



Max M. Kampelman Papers

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MADRID, FLIGHT 7, AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS

By

MAX M. KAMPELMAN

Defense Strategy Forum

October 25, 1983

Washington, D.C.

It is only seven weeks since Madrid ended, but it is time to begin to shift my focus away from the fascinating details and intricacies of my three years in Madrid and direct them to the more significant broader picture of which Madrid was a part, the intensely troubling East-West picture.

Let me begin by nodding in the direction of the title affixed to this talk. The Korean airplane shootdown provided a regrettable but appropriate atmospheric ending to the Madrid meeting. For three years, we had been saying in Madrid that the Soviet Union was a lawless society, one that ignored its international responsibilities, and one which denigrated humanitarian considerations. The validity of that point was demonstrated by the tragedy which occurred on the eve of our closing sessions.

A number of you in this audience were aware that the decision of our government to agree to the Madrid Concluding Document was not lightly taken. It was true that the essence of all of our requirements, but one, were met by the final series of Soviet concessions, but we also were concerned that we not contribute in any way to a false sense of euphoria or "detente", similar to what mislead us and the West in the 1973-1975 period.

We decided that on balance our interests were better served by agreeing to the document, since it was, in effect, a Western document. But to offset OUR concern about misleading public opinion, at the very next session after provisionally agreeing to the document, on July 18, I made what one NATO colleague called an "ice cold shower" talk, one of the strongest in our three years in Madrid. Flight 7 made it unnecessary for us to be concerned. The Soviet Union stood revealed for what it was and for all the world to see.

In recent months, Yuri Andropov, in addressing his Communist Party cadres, urged them to remember that there was a vital battle underway "for the hearts and minds of billions of people on this planet." Madrid for us was a serious battlefield in that struggle. We were able in that forum, working with a united West, to demonstrate for all who would listen that Soviet violations of the noble Helsinki standards were threatening the peace and stability of Europe.

We accompanied this with the most thorough review of the Soviet Union and its crimes against humanity that has ever taken place in any international forum. A united Western group of nations, speaking in many languages but in one voice, documented the Soviet record of slave labor camps; the use of psychiatric hospitals as political punishment; government-sponsored anti-Semitism; armed aggression in Afghanistan and

Poland; religious persecution of evangelical Christians, Baptists, Seventh Day Adventists, Pentecostals, Catholics; strangulation of scientific freedom; the decimation of cultural and national heritages; the defiance of agreements against the use of chemical and biological weapons.

The audience for us was more than the representatives of the 35 states at our sessions. Our statements were widely disseminated through the electronic and print media. In this "battle for hearts and minds," we had to reach people. We were not content with making allegations, we provided the evidence for those conclusions. Stories from Madrid reached Eastern Europe daily through the Voice of America, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe. My own appearances on BBC and Deutchewelle were constant. They were supplemented by endless numbers of appearances on radio and television stations throughout Europe. The communications we received from the East, as well as from the West, proved the desirability of this activity.

Our uniform message was that the Soviet Union had to comply with the agreement they made in 1975 if they wished to be accepted as a responsible member of the international community.

The question has been raised by some experts as to whether confrontation is consistent with serious negotiation. Our side has not always been clear on this question. When the

U.S. delegation, at Belgrade in 1977, mentioned the names of six victims of Soviet repression, there was great concern as to the propriety and desirability of such an approach. In Madrid, the United States was not alone. We were among 14 states to mention the names of dissidents. And a total of 131 victims of repression were mentioned at our meetings. The first state to mention the name of a victim was Sweden, which mentioned Raoul Wallenberg. The first state to discuss Soviet anti-semitism was Belgium.

Negotiation without confrontation, where the objective facts require blunt talk, is not a serious negotiation at all; it is a charade. A purpose of negotiation is obviously to reach agreement. Where difficult issues are involved, however, that agreement may not be possible in the short run. Equally important, therefore, the negotiating process must be used to communicate concerns where they exist, so as to lessen the likelihood of ambiguity. This clarity could, in turn, lead to desirable changes in behavior pattern. Absent this clarity, there is no reason for the other side to take seriously the depth of our commitments and our perceptions.

In a more limited sense, let me share with you three illustrations to demonstrate my point. My first serious substantial presentation at our main meeting was in November 1980. I spoke of the fact that the United States and Russia had never fought in a war against one another. I discussed cultural and historic similarities between our two peoples, referring to

Cossacks and cowboys. In then analyzing the deterioration of our relationships, I spoke firmly and critically of the Leninist threat to world stability and of Soviet aggression and repression. A few weeks later at a dinner, the head of an Eastern European delegation, whose discretion lost the battle against vodka, quietly took me aside to talk about that speech, and to say that he was taking it home at Christmas to share with friends and family members.

On another occasion, in early 1981, I spoke with great specificity about the Soviet arms build-up and its potential threat against the peace of Europe. At the end of that morning session, another head of an Eastern European delegation came up to me and said: "I never knew those facts, Max, until this morning." He did not question their accuracy.

In late 1981, the head of the Soviet delegation and I engaged in the most serious confrontation that had yet taken place between us. He started with an abuse against our Government that I could not tolerate. Since my briefcase was filled with data to be used when appropriate, I responded fully in what was characterized by some as a devastating fashion. He replied angrily and I again responded with sharpness and with facts. That ended the exchange. At that point, I could see two colleagues from neutral countries approaching me with great concern and sad countenance. They knew I had not started

the exchange, but would the Soviets now walk out of the meeting? What did this mean? I informed them that I was due at the Soviet Ambassador's residence for lunch in an hour and would learn if they were indeed angry by noting if the door would be locked against me.

The lunch took place. It was pleasant and even constructive. My host made no reference to the argument. As a guest, and since I had the last word in the morning, I did not bring the issue up. At the very end, as my host walked me to the door, he said that what he liked about dealing with me was that we could -- and the word was finally translated as "exchange pleasantries" in the morning -- and then engage in serious, business-like discussions in the afternoon.

I spoke of a united Western group in Madrid. This was an indispensable condition for whatever effectiveness we demonstrated there. Prior to the opening of Madrid, I made two trips to Europe to meet with our allies and to discuss our approach to the Madrid meeting. Among the points we made was our decision to mention the names of dissidents because, as a lawyer, I said, I knew of no better way to illustrate a point than to use examples. I hoped that, unlike Belgrade, we would be supported and emulated in this approach. You, of course, know from what I have said that, in the main, we were. But my FRG colleague said to me that he could not do so. His country's approach, effective with the Soviet Union, he insisted,

was to negotiate quietly. They were in this manner able to obtain the release from behind the Iron Curtain of many whose freedom they sought. We talked, and I remember saying that I did not want to recommend any policy which would keep a single human being in bondage who would otherwise be released. But, like a symphony orchestra, someone must bang the drums and blow the trumpet, while somebody else plays the harp or touches the piano keys softly. What is important is that we make music together.

We did make music together at Madrid. This required effort on all of our parts. Our NATO group met three and four times a week, and sometimes three and four times a day when necessary. We consulted on all aspects of the meeting and kept one another fully informed. We worked closely with our neutral friends who shared our values and we met with them, too, on many occasions. The West is stronger in dealing with the Soviet Union when it speaks with one voice and gives one consistent message.

There is today sensitivity within the NATO alliance. Crises are ever present. There is always the potential for divisiveness when 16 free and sovereign states, governed by democratic principles and with differing histories and cultural backgrounds, attempt to formulate common policy. What is necessary is constantly to keep in mind that it is our values, indispensable to our being, that tie us together and that it is those values that are under attack and must be preserved.

In a real sense our task is to raise the vision of the West above the minutiae of our relations, important as they may appear to be at any moment. Let us hope we can prevail in that effort in the face of a massive Soviet onslaught to divide and weaken the alliance.

Let me now make an assertion about dealing with the Soviet Union that is based on conviction and on my experience. The Soviet Union respects military strength. Its incentive for negotiating an agreement is greater when the positions taken by its negotiating partner have the added dignity of being supported by that strength.

The leadership of the Soviet Union is serious. Its diplomats are serious and well-trained, and they appear to be ideologically committed to Leninism. The comment of one Soviet diplomat to one of our arms control negotiators: "We are neither philanthropists nor fools" tells much of their seriousness of purpose. Their response in a negotiation is motivated by one primary consideration: their perceived national self-interest.

There is a responsible view in our society which questions the effectiveness and desirability of our negotiating with the Soviet Union. It appreciates that one of the great international changes of the past decade has been the achievement by the Soviet Union of at least nuclear parity with us.

It believes, with good reason, that the Soviet Union remains committed to the Leninist principle that violence is both necessary and justified in the pursuit of their Communist destiny. Thus, the Soviet Union is the major threat to our security and values -- an aggressive society seeking, with its massive military and police power, to expand its influence; and a repressive society determined to defend its totalitarian power, whatever the human cost.

This view has no confidence in the bona fides of Soviet protestations for disarmament and peace. It knows that after the Second World War, while we and our allies rapidly demobilized, the Soviet Union preferred to keep its troops on a war-time footing, maintaining a large conscript army and large reserve forces. It knows that as we disarmed, the Soviets engaged in the most massive military build-up in the history of the world.

It is not useful to deny this reality. The task is, rather, how constructively to face this reality. I suspect that we and our friends who value freedom will pay a heavy price and suffer great anguish as we come to grips with this challenge. The integrity and character and strength of our society and of our people will undergo the greatest challenge of our history as we learn how to live with Soviet military power, meet it, challenge it, and simultaneously strive to maintain the peace as we remain constant in our ideals.

We still look upon ourselves as a young and developing society, even though we are now one of the oldest, stable systems in the world. We did not seek the role of world leadership, and our people today still tend to shy away from it. At the end of the Second World War, however, our relative geographic isolation, our pursuit of liberty, our bountiful natural resources, and our productive people made us strong. By the end of the war, we were somewhat like a young giant among nations. And, being a giant is not easy. It is not easy living with a giant, and our friends are learning that. It is hard to find shoes to fit if you are a giant; and the bed is always too short. Being strong, the giant can afford to be gentle, but he is also, at times, awkward. His good intentions are not always so interpreted by others.

We make mistakes because we are unaccustomed to and hesitant about the responsibilities of leadership. As a result, our behavior is at times one of fits and starts that frequently bedevil our foreign policy and confuse others.

We talk a great deal about values and about liberty. Some of our more sophisticated friends see this linkage of values with world real-politik as a form of naivete. We, of course, talk about the values of liberty because, to us, they are not abstract. We also know they are not abstract to those unable to enjoy them. They are the distinguishing characteristic between ourselves and the totalitarians and authoritarians of the world. We feel, therefore, that this is our strength.

We know that the future lies with freedom because there can be no lasting stability in societies that would deny it. Only freedom can release the constructive energies of men and women to work toward reaching new heights. A human being has the capacity to aspire, to achieve, to dream, and to do. He cannot be permanently prevented from stretching his muscles to exercise his freedom and achieve ambitions for himself and his children.

This is our faith, and this is what we should talk about.

As we do so, however, we must understand that we thereby implicitly threaten the Soviet Union. Like any dictatorship, the Soviet ruling class is deeply concerned about the subversion of their power -- power accumulated not by agreement but by military and police force alone. Where there is no legitimacy; where there is repression coupled with traditional national and cultural differences; where there is an obvious failure of the system to meet the needs of its peoples -- these obviously contribute to Soviet insecurity. The very fact that there are neighboring free societies creates a powerful draw and attraction for those who live under totalitarian rule. By example, democracies inevitably tend to subvert Soviet authority.

Thus, the dilemma, the challenge, the danger, the threat, the opportunity. There are some who may respond to the danger

to us represented by Soviet military power and theology by ignoring or denying its existence. That would be fatal for us. There are others who are so overwhelmed by the difficulties as to place all of their trust in military power and its use alone. That view can be fatal to us as well.

We dare not and cannot blow the Soviet Union away. We cannot wish it away. It is here and it is militarily powerful. We share the same globe. We must try to find a formula under which we can live together in dignity.

All responsible people understand that we must define our objectives consistent with Hobbes' first law of nature: "to seek peace and to follow it." We must engage in that pursuit of peace without illusion, but with persistence, regardless of provocation. Thus, in Madrid, we attended, talked, debated, negotiated, argued, dined, condemned, talked some more. We achieved some results in words. We have not yet achieved a change in patterns of behavior. That will only come, if it ever does come, when the Soviet Union concludes that it is in its interest to change, and when its leadership decides that it can best keep itself in power if the pattern is changed.

The Soviet Union is not likely soon to undergo what Jonathan Edwards called "a great awakening," or see a blinding light on the road to Damascus. Yet, the imperatives for survival in the nuclear age require us to persist -- through the deterrence that comes from military strength, through dialogue,

through criticism, through negotiation -- to persist in the search for understanding, agreement, peace. The attainment of these goals requires conformity with the agreed upon rules of responsible international behavior.

The peoples of the Soviet Union, who comprise hundreds of different nationalities, share the same values of human dignity that we proclaim. They are as dedicated to the elimination of war as any other peoples. They have no wish to be isolated from their neighbors and from the forward movement of civilization. This creates a fear on the part of Soviet authorities, who then go to great lengths to fence in their own citizens, lengths not before equaled in the history of the world.

Rarely in history has a nation lost so many of its greatest scientists, writers, artists, musicians and scholars through exile, imprisonment and execution. Hundreds of thousands have emigrated and many more would leave if they were permitted to do so. We know of many hundreds of ordinary people who have taken incredible risks to defect when they saw an opportunity to do so.

The "correlation of forces" has moved against the Soviet Union. The credibility of its system as a viable alternative has collapsed for sensible people. "The gas has largely escaped from its ideological balloon."

It is time for Soviet authorities, who have a stake in stability, to comprehend that repressive societies in our day cannot achieve inner stability or true security. We hope they will come to understand the need to disprove that cruelty is an indispensable part of their system. It is true that a system unrestrained by public control tends to ignore the popular good and be blind to the misery experienced by those who do not receive honors and privileges from such a state. But, just as the Leninist aim of achieving world Communism has no relevance in this nuclear age, so must it be understood by an evolving Soviet leadership that in the long run it cannot survive without humanizing its controls and its image in the world.

So often the excuse has been that one cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs. That is true, but Soviet leadership must come to understand that the road they have been following is filled with broken eggshells and we have yet to see the first omelet. Included in our message and program, therefore, must be the understanding that new opportunities for cooperation with us on all levels can open widely if Moscow will live up to its international responsibilities so clearly delineated in the Helsinki Final Act and in the Madrid Concluding Document, whose words they accepted. What we made clear to the Soviets in Madrid, and what I trust they are pondering, is that just as their deeds undermined our confidence in their intentions, so must their deeds, and not just their words, begin to restore that confidence.

Today, the prospects for understanding seem remote. Soviet leadership appears frightened and somewhat disorganized. Threats, coupled with infrequent smiles, are techniques of traditional Soviet political offensives. This time, however, the threats seem more desperate and despairing.

- They threaten to destroy more civilian aircraft.
- Against Turkey, Pravda (Feb. 27, 1980) proclaims:
"The question is - either Turkey will live under conditions of peace with its neighbors and the peoples of the Near and Middle East or, surrendering its territory to U.S. bases, it will spoil relations with its neighbors and in the event of a conflict become a nuclear cemetery."
- Against Japan, Tass (Jan. 19, 1983) inveighs:
"in the present nuclear age, there can be no 'unsinkable aircraftcarrier'". Japanese leaders, it continues, are going to "make Japan a likely target for a nuclear response strike. And for a densely populated country as Japan, this could spell a national disaster more serious than the one that befell it 37 years ago."
- Red Star (June 21, 1983) calls the Scandinavian countries a "bridgehead for aggression," and goes on to warn that these states "are to burn in the fire of nuclear war in the name of 'Atlantic solidarity.'"

-- Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa, during a trip to Asia in mid-April, described Thailand and Vietnam as in a state of "undeclared war". He warned that "the whole infrastructures of Southeast Asian countries will erode if ASEAN, does not end its confrontation with Vietnam and its allies in Laos and Cambodia."

-- And on July 5, Tass quoted Yuri Andropov as having said to Chancellor Kohl that if the Western missiles are deployed "the military threat to West Germany will grow manifold....As for the Germans, they would have, as someone recently put it, to look at one another through thick palisades of missiles."

These threats will intimidate some, as intended. They can, however, be Western weapons in the battle "for hearts and minds."

I conclude, Mr. Chairman, with an emphasis on a theme represented by the word "patience." It is indispensable. We must be prepared to remain in any negotiation with the Soviets for one day longer than they. We must be clear, unambiguous, consistent, and obviously reasonable in what we seek. We must be bona fide negotiators in good faith; anything less is transparent and damaging to our political interest. A corollary to this is a basic principle that arriving at an agreement is

not the most important ingredient for us in any negotiation.
The agreement must be one in our interest.

With patience, persistence, confidence - and with a clear Western mandate, where appropriate, from our NATO allies, we need have no fear of negotiating. Our case is the superior one.

Thank you.

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PENDING

DEFENSE STRATEGY FORUM

our speaker will be

The Hon. Max M. Kampelman

Chairman, U.S. Delegation to the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe

on the topic

"Madrid, Flight 7, and East-West Relations"

Date:	Tuesday, October 25, 1983
Reception:	5:30 pm.
Presentation:	6:00 pm.
Adjournment:	7:30 pm.
Place:	THE INTERNATIONAL CLUB Wadsworth Room, Lower Level 1800 K Street, N.W. (Enter on 18th Street)
Cosponsored by:	<i>National Security Studies Program Georgetown University Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies George Washington University</i>

RSVP



150 East 58th Street, New York, N.Y. 10155
(212) 838-2912

1730 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 429-0129

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National Strategy Information Center, Inc.



Frank R. Barnett
President

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INFORMATION CENTER, Inc.

Invites you to the next . . .

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National Strategy Information Center, Inc.

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September 9, 1983

The Honorable Max Kampelman
600 New Hampshire Avenue, NW
Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Ambassador Kampelman:

We are very pleased that you have agreed to speak at our Defense Strategy Forum on October 25, 1983. As you may know, the National Strategy Information Center (NSIC) works with universities throughout the country in presenting non-partisan educational programs in the field of defense and foreign policy. Here in Washington, D.C., one of our most important programs is the series of Defense Strategy Forums. Begun in 1976, the series is sponsored jointly by NSIC, the National Security Studies Program of Georgetown University, and the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies of George Washington University.


Approximately 250-300 or so carefully selected persons of diverse backgrounds regularly attend the Forums. They are for the most part ranking officials, military officers, and representatives of senior policy levels of the Government, Congress, the media, universities, and veterans and trade associations. The Forums are held at the International Club in the Wadsworth Room. Conducted on an invitation-only and on-the-record basis, they begin with refreshments at 5:30 p.m. The 30-40 minute presentation begins at 6:00 p.m., and is followed by a 30-45 minute question period which will conclude at 7:30 p.m. Recent speakers have included Senator Orrin G. Hatch, Bishop John J. O'Connor, USIA Director Charles Z. Wick, and President of the AFL-CIO Lane Kirkland.

The Honorable Max Kampelman
September 9, 1983
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For your presentation, we are able to offer you an honorarium of \$500. If your schedule will permit, our President, Frank R. Barnett, would like to give a small dinner in your honor following the Forum.

We look forward to seeing you on October 25. With all best wishes,

Sincerely,


for Roy Godson
Director
Washington Office

RG/ct

NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTER
111 East 58th Street, New York, New York 10022
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW, #601, Washington, D.C. 20036

DINNER MEETING WITH

THE HON. MAX KAMPELMAN

Chairman, U.S. Delegation to the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Guest List

Tuesday, October 25, 1983
Tastevin Room
1800 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C.

Host
Mr. Frank R. Barnett
President
National Strategy Information Center

Dr. Angelo Codevilla
Professional Staff Member
Senate Intelligence Committee

Mr. Sven Kraemer
Director of Arms Control
National Security Council

Mr. George Curtin
Program Coordinator
National Strategy Information
Center

Dr. John Lenczowski
Director, European and Soviet
Affairs
National Security Council

Dr. Patrick Garrity
Research Associate
National Strategy Information
Center

Dr. Leslie Lenkowsky
Deputy Director Designate
US Information Agency

Dr. Roy Godson
Director of the
Washington Office
National Strategy Information
Center

Mr. Gerard P. O'Keefe
Director, Department of
International and Foreign
Affairs
United Food and Commercial Workers
Union, AFL-CIO

Mr. Dale Good
Special Assistant to the
President, AFL-CIO

Dr. Michael Pillsbury
National Security Advisor to the
Senate Steering Committee

Mr. Kenneth deGraffenreid
Director of Intelligence
Programs
National Security Council

Mr. Walter Raymond, Jr.
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director
International Communications and
Information
National Security Council

Mr. John Hedges
Counselor
US Information Agency

Mr. Steven Steiner
National War College

Mr. Morton Kondrake
Executive Editor
The New Republic



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
London, U.K.

FILE WITH
REGISTRATION
S/E BOM
FLOWER

November 7, 1983

Honorable Max M. Kampelman
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman
Suite 1000
600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Max:


The citation you want is "Questions of Philosophy" ("Voprosy Filosofii") for October 1980. The authors are Major General, Professor A.S. Milovidov who is head of the faculty of Marxist/Leninist philosophy in the Lenin Military Political Academy, and E. A. Zhdanov, his senior assistant.

The quotation is:

"Whilst speaking against the use of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union does not exclude the possibility of using them in extreme circumstances...Marxist Leninists decisively reject the assertions of certain bourgeois theoreticians who consider nuclear missile war unjust from any angle."

Very best regards,

Sincerely,



Roger G. Harrison
First Secretary

October 31, 1983

Mr. Frank R. Barnett
National Strategy Information Center, Inc.
111 East 58th Street
New York, New York 10022

Dear Frank:

That was a lovely letter of October 26. It touched me greatly, and I am most appreciative for your thoughtfulness in writing. You will find enclosed a copy of the talk that I made.

Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to have such a fine audience.

All my best.

Sincerely,

Max M. Kampelman

MMK:sm
Enclosure

NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTER, INC.

111 EAST 58TH STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10022
—
AREA CODE 212 838-2912

October 26, 1983

The Honorable Max Kampelman
600 New Hampshire Avenue, NW
Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20037

Dear Max,

Tuesday was not my lucky day. But from what Roy Godson told me this morning in a one-sided telephone conversation, it certainly was that for the Defense Strategy Forum audience. Only once in the years we have been conducting the Forum has a speaker received a standing ovation. I deeply regret not having been on hand to hear you. Your experience in Madrid, and indeed your remarkable achievement there in bringing the Soviets to heel after what was clearly an attempt on their part to exhaust both our patience and our stamina, merit far more acclaim and attention than they have received. It was therefore a privilege for our associates in the Forum to hear them directly from you, fresh after the event. On behalf of the National Strategy Information Center and all those present--and with apologies for my own enforced absence--I want to thank you for addressing us.


From what Roy tells me of the specifics of your speech, the lessons of Madrid and the negotiating techniques you employed so effectively there can and should be utilized in our continuing confrontations with the Soviets. Have you considered the idea of publishing it for distribution to a wider audience? I, for one, having missed the opportunity to welcome and hear you, would like very much to read it.

Honorable Max Kampelman
October 26, 1983
Page Two

Roy tells me also that the dinner conversation was even livelier than the earlier questioning from the floor. Once again, many thanks for taking time from your busy schedule to be with us. I hope we can meet soon--when I am once more able to talk--to review a subject which is of such importance to all of us.

With best wishes, I am

Faithfully,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Frank".

Frank R. Barnett

FRB/ct

P.S. By copy of this letter to Dorothy Nicolosi, I am asking her to send you an honorarium.