



## Max M. Kampelman Papers

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1 and this was before Gorky; that when you talk of Sakharov,  
2 he has all the rights to come to the Lebedev Institute and  
3 study. The problem is that he has turned from science to  
4 political science. And the political problem is not the  
5 thing you're arguing. You're talking about scientific freedom.  
6 He has scientific freedom, but he has chosen not to be a  
7 scientist, and therefore the situation is quite different.

8 And this is repeated when I talked about Berlovsky  
9 and others, and so, therefore, a perception is trying to be  
10 built, and this perception is reflected back to our scienti-  
11 fic societies, in the sense that when we write letters of pro-  
12 test about scientific freedom, a letter which embarrasses  
13 certain members, the head of the scientific society comes  
14 back and says, they do have scientific freedom, but this argu-  
15 ment of no longer being scientists comes back.

16 So these are the types of things that seem to be  
17 growing, seem to be having influence, and, as was discussed  
18 this morning, I hope that some time during this conference or  
19 soon after, that we might talk about this changing situation,  
20 or look at it, and see what alternative approaches can be  
21 made, because I think that the world is changing in many aspects.  
22 In terms of these leverages and linkages, it's descending down  
23 into the area of the natural sciences, and I think will be  
24 significantly affecting us in the future.

25 DR. MINKER: Yes, we have three distinguished past

1 Chairmen, and Chairman of the Committee of Concerned Scientists  
2 here -- Jack Cohen, who is a past Chairman, Bob Adelstein, who  
3 is a past Chairman, and Max Gottesman, who is the Chairman,  
4 and perhaps you can make some remarks, Jack?

5 DR. COHEN: Just a brief remark. I don't think it's  
6 very surprising, at least not to a great extent, that the  
7 Soviets have made some of these advances, only because of their  
8 intrinsic abilities, but certainly because they took advantage  
9 of the policies which the several U. S. Administrations gave  
10 them the advantage of doing.

11 That is, the exchange programs were heavily weighted  
12 in their favor, and they sent their people in, and they took  
13 advantage of it. And while we scientists were outside com-  
14 plaining about this -- and I remember distinctly that there  
15 was a GAO report, or two GAO reports, which were very critical  
16 of Administration policy at the time.

17 And we were outside, saying, you're really holding  
18 up things -- you're allowing essentially free access of Soviet  
19 scientists to U. S. science and technology. The Administration  
20 had (inaudible).

21 Now things have turned around, but we don't find  
22 ourselves better off, because they have now taken advantage of  
23 that situation. And it seems to me that even the current  
24 Administration has not organized itself around this issue.  
25 That is, they have simply caused the exchange program to die.

1           And it seems to me there is no positive means to  
2 attempt to use the situation in terms of science. Just as  
3 an example, let me mention the Europeans. The European  
4 scientists tend to be much more active as organized organi-  
5 zations, or organizations of scientists, than the United States.  
6 But we take the (inaudible) as individuals, and through organi-  
7 zations which we have set up, the Committee of Concerned  
8 Scientists, the Scientists for Orlov and Sharansky -- these  
9 organizations have a large list of names.

10           And organizations such as the American Society of  
11 Biological Chemists, the American Chemical Society, really  
12 don't do that much, and have never come out in this area.

13           One of the reasons, I fear, is that the National  
14 Academy of Sciences, which people look to as a leading organi-  
15 zation in the scientific area, has not, itself, come out,  
16 except in very specific cases -- the situation of Sakharov is  
17 a good example of that. And it's fine to have a picket, but  
18 there is, in a sense, an elitism there.

19           The general problem is not addressed, and it seems  
20 to me that there has been very little attempt to use, not only,  
21 if you will, the leverage that we have in the scientific area,  
22 now, though it's limited, but also very little attempt to  
23 expand the -- the fact is that in the Soviet Union, scientists  
24 have a very high status, that they do need to have international  
25 -- they do need to have contacts with American scientists.



1 It seems to me that this has not been approached in a systema-  
2 tic manner.

3 DR. MINKER: Bob?

4 DR. ADELSTEIN: As Jack said, scientists disagree,  
5 and I disagree with some of the things that Jack said, but by  
6 way of agreeing -- he mentioned the National Academy of Science,  
7 actually, that has a history that's very interesting, because  
8 Phil Hamlin, who unfortunately died recently, and was the last  
9 President of the National Academy of Science -- Phil Hamlin  
10 first came onto the scene, and Jack and I (inaudible) by  
11 refusing to go see Levich when he was in Moscow, and that made  
12 a tremendous impression, very negatively, on them. And any of  
13 you who knew Phil Hamlin personally know that, actually, he  
14 is not that kind of an individual.

15 But it made a tremendous impression, both on the  
16 scientific community and subsequently on Phil Hamlin. He  
17 became one of the most eloquent spokesmen, actually, at the  
18 Madrid -- well, I don't know if it was at Madrid, but it was  
19 at Hamburg, and --

20 PARTICIPANT: Both.

21 DR. ADELSTEIN: -- for human rights, and actually  
22 I'm happy to say that Phil Hamlin will always be remembered  
23 for this. And part of that, I think, is an example of the  
24 education of American scientists, who at one time thought, you  
25 know, this is not the kinds of things to hang human rights on.

1 Well, I'll make just two very brief points.

2 DR. MINKER: The U. S. boycott?

3 DR. ADELSTEIN: Yes, but it became much more than  
4 that later.

5 DR. MINKER: Just let me put an addendum, too. I  
6 was called a well-known international agitator for my work in  
7 trying to get Lerner to the conference, by the Chairman, who  
8 was American, and he was the one who was in the middle.

9 And after he came back from the Soviet Union, he  
10 understood what the problems were, and he is now a very major  
11 supporter, and he has also refused to go to the Soviet Union,  
12 because they haven't let Lerner out.

13 So it's important to remember that -- don't judge  
14 your colleagues, and don't have quarrels with them, because  
15 they may be your friends, yes.

16 DR. ADELSTEIN: Right, and actually, I'm quoting a  
17 personal story, but I have had, I think, a unique opportunity  
18 of meeting with Mark Asbell, as he confirmed it (inaudible) --  
19 can't you do something about this hard-working scientist,  
20 who has actually been fired from his Soviet-American delega-  
21 tion? Of course, he had the audacity to contact some of the  
22 Soviet scientists -- some of the dissident scientists while he  
23 was in the Soviet Union.

24 Actually, (inaudible) the President of the National  
25 Academy of Science, and actually will be coming to NIH. But

1 I wanted to make two points. One is, there are two ways, I  
2 think, of going about this, and one of the ways is that Max  
3 and I and Jack went down and asked Makarov, Igor Makarov, who  
4 is the Soviet scientific attache here in Washington, to come  
5 out to NIH, and give us a talk, and let's discuss things, and  
6 he knew exactly, of course, what we were talking about, al-  
7 though his talk was terribly boring, and went on way too long.

8 But as soon as the talk was over, he was confronted  
9 with a whole avalanche of questions, which only had to do  
10 with what he knew he was going to ask about. He stood up there  
11 and he answered the questions, but when he was cornered, he  
12 clearly said that, Jack said, we don't need you, we're better  
13 off without you, because, if we don't have you, we'll do it  
14 for ourselves.

15 And I don't think we should kid ourselves. I think  
16 they will start to do it for themselves. Whether they sneak  
17 into laboratories or not, they're going to, and they're going  
18 to -- they know what the story of (inaudible) is. It's not  
19 going to be lost on them. They know the other stories. And  
20 what they want to do, I think they can do.

21 But I still think that we have to use this avenue,  
22 because they know full well that there is something to be  
23 gained by at least some sort of -- some sort of linkage, some  
24 sort of sharing of information, because it is obviously used  
25 just the way those men in your meeting said -- it can be used,

1 obviously, for the world good, and basically, there are some  
2 people who want some good.

3 The other point I want to make is, we're coming to a  
4 very tough time, and I think that is the message today. I  
5 think they're going to get tough, and when they get tough,  
6 there isn't a whole lot we can do about it. We don't have a  
7 lot to show.

8 There is one very important thing I think we've got  
9 to remember, and that is there are refuseniks still in Moscow,  
10 and in Leningrad, and in some ways, they represent the finest  
11 about the people we are trying to get to. Scientists will  
12 not be able to deal with great numbers. I mean, we won't be  
13 able to get out 30,000 people.

14 But we would make a terrible, terrible, terrible  
15 mistake if we neglected the people, whose leverages are out,  
16 like Berlovsky, like Lerner, who are still there. And the  
17 one thing we can do right now is to make sure that American  
18 scientists who do go to the Soviet Union, go to see these  
19 people, and strengthen their morale. I think that's probably  
20 the most important thing we would be able to do.

21 DR. MINKER: Max?

22 DR. GOTTESMAN: Just a brief comment, which is really  
23 an anecdote, and that is that my dealings with Soviets, offi-  
24 cial Soviets, those who are not refuseniks nor dissidents,  
25 and are not applying to stay here, have been really less than



1 happy. We've talked about meeting with the Soviet scientific  
2 attache, Makarov. I've met him on several occasions. The man  
3 is a virulent anti-Semite. On the first occasion, he talked  
4 to me about, "You Jews are so clever, but we are a mighty  
5 nation," et cetera, et cetera.

6 On the second occasion, at the NIH, he spoke to Jack  
7 about -- asked, why you are so concerned over a few people of  
8 German extraction.

9 I had a Soviet scientist in my lab on an official  
10 visit, and I asked him about the refuseniks, what motivated  
11 them, and he just went like this (indicating).

12 Efforts through members of the Soviet Academy of  
13 Science, like Bill Keene, the head of the Cancer Institute --  
14 we just entertained Bill Keene for a week at NIH -- to inter-  
15 vene on behalf of a refusenik, were totally -- he said he had  
16 never heard of the guy, although he was actually in his labora-  
17 tory.

18 So, Soviet scientists may talk about peace and co-  
19 operation. I am not terribly impressed with that.

20 On the other hand, international conferences must be  
21 open to all people who apply to go, as part of the interna-  
22 tional rule that validates a scientific conference. And that  
23 avenue, I think, is a very effective one, and must be pursued,  
24 and probably the only avenue we can pursue it.

25 DR. MINKER: Earl Callen?

1 DR. CALLEN: I'll try to make it very brief. I'll  
2 also respond with an anecdote.

3 The American Physical Society, the scientists who  
4 have been doing human rights, I guess, since 1973 now -- and  
5 in 1977, I was invited to give a talk at a meeting of the  
6 International Clinical Science Association, about the history  
7 of human rights in the scientific societies. And the reason I  
8 was invited, they had a session on whether political scien-  
9 tists should consider human rights a significant issue for  
10 political science.

11 I said, I can't believe this. We are supposed to  
12 be the automatons, and you invited me here to tell the human-  
13 ists whether you should care about human rights? It just  
14 stunned me.

15 And in '79, they didn't consider it important enough  
16 (inaudible). Anyway, the point that you made again and again  
17 about international conferences being open, is one that we  
18 have to look at very carefully here.

19 I'm sorry to say that a prior Administration started  
20 a policy which is continuing, and getting worse now, which  
21 undercuts that terribly, and that is, we have always made the  
22 claim. At Moscow, in '73, we boycotted the (inaudible),  
23 because we said, people are being excluded from this confer-  
24 ence because of political reasons, not scientific reasons.

25 For the same thing to happen here (inaudible), for

1 the United States government to say that these people can't  
2 come -- good scientists can't come, in that case, people from  
3 Soviet bloc countries, or two Chinese students, can't attend  
4 because of other considerations -- in that case, because they  
5 would learn secrets about technology, you know -- it undercuts  
6 our position terribly, because it introduces precisely the  
7 kind of argument of other considerations -- political argu-  
8 ments, so-called national security -- it's a fraudulent argu-  
9 ment, and anyone can see that, but that's what they invoke.

10 They say, national security, but we do the same  
11 thing when we talk credibility among ourselves (inaudible).  
12 And I think we're in terrible danger. That's exactly the  
13 argument (inaudible) the AAA asked me to make -- there's  
14 hearings on it before Congressman Dan Brown's committee, and  
15 limited access, so that there are secrets going their way.  
16 Technology transfer -- all of these are concerns about techno-  
17 logy transfer.

18 When we say that an open scientific meeting can't  
19 be attended, and the State Department is going to tell us who  
20 can come, on other grounds than who is a good scientist, then  
21 we have lost our credibility in the argument that the Soviets  
22 can't do the same thing over there.

23 And I think that is not only a serious threat to  
24 American science, along with other issues -- it is not only a  
25 disaster for the welfare of American science, but it's a disaster

1 for human rights as well.

2 I'd like to stress another point, the point that Dr.  
3 Shulman made before, and that is the difficulty of not being a  
4 hardliner. In any kind of committee, the strongest (inaudible)  
5 takes a stronger position (inaudible).

6 Right now, we have just that model, because the  
7 SOS started a boycott, and I believe in that boycott, a boy-  
8 cott of Soviet science. (Inaudible) boycotts, by their very  
9 nature, have only a limited kind of effect. Any time people  
10 start paying attention to them, the Soviets get over, and it  
11 loses its impact. So you have to find a way to resolve that.

12 It's very difficult for the American scientific  
13 community to now come to terms with what is a resolution --  
14 how do we make a deal? If you try to say, look, let's make a  
15 deal, then you (inaudible) to cave in, you know.

16 On the other hand, if you don't do anything, you'll  
17 surely lose. In time, you'll get nothing for it. So we have  
18 that internal problem in the scientific community right now.  
19 What is the best deal we can make, and how do we go about it?

20 Now, a suggestion which was recently made, at the  
21 annual meeting -- which I made at the Committee of Concerned  
22 Scientists, to sort of give Frank Press and the National  
23 Academy an indication that they can make a good deal, they  
24 can pull back on their boycott -- that was tabled, and probably  
25 properly so, because people who were sensitive, in the Academy,



1 said, they'll simply cave in if you tell them that we're not  
2 (inaudible) angry, they'll do it for nothing. Maybe that's  
3 right, you know. I voted to table it (inaudible).

4 But somehow we have to find a way to decide on  
5 what's a good price, and try to extract it. But to do nothing  
6 is to get no price at all, and it will surely die. I don't  
7 know how we'll do that, but we've got to do that.

8 We cannot, in that process, distinguish between  
9 refuseniks and dissidents. And Sakharov put that argument to  
10 shame -- he's a non-Jew. And we cannot say, we'll settle on  
11 Berlovsky and a few Jews, and let Sakharov and a few dissi-  
12 dents go.

13 And when we go there, we can't say (inaudible)  
14 refuseniks, when we know (inaudible).

15 (Tape change.)

16 PARTICIPANT: I want to say from the outset that I  
17 thought your remarks were generally intelligent and sensible  
18 and generous, but you did take a slight at IREX, in passing.  
19 Now, of course, I'm not a scientist, and I think of IREX in  
20 terms of, not who comes here from the Soviet Union, but those  
21 of us who go there. And although I allow the force of your  
22 point, that under the circumstance, we can't fully determine  
23 who goes, either, I speak now as a member of a community who  
24 spends their time analyzing the Soviet Union, trying to under-  
25 stand it, and so on. And that community is in very considerable

1 disarray, and has been for a number of years, and that disarray  
2 is much more public, and getting worse.

3 I think if IREX were to disappear, tomorrow or next  
4 month or next year, that we would put ourselves in a tremen-  
5 dously serious situation, in terms not of our scientific  
6 abilities, but of our abilities to understand the Soviets,  
7 and particularly over the course of the next generation.

8 And although I -- again, let me reiterate that I  
9 understand the force of what you're saying, and I understand  
10 your feeling when a Soviet IREX scientist turns up in your  
11 lecture hall, I think it would be a disaster, for our ability  
12 to comprehend their world, if IREX were to disappear. It  
13 would be a long time before individuals and universities  
14 could begin to recover, in ways of sending Americans to the  
15 Soviet Union.

16 So I think it's not right on the subject, but it's  
17 an important point.

18 DR. MINKER: No, it's on the subject. My comments  
19 were what I would do. I'm not saying what everyone should do,  
20 nor am I saying what all scientists should do, nor did I advo-  
21 cate the abolishment of IREX.

22 PARTICIPANT: Well, I thought I heard that.

23 DR. MINKER: No, I just said that this is what I did,  
24 and this is what I said, and I said that there should be multi-  
25 levels. In science, there must be multi-levels. Everyone has

1 his own opinion, and they must be respected.

2 Okay. Jerry would like to make some remarks. He  
3 met some of the Soviet scientists a few months ago.

4 MR. GOODMAN: As I indicated earlier, I was in the  
5 Soviet Union in January, and I had an opportunity to meet with  
6 many of the scientists, on several occasions, actually --  
7 twice in the home of Yuri Medvedkov, who was the spokesman  
8 recently at a press conference where 13 scientists signed a  
9 new document, if you will.

10 It's interesting, because his reflection -- Yuri  
11 Medvedkov was Soviet representative at the World Health Organi-  
12 zation in Geneva for three years. He is a geographer, and  
13 therefore does not apply in the terms that we have been  
14 accustomed to applying to scientists.

15 And, in fact, there is a change taking place. Many  
16 of the people who were his friends were indeed scientists,  
17 people in that room, but not all -- and they distinguished to  
18 me, a non-scientist, although I'm a political scientist by  
19 training if not by intent, suggesting that we must differen-  
20 tiate between those people.

21 There were scientists, and there were mathematicians,  
22 and there were cartographers, and there were all sorts of --  
23 and research people, and they have different needs. And so I  
24 bring -- for those of us to begin to understand how the commu-  
25 nity there is becoming more and more complex, as it becomes

1 more and more variegated.

2           What is clear, though, and this has not changed --  
3 that group, even if we apply the term "scientists," small "s",  
4 still remains in the leadership of the Jewish emigration  
5 movement, regardless of whether they may have other affilia-  
6 tions, or whatever else they do. And that's, I guess, some-  
7 what elitist, but we must understand, as they did -- they  
8 pointed out to me constantly, not that I really needed it, but  
9 I guess it was useful -- this is very much in the Russian  
10 tradition, the intelligentsia being an elite group, and in the  
11 leadership of many, many movements.

12           But this leadership also played a role, not only in  
13 the emigration movement, but also among Jews generally. They  
14 became, for a community without rabbis, the new rabbis, if you  
15 will. And what is happening is that they are now being de-  
16 frocked by Soviet authorities. We don't yet know how wide-  
17 spread this "defrocking," in quotes, will be.

18           What do I mean? A number of them, if you're not  
19 aware of it, have had their academic credentials and degrees  
20 taken away from them, Medvedkov himself, and his wife, who  
21 is also a cartographer, being among those threatened with  
22 actually having this done to them.

23           What does this mean? Not that they're looking for  
24 jobs -- they've been fired, they are unemployed. More insidi-  
25 ous is that, as their academic degrees are taken away from



1 them and their professional status is removed, any of their  
2 research which they have published can be stolen, because  
3 theoretically they don't exist any more, as Professor So-and-  
4 So, as Dr. So-and-So.

5 Therefore, their names can be removed from papers  
6 that have been published previously by these very same indi-  
7 viduals. I assume, therefore, someone else can merely slap on  
8 his or her name to that document, and say, "It's mine," and  
9 since that other person no longer has academic credentials,  
10 they can't say, "It's my research," because you don't exist in  
11 the scholarly-academic-professional world -- a very, very odd  
12 twist, and something that is of grave concern to a number of  
13 these scientists.

14 Now, I cannot say it has happened to many. We don't  
15 really know, but there was sufficient alarm expressed by this  
16 group to suggest that some have actually had this happen.  
17 Some have been threatened with it. They themselves don't know.  
18 But what does it mean to take it away? They come in and take  
19 your degree from your room.

20 But there is this fear that this will be a form of  
21 punishment, to begin to destroy this leadership in the move-  
22 ment.

23 Finally, the Sunday seminars, who had their last  
24 meetings in the Berlovsky home, and then attempted to meet  
25 elsewhere, and could not, indeed don't meet on Sunday. The

1 Sunday seminars meet, on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday,  
2 or whatever. They live, in other words, but they have switched  
3 tactics.

4 The scientists will gather, on call. They have not  
5 surrendered. Some people believe that they have surrendered.  
6 What is happening is that they have shifted tactics. They  
7 will meet, on different occasions, in different apartments.  
8 They will meet when the need is expressed by themselves or  
9 from the outside, which means they are welcoming visitors.  
10 And, here, they want political as well as physical scientists  
11 -- anybody who can come, and if they know in advance that  
12 such people are coming, they will meet, as they did in my  
13 case, and they met with me.

14 So that there is that kind of resistance, I suppose,  
15 which continues, and while I can't say it's well, at least it's  
16 alive.

17 DR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you, Jerry. I think we're  
18 at the point where we can -- we have a few more minutes, about  
19 20 minutes. We do want to close on time, and many of you do  
20 have to leave. I think we can talk about some general points.

21 I'd like to say just a word or two about Dr.  
22 Minker's fine presentation. The thing that strikes me about  
23 it, of course, there are the differences on tactics, and it is  
24 very hard to know what another person's problems are. I know  
25 what the problems were, because I was one of the three official

1 American delegates to the political science convention in  
2 Moscow, and the essential problem was that we had no clout  
3 with the people, the Europeans, who constituted the majority  
4 of the delegates. We could not carry that emotion. Indeed,  
5 the American delegation was split. It was unfortunate, but  
6 nevertheless it was clearly impossible to carry a motion to  
7 get Lerner in, or to abandon the Congress altogether, which  
8 might have been a better solution.

9           And there were certain side benefits for many of us  
10 as individuals. Now, again, with IREX, I don't agree with  
11 everything IREX has done, especially in the last Administra-  
12 tion, when it seemed to me that it was being used for circu-  
13 lating delegations around the countryside and other moves  
14 that did not, as far as I could see, serve academic progress,  
15 but served, shall we say, the political goal of detente.

16           It is true, nevertheless, that as Tom Gleason said,  
17 it has been a tremendous morale factor for the humanities and  
18 social sciences, and a great deal more than that, at least in  
19 the past; and I have always supported the scholarly exchange  
20 on a one-for-one basis. The difficulty was keeping the pro-  
21 fessional staff and some of their government contacts honest,  
22 some few years ago, in doing this on a one-for-one, hard-  
23 bargaining basis, instead of for the purpose of creating a  
24 certain impression in American public opinion.

25           But these are very complex tactical points, and I

1 think the benefit, from hearing from all of the scientists  
2 present, is this -- to me, it has been a revelation that the  
3 physical scientists are more intent, or willing, to make --  
4 although I think they may have a couple of contradictions in  
5 their attitude about having absolutely open congresses in the  
6 United States, and at the same time refusing to receive some  
7 of these specialists in their lectures -- it's a bit hard for  
8 me to reconcile, but that's their problem, again, a tactical  
9 problem.

10 I think the revelation is that there is a large, as  
11 I said before, very significant community, which is ready to  
12 get out in front. And I think several recognize that this  
13 was not always the case. It was not the case when the ex-  
14 changes began 20 years ago. They were way behind, the politi-  
15 cal scientists and others who dealt professionally with the  
16 Soviet Union, at least, in their willingness and indeed eager-  
17 ness to have large exchanges with the Soviet Union.

18 This goes to the essence, it seems to me, of our  
19 problem in the West, and not merely in terms of different dis-  
20 ciplines, and not merely in terms of different nationalities.  
21 It is impossible to coordinate, or so it has seemed, over the  
22 past 30 to 35 years that I have been watching the situation  
23 closely.

24 Yet, we had -- in the '50's, the Germans were way out  
25 in front. They were the whipping boys for the Soviets. They



1 were being pressed on all kinds of -- warmongers, and Fascists,  
2 and so on, and they took it, with bad grace, but the moment  
3 they saw a chance to move away from that deadly position, they  
4 moved away from it, and now they have gone over to the oppo-  
5 site end of the spectrum.

6 The French have shifted back and forth. The British  
7 now are among the hardliners. At one time, not so many years  
8 ago, their position was as soft as could be found. And, of  
9 course, the United States has shifted, and indeed vacillated,  
10 as we have all noticed today, in a manner which, whether it  
11 has any internal logic or not, is utterly confusing to our  
12 counterparts in other countries -- utterly confusing.

13 And this has happened within the United States, in  
14 other groups. Today, in my University of Wisconsin, the soil  
15 scientists, the biological scientists, are much stronger,  
16 relatively speaking, than the physical scientists, and they  
17 are still eager, those I know, at least, to deal with the  
18 Soviets on almost any terms.

19 One of my neighbors, and a good friend, is going  
20 over to the Soviet Union this week. And he is going over there  
21 to deal with his counterparts, whom he has received in Madison  
22 many times, without any conditions, without any effort to put  
23 any pressure on them in any way, for his colleagues or any  
24 others, and he is apparently loudly applauded for doing this  
25 by the majority of his colleagues in Madison, at least, who

1 are in his particular biological field.

2 And we live in a free society, and we are trying to  
3 deal with a society which is not free. We all recognize that.

4 The question is whether, in the long haul, we can  
5 do that effectively, even on what we all recognize is a tre-  
6 mendously important issue, in terms of human rights, and yet,  
7 from a total strategic and global geopolitical perspective, an  
8 issue which is not the most decisive one.

9 And I think, if we have comments on this, we ought  
10 to have a few closing remarks. Murray?

11 DR. FESHBACH: Well, I'd like to address the science  
12 issue (inaudible) I'll skip that. I certainly agree, though  
13 I think we didn't play hard enough regarding economists as  
14 opposed to 13th century Tartar literature -- that, I certainly  
15 agree with.

16 PARTICIPANT: Murray, I want you to point to me the --

17 DR. FESHBACH: Please, you know the basic principle  
18 that I'm talking about. You have to --

19 PARTICIPANT: That's a frequently repeated point.

20 DR. FESHBACH: It's my point.

21 Okay, in terms of the International Political Science  
22 Association, whatever it did do, was it allowed nine Israelis  
23 to go who would not have gotten visas, so there was a certain  
24 demonstration, in effect, in that sense, also.

25 In terms of the physics, astrophysics and graduate

1 students, if you have numbers on how many students there are  
2 in these fields, I would dearly love to see it, because that  
3 is not published at all, and you can't split fish from mud --  
4 that is, physics from mathematics, in any way, shape or form.  
5 And since it was an American lecturing, I assume lots of  
6 people came, not necessarily those who were specifically at  
7 that place as graduate students. But I may be wrong, and I  
8 would love to be informed to the opposite.

9 On exchanges, I was a member of five different work-  
10 ing groups on that, particularly in the science policy area,  
11 though one of my failings is that this Feshbach is not a phy-  
12 sical scientist, but a social scientist, although there were  
13 other Feshbachs involved in this business.

14 And I thought I got an enormous amount out of the  
15 exchanges. I never expected 100 for 100, because that would  
16 be insane, but to get 30 or 40 is a hell of a lot better than  
17 five or six, without the exchanges. And then there's also a  
18 demonstration effect. I did what I had to do. When it was  
19 Yom Kippur, I did not go to Spaso House, I went to the syna-  
20 gogue, period, as opposed to an invitation to a big party at  
21 the Embassy. And then the next day, when we did business,  
22 they knew where I was.

23 Now, I was a member of USG at the time. I'm not  
24 any more, but I did what I had to do. So, in a sense, I  
25 think there were gains and there were losses.

1           The problems with the exchanges, as far as I'm  
2 concerned, is we didn't lead from strength. And strength, in  
3 a sense, meant ignorance. That is, knowledge as opposed to  
4 ignorance. Now, most of the delegations went totally ignorant  
5 of the Soviet system. And they didn't get briefed, they didn't  
6 get informed, they didn't know where to look, and the Soviets  
7 would respond to you at your level of ignorance, is what I  
8 think it comes to.

9           And that's a large part of the problem. And in terms  
10 of the degrees, I think the writing on the wall came when  
11 VAK was transferred from MINVUZ, from the Ministry of Higher  
12 Education to the Council of Ministers, and that was the key to  
13 the political authorization of degrees, awarding now and pro-  
14 bably removal.

15           Thank you, John.

16           DR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you, Murray.

17           PARTICIPANT: I think I would be remiss unless I  
18 responded to one of Seweryn's many provocative statements.  
19 One is that the particular one that we tend to accept without  
20 challenge, and that is that the Soviets militarily tend to be  
21 (inaudible). And there is perhaps an appropriate anecdote,  
22 which I will repeat for those of you who don't regularly read  
23 the New York Daily News.

24           (Laughter.)

25           PARTICIPANT: Several years ago, on the anniversary



1 -- the eve of the anniversary of the October Revolution, the  
2 Soviet (inaudible) was tied up in Riga, when the frigate  
3 (inaudible) was taken over by a mutinous crew. I said several  
4 years ago -- this was in the late '70's, taken over by a muti-  
5 nous crew, which hauled anchor and sailed out of Riga harbor,  
6 it got in sight of Rutland. The pursuing vessels, which  
7 included its sister ship, arrived, and were unable to overtake  
8 it. The Soviet Air Force, in these clouds of rain and snow  
9 squalls, firing shots across the bow, was unable to stop it,  
10 and finally they received orders to bomb it.

11 They couldn't afford to let a Soviet frigate defect  
12 to Sweden. So they came down through the clouds. They bombed  
13 the ship, shot it dead in the water -- except it was their  
14 own ship, the sister ship.

15 (Laughter.)

16 PARTICIPANT: The fleeing ship, however, stopped  
17 dead in the water, fearful of what was going to happen. They  
18 put a prize crew aboard. All of the stricken ship backed  
19 into Riga, but they took off the 21 mutineers, who had been  
20 led by the political officer, who happened to be Jewish. It's  
21 a true story. Unfortunately, it is all for the Soviet Union  
22 -- the story only differs from here whether all 21 or 15 were  
23 shot at dockside, or three blocks away, two weeks later.

24 I submit that, while the Soviet Armed Forces build  
25 up, there is no denying that that fact -- that their armed

1 forces have as many warps and wins, perhaps, as our own, and  
2 has made battle tanks, among other things.

3 The second anecdote that deals with the point that  
4 Dick Davies raised early on, and that Murray talked to a bit,  
5 in the sense of pressures for assimilation. I happened to  
6 have been in Moscow at a time when the pressures, or the  
7 desires, for deassimilation were very large, that is, in the  
8 aftermath of the Six-Day War.

9 Quite literally, the first major celebration since  
10 October, for example, occurred in the Pearl Synagogue, and  
11 literally I sensed thousands of Jews coming out and celebrat-  
12 ing their Jewishness.

13 And I would submit that, given comparable occasions,  
14 in the future, and I wouldn't rule them out -- no one can,  
15 but many of the people that you would think today had been  
16 assimilated, are deassimilated again.

17 DR. ARMSTRONG: Yes?

18 DR. WHELAN: My name is Joe Whelan, with Congressional  
19 Research Service, and just for the scientists here, I want to  
20 mention that I just completed an extensive chapter on Soviet  
21 and international cooperation in space, and Volume I is sup-  
22 posed to come out within the next few months.

23 And about this, I just want to make the very obvious  
24 generalization in this study, and it is that much of the co-  
25 operation -- it depends upon the political atmosphere of both

1 countries over a particular period of time. This covers the  
2 period from '76 to '80, and it has been very interesting to  
3 watch, to see how, from the time of the period of detente,  
4 there was intensive cooperation, and then how, just gradually,  
5 it has declined, so that, when you get to the Afghanistan  
6 invasion, here, again, we reach where we can to hurt them,  
7 and in this way, we did it by withholding cooperation in space.

8 And I forget just who the scientist was at the time  
9 in NASA, but he made the comment, in effect, that everything  
10 has been put on the back burner, and that, from what I have  
11 been able to see, not up to this point, but at least up to  
12 the last few months, that's where it's been.

13 It's interesting, in this connection, that some of  
14 the -- well, also the point that Mr. Bialer had said, that it  
15 seems that we cannot expect, in quite some time, any getting  
16 back to the period that existed at the time of detente.

17 But it's interesting to note, in addition to this,  
18 that there are things here -- I'm no scientist, and I can't  
19 discuss these things in a technical way. But there are things  
20 at which they have succeeded in doing, that we have not, and  
21 that there are ways that we have gained through this coopera-  
22 tion by flying experiments on their spacecraft.

23 So it isn't all a one-way street, and it makes you  
24 wonder -- this raises a question, with the status of our  
25 space program today, where we are going to be five years from

1 now, compared to where the Soviets are. In the --

2 PARTICIPANT: Can I just comment for a moment? This  
3 is a serious problem, and the craziest thing is that, at this  
4 point, where the information direction in our direction would  
5 be most important, we are sort of cutting it off.

6 DR. WHELAN: Yes, exactly.

7 PARTICIPANT: It is very frustrating along these  
8 lines. Just to give you a little feeling, because we are in  
9 the midst of negotiating right now for future programs, with  
10 the cutoff, it is coming to the point that no new initiatives  
11 will be allowed. The only initiative that has been started,  
12 up to now, and may be continued, and I think that's quite  
13 important, because of the successes, and the very active pro-  
14 gram that the Soviets are going to have for the next five years.

15 DR. WHELAN: And one thing, from our past experiences,  
16 too -- it's very hard to get these things going again, when  
17 the political environment has spoiled to the extent that it  
18 is today, and it does take a good deal to get it back on track  
19 again.

20 PARTICIPANT: I wonder -- we had some questions this  
21 morning, and I think this dialogue is an extremely important  
22 one. I hate to see it ending now, because I think ideas are  
23 starting to emerge, and some of the suggestions that were  
24 made this morning, in terms of continued studies and -- I'm  
25 still concerned about the "dropout" word. I hope that we can



1 consider other ways of using that. And many other points were  
2 brought up today. Is there any mechanism by which we can con-  
3 tinue a bit of this dialogue, towards evolving, maybe, some  
4 new approaches? I think what you hear all day today is that  
5 things have changed, and we're just starting to realize it,  
6 and maybe we should start looking at how to react to these  
7 changes, and now that we're realizing it, what do we do from  
8 here?

9 DR. ARMSTRONG: Let me say that I can't really  
10 answer that question, except that there isn't much more time  
11 today. But let me say this -- there are lots of forums. I  
12 mean, this is one, dealing with the Jewish question. I have  
13 another one coming up, a more specialized group, in the  
14 summer, and one in Germany, dealing with the Germans, whom I  
15 consider very, very important in this whole deal.

16 And then we have the International Political Science  
17 Association meeting in Rio de Janeiro, shall we say, a neutral  
18 place, in August, and these various forums all require this  
19 kind of input, though in different ways and in different doses.

20 But I think B'nai B'rith has done a fine job in hav-  
21 ing these two meetings. This is only the second, is it not,  
22 Warren? The other was actually -- you kept referring to last  
23 year, but it really was the year before last, I know very well,  
24 because I couldn't make it in 1980. I could, in 1981.

25 Maybe the solution, I want to suggest to Warren and

1 Bill Korey, is more frequent ones.

2 PARTICIPANT: Sure. I welcome the action, and I  
3 think we're going to pursue -- I think there are a lot of ideas  
4 that suddenly have appeared here, and I think we ought to pro-  
5 vide an opportunity for ventilating that -- maybe get down to  
6 specific strategies and tactics.

7 And I take to heart what Greg Massell has said from  
8 the very beginning, and I shall try to assume the responsibil-  
9 ity, Greg, of putting them all together and linking the two in  
10 a very systematic way.

11 We haven't been doing that, and it was just a matter  
12 of time. And I hope to be doing that in connection with  
13 Madrid, to systematically analyze what happened at Madrid, and  
14 how best -- what the shortcomings were, and I hope to be doing  
15 that in a major article.

16 But I think your recommendation was a very good one,  
17 and perhaps we ought to move to a systematic summing up, lead-  
18 ing to further discussion.

19 DR. ARMSTRONG: I think Warren Eisenberg has a couple  
20 of special business announcements.

21 MR. EISENBERG: Well, it's not very special. I  
22 would indicate that we have been taping this with an eye to,  
23 at least, providing you with some sort of a transcript.

24 Maybe in reacting to the transcript, because many  
25 suggestions were made, and I think seeing it on paper, you can

1 start better defining goals, and I think that's one of the  
2 things that we want to look at -- the fact that a fair body  
3 of information has been delivered.

4 I think that this meeting was tighter than last  
5 year's, in terms of direction. And I think, from that view-  
6 point, it's easier to provide you with information. And I  
7 think maybe your reactions to that would be helpful in terms  
8 of designing a strategy. That's simply all I wanted to add.

9 DR. ARMSTRONG: Thank you, Warren, and I think we  
10 will now adjourn. I would express my thanks to B'nai B'rith  
11 as an organization which has always --

12 (Applause.)

13 DR. ARMSTRONG: But very specifically to Warren  
14 Eisenberg.

15 MR. EISENBERG: Thank you, can I add --

16 DR. ARMSTRONG: Did you want to add something?

17 MR. EISENBERG: I was going to add the National Con-  
18 ference.

19 DR. ARMSTRONG: Oh, yes, and the National Conference  
20 on Soviet Jewry, and to Bill Korey, who I know played an in-  
21 strumental part in organizing this, and the entire staff who  
22 have worked on it and made it a pleasant place for us to be,  
23 but above all to those of you who came and spent your time  
24 here, and contributed so vigorously, and for the bit of discord,  
25 which was good for the cause.

1 Thank you.

2 (Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m., the meeting was adjourned.)

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REMARKS OF MAX M. KAMPELMAN  
AT ANNUAL SOLIDARITY AWARD  
DINNER OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE  
ON SOVIET JEWRY, JUNE 1, 1981,  
ROOSEVELT HOTEL, NEW YORK, N.Y.

Thank you very much. It is an honor for me to be associated with the National Conference on Soviet Jewry and to receive your award. Let me assure you that my appreciation for the award, which I will cherish, is in no way diminished by my sharing with you some personal questions I have about it and our work.

Our Madrid meeting is still in session. We began in September of last year. It is now nine months and in that period, in spite of Madrid, there have been at least 46 arrests of human rights activists and no increase in the departure of Jews from the Soviet Union. Indeed, in the whole of 1980 it appears as if there were at least 242 arrests of human rights activists, Jews and non-Jews, the largest number of such arrests in the Soviet Union in the past 15 years.

You will understand, therefore, when I ask myself whether our program in Madrid, my leadership of our country's efforts at the CSCE meeting there and, indeed, all of our activities and meetings and speeches, in and out of Government, have attained the objectives that would warrant our awarding one another.

(A) I recall a serious evening's discussion in Madrid with our old friend, Nehemia Levanon, the Israeli expert on Soviet Jewish affairs. He started our conversation by enthusiastically commending the efforts of the American delegation. It is true that at the last meeting in Belgrade our delegation had mentioned

a total of 6 names of Soviet dissidents who had been imprisoned; and in Madrid, as of today, we have probably by now mentioned more than 80 names. It is true that in Belgrade, we were the only country who mentioned the names of dissidents; and in Madrid by now there have probably been 11 or 12 countries who have mentioned specific names.

But I interrupted Nehemia to ask: "What good does it do? We have mentioned names but none have been released since Madrid began (this was before Joseph Mendelévitch)." Nehemia then set about to reassure me and I needed some after a long and tiring day. He said we must have patience. The evidence seemed clear that when the name of a prisoner of conscience was mentioned, there was at least some temporary improvement in his human condition. Furthermore, our efforts gave heart to our brethren who were caught in the Soviet vise. Beyond that, one could only hope, he said with confidence, that the combined and united voices of the West would have its effect on the decision-makers within the Soviet Union. "Wait and see," he said. "We have already saved 250,000 Jews. There will be many more. It will work." Like you, therefore, I wait and see.

When this waiting and seeing results, not just in 80 or 90 or 100 names being mentioned in international fora, but in tens of thousands of Soviet Jews having the right to emigrate if they wish; and hundreds of prisoners of conscience released from prison - then and only then will I feel with a depth of conviction that this award, which I gratefully receive from you this evening, is deserved.]

In the meantime, you and I will continue our efforts. We have done so together and we must continue to do so together. I remember the visit of Burt and Anita Levinson and Jerry Goodman to Madrid. I remember their impressive work with a Congressional delegation that was spending that week in Madrid with us. But I also remember their effort, along with others, with delegates from other countries.

And I remember the superb work performed by Ted Mann and Stanley Lowell, who served during the first phase of our meeting as public members of our delegation. Stanley and Ted worked. They worked with our staff and helped to stimulate them. They worked on speeches and made significant contributions. They worked with other delegates. Their value to me was not only that of friends and advisers, but also as intensive partners in helping to create an atmosphere in Madrid which made Soviet violations of human rights a central theme of our meetings.

Our chief problem, the problem of the West, the challenge of our religious and moral values - all of these are represented by the military strength, the ideological aggression and the paranoid inhumanity of the Soviet society and its system.

Our ancient Rabbis tell us that in each one of us as human beings there is a "yotzer hatov" and a "yotzer hara" - that part of us which is good and that part of us which is evil. This was later adopted by Freud and is central to much of his contribution to the understanding of human behavior. The great Protestant Theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, called it "children of light and children of darkness."

These two natures of man are constantly being put to the test. I respectfully suggest that human institutions face the same inner contradiction, so that international relations and the behavior of nations and societies also must come to grips with this duality of the human capacity, a capacity for good and a capacity for evil.

That which is Godlike in each one of us must constantly struggle to assert its strength and, through the process of evolution, strive to evolve into the dominant force in our motivation, our behaviour, or being.

Democratic society and democratic philosophy, the principle of individual human rights, the commitment to liberty and to compassion in the affairs of men and women, these, in my opinion, are the political expression of that which represents the Godlike within us. Human slavery, brutality, terrorism, the domination of the state over the social, political and economic life of the individual - these represent the baser savage-like ingredients of the human spirit, from which we strive to escape.

The audience this evening is primarily a Jewish audience. The purpose of our organization is to work in behalf of Soviet Jewry. The question logically follows: "Why must the Jewish community be preserved? What is there in the Jewish essence that calls for survival at the same time as it produces the hostility and the enmity of anti-semitism, which has been a part of our lives and those of our ancestors throughout history?"



The great contribution of the ancient Hebrew tribes was the statement of faith that there was only one God - a conviction that was hostile to the prevailing ancient belief that our actions on earth were governed by different Gods. The strength of that belief in a single God has had consequences of earth-shaking proportion. If there is only one God, then we are each of us children of that God and thus brothers and sisters to one another. Here is the essence of human brotherhood.

Democracy is the political expression of that aspiration. To the extent that Judaism has survived through the ages, to the extent there can be any excuse for its continued survival, it must be to proclaim this message of the universality of the human being. In some etheral and perhaps mystical manner, that message of faith and strength, which is the essence of the ever-present Hebrew prayer, "Shma Yisroel," - the Lord our God the Lord is one - is the enemy of man's inhumanity to man, of totalitarianism, whether of the right or the left. It is our destiny to represent and symbolize that stretching of the human being to God-like proportions. It is our obligation actively to engage in the continuing struggle for the nature of man and for civilized behavior in the conduct of international affairs.

Here then, perhaps, is the answer to our question. We must assert our values and denounce those who would drag mankind back to a baser, more animal-like self. We speak out, we organize, we mobilize, we write, we protest, and we give awards, - because all of this is part of the evolutionary struggle for a higher form of human being; and it is our task to engage in that struggle.

To do less is to abdicate to the "yatzer hara" in us and to abandon our responsibility as Jews and as human beings.

This is a struggle which Josef Mendeleevitch engaged in for 10 years. Hillel Butman for 9 years. This is a struggle for which Ida Nudel and Alexander Lerner and Yuri Orlov, and Victor Brailovsky and Vladimir Slepak and many thoughts of our brothers and sisters continue to suffer for. This is a struggle in which the great Raoul Wallenberg engaged in. And that is why we must mention their names and identify ourselves with their sacrifices. We can do no less. We must do much more.

And what we do we must do with consistency and with clarity. The fact that the President of the United States sent a greeting to Andre Sakharov on his 60th birthday is part of that message of consistency and is indispensable if we are going to accomplish our goals. It was not enough that scientists and humanitarians all over the world call for his release from exile. It is essential that governments do so as well. It is not enough that I speak for the United States Government in Madrid in behalf of the victims of Soviet society. It requires the voices of the highest authorities. And I am proud that Ronald Reagan, just as Jimmy Carter before him, has called for Andre Sakharov's release as he did so eloquently in recent weeks.

This message of constancy and concern, this message of determination was also vividly communicated last week when Avital Shcharansky and Joseph Mendeleevitch were invited to visit the President and Vice President of the United States. That message, carried by the photographs of that visit, have already had their effect throughout all of the world and that includes within the

Soviet Union as well.

Madrid is only one forum in this wider struggle for the supremacy of the human spirit; and it is a forum we are utilizing. The other day, at a similar function, I was given an opportunity to reminisce about Madrid. Let me share with you one recollection that will never be obliterated from my mind or from my soul.

[ It was the second night of Hanukah in Madrid in a room set aside at the Hotel Castellana so that there might be a candle lighting ceremony. My wife and one of my daughters were there with me. A number of the heads of other western delegations were there too. A call was placed. During the midst of the candle lighting ceremony, the phone rang in that hotel room. It was Moscow on the line. Our call went through. A number of Jewish refuseniks had assembled that second night of Hanukah in the apartment of Abe Stolar. I went to the phone. I told our friends what we were doing in Madrid. They asked questions and unnecessarily thanked us. We introduced the heads of other delegations. We assured them that they had friends in Madrid and elsewhere. They were not forgotten. There wasn't a dry eye in that room that night.

I have handwritten letters in my possession addressed to me by Ida Milgrom, Anatoly Shcharansky's mother; by Andre Sakarov, with suggestions and encouragement; by Irina Orlov, appealing in behalf of her husband. I have brought these letters to the attention of the Madrid meeting on behalf of the American government. And I have said to the Soviet delegation, which outrageously identifies itself as a worker's state and as a socialist society that the actions of their government prove the lie of their claims.

The Soviets assert in private and in public meetings that the welfare of the masses of people is superior to the rights of individuals and that those who challenge their society by claiming their own individual human rights and supporting the rights of others are thus lawless and criminal.

We respond that no broader good can justify the systematic oppression of human beings. We say that those societies that espouse that distinction between the rights of individuals and the welfare of the masses neither meet the needs of individuals nor the needs of the masses.

We also say that the Helsinki Final Act gives us the right - in addition to our duty as human beings - to assert ourselves and to object with persistence to violations of that Act by the Soviet Union and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Thirty-five countries signed that undertaking in Helsinki in 1975. We are now being asked by the Soviet Union to accept new proposals in disarmament and trade, and we say in behalf of the American people: "How can we have confidence in your new undertakings when you keep violating your old ones?"

The issue is not one of human rights alone. The issue is one that is basic to the integrity as a nation. We must continue to make it clear to the Soviet Union that until such time as we see that they are fulfilling the commitments they made in 1975, we will look with suspicion upon every other proposed agreement in every other area of our relations with one another. The strength and clarity of that message is indispensable to our national well-being. It is what a united Western voice has been



proclaiming in Madrid - a message of conscience.

I now return to your award and to your organization. The true reward for all of us will be the attainment of an international atmosphere, which our own government's leadership must help achieve, in which the dignity of the human being is the basic standard by which we judge nations and their place in the international community.

I, therefore, accept your award with gratitude and with full awareness that it is meant to say to all of us that we can do more. I accept it not as a tribute to what I have done, but as an encouragement toward what I must yet do. It is only after we have done all that we can, that we will have our real reward.

Thank you very much. )

# # #