



Max M. Kampelman Papers

Copyright Notice:

This material may be protected by copyright law (U.S. Code, Title 17). Researchers are liable for any infringement. For more information, visit www.mnhs.org/copyright.

Sh

REMARKS BY
MAX M. KAMPELMAN
U.S. AMBASSADOR'S CONFERENCE

LONDON

DECEMBER 18, 1982

MR. SECRETARY, YOUR EXCELLENCIES:

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

IN THE PRESENCE OF THIS ILLUSTRIOUS GROUP OF AMERICAN AMBASSADORS, I TRUST YOU WILL PERMIT ME A PERSONAL THOUGHT ABOUT MY AUNT ROSE, MAY SHE REST IN PEACE. I CAN IMAGINE TELLING HER THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAD JUST APPOINTED ME AS AN AMBASSADOR. THERE WOULD BE A MOMENT OF SILENCE FILLED WITH SKEPTICISM. WHEN THE NEWS WOULD SINK IN, I CAN HEAR HER SAY: "GOOD, MAX, GOOD. BY ME, YOU'RE AN AMBASSADOR; BY YOU, YOU'RE AN AMBASSADOR; BY MOMMA, YOU'RE AN AMBASSADOR; BUT, TELL ME, MAX, BY AN AMBASSADOR, ARE YOU AN AMBASSADOR?"

THE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION IS STILL AN OPEN ONE.

NEVERTHELESS, I WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME PERCEPTIONS AFTER 27 MONTHS OF FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS IN MADRID, INCLUDING MORE THAN 200 HOURS OF PRIVATE SOVIET TALKS.

LET ME START WITH A PREMISE. THE SOVIET UNION REPRESENTS THE MOST SERIOUS THREAT TO OUR SOCIETY AND ITS VALUES THAT WE HAVE EXPERIENCED IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. THE DEPTH OF THAT DANGER LIES IN ITS ABILITY TO CAMOUFLAGE ITS TOTALITARIAN COMMITMENT, ITS IMPERIALIST INTENTIONS AND ITS POWERFUL MILITARY MACHINE WITH THE RHETORIC OF PEACE AND DEMOCRACY.

THE PROFOUND SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WEAKNESSES OF THE SOVIET UNION ARE INCREASINGLY EVIDENT. BUT, THE SOVIET SYSTEM HAS A STRENGTH BEYOND ITS AWESOME MILITARY POWER WHICH DEMANDS OUR RESPECT. SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAVE NO ILLUSIONS AS TO WHAT THEY SEEK AND WHAT AND WHOM THEY OPPOSE. THEY UNDERSTAND THE NEED TO MOBILIZE ALL OF THEIR RESOURCES IN ORDER TO WIN; AND THEY DO NOT SHY AWAY FROM THE WORD "WIN." THEY ARE ALSO BOLSTERED BY A FAITH THAT HISTORY IS ON THEIR SIDE; AND THAT OUR DRIVE FOR MARKETS AND PROFIT WILL HELP THEM ACHIEVE THEIR GOAL.

MADRID IS A SIDE-SHOW IN THE CHALLENGE THEREBY PRESENTED TO US, BUT IT IS A PART OF IT.

I SOMETIMES ASK MYSELF WHY THERE IS A COMMON BELIEF THAT WE HAVE DONE WELL IN MADRID. THERE ARE STILL MORE THAN 100,000 SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN; THE NUMBER OF SOVIET CITIZENS PERMITTED TO EMIGRATE KEEPS DECLINING; THE REPRESSION OF HUMAN BEINGS FOR THEIR POLITICAL OR RELIGIOUS BELIEFS CONTINUES TO INTENSIFY.

ONE REASON IS THAT WE SEEM TO KNOW WHAT WE ARE AFTER. THERE IS FREQUENTLY THE TENDENCY FOR NEGOTIATORS TO BELIEVE THAT THEIR SUCCESS WILL BE MEASURED BY WHETHER THE NEGOTIATION WILL RESULT IN A WRITTEN AGREEMENT. THAT IS A FALSE MEASURE OF SUCCESS. WE KNOW IN MADRID THAT AN AGREEMENT THAT DOES NOT ADVANCE WESTERN INTERESTS; THAT MISLEADS OUR PEOPLES INTO BELIEVING THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS NO LONGER A THREAT TO OUR VALUES OR OUR INTERESTS; THAT IGNORES SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS; THAT USES WORDS WE CAN INTERPRET ONE WAY BUT CAN LEGITIMATELY BE INTERPRETED ANOTHER WAY BY SOVIET AUTHORITIES, THUS MAKING THE WORDS MEANINGLESS -- SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE A SUCCESS. IT WOULD BE A CHARADE.

ONE OF OUR PRIMARY PURPOSES IS TO SEND A CONTINUING AND CONSISTENT MESSAGE, WHICH CLEARLY COMMUNICATES TO SOVIET AUTHORITIES OUR COMMITMENT TO PEACE WITH LIBERTY, OUR DEEP AND SPECIFIC CONCERNS ABOUT THEIR BEHAVIOR, AND OUR REQUIREMENTS FOR A SENSIBLE AGREEMENT THAT DOES NOT THREATEN THEIR LEGITIMATE NATIONAL INTERESTS. SHOULD SOVIET AUTHORITIES DECIDE SIX MONTHS OR 16 MONTHS AFTER MADRID TO ACCOMMODATE TO THAT MESSAGE, I BELIEVE ALL WOULD AGREE THAT MADRID, EVEN WITHOUT A FINAL AGREEMENT, DESIRABLE AS SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE, WOULD BE A SUCCESS.

THERE IS ALSO A NEED FOR PATIENCE. THE SOVIETS HAVE LONG OPERATED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT HE WHO CAN OUTLAST THE OTHER IS MORE LIKELY TO GAIN HIS OBJECTIVES. WE ^{ARE TRYING TO} ~~MUST~~ DEMONSTRATE A WILL OF OUR OWN READY TO MATCH THE SOVIET WILL WITH A RESOLVE THAT IS AS DETERMINED, IF NOT MORE DETERMINED, THAN THEIRS.

FURTHERMORE, SINCE WAR CANNOT RATIONALLY BE CONSIDERED AN ACCEPTABLE MEANS OF RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT IN THIS NUCLEAR AGE, WE CANNOT AFFORD IMPATIENCE. THE NEED FOR PEACE PUTS AN ADDED BURDEN ON US, BECAUSE WE DO NOT HAVE THE ASSURANCE THAT SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAVE EMANCIPATED THEMSELVES FROM LENINIST IDEOLOGY. LENIN, AFTER ALL, WARNED AGAINST SOVIET DISARMAMENT AND PROCLAIMED THE VIRTUES OF "JUST WARS" AGAINST THE CAPITALIST WORLD.

THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR SYSTEMS ARE IMMENSE. OUR CULTURES ARE STRANGELY DIFFERENT. OUR LANGUAGE DISTINCTIONS ARE CONCEPTUAL AND NOT JUST LINGUISTIC. THE VERY FACT THAT THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL GAME IS CHESS, WHERE NO MOVE IS MADE ON THE BOARD WITHOUT CONSIDERING ITS EFFECT ELSEWHERE ON THE BOARD, WHILE OURS IS POKER, WHERE EACH HAND IS PLAYED FOR ITSELF, IS OF SIGNIFICANCE. THE TASK OF OVERCOMING THESE PROBLEMS MERITS ALL THE PATIENCE, PERSISTENCE AND INGENUITY WE CAN GIVE IT.

A FURTHER GUIDING PRINCIPLE FOR US IN MADRID IS THAT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS ITSELF HAS A HIGH PRIORITY IN THE PURSUIT OF OUR NATIONAL OBJECTIVES. OUR IDEAS, IF PROPERLY AND EARNESTLY PRESENTED, HAVE A POWER IN THEMSELVES. LET ME GIVE YOU TWO ILLUSTRATIONS.

MY FIRST MAJOR PRESENTATION AT THE MADRID MEETING WAS ON NOVEMBER 17, 1980. I REMEMBER THAT DATE BECAUSE A MONTH LATER AT A DINNER, A WARSAW PACT AMBASSADOR, WITH A BIT TOO MUCH VODKA, CAME TO ME AND SAID: "YOUR NOVEMBER 17 SPEECH MADE AN IMPRESSION. I'M TAKING IT HOME TO MY SON." THE TALK HAD BEGUN BY NOTING THE COMMON THREAD BETWEEN OUR PEOPLES, COMPARING THE COSSACKS AND THE COWBOYS, AND THEN ILLUMINATED THE PROFOUND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN A STATE COMMITTED TO INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND ONE THAT DE-EMPHASIZES THOSE RIGHTS IN FAVOR OF WHAT IT PERCEIVES TO BE THE GREATER GOOD OF THE STATE.

I ALSO RECALL A FEBRUARY 1981 AFTERNOON. I HAD JUST COMPLETED A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SOVIET MILITARY ARMS INCREASES DURING THE PERIOD OUR COUNTRY WAS REDUCING ITS DEFENSE EXPENDITURES. A COLLEAGUE FROM AN EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRY TOOK ME ASIDE TO SAY: "I DIDN'T KNOW ANY OF THAT."

THE NEGOTIATIONS CAN ALSO SERVE US WELL IN THE PUBLIC ARENA. WE MUST NOT ONLY NEGOTIATE, WE MUST BE PERCEIVED AS NEGOTIATING. WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION, OUR OWN INCLUDED, WANTS THE ASSURANCE OF KNOWING THAT ITS LEADERSHIP IS SERIOUSLY ENGAGED IN THE PURSUIT OF PEACE. THAT ASSURANCE IS SIGNIFICANTLY PROVIDED WHEN DIALOGUE TAKES PLACE. HERE AGAIN TWO ILLUSTRATIONS.

ONE FRIDAY MORNING, I WAS ABOUT TO SPEAK IN ORDER TO EXPRESS SKEPTICISM ABOUT MR. BREZHNEV'S SPEECH TO THE TWENTY-SIXTH PARTY CONGRESS ON FEBRUARY 23, 1981. JUST THEN ONE OF MY STAFF TOLD ME THAT THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, A DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, WAS CELEBRATING HIS 75TH BIRTHDAY THE NEXT DAY. I, THEREFORE, BEGAN BY NOTING THE BIRTHDAY IN A FRIENDLY MANNER. THE THEME OF MY TALK WAS THE HOPE THAT THE BREZHNEV STATEMENT WAS MORE THAN "AN EMPTY GESTURE." THE SOVIET DELEGATE RESPONDED WITH WARMTH AT MY GREETING; SAID HE WOULD, THEREFORE, RESIST THE TEMPTATION TO RESPOND MORE ENERGETICALLY TO ME; AND WOULD CONTENT HIMSELF BY SAYING THAT THE BREZHNEV TALK WAS INDEED MORE THAN "AN EMPTY GESTURE." THE NEXT MORNING I ARRANGED FOR A BOX OF CIGARS (NOT CUBAN) TO BE SENT TO HIM WITH A NOTE: "BIRTHDAY GREETINGS. THIS IS MORE THAN AN EMPTY GESTURE." OUR OWN ALLIES WERE GREATLY PLEASED AT THIS WELCOME SIGN THAT WE ^{UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF ATMOSPHERE IN} ~~WERE SERIOUS ABOUT~~ DIALOGUE.

A MONTH OR SO LATER, THE SOVIET DELEGATE AND I ENGAGED IN THE MOST ANGRY EXCHANGE OF THE MEETING. I FELT HE HAD BEEN IRRESPONSIBLE AND TOLD HIM SO WITH FORCE IN MY RESPONSE. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING, TWO NEUTRAL DELEGATES CAME TO ME WITH GRAVE FACES AND DEEP CONCERN. WHAT WOULD HAPPEN NOW? I SAID WE WOULD SOON LEARN. I WAS DUE AT THE SOVIET RESIDENCE FOR LUNCH SHORTLY. IF THE DOOR WAS LOCKED I WOULD KNOW THAT RELATIONS HAD DETERIORATED. THE LUNCH WAS EXTREMELY WARM AND PLEASANT. I DID NOT MENTION OUR EARLY EXCHANGE AND NEITHER DID MY HOST. INDEED THIS PROVED TO BE ONE OF THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE OF OUR MANY SESSIONS TOGETHER. AT THE CONCLUSION, AS WE WERE LEAVING, HE PUT HIS ARMS AROUND ME AS HE WALKED ME TO THE DOOR AND SAID IN RUSSIAN: "IT IS GOOD TO BE ABLE TO EXCHANGE PLEASANTRIES WITH YOU IN THE MORNING AND THEN HAVE A CONSTRUCTIVE, BUSINESSLIKE EXCHANGE IN THE AFTERNOON."

OUR NEGOTIATION ALSO ASSUMES THAT WE ARE IN A CONSTANT BATTLE FOR THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF MEN. WE HAVE TRIED TO DRAMATIZE THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET UNION FOR AUDIENCES INSIDE AND OUTSIDE OF OUR HALLS. WHEREVER ANY AUDIENCE OR MEDIA FORUM HAS BEEN PROVIDED US, AND IT HAS BEEN AVAILABLE TO US ALL OVER EUROPE, WE HAVE BEEN REPEATING THE MESSAGE OF DEMOCRACY, OUR VALUES, OUR HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS, OUR YEARNING FOR PEACE WITH LIBERTY.

WE HAVE HAD THREE AUDIENCES CONSTANTLY IN MIND: THE KREMLIN, WHICH RECEIVES BY CABLE THE TEXT OF EVERY TALK I MAKE; THE DELEGATES FROM THE 35 STATES AT OUR MEETING WHOSE UNDERSTANDING IS INDISPENSIBLE TO US; AND PUBLIC OPINION ON BOTH SIDES OF THE IRON CURTAIN.

I CANNOT, OF COURSE, CONCLUDE THIS PRESENTATION WITHOUT NOTING THE NATO UNITY THAT HAS, UP UNTIL NOW, CHARACTERIZED MADRID. THERE IS NO SIMPLE FORMULA FOR THIS UNITY, OTHER THAN A MUTUAL RESPECT FOR ONE ANOTHER'S INTEGRITY OF PURPOSE AND A MUTUAL RECOGNITION THAT WE NOT ONLY NEED ONE ANOTHER BUT DERIVE STRENGTH FROM OUR UNITY. FREQUENT CONSULTATIONS, WHICH BEGAN BEFORE MADRID BEGAN, ARE OBVIOUSLY INDISPENSIBLE. ~~THEY CONTINUE TO THIS DAY, WITH NATO CAUCUSES PRACTICALLY DAILY.~~

IN BELGRADE, OUR 1977 PREDECESSOR FOLLOW-UP MEETING, WE WERE THE ONLY COUNTRY TO MENTION NAMES OF HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS; AND THIS WAS A SOURCE OF TENSION IN THE ALLIANCE. AT MADRID, 121 NAMES HAVE BEEN MENTIONED BY FOURTEEN STATES. THOSE OF OUR FRIENDS WHO CHOSE NOT TO MENTION NAMES HEARD ME SAY IN CONSULTATIONS PRIOR AND DURING MADRID THAT IN AN ORCHESTRA, THERE IS NEED FOR A DRUMMER AS WELL AS A HARPIST; WHAT IS MOST IMPORTANT IS THAT WE PLAY MUSIC TOGETHER.

WE HAVE PLAYED MUSIC TOGETHER AND TIME WILL TELL HOW WELL
WE'VE DONE. WE RECESSED YESTERDAY UNTIL FEBRUARY 8. THE
SOVIET UNION CLEARLY KNOWS OUR REQUIREMENTS IF ^{MADRID} ~~THE MEETING~~ IS
^{END} TO ^{OUR MUTUAL} ~~CLOSE ON MARCH 27~~ TO ^{THEIR} SATISFACTION, ^{AS WELL}. WE AWAIT
WITH INTEREST THEIR DECISION AS TO WHETHER ^{THEY} ~~TO~~ MEET OUR NEEDS.

LET ME CONCLUDE WITH APPRECIATION TO THE DEPARTMENT. ~~WITH~~
~~ONLY A FEW RARE EXCEPTIONS~~, THE DEPARTMENT HAS FULLY COOPERATED
WITH OUR DELEGATION AND WITH THE NEED TO RESPECT THE
SENSITIVITY OF AN INTRICATE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION SUCH AS
OURS. SECOND-GUESSING FROM AFAR IS TEMPTING, BUT IT IS
DIFFICULT AND HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR DISRUPTION. BASIC AND
BROAD POLICY MUST COME FROM WASHINGTON AND I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN
PROVIDED THE DIGNITY OF PARTICIPATING IN THAT PROCESS. ONCE
POLICY IS MADE, I AM PLEASED TO REPORT, THAT I HAVE ENJOYED THE
PRIVILEGE OF DEVELOPING HOW BEST TO CARRY IT OUT. I WANT TO
THANK THE DEPARTMENT FOR THAT AND FOR ITS RESPECT FOR MY
SENSITIV^E ~~ITIES~~ ^(DIOJYNKACIE).

AND I WANT TO THANK ALL OF YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION.