



## Max M. Kampelman Papers

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## ARMS CONTROL

REBUTTAL: The US has always favored genuine arms reductions. It is the Soviet Union which has blocked progress in MBFR; it was the Soviet Union which was unwilling to discuss reduction in theatre nuclear weapons in Europe until NATO decided to introduce counterbalancing systems; it was the Soviet Union which rejected the far reaching arms reduction proposals of the previous US administration.

-- But the situation is more complex. In Eureka Reagan talked about limiting and reducing strategic arms, then he delivered "cold war" speeches in London and at UNSSOD. Second, the Administration leaked documents showing US plans to prevail in nuclear conflict and to conduct protracted nuclear war. These documents show how the US is seeking to mislead public opinion and foreign governments. Third, Reagan has just refused to resume talks on a comprehensive test ban.

REBUTTAL: The US has proposed far reaching proposals in all major areas of arms control: We have tabled a draft MBFR treaty, proposed reducing intermediate range missiles in Europe to zero, sought genuine reductions in SALT and START -- not just a freeze which would lock in place the present Soviet advantages; in his Berlin speech President Reagan proposed confidence building measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war; and we have endorsed the principle of a CDE which would develop additional CSBM's. Soviet assertions are propaganda designed to undermine NATO defense efforts.

-- The U.S. is not negotiating constructively in Geneva (START, INF) and Vienna (MBFR). The notorious zero-option is unacceptable for it would force the USSR unilaterally to disarm even though there is now a balance in Europe of medium-range nuclear weapons.

REBUTTAL: As usual, Moscow wants to have it cake and eat it too. The Soviet Union makes the same argument about the "existing balance" in strategic arms negotiations as it has in INF talks. It demands "compensations" for Western sea and air systems and French and UK systems in both forums and always rationalizes arguments for keeping its advantages. The Soviet Union has far more nuclear weapons than it needs for its defense or to deter any potential aggressor. The reason the USSR acquires excessive military power, beyond the deep insecurity of a leadership which rules without the support of its own people, is to achieve political gains in Europe and throughout the world.

-- There is no alternative to detente and peaceful coexistence. Unleashing political war on the Socialist countries undermines the political basis for arms control.

REBUTTAL: The Soviet Union has been avowedly pursuing "political war" throughout the world since 1917. The USSR itself has undermined the cause of detente. It invaded Afghanistan, a small, weak, nonaligned state that could never pose any security threat. The Soviet Union did this because its leaders are driven by a system obsessed with power and cannot resist the temptation to bend others to their will. It is in the interest of the entire world, including the Soviet people themselves, that the West have sufficient strength and will to counterbalance this tendency of Soviet power to expand to its limits.

Wang (4491A)



## US Arms Control Policy

July 1982

Background: Since the end of World War II, the US has been the leader in serious disarmament and arms control proposals. Many of these have focused on controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. For example, in 1946 the US submitted a proposal (the Baruch plan) for international control of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. In 1955, President Eisenhower presented his "open skies" proposal, under which the US and the USSR would have exchanged blueprints of military establishments and provided for aerial reconnaissance. The Soviets rejected both plans.

Major arms control agreements to which we are a party include the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), which prohibits nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water; the Direct Communications Link or "hot line" agreement (1963), improved in 1971, for use by the US and USSR during international crises; the Outer Space Treaty (1967), which bans placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space; the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), the purpose of which is to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons; the Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1971), which prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction on the seabeds and ocean floor beyond a 12-mile coastal zone; the Accidents Agreement (1971), which provides for US-Soviet measures to reduce the likelihood of accidental nuclear war; the ABM Treaty (1972), which imposes limitations on defense against ballistic missile weapons; and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms (1972), which froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers on either side.

US principles: One of President Reagan's first official acts was to order an intense review of arms control policy, to learn the lessons of the past in order to achieve more lasting progress in the future. Four principles, which the Administration is working to implement, underlie the US approach to arms control. We seek agreements that:

- Produce significant reductions in the arsenals of both sides;
- Result in equal levels of arms on both sides, since an unequal agreement, like an unequal balance of forces, can encourage coercion or aggression;
- Are verifiable, because when national security is at stake, agreements cannot be based upon trust alone; and
- Enhance US and allied security and reduce the risk of war, because arms control is not an end in itself but rather a complement to defense preparations as an important means of underwriting peace and international stability.

US nuclear arms control initiatives: On November 18, 1981, President Reagan offered to cancel deployments of the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) if the USSR would eliminate its SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. The US is negotiating toward this end with the USSR in Geneva. On May 9, the President announced a two-phased



approach to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), which began on June 29, aimed at the following objectives:

- In the first phase, we will seek to reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads on each side by one-third, to about 5,000. No more than half the remaining ballistic missile warheads will be on land-based missiles. We also will seek to cut the total number of all ballistic missiles to an equal level--about half the current US level.
- In the second phase, we will seek further reductions in overall destructive power of each side's arsenal, including an equal ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight below the current US level.

Chemical/biological weapons: The US is party to the two existing international arms control agreements affecting chemical and biological weapons: The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibits the use in war of these weapons; the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972 prohibits the production, development, stockpiling, and transfer of biological and toxin weapons. Both agreements contain a common and fundamental flaw. Neither incorporates adequate means to verify compliance. Soviet compliance with both has been brought into sharp question by events in Southeast and Southwest Asia and in Sverdlovsk in the USSR. Because of this, it is clear that effective verification provisions are essential to future agreement in these fields. The US is committed to achieving a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons development, production, stockpiling, and transfer, and, to that end, we participate in the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR): The MBFR talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, underway in Vienna since 1973, are concerned with the reduction and limitation of conventional forces in Central Europe and with associated confidence-building, stabilization, and verification measures. On June 10, 1982, the President announced in Bonn the new NATO initiative to seek common collective ceilings in the reductions area (the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in the West, and East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in the East) of about 700,000 ground forces and about 900,000 ground and air forces. The NATO initiative also includes measures to encourage cooperation and verify compliance.

Verification and compliance: Arms control agreements with a highly secretive adversary like the USSR cannot be based simply on trust. We must have effective means of verification that enable us to know with confidence whether agreements are being honored. In practice, this means we must be able to monitor activities in the areas covered by such agreements in order to detect any violations; we must be able to do so early enough to permit us to assure Soviet compliance and take steps to offset the effects of any noncompliance. Agreements that cannot be effectively verified are not acceptable. In the past, we have relied primarily on national technical means (NTM) of verification--sophisticated data-collection methods (e.g., photographic, electronic, radar, seismic) operated unilaterally by the US. As arms control agreements, the systems they cover, and the possibilities of concealment become more complex, it will be essential to supplement NTM with some form of "cooperative" verification measures. The Reagan Administration has made clear that the US will insist on verification procedures, including the possibility of measures beyond NTM, if necessary, to insure full compliance with any agreement.

## U.S. ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS - HISTORICAL OUTLINE

Risk of War - Beginning in 1961 the US proposed measures to reduce the risks of war including: advance notification of military movements and maneuvers; observation posts at major transportation centers and air bases; an international commission to study possible further measures including "failure of communication"; exchange of military missions to improve communications and understanding; and establishment of rapid and reliable communications among the heads of governments and with the UN Secretary General. Among the results of these proposals were the "Hotline" Agreement of 1963, the 1971 Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of the Outbreak of Nuclear War, and the 1971 Hotline Modernization Agreement.

Nuclear Test Bans - US proposals and participation in multilateral fora and in bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union beginning in 1955 led to the multilateral Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which prohibits nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water; the unratified (bilateral) 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits underground tests with yields over 150 kilotons; and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty, which governs underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Antarctic Treaty - In 1959, at the US' invitation, the Washington Conference on Antarctica met and negotiated a treaty which was signed and later ratified by 12 nations. The Treaty internationalized and demilitarized the Antarctic continent and served as a model for later "non-armament" treaties that excluded nuclear weapons from outer space, Latin America, and the seabed.

Outer Space - Between 1959 and 1962 the US and its Western Allies made a series of proposals that would ban the use of outer space for aggressive purposes; these resulted in the (multilateral) 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which bans the placing in outer space of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and limits use of celestial bodies to peaceful purposes.

Nuclear Weapons Free Zones - US participation in discussions and international studies on this issue contributed to the 1967 (multilateral) Treaty of Tlatelolco which established a Latin American Nuclear Weapon Freeze Zone, and banned any acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons by the Contracting Parties.

Non Proliferation - US concern with proliferation of nuclear weapons led the US to propose, in 1945, a UN Atomic Energy Commission, and in 1946 the "Baruch Plan" for placing all nuclear resources under international ownership and control. These and later US proposals resulted in the 1968 multilateral Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty, designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and to provide assurance that peaceful activities in the nuclear area, by non-nuclear weapons states, will not be diverted to nuclear weapons purposes.



Seabed Arms Control - Beginning in 1967 US participation and proposals in (multilateral) negotiations contributed to the 1971 Seabed Arms Control Treaty which prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction in the seabed and the ocean floor beyond a 12 mile coastal zone.

Chemical/Biological Weapons - A series of initiatives resulted in the 1925 Geneva Protocol on chemical and biological weapons which prohibits use in war of poisonous gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare. This agreement is essentially a non-first use prohibition, since most states reserve the right to retaliate against enemy first use. In 1969, the U.S. unilaterally renounced possession of biological weapons and destroyed existing stockpiles. This prepared the way for conclusion of the (multilateral) 1972 Biological Weapons Convention which bans development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and acquisition or retention of biological weapons.

Strategic Weapons - US proposals for reducing strategic nuclear offensive and defensive weapons, presented in detail in bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union, resulted in the (bilateral) 1972 ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty, the 1972 Interim Agreement, and further protocols and agreements. On May 9, 1982, the President announced a new two-phased approach to the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) to seek significant reductions to equal and verifiable levels in the strategic forces of the US and USSR.

Intermediate Range Missiles - In 1981, the US proposed a complete ban on longer-range ground launched INF missiles in bilateral negotiations on INF with the USSR in Geneva. These negotiations are continuing.

Conventional Forces - Since 1973, the US and 11 NATO Allies have been negotiating with the members of the Warsaw Pact on the Mutual Balanced Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe. In July 1982, the US and its allies tabled a new proposal, aimed at an agreement on staged reductions and common collective ceilings on ground (700,000) and ground and air force manpower (900,000).

Environmental Modification - Joint US/Soviet efforts begun in 1974 resulted in the 1977 Environmental Modification Convention which bans hostile use of environmental modification techniques.



## SOVIET NUCLEAR BUILDUP

DURING THE PAST DECADE, THE SOVIET UNION HAS MOUNTED A SUSTAINED BUILDUP ACROSS THE ENTIRE RANGE OF ITS NUCLEAR FORCES. IN THE LAST 10 YEARS, THE SOVIETS INTRODUCED AN UNPRECEDENTED ARRAY OF NEW STRATEGIC WEAPONS INTO THEIR ARSENALS, INCLUDING THE SS-17, SS-18, AND SS-19 ICMB'S, THE TYPHOON AND DELTA SUBMARINES AND SEVERAL NEW TYPES OF SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES, AND THE BACKFIRE BOMBER. DURING THIS SAME PERIOD, THE UNITED STATES EXERCISED RESTRAINT AND ONLY INTRODUCED THE TRIDENT MISSILE AND SUBMARINE AND THE CRUISE MISSILE.

## SOVIET NUCLEAR BUILDUP

ICBM's. SINCE 1972 THE SOVIETS HAVE DEVELOPED AND DEPLOYED AT LEAST 10 DIFFERENT VARIANTS OF THREE NEW TYPES OF ICBM's. IN THE SAME PERIOD, THE UNITED STATES DEPLOYED NO NEW TYPES OF ICBM's AND ONLY ONE VARIANT OF THE EXISTING MINUTEMAN. IN 1986, WE PLAN TO BEGIN DEPLOYMENT OF THE MX, THE FIRST NEW U.S. INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE IN 16 YEARS.

SEA-BASED FORCES. THE COMMISSIONING OF THE FIRST U.S. TRIDENT SUBMARINE IN 1982 MARKED THE END OF A 15-YEAR PERIOD DURING WHICH THE UNITED STATES DID NOT BUILD ANY NEW BALISTIC MISSILE-FIRING SUBMARINES. IN THIS SAME PERIOD, THE U.S.S.R. ADDED OVER 60 MISSILE-FIRING SUBMARINES IN FOUR NEW OR IMPROVED CLASSES. THE SOVIETS ARE NOW DEPLOYING TWO NEW TYPES OF MISSILE SUBMARINES -- THE TYPHOON AND THE DELTA III -- WHILE WE ARE BUILDING ONLY THE TRIDENT.

BOMBERS. WHEN THE FIRST B-1 BOMBER BECOMES OPERATIONAL IN 1985, IT WILL HAVE BEEN NEARLY A QUARTER OF A CENTURY SINCE THE LAST U.S. HEAVY BOMBER WAS PRODUCED. IN CONTRAST, THE SOVIETS HAVE PRODUCED MORE THAN 250 MODERN BACKFIRE BOMBERS THAT HAVE INHERENT INTERCONTINENTAL CAPABILITIES.

## U.S. - 1945 DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL

ON SEPTEMBER 11, 1945, THE U.S. SECRETARY OF WAR, HENRY STIMSON, WROTE PRESIDENT HARRY S. TRUMAN A PROPOSAL FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC BOMBS:

"IF THE ATOMIC BOMB WERE MERELY ANOTHER THOUGH MORE DEVASTATING MILITARY WEAPON...IT WOULD BE ONE THING... BUT I THINK THE BOMB INSTEAD CONSTITUTES MERELY A FIRST STEP IN A NEW CONTROL BY MAN OVER THE FORCES OF NATURE TOO REVOLUTIONARY AND DANGEROUS TO FIT INTO THE OLD CONCEPTS...IT REALLY CAPS THE CLIMAX OF THE RACE BETWEEN MAN'S GROWING TECHNICAL POWER FOR DESTRUCTIVENESS AND HIS PSYCHOLOGICAL POWER OF SELF-CONTROL AND GROUP CONTROL -- HIS MORAL POWER....."

STIMSON PROPOSED AND THE PRESIDENT AUTHORIZED APPROACHES TO THE SOVIET UNION AND WESTERN ALLIES TO SEEK CONTROLS OVER ATOMIC WEAPONS, TO USE THE BENEFITS OF NUCLEAR RESEARCH "FOR COMMERCIAL OR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES." THIS LED TO A STUDY AND REPORT, THE "ACHESON-LILIENTHAL REPORT," MADE PUBLIC IN MARCH 1946, THAT CALLED FOR THE CREATION OF AN

INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY THAT WOULD HOLD A MONOPOLY OVER NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. THIS IN TURN LED TO A PLAN PRESENTED AT THE UNITED NATIONS BY AMERICAN ADVISOR TO PRESIDENTS AND ELDER STATESMAN, BERNARD BARUCH.



REAGAN TO UN  
USSR ARMS

The decade of so-called detente witnessed the most massive Soviet buildup of military power in history.

They increased their defense spending by 40 percent while American defense actually declined in the same real terms.

At the very time the Soviet Union is trying to manipulate the peace movement in the West, it is stifling a budding peace movement at home. In Moscow, banners are scuttled, buttons are snatched and demonstrators are arrested when even a few people dare to speak about their fears.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has been the leader in serious disarmament and arms control proposals. In 1946, in what became known as the Baruch Plan, the United States submitted a proposal for control of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy by an international authority. The Soviets rejected this plan.

In 1955, President Eisenhower made his open skies proposal, under which the United States and the Soviet Union would have exchanged blueprints of military establishments and provided for aerial reconnaissance. The Soviets rejected this plan.

<sup>Mount</sup>  
***Carter Discloses He Offered Freeze  
In Atomic Arms to Brezhnev in '79***

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**By JOHN VINOCUR**

Special to The New York Times

5/7/82



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## Arms Control

Since November of last year, President Reagan has outlined three major arms control proposals. All three seek deep reductions in weapons or manpower. All are designed to restore a measure of stability in the world.

/ We seek not only to reduce the risk of nuclear war, but all war. We seek not only to protect ourselves but our allies; not just from war, but from the threat of war.

In November of last year, the President announced a proposal to eliminate the intermediate-range, land-based nuclear missiles. This is the "zero option" proposal that Ambassador Paul Nitze carried to Geneva in November. Our negotiations to reduce intermediate-range nuclear forces resume there in October.

This May, at Eureka College, the President announced his proposal for reducing strategic nuclear forces. Ambassador Edward Rowny carried those proposals to the Soviets in late June. Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, START talks, will also resume in Geneva in October.

- 2 -

In June, the President outlined yet another arms reduction proposal. For nine years, we have been engaged in talks in Vienna aimed at reducing the size of conventional forces in central Europe. The President's new proposal for force reductions was unanimously endorsed by our NATO allies and presented as a draft treaty to the Soviets and their allies in July.

We want equal ceilings for similar types of forces. And we want effective provisions for verification. We want -- quite simply -- to establish the conditions necessary for international stability.

# US DEFENSE

## Defense and Foreign Policy

-- New Pentagon directives call for waging victorious and protracted nuclear wars. They are so unrealistic that even the outgoing Chairman of the JCS warned against them. This takes place against the background of US escalation of the arms race and aggravation of international tension.

REBUTTAL: The USSR would like to scare Europeans into believing they are more threatened by the weapons the United States deploys to deter Soviet aggression than by the nuclear missiles the Soviet Union has targeted on Western Europe. The "nuclear war" scare is Soviet propaganda and Mr. Arbatov knows it.

-- Every new US defense budget is a record. America is whipping up war hysteria and dictating to its allies that they must increase their spending.

REBUTTAL: We cut defense spending in real terms for more than a decade while the Soviet Union steadily increased its spending, both in real terms and as a percentage of total Soviet economic output. This sad fact has taken a great toll on the Soviet people. Had the USSR matched our restraint in the 1970's, the West would not now have to make major efforts to restore the balance.

-- US-Soviet and NATO-WP parity is stable. The US is trying to tip the balance, and the USSR is merely taking counter-measures against the US drive for superiority and hegemony.

REBUTTAL: The Soviet Union was ~~been~~ saying a decade ago that the balance of power in Europe was stable. Meanwhile it massively built up its nuclear and conventional forces while the West did not introduce any major new forces or systems. Clearly the Soviet Union cannot have its cake and eat it too.

-- Unleashing nuclear war is madness. Any hope for victory in such a war is madness. The idea of a limited nuclear war is a dangerous illusion, which the US is nonetheless seeking to make accepted in the West. If the US is against nuclear war, why doesn't it pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, as the Soviet Union has?

1 REBUTTAL: Without the nuclear deterrent Western Europe would be at the mercy of vastly superior Soviet military power. As long as the Soviet Union refrains from attacking Western Europe, nuclear weapons will never be used. But we will not renounce our determination to defend ourselves by any means necessary. To do so would invite Soviet domination, or even war.

#### The US and its Allies

-- The US course, proclaimed by its leaders, is to destroy detente, revive the cold war, and instigate a crusade against the USSR. But contrary to US hopes. America's Allies have not followed this path. Instead, tensions with the Allies have grown more acute.

1 REBUTTAL: Moscow has been trying for more than thirty years to divide the NATO alliance by discrediting American motives and policies. Unlike the Warsaw Pact, which is held together by coercion, NATO is an association of free nations who disagree on some points. It is illusory to think for a moment, however, that the Western Allies are not determined to protect their security and will take appropriate measures to counter any force or threat of force. If the Soviet Union would accept the legitimate security requirements of the Atlantic Alliance, instead of constantly trying to undermine them, it would have no need for such propaganda.

-- First, US trade and interest rate policies deliberately weaken US Allies, as the US employs economic blackmail to enforce its will on them. Second, US and West European approaches to problems of security increasingly diverge; many Europeans realize the US cannot sit by safely and use Europe as a forward theater of operations.

REBUTTAL: The Soviet Union maintains total domination over its Allies by outright force, as we have seen in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and again in Poland.

#### Arms Control

-- The Administration has been driven by public opinion in the US and Europe finally to begin talks on arms control.

## U.S. ARMS SPENDING

BETWEEN 1968 AND 1981 -- A PERIOD PRESUMABLY CORRESPONDING TO THE CHARGE THAT WE HAVE UNLEASHED AN ARMS RACE -- THE UNITED STATES DEFENSE BUDGET DECLINED BY 25 PERCENT IN CONSTANT DOLLARS.



## Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone

Background: The Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NNWFZ) concept has a long history in Northern Europe. It had traditionally been dismissed by Norwegian Government as impractical, though some on the Labor Party left began to talk up the issue in late 1980. When the subject was raised by then-Prime Minister Nordli in his 1981 New Year's address, it was taken up as a Labor Government issue despite US efforts to underscore the problems that the proposal would create for the Alliance. In June 1981, President Brezhnev gave support to the concept in a Finnish newspaper interview and opened the possibility that some Soviet territory might be included in any NNWFZ. With the defeat of the Labor Party in Norwegian elections last year, the issue has been temporarily laid to rest, and government bodies in Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Sweden have all concluded that the concept would not increase Nordic security.

### POINTS TO BE MADE

--PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS AN AMBITIOUS PROGRAM OF ARMS CONTROL CALLING FOR SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN THE NUCLEAR ARSENALS OF BOTH THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION. THIS INCLUDES BOTH STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, HANDLED IN THE START NEGOTIATIONS, AND LONGER-RANGE INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) MISSILES, HANDLED IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS.

--AS FOR NNWFZ, IT IS POLICY IN EACH OF THE NORDIC COUNTRIES THAT THERE WILL BE NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORED THERE; NNWFZ WILL NOT ENHANCE NORDIC SECURITY.

--THERE CAN BE NO ISOLATED SOLUTION TO PROBLEM OF NORDIC SECURITY WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED IN CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AS A WHOLE.

--SOVIET SYSTEMS MAY BE TARGETTED ON NORDIC AREA FROM OUTSIDE NNWFZ AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY IT.

--SOVIET ASSURANCES HAVE LITTLE MEANING GIVEN SOVIET NUCLEAR SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES IN THE BALTIC.

### LIKELY SOVIET POINTS

1. WOULD REDUCE THREAT OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT IN NORTH.

✓ --NNWFZ WILL NOT REDUCE THREAT TO NORDIC REGION.

--SINCE NORDIC STATES HAVE NO INTENTION OF STATIONING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THEIR TERRITORY, ONLY THREAT IS POSED BY SOVIET NUCLEAR SYSTEMS.

--NNWFZ WILL NOT ELIMINATE SOVIET SYSTEMS OUTSIDE THE ZONE WHICH COULD STRIKE NORDIC REGION.

--NNWFZ WOULD DO NOTHING ABOUT THREAT TO NORDIC REGION POSED BY SOVIET CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN THE REGION.

2. ANY EFFORT TO LIMIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS BENEFICIAL.

--PROPAGANDA WON'T ADDRESS NUCLEAR PROBLEM; MEANINGFUL, SIGNIFICANT, EFFECTIVE AND VERIFIABLE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WILL. HOPE SOVIETS WILL JOIN U.S. IN ACHIEVING THIS GOAL IN START AND INF NEGOTIATIONS.

3. SOVIETS PREPARED TO HAVE SOME ARRANGEMENT COVERING PART OF THEIR TERRITORY.

--SOVIETS HAVE NEVER SPECIFIED WHAT TERRITORY MIGHT BE INCLUDED, NOR HAVE THEY SUGGESTED HOW THAT NORDICS WOULD ACTUALLY BENEFIT SINCE WEAPONS OUTSIDE KOLA REGION COULD STILL HIT NORDIC STATES.

*THE ONLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE NORDIC AREA ARE SOVIET.*

*SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TREATY SO THEY CAN "OVERSEE" NORDIC DEFENSES*



## Norwegian MAB Prepositioning

Background: In a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding signed on January 16, 1981, the US and Norway agreed to preposition heavy equipment for a US Mobile Marine Brigade in Trondelag, central Norway. The agreement followed months of Norwegian public debate on the issue and was concluded based upon the recommendations of a bilateral group which studied security requirements in the northern region. Originally, Norway recommended that the prepositioned equipment for the Marine Brigade be stationed in the north of the country, but in mid-1980 the GON proposed that it be placed in central rather than in northern Norway. As part of the 1981 Agreement, Norway offered assurances of adequate host nation support to move the US Marine Brigade to north Norway, or other "threatened areas in Norway," as required. Both countries are now actively working to implement the MOU.

### POINTS TO MAKE

--PREPOSITIONING IS IN RESPONSE TO STEADY 4-5% REAL INCREASE IN SOVIET MILITARY EFFORTS OVER LAST 20 YEARS.

--PART OF LONG TERM DEFENSE PLANNING DESIGNED TO ENHANCE NATO'S DEFENSE AND DETERRENT CAPABILITIES.

--MOU IS STEP TO HELP ENSURE FASTER US REINFORCEMENT OF NORTHERN FLANK

### LIKELY SOVIET POINTS

#### 1. PREPOSITIONING IS DESTABILIZING

--DESTABILIZATION HAS OCCURRED AS RESULT OF SOVIET BUILDUP IN KOLA PENINSULA AND BALTIC REGION DURING LAST TWO DECADES; PREPOSITIONING WILL REDRESS BALANCE

#### 2. PREPOSITIONING CHANGES NORWEGIAN POLICY OF NO FOREIGN TROOPS STATIONED IN PEACETIME

--NO TROOPS ARE TO BE IN NORWAY IN TIME OF PEACE. PRESTOCKAGE IS ONLY WAY TO GUARANTEE THAT NORWAY MAY CONTINUE TO HOLD THIS POSITION AND MAINTAIN CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE DETERRENT IN FACE OF SOVIET BUILDUP.

#### 3. MAB IS THREAT TO SOVIET UNION

--ONLY EQUIPMENT, NOT TROOPS, ARE TO BE IN PLACE; US FORCES WILL ONLY BE DEPLOYED IN RESPONSE TO THREATS TO NORTHERN AREA.

1 BRIGADE E. J. B. W.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

GOVERNING

PRESTOCKAGE AND REINFORCEMENT OF NORWAY

The Government of Norway and the Government of the United States, intending to strengthen the security of the NATO area through enhanced Alliance capability for reinforcing Norway, have agreed:

1.

That the United States may provide, consistent with SACEUR requirements and implementing arrangements, a U.S. Marine amphibious brigade (MAB) for Alliance reinforcement of Norway within the NATO chain of command.

2.

The composition of the Marine amphibious brigade shall include infantry and combat service support as well as aviation, artillery, infantry, and anti-tank weapons. The Marine aviation combat element shall perform air defense and close air support missions. It shall consist of two air defense squadrons, two close support squadrons, and appropriate support aircraft, as mutually agreed. It shall consist, furthermore, of approximately 75 heavy transport and light support helicopters.

3.

In order to facilitate the rapid transfer of the MAB in a conventional Alliance reinforcement of Norway, the following heavy equipment and supplies for the use of that MAB will be prepositioned in Central Norway: 24 155 mm howitzers and their prime movers, bridging equipment, motor transport (approximately 250 trucks with about 100 trailers), ammunition, fuel, and food.

4.

With respect to air defense of air bases, in addition to currently planned Norwegian defenses for airfields, the United States shall seek to make available upon favorable terms to the Government of Norway two batteries of I-Hawk subject to the requirements of U.S. laws and regulations. It is understood that Norway will be responsible for operations and maintenance costs, to include the cost of missiles, as well as any costs of refurbishing.

5.

The Government of Norway shall make available adequate means to tactically load and transport personnel and equipment of the Marine Amphibious Brigade from Central Norway to other threatened areas in Norway.

6.

The Government of Norway shall, through NATO infrastructure procedures, provide adequate prepositioning facilities and airbase reception facilities and operating airbases, and

shall assume responsibilities for security and general maintenance of prepositioned equipment and supplies in consonance with the provisions as outlined in Article 10 of the memorandum from the Norwegian Ministry of Defense to major NATO commanders (MNC) of 11 December 1959. Financial arrangements for the cost of operations and maintenance will be mutually agreed.

## 7.

In the event that the Marine Amphibious Brigade should be transferred to other threatened areas in Norway, it will draw on Norwegian stocks of available "common user" items such as munitions, food, and fuel to allow time for the establishment of U.S. logistical support.

## 8.

The Government of Norway shall make available host nation support for the MAB including some 150 over-snow vehicles, two motor transport companies (90 trucks each), one ambulance company (35 ambulances), one refueler section (six trucks), and necessary engineering and airbase support equipment as mutually agreed.

## 9.

The Government of the United States agrees to accept Norwegian rules with respect to ownership, control, and access to infrastructure installations as outlined in Article 10 of the memorandum from the Norwegian Ministry of Defense to MNC's of 11 December 1959.

## 10.

Norwegian policies with respect to the stationing of



foreign troops on Norwegian territory and the stockpiling or deployment of nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory will not be altered by this agreement.

11.

This arrangement is subject to amendment by agreement of the parties.

12.

This Memorandum shall enter into force upon signature. It shall continue in force until terminated by one year's notice by either party.

Washington, D.C., January 16, 1981.

For the Government  
of the Kingdom  
of Norway

For the Government  
of the United States  
of America

## Norwegian Natural Gas and Related Energy Issues

Background: The potential for Norway to become a major supplier of natural gas to Europe has been greatly enhanced by recent discoveries of sizable off-shore gas deposits in the North Sea. Commercial production could bring some new gas on stream by the 1990's. (All Norwegian gas that could technically be produced before 1990 has already been sold to the Europeans.) These additional supplies should enable the Europeans to diversify their sources of imported gas from less reliable suppliers and should assure a politically and commercially secure supply of gas for Europe well into the next century. The small size of the Norwegian economy will make necessary careful planning of gas exploitation activity in order to limit harmful effects on other sectors of the economy. Therefore, although the Norwegian government has a positive attitude toward developing its energy resources, the speed of development will depend on costs to, and impact on, the overall economy.

### Points to Make

--THE IMPORTANCE OF NORWEGIAN GAS TO OVERALL EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY CANNOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.

--NORWAY'S SIZABLE RESERVES WILL ASSURE A SECURE INDIGENOUS SOURCE OF GAS FOR EUROPEAN CONSUMERS FOR A NUMBER OF DECADES.

--THE USG WELCOMES THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT'S INITIATIVE TO DEVELOP ITS ENERGY RESOURCES IN A WELL-PLANNED PROGRAM OF EXPLOITATION.

--THE COOPERATION OF EUROPEAN CONSUMERS IN IDENTIFYING THEIR GAS NEEDS FOR THE FUTURE SHOULD HELP THE NORWEGIANS IN PLANNING A DEVELOPMENT TIMETABLE.

Likely Soviet Points: None anticipated.

## Weinberger View on Nuclear War

"It is the first and foremost goal of this Administration to take every step to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again, for we do not believe there could be any 'winners' in a nuclear war. Our entire strategy aims to deter war of all kinds, but most particularly to deter nuclear war."

..."Since the awful age of nuclear weapons began, the United States has sought to prevent nuclear war through a policy of deterrence. This policy has been approved, through the political processes of the democratic nations it protects, since at least 1950. More important, it works."

..."They now have over 5,000 nuclear warheads on ICBMs, compared to about 2,000 only five years ago. They have modified the design of these weapons and their launchers so that many of their land-based missiles are now more accurate, more survivable and more powerful than our own. They have also developed a refiring capability that will allow them to reload their delivery systems several times."

WASHINGTON — For the past 10 weeks, little seems to have disturbed Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger so much as news reports, repeated questions and continuing criticism of his strategy for protracted nuclear war.

In speeches, press and television interviews, letters to editors, background briefings and private conversations, Mr. Weinberger has vigorously contended that the strategy has been misunderstood and taken out of context.

With unveiled irritation, he has also asserted that disclosure of the strategy, set forth in a Pentagon document that he signed, has given telling ammunition to advocates of a freeze on nuclear weapons, unilateral disarmament and accommodation with the Soviet Union.

Turmoil over the nuclear strategy has become so unsettling in Western Europe, administration officials say, that Mr. Weinberger has asked Richard N. Perle, assistant secretary for international security policy, to try to restore calm on a forthcoming trip to European capitals.

In his office the other day, Mr. Weinberger said that the issue had

consumed much of his attention since the first news report appeared in late May. "We've spent a very large fraction of our time," he said, "trying to assure people that we aren't going around here trying to plan how to keep the war going for several years."

Accounts of the strategy sounded "as if we were sitting around here plotting how to play a long nuclear war," he said. "We aren't planning to fight any war, if we can avoid it. We're planning to deter war."

Mr. Weinberger said the disclosure that U.S. nuclear forces had been ordered to "prevail" had caused much commotion. "I've been to several meetings at which the word 'prevail' has been hurled at me with great venom by some fellow, usually in the back of the room," he said.

"What does he want?" Mr. Weinberger said. "Does he want us not to prevail? You show me a secretary of defense who's planning not to prevail and I'll show you a secretary of defense who ought to be impeached."

The issue of protracted nuclear war arose from disclosure of the classified five-year plan called Defense Guidance that is intended to provide strategic direction to the military services. The document

provided the military content for a wider foreign policy study in the White House and laid out a military strategy ranging from guerrilla warfare through conventional conflict to nuclear war.

The guidance document said that in a confrontation with the Soviet Union, the United States would seek to prevail at the lowest possible level of conflict. But it said that if conventional weapons were "insufficient to insure a satisfactory termination of war, the United States will prepare options for the use of nuclear weapons."

Administration officials have said publicly that the United States must retain the option of using nuclear weapons first, if that became necessary. Otherwise, they have contended, the Soviet Union might have an advantage in conventional weapons.

A key order in the guidance paper said, "The primary role of United States strategic nuclear forces is deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States, its forces and its allies. Should such an attack nevertheless occur, United States nuclear capabilities must prevail even under the condition of a prolonged war."

If deterrence should fail, the document said, the United States must "deny the Soviet Union or

any other adversary a military level at any level of conflict and force earliest termination of hostilities on terms favorable to the United States."

"We've said many times that we don't think nuclear war is winnable," Mr. Weinberger said in the interview. Asked how that differed from prevailing, Mr. Weinberger replied, "We certainly are planning not to be defeated."

Defense Guidance ordered military planners to devise what nuclear strategists call "decapitation" strikes intended to eliminate Soviet leaders.

They were instructed to plan nuclear attacks on "associated control facilities, nuclear and conventional military forces and industry critical to military power." Included would be attacks on Soviet nuclear forces to limit "damage to the United States and its allies to the maximum extent possible."

Specialists on nuclear war have said the most important element in a nuclear exchange would be to retain means of communications. Only that way could missile, bomber and submarine crews be directed when and what to attack. Defense Guidance, reflecting that thought, said the United States must have communications "capable of supporting controlled nucle-

ar counterattacks over a protracted period."

Richard D. DeLauer, undersecretary of defense for research and engineering, said in a recent speech, "In this next five-year period, we have got close to \$20 billion for command, control, communications and certain parts of intelligence." Even so, he said, that would not be adequate.

Finally, Defense Guidance said the United States must "maintain in reserve, under all circumstances, nuclear offensive capabilities so that the United States would never emerge from a nuclear war without nuclear weapons while still threatened by enemy nuclear forces."



## Possible U.S.-Soviet Summit

Background: Arbatov may raise the question of a summit, arguing that we have not replied to Brezhnev's offer of such a meeting in October. Following the June 18-19 Haig-Gromyko meeting, Gromyko told a news conference that Secretary Haig had "agreed in principle" to a summit. There are no preparations under way within the USG for a summit at this time.

### POINTS TO MAKE

- PRESIDENT REAGAN HOPES TO MEET BREZHNEV IN FUTURE.
- MEETING WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY PREPARED AND PROMISE POSITIVE RESULTS.
- QUESTION OF SUMMIT WILL BE CONSIDERED IN LIGHT OF EVENTS AND SUBSTANCE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP IN COMING MONTHS.

### LIKELY SOVIET POINTS

1. BREZHNEV HAS PROPOSED SUMMIT IN OCTOBER. U.S. HAS NOT RESPONDED.

-- U.S. REBUTTAL: PRESIDENT REAGAN PROPOSED MEETING WITH BREZHNEV IN JUNE. REGRET BREZHNEV COULD NOT ACCEPT. PRESIDENT REAGAN MADE CLEAR THAT HE WOULD FAVOR A MEETING AT WHICH POSITIVE RESULTS COULD BE EXPECTED.

2. SECRETARY HAIG AGREED TO SUMMIT IN PRINCIPLE DURING JUNE MEETING WITH GROMYKO.

-- U.S. REBUTTAL: THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN'S POSITION. MUST NOTE THAT SUMMIT NOW WOULD BE SOMBER AFFAIR IN LIGHT OF CONTINUING SOVIET MILITARY BUILD-UP, OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN, REPRESSION IN POLAND.

## Point-Counterpoint Paper

### Central America

Background: U.S. policy in Central America is to support peaceful change, pursuing a sustained effort to help the people of Central America build both democratic institutions--to permit full political participation--and modern societies--to provide jobs, health, and education. We have played a key role in nurturing alternatives to the extremist minorities of both left and right who would seek to resolve Central America's problems with violence. The most worrisome threat to our goals in Central America is the increasing concentration of power and militarization in Nicaragua.

#### POINTS TO MAKE

- TREND IN CENTRAL AMERICA IS AWAY FROM EXTREMES AND TOWARD DEMOCRACY
- MARCH, 1982 ELECTIONS, MORE THAN 85% ELIGIBLE SALVADORANS EXPRESSED COURAGEOUS COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC PROCESS.
- NOVEMBER, 1981, AFTER MANY YEARS OF MILITARY RULE, MASSIVE TURNOUT OF HONDURANS VOTED IN NEW DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT.
- NEW GUATEMALAN GOVERNMENT HAS DEMONSTRATED CLEAR INTENT TO IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION AND END CYCLE OF VIOLENCE. EXAMPLES: OFFERED AMNESTY PROGRAM; INVITED INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TO VISIT.
- LAND REFORM PROCEEDING IN EL SALVADOR. AS OF MAY, 1982, 50,000 SALVADORANS HAVE BECOME OWNERS OF LAND THEY PREVIOUSLY WORKED. THIS LAND REPRESENTS 19% OF ALL SALVADORAN FARMLAND.
- NICARAGUAN MILITARY BUILD-UP AND INTERVENTION IN AFFAIRS OF NEIGHBORS IS PRINCIPAL THREAT TO DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS.
- NICARAGUA OBTAINING SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS, INCLUDING SOVIET-MADE T-55 TANKS. AIRFIELDS LENGTHENED TO HANDLE MIG AIRCRAFT; PILOTS TRAINING IN EASTERN EUROPE.
- COSTA RICA, TRADITIONAL DEMOCRACY WHICH RESPECTS PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION, INCREASINGLY TARGET OF ATTACK BY NICARAGUA, INCLUDING TERRORIST BOMBING IN SAN JOSE WHICH WAS CONCEIVED AND DIRECTED BY NICARAGUAN DIPLOMATS IN COSTA RICA.

#### LIKELY SOVIET POINTS

1. The US is attempting to regionalize the conflict in Central America by introducing arms that would be used against Nicaragua.

--The great bulk of US effort in Central America is economic. No less than 85% of all aid authorized by

or requested of Congress for FY81-83 is economic. The President has also proposed the Caribbean Basin Initiative--an innovative program of aid, tariff concessions, and tax incentives. At the same time, we have not ignored legitimate requests for security assistance from the Central American countries--including unarmed Costa Rica--that fear Nicaragua's military build-up. However, while there are over 2000 foreign military advisers in Nicaragua, the U.S. has only 30-40 advisers each in El Salvador and Honduras. Moreover, we have suggested each country in Central America put a reasonable limit on the number of foreign military advisers and pledge not to import additional heavy offensive weapons.

2. The U.S. has rebuffed Nicaraguan efforts to ease tensions in Central America.

--U.S. has attempted to maintain open communications with Nicaragua. Our efforts to engage Nicaragua in dialogue began nearly a year ago with Assistant Secretary Enders's trip to Managua and have been pursued with particular intensity since April 7, when Ambassador Anthony Quainton delivered an eight-point peace plan to the GRN. To date, the GRN has expressed no willingness to address our and their neighbors' concerns as presented in the peace plan.

--Increasingly, the opposition to the GRN is coming from the Nicaraguan people themselves. The GRN has moved against its domestic critics, closing down an opposition newspaper, encouraging mob action against the church, restricting independent labor union activities, and repressing and forcibly relocating the Miskito Indians.

3. By certifying El Salvador, the USG has demonstrated its contempt for human rights, including those of its own citizens, brutally murdered by Salvadoran security forces.

--(Draw on Points To Make for discussion of improving political situation in El Salvador). Eighteen months ago anywhere from 600 to 2,000 civilians lost their lives each month. El Salvador's sickness of violence has not been cured, but the situation is improving as nascent democratic institutions provide an alternative to violence as a means of political expression. There is still a horrible death toll averaging 300-500 a month, but 300 to 1500 fewer deaths per month is undeniably a positive trend. As for the six murdered and one missing American citizens, the Salvadoran government is making a good faith effort to investigate the cases and bring those responsible to justice. Five men have been charged with murder and are awaiting trial in the December 1980 killings of four American churchwomen.



## THE HORN OF AFRICA

Background: Ethiopia in late June initiated a series of incursions into Somalia. These attacks are the latest in a history of conflict across this border. Ethiopia has the support of the Soviet Union and its Cuban surrogates. In the early 1970s, Somalia was extensively armed by the Soviet Union and in 1977-78 used those arms to invade the bordering region of Ethiopia (the Ogaden) which is peopled largely by ethnic Somalis. Somalia broke with the USSR when the Soviets came to Ethiopia's aid in defending itself against the Somali attack. In 1980 Somalia signed a facilities access agreement with the U.S. The U.S. is presently supplying Somalia with military equipment and we have arranged two airlifts to expedite these supplies to help the Somalis deter the present Ethiopian attacks.

### POINTS TO MAKE

--U.S. WANTS PEACE IN THE REGION.

--PRESENT U.S. AID TO STEM ETHIOPIAN AGGRESSION.

### LIKELY SOVIET POINTS

1. CURRENT CONFLICT IS ONLY INTERNAL, SOMALI DISSIDENTS FIGHTING SOMALI GOVERNMENT.

--ATTACKS WERE MADE WITH SUPPliORT OF ETHIOPIAN AIRCRAFT AND ARMOR.

--WE ARE CERTAIN OF ETHIOPIAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT.



2. THE US MILITARY AID TO SOMALIA WILL DESTABILIZE SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS.

-- THE SOVIETS ARMED THE SOMALIS IN THE FIRST PLACE, SO MASSIVELY THEY WERE ABLE TO INVADE THEIR NEIGHBOR.

-- SOVIET AND CUBAN MILITARY AID AND PRESENCE IN ETHIOPIA IS HUGE; SOMALIA IS NO THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF ETHIOPIA, BUT ETHIOPIA IS NOW INVADING SOMALIA.

3. THE US AID TO SOMALIA IS IN EXCHANGE FOR BASES FROM WHICH THE US WILL DESTABILIZE THE INDIAN OCEAN REGION.

-- THE US HAS NO BASES, ONLY ACCESS TO HOST COUNTRY FACILITIES. ALTHOUGH THE US WILL HAVE ACCESS TO THE SOMALI PORT OF BERBERA (BUILT BY THE SOVIETS) THE SOVIETS HAVE BASES, SHIP REPAIR AND REPLENISHMENT FACILITIES, AND OTHER ACCESS RIGHTS AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA AT DAHLAK ISLANDS, ADEN, SOCOTRA, AND ASMARA.

-- THERE ARE NO US TROOPS STATIONED IN SOMALIA, THERE ARE SOVIET ADVISERS AND CUBAN COMBAT TROOPS IN ETHIOPIA.

-- THE REQUIREMENT FOR A US PRESENCE IN THE REGION SPRINGS FROM THE UNSETTLED CONDITIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND PERSIAN GULF, INCLUDING CONSEQUENCES OF SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, WHICH AFFECT LEGITIMATE U.S. INTERESTS IN THE REGION WHICH WE HAVE EVERY RIGHT AND INTENTION TO DEFEND.

AF/EA Barr:sm  
8/25/82 X20857

Clearance *h* INR/AA:TThorne

ARBATOV

It is reported in the American press that Dr. Arbatov, whose skills have impressed us all tonight, is a key individual within the Soviet hierarchy whose analyses about developments in my country have great influence. My growing concern is that if tonight's discussion is any indication of the kind of information and judgments fed into the Soviet decision-making mechanism, then I am afraid we are in serious trouble.

The United States described by Mr. Arbatov is not an accurate description of my country. I am afraid that a policy is only as good as the information on which it is based. If this is the kind of information communicated to the Soviet Politburo, then we need to be concerned about the policies that will continue to emanate out of Moscow. They will not be policies toward cooperation and peace.

EAGLE-A  
AGAWAM BOND  
100% COTTON FIBER USA

## REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

### Northern and Central Regions

#### Land Forces

37. Warsaw Pact forces facing this area consist of some 104 divisions drawn from the armies of the Soviet Union, German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Poland and deploying some 27,200 tanks and 19,500 artillery and mortar pieces. Two-thirds of these divisions are deployed in the forward area. In the far north the Warsaw Pact has two Soviet divisions. Further down within the same Military District are an additional 7 divisions including one airborne division. 95 divisions face the southern part of the Northern Region and Central Europe. The Warsaw Pact also has considerable amphibious capabilities in the Barents Sea and the Baltic.

38. Opposing the Warsaw Pact, NATO's in-place land forces in Europe are composed of armed forces from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States. The in-place land forces of NATO in this area consist of some 39 divisions including those forces in the United Kingdom, fielding about 7,700 tanks and 4,550 artillery and mortar pieces including prepositioned equipment. Most of these Northern and Central Region land forces are kept in a high state of readiness, but deficiencies include some maldeployment, and lines of supply which run too near and parallel to the border. Although all NATO formations are dependent in varying degrees on mobilization and redeployment, approximately 75% of these forces could be in position very quickly indeed. There are in addition 13 United States divisions in North America which together with their associated equipment and tanks, drawn from an overall total of some 5,000 tanks and 2,500 artillery/mor-

tars, could be available to move to Europe in due course. Some of these could be allocated to the Southern Region. Up to three of the divisions would arrive quickly by air. Other United States divisions, with their equipment would arrive later by sea. A Canadian brigade group also would reinforce the area.

39. In total, over half of the 104 Warsaw Pact divisions in the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Northern military districts of the Soviet Union could launch operations within a few days of mobilization. In the best situation, assuming simultaneous mobilization and deployment forward within the region, NATO could count on some 42 divisions, which would have to hold out until additional United States and Canadian forces arrive by sea. In the meantime, the Warsaw Pact forces could be quickly expanded to their full 104 divisions, plus a proportion of the 15 Strategic Reserve Divisions from the three Central Military Districts.

#### Air Forces

40. The Warsaw Pact is numerically superior in terms of fixed-wing tactical aircraft in this area. The NATO figures shown below include UK based aircraft and US aircraft based in Europe in peacetime. The high proportion of ground-attack fighter bomber aircraft in NATO air forces is partly required to counter the Warsaw Pact preponderance in armour on the Central Front. Against this force, however, the Warsaw Pact can deploy interceptor forces, many of which can also be used for ground attack, and exceptionally strong surface-to-air defence systems. Aircraft of the Moscow Air Defence District are excluded from the following table

because of their distance from the Northern and Southern Regions. Also some 1,900 United States and Can-

adian-based reinforcement aircraft, which are situated even further from these regions, are excluded.

NORTHERN AND CENTRAL REGIONS - IN PLACE AIR FORCES			
	FIGHTER/BOMBER GROUND/ ATTACK	INTERCEPTOR	RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT
NATO	1,340	445	200
WARSAW PACT	1,580	2,595	415

N.B. Many interceptors can be used in ground attack rôles.



# DEFENCE OF NORTHERN AND CENTRAL REGIONS




FIGURE 6

# *Two Dormant Treaties Awaken Dispute Over A-Test Inspection*

By Murray Marder



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THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, JULY 26, 1982

# *Papers Reveal Sakharov's Wide Insight on Science*





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H. J. Jones 7/26/82

300 Nordic Protesters March in Soviet



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CALLED NAZIS WHEN  
THEY REFUSED TO HOLD A  
RALLY IN A TOWN CALLED  
KHATYN - IN ~~ANOTHER~~  
TOWN CALLED KATYN, ~~IN~~  
~~POLAND~~, THOUSANDS OF POLISH  
OFFICERS WERE SLAUGHTERED  
IN 1943 BY SOVIET ARMY.