Max M. Kampelman Papers

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Version 3
August 20, 2018

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April 26, 1982

The Honorable Max M. Kampelman
600 New Hamsphire Avenue, N.W.
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20037

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Again I would like to thank you warmly for your participation in our Consultation on Soviet Jewry this past March 24. Your presence truly enhanced the gathering.

I would like you to have the enclosed transcript of the consultation both as a record of the proceedings and perhaps to offer you with some helpful material for future courses of action on behalf of Soviet Jewry.

Again, thank you, and warm regards.

Sincerely,

Warren W. Eisenberg
Director, International Council of
B'nai B'rith

WWE/paj
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CONSULTATION ON SOVIET JEWRY

INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF B'NAI B'RITH/
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOVIET JEWRY

March 24, 1982

10:30 a. m.

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DR. JACK TROMBKA
MR. BEN J. WATTENBERG
DR. ALLEN WEINSTEIN
DR. JOSEPH WHELAN
DR. ERIC WILLENZ
MR. YAAKOV YANAI

C O N T E N T S

P R O C E E D I N G S

10:30 a. m.

MR. EISENBERG: I'm Warren Eisenberg, Director of the International Council of B'nai Brith, and we want to thank you for coming to what we think will be a provocative and productive Consultation on Soviet Jewry, that we are pleased to co-sponsor with the National Conference on Soviet Jewry.

I wanted to inform you that we are recording the session, really with an eye to taking a look at what was said. If anything is published, we will certainly contact any of the individuals for their clearance.

I think we have an exciting agenda, and I would like to turn the program over to our very able Chairman, Dr. John Armstrong.

DR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you, Warren.

It's a real honor for me to chair this meeting. As you know, this is the second one that has been carried on on this subject in this format, that is, bringing in a large number of people from the government and other agencies. It's one of very many which have taken place in Washington. The earliest I recall is 1969, on the subject of Soviet Jewry.

I want to mention the name of Hans Morgenthau, who chaired most of these meetings until his untimely death. He chaired the last one; unfortunately, I was not present. I had known Professor Morgenthau over many years, and I personally do

not believe that these meetings would have developed and produced the results they have, in the way of understanding the problem, if it had not been for his work, and we all miss him, and it's a very difficult job to even try to fill his shoes.

Warren Eisenberg has already thanked you, and I thank you personally for being here and taking time from your very busy schedules; and the time, as you well know, is short. We're going to have to move on according to schedule, and I was just telling Bill Korey an hour ago that I'm used to keeping Germans on schedule, and believe me, if you can keep German academicians on schedule, you can keep this group, I think. At least, I'm going to make a very strong effort to do so, and I hope I don't bruise anyone when I do it.

You just got the announcement about the taping of the proceedings, and the fact that this taping is purely for internal use in the B'nai B'rith, and any publication or dissemination will be checked with you, and your permission secured as to your own contribution in advance.

However, there will be press coverage from approximately the time we sit down to lunch until after the discussion of Ambassador Max Kampelman's presentation, and at that time, of course, you should be aware that you may be quoted in other quarters than by B'nai B'rith.

We will have a slight change in the afternoon schedule, at least as originally presented to me, in that Professor

Seweryn Bialer, who is particularly well-informed on the subject, will show up at some still-indeterminate point in the afternoon, and we will squeeze him around Mel Levitsky's presentation, probably right after.

Having mentioned those preliminaries, let us proceed with the discussion. I will try to limit my own contribution to the bare minimum. We do want to be sure we cover certain topics, but I think we can depend, in general, on you, the discussants, and of course those who are making the presentations, to cover those points, and my own contribution, I think, is just to keep a checklist to see that everything is, indeed, covered.

And so I will take, as this outline, the agenda, has, just one minute to outline what I think we ought to cover. In the presentations in the morning, I think we need to deal -- get opinions from you on whether the present plight of the Jews in the Soviet Union, the catastrophic decline in rates of emigration, is indeed purely a concomitant of the decline in what passed for detente in earlier years.

Secondly, following Bill Korey's presentation, I think we have to take a hard look at the limits of what might happen in the future, particularly as we now face growing signs of a truly imminent leadership transition; and thirdly, of course, in the afternoon, we get back to Lenin's great question, what is to be done, what can be done; and here, I

think, the many people present in this room will have very important contributions to make, particularly those who have, like Mel Levitsky, been engaged in this topic with the government, and those who are in the scientific and technical community who have performed such yeoman service in maintaining contacts with the Jews in the Soviet Union.

At this point, I would like to introduce a person whom I am sure most of you know, Jerry Goodman, the Director of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, who will present a general picture of emigration.

MR. GOODMAN: Thank you, John.

If you'll pardon me, I need the tea -- this is not the time to come down with laryngitis, but nevertheless I did.

There is some material on the table. If you haven't picked it up, please do so, because there will be a number of things I will not cite, including some of the statistics, since the flow chart is there, dealing with emigration over the last decade, and secondly, there is also a very brief survey which we released of developments in 1981.

I will only touch upon other subject items as they pertain to emigration.

For Jews in the Soviet Union, emigration, or perhaps more appropriately at this stage, the right to leave, remains a pervasive concept, and yet still an elusive and often heartbreaking goal. In its earliest phases, and it may be instructive

to take a look at that point in time, the emigration of Jews was viewed as a factor of Aliyah, or going to Israel.

That Aliyah, Hebrew phrase, was essentially linked to a variety of interacting elements, including the desire of the people to live in the country, and their ability or willingness to struggle toward that end; two, a development of a variety of strategies by Soviet Jews themselves to achieve their goals; three, international efforts on their behalf, and the public and private pressures exerted on Soviet authorities and on Soviet policies.

Equally critical was the situation in Israel itself, including an effective absorption climate that could accommodate many different economic, cultural, social, and spiritual needs. And in varying degrees, these factors had a major impact on Aliyah, or going to Israel.

At different times, they were also affected by events within and outside of the Soviet Union. Whatever the reasons, whether to escape growing anti-Semitism, to build a Jewish life, to strengthen Israel, or to satisfy personal needs, Jews even today continue to seek to leave the Soviet Union, as they have for more than a decade.

For nearly two million Jews by official count, however, a paradox has been created. Current Soviet policies have unleashed pressures which encourage Jews to leave, an impulse expressed by an increasing number of families.

At the same time, current practices have made it increasingly difficult for those very same people to leave, as emigration dropped from its 1979 record of 51,000.

Indeed, it may be more appropriate at this time to even say that the gates of the Soviet Union for Jewish emigration are virtually closed; this, after more than a decade when 260,000 people did leave.

The inevitable result is frustration, despair, and anxiety. I don't have to tell this group that emigration remains restricted for all Soviet citizens. The authorities spoke of the reunification of families, usually meaning families torn apart by World War II and its aftermath, and avoided the term "emigration" itself.

Jews, therefore, were permitted to leave since the late '60's on the ground that they wanted to be reunited with relatives, usually in Israel, as a form of repatriation, and the Soviet Union then required, as we know, that the would-be emigrant would present an invitation from the relative in Israel.

In previous years, the closeness of the relationship was not crucial. However, in 1979, Soviet officials began to issue visas mainly to those who had invitations -- I should say primarily those who had invitations from first-degree relatives -- parents, spouses, children; on a few occasions, siblings.

In addition, other harassing restrictions were reported. Some couples had to obtain their parents' permission to leave, even if the couple was in their forties and their parents in their eighties. There has also been a reduction of office hours in some emigration offices, occasionally as little as one hour a week; and only this week, we received word that in Kiev itself, no permissions are being granted, and the office is closed. This is unconfirmed, and may only be temporary.

Another practice was to urge the entire family to leave, regardless of desires. Thus, in some cities, if one member had not applied, applicants were told, this is contrary to the principle of family reunification. Each member was thus made responsible for the action and fate of others.

In 1980, over 21,000 Jews emigrated via Vienna, a 50 percent decrease from the '79 peak. The trend that we noticed began in May of that year, before the collapse of SALT II discussions, and certainly months before the invasion of Afghanistan.

At that time, the Russians began to institute restrictions on the right to apply for emigration. Primarily, they began to question the relationship between persons applying and the persons who invited them. The new demands were for an invitation from a close, or first-degree, relative, in addition to the bureaucratic obstacles. The application of

insufficient kinship restriction began in a few cities, and then spread throughout the country.

Among the nearly 260,000 Jews who succeeded in leaving in the last 13 years, many, of course, left relatives behind, including, in a few instances, spouses and children. Thousands of newly-divided families were thus created in the wake of the '79 shift. One estimate is that 500,000 relatives of all kinds were left behind by those Jews who left since 1968, although the balance of those still in the Soviet Union after receiving a visa from Israel is about 380,000, that is, those who we know had requested invitations, and to whom such invitations were sent.

Most of the recently-refused families don't know how to publicize their plight, or are frightened to do so. They are not from the activist group, and generally are not psychologically prepared for the struggle of the older refuseniks.

As a result, the total number of Jews affected by the new restrictions has reached several thousands. A conservative estimate is over 10,000, including those who received a refusal, as well as those whose applications were not even accepted.

Others have apparently decided to postpone submitting their applications, despite other pressures which may encourage people to leave, such as increased job and educational discrimination.

If we use the figure of nearly 640,000 people who requested and received invitations for the first time since 1968, nearly one-third of the total Jewish population in the Soviet Union, based on the last census, have taken the critical first step in the emigration process.

Doubtless, nearly all those who received the invitations from Israel, but not yet presented them to emigration authorities, would not have hesitated to do so, once they learned they had a fair chance of actually receiving an exit visa.

We should therefore consider, and this is imprecise, that the overwhelming majority of those 380,000 to 390,000 Jews mentioned are potential candidates for immediate departure, if indeed that was possible.

The worst aspect of the current Soviet emigration practices is most evident in how the small group of older refuseniks are treated. These people, whose applications for exit permits were rejected, in some cases, 10 or 11 years ago, live in a world where the personal conditions seem to worsen. This is so, notwithstanding the positive and impressive phenomenon of the departure of over a quarter million people in over a decade.

The decisive majority of those older refuseniks have been fired from their jobs following the submission of their applications. In most instances, they have not been reinstated.

Some of their children were driven out of high schools, and the condition of feeling in primary schools worsened after parents were declared traitors.

While I was in the Soviet Union in January, I met one family -- the mother is Jewish, and the father, which is probably the problem, is Uzbek. As someone said to me, he himself, he is probably the only famous Uzbek in the last 300 years -- a bit of self-degradation, a little bit of, I suppose, chauvinism, involved in that statement, which is why they're making it difficult for him to leave. He's a singer, a popular folksinger. Their daughter is 18, was dropped from school -- she was told she could stay if she would denounce her parents. She chose not to.

The family is still there, and neither of the parents -- the Yashbi family, have been working in two years.

Quite often, the sons, who were driven out of the universities, were summarily drafted into the Soviet Army for two years, simultaneously punishing the family and creating an additional pretense, that of security, for refusing exit visas for at least an additional five years.

While it is not possible to determine the exact number of refuseniks, and I have suggested that a conservative estimate today is somewhat over 10,000, some of them submitted applications and were rejected, and out of a fear of apprehension, or of harming relatives, or as a result of false promises

by local authorities, decided to be temporarily reconciled, and have become quiet. Many have even given up their right to receive exit visas.

It was pointed out to me in January that, indeed, our figures will no longer ever be accurate, because what is happening is that a new category of non-applicant, non-refusenik, has been created among Jews. That is, the inability, since May, 1979, increasingly, to receive the necessary affidavit, means that more and more people cannot apply. They don't have the affidavit they were able to obtain since '68.

Not being able to apply, they can't even become refuseniks. And as a number of the scientists indicated to me, we wish we could now be refuseniks, because that, at least, would indicate that we're in the pipeline.

And so many of them are not known to us in the West. Their names do not appear on lists. They are not submitted to our State Department, if and when that opportunity would ever present itself again, to be, in turn, submitted to Soviet authorities; and, therefore, this new category of non-applicant, non-refusenik, seems to be growing, and is of increasing alarm to the people in the country.

In general, the percentage of so-called dropouts before emigration virtually ended had continued to climb, and its climb was dramatic. Let me merely suggest, a survey of the years -- 1976, 49 percent of the people were considered

what we call the dropouts, that is, who came out on the Israeli invitation and chose not to go to Israel. In '78, that climbed to over 58 percent. By 1981, it was over 81 percent.

The figures for the first 2-1/2 weeks of this month suggest that the ratio of dropouts is about 31 percent, who go on to Israel, the remainder not. The dropout phenomenon is a function of many factors. While many persons often avoid explaining why they decide not to go to Israel, information gathered from Jews who had arrived in Vienna made it clear that the decision was often taken while still in the Soviet Union.

In Vienna, many do state reasons that influenced their decision, including fear of the strange and difficult climate, concern about war and Israel's future, and sometimes difficulties in the absorption process.

The difficulties encountered in the absorption process in Israel have indeed been cited, or had been cited, as the decisive factor in the decision of many not to proceed to Israel. The phenomenon, however, reflects a more complex set of problems, I believe, of which the difficulties of absorption are only one.

Is it safe to assume, for example, when there was that emigration, that Jews from Odessa did not encounter worse conditions than those of Chernovtsy, nor were Jews from Kishinev treated better than Jews from Kiev.

Still, the percentage of dropouts from Odessa and Kiev was much larger than that of Vilnius, Riga, Chernovtsy and Kishinev, most of whose Jews came to Israel.

Extensive improvement in Israel's absorption process, although necessary, in my view, would not therefore have solved the problem in its entirety. The phenomenon would appear to be a function of many factors, and let me just tick them off quite superficially -- one, for those under Soviet rule, since 1917, decades of forced assimilation brought about by the lack of Jewish education, isolation from Jewish religious and non-religious sources, and nearly total estrangement from any sentiments of national identity in a society of over 100 over nations and nationalities.

Two, the sustained attack on Israel, Zionism, and Jewish history by all the media, creating negative images among many Jews, as well as non-Jews. Three, fear of armed conflict between Israel and Arab states, and a sense of insecurity among new immigrants prevalent since the 1973 War.

Four, Moscow's campaign to sanitize its people from unfiltered and objective news of Israel, as seen in the jamming of Israel's broadcasting facilities, and the careful searches of visitors by airport customs officials.

Five, the insulation of Soviet Jews from friends and relatives in Israel through systematic interference with communication by phone or mail.

Six, many mixed marriages, and the problems such families have and would encounter in Israel. Seven, objective absorption difficulties. Eight, failure to understand or accept Israel's social and political patterns, which are at variance with self-created images or expectations.

Finally, an atmosphere of seeming economic or financial competition by Jewish community institutions in other countries with greater resources, and the moral authority that this competition suggests.

There are signs, however, that Soviet authorities rely on the fact that so many Jews have gone to the United States, Canada, and elsewhere in recent years, and are not able to provide their closest relatives, still in the Soviet Union, with Israeli invitations, in order to bring about the curve of emigration which began in mid-'79.

The first-degree kinship refusals were most evident in cities and towns in the Ukraine, where the dropout rate had on occasion reached as high as 95 percent. If so, this would have continued to endanger continuation of Jewish emigration, some people suggested, in addition to keeping closed exit gates for those who remained.

As long as Jews who left the Soviet Union with Israeli visas continued on, Jewish emigration was in accordance with accepted principles of repatriation and family reunification. This created no precedents for a claim of free emigration on

the part of other nationality groups who had relatives in the United States and Canada.

The increased dropout phenomenon in the last five years probably changed the nature of Jewish departure to that of a more normalized emigration procedure, which many Soviet authorities began to view with increasing discomfort.

Indeed, in Madrid, at the Conference to Review Compliance with the Helsinki Final Act, some Soviet delegates were quick to note that Jews holding visas from Israel go to the U. S., and suggest that the matter was being, quote, "investigated," close quote.

In any case, some data would suggest that the deliberate decrease in Jewish departures from republics and cities conspicuous for their high percentage of dropouts, and the growth in exit quotas from regions and cities with low percentages of dropouts, might indicate, and I underscore "might," certain considerations of Soviet authority, following difficulties that showed up in various regions as a consequence of the dropout phenomenon.

In any event, whether documented or not, the dropout phenomenon, while not the only cause of the current emigration practice, maybe not even the primary one, is believed to have contributed to it significantly.

At the very least, it became an exploitable issue for Soviet propagandists, and presumably anti-Western hardliners

who do not wish to encourage Jewish emigration under any conditions.

It may very well be, therefore, and I don't know if this is pertinent to the discussion, that some of us who are charged with following this situation daily will have to change our approach, so that the issue of Jewish emigration will no longer be based on family reunification, a concept which seems to have been rejected by Soviet authorities, but a return to a pursuit of emigration and the right to leave, rather than family reunification and repatriation.

But, even as emigration is rolled back, and I'll try to conclude now, parallel pressures continue to build up, which compel more Jews to want to emigrate. The admission of Jews to some higher institutes -- and I'm sure Bill will go into this, has declined dramatically, for example, and Jews may soon find themselves virtually shut out from prestigious academic institutions.

Until 1968, in spite of a quota system, Jews were well-represented at top universities and scientific institutes. By the late '60's, one-third of the Jewish community were university graduates, compared with only four percent of the overall population.

Since then, admission of Jews to higher institutions has declined. They are virtually excluded from the better schools by a system worked out for lowering the examination

marks of applicants. The system is administered by specially selected examiners, who give Jewish students unusually difficult oral exams, notably in mathematics and physics.

Documents of the Moscow-Helsinki Monitoring Group explain how difficult it is to demonstrate this widespread discrimination, since documents, if they do exist, are kept secret.

As a result, Jews have decreasing hope of achieving solid entry-level positions, much less any chance of getting near the privileged top. This discrimination against merit is compelling more and more Jews to seek to leave, as future options become increasingly restricted.

A parallel expression of anti-Semitism is the vitriolic propaganda campaign vilifying the Jewish people, the Jewish religion, the State of Israel, et cetera. Indeed, discrimination may explain in part why so many Jews in recent years have chosen to leave. Their desire may be motivated more by personal considerations as they saw fewer and fewer options for their children, and as a way to improve living standards.

At the moment, Jews seem to be locked into a very difficult situation. For the present time, the doors remain closed, the emigration hovering about 250, 270 per month, as the statistics would suggest.

Simultaneously, more people in the Soviet Union among the Jewish activists accept the notion that their fate is

tied to U. S.-Soviet relationships, regardless of what happened in 1979 to begin the rollback, and that at the moment, they are, in fact, truly hostage.

For the first time, a sense of despair seems to be prevalent among many of the older activists, because they see their fate inextricably linked to Moscow and to Washington, with little hope of achieving what they had achieved in the past as a result of their own efforts, and as a result of efforts by people outside of the Soviet Union, persons in the private sector, and people of goodwill.

If that be the actual situation, then the only hope, I suppose, for those people to begin to see emigration increasing again is to change the relationships between the two countries, where Jews, among others, become bargaining chips.

Whether that will take place now, in the months ahead, or indeed ever, is the question they asked of me in January. Unfortunately, I could give no answer. Maybe you can. Thank you.

DR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you very much, Jerry. That was a wonderfully concise and clear presentation of the background of the problem that is before us.

Now, I'm going to throw the floor open to discussion in a moment, and when I do, please identify yourself. I know many of you, but not all. Speak into the mike -- identify

yourself first, so that in the taping, which we will make but not disseminate, as I indicated, your position and the person who's talking will be clear.

Let me suggest that Jerry has just presented us with the big problem, of course, whether the fate of the Jews wanting to leave the Soviet Union is wholly tied to the fate of Soviet-American and Soviet-Western relationships.

An interesting point in this context that I feel I ought to bring up is the parallel decline in emigration of Germans -- not as sharp; according to the Stuttgarten Zeitung of last November, the decline was about 50 percent between 1976 and 1981, in Germans allowed to leave the Soviet Union, in spite of the direct personal intervention of Willy Brandt, and, of course, the rather more relaxed attitude of the West German government toward relations with the Soviet Union.

Again, the Armenians appear to form a complete exception, if the account somewhat earlier in the New York Times is correct, and it seems to correspond with what I have heard personally.

The issue, therefore, is not what has been happening to the Jews, but what it is tied in with, and this, I think, is an essential prerequisite for our understanding of what can be done about it.

One more small point I would make is the particular person who chose, last autumn, to discuss this issue, in

September, Kommissar Sfigun, who has since dropped dead, or some say committed suicide -- we perhaps have experts on that -- a bit of Kremlinology -- said to be a particular appointee of Brezhnev in the KGB, who put all the groups together, starting with the Jews, the Germans, and the Armenians, and then coming down to the Ukrainians, who allegedly have a right to emigrate from the USSR, and proceeding on to various Muslims, and the Hare Krishna.

That's quite a large crowd to get caught up in. But I think now it's time to hear from people who are better informed than I am.

Yes?

DR. GOLDMAN: I'm Marshall Goldman. I'm not sure I'm better informed, but I'm going to say something which I suspect is certainly going to be more provocative, and it has to -- and I think Jerry has maybe heard a rumor about what I might say, but I've been trying to look back at 1979 and what caused the change in 1979, which, even though it began in May, the flow of emigrants continued throughout the year, and I raise this as not so much what to do right now, but if the opportunity should ever present itself again, what should be done then, and what should have been done differently in the last decade?

And you have to go back to what provoked the formation of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, and it was a very unusual

coalition of disparate groups.

I think that what happened, however -- in the process, periodically there would be troubles, and I know different Jewish groups would come to the Soviet Union, and they would say, well, if you would only show us a sign, let two or three of, probably, the most famous or notorious refuseniks out, then, we will try to do something to improve conditions in the United States, and move towards giving you most favored nation treatment.

And my sense is that our part of the bargain was never met, because periodically there would be occasions where the Soviets would let one or another group of people out.

Now, that's not to say that the Soviets weren't doing things in the interim which were counterproductive from our point of view. But my point is, I think particularly by the time 1979 came along, and the number of emigrants had reached that magic 50,000, that the members of the Jewish community, or the members of those -- those people who really kind of formed that coalition, should have said, okay, you have met, now, the terms, and therefore, we will go to Congress and we will urge that the Jackson-Vanik Amendment be done away with.

Now, Vanik himself, of course, had already moved, at that point. This was an unusual situation, of course. It meant turning, in a sense, against Senator Jackson, who, for a

variety of other reasons, has been very good to the Jewish community, and that would have been politically awkward.

But particularly in 1979, when the issue was being raised of whether or not most favored nation treatment should be given as a package to both China and the Soviet Union, it seems to me the Jewish community was quiet, and should have urged that, if China got it, the Soviet Union should have gotten it as well, because what, of course, happened is that China did get it, and in '79, although officially it was not accorded until 1980.

And if I were in the Soviet Union and saw that, I would say, well, these people are just never going to honor their part of the bargain, and just nuts to them -- and that leads into all kinds of other questions. If most favored nation status had been given, and I know Hal is going to jump down my throat as soon as I say this, but I'm going to say it anyway -- maybe things would have been different in Afghanistan. Maybe they wouldn't have been, but at least there's a question that I don't think can be answered.

So my point is that we found ourselves tied to a point -- to an issue, and couldn't back away from it. We were victims of our own rhetoric, so to speak, and I think the thing might have been completely different, now, if we hadn't done that.

It's always difficult to be nice to the Soviet Union,

I don't deny that. But it seemed to me we pushed our luck too far.

DR. ARMSTRONG: It's an interesting -- well, just let me say a word. I debated this with Marshall myself shortly before the day he mentions, in Cincinnati, as he remembers, and I'm not going to do it now. It's a point of view that we want to get in front of us, Marshall, and I appreciate you expressing it so forcefully, and I do think we have to consider first whether there was such an opportunity, when it was, what it would have cost, and of course whether, in the larger context, which certainly developed very rapidly in 1979, whether it would have been feasible for Jewish organizations, or any organizations interested in this particular cause, in contrast to the whole framework of international relations.

Jerry, did you want to say something?

MR. GOODMAN: Yes. Very impressive, Marshall, but unfortunately, historically inaccurate. Indeed, OVIR began and introduced the new restrictions in May of '79. At that time, we were not aware how extensive it would become.

Discussions with the Administration on some modification of the application of the waiver provision of Jackson-Vanik had begun that very same spring. I know, because I was party to most of those discussions. This is not for the tape, please -- with Secretary Blumenthal, with Brzezinski, with Senator Jackson.

Vanik's views had been articulated in public. Jackson was prepared to accept a modification of his earlier position in regard to assurances, which did not have to be in writing. He had not yet articulated that in public. That was a tactic, not to do that, but that was passed onto the Administration.

We did not deal with the Soviet authorities. We dealt through the past Administration, and Marshall Shulman was aware of what was happening, as well. So, indeed, in the spring of '79, there were a number of discussions. I was in the city every week, flew down from New York, in order to participate in one meeting or another to discuss this, and to nudge this along.

What happened is, whether it was justified or not, and I think the Soviet Union wanted a SALT agreement much more than they wanted concessions on trade, is that SALT II discussions were shelved by the Senate. Whether it was due to the sudden disclosure of Soviet presence in Cuba -- the detachment which had been there for eight years was suddenly exposed in public, I don't -- that's another department to assess. Maybe Paul will have some comments.

But the result is, in any case, SALT II was shelved at the summit meeting in Vienna, where we had a promise from the Administration that this issue would be raised, and indeed we were told it had been a kind of gentlemen's agreement in

advance of the Vienna meeting, in terms of the acceptance on the waiver provision of Jackson-Vanik, the issue never even came up.

The mood was such, at that summit meeting, that it was -- I guess, and we never got a clear answer from the previous Administration, that it was inappropriate to raise the issue that there was not going to be anything forthcoming from the Russians. Things had already begun to chill, and it's more likely that that is what caused, or led to, the Soviet decision to go ahead and invade Afghanistan anyway, because they weren't getting what they wanted.

So while I appreciate your comments, I think that they are inaccurate from a historical viewpoint. Whether the opportunity ever comes -- well, let's hope so.

DR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you, Jerry.

DR. MORTON: Henry Morton, Queens College. I am really in very strong sympathy with Marshall's remarks. We discussed that last year, and I don't know about the historical inaccuracy. I think there is also a problem of public relations.

In the first place, it has to do -- the whole problem of Soviet Jewish emigration has been handled in the Soviet style of harassing Jews to leave, and we go way back to the 1970's when they introduced the higher education tax, and which then helped to result in the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.

This meant that, for various historical reasons, and as far as Jews are concerned, for particular reasons, you cannot be very friendly to the Soviets in regard to this matter.

But I fully agree with Marshall that, in one way or the other, we fumbled the ball in 1979. There was no recognition given, at least officially or indirectly, as far as I know, that this huge number of Jews were permitted to be let out. And if you add up the numbers of the Jews, the Armenians and the Germans, the 60,000 which was part of the Jackson-agreement, was actually reached as far as the Soviets were concerned. They exceeded the amount, because over 60,000 people were permitted to emigrate.

Now, what John mentions regarding the -- I think this is one part, and if the situation ever occurs again, despite the fact -- and I appreciate Jerry's bringing us up to date about the discussions that were not made public, in an attempt to ease the stressful relationship between the Soviets and us regarding trade agreements, there is also the other factor, that I don't think we should use the word "dropouts." It really goes against my grain.

I would rather be able to -- I think we should use -- if we have to use a word, "choice," or "pro-choice," or something of that form, because I do think that we should not necessarily abide by the Soviet fiction that, because they make Jews apply to Israel -- and doesn't necessarily apply to Jews,

that they make Jews apply to go to Israel, that once they get out of that country, under great stress -- I just recently read the book by Ponich, Exit Visa -- I don't know if you are familiar with that, but the stress that these people go through, which we all know, but it's pictured in the form of four families, but it was really a very moving account; and then the stress of emigration, that we should not be forced to hold them to account, that they have to go to Israel.

And if the Armenian example that John cites is any indication, this -- the Armenian's ancestral homeland is under Soviet rule, as we know. So they are permitted to, apparently for reasons of familial repatriation, permitted to join family which is not in Armenia, but outside, scattered in their own Diaspora.

And I think I would be surprised, if not -- most of us here believe that if Soviet-American relations improved, certainly this is part of the chips on the bargaining table regarding Jewish emigration.

DR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you, Henry.

John?

DR. HARDT: John Hardt, Congressional Research Service. I'd like to question the notion of missed opportunity. I think it does have an appeal, but it requires a great deal of fitting together of pieces, and may be useful in terms of the agenda and discussion, but can be somewhat deceptive.

But I'd like to raise another issue, and ask for more comment from those who are more knowledgeable, and that is the internal issue of response to the question of applications for affidavits, and so forth, that were occurring at the same time period, leading to a possible assessment on the part of the Soviet regime that there was a brain drain, or was an excessive amount of disaffection and emigration, that, for internal reasons, aside from what was happening, or in addition to what was happening abroad, may have led them to restrict emigration for internal reasons.

If that is a valid thesis, then the timing and the activities in our bilateral relations are in a somewhat different context.

DR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you.

Greg?

DR. MASSELL: I wanted to make a -- this is Gregory Massell, Hunter College, City University of New York. I wanted to make a broader remark. I recall last year's meetings, as well as meetings, perhaps, under different sponsorship, but with allied concerns -- that every year, as I note, and as I note today, we have here an extraordinary group of people, very well informed in a variety of disciplines, yet every year we encounter virtually an identical problem from the very beginning.

Every remark that was made now, while legitimate,

necessary, important, is essentially ad hoc. It is ad hoc in the sense that, as Marshall quite rightly pointed out, one may have failed to do something, or one should know now what we may have failed yesterday.

But if I would summarize it, to put it in some kind of a meaningful umbrella, I would say, it would be wise, at least I would suggest, for a man like Bill Korey, perhaps, to -- unless I am unaware of efforts in this respect, and I may indeed be innocent of that -- unless I am unaware, I would suggest that Bill Korey and whoever else would be concerned centrally from B'nai B'rith, might be -- might find it important to begin to create the kind of a -- call it a longitudinal analysis, or call it whatever, an analysis from year to year, so that, if we arrived this morning, that relationship, with the effects on Jewish emigration and the status of the Jewish group in the Soviet Union.

I am well aware how difficult it would be to create, from year to year, a cumulative sense of it. For example, what criteria would be used for Soviet decisions? We know very well, the same decision may be taken in one year or another for different reasons. We know that.

There are other pitfalls. Nonetheless, it is the kind of an effort, I think -- partly scholarly, or if done for its own sake, partly analytical, for the sake of ultimately permitting us to bridge the usual problem -- what is, and what

can and should be done about it? In other words, we always encounter the issue of conflicting intelligence. This should be done, but for the following reasons, it can't be -- either our own bureaucratic problems, or our own internal political issues, or Soviet sensitivities to one or another extent; nonetheless, I would suggest that if B'nai B'rith finds this at all -- this type of approach at all meriting of any kind of attention, that, indeed, I personally would be willing, and I'm sure many of us would be willing, who are even better skilled than I at this, to begin this kind of a synthesis, a synthetic approach, to delimit once and for all a study of both backward and forward -- to what extent, for example, Moscow's move, or Vanik-Jackson Amendment, or any other event, may or may not have had any relation to the facts we wish to explore.

DR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you very much, Gregory. We will be coming back to this topic, I think, all afternoon. I think that this is basic to our whole discussion. Whether we can settle it once and for all, I have my doubts, but we might make some serious contribution.

Jerry, you want to say just a word or two, and then we'll pass onto Bill Korey's paper.

MR. GOODMAN: Perhaps to respond to what might have been either an observation, or two questions, at least -- in regard to your question, Dr. Hardt, I think if we go back, the

probable reason for making the decision to cut back emigration was, in fact, internal, not external. The question is, when do you move? When do you make the judgment to initiate what might be considered to be harsh action?

Probably when you believe that you're going to get a reaction in the West that you can absorb or because you are indifferent to Western reaction. That is, if you think you've lost whatever you wanted to obtain, from increased emigration, you might as well do it and suffer the consequences, because you're not being rewarded, and to that extent, Marshall is correct, but I think the timing is off.

Certainly, there is a reward factor involved. When emigration peaked, or before it did, Jews were leaving from about 70 or 80 communities in the Soviet Union. By the time it had peaked, Jews were leaving from nearly 200 communities -- cities, middle-sized, small. That is a phenomenon that has been unregistered in many places, but if you think about the implications, what Soviet authorities were quick to perceive, or slow to perceive, but certainly perceived at some point, was that there was a virtual flood, that the more people would leave, the more success would be bred, the more people would seek to leave, and you would have an upward spiral.

The reverse is also true. The fewer people leave, the fewer apply, and it becomes self-regulating. And that's what I think began to happen in '79.

Certain restrictions were introduced to stop, to cut back the flood, if you will, for internal considerations. There were many middle-sized communities, 30,000, 40,000 Jews, where people hadn't left, where bureaucrats were still Jews, middle-level management.

They began to apply to leave -- civil servants, teachers, people, while not critical to the economy, certainly if they had left immediately, would be a dislocating factor.

And so I do believe that was the primary reason for wanting to regulate, if not halt, emigration. The rest, then, my comments to Marshall, I believe, still hold, in terms of the timing and why they decided to risk it. If you don't get SALT II, and much less trade concessions, then why not incur the wrath of the outsiders?

Finally, with regard to U. S.-Soviet relations and its impact, if the Administration was correct in early '79, as discussions began, in regard to emigration, and to make some modifications on the restrictive provisions of Jackson-Vanik -- if they were correct in telling us that they agreed with us, that we had most of the people fit into the pieces from the Congress, as well, and that the Russians understood it, and that this matter would be discussed in Vienna, either, for whatever reasons, the Russians changed the rules, or the Administration was not correct, or someone was lying.

Those were at least three of the possibilities that

I could superficially garner from that experience.

But, in any case, whether the pieces were in place or not, whether there was some dishonesty involved, whether the Soviets in fact telegraphed one message in Washington and another one in Moscow, which is also a possibility -- the Embassy says one thing and the Moscow leadership says something else, it all fell apart.

And, finally, the term "dropout" is a descriptive term, so we can easily understand the phenomenon. It suffers from simplicity, but no one else has come up with a two-word phrase that is understood quickly before 1,000 people.

If it offends you, Henry, I suggest you try to develop another phrase, which we will be happy to entertain. Thank you.

DR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you. We might consider whether "right to choice" would be followed with "right to life," and we would get into more difficulties.

I know there is one person who wants to raise a comment, but if you could hold that until after --

MR. SONNENFELDT: Well, I won't be able to be here --

DR. ARMSTRONG: Well, go ahead. Could you identify yourself, please?

MR. SONNENFELDT: I apologize. I'm Sonnenfeldt, Brookings. I apologize, to ask for your indulgence to make a couple of quick comments on this part of the discussion,

because you might want to have a different sort of discussion after the next presentation, and I don't think I will be able to participate this afternoon.

I am very much in sympathy with the notion that we don't understand a lot about these emigration trends, and we ought to be very careful with tying this, in the end, extremely precious Soviet behavior in this matter to particular events and particular policies.

I would urge you, for example, to look at the enormous quantitative jump in Jewish emigration from 1970 to '71, and remind you that there was no talk of either MFN or credit in 1971. I was on the first mission to the Soviet Union at Thanksgiving time to the Soviet Union in 1971, which opened trade discussions, but even in 1972, when the increase was again over 200 percent, it wasn't until after July of that year that we really began to talk with any degree of seriousness on this matter, and it is, of course, the United States and not the Soviet Union that made the connection between trade and emigration.

On that point, I think that was a serious error, for a whole variety of reasons. One of them was that we created a link that we couldn't control, with respect to emigration and the trade issues, and the second thing is that one of the instrumentalities, or set of instrumentalities, that we might have had available for the pursuit of our broad interests with

the Soviet Union, including humanitarian interests, was knocked out of our hands.

I have no idea what would have happened to Afghanistan, or to SALT, or whatever, if we had had those instrumentalities available to us. I think it was a tragic mistake, no doubt well-intentioned, and in many quarters, but it was a tragic mistake, in terms of what the United States -- the limited leverage that the United States has available, anyway, in affecting Soviet behavior, that this particular instrument should have been denied to the American government, and consequently to American policymaking in general.

I have no idea what will lead the Soviets to change that, either with respect to emigration in general or with respect to Jewish emigration in particular, but I would say that it would be a long time before we again see the kinds of numbers that we saw in the early '70's, or in the late '70's, in the succession situation.

I doubt that any particular Soviet leader or leadership claque is going to make emigration one of the issues on which it will try to ride to power against their competitors in the Soviet Union.

I would say in conclusion only that I have pleaded in quiet ways, because I don't believe that excessive public agitation is helpful, for a delinking of American trade policy toward the Soviet Union from this issue, and from a whole set

of other issues, and from getting away from what I believe now is a totally sterile discussion about either MFN, or for that matter access to government credit facilities.

I believe that, in this period of the doldrums in American-Soviet relations, or worse, we, as a government and as a public, should think of a totally different approach to economic relations with the Soviet Union, getting away from the old categories.

What the effect of that will be on emigration practices, I do not know, but all I do know is that, unless we do take a fresh approach on that matter, and I have advanced ideas on this in other places, and I won't detain you with that now -- we're going to be in the same fix, at some other point, in some other Administration, and some other Soviet -- with some other Soviet government.

In short, I believe we need an economic policy toward the Soviet Union that can be wielded flexibly by us, with conditionalities that we choose to impose as a government, at times and places of our own choosing, and I think the rigid linkage that has been established, first by us and then subsequently by the Soviets, is folly, and is contrary to any notion of attempting to conduct foreign policy in some strategic manner.

DR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you very much, Mr. Sonnenfeldt.

DR. KOREY: There is a point of departure between

the observations made by Jerry Goodman, and the discussion that has taken place, and what I want to address myself to -- the classic study on the right to leave was done about 20 years ago by a man named Jose Ingles for the United Nations.

He pointed out that when a community, an ethnic or racial or religious community, is deprived of the right to leave, and they are undergoing repression or discrimination of various kinds, then it takes on -- it is virtually tantamount to life itself. One is not only deprived of liberties, one faces the challenge, perhaps, to life itself.

Ingles talked about the morbidity that sets in, the kind of claustrophobic, psychosomatic characteristic. And, certainly, this is what obtains in the Soviet Union, so far as Jews are concerned.

There are three areas of anti-Semitism to which one might address oneself -- one might focus upon. I want to zero in, or concentrate on one. Let me briefly mention the other two -- a basic, almost wholesale assault upon Jewish culture today in the Soviet Union.

I think it's directed to a kind of uprooting of Jewish consciousness, so that you will not find a further reflection in an emigration phenomenon; and so, all efforts made for Jewish self-study in the Soviet Union, is being attacked. Those who are Hebrew teachers are finding themselves warned that they will face trials, that they will face jail

terms, or terms off in Siberia. Some 80 teachers in Moscow, who teach in oponim, in private oponim, have been warned along these lines. There have been raids.

They have made it quite clear that there isn't to be a teaching of the Jewish past, and it's -- that which is the trauma for Soviet Jews throughout Europe, mainly the Holocaust, this is an event which is to be plunged down the memory hole of history. It's not only that Babi Yar is not to be discussed or commemorated. Jews used to be able to attend ceremonies at Babi Yar, in Kiev, up until this past September.

And Jewish holidays are no longer to be observed. Very recently, there was the Jewish holiday of Purim, and the various plays, the games that are associated with that holiday, were -- it was made clear to Jews that they were not to participate in them.

Even the Holocaust is not to be commemorated, and prayers are not to be said -- this kind of Orwellian plunging down the memory hole of history. That's one form. It's not a classic form.

The classic form is the phenomenon of anti-Semitism in all of the media, the vulgar stereotypes, the updating of the protocols of the Elders of Zion -- it's something I've addressed myself to more specifically, and Greg Massell knows this, in the area of the Army, the extraordinary indoctrination program in the Soviet Armed Forces, which spends a lot of

effort in a wholesale assault upon Jews. Some of it is in the publications that you might have over there.

And it raises questions about the future of Jews in the Soviet Union, the kind of anxiety and fear. There's a kind of reflex action, that maybe this is a potential recrudescence of 1952, '53. I personally do not believe there will be that kind of recrudescence, but nothing can be ruled out of order.

Certainly, there is a fear and anxiety. Soviet Jewish refuseniks use the term of catastrophe, a national catastrophe confronting us, and this is the first time they have been using that kind of term.

I do want to focus attention upon the area of discrimination, because this is the area that powers the emigration drive, in my judgment, more than anything else, and particularly in discrimination in higher education, and I am indebted to Murray Feshbach for leading me along this path -- it's not a primrose path.

Recent statistics on the city of Moscow, just newly published in a Soviet volume, inadvertently throw a glaring light upon the critical aspect of the plight of Soviet Jews, discrimination in higher education.

It is precisely such discrimination that powers the drive to emigrate, because universities are the passports to success, achievement, and social life generally. Significantly, the Soviet Union has avoided publishing data on university

enrollment during the past four years. The Moscow data, just published, show that in the academic year 1980 -- '81, the number of Jewish students in all Moscow higher education institutions is 9,911, of a total enrollment of 631,888. The percentage is 1.5, an exceedingly low amount.

Comparison with Moscow data published a decade ago, covering the academic year 1971, records the dramatic decrease in Jewish enrollment. At that time, the number of Jewish students totaled 19,509, of 617,000 in the student body. The percentage of Jews was 3.16.

Of course, in a decade, the number of Jews in Moscow higher education plunged by more than one-half, both absolutely and relatively. The current Jewish student percentage is far below the percentage of Jews in the Moscow population. 1970 Soviet census data shows 251,523 Jews in the total population of over 7,000,000. The percentage is 3.56. That the university age group among Jews in Moscow would be especially attracted to higher education is suggested by the 1971 data on Moscow's scientific community, which constitutes one-quarter of the entire Soviet scientific group.

Since approximately 11 percent of the Moscow scientific community is Jewish, an extraordinarily large percentage, the likelihood of their offspring aspiring to higher education is particularly strong.

Certainly, the pool of talent available for potential

admission to higher education in Moscow would not have been diminished by emigration. The city, until now, has produced a very small percentage of the total emigration group. Careful research indicates that, between 1968 and 1980, the total number of Moscow Jews who emigrated was but 14,494, which constitutes only 5.8 percent of the emigration population.

According to samizdat information to which Jerry alluded, Jews are kept out of the best higher educational institutions in Moscow through the technique of having specialized selected examiners give them unusually difficult oral examinations in mathematics and physics.

A very recent samizdat document, late 1981, spells out the impact of discriminatory practices on the graduates of five high schools of Moscow which specialize in physics and math. Only two Jews were admitted to Moscow State University's Department of Mechanics and Mathematics. The bulk of Jewish applicants were refused.

In contrast, though, a large majority of non-Jewish applicants of the five high schools were admitted. The situation in the rest of Russia, to judge from earlier data, no doubt parallels the Moscow experience.

The number of Jews enrolled in higher education in the Soviet Union plunged downward, from 111,900 in 1968 -- '69, to 66,000 in 1976 -- '77, the last year of published data.

The incredible 40 percent decline is certain to have

dropped even further since then. The statistics on the post-graduate level offers a similar pattern. The number of Jewish post-graduate students in 1970 was 4,945. In 1975, it fell to 2,841.

For Soviet Jews, the evidence points to an overwhelmingly desperate future. If, until the late '60's, they played a major role in the technological and cultural elite, though not in political, diplomatic or security-related spheres, it was largely a consequence of a fairly open, merit-oriented university admissions policy.

That has come to an end. Discrimination is certain to reduce to a minimum the number of Jews permitted to enter the key scientific and higher technical areas. A major and perceptive 5,000-word document, prepared by 127 top Jewish refuseniks last February, highlighted the trend. This is what they wrote: "Access to the highest echelons of power in science and technology is practically closed to Jews," a situation, they said, reminiscent of the one existing in medieval aristocratic societies.

It is the situation in Moscow that is particularly critical, since many of the older generation of Jewish scientists, technical experts, and artists reside there. It is the dwindling of opportunities for the younger generation that has propelled them to seek exit visas.

An indication of this drive is to be found in the

very high percentage of emigrants who came from Moscow in 1981, 37.4 percent. In previous years, the percentage of emigrants from Moscow, as compared to the total emigration population, was but approximately six.

The profound trauma which has afflicted Soviet Jews flows from the drastic cutback in emigration, over 90 percent since 1979. In January of this year, the figure was less than 300, the lowest in over a decade. What with their educational future doomed, and anti-Semitism continuing, it is hardly surprising that the above-mentioned refusenik document would warn that the Jews are facing the threat of a national catastrophe, from whence there is no escape.

DR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you very much, Bill. I think we're all, over the years, extremely indebted to Bill Korey for keeping up with the immense body of material which appears all over the Soviet Union expressing anti-Semitism, published versions, and of course the reports from people coming out of the Soviet Union.

It seems to me that there are two implications here that I would like to spell out. Number one is, how bad can things get?

Now, this requires us -- I personally tend to place the lowest possibility, in terms of what Stalin planned for 1953, which of course we can't spell out in precise terms, but nevertheless was bad enough, and somebody might want to say

more about that, and second, is the intense anti-Semitism expressed in publications, and of course in lectures and other unpublished material, which are officially sponsored -- sometimes much worse, like the Jewish Masonic conspiracy behind the Carter Cabinet -- and the tremendous impositions imposed on Jews who went to pursue careers requiring any kind of training or learning, are these things wholly bad, in terms of the possibilities of Jews getting out of the Soviet Union?

In other words, if they were continuing to train -- if they were even pursuing a nominal policy of encouraging Jews to accept a place in the Soviet Union, obviously the possibilities of leaving would seem to be even more diminished than they are.

But this is a very debatable and questionable theme, and possibly we do have a few minutes to raise points in that regard.

Yes, Mr. Sonnenfeldt? Do you want to raise that issue?

MR. SONNENFELDT: I'll use my brief time to make a quick couple of additional comments on this very, very sad and painful subject, because it isn't only the discrimination itself that is so pervasive, and the human trickery and capriciousness, and all the things that are associated with it, but it is also the utter loss of morale of those who have remained behind in the Soviet Union, incidentally, not just Jews, but

others, whose friends have left, and whose feeling of loneliness, in terms of the kindred spirits with whom they did have an opportunity to spend some time, and to have some confidence, one really is struck. And in Moscow, at least, where I have a little experience with this utter sense of desolation on the part of people who have stayed behind.

There is, I regret to say, a kind of a self-feeding, self-reinforcing facet to this, and that is something that Soviet apparatchiks themselves frequently point out.

In the peculiar logic of that system, if someone is a candidate for emigration, sooner or later the regime, the system, isn't going to put itself out to provide them with the, quote, "benefits" of the system, and consequently people who might conceivably have been admitted to institutions of higher learning aren't being admitted there, because it's assumed sooner or later they're going to leave, and would have been educated for no purpose to the Soviet state.

Secondly, undoubtedly, it's true that even without the urgings of the KGB and of the Party apparat, factory managers concerned with meeting plans are going to be reluctant to hire people who they think, once they've been trained, are going to leave; and consequently, the opportunity for jobs declines.

And, consequently, people who would otherwise have applied for emigration don't even do it, because they are

afraid that it will ruin their possibilities of getting jobs or of getting educational opportunities.

People also don't have children, because they don't know about their future. So these things reinforce each other, sometimes through quite practical ways that have their own rationale within the Soviet logic, which is not to say that the other manifestations of anti-Semitism don't also reinforce it, but within the logic of that system -- so that one has the horrible paradox that the larger the emigration, the more devilish the discrimination, and the tougher the life for those who remain behind.

We noticed this in 1972 and '73 and '74, and then again in '79 and '80. And I don't know what the answer to that dilemma is, given the nature of the Soviet system.

I wish I knew what the answer is. Obviously, one answer is to try and get as many people out as possible, but I don't know what the answer to that is, either. It was gratifying to be able to slip lists of 600, or 300, or 500 people to Brezhnev and Gromyko, and find, in some devious fashion, that two years later, actually most of the people on the lists were out.

But what made them do it, by what system of decision, I don't know. But I did -- the main point I really wanted to make is the self-generating form of discrimination that stems from emigration itself, the prospect of emigration, and the

Soviet attitude toward those who wish to emigrate. And I wish I knew how to get around that miserable dilemma.

DR. ARMSTRONG: Well, there isn't going to be any way to get around it, is there? This is why it is a dilemma, because, as I understand it, as I believe it's happened, you have a desire for emigration. The desire for emigration turns many people -- if you say, even at the managerial level, not only against individuals that they think might emigrate, but the whole group of Jews that might be prospective employees, and that, in turn, furthers an additional desire to emigrate, and one comes back, therefore, to the question of whether emigration on a mass scale is going to be possible, and therefore be the best solution, or whether there isn't going to be such emigration, in which case the circumstances of many hundreds of thousands of Jews in the Soviet Union has actually been worsened. And I think your point has been taken very well.

Bill, do you want to say a word?

DR. KOREY: Helmut's comments are quite appropriate, and I remember, this was something that Arbatov articulated, as a matter of fact, in his peculiar fashion, back in something like '77, '78.

But we must remember this -- that long before there was any emigration of any significance or consequence, whether during the period of '52, '53, when there was not, there was a very profound degree of anti-Semitism, which not only raged

throughout the Soviet Union, but Solzhenitsyn tells us would lay the groundwork for rounding up the Jews and sending them off to Kazakhstan, emptying out Moscow and Leningrad. And all the knowledge we now have about that period indicates extensive excommunication of Jews from all kinds of fields.

And then, much later, that is, the period of 1967 and 1968, particularly '68, and both Sakharov, in his document in June of '68, the memorandum, and Medvedyev, in a much longer document in 1970, both of them outlined, long before Jews were applying to emigrate, how discrimination had become very widespread, and you will recall what Roy Medvedyev said. He said, "You're going to make" -- he said to the authorities in the Soviet Union -- this was in May of 1970, his document, this was a year before emigration began -- "You're going to make the Jews Zionists. You're going to force them to want to leave by this kind of discrimination. If you want to bring about the assimilation of the Jews, you will eliminate all the degrees of discriminatory practices."

So if one were to say, what came first, the chicken or the egg, here, at least historically, we're aware of the fact that it's the discriminatory process, although, once in motion, given the stereotypes that obtain amongst Soviet leadership, you get this vicious cycle that you articulated so well.

DR. ARMSTRONG: It's curious about -- like the vicious

cycle between the anti-Israeli attitude of the Soviet Union and the Soviet alliance with the Arabs. We know the anti-Israeli attitude began well before the alliance with the Arabs, but then, once it began, it became a tremendous additional factor in the opposition of the Soviet Union to Israel.

Are there other questions? Yes?

PARTICIPANT: I wonder (inaudible) what you called the dilemma (inaudible) of having to view the two possibly irremovable and ineradicable problems (inaudible) emigration as a possible alleviating factor (inaudible) what forces within the Soviet system might alleviate that, we've probably had very little input from that (inaudible) this is a matter which I (inaudible) I just want to remind us that this is not the only society where anti-Semitism has caused, on various occasions, an intensification that has barred other solutions, and whether this is (inaudible) the kind of anti-Semitism that is not only virulent, but that forecloses alleviating solutions to relieve it.

Then, the situation, it seems to me, is unfortunately fruitless, at least intellectually. (Inaudible) but I am reminded of the fact of my own life experience as an Austrian Jew. It's very difficult, although not comparable, to what I would say the Soviet Jews face today, that is, the unwillingness of some Soviet Jews whom I have encountered in leaving, because they felt their state was high enough in society, and

being exiled (inaudible) has slowly been replaced by the fact that there is no alternative to their future, except to leave.

And I'm not sure that this is a problem that is (inaudible). The question that faces us is, what might be done to alleviate the condition of those who want to leave? And here, of course, I am aware of the various proposals that have been made, and opportunities that might exist, or that might get found to alleviate this.

But what strikes me is that the link is (inaudible), too. The total hopelessness of the system to reform itself is a factor that may not have been faced squarely by (inaudible).

For a Jew in Central Europe, by the year 1936, I would argue, there was no choice. That doesn't mean that all Jews recognized that fact. The question is what -- the perception of this is, of course, a purely speculative question I raise -- how have the Soviet Jews seen their future collectively?

Now, the (inaudible) falls. We certainly have only contacted a limited number of Jews, but there is an alarming parallel, in my view, between the situation of Soviet Jewry today and the situation of Central European Jewry in the '30's.

I'm not suggesting that the parallel need end in the horror of the Holocaust. I don't want to push the parallel too far. But institutionally, ideologically, and in many other ways, I see very few differences between the anti-Semitism in

the Soviet Union today, and the kind of anti-Semitism which I am, unhappily, only too familiar, in my own life.

And I wonder -- I just wanted to raise that question, that this is being faced squarely by us as a possibility, that there is no relief in sight as far as the Soviet system is concerned, in spite of some possible flickers, occasionally, on the screen.

And it seems to me that is the most horrifying aspect of the situation.

DR. ARMSTRONG: Dick, you wanted to talk about that?

AMBASSADOR DAVIES: Yes. Davies, retired Foreign Service officer. I think one way out of the situation, which we haven't -- nobody has talked about yet, is the obvious one of de-Judaization. That is, young people, particularly those with mixed parentage, or who can succeed in bribing the necessary officials to have their passports altered -- they obtain a passport which registers them as belonging to another nationality.

Now, this, of course -- presumably, there are only a small number who can do this, in any case, but we kept running into people in the Soviet Union who had a Jewish parent, but who chose, as they could at that time, at any rate, to register themselves under the name of the -- under the nationality of the other parent.

And I wonder whether either Jerry or Bill has -- I

don't expect you would have statistics. You would have, rather, impressions of how widespread this is, whether it is growing, as I suspect it clearly must be, so that, when you get a statistic like the one that Murray has come up with from the university students, you have to reckon with the possibility, at any rate, that the drop in those who have registered themselves as Jewish, or whose passports say Jewish, may not represent the true facts, that there is still some percentage of the difference who would have been registered as Jewish ten years ago, but are not now.

DR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you. I think you all know Ambassador Davies, who has a great deal more experience with this than his brief introduction suggested to us.

I do believe maybe Jerry has a few statistics on this point. But I recall talking to a Soviet Armenian visitor, who was rather more flexible than most, and asking him why the Soviet Union did not permit the category, Soviet nationality, the way the Yugoslavs permit the Yugoslav category.

And he said, well, the Ukrainians wouldn't like it, and besides, everybody would believe the Soviet category was just a pseudonym for Jews, anyway.

(Laughter.)

MR. GOODMAN: A brief comment. There had been, and probably continues to be, a countermove among Soviet Jews to assimilate. But to do that within Soviet law, of course, means

that you function under certain restrictions. In the last census, for example, when for the first time you did not have to declare your nationality when you responded to the census-takers, we seemed to have lost, according to those demographers, about a quarter of a million Jews.

The interpretation -- again, we don't have an office there, we don't have the data, is that many of these people, allowing for emigration and everything else, are people who chose not to identify themselves as Jews in the census. And, when given the opportunity, children aged 16 had been opting for, generally, Russian nationality. I mean, Jews -- especially those of mixed marriages, where the possibilities exist.

The problem, though, is that in the last few years there were reports, and, as people come out, indicate that, even for those Jews who wanted to pass as non-Jews, pass as Russians, chose to assimilate, that they encountered, in some job opportunities and in school, where people were being questioned about their patronym and their grandfather's name, to see if there is some discernible Jewish trend among the applicants, and there was some fear that, through that way, they would be identified as Jews, even if they didn't want to be identified as Jews, and therefore would be forced into the same discriminatory practices as were being applied to others who were identified as Jews, and therefore it was a no-win situation.

The classic, when the whole movement began, was the Soviet propaganda machinery in 1970 -- you'll recall that period, when Jews were non-Jews. Jakovsky and others were being brought out of retirement from their Jewish heritage, if you will, to denounce Israel and Zionism in large-scale press conferences and the like, and that's only ten or eleven years ago.

So Jews have that memory, that even those who reached some pinnacle of Soviet society, and wanted to pass, when the State deemed it useful, could not pass. And that message was conveyed very clearly through the trickle-down theory that applies in the Soviet Union.

PARTICIPANT: Jerry, can I ask you a question?

MR. GOODMAN: Yes.

PARTICIPANT: My own experience in Moscow is somewhat the opposite -- the fact that, during periods of high emigration, anybody who would hope to leave would, of course, not have chosen a father and a mother that wasn't Jewish to claim as the --

MR. GOODMAN: Right.

PARTICIPANT: Now, I don't know -- my impression is that, in a census, they just ask, they don't check passports. (Inaudible) to say to a census-taker that you're Jewish, which is quite different from what is put on a passport. I don't know -- I say this as just an impression from people I

have talked to, in terms of how they register themselves on a passport. But if you hope for a chance to get out, you would pick the Jewish parent.

PARTICIPANT: You're right, and I don't know the statistics now, but a certain percentage of people who got out under Israeli affidavits as Jews, who were recognized at one point as being 9, 10, 11 percent, who were, in fact, not Jewish. Some, the State encouraged to seek to fly that way. Others had sought -- in fact, when they had a grandfather or father who was Jewish, or someone, if they hadn't been registered as a Jew, their identity card -- if it didn't say Israeli, were attempting to tell the authorities that they really were Jews -- they had not put it in, for whatever their reasons were in the past, but they really were Jews, in order to be able to emigrate.

And that's true, but that was especially prevalent, I think, when things were good. And my guess is that in the last couple of years, although I don't have the data on this, that this is not the case. As emigration declined, it wasn't worth being identified as a Jew. You couldn't get out.

PARTICIPANT: There were also quite a few marriages for this purpose.

PARTICIPANT: Yes. I had two propositions before I left.

(Laughter.)

PARTICIPANT: Only two?

(Laughter.)

MR. COMBS: I'm Dick Combs from the Office of Soviet Union Affairs in State. I'd like to suggest that the situation might not be quite as gloomy as Bill Korey suggested. It's bad, and it may get worse, God knows, but I think there is good evidence that the Soviet leadership is not of one mind about the Jewish question.

And I followed Mel Levitsky in Moscow, and was able to watch this at close hand for a while. I think if you follow, for example, an artist whom I consider to be very anti-Semitic, Ilya Klozonov, for example, he has patrons on high, and he has enemies on high, I believe, in the leadership, the central leadership.

There are others -- the writer Kikul. I don't know if you read his very anti-Semitic version of Rasputin. And, on the other side of the equation, there are the modern --

(Tape change.)

MR. COMBS: -- was a patron of the anti-Semitic painter, Klozonov.

Well, we're coming into a succession period, and it's very hard to know how Russian nationalism and anti-Semitism may figure into the pulling and hulling, but I think it will figure in. And so here is another dimension and another nuance which I think could be very important. It's something that

should be watched very carefully, and I assume you are.

DR. ARMSTRONG: Bill, did you want to say something?

PARTICIPANT: Just a couple of comments. First, my good friend Dick -- back in the '60's, when we were first getting started, and we were terribly concerned about the plight of Soviet Jews, Dick was always somebody I could call in the State Department and he was always way out front running on behalf of our mutual concern.

In answer to the question that you raised, what we have are some selected statistics on the progeny of intermarriage. There is, as you know, a very high rate of intermarriage in Moscow and Kiev and the major cities of the central provinces -- a much lower degree of intermarriage in the Baltic Principalities, or Georgia, for example.

DR. ARMSTRONG: You mean relatively, not absolutely?

PARTICIPANT: Well, relatively high. Say, in Moscow, something like one-quarter of all Jewish marriages are intermarriages, and in Kiev, one-third of all marriages involving Jews are intermarriages.

Well, in any case, we know, on the basis of the polling samples that the Soviets have done, that a very high rate of identification on the propusk in an intermarriage situation, the offspring will be more than likely identified as a Russian.

But the point is that you can't really escape. Jerry

touched upon it. Medvedyev goes into some great elaboration on this point, and shows that in most institutions, public institutions, particularly if they have any security kind of clearance, they not only want your propusk and your natsional'niy identification, but they want your parents.

You have what is operable in the Soviet Union, and in this sense, Eric is correct -- what you have in the Soviet Union is a Nuremberg factor, a kind of blood factor that operates, so that your parents, then, play a role.

I think Dick Combs is correct in saying that there are ups and downs, and that there -- I am not yet ready to anticipate a massive pogrom. I'm not yet ready to do that, or anything that resembles Nazi Germany. But I'm not going to exclude that, either, possibly.

I'm not going to include it, for the moment, simply because of these ups and downs to which he refers. I've done a little bit of study. I don't know if my Midstream piece -- my Moment piece is out there, but I did a little bit of study of the impact that I think Madrid had on Soviet leadership, on Mr. Brezhnev himself.

Mr. Brezhnev, at the last Party Congress, the 26th Party Congress, on February 23, made a speech -- it was a lengthy speech, it was some five hours, in the course of which, for the first time since 1965 of any Soviet leader, and for the first time since any Communist Party Congress in the course

of a policy address by a State leader, by a Party leader, condemned anti-Semitism. This was an extraordinary, in my judgment, development.

And I think he may have been affected by what was being discussed, and the outrage that was being felt particularly in Western Europe. It was the Belgian representative at the Madrid discussion, and Max Kampelman is here, and he could, I think, vouch for this -- by the way, Ambassador Kampelman made a very detailed, elaborate statement not too long ago at the Madrid discussions on anti-Semitism, and I do believe that the result of the Brezhnev speech was a kind of restraining, and that (Hebrew) are -- you do not see as often the (Hebrew) appearing. You do not see as often the FCAF's appearing, but you see enough of it appearing to take on what Eric had noted.

I would urge you to listen this afternoon when he comes -- he's coming special for this, Seweryn Bialer, because he's concerned about the Soviet future, as you know from the studies.

He was there, and spent some time in November -- I think it was November or December, in not only meeting with the Institute people, the Arbatov Institute people, but in meeting with some people in the Apparat, the apparatus of the Central Committee, in looking into this question, so I think he may have some illuminating remarks precisely on this issue.

DR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you, Bill. I think we had better break for lunch very quickly, but Jim, you had a couple of --

MR. CRITCHLOW: I'm Jim Critchlow from the Board for International Broadcasting. I'm glad that Dick Combs related this problem more closely to the evolution of Soviet domestic politics, because it does appear, to me at least, that it's fruitful to investigate that further, that while we talk about MFN and credits and so forth, it may indeed be closely related to this -- we shouldn't disregard the domestic factor.

Surely, the Soviet Union is going through a very difficult period, now, internally, which affects not only Jews, but also, in one degree or another, other groups of the population, especially those that don't happen to fit into the Soviet-Russian norm, societal norm.

You've had bad harvests, a succession of them in a row. You have an aging leadership, I think, quite concerned about how to maintain discipline, and in other areas -- I wouldn't deny that the indication of anti-Semitism is particularly pernicious, but in other areas in which they've cracked down, for example, on the Islamic clergy, intensification of pressures for assimilation, such as the sponsorship of Russian as a second language, increasingly, and, of course, the continuing resurgence of xenophobia and the extreme forms of Russian nationalism, all of which, I think, is part of this

general picture.

A gloomy sort of guarded note of hope -- this leadership can't continue forever. There has to be a succession. We would hope that the past patterns would repeat themselves, in that the new leadership, perhaps jockeying for popularity and for power, will begin to offer concessions to some of the groups now who are suffering particularly from the present form of retrogression.

DR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you, Jim. Are there any other questions?

DR. SOSIN: Gene Sosin from Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. I wanted to make a footnote to what Eric said in his attempt to draw an analogy between the anti-Semitism in Nazi Germany and in the Soviet Union today, without letting the Soviets off the hook.

I'd like to say that Hitler didn't have television as a powerful weapon of his anti-Semitic campaign, and the Soviets do, and we know, from what Bill and others have analyzed, that to a certain extent, the Soviet media has included television as an important instrument, particularly in that notorious film, which is known as Traders of Souls in English, which was shown on prime time.

However, in my conversations with Soviet Jewish emigres, one in particular now who is up at Columbia now, who was studying with Brzezhinsky and a specialist on Soviet media,

he pointed out to me that there seems to be an element of self-restraint on the part of the Soviet leadership in using or exploiting this new-to-them medium of television, because, as he says, things might get out of hand. There is that kind of atavistic fear, or stikhiynost -- the elemental masses, perhaps, going too far, maybe to the point of stirring them up to pogroms.

Whether the succession crisis will bring to the fore those who might exploit television, for all of its possibilities, fraught with that kind of danger, we don't know. But at least at the present time, we should take that into consideration as a kind of differentiation between what might have happened if Hitler had had television.

DR. ARMSTRONG: He had radio, though, and the Soviets didn't use the radio much, because of precisely this fear (inaudible) documents appear that it would get out of control, in contrast to the galley proofs before the newspaper goes to press, you know.

Still, it's a very alarming prospect. I noticed, at the World Political Science Congress in Moscow in 1979, they were using TV with a certain degree of subtlety, but very clearly, you know. They clip out the points that were made, favorable to the Soviet Union, and bury everything else, and this can't be done -- it could be done by somebody who is willing to take greater chances.

Well, if there are no other urgent questions, I think we can take our break for lunch. We're proceeding on schedule, and that is very gratifying.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the conference was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p. m. this same day.)

A F T E R N O O N S E S S I O N

1:00 p. m.

DR. ARMSTRONG: I think you all know the role that Ambassador Max Kampelman has played in the last few years, since Helsinki was moved to Madrid. It seems that way, doesn't it? And we are very grateful to him for coming, because he is what represents the ongoing effort to bring our questions before the Russians, as well as before world opinion.

I don't think I need to say much about his distinguished record. I've known him, by reputation and second-hand, for many years, as the Treasurer of the Political Science Association, and one of those few people, I think, who made it possible for the American Political Science Association -- which many of you don't know anything about, perhaps, but it's rather important to keep going, and indeed increasing in its activities and its influence in Washington, and it's due to his ability as an old Washington hand that he was able to do that, and I'm sure, in many ways, in many, many intangible ways, this is what makes him so valuable in the Madrid negotiations.

Ambassador Kampelman?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: Thank you very much.

I was thinking, walking over here this morning, that I have done a great deal of talking about Madrid in the last 18 months since I undertook this assignment -- actually, prior

to that as well, because there was a great deal of interest in the country about Madrid, interest among nationality groups, ethnic groups.

I find, in the last months, that the interest has broadened and expanded far beyond that more limited area, and professional groups and others also, now, seem aware of the fact that Madrid and the Helsinki process is playing an increasingly large role in U. S.-Soviet relationships and in East-West relationships.

But I would rather, today, as I thought of this audience, not necessarily talk and make a speech to you. I know that it would be useful if I began with an introduction, and I will begin with an introduction, but I would much rather, if I could get the benefit of the experience and the expertise and the scholarship that is in this room, because we are, in the whole area of East-West relationships, increasingly aware, all of us, that we're running into an impasse of sorts, and the logical question remains, for me and for others, what do we do about it, and how do we proceed?

We could, perhaps, use the focus of Madrid, but I would hope even go beyond the limitations of Madrid.

Let me start by saying that, when I undertook this assignment, experts in the field, in response to my inquiries, indicated they thought the meeting would last four or five months. The preparatory meeting began in September of 1980,

and again I was told that might last for two or three weeks. It lasted, I think, for nine weeks.

And when the main meeting was to begin, November 11, I was told we probably would end it by early March or by late March of 1981. Well, we're in March of 1982. We have still not ended it. We're still going on, and of necessity this means that the Helsinki process has undergone a very significant change, just by definition there has been a change, and it reflects the state of East-West relations.

The reason why the preparatory meeting lasted for nine weeks instead of two or three weeks relates to the subject matter of what's under discussion today. The reason why the main meeting has lasted as long as it has relates to the same kind of problem.

The preparatory meeting, whose purpose it was to set up an agenda and modalities for the main meeting, found itself hung up on one fundamental issue. No matter what form that issue might take, with this sentence, or that paragraph, or the other page, it was one fundamental question, and that is, if the West felt that we were going to have this second review meeting, the first being Belgrade, of the Helsinki Final Act, we wanted to start that meeting with, in a sense, a review of how the Act had been lived up to, before moving into a discussion of new problems, new agreements, new undertakings.

This was the position we took. The Soviets understood

full well that the impact of that would be to put them on the defensive, because, in any examination of how have you lived up to the 1975 Act, all 35 states -- they understood full well that they would have that serious problem.

And so, on that simple issue, we were hung up -- everybody knowing what the issue was about, no matter what form the argument might take.

We asked for adequate time to review implementation. The Soviets did not want to give us any time, and in time, were prepared to give us some time, but in our view it would not be adequate time.

Now, how it ended up was simple. We got what we wanted. What we got was a minimum of five weeks -- really, six weeks, but the sixth week, there was an understanding, other issues could also come in. And it proved to be as much time as we needed for that phase of the meeting.

Now, how did we get what we want? How were the concessions made? There were obviously concessions -- at the last moment. Really, the main meeting began on November 11, as it was scheduled, and we had not yet finished the preparatory meeting for the main meeting, but that, of course, produced the intense pressure.

The neutral foreign ministers arrived in Madrid, came up with an answer, which was our answer, in its effect, and they accepted it, accepted it with stopped clocks and television

cameras and all the rest.

Now, what this did, as far as the West was concerned, is it gave it a little heart. It said, if we stick to it, if we're stubborn, if we hold tight, we'll get what we want. This of course is the lesson that we, of the United States, were trying to press upon our allies, and the fact that it resulted that way stood us in very good stead for the remainder of the meeting.

Also, the behavior of the Soviets during that nine weeks tended to solidify the West. So, today, in the literature and the speeches that are made about Madrid, whether by us or by our allies, the point is strongly made that one of the important results of Madrid is the unity of NATO, the unity of the West, in Madrid -- regrettably, not necessarily that common in our other relationships with our allies. But certainly in Madrid, that has been the case, and to a large extent, the Soviets contributed to that result by virtue of their behavior during those first nine weeks, and by virtue of their continued behavior in the ensuing period.

Now, during those first six weeks, the West did manage -- and I say the West, and I want to include in that the neutral states and most of the non-aligned states, did manage to present the record fully on Soviet violations of the Helsinki Final Act.

Bill mentioned earlier that, on the issue of Soviet

anti-Semitism, it was the Belgian representative that took the lead, and this is true, in a rather dramatic form, in a sense unexpectedly, but it was the Belgian that spoke up and accused the Soviet Union of engaging in anti-Semitic activities during this period.

The Soviet delegate, obviously surprised that this initiative would come from the Belgians, in some anger, questioned whether the Belgian delegate was speaking for his government or not, because it obviously didn't seem to him that he would be speaking for his government on this issue.

And the diplomat responded by saying that he was a professional diplomat, as they all are except for me, and he said he was speaking for his government, because he doesn't make a habit of speaking without speaking for his government. And he made that very clear in his response. And it's indicative, really, of what has been the attitude of the West during this whole period.

In agreeing to spend the first six weeks in the review of implementation, the West also set down certain markers in connection with the agenda. We went for a Christmas break. We returned, I think it was the end of February of 1980. At that time, we were supposed to then begin discussing new proposals, because the theory behind the Madrid meeting was that you get your review of implementation, then you review new proposals submitted by the 35 countries -- there were more

than 80 such new proposals submitted -- you sit down in your various committee meetings, known as baskets, you negotiate something, and you come up with a document. And the thought was, the Department indicated to me earlier, the general, prevailing view was we might get finished by March, the end of March.

Well, we were returning at the beginning of February -- the end of January. January 27 is the date that now comes to my mind. We returned at the end of January to proceed with the new business, the new proposals, but we set out a marker when the agenda was agreed upon, that we would indeed use the first six weeks of the main meeting to deal with review, but we reserved the right to bring up other issues dealing with review as there were new developments taking place, because, obviously, we could not be expected to be discussing new developments before they occurred, and it would only be after they occurred that we could have the opportunity to discuss them.

And so we maintained that marker, that we would continue along those lines when new developments occurred, and we had one other marker that we obviously have been using, because we have been spending so much time in review of implementation after that five-week period.

The other marker we had was that the theory behind the Helsinki Final Act was that it was a balanced document, and that we were dealing with military issues, as you well

know -- very important security issues, at least important to the overwhelming number of the 35 states there, and certainly to the Soviet Union.

We were dealing with trade issues. We were also dealing with human rights issues and family reunification issues, and this balance of issues would have to be maintained. And we could not find ourselves in the position of concentrating, let's say, on the security issue, which the Soviets would have liked us to do.

But if, indeed, the time went beyond March, that balance would be upset, so we would maintain a balance as the meeting continued, if it continued. We didn't really anticipate -- I'll speak for myself. I did not anticipate the meeting would last as long as it did.

So, Madrid has been a forum in which the formal agreements have been few. I would drop a footnote to say, the informal agreements have been more than few.

By that I mean that tentative agreements on the substance of what our final concluding document would be, tentative agreements have taken place, slowly, laboriously, but I would guess that, let's say, by the end of last Christmas, which was the last time that we sat down to do any negotiating, which would have been just up until the point of Poland -- by then, I would say, maybe 80, 90 percent of what would be in a concluding document had been agreed upon, informally and

tentatively.

On the other hand, the remaining 10 or 20 percent was the guts of the problem, and important -- and we were not at the verge of an agreement with respect to those remaining points.

So that Madrid has been characterized by many informal understandings, very few formal agreements, but by what the Soviets call confrontation, and that has indeed been the case, particularly dramatized by Poland.

We have spoken out, as Bill Korey suggested to you, in detail on Soviet anti-Semitism. We have spoken out in detail on their use of psychiatric hospitals for political punishment purposes.

We have spoken out on every single major issue dealing with the violations of the Helsinki Final Act. We have spoken out on military questions, on their growing militarization, on what we consider to be their violations, albeit they were technical violations, of the security provisions of the 1975 Act.

We have spoken out on chemical warfare use. There has not been, in my view, a single issue on which we, West, have not spoken out, decisively and in a sense uniformly.

Now, 18 months -- emigration goes down, not up. Eighteen months of confrontation, discussion, fighting, candor, frank talk, public and private. Let me say to you that I have

probably spent 150, 160, maybe 170 hours of private negotiations with the Soviet delegation during this 18-month period.

They're still in Afghanistan. They moved into Poland. No relief in jamming has been in fact directed now on the Polish situation by the Czechs and the East Germans and the Soviets -- emigration down, repression increased, East-West tensions obviously very, very high today, and it seems to me it would be fruitful if we could have a little bit of discussion here on, what does this mean?

Does this mean that one should use honey instead of vinegar in trying to deal with that society? Does it mean we have to do more of the same? Bill indicated that he thought what was happening in Madrid had had an influence on Brezhnev's speech, that portion of it dealing with anti-Semitism, which was a significant portion.

I might say to you that I made my talk on anti-Semitism after Brezhnev made his speech to the 26th Party Congress, and I referred to his speech to the 26th Party Congress, and indicated how the practice is not consistent with the speech.

But these are the kinds of questions that I think it would be extremely useful to discuss. We're going back on November 9. Our country has made it clear we're going back. There are some forces in this country that think we ought not to be going back. We can discuss that, but we are going back.

We have not done any negotiating since Poland. Assuming for the moment the situation has not improved in Poland by November 9, do we continue not negotiating, or do we begin negotiating, or do we do something else?

These are all fundamental questions that the West is going to have to decide. It would be very useful if we could get some input and some contributions from people whose field it is to know something about how one motivates the Soviet Union, if there are any theories about how one motivates the Soviet Union that people now feel comfortable with.

So why don't I, Mr. Chairman, with your permission, throw it open for discussion? Is that all right?

DR. ARMSTRONG: Yes, please.

PARTICIPANT: Ambassador Kampelman, I read the speech you referred to. You have a marvelous, hard-hitting, heart-warming speech. It is available, you know, over there.

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: I was not aware of it. All right. Thank you.

PARTICIPANT: Yes. May I tell you, I do not wish to begin on a negative note, and I don't wish to disappoint you in advance. It affects -- your conclusion here at this meeting was that you wouldn't at all mind being briefed.

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: That's right.

PARTICIPANT: May I tell you --

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: Or provoked.

(Laughter.)

PARTICIPANT: -- something of which, no doubt, as a political scientist, you have been aware for some time? That the profession, including Sovietologists, I would count among the most underbriefed groups in the United States, dealing with international affairs, and I am sure I don't need to elaborate on that.

And this is what I would like to -- instead of answering as a certain ethnic group, a question with a question, may I say this? You have had, now, an opportunity which I would say is unequaled in the American Foreign Service, in dealing with any country, particularly the Soviet Union -- an opportunity of being in close quarters, and speaking, as you say, with candor, both privately and in public -- that's one.

Second, the issues you have been dealing with have never been raised in public systematically, as you have had a chance to raise them. And I wouldn't be surprised that the more sophisticated framers, our framers, of the Helsinki Agreement had precisely this in mind, to arrange opportunities precisely for articulating and pressing these to the fore.

May I, therefore, as a first question, ask you this? In those close quarters, more than a year of back and forth, perhaps personal as well as official, and again barring whatever issues confidentiality might militate against at this point, would you feel prepared to give us the first set of

insights, perhaps synthetically, in general terms, if possible, which would give us a sense, since this was the first exposure of the Soviets to this kind of a concentrated and successful move, could you give us a sense of their reactions or the spectrum of reactions, obviously, in private, to give us a sense -- what is, what optimal points might make sense, what optimal operational departures might make sense, and under what circumstances?

Before you came, I raised the question which you have just now raised -- what do we know, until now, cumulatively, about Soviet motivations in general, and in particular issues? Therefore, yours is the most fascinating and important case study one can make.

Could you begin?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: Oh, yes, I'll be glad to. And I suppose running through my mind as you asked the question is the difficulty of generalizing a response. But I could be specific with illustrations which might provide some insights, because I too am still absorbing all of this experience in myself, and waiting to see what comes out of this absorption process.

I recall one extremely bitter public debate between Mr. Ilyachev and myself -- "public," I mean in the plenary. There have not been that many intensive exchanges between us for a long period of time. It was as if we were going this

And I remember saying to them, we'll see. He has invited me to lunch, I'm due there in a half hour, if I find the door locked, I'll know he is angry.

(Laughter.)

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: And I went, and we had lunch, and it happened to be a -- with Ilyachev, in relative terms, a productive lunch. He's a very difficult man to have anything productive with.

But this turned out to be a relatively productive, long -- they're always long, but this one was productive, and not a word mentioned. He did not say a word about anything I had said, and we were off, as if we had not had this exchange.

And, at the end, as he walked me to the door -- he's a little smaller than I am, but he put his arm around me, and he said, What I like about you -- he says, is that we could have -- he speaks in Russian, of course, and it has to be translated. He said, We could have -- he was looking for a word, and the interpreter didn't quite have the word, and he finally ended with the word, "pleasantries." "We could have pleasantries at our meetings, but have good, businesslike negotiations afterwards."

Well, that's one kind of indication. On the other hand, I must say to you that he became increasingly angry and hurt, to his disadvantages, because it hurt him within the body -- his responses were awful, and it hurt him within the

body. It hurt him with his own Eastern Europeans. It hurt him, I know, with some members of his own delegation. This is a 75-year-old man, let me say, who is a member of the Central Committee, who is a former editor in chief of Pravda and a former editor in chief of Izvestiya, and he has told me that he is the only person who has held both jobs -- I didn't know that was so until he told me so, and has survived Stalin and Khrushchev, and each time has come back, and he is now, also, a Deputy Foreign Minister.

So, you know, he has some -- but he's a 75-year-old man, with a rigid set of ideas, and simply did not like the kind of factual criticism. If you'll refer to that talk, you will see it's fact, fact, fact.

I tried to use a little rhetoric surrounding the fact, but it's facts that are there. And he has gotten increasingly irritated and angry about this, and let's -- this last Polish phase, which began February 9 and ended March 12, I mentioned to you we had about 100 and God knows how many hours of private -- my secretary told me some time ago she had counted 150, and there have been a number since she counted that, so let's say it's 160, 170.

We did not have any such private exchanges, except over a cup of coffee, during this five-week period. It was perhaps my turn to invite him next, although there was a little ambiguity there, but I chose not to, for a number of reasons,

one of which is I did not want to get into a discussion with him on whether or not we should recess. But I did want to talk to him before the meeting broke up, because I am constantly trying to get some messages to him as to what -- which I know get to Moscow, because, indeed, we give him the text of what I say, so it would be easier for him to cable, you see, to Moscow.

So once the idea of a recess was agreed upon, so I knew we wouldn't be talking about that, I did invite him for lunch on the last day, which was Friday, March 12. And he accepted it, and that morning we told him where it would be, and I gave a wind-up talk, which was, if I must say so, I think, quite effective -- putting it together, and telling him what our country thinks, which is, after all, what they must know.

The important thing are the messages, the communication, so they can be known. As soon as I sat down, I got a message that, regrettably, they could not have lunch -- they canceled it, obviously reflecting this anger.

Now, I can tell you -- I know that this was not necessarily a view shared by everybody in this delegation. You see, that is, there are some who would have liked to have lunch, and would have liked the reaction not to quite be as intense as it has been.

You see the difficulty? It depends on -- with one of them, for example, who's -- I don't want to mention names, but a very high official in their delegation. We had a long

talk once, and I was dealing with the dilemma we were talking about earlier today on -- that Helmut Sonnenfeldt was -- and I was dealing with that dilemma, and some other related questions, pointing out to them, for example, as I do on many occasions, that if -- I didn't know how many people were involved, but if they got rid of 5,000 people, in jails, and sent them out of the country, and that, I thought, was a high number, it would make our job extremely difficult in persuading the world what an awful society they had.

And, you know, I've said that to them over and over again. But, in connection with this dilemma, I discussed how, if I were a Soviet official trying to achieve some stability in my society, dealing with this question of anti-Semitism, how I would do it.

And I told him how. We had discussed this many times. In any event, he made some comment about, well, you know, you have many friends in our society. You never know when they're telling you anything, you know -- but you have many friends, and the younger generation, et cetera.

And I pointed out to him in response another individual of a high position in that delegation, maybe an equal position with his, about the same age, who was completely different than he is, and with whom I couldn't have that kind of a conversation, you see.

So we do have these kinds of exchanges. And I remain,

myself, firmly convinced that a constancy and continuity of message is indispensable if we are ever going to have any kind of relationships of stability with that society.

We have been sending mixed signals for years. And if I were sitting in Moscow, I would be operating on the assumption that the tough rhetoric of the Reagan Administration, and the tough rhetoric of Kampelman during both the Carter and the Reagan Administrations, is something they only have to ask, and smile, and patiently wait until it passes, and there will be the next big trade deal and the next big political deal.

If I were in Moscow, I think I would have that view. Until such time that Moscow authorities can contemplate that there is a serious message here, I think we're going to have this difficulty. And I operate on the assumption that, when they do see that, in order to achieve certain objectives they have, they've got to do A, B and C, that they'll find a way to do A, B and C.

Now, I still have that view. I don't know if that answers your question. It's a difficult question, in which I don't have a sense of certainty, but I have a very strong sense of view.

PARTICIPANT: Were there any substantive limitations at all, for example, in the '70's? Anything --

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: Well, look at the figures. You talked about my speech -- the basic talk was ready in

November and December of 1980. It wasn't delivered until December of '81. It was ready in November and December, 1980, frankly, not in a form that satisfied me as a talk, but a lot of material was there. The bulk of it was there.

My colleague, Judge Bell, then my colleague, had agreed to deliver that talk, and frankly, the talk was not in the shape where it would satisfy me to deliver it, so I was not going to deliver that talk.

But I decided, and I went to the head of the KGB -- he had been in that delegation, whom I know well, and I said, look, we have this talk to deliver today on Soviet anti-Semitism. We're going to deliver it, we're going to deliver it to you.

You take this talk, you send it to Moscow, you tell them, this is the talk that I was going to deliver today. Now, you have been telling me, my friend, that we make too much noise about these issues, that we ought to be engaging in private diplomacy, that a lot more can be done by just private talks. So I said, here is a test, now. We're not going to say a word about this subject. I'm going to let the State Department know what I have done, and if we can see some results on this subject, we will have learned a lesson, and this is your opportunity.

Well, you know what happened in the course of a year. It got worse. The result is, a year later, I made the talk I

wanted to make, which was a stronger talk, and I told him exactly what I was doing. I told him exactly what was involved in this.

Now, I indicated to you, we've got about 80 percent of the final document agreed to. Those are all concessions, really, made by the Soviets. Concessions in words, however, not in deeds, and part of the 20 percent that's outstanding are words that they probably cannot buy, even though they're only words -- words they probably cannot buy. At least, they so tried to persuade me, that they have gone as far as they can go in what they can buy, and yet we're keeping to our words that we want, or words similar to it.

And the lesson I have said to them over and over again is, if you want us to make modifications on those words, we are prepared to do it, if you will give us human lives. You let people out of there -- I'm less interested in the words. I'll give up the words if I can get the acts -- but no results.

But, in dealing with them, you have to understand that it could happen tomorrow. Their delegation was surprised at the Brezhnev speech of February 23, 1981, which gave up their main argument on the security conference, and I can tell from talking to them, they were surprised.

But their whole argument, which up to that day they had been making, about their differences with us on the security

conference, Brezhnev gave it up in his speech to the Party Congress, 26th Party Congress, on February 23. There you are, you see.

Other comments? Questions?

PARTICIPANT: Well, I think, Ambassador Kampelman, you have given us a living demonstrator of the qualifications for the position you now hold. And you posed the question to this group very flatteringly at the end of your talk. Then Professor Massell asked a question of you, and you answered your own question, I think, completely.

You said the things that -- all the things I think one would have said about continuity, stopping the mixed signals. You yourself, of course -- again, you're a living mixed signal, because you are representing one point of view in Madrid, while other points of view are represented, not just one, but several, in Washington, on many of the same subjects that you're dealing with there, not only, of course, vis a vis Europe and the Soviet Union, but vis a vis other parts of the world.

You did mention Poland specifically -- do we continue not negotiating, or should we resume negotiating? Well, this, actually, is a question that -- essentially, I think the main question you asked, what should we do when we have no policy?

You are pursuing a certain set of policies in Madrid, and you raise the question of the significance of the failure,

or the decline in emigration, and the increasing repressiveness in the Soviet Union while Madrid was going on.

Well, clearly, if you don't have an overall policy in this government, let alone between this government and our allies, which constitutes -- gives very strong backing to what is happening in a place like Madrid, and not just backing for you and the delegation, but, in terms of providing resonance for what happens in Madrid, then you can hardly expect the kind of effect on the Soviets that something like Madrid could be part of producing, because the only way you could get an effect on them is through the application of certain sanctions on the one hand, and through the construction of a significant and fairly vociferous international coalition of public opinion groups, on the other.

These two things have to come together in order to have the kind of effect you're talking about. And Madrid, after all, is kind of sequestered.

We here in Washington who are interested in these matters read the New York Times and the Washington Post, and occasionally I suppose there is even a story in the papers in Chicago, but by the time you get out to the Middle West, it gets further and further back in the paper.

What you have to have, in order to have some impact -- there is greater impact, I know, in Western Europe, but what you need in order to have a greater impact is a network of

organizations, of which, perhaps, B'nai B'rith could be regarded as a model -- a network of organizations in this country and in other countries which would provide the channel through which what is happening in Madrid would be publicized, and become known to a larger number of people.

And without that, which would have to be accompanied, also, by important, I would say, economic efforts on the part of the entire West, not just the United States -- without those two things, you're not going to have the kind of effect on the Soviet leadership that you appeared to imply, or even state, in your question about why there hasn't been a greater effect in Moscow from Madrid.

In any case, I am delighted you're going back. I will continue to fight the good fight, regardless of the lack of the kind of unanimity or unified policy that ought to be built around some of the issues you're talking about at Madrid, and I hope you will keep fighting, no matter how long it takes, even if it takes all summer.

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: Well, thank you.

Let me make a few comments about it. First, let me say that our delegation has not at all been embarrassed in Madrid by the controversy on Latin American human rights.

PARTICIPANT: No.

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: It has not come up. It's used, but it is not a -- the message we're trying to get across to

the Soviet Union is very simple: you'd better live up to your commitments, you'd better live up to these standards, you'd better stop this aggression, you'd better do something about the human rights provisions of the -- make an effort toward doing something about these provisions, if you want to have stable relationships with us.

Now, that gets, of course, all confused, to the extent to which you get a grain embargo lifted, and then you've got to go through all kinds of explanations about that, and all the rest, and maybe, then, the explanations are accepted, and maybe they're not. I don't know what is believed in Moscow. But it does set you back. So that is part of the -- actions speak much louder than words.

On the other hand, I will say that, when Al Haig came to Madrid and spoke the same way that I've been speaking in our delegation -- has been speaking, that's very important.

When other statements made by our leaders -- for example, the President spoke in November, the zero-option speech of his, and included in that, he made a reference to Madrid, did it in completely identical terms with what we are doing, and what we're saying.

Indeed, an interesting by-product of it is that we have had some play in Madrid on this conference that I've referred to, the Security Conference. Now, the Russians came in and asked for a conference on military detente and security

-- military detente and disarmament. Well, they've dropped that. I mean, that's not going to happen, and they've dropped that.

Now, the French had something called a Conference on Disarmament in Europe. In effect, what we are -- we have come to, is to hold a conference dealing with confidence-building measures.

Well, however, when I refer to that conference, I keep talking over and over again about a Conference on Surprise Military Attack, because, one, I think that's understandable to people -- surprise military attack. Two, the people of Europe know, if there's going to be a surprise military attack, they know where it's coming from. And it's an issue I want to highlight. The Russians don't like it when I talk in these terms.

And, there, Reagan talks in November about a Conference on Surprise Military Attack, you see -- very helpful in this connection.

But you're right to reaffirm what I have been trying to say. We need a constancy and a continuity of action.

I would like to make one further comment about this business of what to do. Jerry, I don't know whether it was one of your meetings or not, but there was a meeting in New York that I attended, to speak, and I was sitting next to a man and I looked at his name card, and it said, Mendelevich.

And it occurred to me, this must have been Yosef Mendelevich, the only person to have gotten out of jail and out of the country after ten years in prison.

So I introduced myself to him. We were sitting next to each other on the dais, and he embraced me. He knew my name. He had just been released -- knew everything that's happening, knew a great deal about what we're doing in Madrid.

And I said to him, how do you know about all these things, figuring -- he had been a little bit in Israel, maybe he had learned it there. I didn't know what the situation was. "Well," he says, "We know in the prisons what's happening in Madrid."

Now, you know, that in itself is a very significant point. I told that story to Mr. Ilyachev, as a matter of fact, when we were discussing jamming. And I told him that story, and I said, "You fellows are just -- you think you can stop blue jeans, and you can stop rock and roll records, and you can stop hearing -- letting your people know what we're doing in places. You can't, and stop that, because it isn't helping you."

And we talk about that -- but it's interesting that they know what's happening. Now, Radio Liberty obviously plays a role, BBC, other places, word of mouth plays a role in this situation.

Let me say to you, people who are in our delegation

here know, I consider one of my most important jobs, equal to anything else I do, trying to reach European public opinion.

And there isn't a radio reporter, or a press reporter, or a television program, that wants me, that I don't say yes to -- Rumanian, Yugoslavian, British, Irish, doesn't matter. Belgian, Dutch -- I'll be there. I do it, because it is vital, and more is heard about the Madrid meeting in Europe than is heard in the United States.

And it is an important forum, as you point out, and the Russians know this. I had a meeting with the Foreign Minister of one of our major allies at his capital. I was there to make a talk, and he said he very much would like to see me, so we spent a couple of hours together, in which he was extolling Madrid.

He said, in Europe, we get hit on the head with the neutron bomb. We got a terrible licking on this business of negotiating on the TNF. Your rhetoric coming out of Washington is hurting us awfully. But, he said, Madrid is the one bright spot. There, he says, the Russians are on the defensive.

And then he said to me, sitting where you are just not so long ago was Gromyko. And I started talking to him about Madrid, and he began squirming. He was uncomfortable.

It's also interesting, and I can say here I was scheduled to be on a cable television news program with the Russian satellite three weeks ago. Up until the last minute, it was

set. The Russian government withdrew, saying it's hired the mechanics -- a new date was set up for this coming Saturday. I was told yesterday they canceled it. They don't want to talk about it any more. It's not to their interest to talk about it.

Any other comments? Questions?

PARTICIPANT: A follow-up, Max, to your encounter with this unnamed European official. I've heard, and I think some of our -- a minority branch of some leadership, even the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, has suggested that, has Madrid become, really, a diversionary tactic in terms of U. S. foreign policy? That is, has Madrid become the substitute forum for ventilating certain issues that we are not prepared to, or not able to deal with on a bilateral basis, bearing in mind as well that, if so, Madrid is a place which is non-binding, in so many ways, and therefore, let's take the whole process seriously, if in fact your role, that of U. S. delegation, is to supply a forum for American foreign policy issues that we're not prepared to deal with elsewhere?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: I'm really not aware of our not being prepared to deal with other issues on a bilateral basis, Jerry.

PARTICIPANT: Or not able to.

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: We made a decision on START, for example, to postpone it because of Poland. I know that's

a debatable issue, but we never really tied it to Poland directly, and we are going to start START.

Geneva is underway with MITZI. I'm not aware of any subject matters that we don't want to talk to them about, but the fact of the matter is, we're not doing much talking with them, and they're not doing much talking to us. I think, to that extent, you're right.

And we do have to -- on the other hand, the Secretary does see Ambassador Dobrynin. These meetings with Gromyko have taken place. Now, I understand -- at least, it hasn't been announced, that there will be another meeting, but I'm sure there will be another meeting between the two of them.

I am not at all certain that those kinds of meetings go adequately into depth on the questions that divide us. And I am worried about it, and I do have, and I've made certain recommendations as to what we ought to be doing, about going into some of these questions in greater depth than we now go into.

I feel it is essential to have that communication. One of the reasons, incidentally, why I have never had any hesitation about our going to Madrid originally, our continuing in Madrid, and our delegation's returning to Madrid in November, is because I think that this communication is something important to us, and we must never be afraid of communication.

We do well in it. We don't have anything to hide. Any other comments? And I know your hour is running?

(No response.)

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: Well, thank you very much.

DR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

(Applause.)

DR. ARMSTRONG: Now, I'm going to call first -- we are going to have Dr. Bialer, who is sitting beside me, but first Mr. Mel Levitsky, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, who has to leave, is going to tell us about the progress at this end, the Washington end, on these very important questions.

MR. LEVITSKY: I'm glad we're off the record, because if we were on, I think what I would have to say would be rather boring to all of you, and I would probably repeat most of what has been said already.

One of the advantages, or maybe it's a disadvantage, of speaking so late, is that, in fact, many of the things I wanted to discuss have already been said. But I thought I would -- and I was asked to address myself to the question of what the government was doing, and I suppose the way this question is framed is rather simple. It's how we pursue human rights interests in general with the Soviet Union, at a time when our relations are at such a low point, or, is it possible to pursue these interests, given our relations?

I think I would begin from the premise that relations with the Soviet Union are not going to improve very rapidly in the near term. I say this as much in terms of a comment about what I believe the Soviet view is of the relationship, as what I know about our own policy.

I take it also as a given that emigration is a factor of U. S.-Soviet relations. There is an internal dynamic, I think. My own direct dealing with this issue is somewhat dated, but I always believed that emigration itself is a factor of the relationship. It's one that the Soviets have used as part of their bilateral relations with us, and one which, presumably, they will continue to use when they believe the time is right, and when they believe that they can have influence in this particular area.

I thought I'd pose, as a way, also, of stimulating some thoughts for us, because I think, as Ambassador Kampelman said, we have liked to hear suggestions on your part, as well, on this very point -- how we pursue interests of emigration and other human rights problems at this point in the relationship. I would like to pose a few questions first, as a way of prefacing the discussion.

I think the first question is, is there a place for traditional diplomacy, quiet diplomacy, if you will, at a time when the relationship is such as it is, and at a time when there are a multiplicity of public forums that offer themselves

to condemnation, confrontation, straight talk -- any way you want to describe it, and at a time when there is not only, given the relationship, not a need for an Administration to pull its punches, but, in fact, a great pressure, I would say, within the country itself, for the Administration to talk straightly.

I think a second question is, will the Soviets, as part of an effort to stimulate and nourish so-called peace movements, or progressive forces, however they describe them, in both Europe and the United States, will they hold out more openly the prospect of moving on human rights problems, on emigration, as a way of either putting the blame on us for the change in the atmosphere, or the heightened atmosphere, or as a justification for a lack of progress on human rights questions?

If this is the case, would it be in our interests as a nation, and in the interests of the Administration, to play the Soviet game? That is, if the Soviets, for example, as many people believe, view Jews as chattel, should we consider the possibility of how we buy Jews?

Should we explore the price? Should we find out, for example, what it would take to get 50,000 Jews out? Or, in a more difficult sense, what it would take to affect their policies on anti-Semitism? And should we see, in the meantime, what the price might be for movement on non-emigration problems?

I suppose another question is, and this has, I think, been a continual one for the Jewish community here, is, if there is a possibility that some movement can be made, I suppose most would say that it's more likely specific cases would be moved out, rather than large numbers. This is something that we, and you, need to think about.

How important is that factor? Is it important symbolically? Is it important in human terms? Obviously, it is. So this blend that has always been there, I think, in the Jewish community here, between cases, important cases, and the flow, is something else that has to be considered.

There appears, I think it's fair to say, little chance now and for the foreseeable future to influence the total flow. It may come that there are windows of opportunity in the relationship, as there have been in years past, in which the Soviets will use emigration flows to influence U. S. attitudes, and the question is, should we -- should you begin giving thought to what the specifics of this are, as the key, the level of emigration? Do we set it specifically? Do we talk in terms of 60,000? Do we begin to bump into what I think, in my years when I dealt directly with Soviet affairs, what I called the Dracula effect? That is, the Soviets' belief that we have an insatiable thirst for Jews?

(Laughter.)

MR. LEVITSKY: I think this is true. They have

never, even at a time when emigration was very high, have never felt they understood what our upper limits were. They were unwilling, and you were unwilling, I think -- all of us were unwilling to say what the upper limits were, for fear that it really wasn't the upper limit, for one thing.

Another question that comes to mind is, given the state of our relations, what role do the European countries play? It has been suggested, and I in fact have talked about this with Jewish groups here, that the Europeans, in a very clever way, could begin to work more vigorously on the whole question of emigration, theirs and ours, and German emigration as well as Jewish emigration -- that they are in a position where the Soviets see them in the same way they see peace movements in the West as having influence over U. S. policy.

Therefore, they may be willing to satisfy their concerns, if their concerns therefore become the same as ours in terms of the Jewish emigration issue, is there something that they can do, or is there something they can do on specific cases, which probably is more likely, given what I think is the Soviet attitude toward the full emigration flow.

Finally, I think this is, perhaps, an oversimplified question, and I think it's one for you to think about -- what position should advocacy groups adopt at such a period of U. S.-Soviet relations? Will these groups be faced with an uncomfortable dilemma in urging, perhaps, a toning down of the rhetoric,

public approach, by the Administration, in the hopes that the Soviets will act positively on the issue?

And I say this with the experience of several Administrations. I can remember the great pressure, the great interest of American Jewish groups, in having the Administration speak out more forcefully, more vigorously.

I sense -- and perhaps I'm wrong, I hope you will correct me, that in fact there is some discomfort now within these same groups about the fact that this Administration is speaking out very straightforwardly and forcefully -- some discomfort because, in some way, there is the feeling that the relationship has been soured because of it, and for that reason, more Jews aren't getting out. Correct me if I'm wrong, please.

Now, just a couple of personal observations. These are personal, because they're my own thoughts, having dealt with the Jewish emigration issue for a while. I agree nearly completely with what was said about the anti-Semitism and emigration connection.

I mean, from a certain standpoint, the Soviets would be much better off if they would do things which have been rumored over the years -- create a Jewish museum in Moscow, open up a kosher restaurant near the synagogue, things like this. But I don't think they can bring themselves to do this, and it's because of this escalating factor, and it's an irony,

I think, of the relationship. In fact, when they made the determination -- and I think this was part of their whole Party Congress approach, and their attitude toward detente -- when they made the determination that they would let out significantly large numbers, they created a pool of emigrants that is the same as the number of Jews in the Soviet Union, in my view.

That is, because Jews are identified as emigrants, there is less opportunity and more anti-Semitism. Because that is the case, there is less opportunity for their children, which is a big factor, and those emigrants, those assimilated Jews -- and let us remember that many of the current refuseniks, and even some of those who have gotten out, were mainly assimilated Jews -- will eventually have to consider the need to emigrate, because there is no opportunity left for them.

As far as human rights policy is concerned, in this Administration, I think, obviously, our concerns vary from country to country, but in the Soviet Union, I believe we must consider emigration as a central concern, because, if we look at Soviet society, and assess it -- and the Soviet system, and assess it realistically, it's very hard to say that it will change in any great degree, with regard to treatment of human rights advocates.

Therefore, emigration becomes a central factor. It becomes the escape valve. It becomes the way that people can get out, if in fact they can't tolerate their own lives in the

Soviet Union.

So it is central, and it -- I think it must be central in the relationship. I don't personally agree with the argument which is sometimes -- well, maybe I should say I don't know if I agree, but there is an argument made that emigration is the easiest thing for the Soviets to do, and that is why they have used it as part of the relationship.

It doesn't affect their society. It lets people out. It doesn't have them loosen up in terms of internal controls. I guess I am not sure that is the case, because, in a certain way, if one could imagine free emigration from the Soviet Union, this would mean a significant change in their own society, in their own way of dealing with problems.

It also, of course, I think, quite naturally would encourage a number of other groups, whom we don't even know about, at this point, to try the same tactics. And I remember very well being in Moscow when the German emigration movement took its own tactics from the Soviet Jews, and began to demonstrate and began to sit in in embassies. This is something that internally bothers the Soviets.

So I am inclined to believe that, in fact, the proposition that emigration is the easiest thing that they can do, is perhaps not the case.

Finally, let me just briefly outline what the Administration is doing, and what it expects to do. Given this

rather bleak picture, I think, of prospects for emigration, our view is that we must continue to keep the pressure up, particularly in the public arena, not only our own pressure, but pressure from other countries.

And I think, whether you call this rhetoric or not, this is based on an assessment that at least the Soviets want to be respected. And, to the extent that they feel embarrassed internationally by problems, to the extent that there is international pressure, it keeps the pressure up for the time when the time comes, that is, when they are willing and looking around to try to improve their image.

So that, as I said, there are a multiplicity of foreign -- obviously, CSEE is a major one. We have Human Rights Commissions, we have the UN, we have our own public statements, we have our informational programs, and the focus at this point is on the public aspect.

This does not mean there aren't private contacts. The Secretary of State has brought this up at every meeting. It is part of the agenda of U. S.-Soviet bilateral relations. I assume -- Dick Combs can tell us, I assume it will remain so. It's another aspect of it, and I suppose, in a sense, it's a way of saying to them, you may not believe what we say publicly, and maybe you think we have to say this for our own public opinion, but, in fact, it's true -- it is part of the relationship.

There may, as I say -- there is a great deal of unpredictability, I think, in the way the Soviets deal with these problems, but I think there are windows of opportunity, and I think that reinforces the need to keep the public pressure up along with the private approaches.

This is not an easy task, and it's not a very pretty picture, but my own conclusion is, and the conclusion of the Administration is that we need to keep along the same track that we have been going on, and we only need to continue to mount the pressure not only on our own part, but on the part of our allies.

DR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you very much, Mr. Levitsky, for presenting these points so clearly, and posing the questions before us in a way that people like myself, outside of the policy-making apparatus, simply could not have done, in the same degree of succinctness.

Before, with your permission, going on to questions, I think I will introduce Professor Seweryn Bialer, who has made a very great effort to come here. I think all of you know his recent book, which I reviewed personally in the Political Science Review, suggesting that it was the best book on Kremlinology and Soviet internal politics to come out recently, and Alex Fowler reviewed it in the American Historical Review about the same time, and for once we agreed on something -- an accomplishment in itself.

And Seweryn has been in Moscow, as Bill Korey suggested to you, and has talked with the Arbatov group about some of the problems they're dealing with, in a very intimate way, which only Seweryn, with his very particular background, could achieve, and I would like very much to hear his conclusions.

DR. BIALER: Thank you very much. I'm speaking on the basis, first of all, of the study of the Soviet Union which I did in the last few years, but primarily, also, it's an impressionistic talk on the basis of my conversations with the Russians, with Russian officials, Central Committee officials, Party officials, military officials, and even, in two cases, KGB officials, and also people from the Institute that I -- from many institutes that I saw.

And I want to present some thoughts on the tendencies of development in the Soviet Union, in the coming decade, in the coming years, from the point of view of the Jewish situation, only from this point of view.

I am not at all predicting that things that I am saying will happen. I am only saying that they are moving in this direction. Maybe, at some point, the direction will be reversed, maybe they will not happen. But let's say the probability is high that it is moving in this direction.

PARTICIPANT: Seweryn, can you talk into the mike?

DR. BIALER: Thank you very much.

I want first to speak about some domestic elements,

domestic elements in this situation, and secondly about some international elements in the Soviet situation, that has, in my opinion, influence on the prospects of the Jewish question in the Soviet Union.

The first point that I want to make about the domestic situation is the situation -- obvious situation, in this audience, I do not need to develop it at all -- the coming economic, the already-present economic hardships, the difficult choices that the Soviets have to make in the economic field, will, indeed, in my opinion, in the 1980's, or there is a high probability that it will lead to an increase in political authoritarianism.

That is to say that, while there may be a search for economic reforms, the search for economic reforms will be associated with a tightening of the screw in the political arena. In other words, not a unilateral process, but a dual process -- a search for economic reforms, and a tightening in the political arena.

And in such a situation, it is obvious, both from the past of the Soviet Union and from the present of the Soviet Union, that they will look very much for domestic and foreign escape routes -- in other words, for those whose actions or inactions, or deviations, would justify such a tightening of the political screws.

The second point that I would make about the domestic

situation is that, in a situation of scarcity of resources, as they are developing in the 1980's, the conflict among the needs for allocations of resources will be much stronger than it was in the 1970's; in other words, that we should expect a much greater degree level of conflict, a much greater and much more brutal succession, also, in the Soviet Union.

That is to say, the picture, the model, should not be the 1964 transition and 1965 -- 1975 accommodation and compromise, where every group got something, and the military got something, and the consumer got -- and agriculture got a greater investment, and so on. But there will be much harsher choices, and a greater conflict among the needs.

And, therefore, this, together with the power struggle for succession leads to a situation of political tension. There will be, in my opinion, in the 1980's, a much higher probability of political tension in the Soviet Union -- a higher level of political tension than it was in the 1970's and 1980's -- 1970's and 1960's, and the lack, for a while at least, of decisive domestic leadership and policies.

But the thing, from our point of view of interest which is to be stressed is exactly the question of political tension. Again, I have to say that, in my opinion, political tensions are not a situation that is happy for the Jews.

The third point that I would make with regard to the domestic situation is that there will be, in all probability,

a stagnation of the standard of living of the Soviet population in the 1980's, or even a decline in the standard of living of the Soviet population, which will hit very hard, especially the workers, in my opinion -- especially the workers, and that this, a higher probability than ever in the past, in the post-Stalinist past, of industrial unrest in the Soviet Union.

I am not predicting a repetition of the Polish situation at all, not at all. But I am speaking of tendencies towards industrial unrest in the Soviet Union, in my opinion, will be growing. This will be the center -- one of the centers, the focal points, of social conflict.

And, in a situation of such danger of industrial unrest, we know, from countries of Eastern Europe, and we know from past Soviet history, there is an attempt to redirect the anger of the workers, again, in a direction that is much safer for the regime. One of the directions, of course, is the Jews.

The fourth point that I want to make about the domestic changes has to do with the demographic changes, that I will not develop, because they were developed by one present here very well, to our satisfaction. The possibility of changes in the flow of regional investments, a greater competition for investments among the regional needs -- that means non-Russian needs, and a possibility, a greater possibility, of national unrest.

And at least I would say, and I'm trying to be very

cautious, really, there is a greater sensitivity of the Soviet leadership to the national problem, to anything that attaches on the national question, on the ethnic question, in the Soviet Union -- much greater sensitivity in the 1980's than in the 1960's, and in my opinion, a lack of an accommodative spirit with regard to the question -- a lack, simply, which has to do with the lack of resources.

It was, in the 1960's and 1970's, possible to bribe the nationalities, and anybody who visited Georgia and Central Asia knows that those nationalities were bribed -- that the peasants, especially, was bribed, for their standard of living -- and this is, in my opinion, those possibilities of bribery are less pleasant in the '80's, and therefore a much greater lack of an accommodative spirit in this respect.

And, especially, I must say that the Polish situation, by the way -- I talked with a number of Russians after the Polish situation, with a great number of Russians, and I was surprised by the degree of agreement among those whom I would call liberal Russians -- official, of course, liberal -- and the non-liberal Russians, with regard to the lessons of Poland.

The main lesson that all agree on, that one shouldn't wait long, when one sees signs of unrest. One shouldn't let it go. One should hit the meter, quick.

Finally, the fifth point that I wanted to make --

these are very selective points that I made about the domestic situation, has to do with the fact that, through the '80's, a new generation of elites will be coming from at least middle and lower-high levels of power in Russia. I don't know whether the majority of the Politburo will be of the new generation, but there is no doubt that the apparatus of the Central Committee is already, today, to a large extent, composed of a new generation of elites.

And what I can judge, in my judgment, is rather limited, of course. I cannot say I have met so many, but what I can judge, those are people who combine two elements. They combine a very great admiration for efficiency and managerial strict methods and discipline, on the one hand, and with an enormously developed sense of arrogant, great Russian nationalism, on the other hand, you know, much stronger developed sense than in the older generation of the Russians, where it was tempered, still, by the insecurity feelings, by the inferiority complex.

They don't display those inferiority complexes any more. Their nationalism is quite strong, and this is, again, an element, in my opinion, of the development, probable development, of the Soviet Union in the 1980's, which is, in my opinion, not positive from the point of view of the question of the Jewish question.

Let me now pass to a few factors of the international

arena that it seems to me will influence the question in the 1980's.

First of all, I want to say that it is my judgment that probably -- from what I have heard, it's shared by the majority of people in this room, that international opinion and international factors were the key factors in creating restraints on Soviet policies with regard to the Jews.

That is to say, the policy of emigration, the policy was primarily a response to the changing position of the Soviet Union in the international arena, and a response to the search for respect of a global power, search for detente, response to pressures from the United States, from other groups, and so on.

And, in this sense, I must say that it seems to me, again, that one has to regard the international factors in the 1980's as being the key factors, with regard to the future of the Jews in the Soviet Union.

Internal factors move in one direction, and it's a bleak direction, but still, the international factors may be decisive.

But, unfortunately, I do not see anything encouraging in the international factors, either, with regard to the 1980's, with regard to the Jewish situation. And I only hope that I'm a born pessimist, and this is how I survive, and that I am wrong.

(Laughter.)

DR. BIALER: Let me make two points on the international factors. The first one -- we are now in a period where the United States and the Soviet Union are on a confrontational path, are moving towards a confrontation.

We do not know, but it is very likely that it is a turning point. One of the major turning points in postwar history, a turning point, let's say, after the Second World War, the '46 -- '48 period, or the period '59 -- '63, in which there was movement away from one --

(Tape change.)

3-A

DR. BIALER: I am not saying that this is the case, that it will happen, but I say that the chances that it will happen are high.

In this situation, in a situation where you have a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, at least for some period of time, and even a probability of a re-ignition of Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, in a situation where the United States lacks superiority, and is fighting this Cold War alone, the U. S. leverage on Soviet policy is extremely low -- extremely low.

First of all, I do not think that the Jewish question is a key question of Soviet -- of American policy with regard to the Soviet Union. So, even if there is some leverage, it may be used in other questions, in other points. It

may be used with regard to the question of oil in the Persian Gulf, rather than with regard to the Jews.

But even if it is a key question, even if I considered, and I don't consider, that it is, in the eyes of American policy-maker, a key question, I don't think that there is much leverage that can be used against the Soviet Union, not from the American point of view in the near future, or even in the medium-term future.

I do not think -- and here I must say that, if I understood, I share the view of Ambassador Kampelman with regard to the Reagan Administration's policies and how the Soviets view Reagan policy. I do not think that the Soviets have yet decided that this is a serious policy with Reagan's policy, is a serious policy, or a serious threat.

I do think -- and I had a nightmare. This is my nightmare -- that as a result of Reagan's rhetoric, there will be no action, that the rhetoric will be unequal to the action, and the worst will happen, that the credibility, the limited credibility that the United States still possesses, you know, in Soviet eyes, will be through this rhetoric, and lack of action, will be destroyed.

And I think that the Soviets are still waiting, that the Soviets are still in the second phase of their response to Reagan, that is to say, in the stage of -- the first stage is the flirting, the second stage is the response by criticizing,

and the third stage is the decision-making. Should we test the Administration, or should we retreat? They haven't reached that third stage yet. They don't know whether to retreat, or to test the Administration, and in my opinion, they will probably decide a crucial event here will be the question of a military budget, not this year, but next year. You know, whether it can go through the Congress -- and I must say, if one was speaking about mixed signals being sent by the Administration, I have not seen any Administration that was sending -- even Carter, in comparison, that sent so many mixed signals as this Administration, not only looking at the military program.

Look at the MX. It was absolutely incredible, you know, the mixed kinds of signals that are being sent, aside from the rhetoric. The ideological rhetoric is very strong, but the actual actions, signals, are mixed.

In this situation, I don't think that there is much U. S. leverage on Soviet policy, on Soviet action. And here we come to the crucial question of leverage, namely, to the question of Europe, Western Europe.

The key direction of Soviet foreign policy today, in the last two years, today, and in the near future, is a policy of trying to bifurcate detente. That is to say, to have a detente with Europe, while having bad relations with everyone, with Poland, with the United States -- reserve detente,

deepen the detente with Europe, and achieve a split between the United States and Europe, and at the same time, using the Europeans to influence American policy in the direction that will be positive for the Soviets.

I must say that they have reached -- they have great achievements in this respect. I think that Europe has gone very far in accommodating the Soviets. I think that the Germans have gone as far as they can go, without breaking their alliance with the United States, and I think that, in this sense, that the Europeans are now the key, really, element in international leverage and international influence on Soviet behavior, you know, not Americans.

Unfortunately, in my opinion, the Europeans were not so sensitive as we were, or are not sensitive at all, to the question of the behavior of the partner in detente, and especially to the Jewish question.

I must say that I find an almost total lack of sensitivity. That is to say, oh, yes, they will express their protest, they don't like how the Soviets behave -- what do you expect from the Soviets? They will say, you know what we expect -- you know who they are. But we cannot change it, you know. There are more important things -- it is a question of peace -- you know, this is more important, you know.

Nuclear war is threatening all of us with annihilation, so what is 50,000 emigrants, more or less? On such a

scale, it doesn't really make great importance.

They want detente -- to say it simply, the Europeans more and more want detente at any price, and will not make any major effort, if this effort will cost them anything, you know, to influence Soviet policies with regard to human rights.

And, therefore, the fact that they are -- we should try to influence them, we should try to talk with them, we should try to do whatever we can, you know, so they will try to press the Soviets. But, again, I must say, I must express my doubts whether they will be very successful with regard to that.

The second point that I want to make with regard to the international factors is the question of the Communist movement. A major factor in influencing Soviet opinion, and a factor that was very underestimated in this country by various Administrations, was the international, or some Communist parties, which moved away from Stalinism, and where there were major factions, liberal anti-Stalinist factions, who, in their own interests, interests of their own policies, criticized the Soviets.

And I'm speaking primarily about the Italian party, and partly about the Spanish party. What happened is a very interesting thing. Because of Poland, I think, an ineradicable break occurred between the Italian party and the Soviet Union.

In my opinion, what happens now -- and I talked only

a week ago with two members of the Politburo of the Italian Party, and I don't know to what extent to believe, but I talked also to some Socialists, who confirmed this view, that the break between the Italians and the Soviets today is similar to the break between the Chinese and the Soviets -- that this is not simply a quarrel now, but it is a final break. It is a final break.

In this situation, which generally I welcome very much, I must say, one of the elements, one of the leverages, of trying to influence Soviet behavior, one of the leverages that was to limit Soviet anti-human rights behavior, is missing.

They don't care, now. They don't care how the British Communist Party will think about it. It doesn't make a difference, and the French party will swallow almost anything.

So this, in other words, this element of influence has declined also.

And, finally, the third element -- this third element, I am least certain about, is the whole question of the Middle Eastern situation -- the behavior of the Israeli government, the dead-end street in which Israeli policy has found itself, the chaos in the Persian Gulf, which will be increasing, the opportunities which will be growing in Iran and in other Arab countries, growth of Moslem fundamentalism, and the growing opportunities for the Soviet Union in Central Arab

countries, leads to a growing centrality of Middle East and Soviet policy.

In other words, we have here a parallel process of American and Soviet policy, for both of our sides, for both American policy and Soviet policy, the Middle East is becoming more central.

And this, also, in my opinion, is an element, an international element, that adds against the Jewish tolerance, or whatever you want to call it -- Soviet tolerance with regard to Jewish emigration, and the Jewish question in the Soviet Union.

That is, unfortunately, the message that I am bringing, that it will be a tough, dangerous decade, with very dangerous prospects, with limited leverages of influence on the possession and situation of the Jews in the Soviet Union.

Thank you.

(Applause.)

DR. ARMSTRONG: Now, I realize that Seweryn has presented what we need, namely, the whole perspective in which our problem will appear in this decade, and I think many people will have points to raise about that.

Mr. Levitsky is going to have to leave, possibly, before Dr. Bialer, so if you have specific points -- there is a lot of overlap, certainly, between these two presentations, but if you have specific points for Mr. Levitsky, I would

prefer that you got that first.

Yes?

PARTICIPANT: Well, I just wanted to ask one rather specific question. You know, it's one thing to have mixed signals about different parts of the world. Ambassador Kampelman referred to the sort of mixed signals we give on human rights when it concerns the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and when it concerns Latin America, on the other.

But when you're just dealing with the Soviet Union, why do you have to mix the signals by having one policy for Soviet Jewry and another policy for non-Jews, such as is exemplified in the State Department's opposition to efforts to give relief to the people, the Pentecostalists, who have been immured in our Embassy in Moscow for nearly four years. Why can't you have at least a consistent policy towards Soviet citizens?

MR. LEVITSKY: I don't think there is anything inconsistent about either our general policy on human rights nor our policy towards Pentecostalists. Maybe Dick Combs can mention something specifically about the Pentecostalists, but I wonder --

PARTICIPANT: Well, we oppose the legislation which is pending in the Senate. That is, you oppose it, the State Department opposes the legislation which is pending in the Senate to give permanent resident status to those people, which

is probably the only way you are ever going to be able to get them safely out of the Embassy. You are opposed, evidently, to their efforts to get out of the Soviet Union.

MR. LEVITSKY: No, I --

PARTICIPANT: Why is there this differentiation? I don't understand.

MR. LEVITSKY: I don't think there is any differentiation, is there?

PARTICIPANT: No, there is not.

MR. LEVITSKY: There isn't?

PARTICIPANT: No. It's our judgment that it would not help the Pentecostalists to grant them permanent residency status unilaterally. In fact, it would harm their cause, so --

MR. LEVITSKY: How would it do that, Dick?

PARTICIPANT: Well, this is a debatable point.

MR. LEVITSKY: I'll say.

PARTICIPANT: In our judgment, it is not to increase their chances, vis a vis Soviet authorities, if the U. S. unilaterally tries to change their status, their citizenship status. The Soviets, as you know, do not recognize dual citizenship at all.

PARTICIPANT: No, and consequently, they wouldn't recognize, perhaps, American citizenship with its people, rather than -- as they did with Lannie Rigerman, as they did with Zimus Kudirka, as they have done in a number of similar

cases, where there was a question of dual nationality.

PARTICIPANT: The only difference was, those cases were American, under U. S. law, and they did have, under the existing legislation defining U. S. citizenship, a claim. Now, there is no such background for the -- I don't want to get into a big debate about the --

PARTICIPANT: I know you don't.

PARTICIPANT: I have no apology for our policies, though.

PARTICIPANT: Well, I think you should, really.

PARTICIPANT: I don't want to apologize, either. I don't want to hang tough, either. I don't want to hang at all.

(Laughter.)

PARTICIPANT: What I would like to say, though, about the general policy, because I think, really, this is a mis-impression -- if you read, for example, the introduction to this rather thick volume of human rights reports that we are required to do every year, the last one, which is really the first batch of Reagan reports, I think you will detect several things.

One, of course, is a great emphasis on East-West matters, but that is a rather consistent policy, from the standpoint of how this Administration views what are the main human rights problems in the world, and there is a great

emphasis on the fact that the main threat to human rights is the spread of totalitarianism.

So, from the standpoint of consistency, I think, you know, there is consistency. There is also, I think, far more than, perhaps, in other Administrations, a willingness to say that, while we seek a single standard, we must look at each country individually, and that we have a variety of tools, in influencing various countries.

With friendly countries, essentially, this over-simplifies it, but private with friendly countries; the more public approaches with countries where private diplomacy will not, or is not, working.

As I say, it's a differentiation in the way the tools of diplomacy, public and private, are used. I don't think that that is inconsistent. What it means, however, is that in some cases, when we talk, for example, about, let's say, a country like Argentina, where we detect trends that are moving in an upward direction, or when we detect trends, that the most effective thing we can do is to try to encourage that in a private way, and hold out the bait of improved U. S. relations, or hold out the carrot of improved U. S. relations with regard to Argentina, and encourage the movement that is going on.

Now, that is a difference in the way we use our tools, but I don't think it can be described as inconsistency

in the way we view the world.

PARTICIPANT: Thank you.

PARTICIPANT: You raised a question earlier about what position should advocacy groups take, in terms of --

PARTICIPANT: Is that a good term, by the way?

PARTICIPANT: It's a term we use, and I'm glad you've absorbed it. Maybe it's the only thing we agree upon right now.

(Laughter.)

PARTICIPANT: Let me try to respond to the question posed. I think that, let's say, as far as the National Conference on Soviet Jewry is concerned, the coalition of groups in that body -- yes, we always advocate Administrations speaking up, and speaking up forcefully, and that position still holds.

I think the problem, regardless of what the Administration is, is the differentiation between speaking tough and hanging tough for its own sake, if you will, meaning, if you don't bargain, if you're not sitting down and talking to the other guy, you can't bargain.

Now, I regretted the grain deals that have gone through without any preconditions, without -- I'm sorry that Helmut Sonnenfeldt is not here, without any leverage, even outside of the framework of Jackson-Vanik, since in fact that is not pivotal here.

But there could have been, perhaps, and we would have

advocated there should have been some kind of discussions on the table, not necessarily up front, not necessarily binding, both in public or in law, but if there is only a bark, and rarely if ever a bite, then that is where we would take exception to the Administration policies.

They're perceptions that I have, now. I'm not speaking for the National Conference. I'm speaking for myself, if I can separate out -- is that there is a lot of barking, and the barking is welcome. But sometimes it's only barking, and you know, you get those nervous little dogs that bark all the time, and after a while you tell yourself it's only a nervous little dog, and you don't take it seriously.

You want a dog that barks where it's appropriate, but you also want a dog that's really a watchdog, and does something about it.

The impression here is that either the Administration is not willing to, or not able to -- and I don't know, to -- without being warlike, to bite, and that's the question, I guess, implicitly, to ask of Ambassador Kampelman -- that the impression I get is that a lot is diverted to the Madrid forum.

That's an important forum, but if it's the only forum, or the major forum, without any discussions on the bilateral -- in a bilateral context, where you can deal quietly, perhaps, and you can drive a tough bargain, then we are not going to get anywhere, and we are not going to exact, if you

will, whatever concessions we might get on the -- and "concession" may be too harsh a word, but we will certainly not get much in response, or --

MR. LEVITSKY: Okay. I take what you said on the grain deal, and you know what the Administration's position was on the grain deal, but when you talk about "bite" --

PARTICIPANT: What was it, Mel?

PARTICIPANT: No linkage.

MR. LEVITSKY: No linkage? It was something the President said rather consistently throughout his own campaign.

PARTICIPANT: But I think it was a mistake. I understand that pledge he made, but I don't accept it.

MR. LEVITSKY: All right.

PARTICIPANT: Okay.

MR. LEVITSKY: But on the question of bite, what is it you were talking about?

PARTICIPANT: On what?

MR. LEVITSKY: I mean, the bargain?

PARTICIPANT: Oh, that would be an example, on trade.

MR. LEVITSKY: But that is no longer in question.

PARTICIPANT: Well, it may be.

MR. LEVITSKY: All right, but then you have to ask yourself some questions.

PARTICIPANT: I would be happy to sit down with you privately, rather than here, and suggest some options.

MR. LEVITSKY: Let me just say, you have to ask some other questions, which is a rather basic one with regard to Soviet Jewish emigration, which is, what is the role and the relationship of a question like Soviet Jewish emigration? Is it background? That is, is it preconditioned to things -- negotiations? Is it a lever that they have, that they use, without regard to what other pressure? Is it something that we use, as part of the bargaining, in various negotiations that we are engaged in?

And these are, I think, basic questions. There is a whole -- there is a question. I mean, in this group, I probably can't -- I shouldn't say that it is not the most central element of our relationship, but it is not the most central element of our relationship. The geopolitical, strategic security concern is the central part of the relationship with the Soviet Union.

But it's clear, over the years, that when we engage -- within the last 12, 15 years, when we engage in discussions with the Soviets, in whatever discussions, they see it as a background factor. And why did they begin to increase emigration? I mean, some -- obviously, we have talked to them about that.

We didn't say, you have to let out a certain number of Jews before we will talk about CSCE, or SALT, or whatever. They saw this as part of their relationship, which is what I

was trying to get at. It is a central part of the relationship, not in the sense that you use is as a bargaining device, but in the sense that the Soviets see it as part of the relationship.

And, when I talked about windows of opportunity, that is exactly what I meant. There is -- there are, as you know, many windows in our rather complex relationships with the Soviets, and there are different times in these relationships.

Right now, no one could be optimistic about, particularly looking at the figures, about a large flow of emigrants. But I don't -- you know, that can't be precluded. Things would have to change significantly, but there are a number of talks and discussions coming up with them. I hate to say that it's in their hands, but that is sort of the situation we're in.

They're aware of the concern, and they are aware of the fact that emigration means something, and they use it. And what I was trying to get at, in posing the question to you, was that they are going to use it, I think, quite frankly, on various groups, including the B'nai B'rith National Conference, as they are using similar kinds of issues in the so-called peace movement in Europe.

And there are some -- I was just trying to pose a dilemma for those groups, and I think it's an important one.

It needs some thinking, in your own minds.

PARTICIPANT: So far, they haven't approached us.

MR. LEVITSKY: They will, maybe.

DR. ARMSTRONG: Marshall Goldman has a point, I think, directly on this.

DR. GOLDMAN: Well, I think it's focused, and then (inaudible), if you'd like, but on the question of what does one do, how does one proceed, and Jerry's statement that the dog is barking without biting -- I think part of the difficulty is that the pressure groups in the United States keep barking all the time, and never know when to whine or to be nice about it.

And this takes us back to one of the things that we talked about this morning. And I think, from your point of view, it's very difficult for you to make any kind of movement, when indeed the pressure groups don't signify publicly, or don't signal publicly, that maybe it's time to change. In other words, to stop barking and stop biting. In other words, I don't want Jerry to get away -- I mean, I didn't respond this morning because I thought he was talking to somebody else, but I think Jerry is wrong.

And I think, from your point of view, to have some kind of response publicly, either testimony in the Congress or some kind of public pressure -- it might be very nice for Jerry to talk with Senator Jackson, and with Bill Regan or

somebody else. But I can remember, at that time, as part of the American Jewish Congress, making a statement which said, maybe it's time to be flexible, and we were beaten down by new traitors to the cause.

In other words, the minute there was any sign of movement in the ranks, the ranks were beaten back. And I think that's part of the statement, and I think now the question is, what do we have to beat them over the head with?

We have nothing, and it's partly our own fault. And this takes me a little bit to Seweryn's point, if I can -- I think, indeed, it may very well be the same point that he said. We may be (inaudible) timing, and I don't think for Soviet Jews -- I think we may have passed that back, and I think we're beginning a Cold War.

But, at the same time, I think the Soviets are under such tension, economically, in the way you describe, that this may be a unique opportunity to talk to them about other issues which may, indeed, move us back from the Cold War.

For example, when Brezhnev said -- and it may very well be right for him to say this, because he's got 300 missiles in place -- it's time to come to a freeze, I sense, if you read his statement, there are some unique things in there.

I sense that he's saying that, number one, just because they're in place -- I think that it's hurting them,

because of all the things that Seweryn mentioned.

One of the things he said in his speech about the missiles, and it's the first time I've ever seen that, was, "We give our Soviet people" -- and this is, you know, very rough, "We spend every ruble intentionally, but we don't spend more than we have to."

I've never seen a statement like that in the Soviet press, where they talk about missile or defense expenditures -- never had to justify themselves, that they were spending their money wisely, and, to me, that signifies that, indeed, this might be the time to talk about some things; and this, then, comes to my final point, and this puts you back, I guess, in a spot, and I guess I don't agree with Seweryn, as well.

I'm not sure our Administration is prepared to talk with them, even though they are in very desperate straits. I mean, I have this sense they're hollering -- we're going to hold out until they really holler "Uncle" all the way down, and then it will be too late.

So I'll just conclude by saying that I think we may have a chance to do something, because their economic problems are so severe. And that may take us back, but I'm not sure the Administration --

PARTICIPANT: Well, I'm sure the Administration can handle it, but I'm not sure there is enough to work with, for

what you're talking about. Let's not forget that this is -- where we are now has a history that goes back beyond the Reagan Administration, as well. It does, essentially, go back to a number of activities that the Soviets engaged in, both in the Carter Administration and this one. Afghanistan is not the only thing -- Cuba, a sense of a comparative degree of aggressiveness, I think, in general, in their policy of confrontation.

But I think what you have to say about the organizations -- I would like to make one point about this, and without being too critical. I think, at the time when there was a large outflow of Jews, and there were lots of tools, because that was the Administration's policy at the time -- a nice web of interrelationships, economic and otherwise -- what I heard, at least, from American Jewish groups and Soviet Jewry groups, was essentially what the activists in Moscow were saying, and for good reason.

They're bright people, they live there, they should know more about the relationship, and what it takes to affect the Soviets, than we do. And, frankly, I think that's wrong.

I think that, because they live there, and they are under pressure all the time, they are not necessarily the best judge of what the tools in the relationship are.

Now, that's a historical comment, because I think, at this point, the relationship is much different. But if

there is a mistake, say, in terms of the public positions, I would point to that, more than anything else.

Whether an American Jewish group could say the kinds of things you were talking about, and not be accused of betraying the cause, is another question. But the reliance on what was heard among some very bright, good activists in Moscow, I think, is a mistake.

DR. AZRAEL: I'm Jeremy Azrael from the State Department. I heard you talking about bites and barks, and I think kind of a canine dialogue, as well. I mostly heard a sort of cry of anguish and dissatisfaction with the Administration, which, on that level of conversation, I would submit, is doing a better job of barking than it was early on.

MX, which can scarcely be blamed on it, to the contrary notwithstanding, it's biting, in areas -- I'm talking about the defense budget, to which the Soviets are certainly awfully attentive. And it's doing quite a lot of talking, in all kinds of ways, from arms control forums to high-level meetings, quietly, as well.

I still don't have any problem understanding the sort of sense that mixed signals are coming out, and so forth and so on. I'm not as sure on whom to blame some of those things.

But what's the instruction, from your point of view? I think it was Mel Levitsky's question, as well as Marshall's

question. What, from your point of view, is not reasonable -- I can't tell about what you are complaining. I can't tell whether you want more conversation, a different kind of barking, less barking, more biting. It didn't come through very clearly, for those of us who came for instruction.

MR. GOODMAN: I have a cat, not a dog, at home, so I think we'll drop the canine analogies. It's gone about as far as it should go.

PARTICIPANT: I like that -- the paper Pomeranian. So don't drop it.

(Laughter.)

MR. GOODMAN: When I was a child, I fashioned myself as the Scarlet Pimpernel, not the Pomeranian.

(Laughter.)

MR. GOODMAN: I know it would be presumptuous of me, certainly, in this forum, to suggest what the Administration should do specifically. I think that, as issues come up, it's appropriate to sit down and explore them one by one. I was never an advocate of, in this area, global scenarios, and I certainly would not suggest them now, nor am I complaining. It may have come through that way, and I want to clarify, I am not complaining.

I see it, and have seen it in many ways, as a partnership, or partnerships. And, invariably, in partnerships there are disagreements about a particular instance, at a

moment in time. That will always be. Even my cat doesn't always love me.

But what I was trying to suggest is what opportunities present themselves, and it may be more appropriately in quiet discussions, one-on-one, rather than necessarily only in public fora -- that, when and where opportunities present themselves, or where they can be created, those opportunities should not be lost, because, indeed, as Mel and others have suggested, there are few such opportunities. At the present time, there may not be too many.

And so I will only refer to the one that I cited earlier. If there is a sale, a grain sale, you may not want to link it to Jewish emigration -- link it to something. I'm not necessarily advocating only one particular area to deal with. Link it to something. In fact, unless I don't have the information, nothing was linked to it, except sales, per se, which is valid, but in my view limited, and sends the wrong signal to Soviet authorities.

Marshall Goldman, Professor Marshall Goldman, on a number of occasions, has said, if he could have his druthers, he would love to see the Jackson-Vanik Amendment always hanging out there -- never passed.

Implicit in that, I assume, Marshall, is the fact that you then take the principles of that concept, and you apply that whenever appropriate in discussions and the like.

That's what I would love to see, and if I am assured that that is, in fact, the case, or will be, fine. I have no -- having said that, I have no complaints with the Administration, because I think a lot of the public pronouncements have been healthy. They have been good, both those coming out of Washington and out of Madrid.

When my organization met with the Vice President about a month ago, that, to me, was a statement from the Administration, a very good one -- the act of the meeting itself, and the declarations which followed, so, again, there is no fault there.

I'm merely suggesting, as a general line, if you will, an appeal, rather than a complaint, to be sensitive, and not let the few opportunities that we might have slip by, because, indeed, as Professor Bialer suggested, there may be very few opportunities, if any at all, in the coming time, and they're too precious.

So it's by way of -- on specifics, I'll be happy to sit down at any time and discuss them as they come up. I don't really think this is appropriate. While I'm for public diplomacy, this may be too public.

PARTICIPANT: All right, but my one comment on that is, those are strictures at that level of generality that perhaps are better addressed to other targets in the American -- than to the targets, mostly from Foggy Bottom, who happen

to be sitting in the room.

DR. ARMSTRONG: Mel Levitsky wants to say something on this, and then Seweryn does.

MR. LEVITSKY: Well, I just wanted to say two things that occurred to me, that had come up before. One is the use of the word "rhetoric." The connotation is that these are just words, but I think, at a certain point, rhetoric is reality, and I think it should be taken as such. I mean, what the Administration is saying about the Soviets is the reality of what the Administration believes about the Soviets.

Therefore, if the Administration uses what you call rhetoric in public fora, it becomes part of the relationship, and means something, when things move forward or at appropriate times. So I think maybe we are too rhetorical about using the word "rhetoric."

The second point I wanted to make is that when we talk -- this came up earlier, when we talk about the U. S. government, or groups being able to respond to signals by the Soviets, boosts in figures and things like this, let us keep in mind how much easier it is for the Soviets to do things than it is for us to respond to them.

If you, even in your own private organizations, think about how long it takes to get an idea through and accepted by everybody, if you look at the U. S. government, it is often the case that by the time you want to respond, the

time for responding is over, so that we should not place too much emphasis, I think, because of the nature of our system, and because of the fact that it's not just the Administration. It's the Congress, and it's public opinion, and it's a variety of factors. We should not place too much emphasis on responding to things the Soviets do. We simply are not -- and for good reason, and thank God for the reasons, that we are not in a position to respond quickly to these things, even when we recognize that they're signals, even when they tell us they're signals.

So, when we were talking, it sounded as if it were sort of a mechanical thing. You see a signal, you should respond to it, and why miss the opportunity?

The fact is that that simply is not possible, given the kind of system of government that we have.

DR. BIALER: I have two points to make. First, in response to what Marshall Goldman was saying, I think he is perfectly right that, in our dealings with the Soviets on this issue and on other issues, that we have, really, two tools, two leverages, a positive and a negative incentive, and that the reliance on only one is not -- simply, you know, denies us a much broader range of points of influence.

I would only say that I may be a little more pessimistic how influential is the positive incentive, and I have here two points to make. First, let's not forget that,

throughout the whole time, that while we did not fulfill our promises to the Soviets with regard to economic -- to trade, and so on, credits, and so on, the Europeans and others fulfilled it in some respects. And what effect did this have on the Soviets?

Did it have any major effect on the Soviets, let's say, on the deployment of their SS-20 in the last few years, because the Europeans were trading with them, or whatever?

And this leads to the second point, that the positive incentives, in my opinion, are only then having an effect on the Soviets, when the Soviets have, at the same time, negative incentives, when they are both brought together. That is to say, if they are afraid of us, they will also trade with us, and make the thing -- in other words, they cannot be separated.

And if it's a situation, as it exists now, where the military balance is skewed, in my opinion, in one direction, we will not substitute trade for the change in balance, because the trade will be like a carrot that you give to the rabbit to eat, and it will eat it, and it will do nothing.

You know, we have to work on both at the same time. But I agree with you fully, that when the negative works, then the positive may work, too.

Now, Jeremy -- I think that he is joking, that he may not understand what he is saying, that when he says that he

doesn't see the mixed signals of this Administration, he must be joking.

DR. AZRAEL: I didn't say that.

DR. BIALER: Oh, you didn't? I'm so glad that you didn't.

(Laughter.)

DR. BIALER: I'm very glad, because I must say, wherever I look -- and if you want to be specific, I can be very specific. Everywhere I look, I can see the contradictory signal. We are asking our European allies not to trade, and yes, we are liquidating the grain embargo. This is not a mixed signal? What is, then?

In El Salvador, we are saying that this is of crucial importance -- it's a vital area. I mean, this, we will go to fight, and of course we cannot go to fight -- Congressmen are not permitted to fight, so why do we make the big deal, that this is such a crucial area? And how will it end, in some kind of a compromise, whatsoever, where our rhetoric, that we have elevated, directed it at El Salvador, is so important, will come to haunt us back, because we have created an image that it is very important, and we cannot do anything about it.

And the Middle East. Could you describe the Middle East policy? Whether you listen to Weinberger, or whether you listen to Haig, or whether you listen to -- it's completely

mixed. It's mixed up and mixed. Not to say about us --

(Applause.)

DR. ARMSTRONG: I think we have time, maybe, for just a couple more questions on these themes before we go to the scientists. Henry, do you --

DR. MORTON: Well, I'm afraid it might be more of a statement than a question. But it's really a codicil to Seweryn's talk, and the remarks of Marshall Goldman. And what I would -- and I think you would probably agree with me, is the continuing tragedy of Soviet-American relations, which also affects the Jewish question.

Seweryn really pointed out so very well the problems that the Soviet Union faces, particularly domestically, in the '80's, and what importance this might have. But perhaps those of us who deal, like I do, with a good number of students -- and when I receive from them the image, when they walk into the class on Soviet foreign policy, you know, the image they have of the Soviet Union, they are really brainwashed by the media presentation that they receive.

And not only they, but people that -- civilians, so to speak, that you and I encounter, about the USSR. We don't have the foggiest notions about what really makes the Soviet Union tick, not that we always can agree on it.

But we have really built up the Soviet Union as this powerful monster, and we never really discuss publicly, or

very seldom publicly, the great problems that they have, in addition to the continuing, and maybe deepening, of the economic crisis, but the problems they have just with Poland, and the fallout in Eastern Europe -- that they are stuck in Afghanistan, that there is an undeclared alliance which now is shaken, because of our recent policy towards Taiwan, with China, Japan, and the United States, obviously against the Soviet Union.

The Soviets have lost China, Indonesia, Egypt, Somalia, Guinea, the Italian Communist Party -- one could go on. And, in the public image, this is not understood.

And I think that what compounds this tragedy is, as a result, the statements that we make, either officially or unofficially, come out of an ethnocentric American position, and we're answered by ethnocentric Soviet position.

Now, I don't really have many solutions to this. But I think that we ourselves, sometimes, are caught up in a mythic Soviet superabundance of power that really does not exist. That doesn't mean that they're not strong, and they're not threatening. I'm not, in any way, meaning to implicate that, but I think we are not sufficiently realistic about the problems that they have, and their vulnerabilities, and we have really failed to make the greater public, or the attentive public, at least, aware of that.

DR. ARMSTRONG: I think this is a point, Henry, that

Seweryn should very probably respond to.

DR. BIALER: I think it's an extremely important point that Henry is making, and I am not sure whether I am in agreement or in disagreement. Let me think about that a little while.

If you say that the Soviets have weaknesses, there is no doubt about it. I mean, there was one statesman, before the war, a European statesman was dealing with the Russians, and he had a good proverb for it -- "The Russians are never as strong as they look, and the Russians are never as weak as they look." Because, whatever -- depending on what, the Soviet Union is not one country. The Soviet Union is a mixture of different countries. It is a combination of India and America. It is a combination of Luxembourg, and at the same time, of Afghanistan. If you can combine it, and regardless -- and depending what you look, you see strengths or weaknesses.

So, from this point of view, I am far from -- I would be far from trying to create a picture of the almighty and all-powerful and all-successful Soviet Union. They have tremendous catastrophes in their foreign policy that they had, and the tremendous reverses that they had -- this, along with some successes, with some major successes.

But I think that there is -- this is certain, to this extent, I agree with you. There is one point that needs stressing, that unfortunately we have to be afraid, not only

of Soviet strengths, but we have to be afraid of Soviet weaknesses; that the Soviet weaknesses are one of the major points of danger to their neighbors and to their faraway countries.

Let me give you some examples. Let's take foreign policy. A normal country -- by "normal," I mean a country --

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(Tape change.)

DR. BIALER: A great power has always various foreign policy resources. It has ideologic resources, it has economic resources, it has political resources, and it has military resources.

In the Soviet Union, unfortunately for us, the Soviet Union is very weak in foreign policy resources. It has built up one resource to an enormous extent, the military resource, and it is very weak in other resources. It doesn't have allies. You know, you cannot call what you have in Eastern Europe an alliance system, right? It has very few allies.

Culturally, it is very poor, and it's not attractive to anybody -- very unattractive. Ideologically, it is also weak (inaudible). Economically, we know what constraints there are. So, in this situation, they try to translate one resource into other resources -- military resource into political resource, and this is exactly the danger that we are facing. This is the danger.

That is to say, one can say, I am not -- personally,

I do not think that there is any chance in the world that the Soviet Union can become a dominant international power, to the extent that America was after the Second World War, exactly because their resources are so uneven.

But, at this specific period today, when their ambitions are still high, when the nationalism is still growing, when they are on the assembly line of their ambitions, when they have made major sacrifices to alter history, and they want to have something for those sacrifices, the only thing that they can use is the military power.

This is true, also, about other things I could look -- other examples, but this is exactly the major point, is that the weaknesses are dangerous.

DR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you very much, Seweryn. I would like to go on with this, and we might possibly have a little time to come back to it, but I think, at this point, it is most appropriate that we move on to the people who have sat here very patiently, with their very major contribution, the scientific and technological representatives.

They are people who know science, and know technology. They know what it means to the Soviet Union, and they have very definite opinions on the way in which it can be utilized, and I might say that, over the years, it has been my own observation that it has been the scientists, the people who are skilled, with large reputations, in science and

technology, who have been most effective, at the personal level, in making contact with the dissidents in the Soviet Union.

And so I am very happy to welcome, first, Dr. Jack Minker, Professor of Computer Science at the University of Maryland, and then we'll have some comments, I think, from his colleagues.

DR. MINKER: First, it's extremely difficult to follow Ambassador Kampelman and the brilliant remarks by Dr. Bialer, so, without apology, I will try to do the best that I can.

We scientists are not an advocacy group, with all due apology to Jerry. We are not interested in giving a message to the State Department. So, those of you from the State Department, we're not here to tell you what to do.

Scientists are advocates, however, for openness in science. I'm also not here to, really, exclusively talk about the Jewish problem, because I think scientists are not specifically concerned about the Jewish problem, per se. They're concerned more with science and the openness of science, rather than the Jewish problem, I think. And making this a Jewish problem would turn away many scientists who would not turn away, and I have never taken this problem as a particularly Jewish problem, and I think it has paid off.

Scientists, I think, do have leverage, because the

Soviets need our science and our technology, whatever they say, and they are getting very brass about it, and I think that the new generation, as Professor Bialer has said -- for example, Dr. Makharov, is very nationalistic, and he says, the hell with you people and your science. We think our Soviet scientists have been paying too much attention to your scientists, and we are going to change it.

So they are specifically getting very aggressive with respect to science, and what they are going to do about their own science, so that they are not dependent upon us, upon our computers, or upon our programming, which was specifically mentioned by Dr. Makharov in an open session that he had.

What I will try to do is tell you some of the things that the scientists have been doing, and some of the facts, and perhaps some of it will corroborate some of the statements that have been made here.

I think all of the scientists are concerned about the plight of the Soviet scientists, and all the -- and scientists in other countries as well, but particularly about the Soviet scientists.

And there have been harsh, repressive measures that have been taken against scientists in the last year or so, particularly harsh measures, where I have a list of some 60 Soviet scientists, some 14 computer scientists only, since I

specialize in that area -- some 14 Soviet computer scientists are now in jail. Three of them are in exile, and this is a very serious situation.

Scientists, I think, have been in the forefront of human rights in the Soviet Union, and there have been several places where they have been in the forefront of it, with general organizations, such as the Committee of Concerned Scientists, the Scientists for Sakharov, Orlov and Sharansky, and let me tell you about the Scientists for Sakharov, Orlov and Sharansky, as an aside. The name was originally Scientists in Support of Sharansky, and this was changed because it was -- people did not want this to be a Jewish issue. They wanted it to be a Soviet scientific issue, and so the name is now Soviets for Sakharov, Orlov and Sharansky, as it appropriately should be.

Another organization that has been very much in the forefront is the National Academy of Sciences at the general organization level. At the scientific organizations, there have been several specific ones who have taken very strong stands with respect to human rights, the Association for Computer Machinery, the physical organizations, the medical profession, and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Let me tell you some of the things that the Committee of Concerned Scientists has done, and first of all, they keep

a list of names of Soviet scientists whose rights have been violated, and this is extremely important, to know who they are, and that people correspond with them. And there has been an effort made to correspond with them, because we must try to keep these people's scientific lives going.

Any time a scientist is out of business for six months, he loses most of his scientific capabilities, because of the fast movement of things in science. So it is extremely important that we try to help them keep up with things.

The Committee of Concerned Scientists has helped with the weekly seminars that were held, first, at the home of -- who started them?

PARTICIPANT: Asbell?

DR. MINKER: Mark Asbell, who started them, Bornell, and then Asbell and then Berlovsky, and the Soviets have cut off, effectively, these weekly seminars that were held on scientific matters.

The Committee of Concerned Scientists also supports the International Conference on Collected Phenomena, and, again, the Soviets have been very repressive here. There have been four international conferences held in Moscow, and this latest one was cut out by the Soviet Union.

They threatened the Soviet scientists, for one, and for two, the -- those who were going, such as myself and a number of Nobel laureates, such as Penzias and Wald, were

denied visas to go, even when we were going to go, when the conference was cut off.

We have tried to brief individuals going to the Soviet Union, and to organize a very major resource that the Committee of Concerned Scientists has, which is the Nobel laureates, and I must say, it has been very heartwarming that people who are at the top of science, and have made very major contributions, are also making contributions with respect to human rights. They have not forgotten their colleagues, and that's been very gratifying.

We try to assure that the Soviet Union -- that conferences in the Soviet Union are open to all people, and that is extremely important, and here I might say that we had a major fight with the Soviet Union in 1975, when there was supposed to be a conference in the Soviet Union, in Tbilisi, on the subject of artificial intelligence, and we -- I was involved in this, because this is basically my field, and we forced the Soviet Union to permit Alexander Lerner to come to Tbilisi, when he was denied permission by the KGB.

And I might say that here, the tactics were very interesting. The tactics were at two levels, to do this. One was at the open level, and two was at the behind-the-scenes level, and the people at the open level and the behind-the-scenes level were communicating with one another.

I was the open level, harassing the Soviets and

writing in the open literature, requesting why there should be a conference there when they aren't going to meet international standards.

And meeting international standards is the key, because they must, as Ambassador Kampelman said, be kept to the letter of the law, and they agreed to international standards, and make them heed it, or else don't have conferences in the Soviet Union. This was our stand, and it worked very effectively.

I was in the open literature, making my position on this clear, and my colleagues, who sometimes were very much against me, said, no, why don't you be quiet, and we'll do it behind the scenes?

I said, fine, why don't you do it behind the scenes, and I will be out in the open, and maybe this will work, and indeed it did work. I told the Soviet scientists that unless Alexander Lerner was permitted to come to Tbilisi, that there would be no conference, and indeed the Soviet Union actually succumbed to this, and they did let him go.

It was a major success for the Soviet scientists there.

We have made visits to the Administration and spoken to the scientific attaches, like Press, Frank Press, who was the science advisor, who did take messages to the Soviet Union. We've spoken to Keyworth and Pipes, and Professor Bialer's

comment that we have very little leverage with the Soviet Union is indeed the perception of Richard Pipes of the International Security Council, who said, why don't you scientists do something? We can't really do anything with respect to the Soviet Union.

We did tell him that we were trying, and we were hoping that the Administration would do something, but that's a different matter; there is no linkage. Yes, they said that.

The Scientists for Sakharov, Orlov and Sharansky have organized rallies and supports for Sakharov, and I think the success -- one of the successes was the fast by Sakharov that was supported throughout the world by the scientists, and many who went down to the Soviet Union to hand petitions organized by our distinguished colleague, Earl Callen, there -- gave a carrot, and said that when we came, the Soviets had told us that there had been a broadcast. The Soviets didn't come out to meet us. There was a broadcast before we came, that the Soviets were letting Sakharov's daughter-in-law out.

I thought Earl Callen was very gracious in his statement that, we appreciate what the Soviets have done, and we hope that they will do more. So the scientists are giving the carrot and the stick, I would say.

The Association for Computing Machinery has over 30,000 members, and they have voted to not support conferences in the Soviet Union, simply because Sharansky is in jail, and

he is a computer scientist, as well as other computer scientists having problems in the Soviet Union, and there is not an atmosphere for the conduct of a scientific meeting, and that is extremely important.

There was also a Committee on Scientific Freedom and Human Rights of the Association for Computing Machinery, and, in this regard, we have published a list that I edited of a number of scientists, computer scientists throughout the world, who are having problems with human rights, and this, I think, has been effective, and there is now a new list that I am updating.

So if anyone knows of a printout that you might look at to see who the computer scientists are -- but throughout the world, there is a problem with human rights, and there are some 80 computer scientists that we know of who are having problems.

What else can be done by scientists? Well, there are many things. First, I think we have to maintain the scientific abilities of human rights victims by supporting weekly seminars, international conferences, adopting scientists and corresponding with them, to keep their scientific capabilities alive.

We also have to help publish papers by these scientists, and as a matter of fact, a paper by Berlovsky was published. Berlovsky was informed that a paper of his was

being published just on the day that he was being sentenced by the Soviet Union. And Berlovsky, by the way, is still active technically, and is writing, even though he is in exile. And we have to correspond with people like Berlovsky and keep them alive.

We have to work against conferences in the Soviet Union, when they are not going to be maintained according to international standards. If they are, then there is no reason not to hold them there, but at any rate, we must make sure that this -- that they are open.

I might say that I was devastated that, after the success that we had with the Tbilisi conference in 1975, that in 1979, a group of political scientists held a conference in the Soviet Union, and Alexander Lerner was invited to this, and the organizing committee of these political scientists who know we stupid computer scientists don't know politics, and they know -- they permitted Lerner not to come to the conference; they caved in to the Soviet Union. I was devastated.

At any rate, what should be the attitude towards Soviet Union visits here? I think it's a mixed attitude. I don't think there is a monolithic attitude that the scientists can be told to take, or should be told to take, nor should we get into these internecine fights that Marshall Goldman was referring to.

We cannot say that, because you don't boycott the

Soviet Union, you're no good. We who do boycott, we're good -- I think that's turning into internal fights within the scientific community, and we are not fighting with our internal scientists. We are against repression of scientists at all levels, and not against our colleagues. Each of our colleagues can think differently, and we respect that.

Those who want to go to the Soviet Union, we respect them, but we urge them, please, when you go, also meet with the scientists who are being repressed. Otherwise, your visit is a waste; and they have been sympathetic, many of them. Some of them are completely insensitive to this plea.

I certainly don't advocate international IREX exchange, simply because it's a formal exchange with the Soviet Union, and you're getting anyone who they want. And I have been against it, and I have not accepted any IREX exchange students, and as a matter of fact, I refused to allow a Soviet scientist to sit in to my class recently, simply because I was denied a visa to go to Moscow.

And I told him that, because I was denied a visa to go to Moscow, and could not listen to your people, why should I let you listen to me in my class? And I asked him to step out of the class.

On the other hand, if there are scientists who come to the University of Maryland, who are legitimate computer scientists, certainly I am going to sit down and speak to them,

even though I am against the boycott. I'll exchange, because it's of interest to me, and because it's of interest to science. I think this is the way it should be, rather than taking a monolithic attitude and saying, I'll speak to no scientists. It won't work, nor will I think a general boycott work, and this, I think, is a posture position and a false position, because you will never get all the scientists to agree. And it will, again, start an internecine war, which we don't want, and keeping the objectives straight is important.

Again, I believe that scientists will support scientific integrity, when they will not necessarily support a Jewish problem, and I think this is extremely important to keep in mind.

I think it's also important that we realize why science and technology is important. It's because the Soviets need it, because they are behind, primarily, in technology. They have extremely capable scientists -- extremely capable physicists, extremely capable mathematicians. Perhaps less so in mathematics, now that they have gotten rid of many of the brilliant Jewish mathematicians, but they certainly are no slouches in scientific areas, and we have to keep that in mind.

Where they are behind is in the technology of how to do things, and they need us.

I would also like to make a plea that this is an important area. Once the U. S. loses its lead in science and technology, then we're in trouble, and some of the actions by the Administration, in not supporting science as heavily as it perhaps should be, is a trend in the direction of losing our strength in science, and the Soviets will then overtake us, and then we have lost our leverage in this important area.

So that I would just like to say that there are a number of colleagues here who have had particular experiences, and who might discuss some of their particular experiences -- I don't know how you want to run it now. At any rate, these are the remarks that I --

DR. ARMSTRONG: Yes, thank you very much. And I think the best thing to do is to ask Dr. Copley, your colleague, who has already asked me if he could speak, to say a few words, and perhaps then you would want, to begin with, to call on some of your other colleagues whom you know personally, and I do not.

DR. MINKER: Sure.

DR. ARMSTRONG: And then we can have a few minutes for general discussion. It would appear that our last speaker, Dr. Thursz of B'nai B'rith, is not coming. He has apparently renounced his position to give us more time, and I appreciate that. We'll have about 45 more minutes. So you go ahead first, Dr. Copley.

DR. COPLEY: I would like to sort of pursue the latter point that Jack was making. The -- I think this has sort of strongly come home to me as of last week. There was a major conference in Houston on interplanetary science, and my remarks sort of come through that particular experience.

The Soviets successfully, this month, have landed two spacecraft on Venera, and a group came to present their results. This is the first time we have seen as confident a group, and confident because of a very important factor. That is, the technology which had been developed to do this is an order of magnitude better than anything they have done up to this time. The mission worked completely satisfactorily. The results are phenomenally good, and these men came and spoke.

It's this changing of perspective, and the changing of balance, which I think is going to become a very important factor in future negotiations, in linkage, and in leverage, and so forth.

The interesting thing about the talk was that it was presented -- given about an hour for presentation. The hall was completely packed, and the results of the mission were given in one half hour, and the second half hour was devoted to a plea to the scientists of the world to work together in peace, and to cooperate together with the Soviet Union to bring about peace.

It was the first time at any meeting of an international basis that I know of where a political statement was made as part of a scientific talk. So, to me, this is indicating a change in attitude, and that change in attitude, I think, is coming through a certain confidence which is evolving at this point, and it's a confidence and also a certain frustration, too.

I don't know if you know -- as of May, these -- I think 11 major agreements which were negotiated during the Nixon Administration, in terms of joint Soviet-American scientific efforts, is now ending.

These particular treaties will not be renegotiated at this point, and it has been made rather clear. So the counterposition of the plea for peace and cooperation, the confidence, to me is an extremely significant factor, and I think is going to affect the capabilities of scientists, maybe not so much in the medical area -- and Bob, or Max, I don't know what you have to say. But I think, in the physical sciences, with the capability of -- well, with our resources here being depleted considerably in basic research, what the Russians are doing, and which I noticed the first time I was in -- in terms of the change from my previous visits to the Soviet Union, in '79, I noticed a major investment in resources of -- for performing very basic research.

I think this is a very important factor. For the

first time, for instance, they took me throughout the country. I was at a number of major places -- Accelerator Laboratories up at Dubno, in Moscow, and then down to the Neutrino Laboratory in the Caucasus.

Now, in a sense, it's this brain drain only in their direction, but I think that it's trying to be supported here, because, with this type of research, as capabilities, let us say, here in the United States dwindle, the desire of those scientists who wish to work in research, and, for an example, they have made available to us now the use of their large accelerators.

What does that mean? We come there with our instrumentation to do such experimentation -- or the Neutrino Laboratory, which there is nothing like in the world. It is a phenomenal thing. It's a laboratory built into the side -- the middle of a mountain, a two-mile hole drilled into the mountain, and a five-story building built in the center of the mountain. There is no facility like that in the world. It is drawing a tremendous number of scientists, who have not this capability anyplace else.

And I think this is, in a sense, going to support and build up their capability and their confidence. It is something that I think we knew about, but are forgetting about at this time. That is, making such facilities available helps you in a very subtle way. It helps you, in the fact that the

brains, the technological capability, comes to you, because of the desire to use such facilities.

And so, therefore, there are two frustrations that I see arising here. One is that as our capability to supply technological and basic research facilities to scientists of the world -- that there will be a turning toward, in certain areas, and I don't know how it is going to affect other areas, to the use of the facilities in the Soviet Union.

And this, in a sense, builds up the technology, and takes away, in a sense, our leverage.

The second thing that happens here is that, as I lectured through the Soviet Union, the ratio of people working in the field to students was a phenomenon to me. There were a much larger number of individuals on the graduate level listening to the lectures than I get here in the United States.

I think the number of people going into the basic research area is increasing very rapidly, because it's a very attractive thing for Soviet scientists, Soviet citizens, to do. And I think that's, again, another thing which is changing the direction of this leverage. These are the types of points.

Now, one other facet in this whole business, which to me is very interesting, is when I do argue with my colleagues in the Soviet Union about freedom, they ask me, what are you talking about? And their argument goes the following way --