations all of which are intensified by deep emotional experiences and convictions. I suggest that the primary task for the U.S. is not to try to impose hasty solutions. It is rather to encourage small confidence building steps between representatives of all the parties who are prepared to enter a relationship in which compromises are possible. Our task is to discourage violence

and, indeed, attempt to prohibit it. It is to be patient and persistent in the pursuit of that process.

The need to build confidence is clear. This should be the main thrust of a constructive American policy in the area. It is the surest way to establish a foundation for agreement. Short cuts will not work. Indignation and anger will not succeed. Creative and imaginative leadership is now what is required on the part of our country, the strongest and most respected in the world.

We should address ourselves to the issue of armaments. The Arabs have every reason to be concerned about Israel's technological superiority in weapon development. A ban on the massive international arms trade aimed at the Middle East would provide assurances that there will also be a cap on that technology. Similarly, Israel cannot afford to continue to place so much of its resources into arms, particularly at a time when it is carrying the immense burden of absorbing hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union who require housing and employment opportunities within an expanded economy.

It makes no sense for us, at this time, to be supplying sophisticated additional arms to any country in the Middle East. We should organize an international effort to withhold such sales for the next eighteen months, for example, while we proceed to stimulate negotiations in this area. The fact that



Syria, since the end of the recent Gulf War has acquired and is continuing to acquire massive amounts of new weapons of destruction only serves further to handicap the peace process we are seeking to advance.

The list of potentially valuable confidence building measures is a long one. The Middle East in its entirety must be persuaded to appreciate that each of the countries and peoples in the area have a great deal to gain from economic and scientific cooperation. Disease must be conquered -- food must be produced -- water must be supplied and distributed -- trade must be encouraged.

The attainment of these goals and of the fruits of modern technology requires cooperation among all who reside in the area. The task of the U.S. as the respected world leader and exemplar is to help establish a community of interest in the region. Within that broader context, it is time that the Arab Palestinians, who continue to face discrimination in the Arab world they inhabit, join forces with the Jewish Palestinians in a joint effort to make the entire region a land of milk and honey. No two peoples are more energetic and creative.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I trust that your efforts and those of your Committee will help stimulate us on the path to peace.

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The Middle East presents a troublesome set of challenges and it is appropriate that you seek to explore them within the context of the United Nations and its potential role. I regret to say that I believe the United Nations has, (I hope only temporarily), disqualified itself from playing a constructive role in those crucial <sup>CHALLENGES AS THEY</sup> ~~changes involving~~ Israel. Its decision to follow the leadership of the Soviet Union in 1975 and declare that Zionism is racism was a clear demonstration of its bias and lack of reliability as either a mediating or conciliating force in that tense part of the world. It is fully understandable that Israel is suspicious of the U.N. role and strenuously resists its influence.

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✓ The Security Council in 1967 and in 1973 did not <sup>AND HAD NO REASON TO</sup> ~~in any way~~ "condemn" Israel, or refer to an Israeli "invasion", or "demand" withdrawal from the West Bank, words and concepts that were correctly applied to Iraq.

The reason is that Israel had not, in 1967, invaded or committed an armed attack upon its neighbors. It was, in fact, itself at the time the victim of aggression by the Arab states. What 242 did was express Israel's right to "live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force" as a fundamental basis for a negotiation designed to bring peace to the area.

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I trust that your efforts and those of your Committee will help stimulate us on the path to peace.



UNITED STATES SENATE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

TERRY SANFORD  
NORTH CAROLINA

202-224-3154

May 14, 1991

The Honorable Max M. Kampelman  
United Nations Association  
485 Fifth Avenue  
New York, New York 10017

Dear Max,

Thank you so much for participating in our hearing on "The Role of the United Nations" last Friday. Your comments were timely, insightful and contributed greatly to the success of the hearing. I know that I, for one, learned a great deal in those two hours and I trust our audience did as well.

I hope that you will feel free to keep in touch with me, especially with any ideas you have for future hearings in the Subcommittee.

Thank you again for all your help.

With best wishes always,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Terry Sanford".  
Terry Sanford

TS/bl

# United States Senate

## COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

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| AGENDA |
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THE MIDDLE EAST: ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Friday, May 10, 1991  
10:00 a.m. SH-216

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WITNESSES: The Honorable Max M. Kampelman  
Former Head, Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva  
President, Board of Governors of the  
United Nations Association  
Washington, DC

Mr. Edward C. Luck  
President, United Nations Association  
New York, NY

The Honorable Richard W. Murphy  
Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations  
New York, NY

The Honorable Eugene V. Rostow  
Distinguished Fellow  
U.S. Institute for Peace  
Former Under Secretary of State  
Former Director U.S. Arms Control and  
Disarmament Agency  
Washington, DC

Mr. David J. Scheffer  
Senior Associate  
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace  
Washington, DC

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
SENATOR SANFORD WILL PRESIDE/OPEN  
5/9/91  
Kathi/x4092

UNITED STATES SENATE  
Committee on Foreign Relations  
Room SD-423, Dirksen Building

(Please do not detach this slip  
from the transcript.)

May 22, 1991.

TO: MR. KAMPELMAN

Attached are pages of the hearing transcript of  
MAY 10, 1991, THE MIDDLE EAST: ROLE OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS.

Please make such minor factual and  
grammatical changes as are necessary for clarity  
and accuracy (extensive rewriting will not be  
accepted) and return by June 12, 1991, *the absolute  
latest. Failure to meet the above deadline will delay the  
publication of the hearing.*

Any additional material to be included in the  
hearing in the hearing record, including copies of  
questions sent to the witness by your Senator, or  
additional material received from the witness by your  
office should accompany return of these corrections.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Please return to:  
The Editor  
Committee on Foreign Relations  
Room SD-423, Dirksen Building  
Washington, DC 20510  
Phone No. 1-202-224-3947

(Please do not detach this slip  
from the transcript.)

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Stenographic Transcript of  
HEARINGS  
Before the

**Subcommittee on Near Eastern  
and South Asian Affairs**

**COMMITTEE ON  
FOREIGN RELATIONS**

**UNITED STATES SENATE**

THE MIDDLE EAST: ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Friday, May 10, 1991

Washington, D.C.

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1 THE MIDDLE EAST: ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

2  
3 Friday, May 10, 1991

4  
5 U.S. Senate

6 Subcommittee on Near Eastern and

7 South Asian Affairs

8 Committee on Foreign Relations

9 Washington, D.C.

10 The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07  
11 a.m. in Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Terry  
12 Sanford, Chairman, presiding.

13 Present: Senators Sanford, Pell, and Hatch.  
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1 STATEMENT OF HON. MAX M. KAMPELMAN, FORMER HEAD, NUCLEAR  
2 AND SPACE TALKS IN GENEVA, PRESIDENT, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF  
3 THE UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION

4 Ambassador Kampelman: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator  
5 Hatch. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before your  
6 sub-committee this morning.

7 We are dealing with a very complicated subject<sup>at today's hearing</sup>, but we  
8 are also dealing with the pursuit of peace, and I think it is  
9 worthy of whatever energies and contributions any of us can  
10 make.

11 I do not have a prepared statement, and as I look at the  
12 panel that we have here I can see that my primary motivation  
13 in being here is to learn, rather than necessarily to try to  
14 teach.

15 I do want to <sup>say,</sup> ~~start with,~~ first of all, ~~let me say~~ that I  
16 appear<sup>today</sup> in my individual capacity, ~~here~~ and not as Chairman of  
17 the Board of Governors of the United Nations Association.

18 I ~~do~~ <sup>also</sup> want to <sup>state</sup> ~~say~~ at the outset that I regret ~~to say~~, but  
19 ~~I believe~~ <sup>and</sup> I hope <sup>that it is</sup> only <sup>temporary</sup> ~~is~~, <sup>nature</sup> ~~but I believe that~~ <sup>has that</sup> the  
20 United Nations ~~has~~ <sup>has</sup> disqualified itself from playing a  
21 constructive role in the crucial challenges facing us in the  
22 Middle East as they involve Israel.

23 The decision of the United Nations to follow the  
24 leadership of the Soviet Union in 1975 and declare that  
25 Zionism is racism was a clear demonstration of its bias and



1 its lack of reliability as either a mediating or a  
2 conciliating force in that tense part of the world. It is  
3 fully understandable, in my opinion, that Israel is suspicious  
4 of the United Nations role and strenuously resists its  
5 influence.

6 I say I hope this is only temporary because the United  
7 Nations has it within its power to demonstrate that it can  
8 correct that grievous error of judgment that it exercised, and  
9 if it does so I would ~~of course~~ feel that the United Nations  
10 should be strongly encouraged to play a constructive role <sup>in that</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>regi</sup>  
11 ~~potentially can do so.~~ <sup>first</sup> But it has to demonstrate its  
12 impartiality, whereas in my opinion it has demonstrated rather  
13 its partiality in this area.

14 I find, much again to my regret, that efforts continue to  
15 be made to use the United Nations as an instrument of  
16 coercion, designed to pressure Israel into acting in a manner  
17 which it reasonably perceives is contrary to its security  
18 interests.

19 I had the occasion yesterday to be faced with just such  
20 an effort in the course of a discussion I had with the  
21 ambassador of one of the Arab countries in the area, who quite  
22 genuinely, it seemed to me, was comparing the presence of  
23 Israel in the West Bank and in Gaza with Iraq's forceful  
24 annexation and occupation of Kuwait.

25 You keep hearing this coming up now in the discussion,

1 and this effort is wrong. It is wrong as a matter of fact.  
 2 It is wrong as a matter of law. And I am pleased to <sup>be present</sup> ~~have the~~  
 3 ~~presence~~ here <sup>with</sup> ~~of~~ Professor Rostow, who is an expert on  
 4 international law, who might discuss this further.

5 You do not want long statements from those of us who are  
 6 up here, so let me leave some of what I have just said for the  
 7 discussion. But I do want to add the following, if I may, and  
 8 that is that Israel as a democracy, the only democracy in the  
 9 area, finds itself subject to democratic restraints not shared  
 10 by its neighbors and its potential negotiating partners.

11 Its political system is highly sensitive to public  
 12 opinion, and its Prime Minister and Cabinet can never be free  
 13 from considering the political implications of decisions that  
 14 it makes or abstains from making.

15 The permeating influence within Israel is that of its  
 16 insecurity. The public, for example, is deeply divided on the  
 17 slogan of "land for peace," I must say a slogan that in my  
 18 opinion has no <sup>NEGOTIATING</sup> basis in Security Council Resolution 242. That  
 19 is a gross oversimplification of the resolution and a  
 20 distortion of its meaning, ~~in my opinion.~~

21 ~~But~~ there is a division within the Israeli community on  
 22 the principle of land for peace. <sup>THIS IS</sup> not because there is a  
 23 difference of opinion on the desirability of peace, but  
 24 because there is a difference of opinion as to whether  
 25 Israel's withdrawal from land would produce peace or simply

1 produce a military advantage to its adversaries. ~~And~~ <sup>A</sup> all of  
 2 this inhibits flexibility on the part of Israel's leadership,  
 3 and ~~we~~ <sup>this</sup> must come to <sup>be</sup> understood, <sup>OO</sup> ~~this~~.

4 We are dealing with a very complex issue. It has  
 5 historical contradictions, legal ambiguities, and political  
 6 aspirations, all of which are intensified by deep emotional  
 7 experiences and convictions.

8 ~~And~~ I suggest that the primary task of the United States  
 9 is not to try to impose hasty solutions. It is, rather, to  
 10 encourage small confidence-building steps between  
 11 representatives of all the parties who are prepared to enter a  
 12 relationship in which compromises are possible. Our task as a  
 13 country is to discourage violence in the area and indeed  
 14 attempt to prohibit it if we can. Our task is to be patient  
 15 and persistent in the pursuit of that process.

16 Mr. Luck is here. He and I have now written two pieces,  
 17 for the Washington Post and ~~The~~ New York Times, which I think  
 18 we can make part of the record, as an illustration of the kind  
 19 of confidence-building measures that would be called for and  
 20 are desirable in the area of restraining the arms race in that  
 21 part of the world.

22 It seems to me ludicrous that we are in the process of  
 23 supplying additional arms to that area at a time when we are  
 24 also trying to talk peace, ~~and what we should be doing,~~ <sup>IN THE AREA AND TO</sup> ~~we~~  
 25 should be saying to the countries, <sup>x</sup> (all of the countries who

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1 are supplying these arms -- and this is where the United  
2 Nations can play a role -- let us put a halt to the shipment  
3 of arms for the next 18 months, two years, while we negotiate  
4 and see if we can come up with something constructive in that  
5 area.

6 Now, this does not all depend on us in the United States.  
7 I am troubled by the fact, for example, that in recent weeks  
8 Syria has received assurances of large sums of money designed  
9 to produce arms for ~~it, for Syria~~ <sup>itself</sup>, from its Arab neighbors and  
10 from others. That is destabilizing at a time when we are  
11 seeking stability, and that is only one illustration of the  
12 kind of confidence-building measures that are called for. The  
13 list of potentially valuable confidence-building measures is a  
14 long one.

15 The Middle East in its entirety must be persuaded to  
16 appreciate that each of the countries in the area, and peoples  
17 in the area, have a great deal to gain from economic and  
18 scientific cooperation. Disease must be conquered, food must  
19 be produced, water must be supplied and distributed. Trade  
20 must be encouraged.

21 The attainment of these goals and the fruits of modern  
22 technology requires cooperation among the states. The United  
23 States ought to be playing a role in helping to foster and  
24 stimulate and encourage that kind of cooperation.

25 I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I trust that your

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1 efforts and those of your <sup>sub-</sup>committee will help stimulate us on  
2 the path to peace.

3 Thank you.

4 (THE PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR  
5 KAMPECHIAN FOLLOWS)  
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1           STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD W. MURPHY, SENIOR FELLOW,  
2           COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

3           Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the chance to be  
4           with you this morning.

5           I did just get back yesterday from Cairo, where I was  
6           addressing a conference on postwar developments that the  
7           American University of Cairo has just completed, and during my  
8           visit to Cairo had the chance to review the situation with  
9           President Mubarak and some of his advisers.

10          But if it is ever permitted in the U.S. Senate to quote  
11          oneself, I would like to draw on my speech to the conference  
12          for a few remarks, and then if you would like the full speech  
13          I would be delighted to turn that in.

14          Senator Sanford: Absolutely, we do.

15          [The information referred to follows:]

16          [SUBCOMMITTEE INSERT]

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1           Mr. Murphy: Well, I made the points that historians,  
2           wherever they stand today and the commentators stand today on  
3           the nature of the war we have just seen in the Gulf and its  
4           outcome, its fallout still not complete, they are going to  
5           agree that, had it not been for the steady and the close U.S.-  
6           Soviet cooperation, our President would not have been able to  
7           garner such wide international support for the use of force  
8           against Iraq.

9           The Iraqi invasion of last August served as a first test  
10          of the new order of relationships, and that concept of new  
11          relationships is still only partially defined. In one sense,  
12          the war could be seen simply as a superpower exerting its will  
13          on one side of a regional conflict. It reaffirmed, it did not  
14          invent, the principle that aggression should be resisted.

15          We engineered politically the votes in the UN Security  
16          Council and it was basically, as people in the area are quick  
17          to tell you, the first Arab-American war. We militarily  
18          prevailed in the field to defeat an Arab power.

19          President Saddam could not have foreseen how strongly he  
20          would be condemned by all parties, but there was a clear  
21          warning to him by Shevardnadze in his speech to the General  
22          Assembly last September that the U.S.S.R.'s position would be  
23          in some ways even tougher than that of our own, as the  
24          statement stood at that point in time.

25          The suspicion that you heard around the United States



1 that the presence of Soviet advisers in Iraq was the real  
2 measure of Soviet intentions and that they did not leave  
3 throughout, right until the end of the conflict, not all of  
4 them had evacuated the country, or that Soviet generals would  
5 be able to compel Gorbachev to invoke the 1972 Iraqi-Soviet  
6 friendship treaty and repudiate his cooperation with the West  
7 turned out to be groundless.

8 So Saddam Hussein found he could not play what might have  
9 been a trump card.

10 The easing of tension between Moscow and Washington may  
11 have made this war possible, paradoxically. The old order  
12 based on a bipolar geopolitical equilibrium has been upset and  
13 it is an open question in my opinion whether this paradox is  
14 going to push other regional conflicts into war.

15 In the years ahead there are going to be limits on our  
16 ability and our readiness to accept the responsibilities of an  
17 open-ended leadership role. We cannot coerce a new world  
18 order into being. We can support the idea of collectivism  
19 among nations working for constructive incremental change.

20 This has certain implications, I submit, for the future  
21 role of the United Nations. There is a growing awareness in  
22 our country that we cannot by ourselves solve the world's  
23 problems by being the worldwide balancer of forces. It is not  
24 that those who advocate neo-isolationism are going to prevail  
25 in our thinking, but neither are we about to turn our



1 responsibilities entirely over to the UN, because by itself it  
2 simply cannot bear that burden.

3 The Security Council still reflects unequal power  
4 relationships in the international arena and the General  
5 Assembly is often more a symbol of international divisions  
6 than of unity. And we have to remember that the Council  
7 resolutions on the Iraqi invasion passed with such  
8 consistently wide support, not just because of sympathy  
9 towards a fellow nation that had been invaded and liquidated  
10 by its neighbor or a new conviction about international law,  
11 but because of the convergence of interests by nations drawn  
12 together for different reasons, acting with different  
13 objectives.

14 Some were driven mostly by concern or fear of Iraq, its  
15 encroachments throughout the region, some by deeply rooted  
16 animosity towards the leadership of Saddam Hussein personally.  
17 Others supported the coalition for economic, perhaps even for  
18 legal, reasons.

19 But the UN did provide a focal point. It did provide a  
20 single platform where the international consensus could be  
21 identified and translated into action.

22 I see no inconsistency between trying to make the UN more  
23 effective as well as acknowledging the impact of power  
24 relationships in the international system. The Council coped  
25 with the crisis as its founders had hoped it would, and it has

1 some significance that our public opinion associated itself  
2 with international reaction in applauding the smooth  
3 functioning of the Security Council during the several months  
4 of this crisis.

5 It may be a new readiness to give the UN a chance to play  
6 a leading role in more problems than many Americans have  
7 thought it capable of playing in the past. And it is  
8 conceivable, at least, that expanded use of UN mechanisms may  
9 help create further content for the new world order.

10 As far as the Middle East is concerned, it is not many  
11 years ago, the 1970's after the October War, when the attitude  
12 in Washington was basically: It is our Middle East, it is our  
13 job to solve the problems. And we did play a superb role, a  
14 solo role as the outside power, in developing the  
15 disengagement agreements between Egypt-Israel, Syria-Israel,  
16 and laid the foundation for what six years later became the  
17 peace treaty.

18 I do not sense that attitude has survived in Washington  
19 today. The limitations on our capability to move and  
20 orchestrate the peace process I think are more evident than  
21 perhaps any time in the last.

22 It is only four years ago that we argued with the Senate,  
23 made a presentation on behalf of the Reagan administration,  
24 that one of the important considerations during the Gulf War  
25 between Iran and Iraq, reflagging Kuwaiti tankers, was to keep

1 the Soviets out of the Gulf. What a rapid transformation of  
2 attitudes we have seen in these four years.

3 Well, if collective resistance to Iraq and new  
4 cooperative relations with the Soviet Union have not  
5 established a new world order, yet there is something  
6 nonetheless new in the air.

7 Restraining the arms race, I absolutely agree with  
8 Ambassador Kampelman, is an essential. How to do it? I think  
9 we are going to have a lot of debates in public, within your  
10 own congressional circles. But it is out of control. It is  
11 grotesquely out of control, and just how to bring about  
12 greater transparency and establish better controls over the  
13 sales to the region I think is a matter of very high -- should  
14 be a matter of very high priority for all of us.

15 Thank you, sir.  
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1           STATEMENT OF EDWARD C. LUCK, PRESIDENT, UNITED NATIONS  
2       ASSOCIATION

3           Mr. Luck: It is a pleasure, Mr. Chairman, to have the  
4       opportunity to give you my personal views on how the United  
5       Nations could help shape a more peaceful future for the Middle  
6       East. I will focus on the possibilities for regional arms  
7       control, particularly on restraints on advanced conventional  
8       weapons and surface-to-surface missiles.

9           For all the talk of restraint through the years, there  
10      has been remarkably little progress. Trying to contain an  
11      arms competition in the world's most volatile and highly armed  
12      region, where animosities, insecurity, and distrust run deep,  
13      is of course no easy task. There are no risk-free, guaranteed  
14      solutions.

15          But in my view the chances for success, as well as the  
16      risks of doing nothing, are higher than ever. To the legion  
17      of skeptics, we should ask: If not now, when? After all, it  
18      would not be too many years before several countries in the  
19      Middle East have the capability of wedding chemical and  
20      nuclear warheads to ballistic missiles, threatening civilian  
21      populations throughout the region and eventually southern  
22      parts of Europe and the Soviet Union.

23          Imagine the horrendous consequences if Saddam Hussein's  
24      Scud missiles had carried other than conventional warheads.  
25      The experience of the Gulf War, moreover, suggests that the

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1 revolution in conventional weapons technology will ensure that  
2 the next war in the Middle East will be quick, costly, and  
3 terribly destructive, with major advantages accruing to the  
4 side which strikes first.

5 Besides, neither Israelis nor Arabs can afford the  
6 enormous investment entailed in another cycle in their high  
7 tech arms race, given their staggering human, development, and  
8 ecological needs.

9 The time is ripe for a far-reaching arms control  
10 initiative for several reasons. One, the end of the Cold War  
11 and Soviet domestic preoccupations have convinced Moscow to  
12 ease its military ambitions in the region, to distance itself  
13 from radical Arab regimes and causes, and to expand its  
14 relations with Israel and its cooperation with the United  
15 States.

16 Second, following the war U.S. influence in the region is  
17 at its zenith and its leverage is enhanced by the growing  
18 interest of local West states in acquiring American defense  
19 technologies, which performed so well in Desert Storm.

20 Third, the international response to the Iraqi invasion  
21 of Kuwait, as orchestrated through the UN, has resulted in an  
22 unprecedented degree of cooperation among the permanent  
23 members of the Security Council, in revival of the notion of  
24 collective security, and in the deployment of UN arms monitors  
25 and additional peacekeepers to the region.

1 Fourth, the defeat of Iraq's forces has rid the area of  
2 its most threatening military machine, bolstered U.S. ties  
3 with moderate Arab countries, and offered an opportunity to  
4 take a fresh look at longstanding regional tensions.

5 And finally, the current balance of forces in the region  
6 is basically satisfactory to all sides, with no country so  
7 dominant or insecure as to tempt a first strike.

8 All of this could change, of course, if the international  
9 community does not move expeditiously to take advantage of  
10 this unusual confluence of favorable trends. Relations with  
11 Moscow or Beijing could sour, or Arab-Israeli tensions rise  
12 again. A large influx of armaments to any country in the  
13 region could upset the current military balance and spark a  
14 wholesale scramble for the latest in new technology and  
15 firepower.

16 Arms restraint, of course, cannot be sustained for long  
17 in a political vacuum. Arms control and diplomatic  
18 initiatives should proceed along parallel tracks, since the  
19 political and security problems of the Middle East are  
20 intertwined in a way which requires that they be addressed  
21 simultaneously as part of an overall strategy for bringing  
22 peace to the troubled region.

23 Likewise, it would be difficult to maintain effective  
24 arms limitations from the outside without some degree of tacit  
25 cooperation from key states in the region. Engaging them in a

1 broad-ranging security dialogue may in fact prove to be one  
2 way of beginning to bridge the deep political divisions in the  
3 area.

4 Past experience also teaches that the U.S. cannot achieve  
5 very much acting alone. Our restraint would need to be  
6 matched by that of other major suppliers of arms and related  
7 technology to the region. The UN Security Council now offers  
8 a promising mechanism for opening discussions among the major  
9 suppliers, which happen to be its five permanent members.

10 It is charged under the Charter with the task of  
11 regulating armaments. Its decisions can be made binding on  
12 all UN member states and it is already imminently involved in  
13 implementing arms limitations in the Persian Gulf.

14 Whatever qualms one might have about the UN's ability to  
15 act impartially on political issues in the Middle East -- and  
16 I believe the situation is improving -- I have no doubt that  
17 the world body can play a useful role in helping to build a  
18 consensus for arms restraint and then overseeing its  
19 implementation.

20 As Max Kampelman mentioned, he and I have put forward  
21 specific ideas for achieving a ban on surface-to-surface  
22 missiles and a moratorium on conventional arms shipments to  
23 the Middle East. These proposals are detailed in recent op-  
24 ed articles in the Washington Post and the New York Times, so  
25 that in the interest of time I will not describe them in

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1 detail at this point. Max and I of course would be pleased to  
2 respond to any questions you might have during the discussion  
3 period.

4 In closing, Mr. Chairman, it should be emphasized that  
5 this is a time of extraordinary and unprecedented opportunity  
6 as well as of growing dangers. Whether one speaks of a new  
7 world order or simply of a chance to do a bit better at  
8 sustaining international peace and security, it is clearly a  
9 time for bold and fresh perspectives. It is simply too  
10 dangerous to pursue business as usual in the Middle East.

11 Thank you.

12 [The prepared statement of Mr. Luck follows:]  
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1 but I think it is a great experiment, but not one that will be  
2 without controversy.

3 Ambassador Kampelman: Mr. Chairman, let me say in that  
4 connection that I think the efforts of your subcommittee are  
5 relevant and appropriate here. I did not hide ~~when I spoke~~ <sup>before</sup> my  
6 skepticism about the United Nations in the particular area of  
7 dealing where Israel is involved.

8 For a long period of time I was skeptical about the  
9 United Nations because it struck me as nothing but an  
10 instrument of the Cold War <sup>AGAINST US.</sup> But it is changing, and it is in  
11 our interest to have it change, and the United States ought  
12 not to be letting the process operate by itself, because  
13 without our leadership, it may not operate in the proper  
14 direction.

15 This is one reason I agreed to serve with the United  
16 Nations Association, and it is therefore another reason why I  
17 encourage the kind of attention to the United Nations that I  
18 think you are giving ~~it~~ and that others are giving it, because  
19 it has a potential to grow to meet the evolving problems  
20 facing this universe of ours.

21 ~~And we are going to make mistakes. We are going to~~  
22 clearly make mistakes. I think we have to strengthen the  
23 institutions. I think we really have to take a careful look  
24 ~~at 42 and 43.~~

25 The United Nations Association ~~we~~ began looking at this

SPECIFIC PROBLEM

1 some time ago to see what can be done about strengthening ~~that~~ <sup>THAT</sup>  
2 mechanism. ~~So~~ <sup>T</sup> That is where I think we ought to be heading,  
3 and it is the responsibility of our country to begin  
4 addressing this ~~problem~~ <sup>NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE U.N.</sup> ~~I think.~~

5 Senator Sanford: Let me just -- excuse me. Go ahead.

6 Ambassador Kampelman: I was just going to say, ~~I want to~~  
7 ~~support fully -- and he supported me~~ that it is pitiful  
8 that we cannot make a contribution as the United Nations in  
9 this Arab war against Israel. It is ridiculous that we  
10 cannot. And I would hope that a way can be found to repeal  
11 that resolution.

12 Senator Sanford: Do you think it is possible to repeal  
13 that resolution, just given the mechanics of it or the  
14 politics?

15 Ambassador Kampelman: Well, we have looked into that and  
16 I would like to have Mr. Luck's judgment on this as well. Of  
17 course, there are different ways of repealing it. One can  
18 repeal it by an actual resolution specifically repealing it.  
19 One can repeal it in the form of another resolution which  
20 implicitly repeals it and therefore saves the face of those  
21 who have been for it.

22 I think, with respect to one or another of these things,  
23 we are finding greater receptivity on the part of the Soviets.  
24 Many of the countries who voted for it, the Eastern European  
25 countries, are now opposed to it. Many of the Latin countries

1 who supported it at one point are now very skeptical about it.

2 I would like Ed's judgment on that.

3 Mr. Luck: The effort I think is extraordinarily  
4 important, both for the UN's credibility and for moving the  
5 peace process in the Middle East, to make every effort to try  
6 to get this reversed or repealed or in some way superseded.  
7 It is not going to be easy.

8 There is only one precedent in the history of the UN for  
9 the General Assembly reversing an earlier judgment. But as  
10 Max has suggested, the tide is very much changing on this.

11 What I would not want to see and what I think the  
12 Israelis are very much concerned about seeing, too, is a very  
13 close vote on something like this. You want something that is  
14 going to be an overwhelming statement of the international  
15 community that this was a bad mistake. I think we are getting  
16 close to that. I am not sure that we are quite there yet, but  
17 I think we have to keep testing the waters, because some day  
18 very soon, I think, it will be possible to remove it from the  
19 books.

20 Senator Sanford: Well, this blunderbuss sense of the  
21 Senate resolution saying repeal it -- your comments I think  
22 are well taken, that there may be a more subtle, politically  
23 acceptable way of going about it.

24 Ambassador Kampelman: Although I think it is good for  
25 the Senate to be doing something like this.

1 [Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the subcommittee was  
2 adjourned.]  
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