



## Max M. Kampelman Papers

### **Copyright Notice:**

This material may be protected by copyright law (U.S. Code, Title 17). Researchers are liable for any infringement. For more information, visit [www.mnhs.org/copyright](http://www.mnhs.org/copyright).

Development of Political Thought 164f

Mr. Kampelman

1947

1. Plato discusses three views of justice with which he disagrees. What are they? What criticism does Plato make of them?
2. What criticism does Plato make of Democracy? What answer could a modern Democrat give to him?
3. How does Aristotle's use of the word "association" differ from and how is it similar to Plato's use of the word "unity" in characterizing the state?
4. What is political science to Aristotle? How did he feel it should be studied?

Text - according to St. Barker - Book II, Par. 2, sen. 2.

Life under individualism, we are told, is "nasty, brutish and short".

Plato understood problem - UNITY!

Modern community can learn from Plato - suffering.

It is anarchistic, selfish, individualistic.

Positive program called for:

- a) community welfare the ultimate good
- b) individualism must be curtailed for
- c) emotional punch line of "human brotherhood", community.

Series protagonists, who is for human brotherhood, is also vs. individualism, the poor listener, who is meekly also for human brotherhood (who isn't) is in howlsten position of either joining chorus vs. evil individualism or of being an outcast among men.

Are those real alternatives? - Let's take risk of outcast. - What are poils?

How many have seen Hollywood news in past 2 weeks?

- a) heard Jack Benny or Fred Allen last night?
- c) read Carles newspaper past day?

Individualism? - Hell! (summar) - Man Culture!

yes, security suffering - But from lack of individualism

How many of us can think originally anymore?

a) Little O yphan Annie gives millions lala ideas.

b) Hayek writes book - Digest, Book, month,  
newspaper: nature of capitalism

Individualism? - Where?

a) In U.S. - who dare pay asked to retract statement

b) Physicists making an atomic energy.

c) thousands of workers doing same dull jobs.

d) same forms of entertainment; music.

Result? - Stagnation. Man Culture. Man Psychology. <sup>Thinking.</sup>

Is that individualism? - No. It's Totalitarianism.

Ask any teacher who knows anything - Can  
walk into classroom and know just what  
to say to make students angry or upset  
(John J. Lewis) - evoke laughter.

N.Y. Times item: minister arrested for picketing  
U.N. - part in Belenue - Poor fellow  
believed in Jesus in this Christian world  
and was against poor politics, war, and  
negot makes right.



"It's a Character":

About 85-90% of American people are Republican or Democrats - Individualism?

Who were most fellows a few years ago?

Drafted! - Individualism - Be

Damned! (sermon) - Totalitarianism!

← (N.Y. Times cartoon of radio preachers - use not again I'll have to cut you off the air.)

Yes, world suffering - But of man totalitarian, loss of individualism

a) Machine made cogs of men - not human beings with worth and dignity.

b) Cancer in body politics of past 25 years in Fascism, Nazism, Bolshevism - State domination without restraint.

Society suffering from War - the more opposed of individualism than which there is no other.

(Now let's be Platonists - Put up a Devil's Advocate)

Ah, but you say: "yes!" - We admit that  
the evils of the world shouldn't be blamed  
on individualism. The world is not  
suffering from individualism, but from  
its opposite - Totalitarianism - Granted!

But isn't the point still true, you say, that  
selfishness and anarchy are threats to  
the welfare of society - and isn't the  
welfare of society more important than  
the welfare of the few?

And I reply - Wait! If you grant that individualism  
is not the cause of our suffering, then the  
whole case built up by the anti-individualists,  
the absolute collectivists is wrong -

Pressing their case on a diagnosis which says  
that individualism is the illness,  
they've come forth with a solution,  
medicine, to substantially curtail  
individualism

you're sick, they've said. - What if the  
medicine does test bad - you must  
become better

But the medicine won't cure the patient. - The  
isn't suffering from individualism and  
a medicine to treat it will not only  
test bad, but won't work.

The poison in our patient's system is totalitarianism,  
loss of human dignity and personality.

In fact, let's look at the medicine. - Why  
it's more of the same poison eating  
away.

a) It tells us to forget about the part  
and think of the whole.

b) State ought inculcate values in children,  
citizens, schools

c) Ought to demand adherence - or out!

Shades of Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini

The patient will die with that  
medicine.

(How do we ~~do~~ <sup>treat</sup> patient?)

Certainly, community welfare is important. — But what is society? — It's a group of individuals

a) A good society is one which serves these individual needs.

you can no more talk about community welfare in any meaningful sense and at the same time make a practice of chopping off members of the community, than you can talk about family welfare and lop off your kids.

Yes, community welfare is imp't — If you understand by it, individual welfare, the welfare of each one of us.

This ties in with democracy and majority rule perfectly well!

Dem: At any given time, in case of a difference, the will of the majority should be put in effect.

yet, what is a majority? - It's a group of individuals on any given subject at any given moment.

- a) These same individuals at the very next moment on another question may be members of the minority.
- b) As such, these individuals in the majority will guide themselves with that restraint and respect toward minorities as to preserve as much of their individualism as necessary.

Furthermore, majority rule is meaningful and virtuous only insofar as it is "free". The only reason we choose it over elite rule is that elements of free thought and discussion, interplay of ideas permit of peaceful change more easily in case just majority <sup>decision</sup> ~~seems~~ wrong.

- a) No votes in maj. rule if they only hear 1 point of view
- b) Maj. must hear all views for its judgment to be free; and only if it's free is there virtue.

Remove the "minority", "individual", "character"  
and you remove free majority and lose  
democracy.

Individualism, therefore, becomes an unjust value,  
not a cause and then to be  
removed. - Remove individualism and  
you lose all liberty; all democracy.

As Aristotle said: a polity depends on  
aggregation - Community does not  
mean identity. - We must have  
variety and respect for variety.

Only by preserving the sense of individualism,  
in its highest meaning, respect for  
minority opinion (even if obnoxious),  
can we ever hope to develop that  
sense of community responsibility,  
sense of brotherhood and wholeness, based  
on respect for each part, which all  
as on both sides of the question  
agree symbolizes the recovery and  
healthy state of our patient (democracy)

Unity is "association" not "oneness".

Society suffers from mass manipulation

Overconcentration in industry and govt

Who are the anarchists, individuals, subjects?

a) wealthy =

b) communists =

What action

a) who they do control is public interest, we act

b) who they do not control is, we act - no power

1 - World suffering from mass manipulation

2 - Individual dignity & respect lost in economy, polity, ideas.

a) Nazism, Fascism, Bolshevism

b) mass culture

c) machine technology

d) WAR - Buchenwald

3 - Effort to reduce further accumulation, that stagnation, bureaucratization

4 - Ultimate aim to increase spirit of community

a) cannot effect, by forcing a large scale - not by passing laws

b) Community spirit = helping individuals within.

c) training, thought, all in mutual dignity & respect

d) reorganizing system to encourage cooperation

5 - C.P. - will flourish as long as we guarantee

indist - decently, then power - reds power & may. will

(a) step as little as possible on them for indist. events will

Communism good v. city good  
+  
responsibility

more culture at just Sinatra

lack of argument on values

~~fact that collect~~ is love is the point

Hollywood doesn't teach - Russia, 'Genghis Khan'!

what is majority? - and how means respect for other guy,

less minor rights

why living in maj. rule?



*Boat*

Political Science 166s

- ✓ 1. "Machiavelli's method is the method of science applied to politics; his psychology is not concerned with conclusions about man but only with political man." Examine.
- + 2. "Machiavelli is one of the foremost advocates of and defenders of tyranny in modern political literature." Examine.
- ✓ 3. "For Hobbes the nature of man is both the predicament of mankind and the source of man's deliverance from that predicament." Discuss.
- + 4. "Republicanism in the 17th century was essentially an aristocratic doctrine and not at all a general proclamation of the rights of man such as the political program of the Levellers suggested." Discuss.
- ✓ 5. "Rousseau saw, as Locke did not, that belief in natural rights is impossible to reconcile with a belief in majority rule democracy." Examine.
6. "Rousseau understands that the state is not the enemy of freedom but makes freedom possible; and that a complementary relation of individual freedom and social authority is necessary for a strong, free, and democratic state." Examine.
7. "Rousseau is an illogical combination of Hobbes and Locke." Examine.
8. What is the importance of property in Locke's theory of the state of nature and government? Evaluate.
9. What is the place of natural law, natural rights, and contract in the political theories of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau?
10. Compare Locke's theory of the social contract with Rousseau's. What was their purpose in using the social contract? Did they solve the problem of responsible government?
11. "The contract writers show that the social contract was a device not for explaining the origin of government but political obligation." Examine.

Ought men to buy  
the State ???

- a) I mean problem
- b) Cuban philosophy,  
an man in that  
context.
- c) Bring your babies ready  
to hear on problem.

---

T Y P E D  
by June 9!

Adult Specials

Saul Jaye Miefeld  
Charles C. Swanson  
Benton E. Harrison  
Wilton H. Dickerson  
Selma Greenberg  
Peyton Sher  
Frank W.<sup>m</sup>. Johnson

---

Developed

### DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 3

Much of this course will relate to the discovery whether the duty of the governed to obey their government is, on the whole, greater to the proportion in which the government acts with the consent of the governed. We thus will spend some time around the words "CONSENT", "FREEDOM", and "RIGHTS". What is the relation between consent, freedom and the duty of the governed to obey the rulers.

What do we mean by "consent"? What is "consent of the governed"? Is there really <sup>such</sup> ~~xxxxxx~~ a thing in actuality or are there really many in society who do not consent and are thus not obliged to obey the laws? Or, if this latter is suspect for no state can perform its functions if it contains a large number of persons exempt from obedience, then must we perhaps not conclude that consent cannot be the sole basis of duty.

Ordinarily, by consent we mean an expression of a wish on the part of a person that another should perform or abstain from performing an act. This alone does not create consent unless the action is conditioned upon the wish. So that my wish that Spain free its political prisoners does not make an act of amnesty one with my consent if Spain could or could not have acted regardless of my wishes.

Now the man who acts is the agent of the man who wishes if his right to act flows from the wish and not merely because of the wish or because it pleases.

To accept another definition, such as, ie, that there is consent so long as there is no wish contrary to the act, would mean that the despot is governing with the consent of the governed so long as the people are too brutish or ignorant to wish him to do otherwise.

Nor is it consent merely when people approve of the effects of an act. If this were true it would follow that God governs the universe with the consent of the faithful and even of the atheists who approve of the effects (even though they may consider the acts as coming from another source)....Consent is, therefore, quite distinct from approval of effects.

Nor is it consent when the act happens to agree with the wish and nothing more. So that if a child wishes to be given a toy by his father and the father, even with knowledge of the wish, gives the toy to the child, it still cannot be said that the ~~xxxx~~ gift was made with the consent of the child.....Neither can it be said that when a despot acts in accordance with what the subjects may want, that we have action with the consent of the subjects.

(compare Locke's Second Treatise, 119,:"every man that hath any possession or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any government doth hereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during this enjoyment, as anyone under it, whether this possession be of land to him and heirs forever, or a lodging for only a week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway; and, in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of anyone within the ~~territories~~ territories of that government"

(Locke here goes so far as to assert that a man by merely inhabiting or owning property tacitly consents to all the laws. The promise, he says, is tacit because it is not expressed in words but it is none the less a promise.)

The argument against Locke's definition is not difficult to make. Certainly we cannot say that rebels within a society consent to the society they plot to overthrow merely by their presence.

To accept this concept of Locke's is to say that all governments rule with the unanimous consent of all subjects.

Giving consent, therefore, means giving to another the right to act in a certain way....Thus the father who consents to his daughter's marriage is giving her the right to do a certain action, it being presumed that she would not have the right to do so without his consent. But if she is over 21 and in full mind, he is not giving his consent in the sense relevant here.

Now let's look to another kind of argument on "consent".

How about the argument that the citizens of the modern state, to the extent to which they do not know their best interests, are not consenting parties even when they vote governments into power. It is thus argued that the governors of a capitalist state so corrupt the minds of the poor that they are thus artificially induced to desire the maintenance of an economic and social system which involves their exploitation. The schools and the churches teach them a capitalist morality; the newspapers, radio, movies, novels all serve to arouse in their minds beliefs and desires which are materialist and property minded. The minds of the workers are enslaved so that it is not necessary to enslave their bodies. They can choose their governors because they were taught the sort of governors to choose.

Without going into the merits of the argument, all we need say is that there is still consent. They may be fooled and the victims of deceit. In so far as they have been thus deceived, they have been robbed not of the power to choose and consent, but of prosperity and happiness. It is evil, but does not affect consent.

There is consent to action so long as they express the wish and so long as the right of the governors to act depends upon that wish. Propoganda in the interest of the few need not render government with the consent of the many impossible.

With this definition of consent in mind, we can see that when we apply this to "representative government", one man is the representative of another only if he is his agent, only insofar as his right to perform certain actions is dependent upon the consent of the person he is said to represent.

Thus a king is not representative of a nation where his right to act does not depend upon consent, even if his actions would be approved of and even if he is "typical" of the people.

With reference to the agency created by consent, it lasts depending upon the arrangement. If A empowers B to act for him during 4 years, then A, even if he disapproves of B's actions, is also responsible for them and cannot assert that they are done without his consent. For under the agreement, for the 4 year period he has made himself responsible for his agent's actions.

Similarly, an agreement of consent on a particular issue does not make B his agent on another matter.

But where there is consent, then the agent can act within that consent; provided that the man who consented and empowered him to act had the right to do so.

Thus A cannot give permission to B to act as a husband toward A's wife. He doesn't have the right to do so.

It now remains for us to find out to what extent popular governments govern with consent of their subjects. It is clear at the outset that "representativ democracy" is the closest we can come.

Yet even under representative democracy, it is clear in the light of non-participation in elections and three corner races, the vast majority of laws are consented to by either a minority or a bare majority of the people. There is thus no such thing as government by the consent of all the persons supposed to owe obedience to the government..

Under the very best possible conditions, so far as consent is concerned, it may be true that the rights of the governprs depend upon the consent of a majority of the governed, but never upon the consent of all persons who can rightly be said to be obliged to obey the law.

It follows from this that consent cannot be taken to be the only basis of political obligation.

(discussion)



## General Will:

We next turn our attention to the term "general" or "real will", which is primarily a theory of the nature of consent. We see it in Rousseau and other 19th century theorists who used it to show that the subjects of the state were perfectly free even when they appeared to be coerced. They would never have had to worry about the paradox of self-government and coercion had they not thought consent was the only basis of political authority.

This necessity to prove consent to be the only basis for political authority brought these philosophers in great difficulty. They saw that the vast majority of persons obeying some sovereign authority or other had never explicitly consented to do so, but they were unwilling to admit that their theory was false. They therefore expanded the meaning of the word "consent" so that it covers all sorts of other facts which did not partake of the nature of consent at all but which did in some way connect with the obligation to obey government.

It was clear to them, for example, that to receive benefits creates obligations towards the providers of them on the part of persons who receive them.

They saw that to be protected by the law creates, on the part of the persons protected, an obligation to obey the law.

They, therefore, tried to make out to accept the protection of the law was equivalent to a tacit consent to the general governmental activities of the persons who enforced the law; and that there too there was a case of an obligation to obey the government ultimately based upon consent.

Now it was not long before philosophers became dissatisfied with these rather crude efforts to maintain the contract theory through a distortion of the word "consent". They saw it was no use giving the name "consent" to what was not properly consent at all. They therefore changed their tactics and tried to make out that as a matter of fact the governed always do consent to the actions of the governors, even if they appear not to be doing so.

Rousseau is the first of the modern philosophers who took up this line of argument, albeit tentatively retaining much of the contract theory. . It was not until Hegel ("Philosophy of Right") that the old contract theory was abandoned and a new explanation of why one must obey the govet was offered in its stead.

The new explanation did not really reject the thesis that consent is the sole basis of political obligation, but it attempted to interpret it in such a way as to avoid the difficulties which ruined the contract theory.

Instead of attempting to prove that consent was involved in facts which quite obviously did not involve it, it attempted to show that there existed so close a relation between the will of the governed and the governors, in so far as it was expressed in law, that any real conflict between them was impossible.

The governed, says the theory, always intended to do and wanted to do what the law required them to do, even when, in fact, they might appear not to want to do so. Moreover they wanted to act in this way not because the law required that they do so, but because what they wanted to do was in every case precisely what the law enjoined.

"e see then that the philosophers attempted to reinstate consent as the sole basis of political obligation on the plea that the law gives effect to a social will which is at the same time the real will of the governed so that the obligation to obey the law derives from the fact that the law gives effect to this real will. We must obey the government - the interpreter of the social will - because it is really doing nothing other than enforcing our will. We are therefore, always consenting parties to its actions even if we are not conscious of doing so. . All governments in so far as it enforces t e law are, according to this theory, newessarily representative govt.

This theory makes not only consent impossible and unnecessary but also political obligation. If the state always does what the individual wishes, for thereason that both the wills are really the same will, there is no need for an explanation of how it is the duty of the subject to obey the govt even when it requires him to do what he does not wish.

To Rousseau the social will is thecommon good. Since the singlewill is also the common good, there is a kind of unity between the social will and the <sup>single</sup> ~~common~~ will. The unity, however, does not mean that they are the same . The sum of all the single wills is the will of all and there is a dif erence between the will of all and the common or social will. The common or social will regards only the common interest, while the will of all and the single wills have regard to private interrests.

Yet even while defining the commonwill as the common good, he does not state exactly wh,t the common will is, and often says that it is the sum of all the individual wills in so far as they tend to bring about the common good.

There is thus a kind of inconsistency. Sometime the general will is the will of the majority of single wills and sometimes it

is something else, separate, like a super-mind, a State with moral and mental attributes of its own.

Even if it is true, however, that there is a good common to several people does not mean that there is a will which is also common to them. It is, of course, also doubtful whether there is such a thing as a common good.

Now let us briefly examine the doctrine of "real will" as expressed by Hegel and Bosanquet. The individual to them is a partial and incomplete expression of something greater, a kind of super-ego, or State, a fuller and more complete being than any individual can be.

To Hegel (Philosophy of Right) the State "is the realized ethical spirit...The State is absolutely rational...it's substantive unity is its ... absolute end".

The State is, therefore, its own end, and is not to be distinguished from something called "common good". The existence of the State is the only common good. Thus the State "has the highest right over the individual whose highest duty in turn is to be a member of the State...It is the objective spirit, and he has his truth, real existence, and ethical status only in being a member of it".

Yet it would not be completely accurate to say that Hegel advocated the entire subordination of the individual to the State with its crude implications. The subordination he advocated would bring about the highest development of the individual's own best characteristics. "The modern State has enormous strength and depth, in that it allows the principle of subjectivity to complete itself to an independent extreme of personal peculiarity, and yet at the same time brings it back to the substantive unity, and thus preserves particularity in the principle of the State...The universal

must be actively furthered, but, on the other side, subjectivity must be wholly and vitally developed. Only when both elements are present in force is the State to be regarded as articulate and truly organised...the State is...strong in its union of the universal with the particular interests of individuals. Thus just so far as people have duties to fulfill towards it, they have also rights".

The State is thus also the articulation of an ethical idea, just as much dependent upon the moral development and freedom of its members as they are on the existence of the State.

"It has often been said that the end of the State is the happiness of the citizens. This is indeed true".

Bosanquet gives a more complete account of the relation of the individual to the State. He begins with what he calls the paradox of self-government. How can the self be self-governing when suffering social coercion? The mere fact that a law must often be maintained by force shows that it does not always give effect to the actual wishes of the governed. Indeed, whenever the law is enforced and not just habitually obeyed it is enforced contrary to the wish of the individual to whom it is applied.

Bosanquet handles this dilemma one way by expanding the concept of "freedom". There must be a kind of freedom which will make it possible for us to do what we wish to do when we appear to be forced to do the direct contrary. This kind of freedom he regards as positive, in distinction from the merely negative freedom which is freedom from external constraint.

This positive freedom involves not only freedom from external constraint but freedom from constraint by the lower emotions and impulses which belong to non-rational man.

It follows, therefore, that man is free to the extent to which his will is determined by reason. To act rationally is to act freely; to act irrationally is to be constrained by one's lower nature.

The will insofar as it is constrained by reason, Bosanquet calls "real" or "good will"; insofar as it is determined by non-rational impulses, it is the "actual" will.

The "real will" is good because it can only find permanent satisfaction in ends determined for it by reason. He also justifies his use of the term "real" by saying that a man in ordinary language use is said to control himself when his will is determined by reason, and he is often said not to be "himself" when his will is controlled by non-rational impulses.

The real is thus that what ought to exist and also what really does exist, whereas the actual is merely what appears to exist. So that the real self, the good self, the rational self and the free self are identical.

Now when the state coerces the individual in the name of the law, it is forcing his actualself to do what his real self wishes to do. It is, therefore, forcing him to be free. ...If we ask what guarantee is there that the state will force the individual's actual self to do precisely what his real self wishes, the reply would be that the general will as expressed by law and the individual's real will are identical.

There is definitely alleged to be a real or general will which is the will of society and at the same time the will of all individuals in so far as they are determined by reason.

Bosanquet takes the reality of the individual to be not what at any time he actually appears to be, but rather what he ought to be. But in so far as he is what he ought to be, his will ceases



to be merely his own and becomes simultaneously the will of all other persons in so far as they are what they ought to be. From this it would seem to follow that the separateness of the individual is mere appearance, and that the reality is the idea which, as the general or real will, finds expression in the law.

Bosanquet's general theory may be summed up as follows:

- 1) Self-government alone is compatible with the moral dignity of the individual.
- 2) It is therefore necessary to reconcile this self-government with his apparent subjugation to other persons' wills whenever he is forced to obey the laws of the State.
- 3) This reconciliation of incompatibles, however impossible it may seem at first sight, can be effected as soon as a proper distinction can be made between positive and negative freedom.
- 4) Positive freedom requires the absence of restraint by one's lower impulses, and consists in the motivation of the will by rationality.
- 5) Insofar as the will is motivated by such desires it may be called "real" will and good, but insofar as it is motivated by the lower, evil and irrational impulses it is not really a will at all, but merely appears to be one.
- 6) The real will of one individual is numerically identical with the real wills of all other individuals and is the same thing as the "general will".
- 7) This general will is expressed in the law, so that it follows that the individual when he appears to be forced to obey the law against his apparent wish, is really being forced to do what he wishes, and is thus a consenting party to all enforcements of the law.

It is not necessary to belabor our agreement or disagreement with Bosanquet's belief that there is a special relation between reality and goodness. The opinion that good tends to perpetuate itself and evil to destroy itself develops into the opinion very soon that only the good really exists and that the existence of evil is illusory.

In the "Republic" Plato has Socrates prove to Thrasymachus that justice is more profitable than injustice. We say today that "honesty is the best policy". There is a consensus of opinion that the good life leads to harmony within the soul, while evil persons have uneasy consciences..~~xxxxxxx~~

Yet, is reality goodness? A little thought will convince us that the laws and customs of even the most enlightened countries are far from being the embodiment of reason, for they donot, if obeyed, tend to bring into existence what completely reasonable men would desire under the circumstances.

Laws, customs and social conventions have contributed greatly to the development in men of some of the most unpleasant qualities which civilization has brought to light. The laws of property and social conventions, for instance, make permanent class-distinctions, which often give rise to arrogance and indifference in the wealthy and to hatred and envy in the poor. So ~~after~~ also the past inferior status of women were the consequences of bad laws which have not long been repealed in even the most advanced countries.. And these laws were justified by phalosophers, legislators, and religious teachers, who looked upon woemn as hardly superior to children.



Laws have, of course, played their part in civilizing man, but no one doubts that civilized man might have been a very much better person than he is had the laws which civilized him been themselves better.

Laws are rather perhaps the best which the men of a time can be expected to make, to say the best of them. But so far are we from believing that laws and customs are the embodiments of reason that we are always agitating to have them altered, being inspired to do so by the wise men of our time who are supposed to be wiser than the law.

It would seem, therefore, after this hasty examination that it is difficult to accept the "real" or "general will" of Hegel and Bosanquet so that they have not proved to most of our satisfaction that when an individual does what the government orders him to do against his apparent wish, he is really doing what he wishes.

The idealist theory of implicit consent, as an explanation of why it is the duty of the subject to obey the government, falls to the ground, and with it the most complicated and obscure of all attempts to base political obligation upon consent alone.

The nature of the relation between consent and political obligation, which is the object of our pursuit, has still to be found.

### Common Good:

In addition to the theories already discussed, there has been evolved a further theory of political obligation which has been fairly widely accepted and which has also been constructed with a view to avoiding the difficulties which lay in the path of the contract theorists. This theory, unlike the Hegelian, altogether rejected consent as a basis of political obligation and substituted for it the notion of a "common good".

It maintained that the only fact which justified obedience to the government on the part of the governed was the promotion by the govt of some good which was common to all the persons who owed obedience to it.

Theory best expounded by T.H.Green ("Lectures on Political Obligation") : "The State is an institution for the promotion of a common good... Because a group of beings are capable each of conceiving an absolute good of himself and of conceiving it to be good for himself as identical with, and because identical with, the good of the rest of the group, there arises for each a consciousness that the common good should be the object of action... What is certain is that a habit of subjection founded upon ... fear, could not be a basis of political or free society; for to this it is necessary... that it should represent an idea of common good, which each member of the society can make his own so far as he is rational, i.e. capable of the conception of a common good".

It is clear, he says, that the duty to obey the govt depends entirely upon the success with which it promotes a certain end. Indeed he would hold that the duty to overthrow the government and the duty to obey it both derive from the same source, the general duty to promote the common good. If the State

does the opposite, it would be the duty of the governed to rid themselves of their rulers.

What is this good which the State exists to promote? Its nature? How can it be common to several people? What does Green mean when he says "my good" and "your good"? Is my feeling of pleasure "mine" exactly in the sense that "my" shoes are? Here we get into difficulties.

And even if these questions are answered and there is a common good which it is the duty of the State to promote, why should this be the sole duty of the State? Why shouldn't the State promote other things as well which are common to several?

The good which it is the duty of the State to promote is the moral qualities of its members. He insists, for example, that: "The value then of institutions of civil life lies in their operation as giving reality to capacities of will and reason, and enabling them to be exercised. In their general effect, apart from particular aberrations, they render it possible for a man to be freely determined by the idea of a possible satisfaction of himself instead of being driven this way and that by external forces, and thus they give reality to the capacity called will: and they enable him to realize his reason, i.e. his idea of self-perfection, by acting as a member of a social organisation in which each contributes to the better-being of the rest".

The State, however, cannot promote this end directly. It does so only through the maintenance of the institutions of civil life, which make possible this moral development. An institution which does not exist with a view to maintaining this good is not properly a State.

Green is not satisfied with telling us that the common good consists in the moral development of its members. He also attempts to tell us what this moral development itself consists in. "The true development of man...consists in so living that the objects in which self-satisfaction is habitually sought, contribute to the realisation of a true idea of what is best for man".

Basically, this seems to involve a circle. It doesn't help.

Let us consider perhaps how the members of society are to acquire their moral qualities, for help in this problem. "only through a recognition by certain men of a common interest and through the expression of that recognition in certain regulations of their dealings with each other, could morality originate, or any meaning be gained for such terms as 'ought' and 'right' and their equivalents" He tells us elsewhere, however, that common interest is the same as common good.

It would seem, therefore, that the existence of a common good is prior to the existence of moral persons. Yet this is contradicted by Green's own words to the effect that the end of the State, the common good which it exists to protect and promote, consists in the moral perfection of its members.

On the one hand, he says the moral individual is the one with the capacity of having his actions determined by a desire to promote the common good. On the other hand he says the common good consists in the development of moral personality in the individual.

And nowhere does he adequately describe what the common good is.

Id Green is saying that the promotion of all good depends to a large extent upon cooperation and social intercourse, then there is very little dispute. There is no denying that a man who from

his earliest infancy lives entirely alone on a desert island would miss most of the most valuable things in life. He would possess few, if any, of the qualities of a moral and intellectual being, even if, in fact, nature had endowed him more liberally than any man who ever had the advantage of living in civilized society.

Let this does not tell what common good is or prove that the State exists for common good.

(Discussion of Problem - Challenging Anarchism)

## MACHIAVELLI

The relation of ethics to politics is not a simple problem capable of definition without regard to time and space. It involves an attitude to fundamental questions, the meaning of historic experience, the nature of man, the purpose of the state. Answers to these will present themselves differently to man and thinkers depending upon the conditions they confront.

Political philosophy by its very nature is pragmatic. Its practitioners do not sit down in a dispassionate vacuum to write a treatise, in a real sense much is autobiographical, the reaction upon themselves of a special environment individually interpreted.

No thinker has so suffered at the hands of his interpreters as Machiavelli. Most generally it has been assumed that he made a Moloch of success, and many of these critics then go on to show that despite Machiavelli, honesty can be made to pay.

Or it has been urged that he is a great satirist, that his book is a veiled attack, keenly disguised but hence more effective, upon the methods of the Italian tyrant, by revealing how remorseless the logic of tyranny is.

Or it has been argued that the doctrines he seemed to preach are, in fact, simple truths about human nature in politics.

Others prefer Machivalli as a patriot, the antecedent of Mazzini and Cavour.

Be that as it may be, to understand him we must regard him essentially as an Italian of the 16th century; and we must read THE PRINCE, not as a summary of his creed, but as a fragment of the larger whole, along with the more profound DISCOURSES.....In this context Machivellu emerges essentially human, even if less simple. He was complex but a great man.

Machiavelli is peculiarly unintelligible save in the context of the feverish and decadeny brilliance of Italy at the end of the 15th century. A man of ambition, an ardent lover of his country, bitten, like most of his generation, with the hunger for power and fame, he differs mainly from the mass of his contemporaries in his capacity to digest his experiences.

The keynote of his time was to dare all by experiencing all. A new world had come into being. The old landmarks had been swept away. Religion had ceased, at least for the ambitious men, to be a canon of conduct and was instead an instrument of control. Status was disappearing and birth was counting for less as subtle brains and iron will came to the fore. With this experience that he knew, he wrote. He lived in a jungle and hence wrote for the jungle and did not provide hunters with treatises on the ways of domestic animals.

Writing a grammar of power for use in the 16th century, he explained the way in which the state he knew could be made strong and enduring. He did not inquire whether it was right to attain position in that way; nor did he suggest that other and better ways did not exist.

He sought two essential things: first, the rules which govern the individual's ability to realize his will in a world where such realization was the highest ambition recognized by men, without regard to moral substance;;;and second, how in a world of fraud and force and passion, to keep what one has gained,

He discussed power and not morality.

Basically, PRINCE is not a code of conduct for every-day life; it is a text-book for House of Medici, set out in terms of their own history and aimed at convincing them that he knew this business of government.



The Medici seek to know how they may perpetuate their power and he attempts to enlighten them and contribute a self-contribution to his own qualities.

That it is only partial and incomplete as an expression of his total views can be seen from DISCOURSES, which teach the nobility of republican Rome, the worth of democracy, the vicious character of Caesarism. No ruler, he says, can ever hope for safety, save as he builds upon the favor of people. Popular affection is stronger than fortresses - it is always an evil thing to destroy a free government.

It is bad not to provide against extra-legal action by constitutional forms...It is never virtuous to betray one's friends or to kill one's fellow-citizens...A people is always less avaricious and more grateful than a prince.....Power is poisonous only where it is usurped, for where it is given by the free suffrage of a commonwealth it is rarely exercised without responsibility.

Most of the evils from which a people suffer are traceable to faults in its governors....Treaties enforced by the sword lack that consent which is the essence of obligation.

These are not the maxims of Machiavellianism, as we know the term. Perhaps at heart Machiavelli was always loyal to the Florentine Republic

In any event, Utopia is inscribed on his map and for all his brave show of "realpolitik", we catch his glance straying in that direction with a sense of longing.



Yet, behind all this there is doubtless a low view of men, with a firm disbelief in the idea or even the possibility of progress..For Machiavelli, history shows no eternal laws; its events are the outcome of capricious fortune and change occurs as the relentless men bend institutions to their will...The lesson then is clear.If you would be master of your fate, you must not shrink from what events demand.

Choose kindness, charity, justice, if in them are the seeds of success. But show, above all, resolution, an inflexible determination, and also the hypocrisy of the fox and the courage of the lion.

These are the qualities that bring the leader to his goal. These leaders have evil characteristics for those who are destined to lead in politics are those driven by their fate to seek authority.

Such is the grim business of government; but grim as it is, government there must be.

What indeed is most striking in the PRINCE is less its cynical disregard of the normal standards of conduct as the accuracy with which he depicts the necessary conditions of political controversy in any situation, particularly where there is no general appreciation of right and wrong. Let men feel injustice passionately, and there is no injustice most will not perpetrate to remedy the original injustice and grievance.

Make possible the existence of dubious roads to power and fortune, and men will, despite all possible consequences, travel along those roads so long as they have confidence that danger is remote.

Give men the conviction that they hold the truth which is the price of salvation, and they will torture and imprison their

dearest friends in the assured belief that they act for the sake of those friends.

To criticize Machiavelli for having said these things with a clarity so admirable is to miss completely the lesson they imply.

We must eliminate invective as we analyze his contributions. We must appreciate the large degree to which his doctrines are the enduring basis of political action.

Wherever men feel passionately that their end is so great that it is useless to count the cost, there will be found, consciously or no, a disciple of Machiavelli.

This is particularly true in periods of revolution. The student of Lenin or of Mussolini will have no difficulty in detecting the school to which they belong. For every revolutionary leader stands poised upon the edge of an cliff and to safeguard his precarious hold he will do to others things that attempted against himself he would consider wrong.....His followers will applaud his relentless courage and relentless decision, while his enemies will insist that he debases the moral currency of mankind.

So the followers of Lenin have insisted that the excesses of Bolshevism are a small price to pay for its ultimate prospect; and the disciples of Mussolini excused the outrages of Fascism on the ground that they are the vaccination against the virus of Communism.

The advocates of Irish freedom were outraged by the excesses of British troops in Ireland, but they had little difficulty in accepting the violence of the Sinn Feiners as the inevitable result of a nation struggling to be free. (also Palestine)

It is not strange that Machiavelli and Hobbes and others react to these political facts by throwing up their hands, saying life is a jungle and the habits of the jungle alone insure survival; that men

are a mean and little breed of animals; and force and fear alone can keep them to the straight path.

Yet what about that?

Machiavelli wrote that the prophet without arms is doomed to destruction, yet in the next generation, Calvin arose to confound his maxim.

Napoleon epitomized his ideal, yet he ended in St. Helena exile.

To Pilate, doubtless Christ was an incident destructive of the peaceful process of administration, yet he proved that the authority of moral appeal is, in the long run, not the less potent than the might of armed legions.

This is not to say that force and fraud have not won their victories.. But to say that ~~acting on that basis is not to tell the whole truth for~~ man is base and urge action on that basis is not to tell the whole truth for human nature can often be trusted and acting on that basis has also brought great rewards..... Also to argue with Machiavelli that the end always justifies the means is also incomplete and inadequate, for we know that the means enter into the end and transform it.

The imperialist school seeking to confer Western civilization on Africa may have been motivated by a high cause, but being careless in their means they came to disregard their original purpose..... 7 centuries of force did not win the affection of Ireland for Great Britain..... A leader cannot count upon followers whose support is a matter of purchase.... In the final assessment, his supporters will always act upon the motives he assumes them to possess..... The roots of loyalty are ultimately moral in purpose.

Modern democracy has also some lessons to teach us about Machiavelli. Where a whole people participates in political life, where the sense of interest in the political drama is widely diffused, and there is education to understand it. ...So that though it is true that the "boss" of an American city has recognizable kinship with the prince of 15th century Italy and tho it is true that parties attain power by fraud and deliberate deceit;;yet the important thing is that they cannot hope to retain power for long by these means.

Govt by discussion engenders a capacity for self-regeneration to which other systems cannot pretend. But is it true from the evidence we have today?

It is in the area of international affairs that these lessons of Machiavelli become particularly applicable. Even among high-minded men, activities are undertaken in national interests which rationally would never be undertaken....The sentiment of nationalism still persuades men and peoples to crimes that the detached observer cannot for a moment condone.

Yet the price we have to pay for acting on these assumptions is war. And unless, it is clear, we abandon those assumptions there is no escape from the corruption of our civilization.

In times of conflict it seems as if the stakes of success are too high and the price of defeat too terrible to seek for moderation or for principle.

When conflict is so loosed, the nature of man in its context becomes what Machiavelli assumed it normally to be.

The great contribution of Machiavelli, the reason why he is considered the first political scientist or the father of modern political thought is that he makes the first decisive break. The State to him is a natural entity. It arises out of natural forces, which the ruler must know and understand if he is to survive in the

ruthless competition of life.

Machiavelli thus lays the foundation for Marx and the later theorists who reduce politics to the study of power-conflicts and their control.

There were, of course, many differences between Machiavelli and these later thinkers. He had little conception of the economic forces which Marx sees at the basis of all change, political, social and intellectual. But for Machiavelli as for Marx there is no divine order of things designed by God in accordance with his plan for man and the universe (and yet they both had plans and laws of their own which they substituted)

Machiavelli's insight that the state can be understood only in terms of human lusts and appetites, and his recognition that the successful ruler must learn to control those forces, mark an epoch in political thinking and constitute the basis for the whole modern development.

Again, without formally stating it, Machiavelli is clearly looking forward to the concept of sovereignty and to the corresponding notion of the national territorial state. He completely rejects the feudal conception of a complex hierarchy of relatively autonomous entities and substitutes an all-powerful central authority, supreme over all institutions within.

Thus since sovereignty is much the problem of modern politics, Machiavelli begins this tradition.

Machiavelli's chief immediate practical goal is the national unification of Italy. This is central and constant. This goal was appropriate to his time. Italy of his day was divided into a number of turbulent states and provinces; this fragmentation left it open to uninterrupted series of invasions.

He concluded that Italy could be unified only through a Prince, who would take the initiative in consolidating the country into a nation. He came to this conclusion not because he preferred a monarchy or absolutism but because he found it to be dictated by evidence.

In developing his program he became the first real political scientist in that he divorced politics from ethics. By doing that he freed politics to become more scientific and objective in its study of human behavior. He divorced the two in the sense that every science must divorce itself from ethics. Scientific descriptions and theories must be based on facts, evidence, not upon the demands of some ethical system. To do otherwise is to "doctor" the results to conform with moral principles.

In his work he assembles a large number of facts. These come first and foremost. If they disclose that successful rulers lie frequently and break treaties then such a generalization takes precedence over some opposite law drawn from a metaphysical belief that all men have an innate love of truth, or from an optimistic hope that in the long run truth triumphs over lies.

If the facts show that government is more securely based on the confidence and support of the people than on fortresses then that settled the question.

He likes to generalize from these facts into laws of politics, for that is more important than describing individual events. So that



in judging the practice of the Roman Republic which elected consuls for a year only and then, even if the consuls were leading armies in the field, recalled them at the expiration of the term leading to military inconvenience and sometime the prologation of the campaign, he found that such a step was essential from the point of view of the preservation of the liberty of the Republic. The liberty of a republic is secure only when its officials are elected for a short, definite term which are never prolonged; and that the twilight of the Roman Republic, as of so many others, was first plainly indicated by the practice of extending the terms of officials.

Taking the question how states should proceed if they are to prosper in the treatment of enemies, internal or external, once the enemies have been defeated, again he looks at Roman, Greek, Italian, Carthaginian and French history. There is no successful "middle way". The enemy should be either completely crushed or completely conciliated. A mixture of the two simply guarantees both the continuation of a cause for resentment and revenge.

"Foe Government is nothing but keeping subjects in such a posture as that they may have no will, or power to offend you. And this is done either by taking away all means from them of doing you any hurt; or by obliging and indulging them so, as they may not in reason hope to better their fortune.



What else does Macchiavelli tell us about "political man"? He implies a sharp distinction between two types of political man: a ruler type and a ruled type. The ruler type includes those who occupy leading positions in society, those who aspire to those positions or those who might aspire if they had the opportunity. The ruled type are those who neither lead nor are capable of becoming leaders.

The ruled is the great majority....This view is characteristic of many who believe that the active political struggle is confined to the most part to a small minority.

The outstanding characteristic of the majority is its passivity politically. Unless driven by the most extreme provocation on the part of the rulers or by rare and exceptional circumstances, the ruled are not interested in politics or power. They want a small minimum of security and a chance to live their own lives.

The ruler type, however, is not distinguished from the ruled by any moral standard, or intelligence, or consistency or perfection. There are, however, certain common characteristics that mark the rulers and potential rulers and divide them from the majority.

First, the rulers have ambition, drive, spirit, the will to power. Those who rule above all want to rule. They drive themselves as well as others. They have that quality which makes them keep going in spite of difficulty and danger.

The ruler usually has strength since wars and fighting are the training ground of rule, he believes, and power is secure only on the basis of force.

Another quality, more universal, is fraud. "I have found it always true (DIDCOURSES, Book II, Chap 13) that men do seldom or never advance themselves from a small beginning to any great height, but by fraud, or by force (unless they come to it by donation, or right of inheritance). <sup>1</sup> do not think any instance can be found where force alone brought any man to that grandeur, but fraud and artifice ~~xxxx~~ have done it many times..."

The combination of force and fraud is described too in PRINCE: "You must understand that there are ~~two~~ ways of contending, by Law, and by force: The first is proer to men; the second to beassts; but because many times the first is insufficient, recourse must be had to the second. It belongs, therefore, to a Prince to understand both, when to make use of the rational, and when of the brutal way..."

Finally, political man of the ruler type is skilled at adapting himself to the times. In passage after passage he comes back to this characteristic: neither cruelty nor humaneness, neither rashness nor caution, neither liberality nor avarice avails in the struggle for power unless the times are suited.

He has an interesting theory of history.

First, political life is never static, but is continual change which cannot be avoided. This cycle follows: a good, flourishing prosperous state becomes corrupt, evil, degenerate; from the corrupt state there arises one that is strong and flourishing... This cycle cannot be avoided. The very virtues of the state contain the seeds of its own destruction... The strong flourishing state is feared by all beighbors and thus left in peace. Thus war and force are neglected. The peace and prosperity breed idleness, luxury which in turn lead to political corruption, tyranny and weakness.... The state is then overcome by the force of uncorrupted neighbors and itself enters a new cycle as the hard days and arms purge the corruption and bring a new strength, new

prosperity..But then again degeneration sets in. (History of Florence, Book V)

Secondly, this change expresses the more or less political pattern of human nature.. Governmental instability follows in part from the limitless human appetite for power: "It is observed by most ancient Writers, that as men are afflicted in adversity, so they are satiated in prosperity; and that joy and grief have the same effects: For when men are not necessitated to fight, they fight for ambition, which is so powerful in our minds, that let us arrive at what heights of good fortune we can, we are never contented, but are still laboring for more; and this happens to us, because we are naturally capable of desiring many things, which we are unable to compass; and therefore our desire being greater than our power to acquire, our minds are never at rest with what we enjoy. And this is the occasion of all our varieties of fortune".(DISCOURSES, Book I, Chap 37)

Third he emphasizes "Fortune", which means all those causes of historical change that are beyond the deliberate, rational control of men. These play an important part in history he believes. This conception of fortune fits in closely with the idea that the ruler type is one who knows how to accommodate himself to the times. Fortune cannot be overcome but advantage may be taken of it. "Yet this I shall assert again that man may second their fortune, not resist it; and follow the order of her designs, but by no means defeat them~~xxxx~~: Nevertheless men are not wholly to abandon themselves, because they know not her end; for her ways being unknown and irregular, may possibly be at last for ~~xxxxxxbeing~~ our good; so that we are always to hope the best, and that hope is to preserve us in whatever troubles or distresses we shall fall" (DISCOURSES, Book II, Chap 29.)

But the best way to make use of this opportunism is to be firm, bold, quick indecision and not cowardly or timid.

Fourthly, he believes that religion is essential to the well-being of a state. He doesn't care whether religion is true or false, but instead estimates the role that religious belief and ritual perform in politics. We might say in a general sense that he analyzes "myth" and finds it to be politically indispensable. Religion, he says, unites people, keeps them good or deters them from being bad.

(real last chapter from Burnham)

(real first chapter in Burnham book on FDR)

THOMAS HOBBS (1588-1679)

Entered Oxford before he was 15. Later found university teaching barren and profitless. In LEVIATHAN later condemns universities for their "frequency of insignificant speech". Became tutor to the son of William Cavendish and through the family met Ben Jonson, Bacon and all the philosophical and scientific thought of the continent....He kept moving in "royalist" circles and for a while was brief tutor in mathematics to the Prince of Wales..

These associations undoubtedly influential in making him a royalist in theory though his "atheistical" ideas toward religion led him to be opposed by the Stuarts; and when his LEVIATHAN appeared, he even had to flee the French court to return to England.

He was a monarchist because he thought a king was most likely to give his country the strong and absolutely sovereign govt which he believed it needed. When, therefore, returning to England after his dismissal by Charles Stuart, he found to his surprise that the Protectorate was precisely the type of govt he desired. This, of course, led to charges of disloyalty against him when the Restoration took place. But Hobbes defended himself to the satisfaction of the King who gave him a pension.

When Hobbes died at the age of 91, he left a great, even if not enviable reputation and many writings. The names "Hobbes" in his lifetime became almost synonymous with "atheist" and everything else objectionable.

To understand the LEVIATHAN, his treatise on political theory, we must two historical events which influenced him.

First, was the development by Galileo and others of a new physical science which was changing the physical world from a dramatic qualitative conception into an abstract, quantitative conception of colorless, soundless particles moving with mathematical precision in accordance with simple, determinable mechanical laws.

Hobbes looked upon these mathematical principles as serving to explain not only gross bodies on the planets, but also of all phenomena including the movements of the human mind. To make this transition, he conceived of everything as existing in a body, ie, of particles moving in accordance with deterministic mechanical laws. Everywhere we have completely determined behavior.; every change in the state of affairs is entirely determined by antecedent events in time and may be predicted with certainty.

Thus man could be studied and thus societies could be studied. For societies are conceived of as groups of individual ~~may~~ men reacting upon one another. The same law of motion operate to explain all these phenomena

The second influence on Hobbes thought was the violence, the brutality and waste of life and property of the Civil War in England. He was led to look upon man as an animal moved by considerations of fear and self-interest.

The only attribute which distinguishes man is his capacity for rational thought.; yet even the reason is purely instrumental and doesn't alter his base picture of man, since all it does is enable the animal to avoid many of the things he fears and secure many selfish gratifications whose enjoyment he would otherwise have to forego.



The fact that fear and self-interest are the sole motives which affect human behavior means that life is hard and cruel. The very nature of animals, including man, determines them to be violent.

This "naturalist" view denies any real or fundamental difference between man and the rest of nature. Thus since justice among animals "lies in the fist" so does it among men; there is no moral order; might makes right. The only conceivable instrument to achieve any sort of order out of chaotic conflict then is force, for force alone is the appeal that fear and selfish desire understand.

In Hobbes, therefore, we have one of the most thorough-going and far-reaching applications ever made of a completely frank and clear-sighted naturalism to the field of politics.

To Hobbes, therefore, political theory is to rest firmly on a knowledge of strengths and weaknesses, the capacities and limitations of human nature.

From an analysis of these qualities we see that men are driven to set over themselves a common authority, a veritable leviathan, to restrain man's anarchical impulses and lift men out of the miserable condition of plunder, assassination and fear that is the natural state of man outside the bonds of organized society. That is why men created commonwealths and appointed rulers.

With this view of human nature too, a condition of war of every one against every one, it followed that natural right and natural law could be of little consequence. These natural rights are nothing but the liberty each has to preserve his own life and do anything appropriate to carrying out that end. Natural law, therefore, gives man two alternatives: that each man insist upon his own absolute liberty and rely solely upon his own power and



resources for defense against invasions of liberty; or (2) that each man contract with each other man to divest himself of part of his liberty and set up a common power to conserve the liberty of all.

Organized human society is everywhere a product of contractual relationships born of the second, which is the only rational alternative provided man by nature.....This is not a contract between rulers and ruled for it precedes rulers; nor does it matter if it is entered into by fear and duress...Under the law of nature it is the only alternative to individual self-reliance

Political society is thus an institution founded upon a social contract that men have been obliged to make in order to escape the reign of violence which results from unrestrained liberty.

Rulers are not parties to these contracts; they are objects of it, invested with authority and power to compel the parties to perform their obligations under it. If there were no such supreme and independent authority, it would be a vain and futile gesture...Any man could ignore it at will and the members of the commonwealth would find themselves in the same position as though they had not contracted at all....Coercive power must, therefore, exist over men which is not subject to the passions and capricious determinations of men.

Upon this foundation, he builds a superstructure, a system of rights and duties as between sovereign and subject. Being bound, every man to every man, the subjects who agreed to submit their wills to that of the sovereign, do not therefore have the right without the permission of the sovereign to make a new compact and appoint a new sovereign over them. Everything they do must be

in accord with the will of the sovereign.

Neither can it be argued that the sovereign by an act or omission of an act ever forfeits the prerogatives conferred upon him by the social contract, because the sovereign is not a party to the contract and cannot violate it. He is a creature of the contract but above and apart from it.

Nothing short of an agreement, binding every man to every man, to dissolve the social contract and return to a state of complete individual liberty could lawfully undo the effects of the social contract and deprive the sovereign of his authority.

The possession of sovereignty also carries with it the right of immunity from civil or criminal action, the right of public censorship, the right of making laws to regulate personal and property relationships, the right to adjudicate controversies, the right to make war or peace, the right to choose officials, to punish, to reward, to honor.

“ subject can follow his own will up until it conflicts with will of sovereign.

Hobbes also, in this treatise on politics, sets out to discuss the various forms of commonwealths. He distinguishes between monarchy, democracy, aristocracy; discusses their characteristics.

He also perceived very well the intimate relation between economic and political life. He quipped, for example, that if the geometric axiom proving that the 3 angles of a triangle constituted 2 right angles had been unfriendly to the rich, all the books on geometry would have been burned.

He argues that the needs and wants of the people must be satisfied...He denies any inherent right of property and considers it the function and duty of the state to regulate the ownership and distribution of land, to control and regulate commerce, to control money and tax wealth.

It is interesting to note Hobbes' evaluation of the things that weaken or tend to the dissolution of the commonwealth. First, he mentions the lack of energy, aggressiveness which cause some rulers to fail to seize and exercise the full power necessary to the proper exercise of authority. Second, he mentions the demoralizing effect of certain erroneous and seditious doctrines.

One such doctrine is that every private individual is a competent judge of good and bad and consequently ought to be guided solely by conscience. That is possible only in a state of nature. In organized society, there can be but one standard of right and wrong, and that is the civil law. Private conscience and judgement have no place in man's relation to society.

Another pernicious belief is that study and reason are to give way to supernatural faith. Deluded mortals who believe that God has inspired them and revealed his truth to them cause disorder; they belittle the work of education; they make for dogmatic self-righteousness; disrespect for authority...Security, stability and order cannot be maintained where the individual conscience is supreme.

Another menacing thought is that the sovereign is subject to civil laws; that man is entitled to his own property; that the sovereign power may be divided...All of these tend to deny the existence of sovereignty and undermine the cornerstone of ~~the~~ commonwealth. The sovereign made the law; the commonwealth is the source of property and the sovereign cannot perform his functions if he cannot intrude; and to divide sovereignty is to divide a thing whose essence is unity and destroys it.

One of his chief characteristics is that he succeeded in achieving a degree of scientific detachment which not many political thinkers have attained. His system turned out, as AD Lindsay notes to be "a vindication of the absolute rights of whatever government happens to be in power".

He cannot be ignored. No thinker has presented a stronger case for political absolutism and none more powerfully supported the thesis that the consent of the governed is not necessary to the exercise of sovereign authority. No theories are more damaging to the concepts of liberty and democracy..

Nor have thinkers formulated better grounds for the suppression of revolution. Lincoln even had to fall back on the Hobbesian conception of social compact and sovereignty to find justification for the use of force in quelling the secession of the South. To maintain the position that the Union could not be legally dissolved by action of any of the states, he had to maintain the juridical position implying that the state is an entity which absorbs the wills of all its members.

Again and again Hobbes presses the point that where every man is free to judge for himself what is right or wrong, to decide for himself what God expects of him, to obey or disobey in accordance with what he believes the state to be invading his conscience, to challenge the sovereign whenever he believes the social contract to have been violated- with this there can be no uniformity as to what is binding in ethics, religion or law..The purpose of the state, the supreme object of political authority, is to abolish the anarchy and multiformity which makes morality impossible. This cannot be accomplished unless the power of the sovereign is absolute and supreme.

This position is a challenge to the libertarian position. Unless we are willing to say, as the anarchist is but the liberal is not, that men are so enlightened and ennobled by understanding as to need no master but the individual conscience and pension the police as we put all our money in schools and churches, then we compromise. We strike a bargain with our principles and say there are areas where men still need an overlord. The problem then becomes one of trying to draw the line between the things that are Caesar's and those that are not..Hobbes said: Render unto Caesar that which Caesar ~~demands~~ demands and unto God also that which Gaesar commands.

How else get out of the dilemma? Do we say the State can forbid the sale of alcoholic beverages but not watered securities or vice versa? That the state can carry Sewell Avery but not Henry Wallace?

One of the great English political thinkers.

John Locke (1632-1704)

His effort is primarily a superlative appeal to reason. When he wrote on government it was to explore the reasonableness of political authority and to explain what forms and processes of government were or were not in accord with reason.

This strain ran through all his writings. In LETTERS on TOLERATION he emphasized that men may think they are right but they cannot know it.

This extended to his attitude on govt. He agreed with Hobbes that human nature was fallible, but disagreed with the necessity of absolute authority. What assurance do we have of the rightness of the sovereign's precepts? The kings and bishops also have finite and fallible minds. Is it not better then to practice tolerance and trust from the free competition of ideas that we will reach relative truth.

His TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT (1690) vindicate the Whig Revolution. His first treatise refutes Filmer's "Patriarcha" championing divine right of kings. The second elucidates his own theory. He espouses the social compact theory of the state. With Hobbes he agrees that the original state of nature was one of equality.

Yet in this state of nature there was no jungle war of man against man, but a reign of law predicated on reason and equality.: equality in that none are dominated. This equality embraces all; and these are inherent and inalienable rights of man. Here we have the doctrine of natural rights which is Locke's great contribution to political thought, in that this was adopted by many followers.

This was most devastating to the old order. Imbued with fanatical beliefs in the rights of man, revolutionists of the



18th and 19th centuries blasted the old world and headed the world toward democratic experimentation.

Locke's state of nature was not blissful completely as differences of opinions caused difficulty and with each man judging his own case, there was less cooperation for the common good. Hence they recognized the need for forming civil government. This new compact did not involve a surrender of any natural rights except that of executing the law of nature and redressing one's own wrongs. Society as a whole received the right to do justice among men.

The business of political authority was thus to preserve and not invade men's natural rights of life, liberty and property.

His concern, unlike Hobbes', therefore, was not to exalt political authority but to describe its limitations. His political community was the product of voluntary consent of its members and his rulers were mere agents having none but delegated powers.

The sovereign is therefore not a person, elected or hereditary, but law - law rooted in common consent.

Yet common consent does not require unanimity, for that is impossible. Hence he is for the majority.

There is such a thing as supreme power in govt; it is located in the will of society as expressed in majority law and executed by responsible agents. He assigns to the legislature this supreme power; yet it is not arbitrary or absolute. The legislature must respect the inalienable rights of the individual. The natural rights of man are constitutional limitations on the authority of all lawmakers and rulers.



He also came out for separation of powers.:

"It may be too great temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same persons who have the power of making laws to have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making and execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community, contrary to the ends of society and government. Therefore in well-ordered commonwealths, where the good of the whole is so considered as it ought, the legislative power is put into the hands of divers persons who, duly assembled, have by themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws, which they have done, being separated again, they are themselves subject to the laws they have made.... But because laws that are at once, and in short time made, have a constant and lasting force, and need a perpetual execution, or an attendance thereunto, therefore, it is necessary that there should be a power always in being which should see to the execution of the laws that are made, and remain in force. And thus the legislative and executive power come often to be separated".

contributions

One of his most significant ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ is his theory of revolution. If a ruler abandons the ends for which men gave up the state of nature, the people have a right to resume their original liberty, for a new govt and thus provide for their own safety and security; "The end of government is the good of mankind; and which is best for mankind, that the people should always be exposed to the boundless will of the tyrant, or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be opposed when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power, and employ it for the destruction, and not the preservation, of the properties of their people?"

Locke, however, was no radical. He was a champion of property rights. The chief object of political society was the protection of property. In the state of nature, it was the function of each man to safeguard his own right of property, which was unsatisfactory as there was much insecurity. Hence the compact gave society the duty to punish for offenses against property.

Locke had a real effect on later growth of democracy. Parrington says his volumes "became the textbook of the American Revolution". The Declaration of Independence follows it. He supplied the French philosophers with ideas for the French Revolution.

He is significant in that he gave the world a systematic, rational, and realizable philosophy of individualism, popular sovereignty and constitutional government - or, at least, the world took that from him.

Kendall denies that Locke is a philosopher of individual rights against the majority. Locke's individual is a "community member" participating in a common standard of justice, with his rights dependent upon corresponding duties.

(p.112)

Putting Locke with the majority rule democrats. Yet he ignores the problem of the political machinery to implement majority rule and popular consultation. He says:

"The majority ... may...make laws for the community from time to time, and execute those laws by officers of their own appointing, and then the form of the government is a perfect democracy; or else may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few select men, and their heirs or successors, and then it is an oligarchy; or else into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy...And so accordingly of these make compounded and mixed forms of government, as they think good".

Thus the majority may if it likes set up a hereditary monarchy and name the period for which it is to continue in power; the majority may, if it chooses, act to prevent the exercise of power by future majorities.

Thus the any variety of institutions is compatible with Locke's sovereignty of the community so long as it is recognized that the rulers are the trustees of the people who delegate their power to them.

He is saying, therefore, that the only lawful title to the exercise of political power is popular consent, that the majority of the people have the right to speak for the whole people, that majority rule is thus the only right....Thus before a scheme can be considered a right scheme of govt, its defenders must point to authorization by popular majority, and that when the authorization takes place, it remains until it is altered by the mandate of a popular majority....Thus the majority, it is implied, may make what arrangement it pleases for future govt

Jean Jacques Rousseau:

Born in Geneva in 1712.

Starts like Locke with social contract, but is not as clear. Yet he does grapple with problems ignored by Locke.

To Hobbes and Bodin, the problem of political organization was one of establishing authority in the 16th and 17th centuries.

But when the battle for sovereign authority was won, Locke and others began to realize that the danger had reversed itself. The sovereign was now too powerful rather than not powerful enough. He regarded himself as a separate and distinct entity with a life and purpose of his own, subordinating all else in the state.

Locke thus insisted on consent of the subject for authority. But he ignored: that mere initial consent at the time of formal contract is not sufficient; that a majority is just as capable of exercising force against a minority in a democracy.....Consent may thus be as much a problem in the democratic state

Rousseau attempts to meet this.

He develops a common good into the creation of which all men can and must enter since it is for their good as individuals. Their lives are incomplete in isolation. Here is like Plato and Aristotle and their organic theory of man.

This is contrary to the impression of the earlier works where he glorifies (DISCOURSE) the state of nature as utopian, with social and political man a fallen angel.

If it is true that man must be in society to be complete doesn't it follow that the state of nature is really "unnatural" or abnormal because it occurs relatively seldom and when it does occur leads to bad results.

He can best be understood if viewed as protest and wish fulfillment. In his early work he yearns for nature, happiness as an unspoiled child of nature. Men lived free, healthy, honest and happy lives; they were crude and unsophisticated but pure and noble.

Had talents of individuals been equal, this idyllic state of nature would have been maintained. But the more gifted strove to outdo their fellows, invented arts permitting them to acquire more than others, accumulating riches...Then, by clever sophistry, the rich persuade the poor to join them in setting up a commonwealth, ostensibly to guard the weak, restrain the ambitious and secure to all their possessions, but actually to legitimize and perpetuate the system of rich over poor.

The starting point for Rousseau of reform was plain, get back to nature and follow nature's laws. This is the remedy to all problems.

Yet when he writes SOCIAL CONTRACT, he seems to recognize the impossibility of returning to nature in civil society. The golden age of equality and justice is a lovely dream but not a real hope. Out of question. If Europe is to have any salvation, it must be found in principle of political obligation reconciling liberty and authority, removing inequality.

Rather than back to nature, he seeks a formula to explain political society in terms agreeable to the rights and interests of the common man and a philosophy of democracy.

Hence social contract. But he denied Hobbes' statement that with this men bargained away their rights, freedom and equality. To say that a man gives himself gratuitously to another is absurd. To say that he sells himself to another means a quid pro quo. What is the selling price? peace, protection? Only in name; actually

he gets war, extortion, oppression...Certainly men never knowingly made such a bargain; and if they did, they could not bind their children.

"Men cannot renounce liberty. They may lose liberty by conquest, may submit to save their lives - but this force gives no right that force may not destroy.

The real nature of the social contract then was as follows: Each gave himself unreservedly to the whole community, surrendering all his rights and liberties. This preserved equality. But in giving himself to the community as a whole, each gave himself to nobody in particular. Thus liberty was preserved. ...Coming into political society thus each member "puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole"...The sovereign was thus the general will.

To meet the criticism that the individual after parting with all his rights, cannot now claim any liberty in this complete subjection of the individual to the state, he says that although the individual is absorbed in the state, he remains free because the state and the individual are inseparable.

The state in his view is composed of equal individuals none having authority over the other, equally participating in the general will.

"He never really met the question how the general will could be formed and applied without detriment to the free and equal status of any member of the body politic.

What is this general will? It is the crux of his system. It must not be confused with the totality of individual wills



Individual wills added together cannot constitute the general will because individual wills take account of private and particular matters whereas the general will only takes account of common concerns. The general will would then seem to be the will of the people functioning as a body politic.

This gives a rational moral sanction to government. Obedience is due not because the state is divinely ordained or is right but because it speaks for society as a whole.

Yet what about the rights of man? If the social will, expressed in law, is unconditionally obligatory upon all members of the body politic, can there be any individual rights? This troubles him but he must answer: "If the State is a moral person whose life is the union of its members, and if the most important of its cares is the care of its own preservation, it must have a universal compelling force, in order to move and dispose each part as may be most advantageous to the whole...Each man alienates, I admit, only such part of his powers, goods and liberty as it is important for the community to control; but it must also be granted that the Sovereign is sole judge of what is important".

Still there are some rights. The sovereign community "cannot impose upon its subjects any fetters that are useless to the community, nor can it even wish to do so; for no more by the law of reason than by the law of nature can anything occur without a cause"....Thus no contest between individual and state.

"Instead of a renunciation, they have made an advantageous exchange: instead of an uncertain and precarious way of living they have got one that is better and more secure; instead of natural ~~in~~dependence they have got liberty, instead of power to harm others security for themselves, and instead of their strength, which others might overcome, a right which social union makes invincible. Their very life, which they have devoted to the State, is by it constantly protected; and when they risk it in the State's defense, what more are they doing than giving back what they have received from it?"



Yet he gets into dilemmas. What if all the people cannot be assembled? What if they don't agree? If majority is binding where is general will?

His answer: Dissenters can choose to leave in exile if they choose not to submit. After that, majority rules.

## JOHN STUART MILL:

Wrote extensively on many subjects: logic, history, metaphysics, economics, govt. REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, LIBERTY, PARLIAMENTARY REFORM, UTILITARIANISM, SUBJECTION OF WOMEN.

Looked upon liberty as an ultimate. Older utilitarians considered other things as vital as liberty and thus were often willing to sacrifice liberty to other ends. They lived in an age when ~~liberty~~ tyranny was the exclusive property of minorities and to overcome them, their liberties were curtailed and they were subject to social controls..But Mill lived in an age when it was evident that majorities could be tyrannical too. Hence it was necessary to protect minorities.

Not believing in inalienable rights, he advocated the theory of Greater Utility. Individual freedom of body and mind was of such vast social as well as individual importance that:

"the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection...The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him. or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, ~~his~~ his independence is of right, absolute".

Here is pure far-reaching individualism.

Now he begins with exceptions and qualifications. His doctrine of liberty was intended to apply "only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties"; not to children or other persons whose immaturity or other deficiencies of mind, body,

or character required them to be taken care of by other people. For the same reason it could not be extended to backward peoples or races.."Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion".

Nor was that all. Even in a civilized society as between mature and intelligent persons, there was a sphere in which individual liberty must be entirely subordinated to collective welfare....We must consider the individual's obligation to do no harm to others and the individual's obligation to bear his due share of the "labors and sacrifices" necessary to secure society or any of its members against harm.

Yet he did speak strongly:

"We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still".

"All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility".

"Judgment is given to men that they may use it. Because it may be used erroneously, are men to be told that they may not use it at all?".

"He who knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that".

"Popular opinions, on subjects not palpable to sense, are often true, but seldom or never the whole truth".

"The fatal tendency of mankind to leave off thinking about a thing when it is no longer doubtful, is the cause of half their errors".

"If the teachers of mankind are to be cognizant of all that they ought to know, everything must be free to be written and published without restarint".

too  
"Mankind can hardly be often reminded, that there was once a man named Socrates, between whom and the legal authorities and public opinion of his time there took place a memorable collision".

Mill placed primary emphasis on the utility of absolute liberty of thought and expression. He seemed less sure in dealing with other libertues....He opposed using coercion of state for the good of the individual alone and yet saw the need for state interference for positive social ends - and he insisted on maintaining the line of distinction.

He would not, for instance, admit that the police power of the state should be used to punish a person for gambling, drunkenness, or sexual immorlaity, or to abridge his access to those evils....But he did concede that the power might be justly used to combat the social consequences of such actions..

He was willing to grant a government a much-widened sphere of authority, but it must be atype of government that could be trusted to follow the principles of utility.

His essay on REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT tries to find that form of government best adapted.

Polotical institutions are made what they are by human volunatry agency and can be good or bad. Hence "The first element of good government...(is) the virtue andintell&gence of the human beings composing the community"...Hence the "most important point of

excellence which any form of government can possess is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves".

Becoming practical, he admits that in isolated cases a benevolent despot might measure up to his standards. But only a representative govt can do so in the long run. But a representative govt does not necessarily mean democracy. He mistrusted ultimate sovereignty in the hands of a majority. It was alright for the majority to have the power of approval or diap proval, but it is beyond their capacity to administer govt with all its intricacies and complexes. The representatives of the people were also incompetent on that score.

"Instead of the function of governing, for which it is radically unfit, the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government; to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers questionable; to censure them if found condemnable, and, if the men who compose the government abuse their trust, or fulfill it in a manner which conflicts with the deliberate sense of the nation, to expel them from office, and either expressly or virtually appoint their successors".

He pointed out the weaknesses of democracy: "first, general ignorance and incapacity, or, to speak more moderately, insufficient mental qualifications, in the controlling body; secondly, the danger of its being under the influence of interests not identical with the general welfare of the community".

Mill beleived that it was possible to organize democracy sp as to offset these weaknesses and still remain democratic. Hence his advocay of minority representation and his advocay of the Hare system of proportional representation. That the majority

should always prevail over the minority and the minority be unrepresented was tyranny and not democracy. The essence of democracy was equality and that required minority representation.

Hence his advocacy too of full representation by extending suffrage to women too.

Readings in the Classics  
Examination - Fall Quarter, 1946

Write only three questions, choosing one from each section.

Section A.

1. (a) What was the view of justice brought forward by Cephalus?  
(b) What was Plato's answer?  
(c) What bearing does this discussion have today?
2. (a) What is the position of Thrasymachus?  
(b) How does Plato refute the position?

Section B.

3. (a) What is the purpose of the state for Plato and Aristotle?  
(b) What was their conception (narrower sense) or definition of the state?  
(c) What was their view of tyranny?
4. Compare, briefly, Aristotle with Plato on the following:
  - (a) Relation of the state to society and government
  - (b) Property
  - (c) Education
  - (d) War

Section C.

5. Plato placed his confidence in the wisdom of the few and set up an authoritarian state, whereas Aristotle placed his trust in law and set up a middle class democracy. Examine.
6. (a) Although Plato denied rights to most members of his state, he laid the basis for a theory of rights.  
(b) Although teleology was a factor leading Aristotle to consider the city-state as the final form of political organization, it was not the only one.
7. (a) Plato misunderstood liberty and therefore could not appreciate democracy. Examine.  
(b) Aristotle understood democracy because he appreciated equality. Examine.



Possible Exam Questions:-

Write a brief essay on the nature and object of the study of political theory.

"

Both Plato's and Aristotle's theories of the state are intended to be answers to the Sophists contention that the state is conventional". Discuss - in so doing state and compare the views of Plato and Aristotle.

Compare Plato and Aristotle with respect to their discussion of the causes of revolution, i.e. - changes in the constitution of the state.

Compare, analyze and evaluate Plato's and Aristotle's views of democratic government.

State whether you believe fact statements can be separated from value statements in political science. Discuss the implications of both positions and their consequences for teaching and for political action.

Compare Plato's communism with modern socialism as regards: working class, political emphases, individual liberties, democratic processes.

Discuss critically rather than descriptively Plato's elitist rule.

If the only two political books you ever read were Plato's REPUBLIC and Aristotle's POLITICS, how would they help you understand the problems of the 20th century.

Government 39-40. Winter Session 1947-48

This course deals mainly with political thought as seen at first hand in some of the important writings of some great thinkers: Plato's Republic, Aristotle's Politics, Machiavelli's The Prince, and an extensive portion of Hobbes' Leviathan. In addition, selections from other original works are read in Francis W. Coker, Readings in Political Philosophy.

Classroom time will be spent mainly in group discussion of the original writings. It is hoped that an analytical approach will result in an appreciation of the history of political thought. History as background, however, is to be provided mainly by prescribed readings in Sabine, A History of Political Theory.

One-volume texts other than Sabine's are George Catlin, The Story of the Political Philosophers (1939), Thomas Cook, History of Political Philosophy from Plato to Burke (1936), Chester Maxey, Political Philosophies (1938), Raymond Gettell, A History of Political Thought (1924). Bibliographical notes within quotation marks below are from Cook, supra.

Treatises: "W. W. Willoughby's The Political Theories of the Ancient World is a simple treatment of Greek and Roman, as well as Oriental political thought, and should prove valuable to the beginner. C. H. McIlwain's The Growth of Political Thought in the West analyzes and interprets political theories from the Greeks until the end of the Middle Ages. While very interesting, it is not an easy book, and may confuse the beginner who has not mastered the basic concepts of political thought and the chronology of the period. W. A. Dunning's A History of Political Theories, Ancient and Medieval covers roughly the same period in a simple and straightforward manner." A later period is covered in A History of Political Theories: Luther to Montesquieu.

R. W. and A. J. Carlyle's classic A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West "is at once clear, interesting, and scholarly." The six volumes are "very thorough . . . . In general, however, they are not for the beginner."

"On the political ideas of the entire sixteenth century, J. W. Allen's Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century is the standard work. Full and scholarly, it is not difficult reading, and is full of penetrating analyses." It "presents a detailed account of the development of theories and their relation to the changing fortunes of the different parties involved."

The essays in the volumes edited by F. J. C. Hearnshaw are generally excellent: The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Medieval Thinkers; The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Renaissance and Reformation; The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries; The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great English Thinkers of the Augustan Age, A.D. 1650-1750.

Additional bibliography may be found in Sabine and Coker. A valuable ready reference are the articles on men and periods in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences.

Fri. Sept. 26: Introduction

Mon. Sept. 29: The problems of political theory

PART I. Greek Political Thought

Wed. Oct. 1: Sabine, "The City-State"  
"Political Thought before Plato"

Fri. Oct. 3: Republic, Book I  
Sabine, "Plato, the Republic"

Mon. Oct. 6: Republic, Book II

Wed. Oct. 8: Republic, Books III, IV, V

Fri. Oct. 10: (continued)

Mon. Oct. 13: Republic, Books V, VI, VII

Wed. Oct. 15: Republic, Books VIII, IX

Fri. Oct. 17: (continued); Book X

Mon. Oct. 20: Sabine, "Plato, the Statesman and the Laws"

Wed. Oct. 22: Politics, Book I  
Sabine, "Aristotle, Political Ideals"  
"Aristotle, Political Actualities"  
Essays on the Republic to be submitted.

Fri. Oct. 24: Discussion of student essays.

Mon. Oct. 27: Politics, Books II, III, VII, VIII

Wed. Oct. 29: (continued)

Fri. Oct. 31: Politics, Books IV, V, VI

Mon. Nov. 3: (continued)

Wed. Nov. 5: Sabine, "The Twilight of the City-State"

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE:

The beginnings: "For the beginner, G. Lowes Dickinson's The Greek View of Life provides an admirable background to the study of Greek political thought. It is concerned mainly with the Greek attitude towards religion, the individual, and the state. It is, however, rhapsodic and uncritical. It may be supplemented by A. E. Zimmern's The Greek Commonwealth, which gives a fairly detailed picture of

Greek civilization. The Legacy of Greece (ed. R. W. Livingstone) contains articles on various aspects of Greek life. Among them Professor Zimmern's article on 'Political Thought' is directly germane, while an essay by Professor Gilbert Murray, concerned with the lasting significance of Greece's contribution to the world, is suggestive, stimulating, and finely written.

"For the emergence of Greek thought, its geographical background, its foundation in language, and its development by the poets, J. L. Myres's The Political Ideas of the Greeks is the best work in English. It is not, however, recommended to undergraduates who have not studied Greek and Greek history. On Socrates and pre-Socratic political ideas, Chapters III-V in E. Barker's Plato and His Predecessors are very good, while the first two chapters of the same work offer a sound introduction to Greek political concepts generally and to the actual nature of the Greek state."

Plato: "R. L. Nettleship's Lectures on the Republic of Plato gives a readable and relatively simple account and interpretation of that dialogue. A more advanced and technical work, with much valuable discussion of specific problems from the point of view of the Hegelian Idealist, is Bernard Bosanquet's Companion to Plato's Republic. It is not suitable for the beginner. Barker's Plato and His Predecessors contains a systematic account of the various political dialogues and of their relationship. His discussion of the Laws is particularly full and valuable . . . . In an appendix he also presents a detailed summary of the subsequent influence of Plato's political ideas. In certain respects, however, G. Lowes Dickinson's Plato is the most useful work for a beginner. It is a simple, well-written interpretation of Plato's essential meaning. It was first given as a series of radio addresses over the British Broadcasting Corporation and was designed for a popular audience."

Aristotle: With regard to the Politics, "A learned discussion of the arrangement . . . is contained in Volume I of Newman's The Politics of Aristotle, together with much valuable material on the arrangement of that work to Aristotle's philosophy in general . . . . E. Barker's Plato and Aristotle is the most useful secondary work for the person concerned mainly with political theory. It is thorough and systematic, and includes an epilogue that traces the subsequent influence of the Politics. Dunning's chapter on Aristotle is full, clear, and simple. The student desirous of gaining a general understanding of Aristotle's philosophy -- something to be highly recommended -- will probably find A. E. Taylor's Aristotle a good work with which to start."

## PART II. Roman and Medieval Thought

- Fri. Nov. 7: Coker, POLYBIUS  
Sabine, "The Law of Nature"
- Mon. Nov. 10: Coker, CICERO  
Sabine, "Cicero and the Roman Lawyers"
- Wed. Nov. 12: Coker, ST. AUGUSTINE  
Sabine, "Seneca and the Fathers of the Church"



- Fri. Nov. 14: Sabine, "The Folk and Its Law"  
"The Investiture Controversy"
- Mon. Nov. 17: Coker, JOHN OF SALISBURY  
Sabine, "Universitas Hominum"
- Wed. Nov. 19: Coker, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
- Fri. Nov. 21: Coker, MARSIGLIO OF PADUA  
Sabine, "Philip the Fair and Boniface VIII"  
"Marsiglio of Padua and William of Occam"
- Mon. Nov. 24: (continued)
- Wed. Nov. 26: Coker, NICHOLAS OF CUSA  
Sabine, "The Conciliar Theory of Church Government"  
Essays on a medieval thinker to be submitted
- Fri. Nov. 28: Discussion of student essays

#### BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE:

Roman Political Thought and Christianity: "For background material F. F. Abbott's Roman Political Institutions should prove useful to the student who lacks knowledge of Roman government. In The Legacy of Rome are two articles that can be thoroughly recommended, the one by Ernest Barker on The Conception of Empire, the other by F. de Zulueta on The Science of Law. For an understanding of the development and social significance of Roman law, H. S. Maine's Ancient Law is still valuable and is easy reading. His central thesis, however, has been modified, if not totally destroyed by more recent scholars." For political thought proper, Volume I of Carlyle, supra is "still the best single book available . . . The first two chapters, treating of Cicero and Seneca respectively, are particularly useful for undergraduates. Later chapters on the political theory of the Roman lawyers are good, but may prove confusing to one who lacks some background of Roman law.

"G. H. Sabine and S. B. Smith have done a translation of Cicero's De Republica, with On the Commonwealth as its title. It includes an introduction that analyzes Cicero's political ideas and sets them in their background.

"The essential principles of Stoicism are carefully stated and critically examined in R. M. Wenley's Stoicism and Its Influence. Reinhold Niebuhr's An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, while not primarily historical, is illuminating on Jesus' social philosophy and its implications."

St. Augustine: "J. N. Figgis's The Political Aspects of St. Augustine's City of God is the best work for the political theorist. It analyzes the scope, theory, and influence of St. Augustine in a clear and forceful way, and is intelligible to the unlearned."

The background and character of medieval thought: Part III of Volume V of Carlyle, supra, "contains a simple and readable summary of the chief elements in medieval thought, while Part I gives accounts of certain special topics and should be useful to the more advanced student. F. W. Maitland's introduction to, and translation of, a chapter of O. von Gierke's great work, under the title Political Theories of the Middle Ages, also contains brilliant and scholarly studies of the main concepts of the period and their development. While stimulating, it is not easy, assuming considerable knowledge on the part of the reader.

"... the student will find very good articles in The Legacy of the Middle Ages, edited by G. C. Crump and E. F. Jacob. F. M. Powicke's article on The Christian Life should help to make the outlook and ideals of the period intelligible. The section on law includes articles on Customary Law, by P. Vinogradoff, on Canon Law, by G. LeBras, and on Roman Law, by E. Meynial. These contain some technical material, but also state admirably the basic principles and significance of the subjects treated. Finally, the article by E. F. Jacob on Political Thought is a masterly, though brief, survey and interpretation of the subject. A short and readable account of the influence of Roman Law is contained in P. Vinogradoff's Roman Law in Medieval Europe, while James Bryce's The Holy Roman Empire is a fairly detailed, but quite lively account of that institution. On the relations of the temporal and spiritual powers, A. L. Smith's Church and State in the Middle Ages is useful."

John of Salisbury and St. Thomas Aquinas: Essays on both in the first volumes edited by Hearnshaw, supra. "There is a translation of the most important parts of John of Salisbury's Policraticus, under the title The Statesman's Book of John of Salisbury, done by J. Dickinson, who contributes a fine introduction, including a very clear discussion of Higher Law. There is a chapter, entitled 'Group Life and the State,' in M. de Wulf's Medieval Philosophy which contains a valuable account of St. Thomas Aquinas' social philosophy. E. Gilson's St. Thomas Aquinas is a sympathetic and intelligible account, by a distinguished authority, of the angelic doctor. Its emphasis, however, is not political."

Dante and Dubois: "On Dante, J. J. Rolbiecki's The Political Philosophy of Dante Alighieri is the most thorough treatment as far as political ideas are concerned. On Dubois, there is an excellent essay by Eileen Power" in Hearnshaw's first volume, supra.

Marsiglio of Padua and William of Occam: "C. W. Previt -Orton's edition of The Defensor Pacis of Marsilius of Padua contains a short, concise, and valuable introduction that presents the argument of that work in a systematic way. On Occam, there is a very interesting article by Max A. Shepard, entitled 'William of Occam and the Higher Law,' in The American Political Science Review, December 1932 and February 1933."

Wyclif: "Of Wyclif there is a thorough and absorbing account in H. B. Workman's John Wyclif; A Study of the Medieval English Church. It is, however, in two volumes, and it moreover assumes considerable knowledge of the general history of the period. A brief, but lucid, ac-

count of Wyclif's doctrine of lordship is contained in R. L. Poole's Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought, Chapter X. Interesting material on this general period may also be found in J. N. Figgis's The Divine Right of Kings, Chapters III-IV."

The Conciliar Movement: "The material on the Conciliar Movement in English, and suitable for undergraduate use, is limited. Chapter X of Dunning's Political Theories, Ancient and Medieval gives a clear and straightforward account of it. Lecture II in J. N. Figgis's From Gerson to Grotius is at once profound and provocative. The whole work, indeed, is of first-rate value . . . . It is, however, brief, and is an interpretation addressed to scholars rather than a simple analysis of individual thinkers or a strictly chronological account. Perhaps the best introduction for the student is E. F. Jacob's essay on Nicholas of Cusa in F. J. C. Hearnshaw's The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Renaissance and Reformation."

### PART III: Machiavelli to Hobbes

- Mon. Dec. 1: The Prince  
Sabine, "Machiavelli"
- Wed. Dec. 3: (continued)
- Fri. Dec. 5: (continued)
- Mon. Dec. 8: Coker, MARTIN LUTHER  
JOHN CALVIN  
Sabine, "The Early Protestant Reformers"
- Wed. Dec. 10: (continued)
- Fri. Dec. 12: Coker, VINDICIAE CONTRA TYRANNOS  
Sabine, "Royalist and Anti-royalist Theories"
- Mon. Dec. 15: Coker, JEAN BODIN  
Sabine, "Jean Bodin"
- Wed. Dec. 17: Coker, HUGO GROTIUS  
Sabine, "The Modernized Theory of Natural Law"
- Fri. Dec. 19: Coker, RICHARD HOOKER  
Sabine, "England: Preparation for Civil War"
- Mon, Jan. 5: Leviathan, Chapters 13, thru 21, 26, and 29  
Sabine, "Thomas Hobbes"
- Wed. Jan. 7: (continued)
- Fri. Jan. 9: (continued)
- Mon. Jan. 12: (continued)
- Wed. Jan. 14: Sabine, "Radicals and Communists"  
Essays to be submitted
- Fri. Jan. 16: Discussion of student essays.



BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE:

Machiavelli: "The material on Machiavelli is voluminous." The Prince has been published in the Everyman's Library and by the Oxford University Press. "The great English edition is, however, that of L. F. Burd. Apart from his scholarly introduction, it contains a prefatory introduction by Lord Acton -- one of the finest essays existing on the subject. That essay may also be found in Acton's History of Freedom. There is a brief, but stimulating, essay on Machiavelli in H. J. Laski's The Dangers of Obedience. A great work that discusses Machiavelli's life and setting is P. Villari's The Life and Times of Niccoló Machiavelli (2 volumes). While long and scholarly, it is not difficult reading -- is, indeed, extremely interesting. A more popular account, which conveys admirably the feeling of the Renaissance, is given by R. Roeder in his The Man of the Renaissance. The connection of Machiavelli with Luther and the Reformation is discussed in Figgis's From Gerson to Grotius, Lecture III and in R. H. Murray's The Political Consequences of the Reformation, Chapter I, though the two viewpoints are interestingly different. In Part IV of J. W. Allen's A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century there is a good and thorough chapter on Machiavelli, followed by one on Guicciardini, which it would pay the student to read. An English edition of Machiavelli's works, containing the Discourses and the History of Florence is that of C. E. Detmold. The latter work is, however, more readily available in the Everyman series. A brief selection from Machiavelli's correspondence, illuminating as to his character, has been done by D. Ferrara."

Luther and the Reformation: Part I, Chapter I of Allen, supra, "deals with Luther and his disciple Melancthon, while Ch. II examines carefully the theory of the Anabaptists and the issues between them and Luther. Allen also gives a more brief treatment of Luther in an essay on him" in Hearnshaw's second volume, "where may also be found an essay on Erasmus by J. A. K. Thomson.

"For the Reformation itself, R. H. Murray's The Political Consequences of the Reformation is useful, being easy and interesting to read and not too allusive or obviously learned. Ch. II discusses particularly Luther's connection with Divine Right. Figgis's main ideas concerning Luther's political thought are given in Lecture III of his From Gerson to Grotius. . . . Of Luther's political ideas there is a careful exposition in L. H. Waring's The Political Theories of Martin Luther."

Calvin: Allen, supra, Chapter III, "discusses carefully not only the Institutes, but also Calvin's practice in Geneva, his views on resistance, and the connection of his ideas with Catholic teaching. The following chapters deal with the issue of toleration and the later developments of Calvinism. Murray discusses Calvin in Ch. III of his book, while in Hearnshaw there is an essay on the subject by Rev. W. R. Matthews. One of the most balanced discussion both of Calvin's theology and of his social and economic philosophy is contained in G. Harkness's John Calvin. Of the general question of the connection between economics and Protestantism, particularly on its Calvinist side, there is a superb and finely written discussion in R. H. Tawney's Religion and the Rise of Capitalism. A more brief

analysis, also brilliantly written, of the whole relation of Protestantism to emergent capitalism is contained in Ch. I of H. J. Laski's The Rise of Liberalism. A translation of John Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion in three volumes is fairly readily available, but the most significant portions of that work, from the point of view of political philosophy, may be found in J. Mark Jacobson's The Development of American Political Thought, Ch. I."

The Vindiciae: "H. J. Laski's introduction to his edition of the Vindiciae, under the title A Defense of Liberty Against Tyrants is also to be thoroughly recommended, though, since it assumes considerable familiarity with the subject on the student's part, it should not be read as a first introduction to the subject."

Bodin: "There is in English no recent book devoted exclusively to Bodin's social and political ideas. But Allen discusses Bodin's theories with his usual thoroughness in Part III, Ch. VII of the work previously cited, while his article on Bodin in F. J. C. Hearnshaw's The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries deals magnificently with Bodin's theory of sovereignty. Hearnshaw himself has an article on "Bodin and the Genesis of the Doctrine of Sovereignty" in Tudor Studies (ed. R. W. Seton-Watson). . . . B. Reynolds Proponents of Limited Monarchy in Sixteenth Century France is an interesting historical study, centering around Bodin and Hotman, and stressing, as the title implies, the limitations they placed on the sovereign. A balanced and clever discussion of the question of whether Bodin did limit sovereignty, and how, together with interesting reflections on the relevance of his theories to present-day issues, is M. A. Shepard's article, 'Sovereignty at the Crossroads; a Study of Bodin,' in The Political Science Quarterly, December, 1930. Unfortunately no recent or readily available translation of Bodin's works exists."

The Jesuits: See Allen, Murray, and both of Figgis's volumes. "Jesuit political theory is analyzed in its anti-monarchical aspect in the fine introduction by C. H. McIlwain to his The Political Works of King James I. The treatment of Bellarmine is particularly good. A careful analysis, very good especially on Mariana, is in Ch. IV of Dunning's Political Theories: From Luther to Montesquieu. In Hearnshaw's The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries there is a clear and valuable article on Suarez by A. L. Lilley."

Althusius and Grotius: "On Althusius, the introduction by C. J. Friedrich to his edition and translation of the Politica Methodice Digesta is a thorough and scholarly account which, however, makes its subject perhaps unduly important. . . . In Hearnshaw's The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries there is a brief article on Grotius by the editor, which is useful as a summary. A more lengthy discussion is given in A. D. White's Seven Great Statesmen, while for the more advanced student W. S. M. Knight's Life and Works of Hugo Grotius may be recommended."

Seventeenth Century English Thought: "G. P. Gooch's Political Thought in England from Bacon to Halifax is the best introduction, being simple, brief, and scholarly. . . . Gooch's English Democratic Ideas

in the Seventeenth Century (2nd edition, with notes by H. J. Laski) is more specialized, but excellent and not difficult. Its treatment of Levellers and Communists is particularly valuable, while it has two useful introductory chapters on early modern democratic ideas in general and on democratic theory in England from Wyclif on. The second chapter of Laski's The Rise of Liberalism is a stimulating essay on the religious, scientific, and political thought of this period and its connection with the growth of the middle class."

Divine Right: "Figgis's The Divine Right of Kings is the standard work. It deals with that peculiar idea sympathetically, and explains its relevance to its period. . . . A brief, but somewhat superficial, treatment of the same subject may be found in I. Brown's English Political Theory, Chs. IV and V. C. H. McIlwain's The Political Works of King James I contains a very useful introduction, analyzing that monarch's ideas and setting them in their background."

The Levellers: "T. C. Pease's The Leveller Movement is the one available work on that subject. While not light reading, it is full of substance without being exhaustive. A. D. Lindsay's The Essentials of Democracy, a short and provocative work, contains some material on democratic ideas in the Cromwellian army, used primarily to illustrate problems of contemporary democracy."

Hobbes: "Ch. II of Gooch's Political Thought in England from Bacon to Halifax is a brief, but good, discussion of Hobbes's theories. . . . A more lengthy account thereof, sound but somewhat pedestrian, is to be found in W. Graham, English Political Philosophy from Hobbes to Maine. H. R. Lord's The Principles of Politics, which analyzes dominant trends in seventeenth and eighteenth century thought topically and critically, has much that is valuable on Hobbes's ideas, particularly of the contract and of sovereignty. C. E. Vaughan's Studies in the History of Political Philosophy, of which the first volume is devoted mainly to social contract theories, contains in Ch. II thereof a good analysis of this aspect of Hobbes's thought. For a criticism of Hobbes's theory of political obligation, as devastating as it is short, the student should consult E. F. Carritt's Morals and Politics.

"Of books on Hobbes, G. E. G. Catlin's Thomas Hobbes as Philosopher is a short introductory sketch by an admirer and disciple of the philosopher of Malmesbury. Larger works are Sir L. Stephen's Hobbes in the 'English Men of Letters' series -- an excellent work, and G. C. Robertson's Thomas Hobbes, a very valuable biography. Hobbes's Leviathan itself is readily obtainable in the 'Everyman' series. His other works are less available, though F. Tonnies, a distinguished German student of Hobbes, has had printed his Elements of Law. The great edition, however, is that of Molesworth (16 vol.), which includes both the English and the Latin works."



While we have no coherent political theory produced by ancient or contemporary primitive tribes and societies, political theory seems to have emerged very soon after the development of settled states and complex forms of govt.

Political theory is often related to metaphysical and ethical principles derived from thinking about the purpose of man and the nature of social organization necessary to carry out that purpose.

It is thus of course clear as a first point that the values of the philosopher are much related to his environment and personal experience.

Most of it, even the utopias, are an evaluation of what is in terms of what ought to be.

Looking at these theories we find that they are not entirely without influence in terms of political practice. While the ideas propounded may never be achieved in all their purity, and while man still manages always to be ruled by bad govt in spite of the theories and utopias, it is nevertheless true that practical programs are formulated and modified and that revolutions take place in terms of the theories.

So we have a reason for studying the ideas of dead men.

Another reason is that ideas of political philosophy don't change very much. For one, there is a lag in ideas, take longer to get accepted than latest style in dresses i.e. take longer to become familiar with parts of culture and then are less obsolete.

Basically, the essential ends of social org. change little. The institutional setting changes, conditions, but not the basic idea of the problem of govt, of organization of man as a social animal.

Beyond that are the divergent views, as to the kind of animal man is.

Does God in some peculiar way designate rulers?  
Has he given Kings, not only to Israel, but to the whole world?

Or does authority rest in the people?

One set. Another set:

The necessity for political authority is generally recognized, but much dispute about the limits of political authority. Are there any? Should there be? Has the individual any claim to a sphere of freedom where authority may not touch him? May he resist the state in terms of conscience or of interest? How legitimate is conscience?

Also, has the individual any rights against the state? How does he get them? Do they come from God, from a rational nature, from the mere fact of human existence, or are they simply privileges?

Do groups have claims against the state? May a church resist on conviction that sphere of state is limited, and that obedience stops once line passed or state malperforms duties?

Can other groups like citizens, or nobles resist on grounds that states activities harm them? Who is to judge harm?

Should there be complete freedom to think as one likes and express ones thoughts, or should the rulers alone say what is to be taught and thought?

Generally, what duties have individuals and groups toward the state? Are the past performances and benefits derived from state the criteria?

Or does our obligation to the state depend on the nature of the state and hence our obligation toward majority different from toward oligarchy? Does majority have duty to obey minority? Must minorities always obey majorities?

How is the conflict between duty toward state and duty toward God to be resolved?

In these connections, aside from physical power of state, does it have any moral claim on its people? Must there be consent before authority? Has the state itself duties, the non-performance of which destroys the moral basis of its power?

Some insist that man is basically good. Thus the restraints imposed by social authorities, particularly the state, are unnecessary and should be removed...Others that man is bad. He must thus be controlled by the iron hand of authority... Perhaps the majority that he mixture of both, that govt is necessary to prevent disorder, but that it also has function of promoting wellbeing create environment for man.

We will see that a majority of thinkers we study do not profess a faith in wisdom or capacity for mass of mankind. Accordingly they argue that the wise, or rich, or wellborn, should rule and that masses must be restrained lest anarchy prevail.... Nevertheless most of them would say that that govt must still be for good of whole.

Whatever the differences, same problems still prevail. How do you bring about a state which must have cooperation if man is basically shortsighted?

Is the State based on force, economic power, intelligent recognition of the need for organized compulsion, plain Topsy growth?

What about the source and basis of political authority? Who has the right to rule, to govern his fellowman, and why?

Are particular people justified in claiming authority over their fellows because they belong to some priestly caste and perform?

Does political authority derive from paternal authority? Is the mere fact of birth a sufficient justification for office?

Does the possession of property above the average give sanction for authority?

Is it based on peculiar abilities? What are the abilities? So they rest, as Plato said, on capacity for philosophizing, for discovering and contemplating eternal truth? Or do they rest on the power to administer complex society efficiently?

Or again, is the mere power to seize and hold the machinery of govt of itself a justifiable basis for authority? If not, do you have a better one?

Is there a higher or natural law above the state? What is it? How do you know? Can it be enforced?

Do men possess certain natural rights under that law? Which? Is there a fundamental right to life, liberty, property, work??

What is law? Is it the will of people,? Which? Is it principles of right reason? How is it to be recognized? Is it the will of God? Interpreted by whom? Which version?

In considering other groups, do they exist by states permission or with rights of their own? To what extent should they participate in politics and exercise pressure over state?

What justification is there in society for private property? Why should state protect it? Why shouldn't state promote equality? Can state subordinate property rights to social wellbeing?

Associated: Are human beings equal? What respects? Are they unequal? Should it extend to politics if it exists socially, financially.

Why equal voting? Better decisions? Or easier enforceability? or moral?

Does refusal to grant equality justify resist

Basically, is the state to preserve order and prevent crime, a police and military state, or has it more positive functions?

Is it an umpire between interests?

Is it the function of the state to educate? What if the church or the trade union wants to educate?

Should the state promote a better race of men? Should it adopt eugenic policies? Can it stop birth control?

Is the state justified in making war? Can it carry it out by any means? CO?



Is there anything beyond the state? Brotherhood of man? Anything with superior claim to loyalty? Superstate? Anything limiting states activities visavis other states? Is the state but a form of development or final form?

These are problems, some of them. All thinkers don't deal with them, but they have had continuous history from Greeks to present.

In general the ideas have been similar tho with different emphases in different ages.

You will find that the essential questions were raised by Greek philosophers. They also suggested main alternative answers.

We are primarily concerned with the problems?

If Political Science is to be a science, it must be differentiated from the study of values. It is a study of the struggle for power, of means, not of ends. Fact statement vs preference statement. Business of political scientist is not with ideal society but with actual societies....Not concerned with whether rebellions ought to exist, but with circumstances under which they do exist and how to be met....Not with "why" as with "how".

Granted an end, ideal, purpose, how is it to be given effect....Not a crass statement. Do ends reach maturity by virtues of good conquers evil? Good may be truth but does it necessarily prevail. The study of realization thus is vital.

Politics is thus not defined in terms of objects, such as states, but in terms of activity, that of establishing control.

Control does not necessarily mean domination. It means more assurance concerning the actions of another party in relation to your own.

Political philosophies always have been the great moving forces of human behavior. What men have thought or have thought they thought about government has so amply shaped their deeds that an understanding of the political life of mankind is missing without it.

What is political philosophy?

An earlier age viewed politics as an art, that of governing. Just as a carpenter of skill writes a book so an expert in governing writes a book for those who want to govern.... Yet, if this were correct the writers of political theory would need to be masters in the art of governing (many can't govern own lives) and statesmen would need to apprentice themselves to them. Yet, few statesmen owed their success to study of writings.

Difficulty in being such an art: situation of action always unique

If political theory is not a body of science for instruction of statesmen what is it? MARX says it is not prior but posterior to political fact. Men acting politically are not guided in their actions by knowledge of political principle as an MD would be of science. Rather man acts irrationally. Laws are not made or constitutions created by obeying a theory. There is a theory, true, but it is invented afterwards to fit facts. They are rationalizations (motives for the political acts are economic hence study econ)

We have seen how there is a close relation between the political thought of any given period and the actual political conditions then existing. Most political theories arose either to explain and justify the authority that men obeyed or to criticize it in the hope of change....Even the Utopias prove to be based on the political ideals of the time and are aimed at specific evils.

Plato's REPUBLIC has little meaning unless viewed in the light of conditions then existing in decline of Greek city-states....More's UTOPIA depends upon background of social unrest during change from age to sheep raising in England....Bellamy's LOOKING BACKWARD presupposes the modern city and modern capital-labor problems.

It is true that ancient problems can be applied to modern ones. Yet, also true that different eras place other emphases. Thus, in medieval period, controversy on supremacy between spiritual and temporal authorities....In 17th and 18th cent. on contest between monarchic and democratic theories of polit; ...today with growth of state activity, on its limits, on connection between political and economic interests.

Also, the same problem may have diff meaning at diff periods. In 18th cent., liberal thinkers favor individualism because they wished to limit govt activity controlled by monarchs; Today, the same type thinker is likely to hold moderate socialist view and favor extension of govt regulation on ground that people have control

Political thought begins with the Greeks. Its origin is connected with the calm and clear thinking of the Greek mind. It was a Greek characteristic to wonder and of course philosophy is the child of wonder (they produced the science of logic, they inquired into matter and produced science of logic)

They didn't project themselves into religion and didn't depend on faith. They used reason. He was able to do this because he escaped control by the church and did not possess an inferiority complex about man, his thought and endeavor.

A sense of the value of the individual was the primary condition of the development of Greek political thought. Hence you had the Greek city-state based on a concept of free citizenship in a self-governing community.

Greek states cohered by law and not by supreme to an individual; they were fellowships and associations and not mere unions of masters and slaves. Here were individuals distinct from the state and yet forming the state.

The Greek city states were also not stationary. Aside from Sparta, there was a principle of growth and experience of cycles. This development seemed to follow the same order from monarchy to aristocracy, to tyranny to democracy. This stimulated political thought, as the different forms and constitutions suggested comparison and discussion.

Also in spite of democracy, aristocracy had not given up the ghost. Democracy still had to defend itself against the claims of wealth and nobility. The wealthy no longer had legal privilege but they had the social privilege of birth and wealth. The economic prosperity of Greece added to their wealth and added to their prestige so that the loss of legal privilege was more than outweighed by the growth of social influence.

So that the Many in spite of their legal equality still had to contend with the practical



superiority which wealth and birth and culture gave the Few. The Few continued to talk of property rights and birth rights which the Many had to refute. We have, therefore, from the beginning of the 6th century to the close of the 4th (Solon to Plato to Aristotle) the weighing of the claims of the wise and virtuous Few against the Many.

This gave an impetus to development of political theory in the same way that the popular revolts against monarchy in recent times stimulated theory

Also the fact that there was democracy meant stimulation because there was discussion, govt by word. For democracy to live there had to be discussion of principles

Stimulation was also afforded by the variety of city states, all in intimate contact. Each imposed different qualifications for citizenship and the question would arise as to the real meaning of the State, what was a citizen really, and more imp't, what is the best state? Which state is nearest to perfection? How did existing states measure to perfection?

The nature of the state aroused political consciousness. The size was small, intimacy and mutual concern led to a kind of social pressure on each to conform and be informed

But to the Greeks, political science was more than a study of the state as such, it was also the study of ethics for the state was an ethical society, a manner of life with a moral spirit. Questions of moral philosophy must thus be studied... Political science to the Greeks was thus a theory of the state, a theory of morals and a theory of law.

What is the aim which a State ought pursue? What methods ought it use to attain the true moral spirit? It is with these questions. If state attains these goods, then the individual too attains good, their goods are ideally the same.

Talk about individual rights is therefore lacking as compared to modern political theory. Their moral purpose was same as states. This solidarity is foreign today.

So to Plato and Aristotle, the positive furtherance of the state is the mission of the state, while to the modern thinker the state is looked upon negatively, to remove hindrances to moral life. to guarantee rights of individuals.

It is also interesting that in the Greek city state there is no distinction between State and Church. There was no organized church and the gist of cults that developed was external public worship and each community cared for its own local ritual as much as it cared for its public affairs.... Religion was an aspect of political life

The city-state therefore was conceived as a moral association and thus approached its subject from an ethical point of view... It was also a thought so closely allied with the actual practice that it always conceived itself as a pre-eminently practical study, a bent which reflected itself in the use of the treatises as manuals for statesmen (Plato tried to get Dionysius to put the hopes of the Republic into practice.)

The opening of Greek authentic history begins about 700 BC. The Hellenic world is a group of small communities scattered among the hills and valleys of the peninsula...Politically each community is isolated and independent. Yet there is a common origin.

In this period there is no single form of govt. But in practically all the more progressive and powerful states, save Sparta, some species of aristocracy or oligarchy prevails. The patriarchal kingship of Homer's days, is no more. Supreme authority is vested in a relatively small no of privileged persons.

This aristocracy had moreth n political power. As representatives of the privileged families, they regulated the whole social, economic and religious life of the community as well.

By the 6th century, aristocracy was succeeded by tyranny. On the one hand, the growth of the cities and prosperity, the expansion of commerece, intellectual development staedily undermined the moral foundations of the old system.. On the other hand, the degeneracy of the aristocracy gave opportunities to the able and ambitious to take individual power, so that again practically all citis but Sparta were ruled by tyrants and monarchy became the prevailing type.

Tyranny was characterised by violence and cruelty; at first displayed toward aristocracy but later toward the whole subject population. The many and the few, therefore, combined for comon relief. One by one, the tyrants were expelled.

The new era, however, was not uniform. There was no single type of uniform. Instead the coalition vanished and the conservatives opposed a griwung democratic wave thus leading to a conflict between democracy and oligarchy. It is in the midst ofthis wides read conflict that the most brilliant contributions of Greek thought began to appear.



Another feature is that they did not distinguish between "state" and "society", between the complex of groups forming a whole and the neutral authority, or between the area of voluntary cooperation and compulsion. In a free society of the Greeks, society and state interacted; the spirit of democracy was active and free social opinion and social groups could easily influence the life of the state.

In fact, this fact was the real danger to the Greek state. There was little fear that the State would stifle society as much as that the State would be corrupted by sinister social interests, a continual plague of politics. In a large state it is a danger because a "machine" can secretly and effectively grab control. In the city-state the rich and the poor vied for control leading to discord and much political thought was interested in finding a harmony.

Plato sought the solution in a specialized class of governors detached from society by a system of communism. Aristotle used other means. He turned to law as the true sovereign of the state with the "middle class" to administer the laws so that neither extreme would rule, but the one which shares the interests of both.

So much for the general conditions of Greek political theory as it related to city state life. More particularly, however, there were 2 states, Athens and Sparta which occupied the attention and helped to determine the theory of Plato and Aristotle,

That both spent the major part of their lives in Athens. Athens had a highly developed political life and theory, whether the theorists agreed with it or not, it was there for analysis and examination.....In Athens, freedom was claimed as a birthright; by freedom they meant living as one liked, with sovereignty in the majority, equality of law for all, equal regard for all, equal free speech for all...Neither was culture forgotten.

Athens was in fact proud of her culture over and against Sparta closely devoted to war...Nevertheless, Sparta had a great attraction for the philosopher. Here there was discipline, stability, training. Her constitution stood secure for hundreds of years. Here there was admiration. No wonder that the REPUBLIC to an extent is a critique of Athens and a laudation of Sparta subjugation of the individual to the state

To Plato, Athens failed because she didn't train for politics thus disfiguring her politicians; in putting the individual above the state.. Athens ought follow Sparta's example.

Plato though did see the faults of Sparta too: the narrow aim of success in war being the end and aim of existence; her training produced only a limited type of individual.

What was needed was a blend of the width of Athenian and restriction of Spartan character for the ideal Greek; a combination of Athenian individualism and Spartan unity and order.

## Spartan Constitution

In Sparta the first fact to be noticed is the social basis of the state, a rigid classification of the people into 3 classes: Spartans, Peroikoi, and Helots. The Helots were the most numerous, the serfs whose manual labor, agricultural, supplied the subsistence of the whole population. They had no share in rights, were in slavery. ....The P middle class enjoyed full civil rights and a degree of local self-govt. They engaged a bit in agriculture but mostly in industry and commerce. They had no share, however, in the political life of the state.

The Spartans were the political people. They were numerically insignificant, but trained solely for the performance of public duties. He was prohibited from trade and commerce; all he had left was a military and political career....At 7 they were taken from parents and put in charge of the state; given gymnastic training for physical perfection. The boys were given military training; the girls training to bring forth hardy offspring....The Spartan kept in military affairs until his declining years when he assumed duties of magistracy and shared in administration....Discipline was maintained by a public dining hall under watchful eyes of the magistrates; diet was rigid; family life discouraged; no written laws other than judgment of magistrates.

Spartan govt organization: at nominal apex stood 2 kings, equal in dignity and authority...next a senate of 28 elected for life....next an assembly of all the Spartans....finally the Ephors, an annually elected board of 5 members.

The kings authority was not great...the senate had mostly judicial functions....the assembly met rarely....real power in the Ephorate elected by all (still not democratic, because many Spartans disenfranchised for not contributing to public tables, serious as number of landowners decreased.



## Athens Constitution

In sharp contrast to Sparta. Its stages developed as we described until it became in form and essence democratic. Its social basis lay primarily in distinction between slaves and freemen and then between nobles and commons. The characters were not as rigid though as in Sparta. Also, there was a large alien population identified with Athenian life. ...The citizens, however, were the nobles and commons alone

At its center, the system had an assembly, the general body of citizens. The supreme political organ of the state. Its function, however, was mostly executive rather than legislative...detailed administration was in hands of a Senate of the 500, chosen by lot from the citizens; its members alternated daily in conducting public business....In military and diplomatic affairs, the state was represented by the generals, a board of 10 elected by the people.....The judicial authority was exercised by popular courts; 5000 citizens, drawn by lot, were divided into 10 panels; every juror received pay.

In general, the Athenian constitution opened to every citizen an equal opportunity to share in political authority. Democracy was complete for all who could claim Athenian citizenship..... These citizens, however, were a vast minority compared to the total population.

The City State was the place where all occupations met on common ground. Life within common walls drew men together in a natural intimacy. If it did not abolish the prestige of wealth and birth and culture, it established a tradition of easy intercourse between all classes.... Climate also made life largely a matter for the open air. Men met, marketed and talked in the market place; they exercised together; there they met in assembly for deliberation, settled matters. The open life of the square meant much more than the home.... Here the democratic ideal of equality and free speech found their natural root (Hence Aristotle advocates the allocation of offices according to worth for "mutual acquaintances with one another's characters is necessary to the citizens, both for decision on points of justice and for the proper award of office according to worth". He also has such a society in mind when he justifies the right of the masses to a share in political power because "the masses have a better faculty of judging; for some see one aspect, some another, but all together see every side".

An important characteristic of the city-state is that it was composed of country as well, and hence is different from our city. Furthermore, citizenship went by birth and hence by descent. The city-state, therefore, was very much a family affair.

This explains why the state received the last measure of devotion from its people. A citizen was united by blood with his society. He does not, therefore, of separate individual life or separate individual rights either.

So that while modern thought starts from the rights of individual and conceives of the ~~individual~~ state as existing to secure the conditions of his development, Greek thought starts from the right of the State to a self-governing existence and conceives of the individual to further that existence.

This feeling continued after the concept of citizenship changed

slavery- 80,000 slaves to 40,000 citizens in Athens; slaves well off except for the unskilled who worked in mines

education- used to make society cohere

Read G.L. Dickerson, The Greek View of Life :

p. 116 - Aristophanes for the "many"

p. 120 - Thucydides for the "many"

p. 94 - Aristophanes for the "few"

Also p. 88 - for internal schism and Peloponnesian War at close 5<sup>th</sup> century.

By 4<sup>th</sup> century, both Sparta & Athens decadent.



## Sophists

The natural tendency of early Greek thought was one which accepted the order of the State and the rules which it enforced without murmur and without question...Men were born, and lived and died, under ancient customs whose origin no man knew.

Then thinkers began to detect laws in the world. This gradually undermined the stability of the old order. People began adopting laws made by men....At the same time, the growth of human knowledge was developing. New data was being collected by travellers. Much was becoming known of the customs of different peoples and considerable attention was devoted to anthropology. This led to some doubts about the existence of any natural or universal law as they contemplated the infinite variety of savage customs. There could be nothing here the product of nature, it must all be the product of man.

The teachers in this Athens of the later 5th century are the Sophists. They were the first professional teachers of Greece and their teaching was meant to give practical help in politics...To go to the Sophists was to go to the university and to prepare for life, which meant preparing for politics, to be politicians (just as Plato wanted his guardians to prepare for in his plan of education)...They were  $\frac{1}{2}$  professors and  $\frac{1}{2}$  journalists;  $\frac{1}{2}$  teachers and thinkers and  $\frac{1}{2}$  disseminators of the new and strange, the spectacular; they combined the philosopher and the charlatan.

They taught everything: grammarians, logicians, rhetoricians, philosophers, physiologists....They are thus not a school with a single set of tenets and are not also confined to a single subject...It is also interesting that though they received pay in the 5th century, they were criticized for doing so and hence took care to teach the humanities (learning for learning sake not remuneration)

Now a word about their origin. For the most part foreigners, resided at Athens with a large measure of social equality but deprived of political privilege. They came because Athens was the intellectual centre of Greece; yet their pupils were the rich and out of sympathy with the democratic institutions.

The Sophists professed to teach eloquence and practical ability in general which the rich were anxious to learn for their own ends, namely control elections gain influence and change the constitution...The position of the Sophists was thus quite a difficult one and they fell into disfavor.

### Antiphon the Sophist

A writer on many subjects. Combined physical and ethical speculation. Used a naturalist view of both to discredit the enacted law of the State as nothing but opinion and convention and also to overturn the distinction between Greek and barbarian.

Rules of nature are necessary and as real as laws; cannot be contravened without consequences (fall by contravening laws of gravity). It is the law of nature for men to seek life and shun death; hence they seek the things that promote life, comfort and shun death and discomfort.

But man's laws interfere with the laws of nature, by bidding us to do things which are unnatural because they are unpleasant and only make life poor and nasty...There is thus no virtue to being law abiding...He thus tries to discredit the conventional law of the Greek city-state.

Antiphon also seeks to overturn the conventional distinction between Greek and barbarian. He anticipated the cosmopolitanism of a later age by attacking the fundamental distinction which existed between Greek and the rest of the world. Looking at men, he said they were equal, breathing the same air through the same bodily organs. Since all men are seekers of life and pleasure, it is the true law of their life and one man is thus equal to another. Any view which makes one man better than another is artificial and fantastic.

He thus argues that laws which impose duty on us toward parents no matter how they behave to us is a figment

Plato on Sophists:

It is to Plato that we owe the knowledge which we possess of this school.

The moderate form of sophistry is stated by Glaucon in REPUBLIC (second book): "To do injustice is by nature, good; to suffer injustice, evil; but the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have both done and suffered injustice, and have had experience of both, not being able to avoid the one and obtain the other, they think that they had better agree among themselves to have neither: hence there arise laws and mutual covenants; and that which is ordained by law is termed by men lawful and just".....This is a theory of individualism, men fully conscious of their individual wills ask why the men of the past surrendered the free exercise of that will...Explained as a voluntary act which makes the state only have a conditional sort of validity.

Glaucon thus states a kind of social contract theory: there was an original state of nature in which men lived freely according to their own pleasure; a contract of surrender for protection of their lives.

Another form of sophist philosophy is stated by Plato in GORGIAS, more extreme. Callicles rejects all law as the mere product of contracts made by the weak to defraud the strong of the just right of their might. Law is a "slave morality", the opposite of Nature. Inequality is the rule of Nature. ~~In~~Equality exists only by convention for the stronger get more than the weaker. By strength he includes body and mind, will and intellect (A Nietzsche philosophy)

A still more extreme form of sophistry is represented by Plato in 1st book of REPUBLIC as having been held by Thrasymachus....There is no such thing as natural Right. Right is that which is enforced by the strongest power in the State. Regardless of what it enforces, it's right. Right equal "is". A kind of empiricism

Why these theories? The proofs usually offered were of 2 sorts. One is the example of brute animal life. Aristophanes in (Clouds) uses it. A character strikes his father and justifies his action: "Look at cocks and other such animals - they punish their fathers; and how do they differ from us - except that they don't make Acts of Parliament?"...Similar to the survival of the fittest argument heard today.

A more serious proof is conduct of states, the political fact of the Athenian Empire. States were tyrants and imposed their will on subject peoples and the individual was entitled to follow the example of the city....Thucydides emphasizes this characteristic of the Athenian empire.



"It was always an established thing that the inferior should be kept under control by the more capable", the Athenian ambassadors say to the Spartans in the negotiations preceding the Peloponnesian War.

In talking to the people of Melos, an island attacked by Athens for failure to pay tribute in 416, the envoys say: "You know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must. Of the gods we believe by tradition, and of men we know for a fact, that by an irresistible law of Nature they rule wherever they can".

These Sophist views opposing Nature to the State had other effects as well: It was used to undermine religion and to turn the gods into creatures of convention.....The apex and basis of Greek society, the noble and the slave were attacked as unnatural....The family was attacked, as was the position of women. We have Euripides advocating community of wives. There was much discussion about the emancipation of women.

Plato is, therefore, much indebted to the Sophists of the end of the 5th century for his ideas. Yet, on the whole, his verdict upon them is unfavorable

## Socrates

Unlike the thinkers with whom we have hitherto been concerned, Socrates was a full Athenian citizen. He was born about 470 and met his death in 399, among the troubles of the Peloponnesian War.

He took a full share in civic duties. He fought as a soldier winning admiration. At 65, he became a member of the Council. In this capacity, he steadily refused to go outside the bounds of civic law and steadily discharged his duties. At one time, he refused to go along with the Council in condemning 9 Athenian generals for their failure to rescue drowning sailors in a naval battle, on the ground that such a mass condemnation was unconstitutional, in 405. ...A year later he refused to obey the command the 30 Tyrants who were exercising a reign of terror in Athens and who ordered him to arrest a citizen.

He was the son of a sculptor and learned his father's craft. He appeared as a typical citizen of Athens but he really devoted his life to the study of philosophy and associated with all the thinkers.

At first, he was primarily interested in physical sciences. He found that they only gave a mechanical explanation of how things were made, and he wanted to know "why"....He wanted to ascend from natural science and its occupation with matter to genuine philosophy in the sense of an inquiry into the purpose or final cause of things. ..Socrates represents this transition in Greek thought.

It is said that an old Delphic oracle pronounced Socrates the wisest of men and S, who had a sense of humor, set himself to disprove the oracle by questioning others and proving them to be wiser than he. He succeeded in achieving the opposite, for he found that while others were unwise enough to profess to know what they did not know, he was wise enough to confess that he knew nothing. ...He henceforth gave himself up to a life of service, believing he had a mission from the Delphic god. He thus undertook a crusade against sham knowledge and became the preacher of genuine wisdom.

This account introduces us to the peculiar method of Socrates. In place of cryptic prose or verse, or topical order and eloquence, he adopted a dialectic method, question and answer. It was an unpleasant method for the victim, but a general organ of truth for Socrates. True knowledge could only be acquired to him if they "knew themselves", if they knew how much they really knew.

S differed from the Sophists in concept of "goodness". To the Sophists, it was excellence in a special art to be mastered by acquiring special knowledge. To Socrates, goodness was a general capacity, not a specialty but part of the whole soul which issues in a balance and harmony of all activities.. Knowledge, therefore, need not be special or professional..Socrates did not believe that knowledge was something separate from the knowledge of ordinary men. he did not differentiate between things that belonged to nature and those that belonged to law.

As a matter of fact, he was a firm believer in law...But more imp. Socrates had a conviction that what mattered was not so much what you knew, as the way in which you knew it....Not so much a knowledge of new things as a new way of knowledge of old things...not so much knowledge of nature different from ordinary world, but knowledge of the world and the reason why it was as it was.



Hence to him there was two kinds of knowledge. The knowledge men ordinarily possess is not real knowledge but opinion. They don't know things in the only sense in which knowledge can be spoken of, as the product of a cause and related to that cause... They know, i.e., that they ought to be temperate for they've heard it, but they don't know really why they ought to be.

If goodness is knowledge and there are two sorts of knowledge, there will be two sorts of goodness. There is the goodness based on opinion and the goodness based on knowledge.

Opinion is insecure, liable to be forgotten or changed and hence the goodness based on opinion is equally insecure... Knowledge is secure, because it is based on reasoning reference to a cause and so goodness based on knowledge is equally secure..... Goodness based on opinion is a matter of habit; goodness based on knowledge is a matter of reasoned conviction and insight.

Yet both are forms of goodness. They both have the same content; the difference is only in the grasp of that content.... Hence his objection to conventional morality was not that it was based on wrong principles but that it lacked any consciousness of the principles on which it was based. This was a weakness: it was liable to disappear in a new environment; it was unable to respond to new and unprecedented demands; it could not be communicated.... Goodness resting on principles can be defined, can be communicated and taught.

Socrates was an intellectual. He researched into himself, and sought to have expert guidance of life based on it. He objected to incompetence, to the rule of a sovereign Assembly because it gave every cobbler and tailor an equal voice. He taught the need of an expert knowledge for the conduct of political affairs (and was forerunner of Plato's doctrine of specialization). Expert knowledge, however, to him included a philosophic education as well because things of justice and temperance belonged to the politician as well and a true and philosophic notion of justice is necessary.

Yet he wasn't a typical intellectual in the sense that he sought to communicate his way of life to others. He conversed with all in street, market place wherever men were gathered. In this sense he differed from the Sophists in that they taught young nobility.

Socrates was also a mystic. Although he preached that men ought to guide their lives by an intelligent grasp of principle, his own life was guided by the voice of the Delphic oracle. Plato tells us that he sometime fell into a trance (Apology?)

We see Socrates, therefore, criticizing the characteristics of Athenian democracy—the use of the lot; the composition of the Assembly; the ignorance of Athenian statesmen. He preached that the handling of politics required a kind of esoteric mystery of knowledge. And he made converts by his preaching.

On this scene two oligarchical revolts against Athens take place in 411 and 404; Sparta is establishing oligarchies wherever they can and there was a sympathetic party in Athens. Athenian democracy to the Athenians is insecurely based.... Socrates talked of experts and the need for knowledge, so did the oligarchical circles.... It is not strange to find the Athenians thinking about making an example in 399.

Socrates is accused of refusing to worship the gods whom the state worshipped, of introducing other and new divinities and of corrupting the youth. And he is condemned.

There are 2 branches to the accusation. One religious and the other moral - and yet both are basically political. He fell a victim to the weakness and fears of the restored democracy of the years following the Peloponnesian war.

We have already seen that piety for the Greeks consisted of formally worshipping the gods received by the state. It was a civic duty. Greek religion was an aspect of political life. Hence religious non-conformity was not really a matter of religious persecution when punished but rather an act of political vengeance....Socrates did not die as a religious martyr but because he was dangerous to the political order of the state.

Socrates preached the sovereignty of knowledge, a doctrine which might easily have become in its political application a doctrine of enlightened despotism. This indeed is what it became in the hands of Plato.

Enlightened despotism is not only anti-democratic but can become inimical to the rule of law. If knowledge is sovereign, law may perhaps be subordinate...In this sense he was an enemy of democracy.

Comment: Politics is a matter for thought and govt a concern for the wise. But wisdom is not the whole thing.....For proper guidance of the state, it is necessary that the wise should rule; but for the safety and unity of the state it is also necessary that the will of the people should be attuned to their rule....Both are equally necessary. ... In addition to wisdom and will, "instinct" is also necessary, the product of experience.

Yet Socrates and Plato in being criticized must be considered in the light of their environment....They spoke of knowledge to a people which already recognized the elements of will and instinct...They spoke to a democracy where the popular will was present...They, therefore stated a half-truth which had been neglected; they omitted the truth which seemed to them over-emphasized.

Conclusion: It is on the death of Socrates rather than his life that the thought and imagination of centuries has fastened himself. The greatest lesson of his life was his death.... He taught that for the sake of conscience a man may rise up against Caesar... Greater than the command of the Athenian State was the command of God. Greater than civic duty was service to his god.... This is the temper of the martyr...

In all other matters but conscience, man must render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, even to the debt of his life. ~~So that if he were promised a suit~~

Socrates was faced with a conflict of duties. By his death he sealed his choice. On the one side stood his duty to the Athenian state which throughout his life and even in his death he loyally acknowledged .... On the other hand stood his duty to god to testify at all times and to all men the gospel of Knowledge... He made his choice. He suffered his consequences.



## PLATO

Born about 428 BC of a distinguished Athenian family. From his earliest years he was a member of the Socratic circle. Originally, he seems to have thought of embracing a political career, but the death of Socrates changed his plans and he turned to philosophy.

Down to the date of his first visit to Sicily in 387, he was largely occupied with the composition of his earlier dialogues: the Apology, the Crito, the Gorgias, and part of the Republic. He was between 30-40 then and travelled a bit as well. In 387 he visited Italy and Sicily and came into contact with Dionysius I, tyrant of Syracuse who was annoyed by Plato's denunciation of injustice and tyranny and delivered him to a Spartan ambassador who sold him into slavery. Ransomed from slavery he returned to Athens and in 386 opened his Academy, where he spent the remaining 40 years of his life.

Athens was by this time the university of Greece. She lost empire but became a central market of Greek trade and a central focus of Greek thought.

The Platonic curriculum was largely mathematical. The approach to philosophy was through geometry. We are told that the inscription over Plato's door read: "Let no man ignorant of geometry enter here"... Plato's lectures are all lost to us.

Whatever emphasis on science, the ultimate purpose of his teaching was ethical. Like all Greek philosophers too he wanted his knowledge to issue in knowledge and to be a way and in inspiration to life.

The aim of Plato was to train the philosophic ruler who should rule by trained intelligence and not by the letter of the law, or, if that aim is unattainable, to train the philosophic legislator who should imbue even the letter of the law with the spirit and wisdom of understanding. (The former is the ideal of the REPUBLIC, the latter of the LAWS)

This aim was not a mere dream and Plato's achievements were not inconsiderable. The Academy was a school of political training from which statesmen and legislators issued. The influence of the Academy was widespread. The development of Greek laws owes no small debt.

Plato himself on two occasions went to Syracuse to advise Dionysius II (Epistle), at age of 60 for the first time. Dionysius was impatient at Plato's mathematical emphasis, there was dissension in the court and failure

But Plato was a philosopher and these problems engaged his attention most closely. There always seemed to be a struggle in his mind between the philosophic impulse toward abstract thought and a feeling that he ought come into contact with the realities of a world of action

The form of Plato's writings is that of the dialogue. Like Socrates, his purpose was to awaken thought, to be gadfly, to call to the intelligence of man. He desired to show thought at work.

A particular feature is his use of the analogy. His analogies are from the physical world and the arts, but are chiefly drawn from the animal world. In the REPUBLIC, the analogy of the dog is more than once made the basis for important arguments. By considering the temper of the watch-dog, he arrives at the principle which should dictate the choice of guardians, by a comparison of the male watch-dog with the female he decides that women ought to be guardians as well as men; by an argument from the breeding of animals he comes upon his peculiar theory of marriage.

Most prominently, however, is the analogy with the arts. Politics is an art and the statesmen should know what he practices. Also, because the artist ought to be free of rules in the practice of his art, statesmen should ideally be free from restraint by law, and he holds a theory of absolute government..



## THE REPUBLIC

Composed in the maturity of his life, about 40. It is an attempt at a complete philosophy of man. Primarily, it is concerned with man in action and is, therefore, occupied with the problems of moral and political life.. But man cannot be understood without understanding his thinking and so it is also the philosophy of man in thought. ...Viewed in this way it forms a single and organic whole....Viewed separately it falls into a number of treatises: on metaphysics, the unity of all things in the Idea of the Good; on moral philosophy, the union and perfection of human virtues in Justice; on education, (Rousseau said the republic "is not a work upon politics, but the finest treatise on education that ever was written"); on political science, sketching the polity and social institutions of the ideal State; on history, explaining the process of historical change and the gradual decline of the ideal State into tyranny.

The question which Plato set himself to answer was simply: "What is a good man and how is a good man made?"...This was not simply a question of moral philosophy, because to the Greeks a good man must be a member of a State...A second question thus naturally followed: "What is the good State and how is the good State made?", a political question....Yet to a follower of Socrates a good man must be possessed of knowledge. A 3rd question thus arises: "What is the ultimate knowledge of which a good man must be possessed in order to be good?", a metaphysical question....To this a 4th question emerges: "By what methods will the good State lead its citizens towards the ultimate knowledge which is the condition of virtue?", a theory of education.... Since Plato's scheme of education calls for a readjustment of social conditions, we get a new economics reinforcing the new pedagogics.

With reference to the economics, it has been suggested by Marxists that the mainspring of the REPUBLIC (Pohlmann) is Plato's aversion to contemporary capitalism and his desire to substitute a new scheme of socialism, and that it is an economic treatise...This argument is reinforced by attempting to show that in contemporary Greece the struggle between oligarchy and democracy represented a struggle of capital and labor and that in Plato we find a vivid sense of the evils of this struggle and an attempt to deal with those evils by socialistic remedies..Hence the attack on private property and the proposal to abolish the use of money.

The obvious first objection to this theory is that it means the importation of modern socialism, which is a revolt against a complex system of production, into the far simpler conditions of Greek economic life....This is met by the reply that the conditions were not simple that credit was highly developed in the city-state, that overseas trade was abundant. there was a vast system of usury, and that there was a socialist attack on profits at that day.

Whatever the truth of Greek economics, however, it is difficult to agree that the reform of the state proposed by Plato is meant as an economic reform of an economic evil..Plato may touch upon economic questions, but he always regards them as moral questions. For example, he may write about division of labor, but we soon learn that he is concerned with it not as a method of economic production, but as a means to the moral well-being of the community

The REPUBLIC is in many respects a polemic, directed against teachers and the practice of contemporary politics. For Plato, he advocated a conception of justice as a quality of the soul, in virtue of which men set aside the irrational desire to taste every pleasure and to gain a selfish satisfaction out of every object; they rather accommodated themselves to the discharge of a single function for the general welfare...Correspondingly in politics, the State was not the field for the self-satisfaction of its ruler, but the body of which he was a part...He opposed individualism in the State in favor of collectivism.

In truth the individual secured his own ends by securing those of his fellows...The old harmony of interests of the State and the individual is thus restored in Plato..This is the secret of the human soul and of the universe, this harmony...The State is thus not a chance combine of individuals, but a communion of souls rationally and necessarily united for the pursuit of a moral end, and unselfishly guided toward that end by the wisdom of those who know the nature of the soul and the purpose of the world.

The existing states of Greece did not conform to this ideal. Excess individualism was popular. In Athens there was ignorance and selfishness leading to discord. He wanted to substitute harmony and hence his aims are "specialization" and "unification"...Hence we can understand his eccentricity on communion of wives.

There was ignorance, a special curse of democracy, for any man might speak in the Assembly and help sway its decisions; any man might become executive by lot...This was inefficiency...But it was also a false equality, and as such was unjust...Justice to Plato was that each man should do his work in his station of life determined by his capacities...Everyone has a function. Just as an axe is misused when it is used to carve a tree and also cut it down, so is a man misused when he governs when he is only fit to be a mere craftsman..This is not only mistaken but unjust. Unjust because he doesn't do his work proper and because he shoves the better man aside.

His chief annoyance, however, was ~~the~~ individualism, selfish striving for power dividing cities into rich and poor. It was present, he saw, in oligarchies, as each strove for money, the rich to be richer. Rather than be neutral the state became a tool of a class.... It was present in democracy too..He saw the citizens paying themselves from the coffers of the state and also using their authority to pillage the rich, confiscate estates. Politics to them too was a source of economic gain

Hence Plato was interested in rehabilitating a strong and impartial authority; unselfish govt and civic harmony.

It is from this anti-amateurism and anti-selfishness that he comes to his idea of specialization..He divides his ideal State into 3 classes: the rulers, the fighters, the farmers (the men of gold, silver, iron and brass)-each with an appointed function to care for government, defense, sustenance.

He is primarily concerned with first 2 classes and he trains them carefully...Primarily he trusts to an education, then he makes use of material means. He suggests a system of communism to free them from material cares so that they can perform fully the use of knowledge; no private property and frees them from temptation.



## On Justice

Plato wanted to substitute his true view of Justice as being each doing his appointed work in contentment, for the prevailing ones. We might ask, therefore, what were these prevailing views, why did he reject them?

The first conception of justice to be considered is that which underlies traditional morality; presented by Cephalus. Looking back over his life justice seems to lie in speaking the truth and paying your debts. Polemarchus after his father goes to "look after the sacrifices" takes over and modifies it slightly to be giving to each man what is proper to him. ...The word "proper" comes to assume, in the discussion, the assumption that justice is an art, giving good to friends and evil to enemies. This permits Plato to make the point that if justice is an art, it is capable like other arts of doing two opposite things. Just as the doctor can create as well as prevent disease, then the just man can be just and unjust at will.....Furthermore, it is easy to say good to friends and evil to enemies, but what if the friend is in reality an enemy, what does one do?....Finally, it is even ever just to do evil to enemies? Doesn't injury cause deterioration and is it ever just to make a man worse? .....Polemarchus then abandons his position.

Plato is saying that justice is not an art in the sense of a technique which can be used at will; it is rather based on a grasp of principle. Justice is a quality of the soul. Once you have it, you can never use it to injure others or to cause deterioration in any man.

Thrasymachus represents the radical view of the later 5th cent. His first position is that justice is the "interest of the stronger"; might is right. The standard of action for a man living in a community is thus the will of a ruler who wills his own good. While every man acts for himself and tries to get what he can, the strongest is surest to get what he wants.

But if justice is the rulers interest; then for everybody else justice is "another's good". ~~xxxxxx~~ To be just then is to act in the interest of the ruler, while to be unjust is to act for the satisfaction of yourself...But why should it be just for the ruler to get his own way and unjust for someone else to do the same...Why the double standard? What is true of one is true of the rest. In fact, the real standard of action for any sensible man is to satisfy himself; so that in the conventional sense, injustice and not justice is the real virtue and the true wisdom for all sensible men. Injustice is better than justice and the unjust man is the wisest.

Plato meets these two positions. To the argument that a govt governs for its own advantage, he says that govt is an art. The object of an art is the well-being of its material (the perfect teacher is one who remedies all the defects in his pupil's minds) The ruler is, therefore, as ruler unselfish, interested in the well-being of his citizens...When he does act to earn a livelihood, which Plato admits, he acts not as ruler but as one practicing the art of wage-earning.

Next to the second argument, he seeks to prove that the just man is wiser, stronger and happier than the unjust...He is wiser because he knows that there is a limit, that his purpose and aim in competition is "excellence"...His aim is to do better than the

bad but not better than the good, with whom he is content to be equal. ...Wiser than the ~~just~~ unjust man because he thus acknowledges the principle of limit, the just man is also stronger, for strength depends on a strong bond and that calls for acting justly by one another.... The just man is also happiest, a point of supreme importance. Reason: Everything has its appointed function. The virtue or excellence of anything depends upon the adequate discharge of that function (The virtue of the eye is clear vision; of the ear, good hearing). Now the function of the soul is life; the virtue of the soul is good life. ...The soul, therefore, can only discharge its function if it possesses the virtue of good living, or justice, which means it is happiest because that follows from good living...The more virtuous soul is thus the happiest soul....Since happiness is more profitable than misery, it follows that justice, which is happier, is more profitable than injustice

Glaucon presents a third view, a pragmatic one. To him, justice is artificial, the spirit of convention. Using the "social contract" argument, he argues that in a state of nature men suffer injustice freely and without restraint. This is intolerable, so the "weaker" make a contract with one another; then they establish laws and conventions which become the standard of action and code of justice. Human nature thus becomes perverted from its real instinct of self-satisfaction toward law....Justice is thus the child of fear...Justice is thus the child of fear "it is a mean or compromise between the best of all, which is to do injustice and not be punished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without the power of retaliation".

Justice is thus the necessity of the weaker and not like Thrasymachus, the interest of the stronger.

This view is also that of Hobbes, and implies a view of human nature that man is a selfish nature for whom justice is artificial rather than natural.

Plato meets this in rather elementary terms. In all the opposing views, there is a common element which treats justice as if it were something external, an accomplishment, an importation, a convention. None of the views are carried in the soul. He, therefore, sets out to prove that justice is on the contrary everlasting. He proves it by showing that that it is the right condition of the human soul, demanded by the very nature of man, Justice is thus internal....But he doesn't demonstrate it to us directly by studying the inner man, he rather studies the State.

His reason: if we had to read a manuscript of which there were 2 copies, one small type the other large, we would take the large. Well, justice too exists in 2 manuscripts, in man and in a larger more visible scale, in the State. He thus proposes to study justice as it exists in the State...He thus builds an imaginary state from the beginning and with both feet enters upon political speculation.

Plato is able to do that because of the belief that the State and man are the same that one cannot draw a distinction between the consciousness of man and the consciousness of the State; the consciousness of the State is just the consciousness of its members when thinking as members...Thus the courage of the State is the courage of members facing enemies in the field...."States do not come out of an oak or a rock, but from the characters of the men that dwell therein". Justice is, thus, to be found in the mind of man, the great contribution of Plato and Aristotle.



Now, however, Plato presupposes a knowledge of man in building the State though he is building a State to illustrate man. His conception of the human soul is a threefold thing, and this is a foundation of much of the REPUBLIC.

First of all, there is in the soul an irrational or appetitive element of desire, the ally of pleasure and satisfaction, out of which comes love, hunger, thirst.... Then there is an element of reason, an element of supreme importance in the state for it will be a guide of action for the state and a bond of union for its members.... Lastly and midway between the two comes an element of spirit, similar to a sense of honor or chivalry. It inspires men to battle and combines the ambition and competition of appetite with the indignation against injustice of reason. "In the battle of the soul it takes its stand by reason's side".

In building the state, he occupies himself first with the economic structure necessary to its life and in doing so he implies the very concept of justice which his construction intends to prove. Namely that each should do his "own", everyman fulfilling a single specific function... He shows, beginning with appetite as the primary basis of the State, that it involves some form of association. For food, warmth and shelter there must be common action. And so the State first finds its binding force in human need.. Each man needs his fellows because of this mutual need. The result is an inevitable specialization, division of labor. This means an easier production of more objects of better quality.

This association of men is first limited to farmer and builder, clothier and cobbler, but is increased by the addition of mechanics to make tools, cattle-tenders, people in foreign and domestic trade, thus reaching the measure of an adult state.

To Plato the state viewed as an economic concern contains features valuable not only in themselves economically but also as foreshadows of political truths. If the cobbler by sticking to his trade to the last produces better and more work, why not the statesman?... Also why not learn from the reciprocity and thus eliminate individualism

Now he pays attention to the spirit. Men are not content with the supply of the merest "necessaries"; they need satisfaction of their desires for refinement. Pictures and poetry, music and dress are all "needs" of mankind and a large population is needed to provide them. A larger territory is then needed to supply the larger population. ... War then enters as one of the functions of the State, which must acquire and defend a larger ~~state~~ territory. Thus spirit appears in the form of a military force of guardians..

Specialization now again enters. No general citizens militia for time of need, but a trained professional army. If manufacture of shoes needs expertise so does the art of war a much more vital necessity to the State.... There must be soldiers whose business it is to make war and nothing else; they must be chosen for an aptitude of an abundance of spirit and must be trained to further develop that spirit. Hence his education scheme which we will study below, to create the happy warrior.

Now for the part reason plays. Reason enters in the selection of soldiers whose natures must not be merely quick and spirited. The



soldier is a guardian of the state, and like a watchdog the guardian must be mild and gentle to those of the house he guards, though fierce to every stranger. The faculty of reason must, therefore, be present in guardians to distinguish between the citizen whom he defends and the guardian whom he attacks... But reason is present most in the govt of the state. It is perfect not in the guardian but in the ruler, the perfect guardian so that the lesser spirited guardians are now called auxiliaries..

The rulers not only come to know and understand, but also by virtue of that knowing come to love and that is another aspect of reason. The ruler must be loving. He will govern the state best for he cares for it most and knows that its welfare is his welfare.. Govt will, therefore, be unselfish and be practiced as an art for the good of community... This results in unity.

Appetite may draw men together for economic motives; spirit may add a new military bond; but it is reason that holds men together by teaching them to understand and love one another

Rulers, therefore, are to be a special class for not all have this reason and love. Those who have it are to be carefully discovered by moral testing and selected from the soldiers.... Furthermore, since the ruler must be a philosopher and the philosophic nature is reserved for only a few souls, there is an intellectual test... He must know the essence of Beauty, Justice, and Temperance so as to fashion into their likeness the characters of the people he rules. (uses the analogy of painter and a clean canvas who compares beauty, justice and temperance with the human copy "and one feature they will erase, and another they will put in, until they have made the manners of men, as far as possible, conformable to the Divine".

Ultimately this means a knowledge of the Idea of the Good. This means grappling with the essence of existence, its mystery, the purpose of all doing and all being.

The State is therefore a rational organization and as such must be guided by the highest reason possible for man, hence the "philosopher king" is the logical result.

The ruler, therefore, and here we get a transformation, is thus a philosopher rather than a lover of the State primarily. We thus get another kind of education designed for the philosophers.

We see the Platonic State, therefore, as a community marked by a division of labor between 3 specialized classes, the rulers, the soldiers and the farmers. This leads to 3 classes in the society.... Just as in man, the appetitive and spirited aspects of the mind are subservient to the rational which brings order in the mind, so in society does reason rule and place order. Govt will become a philosophic autocracy to which economic and military classes will be subordinate.

We can ask a few questions here. Granting the division of elements in the mind, that does not mean that each element is full in and of itself... In each mind all elements are present, yet in his State each man would be limited to one activity corresponding to one element only. Each is forced, therefore, to live as a citizen with only a single part of his mind.... The ruler must live by reason so he

must abandon appetite, so he is brought into a communistic regime which prevents the play of appetite and thus paralyzes an integral element in human nature...Also the farmer must live to satisfy appetite, and he suffers an atrophy of his rational self.

How will the system be maintained? The citizens possess a knowledge of their duties and limitations. Each class knows what it can do; each knows it would be unjust if it tried to do other things and interfere. Each class therefore exercises self-control and thus lends its will and consent to the class arrangement.

We can doubt this and ask whether caste distinction and great division of producing and ruling classes will work...Also whether subjecting state to single sovereignty rather than general will can last.

In spite of this, there is another side for Plato sees it possible for individual members of a class to attain higher status or lower; no hereditary bond.

Now with this, Plato tells us the answer, the nature of justice. Justice is the specialization, the will to fulfill the duties of one's station and not to meddle with other stations. Justice thus habitates in the mind of every citizen who does his duty in his appointed place.

Social justice is thus the principle of a society of different types of men combined under the impulse of their need for one another making a whole which is perfect because it is the product and the image of the whole of the human mind.

This is thus Plato's answer to individualism as well, for the man is not isolated, he is part of a whole.



## On Education

Now we come to how to realize justice in the state. Plato suggests 2 institutions: a system of common education and a social order of communism. Education will give the training for special work and the instinct for keeping unselfishly to its performance which justice demands. Communism will provide the time for the training since men will be liberated from the necessity of acquiring a livelihood, will remove temptation, and instill a view of the individual as part of a whole.

Education is more important for it goes to the source of evil.; at least that's the lesson of Book III. The education emphasis is logical. If justice is the discharge of one's function, the state must for the sake of its own excellence train its members to excellence in the discharge of their function. The community then must for the sake of its own coherence imbue its members with its own principle. Education is thus regarded as a social process by which the units of a society become instinct with social consciousness and learn to fulfill all social demands.... Education thus exists for the sake of the initiation of the citizen into the spiritual life of the State... Education thus adjusts the individual to his society.

But it is also more than that. It is also the vision to absolute truth. It is good in itself for its own sake. It is the contemplation of the reality which lies beyond time, beyond the shadows of life. It is the way of truth.

In his system of education, he turns away from Athens to Sparta. At Athens, education was private. With little exception, education at Athens was left to the discretion of the family and the chance of private schools. The family, not the State, was responsible for the training of youth. This violated Plato's sensibilities. That is why the Athenian ~~xxxxxxx~~ citizen was untrained and hence repaid his State by being inefficient.

It is interesting that in reacting against the family's control against education, he goes on to abolish the family altogether.

Spartan education was different. As a war state, she made large claims on the obedience of its citizens. The Spartan youth was taken from his parents at 7 and his education entrusted to an official of the State. The family had no control over the education of its members. The aim of the training was to temper the mind to a fine edge of courage, using tests and trials. Women as well as men were subject to the training. The home had no place in the state. Sparta was in many ways an inspiration to the state of Plato and his education.

From Athens then comes the individual aspect of Plato's scheme of education-the development of the whole man;; from Sparta its social aspect-it must be controlled by the State with a view to adjustment.

To Plato the soul can no more live without its food for its activities than can the body; and, therefore, as long as the soul lives there is need of education to supply its nutriment... Education is the matter of a lifetime too. A man is being educated as long as he is capable of a response to each new stimulus, as long as experience causes reactions... Education, therefore, is not only occupied with youth, but also with maturity

In Plato's State education is far from finished when a young man comes of age. One stage may have ended, but there is another stage for those who can climb. Not until the age of 35 can the training of a citizen be said to be finished. And long after that age and after 15 years of life have been given to governing, Plato would have his citizens turn once more in their declining years to study philosophy on their own account and contemplate in the fulness of their experience all time and all existence.....Here at this stage we find Plato no longer talking about plasticity of the soul, but rather of illumination, the slow turning of the eye to the pure light and the gradual winning by the soul of wisdom through effort and strict self-discipline.

For the environment of his education, he believed that mind develops through contact with all the past products of mind, his science, art, literature, philosophy.

Men must also be educated in civic action for the State too is a product of mind and hence there must be contact with State. The fulness of education is in proportion to the fulness of experience which it embraces. No human mind has developed to its highest unless it develops in every way in which mind has developed in the past, and that includes political development.

There is thus in Plato no distinction between mind practical and mind theoretical and certainly no confining of education to the latter. Since the whole of the mind must be developed, all the practical training and experience which we can acquire is a part of our education. ....Thus Plato once more reaffirms the connection of man and the State. The State, we have seen is a product of man's mind; we now learn conversely that it is also one of the necessary elements in the development of his mind.

The fulness of human experience is therefore the curriculum and subject-matter of education. But that experience is not meaningless. In Plato's teleological conception of the world and of the mind, everything moves toward a purpose. For an action to be rational it is purposive. That purpose is always the attainment of the Good. ...To know a thing, therefore is to see it as part of this scheme.

There is thus an ultimate purpose both in the action and the thought of the human mind and in the existence of the world in which mind acts and which mind knows. Action, knowledge, existence - all imply the Idea of the Good; and right action is action in the light of the knowledge that the Good is the reason of all existence.

Education thus culminates in the knowledge of the Idea of the Good. But since action is a part of mind, to know the world is also to act accordingly. So that education issues in doing as well as in knowing; and to be trained to know the Idea of the Good is also to be given the master-key of knowledge action.....This is the real and final sense in which virtue is knowledge; and this is the culmination of the philosophy of man which Plato expounds.



So much for the general nature of his subject matter. To look into details we have to distinguish 2 main stages depending on age and class differences...The first stage which belongs to youth is also the stage thru which the great majority of soldiers pass; and it is a training of youth and militarism. It is also a training of character, a social training as well to carry out function.

The second stage belonging to maturer years is also only for those "perfect guardians"; a training of middle class and ruling class. Understanding is formed through science and philosophy and hence assumes a more individualistic and less social tinge than the earlier training for its study calls for a philosophic detachment.

The first stage study is study to the old Athenian study of gymnastics and music, although with a much wider significance as they include diet and medicine as well as bodily exercise, the general care of the body. His music includes literature and the study of plastic arts, in other words, art thru speech, sound or form.

Both the training of body by gym and of mind through music are for a moral purpose, the formation of character. Gymnastics are to elicit qualities of endurance and courage. The Greek dances too were not only rhythmical but also represented stories giving them a moral. They also brought solidarity (battles won on playing fields of Eton)

As for music, the rhythm and diction of poetry, the sounds of musical instruments, the shapes and colors of plastic arts carry a strong artistic appeal and a moral suggestion. The lessons they carry, therefore, should always carry the idea of the Good. He thus attempts to reform literature and music toward that end.

The first thing he attempts to reform is literature, its content as well as its form and here he takes himself into religion, because the poets were also religious teachers of Greece. He thus attempts to re-edit Homer and the dramatists whenever they misrepresent his view of the nature of God.

This regulation of the State into culture and religion (USSR and Shostakovitch, Hollywood investigation) is justified because the State is interested in the character of its citizens; and since the soul assimilates itself to all things with which it comes in contact, there is a real influence similar to influence of education. (would we let education be unregulated?)....Hence he regulates content....But also form. The drama, for example, is a literary form of democracy where each man plays many parts; yet in the ideal State each man, as part of justice concept, has one function; furthermore, with drama and everybody acting there is a tendency toward posing....

Hence in the ideal state the literary form is that of the narrative; and poetry will be the epic form where the narrator preserves in the main a single attitude. Even poetry, however, is not safe as he criticizes it for only imitating truth and never ameliorating human life. All the poet does is corrupt men into unreal feelings of pain and pleasure, making us grieve or rejoice at the imaginary fortunes of others. He thus looks upon it as good only when it is useful to the State and to human life

Like literature, music in the narrower sense of the word must also be submitted to the regimen of the State to preserve the purity of its moral message. The state is universal critic, because the suggestions of music find their way into the soul with a more subtle pervasion than those of the other arts. It must thus be brought into harmony with fundamental social principle of one man one function.

The basic criticism of the view is the false conception that art serves a moral purpose. It is contended that the free play of the artistic impulse is everything; and that to confine it leads to a loss of appeal to emotions, fail to touch the audience

\* \* \* \*

This leads to an interesting observation. Plato's emphasis on the state as an educational authority is the recognition of a truth "Let me write the ballads of the country and I care not who writes the laws". A good education in music and gymnastics carries with it everything else, and there is no need for external laws which reside in mere "words and letters". Since law is a spirit, the lawgiver is the educator, and the spirit alone will solve all things.

Out of this springs Plato's aversion to written law. It leads him thus to the position of his theory of education adding new functions to the State of regulating artistic productions, but of also taking away in the same breath some of the oldest rights of the State, the system of laws and law courts. Plato would sweep away the whole apparatus of law-courts, just as he would abolish for the same reason surgery and drugs.

Plato's state will prevent disease and not cure. There will be no need for lawyers and physicians; they exist only when there is no proper education.

Legislation is therefore a palliative to him.

This view is in contrast to our own where the State is the guarantor of a legal scheme of rights and duties; an organ of justice.

Comment: Can the spiritual basis of law ever do away with the need of its external expression. Doesn't it need an objective form?

Now let's come to the education of maturer years leading to the perfect guardian. Here we go from education thru art to education thru science with an emphasis on mathematics and metaphysics, similar to curriculum at his Academy. This type is more of an individual development. It begins at the age of 20 and ends by successive stages in the "contemplation" of the good life, pure idea.

Plato's belief in math is connected with his general philosophy. Truth does not reside in sensible particulars, which are only shadows of the Universal Idea. That which "is", is thought not sense-perception. Math is important because it is a ladder which takes you above particulars. Thus the units of arithmetic are not concrete, but abstractions of the intelligence....Of course, it can satisfy practical needs as well, and hence from the combination is a good first step in any system of higher education. ....From arithmetic to geometry, which has a practical value as well too.....Then astronomy and harmonics.

These studies should occupy 10 years, from 20-30; and for only those who show most promise particularly in sciences....During this time, the aim will be the discovery of common principles by which all study subjects are united....

These studies are a natural preparation for the study of dialectics which occupy the 5 years after and which is an instrument by which we attain ultimately the final object of thought, the Idea of the Good.....This dialectic is really logic and metaphysics or philosophy. It is not merely a study for mental discipline, but of the first principles of Being...This study will discover those who have the true philosophic nature; and those who remain will be the true philosopher-kings and perfect guardians.

For 15 years from 35-50, they will serve the State, commanding in war, holding office and gaining experience of life. They will be continually tested.

Those who survive, at 50, will be allowed to reach the great goal, not that of rest but of perfect activity. They may spend part of their time in pure philosophy and in contemplation of the Good; and when their turn comes they must spend part of their time in service of the State.....their dedication is that they must do all they can so as to leave the State as they found it, perfect.

We see here that as in Plato a kind of wavering between the ideas of action and of contemplation. Sometimes the goal is the vision of the Idea of the Good; sometimes the better treatment of humanity and social service...Sometimes education is social adaptation; sometimes perfect self-development.

It would seem as if Plato really believed the contemplation of truth to be the highest life; and hence sometimes led to practical action or sometimes be self-sufficient...Sometimes he would justify it as leading to good community and sometimes as good in itself....It is the dilemma of the thinker.

This position that the thinker is to be a man of action, is a kind of renunciation of his ambition (Barker compares it to the monk taken from his cell of contemplation to sit in the papal chair, protesting and yet consenting)

The end is therefore government, paradoxical. We thus must consider the nature of rule by philosophers. Education is not the consequence of govt and a function of govt, the rulers are the creation of the education system.

Let the State itself is an educational system

In his government, the philosopher-kings are sovereign, absolute; but he does establish a kind of constitution or set of rules for them thereby restricting them: no wealth or poverty; limited size; rule of justice for specialization to be preserved; no change in education system.

unwritten  
yet 4 principles  
no poverty or wealth  
limited size  
rule of justice, especially  
no change in education



## ON COMMUNISM

Not only does Plato invent a new system of education, but also a new social order under which the governing class surrenders both family and private property and embraces communism; again done in the name of justice with spiritual betterment the aim. This system of communism, however, is only a material and economic corollary of a spiritual reformation which he is more interested in. This is so in spite of Aristotle's criticism implying Plato did not believe so. To Plato man and society were to be regenerated spiritually and that man's mind was to be reformed first. It's just that he recognizes the importance of the character of social conditions in which minds work. It should not be a disloyalty to the spirit to recognize that material conditions exist and affect life.

Communism was not new to the Greeks. A number of Greek communities held property in common and the theory began definitely to appear in Athens by the 5th century. The individualism of the Athenians, however, prevented a socialist party from existing. Some thinkers were attracted nevertheless to a naturalism freeing people from conventions of civilized life and leading to ideas of community of wives and of property.

Plato shows some of this naturalism in discussing community of wives but his arguments for community of property are all ethical. Communism comes out of his concept of justice. If the rulers are to devote themselves to the discharge of their special duties, they must put aside that element of appetite and hence must abnegate the economic side of life, the outward expression of appetite. A community life, in the sense of a life divested of economic motive, is thus necessarily connected with and issues from his theory of the State. Without communism reason would either be dormant or would be troubled by appetite.

Furthermore, reason issues in communism. It means unselfishness. It means welfare for the whole.

This is the psychological basis of his communism. But he emphasises more the practical and political. Communism of property is necessary because the union of political and economic power in the same hands is proved to be fatal to political purity and efficiency. Whenever such a union is effected, 2 results follow: the holder of political power, intent on economic interests, forgets the need of wisdom and unselfishness and turns to economic advantage; and the subjects, despising his ignorance and selfishness, murmur until there is no longer a community... Hence his communism is quite practical.

It is also philosophic in being part of his special function theory. Men with a function as exceptional as govt must be exceptionally equipped. Men with a unique duty must submit to unique regulations. Here there is a parallel between Plato's guardian communism and the communism of the medieval monastery. Guardians and monks are alike vowed to a high calling; and must be free from worldly callings interests and distractions. The separation of church and state in medieval church is similar to Plato's separation of politics and economic power.

For these reasons the communism is not a matter for the whole State. It does not touch the third or economic class. A system which means the abnegation of appetite can hardly affect the class representing appetite. A system depriving the governing class of economic interests can hardly affect those who do not govern.... The third class retains property, albeit under strict govt supervision; for the govt regulates trade and industry, assigns to each his special work in craft without interference or dissension. Producers are prevented from becoming too rich or too poor, for they both corrupt the state. But this is State control for the 3rd class and not communism.

Another characteristic of his communism is that the "take" isn't great. They are partners in poverty. They have no property, either individually or collectively, for the farmers keep the land and its products;;; they have no houses and live encamped in common barracks which are always open and public;;; they have no gold and silver.. They live on a salary paid in kind by the farmers; and these necessities are not private but are consumed at common tables.

His socialism is a kind of ascetism and parts company with modern socialism which stresses the more just distribution of worldly goods. They differ too (socialism is not USSR type) in that Plato's is more a political than an economic socialism, while socialists have traditionally been more concerned with economic program, the socialization of the means of production. Furthermore, the aim of most socialists today is control of economic objects by a democratically controlled State. The whole community must own the means of production and distribution

There are differences and difficulties in Plato's system. In the first place how can a system of communism be peculiar in one part of society and not in another, private property and communism in one State. His society invites dissension and here he wanted to build one without dissension..... If private property is a cause of dissension, why should it still be tolerated among the members of the third class? It will breed dissension in that class and the guardians, deprived of material means, may be unable to control the dissension of the class possessing property.

It is also difficult to see how a spiritual hierarchy can understand and control the motives and actions of ordinary men.

+q+~`^=#§

In line with his idea of eliminating distractions from work and temptations to self-interest, he calls for community of wives to deal with the sex and family problem.

This idea was not new to the Greeks either. Spartan women shared to an extent in training, there was little family life, wives were lent out by husbands to bear children.

Generally, however, women in Greece were 2nd class citizens. Public life was masculine life. Women sat at home, spun and bore children; they married early at 15, saw few men other than husbands ... Marriage was a means and wives an instrument for children.

Plato set his face against the private household, with its secluded women, its hoarded property, its narrow life.

To Plato, the home was only a stumbling block. Pull down the walls and let the free air of common life blow over the place. The home is thus condemned as a centre of exclusiveness, where selfish instincts flourish. The women's mind is wasted on servicing tables.

There are 2 sections to Plato's argument, one with emancipation of women and the other with the reform of marriage. He begins with the emancipation of women saying that the seclusion of women not only stunts the development of women but also means that the State loses the services of half its members. Using the watchdog analogy, he says women can do the work of men except that they are weaker. He denies that there are any differences in kind between men and women. All she is is a weaker man. To ignore those women with a capacity is to ignore the principle of justice, for then some women will not be discharging their special function. He is, therefore, not to much a teacher of women's rights as of women's duties. If women are trained then the State will gain new instruments and discharge its functions more efficiently.

The question remains, however, how can women devote service to the State and be reconciled to the physical necessity of continuing the species? Plato, therefore, turns to communism under which the wives and children are held in common.

He had 2 reasons for this. First, a physical one using again the analogy of the animal world which suggests that breeding selectively is wise for good stock. Men and women guardians living together in common barracks and discharging their duties in common will naturally have intercourse with one another. But that intercourse must be regulated and with a view to the greatest benefit to the State. The best among the men and women guardians must, therefore, be united at the proper age and at stated seasons in temporary marriages; and the offspring of the marriages must be reared by the State.

But he has also a moral reason for his reform. The parentage of children will be secret as children are taken at once from their mothers. The mother will have nothing to do with the rearing of the child. Parents will have nothing to do with children. But since the unions and births will take place at given seasons, all the parents will be taught to think that that all the children of the period are their common children and all the children will think they are brothers and sisters of one another. This will create real unity, one body, all one family.

This will create consistency with common property. It will also permit the abolition of legal rules for family ethics will be substituted. Men will do their duty toward one another out of a sentiment of kinship and affection. Sedition will never haunt a state whose rulers are a single family.

Plato's theories of eugenics are here of interest. Good stock is not the whole of the matter of heredity; it is also a matter of timing. Both parents must be in their prime. He fixes the period of reproduction for men at between the ages of 25 and 55; and for women between the ages of 20 and 40. Where infants are born out of parents not in these ages, they are to be put to death.

He also wants to regulate population to keep it to optimum level for political stability. He thus regulates the number of marriages. He also deprecates the prolongation by medical skill of the life of chronic invalids. He favors abortion when birth is

not within his rules.

Plato's scheme for the reform of marriage, therefore, has many purposes. It is a scheme of eugenics; a scheme for the emancipation of women; for the nationalization of the family; for the improvement of the state.

The position has been criticized as not taking sufficient cognizance of the sex differences and their consequences. His ends may be laudable but the means are condemned. Women instinctively need child nurture as do children.

Furthermore the union of men and women for sexual intercourse alone followed by instant departure is condemned. Natural marriage is a more permanent and secure relationship.

Also corrupting the sex process so as to make the individual a mere means denies a fundamental right to personality

He doesn't do justice to the real nature of the marriage tie.

#####



Under Plato's scheme of communism, there lies the assumption that much can be done to abolish spiritual evils by the abolition of those material conditions in connection with which they are found. He, therefore, uses the surgeons knife to cut away the material things. By compelling men to live under completely different external material conditions of life, he hopes to produce a different spirit.

Aristotle criticizes this view. "To combat a spiritual disease you use spiritual medicine. Educate a man to the truth. Material conditions are not causes but are concomitants. To free men from drugery is not necessarily to make them live the free life of the spirit.

It is obvious that Plato's attitude involved a certain element of reaction. He wants to return to simplicity, eliminating superfluous elements. Music is confined to the simple and direct expression of simple moods by means of simple instruments; in medicine when we read of the physician's duty to leave the chronically ill to perish, we're reminded of the savages who starve the aged and help them die;; in his communism he tries to get back to the tribal society as it were.

## Plato and States of Greece

The REPUBLIC is not just a Utopia in nowhere. It is meant by Plato to influence real life. It is based on actual conditions. In the 8th and 9th books, it contains an analysis of the actual constitutions of Greece in which Sparta, at once a type of timocracy and oligarchy; Athens a type of democracy; and Syracuse, a type of tyranny all pass under review. - Plato thinks they are all diseased.

In all of them, knowledge is stunted as political ignorance reigns; elements other than reason predominate... He thus prescribes the course of study in his Academy, the sovereignty of reason.

He is serious about the practicality of his proposals, may even have had a particular city in mind, and suggests that all inhabitants over age 10 be banished "into the country" and begin training the pure innocence of children into the ideal ways of justice.

Yet, practicality is not the test and in Book IX he makes clear that it doesn't matter if his state ever existed at all. It is built of thought and is an example for those who want to set life accordingly. His inquiry is for the sake of an ideal. The fact, in fact perhaps, must fall short of the theory in its approximation to perfect truth. The dream, however, can live on and have its effect. It is impossible to estimate the influence which Plato's dream city has had on the minds of many generations, but it is safe to say that the influence has been at least as great as that of the actual state of Sparta.

In proceeding to discuss the degeneracy of the states, Plato is not particularly concerned with historical accuracy as to order, but more with logical consistency beginning with the ideal state. In this reverse process, reason first disappears and state by state we deteriorate until tyranny depends on the worst elements of appetite of all.

His chief purpose is to discover the true nature of injustice. He thus takes timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny, sketches first their origins and characteristics and then depicts the type of individual character to which it corresponds.... From this he wishes to demonstrate that justice is happiness and injustice is misery.

### TIMOCRACY

The first corruption in which element of reason loses its predominance and gives way to spirit. It arises out of a division in the community. First the scheme of marriage goes awry; the rulers fail to unite the right mates and a worse progeny is born. Inadequate for their work, the rulers neglect the scheme of education. They thus produce a state of confusion in which men of gold are found in 3rd class and men of silver and iron in the 1st. Guardians are thus mixed and there are conflicts between philosophic and economic natures. The latter win and private property is instituted. We then get masters and slaves developing.

The philosophic nature as are not completely beaten, however, so that we get a mixed constitution and not outright oligarchy. They thus retain the system of common meals and common education and rulers abstain from work.

Basically it is a combination of reason and appetite, but it rests essentially on spirit, with honor ambition and war respected. It is

essentially a military state; with the soldier dethroning the philosopher; military skill delighting the populace.

Justice is, therefore, beginning to disappear. Each element is not in its proper place. Balance is gone and with it, unity. There is division.

### OLIGARCHY

Some of its features present in timocracy. It is more appetite than spirit, however. Its aim is more trade and money than war and glory. The military thus becomes corrupted into the commercial state. The possession of property comes to be the justification for citizenship.

Justice gets corrupted further as the function of govt is assigned on no ground of capacity but simply on the possession of property. Also in its whole scheme of life, it refuses to assign specific functions to specific faculty. It permits the same persons to have many callings.

This is not only fatal to justice but also to unity. The few acquire great riches; many become poor. It becomes the home of a proletariat without land without money or occupation. This proletariat turns to crime in its discontent, which creates danger..... The wealthy too have an element of danger present. Living for the sake of acquisition, seeking wealth, they develop criminal appetites, which are demonstrated in commercial dishonesty (definition of ethics)

Division and danger thus come early in oligarchy. Knowledge and justice recede further. Instability reigns. Class-consciousness develops and when the poor are drafted into the army with the corpulent rich and find their masters physically and morally degenerate, contempt is added to hatred.

A slight flame and there is an explosion and revolution. The poor conquer their enemies, democracy comes into being and inaugurates a regime of liberty and equality in social and political life.

### DEMOCRACY

The basis of oligarchy is appetite; that appetite becomes prevalent in all its forms under democracy. Drill and discipline disappear. Instead there is liberty for everyone to order his own life as he pleases according to the appetites of the moment. No more hierarchy based on natural elements of the mind.

Democracy is anarchy. It is like an embroidered robe "spangled with all manner of characters!" No one constitution, but many. It is impossible in Plato's view to speak of an agreed and single rule of life in democracy... Law is more honored in breach than in observance. Social training is of no account. Democracy never inquires if the statesmen are uneducated, and only asks whether they are friends of "the people".

Those who would defend democracy say he is describing anarchism. That democracy is govt of a community by the common mind and will as expressed by public opinion. If the common will is strong, it may regulate individual life on many sides and need not be anarchist.

Identifying democracy as he does, however, Plato condemns its 2 cardinal principles, liberty and equality as the negation of principles. Equality is the negation of social order and hierarchy. True equality, he says, is to assign more to the more worthy, less to the less, proportionately.

Liberty is the negation of social type and social training.

Democracy is thus the negation of justice.. Democratic man is everything by turns but nothing long. He indulges freely. He is unstable.

Soon democracy becomes ruined by the good it pursues. Extreme democracy leads to chaos and all distinctions between rulers and ruled disappear; family distinctions disappear; in school, masters fear scholars and scholars despise their masters.. Order and regulation leave the streets and even horses drive people from streets.

The unemployed drones become professional politicians and they proceed to pillage the formerly well-to-do middle class for the benefit ostensibly of the strong masses but really for their own benefit.

Democracy thus becomes the govt of a community by professional politicians at the expense of the well-to-do...This involves revolution as the middle seek to defend themselves and then get accused of plotting against the people...In the struggle, a protector of the people takes the popular side. He provokes civil war and turns into a tyrant.

The verdict of the REPUBLIC on democracy is one of condemnation. In its life it is not lovely; in its death it prepares for tyranny.

### TYRANNY

It is weakness more than wickedness which is the mark of democracy; but it is wickedness and not weakness which is the mark of tyranny. Its psychological basis is still appetite, but it is the worst form, brutal and lawless, the lust of flesh and the pride of power, which man has in common with the beasts. It is evil and prevents social unity. It is absolutely unjust for it cannot be part of any common scheme.

We thus come to the end of the circle, face to face with the principle which started us off, that of brutal self-assertion of Thrasymachus....Whether the new cycle is to begin again, we don't know.

Of course, whether he proves that the just man is happiest is in doubt, though to the Greeks who disliked tyranny, he made his point that man was unhappiest under tyranny which was most unjust.



One other phase of the REPUBLIC must be noted before having it, that of Panhellenism. The structure of his ideal State complete, and his internal structure explained, he turns to foreign affairs. He advocates a foreign policy of alliance among the States of Greece, in opposition to "barbarians"....He emphasises the idea of a common law regulating the relation of the Greek states.....He asks that the Greeks behave toward one another with a restraint which they need not show the outer world.

His state is safe internally, but not externally. He has no notion of universal brotherhood and limits it to the Greek world.

Within, Greek cities should never enslave Greeks or allow others to do so....War between Greek states is really civil war and not war proper. War must, therefore, be made so as to make reconciliation possible.

Real war is to be made between Greeks and barbarians, their "natural enemies".

In spite of this limited outlook, he is a pioneer in standing for a rule of international law.

## ARISTOTLE

Aristotle conceived of his own contributions to knowledge not as breaking fresh ground but as developing the contributions of his predecessors. He also conceived of himself as standing in the end process of that development and regarded his own development as the final attainment of Greek knowledge..

He thus regarded himself as the systematizer of a given knowledge rather than as the creator of an original philosophy.

He makes use of his predecessors, even though he criticizes them severely, and in fact is subject to the charge of plagiarism. It seems though that most students accepted the words of their masters as their own, and Plato was his master.

Unlike Plato, he was conservative. He attempted to create an Ideal State but he was primarily concerned with justifying the existing institutions like the State, slavery, the family.

He was the son of a physician and was thus probably trained in anatomy. It is said that his practical knowledge of dissection explains the analytic method, the comparisons he draws between the State and the human body. During his studies, he came in contact with Isocrates which explains his interest in rhetoric and poetry, and may have helped turn his mind to logic.

But the influence of Plato was dominant and attracted him from the study of speech to the study of man, to ethics and politics.

Immediately following Plato's death, however, he spent 12 years away from Athens apparently living a normal life though an exciting one. He stayed with Hermias, tyrant of Asia Minor and ex-slave for 3 years; He, in fact, married his adopted daughter after H's death. This friendship and the marriage affected A's ideas; and he comes to look upon marriage as a natural institution; and leads him to attack communism.

He had no contempt for the goods of the world and in fact was a man possessed of the comfortable means. He believed that a man's perfect development demanded a material basis of wealth as its condition.

After Hermias he spends the next 8 years living in the very center of events and in contact with the greatest figure of his generation as tutor of Alexander. He is thus a man of the world acquainted with the courts of princes. When he writes of education, of politics, he is discussing things of which he is a part. He knew from the inside the meaning of politics.

The most important part of his life, however, is not that spent with Philip and Alexander but his life at Athens as head of a school from 335 almost until his death in 322.

Science, says A, deals with forms rather than matter for matter is unknowable and is in constant flux, while form is permanent. Hence the permanence of a State is not its matter, not its citizens, but its form; that is to say, its constitution. Science then is a science of forms and political science is a science of political forms, or constitutions..

There is, however, a teleological relationship between matter and form in that the flux of matter is headed toward the development of form. Form is an end toward which matter is determined. Matter is the primary material necessary for the realization of some end; and this primary material develops until the end is realized. There is thus a constant movement from matter to form, or from the potential to the actual.

This teleological view of movement towards an end is part of A's philosophy and he applies it toward the whole of nature. Everywhere things are regarded as determined toward an end.

Thus in science, like astronomy, there is a certain primary material like the empirical generalizations made by a shepherd or sailor about a star which moves towards an end of scientific knowledge;;; in poetry, there is primary material of impromptu imitations which increase until they reach their fulfillment in perfect tragedy;;; in politics there is the primary material of family and its final form is the State.

This teleological view of life, helps him to an evolutionary view of the State. Believing in development, he naturally turned to historical method; he traced the historical growth of the State from its first origin and he criticizes Plato's theory of revolutions as being unhistorical.

His view, however, is teleological rather than historical and he emphasizes not the process of development but the end. "Animals are not constructed as they are, because they have developed as they have: they have developed as they have in order to attain the construction which they show"... he end explains the development and not the development the end.

This gives A an organic conception of the relations of the individual to the State. Since membership of a proper State is the end of human development and since its end is the real nature or meaning of anything, it follows that man has his real meaning as a member of a State.... In the State and as a member of the State, he lives and has his meaning; without the state and apart from it, he has no meaning.

This is the meaning of the famous phrase: "Man is by nature a political animal". Man's real nature is in that citizenship. Without that citizenship, he has not attained that nature.... He is only as a member of the state; he acts only as a member of the state and to promote its aim.

This view, of course, obviously emphasizes duties rather than rights

There are, however, defects in A's teleology and hence defects in his political thought. He saw that there had been a development of the State, but he did not see that there was a development still to come. On the contrary, it led him to see in the city-state the final goal and completion of all political progress and to shut his eyes to the growing empire around him.

A's teleology also tells him that there is a kingdom of ends. That which is the end of one activity may be itself the means to a still higher end. Plants thus exist for animals, and animals for man....It helps him to a view of the State which makes it, not the one association and the sole end of man, as it tended to become in Plato's hands, but the supreme association and the dominant end. It is an association embracing other associations, like the family. Its end is "good life" but in that there are other subordinate ends, like that of common friendship.

The State thus embraces and does not neglect other associations. Hence the household is saved by him as part of the end....But just as the household is preserved so is the slave preserved as a means to the end of household.

A's teleology has a further use. It serves to classify states in order of merit. The "essence" of a thing lies in its end; therefore, in defining we must always give an end. Everything is defined by its function....Thus one class of states is engaged in the pursuit of wealth; another is aimed at liberty; a third with virtue.

Let us now consider more fully A's conception of the State as it relates to unity. In the beginning of the 2nd book, he combats Plato's conception of political unity and suggests his own by replacing P's "Oneness" with a more moderate "association". A city is not one in the identity of exactly similar members; it is one in the cooperation of dissimilar units.

This is the problem of the universal to the particular. He holds that the whole is not over and beyond the ones. In politics, the State does not tower above the individual to the negation of the individual self; it is an association of individuals bound by spiritual chains about a common life of virtue.

An association must be composed of men diverse in kind and yet so far alike as to be fairly equal; for master and slave cannot form an association..Each of these diverse yet like and equal elements possesses his own specific advantage; and each naturally exchanges his own advantage, which his neighbor needs, for his neighbors, which he needs..The essence of association are therefore differentiation and consequent exchange.

His criticism of P, therefore, is that diversity is as important as unity; or rather it is essential for unity. But P swept away diversity, the means toward the end.

The term "association" does not, however, adequately reflect A's concept of unity. The State must also be classed as a "compound" or an organic whole in which from the parts there is produced a new "whole".



This new "whole" consists of its parts different in kind whose identity is still maintained; but the whole still is prior to the part...The individual cannot exist apart from the State which is thus prior to him.

A cohesive factor increasing this inner unity is "justice" and "friendship". Justice is the political good; it is a "reciprocal rendering of equal amounts". It ensures to each his rights and enforces on all their duties. It provides a scheme of rights and duties

Behind justice there is friendship, which varies as justice varies. This friendship expresses itself in social intercourse, in sharing of a common life. One of the aims of the State is, therefore, social life.....They are related. Justice may secure to each his private property; friendship will throw that property open.

Friendship also means developing a concept of common good; the good of another is one's own good. The State must, therefore, possess the virtue of friendship.

Friendship is thus of the essence of political association, as leading to social intercourse and the right use of property and as making for political fellowship and full happiness.

\* \* \* \* \*

With this background, we examine what A says about Political Science as a science. ETHICS lists a horizontal and vertical arrangement of sciences. Horizontally, they are divided into theoretical sciences which deal with objects unalterable by man and hence aim at understanding and not at altering those objects; and the practical and productive sciences, which deal with objects alterable by man and therefore aim at both understanding and altering.

Theoretical science seeks to bring man into conformity with the eternal, which is truth. It, therefore, analyzes material until the mind attains the truth.

Practical science attempts to bring external things into conformity with man's principles. It calculates the means by which that conformity can take place.

He lists political science as a practical science. It means that instead of analyzing the facts of political life and seeking like physics to classify and explain; political science first discovers a principle (happiness or the supreme good) and attempts to calculate the means by which the State can be brought to conform to the principle.

For a full understanding of ~~Plato's~~ A's ideas we must turn to his vertical classification. Here he classifies sciences according to a hierarchy, one subordinate to another but all to a common end..... Here he lists political science as the greatest and most dignified of all practical sciences, because its end is the ultimate end to which all others are subservient, the end of man's life.

His definition of political science, however, includes ethics.

Ethics is not a separate branch to A. Politics is ethics. To treat the end of society is to treat the end of an individual, for both have the same end. Whether a man is considered as living a life in himself or as living with the life of the State, he lives the same life, for the same purpose in the same way. He, therefore, begins his study of ETHICS by telling us that the subject is politics.

This is to be contrasted with the course of modern political science which with some exceptions beginning with Machiavelli, the parent of modern political science, has divorced them. Mac: "It is frequently necessary for the upholding of the State to go to work against faith, against charity, against humanity, against religion".

We now come to the exact way in which political science as a practical science with an ethical purpose, works toward the realization of the end of human life. There are 3 stages in morality: natural disposition habitual temperament, and rational action and these dictate and control our behavior. We are born good, or we have goodness thrust upon us, or we achieve goodness.

Generally, we are in the second stage, of habitual temperament determined by the pressure of external forces, such as the opinion of our family or country and we absorb those influences not because we will to do so out of a clear knowledge and voluntary acceptance of their reason and purpose.

Political science in its widest sense teaches us to assimilate, because it teaches us to unify these forces as all issuing from the one end of human striving: happiness or the Good. It gives us a clue for self-guidance because it enables us to understand ourselves rationally in the light of a principle. Man is thus lifted to a high stage of moral life. Progress in political science is not so much to know more as to be better, not an increase through knowledge but of goodness through knowledge.

But not all can gain that understanding and self-guidance in the light of principle. It is only to a few men morally gifted by Nature, or carefully trained by man. The majority must always remain in the state of creatures of habits which they do not understand. But even for the latter, political science is necessary. It does not minister to them directly an inward light, but it does guide them indirectly. They receive a guidance from without for they are led by those in whom that light is burning. The rulers of the State guide them toward their end by punishments and by rewards, by pain and by pleasure, acting upon their instincts because they cannot appeal to their reason; and supervising alike the education of the young and the habits of adult life.... In this sense political science "lays down the laws of what is to be done and what is not to be done".

Now what is the "end toward which we are all guided, the end of life? Aristotle discovers man's end by investigating his function. That function is not life, for that is the function of all things that live, of plants and animals as well as life, - but life of a peculiar sort, corresponding to the differences of man from other living things.

A conceived that life was identical throughout organic Nature. But life has its different kinds. There is the life of nutrition and of growth, with which the reproduction of the species is connected; and this is the life in which plants share...there is the life of sensation, involving the power of having images presented and consequently of feeling desire, and this, as well as the life of nutrition, is the life of animals....lastly there is the life of reasoning, peculiar to man but combined in man with the preceding stages of nutrition and sensation, each higher stage always presupposing and containing the lower.

But the lower life when united with the higher to some extent alters its character under the influence of the higher. Thus while the function of man is broadly and generally a life in which his complex powers of nutrition, sensation and reason all come into play, it is specifically a properly a life of reason....Here is virtue, living in accordance with reason, (not pure reason)

As the science of the ultimate Good, political science thus appears to be concerned with the direction of men towards a rational life. This direction is given in 2 ways: it teaches some men to realize the end of life for themselves and this unifies their character and lifts them and lifts them to the plane of self-conscious direction by the light of an inner reason....But most men it aids indirectly and by means of the few it has taught directly..For the legislator and the statesmen determine for most men their ends and the means for their realization.

By political science the legislator is able to know both the end and the means; by political science he can impart his knowledge to others.

Political science is therefore the master science and uses the other sciences for purposes of study. Hence POLITICS uses domestic economy and the theory of education as vitally concerned with political science. The State must regulate the material and spiritual equipment necessary to the good citizen...Education is of particular concern to the State for it forms character.

POLITICS deals with the polis, as the title indicates; or, to be more exact, with the 150 or so examples of the polis scattered over the Greek mainland and Greek maritime possessions..

It presupposes a small Mediterranean world which was a world of civic republics (the largest with an area of 1000 sq miles, but many with 100 or less)

The Greeks had a notion of a community called "Hellas", but it was in no sense a political community. (Herodotus conceived it as having the 4 bonds of common blood, speech, religious shrines and social habits, but he recognized no political bond;;; Plato argued for intl law but the very nature of his argument involved sovereignty of each polis;;; Aristotle himself could say that the Greek stock had the capacity for governing every other people if it could achieve political unity, but he never sought to investigate the method by which such unity might be achieved.

The assumption of Aristotle, as of the rest of Greek thought, is that of small state or civil republics whose citizens know one another personally, and which can be addressed by a single herald and persuaded by a single orator when it assembled at its town meeting.. It is a small and intimate society; a church as well as a state; it makes no distinction between the province of state and society;;; it is in word, an integrated system of social ethics, which realizes to the full the capacity of its members and thus claims full allegiance....

.. limit in size is imposed on it by its very nature and purpose (as conversely the limit of its size helped produce its nature and purpose)...Being a church and a system of social ethics, it cannot be a Babylon.....It is small and complete in itself, self-sufficient in the sense that it meets its own resources, physical and moral; as it does not draw from others, so it is not bound to give to others.....

Whole and complete, with a rounded life of its own, the polis rises to a still higher dignity than that of self-sufficiency. It is conceived as natural, as a scheme of life which, granted the nature of man, is inevitable and indereasible.

In talking about the natural character of the polis, it makes a distinction between nature and convention, between institutions existing by nature and those existing by convention. This distinction was drawn before it...Some of its predecessors had argued that the state, in the form of the civil republic, was merely a conventional thing, one that might or might not be and was only because men agreed by contract that it could be...Some had even argued that it had better not be at all, because it defeated the good old rule and simple plan of 'nature', that of the strong dominating the weak.

These theories of natural rights cut at the roots of tradition and undermined the Greek city-state, challenging the whole idea of its social ethics.....These theories were also a kind of individualism, which had associated with it as ally the individualism leading to the pursuit of private culture, making the state nothing more than an instrument to live and to turn out profits for its members.



This theory too implied a definition of "nature" as a identification with nothing more than primary instincts and primitive impulses

This was quite contrary to Aristotle's general philosophy of "nature" which Aristotle had himself developed... seeing everywhere the growth of an initial potentiality into a final form or end, and seeing its end as the essential nature of every thing, he applied his general philosophy to man and to man's long development, as he struggled upward from the potentiality of primary instinct to the end or nature of a political being, a being intended by his potentialities for existence in a polis and a being who achieved his nature in and through such an existence. ...The polis was thus perfectly natural because it was the natural home of the fully grown and natural man.

He does not, however, rest his belief in the natural character of man solely on the fact of growth. "What makes the State natural, in his view, is the fact that no matter it came into existence, it is as it stands the satisfaction of an immanent impulse in human nature towards moral perfection.--an impulse which drives men upwards, through various forms of society, into the final political form.

It is interesting that though he talks of the development as "natural", also considers the drive to be conscious as well as an impulse: "There is an immanent impulse in all men towards an association of this order: but the man who first constructed such an association was the greatest of benefactors"...No contradiction ..

Collingwood says Aristotle thinks of growth (IDEA OF NATURE) as "the essence of things which have a source of movement in themselves"; 2 notions implied here are that of "growth" as "movement", the process of development and also the concept that the things moving have the source of movement in themselves, so that it is not only change, but also self-change, an effort "seed pushing its way up through the soil"

The state is therefore natural when or in so far as it is an institution for that moral perfection of man to which his nature moves. All the features of its life (slavery, private property, family) are equally justified and natural when they serve that sovereign end.

A state which is meant for the moral perfection of its members will be an educational institution. Its laws will serve to make men good. Its offices ideally belong to the men of virtue who have moral discernment; its chief activity will be that of training the young and sustaining the mature in the way of righteousness. ....The state is thus a church. ...Political science thus becomes a sort of moral theology.

Like Plato tho to a lesser extent, Aristotle would exercise a moral censorship of plays and tales and he would subject music to an ethical control.

That is what distinguishes Plato and Aristotle from present political writers who do not look upon state as a church.

Using his ideals as a measuring rod, Aristotle now passes judgement on the Greek states of the 4th century. Unlike Plato, however, who first constructed the ideal and then showed how the actual states were a corruption of that ideal, he follows the reverse order when, early in POLITICS, he examines actual states in order that their merits and their defects may throw light on the requirements of an ideal state; but he too uses ideal principles to criticize and classify actual states.

Three results seem to follow: first, an elucidation of the principles on which offices should be assigned and constitutions constructed (for a constitution is a mode of assignment of office); second, a classification and a grading of actual constitutions; and finally a criticism of that democratic constitution which was general in the 4th century and which Aristotle considered inevitable.

Offices, we are told, should be assigned on the basis of distributive justice. To each the state must assign its awards in proportion to the contribution which each has made to itself; and in estimating the contribution of each, we must look to the end of the state and measure the contribution of each to that end.

Logically, this would seem to mean the enthronement of the virtuous, or an ethical aristocracy and would involve in the last resort the enthronement of the one man of supreme virtue, an absolute divine monarchy.

Actually, however, Aristotle is practical enough to recognize that other contributions tend to the realization of the end too. Besides virtue there is wealth which is necessary to the end because virtue requires material equipment. Besides wealth there is "freedom" which means not only the sense of free birth but also freedom from dependence on others and freedom from mechanical toil.

This is one of the lines along which Aristotle moves to the theory of the mixed constitution, which recognizes various contributions and thus admits various classes to office.

A classification of constitutions readily follows on this line of speculation similar to Plato's. The criticism of the democratic constitution follows in its turn: It has abandoned "proportionate" for "absolute" equality; it awards the same honor and the same standing to each and every citizen; it is based on recognition of only one contribution, that of "freedom" and that contribution is by no means the highest or weightiest.

Nor is this all, not content with the freedom which means a voice for all in the collective control of common affairs, it has added a freedom which means the absence of control, the surrender of moral discipline. And this is anarchy, the negation of the city-state as conceived by Plato and Aristotle. It is this dislike of anarchy which makes Aristotle, though less than Plato, a critic of democracy.

Aristotle is less critical

Aristotle is less critical than Plato, however, of democracy. He recognizes that there is much to be said on behalf of the mass of the people. They have a faculty for collective judgment.: "some appreciate one ~~thing~~part, some another, and all together appreciate all" ... "people know where the shoe pinches... People thus should have a share in the govt of the state...." Aristotle would thus have them elect magistrates and holding them to account at the end of their term of office

Aristotle's view of law is different from that of Plato. Anxious for a free field for the higher wisdom, Plato will have no laws in his state. The eternal ideas matter more than laws and those who understand the ideas must be free to stamp them at their discretion on the state.... Aristotle believed in the sovereignty of law; "The rule of law is preferable to that of a single citizen: even if it be the better course to have individuals ruling, they should be made law-guardians or ministers of the laws".

This law of Aristotle, however, is not code but custom, written and unwritten.

\*\*\*

In modern times we distinguish between state and society. The one is the area of politics proper, of obligatory rule and involuntary obedience: the other is the area of voluntary cooperation, conducted in and by a variety of societies, educational, ecclesiastical and economic. .... It would be difficult to apply any such distinction to ancient Greece; the polis included everything.

The study of politics, therefore, also included economics and education. His theory of ~~the~~ economics is a theory of the ways and means in which household and cities can properly use the means at their disposal for the better living of a good life. Wealth, on his basis, is a means to a moral end. As such a means, it is necessarily limited by the end and it must not be greater than what the end requires.... This is not socialism, but is a line of thought inimical to capitalism. It has tended to foster modern socialism.

There was a certain amount of quasi-socialistic opinion in Greece of the 4th century. Plato was not a socialist; he divorces political power from economic; but he advocated communism. Yet socialist schemes remained matters of airy speculation, which never penetrated to the people.. The citizen of Athens was more often his own employer than an employee; there was little of a wage system.

The system of private property which Aristotle defends on the ground that virtue needs its "equipment" and personality its medium of expression was never in any real danger. It was protected as it perhaps always will be, by the conservatism of small farmers and small artisans working on their own account. The utmost extremity of the radical politician was a demand for redistribution of land and for cancellation of debts.

Slavery was more of a moot question.. Plato protested against enslavement of Greeks but neither he nor Aristotle protested against any and every form of slavery. In LAWS Plato recognizes slavery and legislates for slaves whom he couples with children as having imperfectly developed minds.

Aristotle recognizing that there has been much debate makes no clear pronouncement on the subject of enslaving defeated Greeks, but he obviously inclines to regard slavery as only proper for barbarians who are by nature slaves. The natural slave is a man whose chief use is his body but who possesses mind enough, not indeed to control himself, but to understand and to profit by the control of a superior



mind...He is a family slave who is caught up into and elevated by the life of the family...There is no great harshness in his view of slavery...In the ETHICS, a slave as a man may be his master's friend...In POLITICS, we are promised an explanation of why "it is wise to offer all slaves the eventual reward of emancipation" ...Slavery was thus a moral institution. He defended it ~~xx~~ because its potential moral benefits

Another problem of family life debated in the 4th century was that of the position of women. Plato would have them emancipated from household drudgery for political service to the ideal state. In speculation of this order the emancipation of women was connected with community of wives and it was assumed that women could only be free if the institution of marriage and the monogamous family was abolished....This negative assumption attracted attention and criticism rather than the positive proposal.

Thus Aristotle discusses only the question of whether wives and children ought to be in common. Upon this line, he defends the private family as vigorously as he defends private property and on the same ground. The family is justified by the moral development which it makes possible....This is very true, but it does not solve the position of women

Finally with reference to education, which is part of the state because the state is intended for moral perfection. His curriculum is to be mainly aesthetics, and especially lay of noble music. This was unlike any system of his day. Spartan was by the state but merely military; Athens had its aesthetic side but not controlled by state.