



Max M. Kampelman Papers

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6/4

October 10, 1984

Mr. M. Scott Davis
Roosevelt Center
for American Policy Studies
316 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E.
Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20003

Dear Mr. Davis:

I am sorry for the delay in responding to your letter of September 19, but I have only returned a few days ago from a rather long trip to Europe.

You have done well with retyping the edited text of my remarks. I have gone over it once more and it is now ready to be returned to you. You will find it enclosed.

All my best.

Sincerely,

Max M. Kampelman

MMK:nct

Enclosure

ROOSEVELT CENTER

For American Policy Studies

September 19, 1984

Ambassador Max M. Kampelman, P.C.
Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Kampelman
600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Suite 1000
Washington, DC 20037

Dear Ambassador Kampelman:

I have enclosed our retype of your edited text of your remarks at the Roosevelt Center on June 4. Unfortunately, we were unable to read some of your handwritten corrections. I have underlined these and enclosed a copy of your own edited text. Please read our retype to fill in these points and to approve it for publication.

If possible, we would appreciate receiving your final markup by October 19. Many thanks for your contribution.

Sincerely,



M. Scott Davis
Research Associate

Enclosures

6/4

LEON SLOSS ASSOCIATES, INC.

National Security Consultants

1611 N. Kent Street, Suite 511, Arlington, Virginia 22209
703/841-1385

June 21, 1984

Ambassador Max Kampelman
Suite 1000
600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037

Dear Ambassador Kampelman:

Enclosed is the edited transcript of your statement at our meeting on June 4th.

In editing the transcript, I focused primarily on eliminating redundant statements and grammatical errors. I did not alter the sequence of paragraphs within the paper, and made only slight changes in the order of sentences within each paragraph. Please make any further changes which you feel are necessary. As you know, we would like to publish the final version in a book, along with the statements of other speakers from each of the three sessions of this conference.

We plan to hold the next meeting on July 27 at The Roosevelt Center for American Policy Studies located at 316 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E., 5th Floor, Washington, DC 20003 (202/547-7227). I hope you will be able to join us again.

We appreciate your contribution, and look forward to receiving your amendments to this draft.

Sincerely,



David Sloss

DS:jrn
Enclosure

Kampelman

At the outset, let me say that on the basis of a single negotiation at CSCE in Madrid, although this negotiation lasted for three years, I am not prepared to recommend any cosmic lessons about how to negotiate with the Soviets. I have had the opportunity to look over the transcripts from the first symposium, as well as the papers of Mr. Sonnenfeldt and Ambassador Dean. It was a humbling experience to read these papers, which further emphasized for me my own unreadiness to reach any cosmic conclusions based on my experience.

So I will talk about Madrid. I will talk primarily about the subject of negotiation, rather than the substance of the issues. And I will wait for somebody else to write a book on how to negotiate with the Soviets. I expect this will not be a simple task.

Regardless, let me start by saying that I am not a professional diplomat, had little diplomatic experience before assuming my ambassadorial post. However, I did have extensive experience as a negotiating lawyer in the private sector. I also had substantial knowledge of the political process in this country. I mention this because it proved to be very helpful to me in the negotiations. All my experience merged to produce in me certain attitudes and behavior patterns.

Incidentally, I must say I was told, and told in good faith, this

negotiation would last only four or five months. Nobody thought it would last three years.

Regardless, it became very clear to me as I immersed myself in the preparations, that I had three kinds of support problems. One set of problems concerned support from the State Department and U.S. government in Washington. I exerted much effort to become acquainted with the personnel in the Defense Department, the Arms Control Agency and the State Department. I tried to elicit from them their own insights concerning the major problems we would face. I began this process very early and never stopped.

The second set of problems concerned my need for a domestic constituency. I discussed this with the public affairs officers at the State Department and also with the Commission. The Commission is a unique feature of the Helsinki process. It is established by law and includes senators and congressmen as well as representatives of the State, Commerce, and Defense Departments. The Commission concerns itself on a full-time basis with the substance of the Helsinki Final Act. That is their job. They have a large staff to handle these issues; nothing comparable exists in the State Department. I learned very quickly they had the specific data I required, except in the area of security issues, which data I had to obtain from the executive branch. But in the humanitarian, cultural, scientific and related areas, the Commission was my primary source of information.

Before the Madrid meeting opened in September, I visited 11 or 12

cities on two or three different trips. The State Department, with the help of the Commission, arranged meetings in each one of those cities. They invited ethnic groups and human rights groups who were interested in the Helsinki Final Act. They also invited other people who had expressed their interest to either the State Department or the Commission. Indeed, there was a great deal of interest in these issues throughout the country. Regardless of these meetings, I told the invitees what I wished to achieve at the CSCE negotiation, and listened attentively to their reactions. I learned a great deal from them.

Just as importantly, these meetings helped me to develop a domestic constituency. I created a mailing list with the names of everybody who attended those meetings. I also asked them for names of other people who might be interested. Later, I sent regular letters from Madrid to people on that mailing list. I sent them copies, for example, of all the statements I made. As often as possible, I wrote them summary letters explaining the course of the negotiation so they knew I had not forgotten them. I did this primarily because they were all very skeptical that their concerns would be expressed by the American delegations at the the Madrid meeting. Many said they had had the experience before of meeting with people and then discovering their concerns were not being taken into account. Frankly, I did not like that cynicism and did not think it was a healthy attitude for them to have toward our government. Moreover, I did not want them to have that attitude toward me. So that is why I took great pains to develop a local constituency.

My third support problem, which was substantively the most important, concerned the Europeans. Prior to Madrid, there was a Belgrade meeting because the Helsinki Final Act provided that there ^{SHOULD} ~~could~~ ^{REVIEW} be a Belgrade meeting. At the time of the Belgrade meeting, or shortly thereafter, I heard frequently from Arthur Goldberg about his frustrations. At the time, I paid little attention because I did not think I would be involved with that situation. When I did become involved, though, I remembered Mr. Goldberg's frustrations, which concerned both our allies and the State Department.

It soon became clear we had had problems with our allies in Belgrade--problems I hoped we could avoid in Madrid. So I asked the Department to arrange meetings for me in Europe. My purpose was to educate myself, to learn the cast of characters in Europe, and to begin discussion of issues. These meetings proved to be invaluable. Our allies were extremely gracious and introduced me to high-level officials, not just my counterparts. Thus it was clear they were paying far more attention to this meeting than was Washington.

In fact, the lack of interest in Washington was an advantage for me because it allowed me significant freedom. Washington looked upon the CSCE as a necessary but unimportant sideshow. So those who dealt with the cosmic issues did not pay much attention to what we were doing.

One of the problems Mr. Goldberg addressed in Belgrade was called

the "issue of names." Mr. Goldberg had instructions from the President to deal actively with the issue of Soviet dissidents. To highlight the issue of dissidents, he felt it necessary to mention names of victims of Soviet repression. So he mentioned six names in Belgrade. (The U.S. was the only delegation to do so.)
Unfortunately, his decision to mention names did not ^{I WAS TOLD,} have the approval of the Department or the allies. As a result, Mr. Goldberg was upset that the allies were not helping; the allies were annoyed because he was doing something they had not expected; and the State Department was irritated because he was acting without the proper clearances from the Department. ^{YET, HE WAS ABLY CARRYING OUT THE WISHES OF THE PRESIDENT.}

Prior to the Madrid talks, I discussed the issue of names with the allies wherever I went. I said it was my personal inclination to mention the names of the victims of Soviet repression because as a lawyer, if I was going to make a case, it was essential for me to illustrate the case. Moreover, I said, I could not illustrate it without mentioning names, so I hoped they would cooperate with ^{US} me in that regard. ^{THE DEPARTMENT SUPPORTED THAT POSITION}

^{IN BONN, I WAS TOLD THEY COULD NOT FOLLOW OUR LEAD ON THE ISSUE OF NAMES.}
~~The FRG representative, (inaudible), was the only person who refused to cooperate on this issue. The others all said they would take it under advisement. But~~ The Germans had special concerns about their countrymen in ^{THE} East Germany. They were very ^{DIRECT} honest about this. They said that in 1979 they had secured the release of ⁴⁹ 79,000 ethnic Germans. (It was then 1980). They had not done it with petitions, or with demonstrations, or with picket signs in front of the Soviet

Embassy. They had done it by quiet diplomacy. ~~They acknowledged that it also cost them money, but that did not alter anything.~~ They had secured the release of ⁴⁹~~79~~,000 ~~East~~ Germans and did not want to do anything that would endanger their ability to obtain further releases.

~~Genscher mentioned this illustration on the last day of September 1983 when we had breakfast with the Foreign Ministers in Madrid. He spoke about how pleased he was with this meeting.~~ I replied that I understood ^{the}~~his~~ viewpoint and did not want to be responsible for any program which left even one person behind the iron curtain who might otherwise get out. But I said that we had to view ourselves as an orchestra. In an orchestra, there are people who loudly bang the drums and blow the trumpets, as well as people who softly play the harp or the piano. In some orchestras, one person can play more than one instrument. But like an orchestra, I said, it is important that we play music together, and that there be some harmony in what we do; that is the key. Later, that idea became the theme of U.S.-allied cooperation in Madrid.

One month before the start of the meeting in Madrid, I had spoken with my Rumanian colleague during his visit to Washington. ~~I said I could learn things from him at the meeting, so~~ I asked our Embassy in Bucharest to invite him and his delegation to have lunch with me on my first day in Madrid. He accepted, and we had lunch along with a few people from our delegation.

After the meal, he took me aside to say he had told the Soviet

delegate about this lunch and that the Soviet delegate would also like to talk with me. In response, I expressed my willingness to meet with the Soviet delegate. This surprised the Rumanian because we had not been talking to the Soviets since their invasion of Afghanistan the previous December. (It was then September.) Regardless, I said that I could not conceive of being in a meeting with 35 states and not talking to one at the parties. ~~In that kind of meeting,~~ ^{W/ HAD} we ought to be talking to each other. ✓

I had raised that question with the Department beforehand, and said I thought it would be terrible for me not to talk to the Soviets. They said I could do whatever I wished. So what I was doing did not run contrary to any public policy.

At any rate, the Rumanian was pleased to hear I would meet with the Soviet delegate. He called me an hour or two later to say the Soviet was also very pleased. The head of the Soviet delegation for the preparatory meeting in September 1980 was their Ambassador to Madrid, Yuri Dubynin. He had previously been the DCM in Paris, had headed their negotiation in Geneva, and was an expert on the C S C E. ✓
^{IT WAS MY IMPRESSION}
~~(inaudible) When I first talked to him,~~ he thought he was going to be head of the ^{Soviet} delegation throughout the meetings. As it happened, he was relieved of that duty and moved to a secondary spot after the preparatory meeting.

Regardless, the Rumanian called to say Dubynin was pleased and would like to know where and when we should meet. I suggested meeting

over lunch the next day and asked Dubynin to choose the site. The Rumanian agreed, but then called me back thirty minutes later to say, with a touch of sadness in his voice, that the Russian wanted me to decide where to meet. It was clear the Soviets wanted to be able to say I had asked for this lunch. The request was foolish because I had just arrived in Madrid that day and would have been lost a block from the hotel. Meanwhile, Dubynin was their Ambassador and knew the good restaurants. Nevertheless, I said, if he wants to make it appear that I am asking for this meeting, we can have lunch in my apartment, ~~because I know how to get there.~~

So we met in my apartment the next day. He was attended by his deputy, a KGB general, ^{KONNARCHEV} ~~named Kondrichov~~, who remained the number two man on the Soviet delegation throughout the Madrid conference. This was a long meeting. I started by saying that I wanted them to know I was a strong anti-communist and believed their system ran contrary to my values and was a threat to the security of my country. I said this in a very low, moderate voice, but I wanted them to know. On the other hand, I said I was very serious about the meeting, and hoped we could achieve something constructive because it made no sense for us to do anything else. In retrospect, it was a good talk.

That night I received a phone call from my deputy saying that Kondrichov ^{A. SITOV} had called and wanted to continue the discussions the next day. At first I agreed. Then I suddenly decided to do something which I later felt good about: I asked my deputy to tell Kondrichov ✓ the next night was the Jewish high holidays and I intended to go to

synagogue. However, I said, I would be glad to meet with ^{THE SOVIETS} ~~Kondrichov~~ ✓
the following day. I ^{FOELT IT WAS IMPORTANT} ~~said this not because~~ I was planning to go to
~~synagogue, but primarily~~ to make a statement to the Soviets. ~~I am not~~
~~sure I would have gone to synagogue otherwise, but after making that~~
~~statement, I decided to go.~~

Before the Madrid conference began, while visiting London, I had ✓
talked to my British colleague about NATO Caucuses. When I saw him
again on my first day in Madrid, I offered to hold the Caucus' first
meeting at the American Embassy. He suggested that it would be better
to hold the first meeting at the British Embassy because the French
might not attend a meeting at the U.S. Embassy. In Belgrade, they
^{DID NOT} ~~never~~ attended the NATO Caucuses. So we held the first meeting at the
British Embassy. We then rotated sites alphabetically, so the U.S.
hosted the second meeting.

~~Regardless,~~ ^{TOOK PLACE ON} The first NATO meeting was the ~~same~~ day I had met my
Rumanian friend for lunch. I told the NATO Caucus about my lunch with
the Rumanian, as well as my appointment to have lunch with the Soviets
the next day. I said I did not want to be in the position of refusing
to meet with the Soviets, but that I would find a good reason to
cancel the luncheon if they objected to its taking place. I thought
they might not want one conference to begin with a meeting between the
superpowers, but they all enthusiastically agreed I should proceed
with the meeting.

We then discussed what we hoped to gain from a meeting with the

Soviets. Note the conference was then in a preparatory phase, the purpose of which was to develop an agenda. Both the NATO countries and the Soviets were ^{DISATISFIED} ~~very unhappy~~ with the agenda and the modalities of Belgrade. But the NATO countries agreed among themselves to accept the Belgrade modalities, ^{SINCE WE COULD EASILY LIVE WITH THEM.} ~~So~~ I proposed we make an offer to the Soviets to accept the Belgrade modalities, and thereby avoid a long dispute over the agenda.

^{AGREED AND}
The NATO Caucus ~~liked the proposal, so~~ I made that offer to the Soviets. I noted it was an election year, and it would be very popular ^{IN THE US} for us to have a fight over the agenda. Nevertheless, I said, we would prefer to spend just three days or a week on the agenda, be done with it, and save our fights for the main issues, ^{SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER} on which we have serious differences. ~~Warren Zimmerman, who was my deputy, thought I had made a persuasive case and the Soviets would accept my proposal.~~ ^{AFTER SOME DAYS AND THAT PROVED TO BE A DISADVANTAGE.} ~~As it happened,~~ they rejected the proposal. The result was that the preparatory meeting lasted for nine and a half weeks. In the end, ^{THE SOVIETS} they capitulated and gave us much more than we had expected.

At the end of the NATO meeting, I said I thought I should report at the next NATO meeting about my meeting with the Soviets. We had not yet scheduled the next meeting, so I proposed holding it the following afternoon. My purpose was to make them feel we were sharing, ^{THAT} and I was not doing anything behind their backs.

^{DECLINE, KNOWING HE WOULD BE}
I then spoke to the Frenchman afterwards, ~~who I know was curious~~ ^{MY MEETING WITH THE SOVIETS, I UNDERSTOOD THAT HE} about ~~what happened,~~ and said I thought he should attend the next

meeting which was going to be at the U.S. Embassy. He did come to the U.S. Embassy and subsequently attended every NATO Caucus throughout the Madrid meeting. For the first ^{FOR} ~~two~~ weeks, he spoke in French, and I needed a translator. ^{THESE AFTER TO ACCOMPANY ME} ~~After two weeks,~~ he started speaking in English. We ~~then had very good discussions and~~ developed a good relationship.

Throughout the conference, the NATO Caucus met ^{AT LEAST} ~~three~~ times a week. If we were at a critical point in the discussions, we might meet five or six times a day; ~~indeed, we would hold a virtually continuous session on the side.~~

I myself did not get very involved in procedural issues. ^{OUR} ~~my~~ position was clear. ^{OTHERS IN} ~~so I let others in the NATO group handle it~~ ^{ASSUMED MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY} ~~because I do not like to argue too much about~~ ^{PROCEAURAL} ~~agenda~~ issues. ^{HERE, MY PREFERENCE IS} ~~Regardless, as I mentioned,~~ ^{TO ASSURE DIRECTION} ~~At the end of the preparatory session,~~ ^{Soviet delay} ~~Ilyachev arrived from Moscow and gave us what we wanted. That ended the preparatory session.~~

The main meeting continued with intensive bilateral discussions between the U.S. and Soviets. ^{THAT} Over ^{PERIOD, I HAD} ~~three~~ years, ~~my secretaries~~ ^{UNPRODUCTIVE PARTICIPATION} ~~counted~~ between 375 and 400 hours of private meetings with the Soviets. That is a lot of talking. Much of it was ~~wasted~~ ^{WITH US AND} with Ilyachev, ~~particularly.~~ He was 75 years old when he started, ^{THE NEGOTIATIONS} ~~76~~ when he finally returned to China. ^{IF} ~~he did not want to talk substantively, he would talk about Chinese cooking or his adventures in China. It was not always easy to be serious.~~ ^B But we did have some

^{AND PRODUCE}
serious discussions.

There was one important difference between the Madrid meeting and other U.S.-Soviet negotiations which makes it difficult ^{FOR ME} to generalize, ~~based upon my experience in Madrid~~, on how to negotiate with the Soviets: Our government did not view the conclusion of an agreement as our most important objective. We would have liked to reach an agreement or at least one that served our interests. But as the meeting evolved, I became progressively less excited about reaching an agreement. ^{WE HAD OTHER OBJECTIVES AS WELL.}

^{MY EXPERIENCE} ~~I had a prejudice~~ as a lawyer ^{TAUGHT ME} because ~~I would also tell young~~ lawyers who were entering the firm that ^{CONCLUDING A WRITTEN} ~~conclusion of an agreement~~ ^{WAS NO} ~~does not necessarily~~ ^{Y INDICATION} indicate that a negotiation was successful. A negotiation is successful only if one ^{ACHIEVES ONE'S OBJECTIVES,} ~~obtains the agreement he wants.~~ One can reach ^{WRITTEN} agreements that are not in one's interest. It would be absurd to call ^A ~~that successful~~ ^{SUCCESSFUL} negotiation simply because a piece of paper ^{IS} ~~was~~ signed.

While negotiating in Madrid, there was one very important fact we always tried to remember: we had signed an agreement in 1975 which defined an important set of values. But the Soviets did not adhere to that agreement and acted as if they had not signed it. That fact was always in our minds, and I reminded the Soviets about it continually. Particularly as we became personally closer after spending many hours talking with each other, I never let them forget that fact. I would say to the Soviets ^{THAT} [^] we were prepared to have an agreement to disagree,

and to meet again in two or three years. I said the issues were too fundamental for us to expect to reach an agreement. We would require ^{PROVISIONS} ~~things~~ they could not give us, I said, and we would not accept anything less. I was very candid. This proved to be a useful tool, although I did not intend it as a tool; I really meant it.

~~CONCLUSION A WRITTEN~~
~~Conclusion of an agreement~~ was ^{ONLY} ~~certainly~~ one of our objectives. ~~One should not belittle that, but~~ ^T there were ~~also~~ other objectives. One important objective was alliance cohesion. Indeed, this objective assumed greater importance as the meeting continued, and more people in our government became interested. (As the meeting progressed, I began to receive more questions and more visitors. Members of Congress would come and would want to know what was happening. I welcomed that.) Frequent NATO Caucus meetings furthered alliance cohesion because the allies knew the U.S. would not adopt any position at the conference without first clearing it with them. I might state some issues more forcefully than would some of our allies, but ^{OTHERS} ~~at~~ ^{WOULD JOIN ME.} ~~times the British delegate appeared even more anti-Soviet than I.~~

Apart from the NATO Caucus, the Common Market countries also met as a group. We had thought after the second or third week that we could avoid these ^{DUPPLICATIVE} meetings, since the NATO Caucus was meeting so frequently. Every Common Market country, except Ireland, had agreed to dispense with ^{THEIR} ~~a~~ separate Caucus. ^{I WAS} ~~So~~ the Irish delegate, with whom ^{TOLD, SENT} ~~I discussed this issue at length, recommended sending a cable to his~~ ^{DUBLIN} ~~superiors~~ saying the others urged the formation of a Western Caucus that would include Ireland ^{AND SPAIN.} ~~to replace the NATO Caucus.~~ The Western


~~Caucus would also include Spain, which was not then a part of NATO.~~

In this manner, the Irish delegate told his superiors, ~~Their~~ position would be fully considered in one context of the Western Caucus.

The Irish government rejected this proposal, so the Common Market countries continued meeting as a group. I suggested to the other ~~excluded~~ ^{NEW-TOW} members of the NATO Caucus that these meetings should be no cause for concern. I recommended ^{ONLY MADE IN JEFF} we view the EC as a subcommittee of the Western Caucus. The subcommittee could make recommendations to the larger Caucus, but these would be subject to the approval of the larger group. My recommendation was ^{IN EFFECT} accepted and the procedure was followed. Some people in ^{our} the Department were ~~very~~ unhappy about this arrangement, but I did not even try to alter it because it was a hopeless cause. Indeed, the EC subcommittee proved to be useful in much of our work.

^{ANOTHER} One of our objectives was to begin the process of bringing Spain into NATO. Thus, the head of the Spanish delegation, Javier ^{RUIZ DE} Perez, who became the first Spanish Ambassador to NATO, met with us frequently to discuss this issue. Moreover, Spain was present at all meetings of the NATO Caucus.

^{DURING A PRIVATE MEETING WITH} At one time, [^]Mr. Ilyachev asked to meet with me privately, so I ~~agreed.~~ ^{THAT} At our meeting, he complained the Soviets were making all the ^{SUBSTANTIAL} concessions, while we were making none. He ~~charged this was not right~~ and made them look bad. He was very candid. / [^]AGREED, BUT EXPLAINED THAT

~~I replied "Assume that, upon entering a negotiation, you hope to~~ ^{THEY HAVE AN END}
~~OBJECTIVE AS TO WHERE THEY WANT TO BE AT THE END. THEY~~
~~conclude a certain agreement.~~ ^{THEY} You do not begin by asking merely for
what ^{THEY} you hope to receive; rather, ^{THEY} you ask for far more, assuming that
^{THEY} you will make compromises which lead to the ^{END} agreement ^{THEY} you want. It
would be fine if the U.S. could adopt a similar approach, ^{AND THEN END AT SOME MID-POINT} but we
^{(DECLINED,} cannot, because we have to negotiate ^{FIRST} with ^{AMONG OUR FRIENDS.} NATO. Moreover, we must
^{IN} ~~(NO THIS RESTRAINT WHILE WE CAN BEGIN OUR BARCAINING.)~~ satisfy public opinion. ^{AND} Thus, although we might enter a NATO meeting
with a proposal that asks for far more than we hope to receive, by the
^{(I CONTINUED,} time we meet with you, ^{AND} we have already moderated our demands to
satisfy the Danes, Norwegians, Dutch, Germans, etc. We also must
moderate our demands to persuade our publics that we have a reasonable
position. As a result, we begin our negotiations ~~with you~~ by
proposing something reasonably close to our final position, whereas
^{THEY SAY} you begin with a heavily padded proposal. Thus, to conclude an
^{(I SAY: "} agreement, ^{AND} you must make most of the concessions because we have very
little left to concede." 

^{ME}
He listened very attentively to ~~this speech~~ and did not raise the
issue again. ~~I think he understood I was right.~~

The NATO Caucuses were indispensable. They were informal
caucuses which we often supplemented with dinners and luncheons.
Occasionally, one member of the group would arrange a private lunch
for four or five of the 16 countries. I attended such lunches, but I
never arranged one because I did not want to be accused of excluding
anybody. ^{NEVERTHELESS} ~~Regardless,~~ those private meetings were very useful. ~~We~~
~~would sometimes arrive at a position and then try to sell it in the~~

~~big group~~

The Soviets helped us a great deal ^{IN} ~~by~~ radicalizing the West ^{BY} ~~with~~ their behavior. There is no question about it. They occasionally engaged in ^{NEGOTIATIONS} such foolish behavior ^{WHICH ALIENATED OTHERS} ~~that the heads of delegations would complain to their capitals the Soviets were impossible.~~

The Western Caucus ^{STRENGTHENED BY} ~~there was~~ ^{COHESION} very personally cohesive. That cohesiveness enabled us to agree on instituting an eight-month recess ^{FROM} ~~in the wake of Poland's declaration of martial law.~~ ^{4 MARCH TO NOVEMBER 1981,} During that recess, I received ^{THAT} many cables ~~from our allies saying they were feeling~~ ^{PRESSURE TO REOPEN NEGOTIATIONS AT} expectantly awaiting the resumption of the meeting ~~so that we could return to business as usual.~~ ^{RETURN TO "BUSINESS AS USUAL"} We did not want to ~~reopen the conference~~ because nothing had ^{CHANGED} ~~changed~~ in Poland.

Fortunately, on the last day before the recess, ^{MARCH} the Norwegians ^{INFORMED THAT} told me the Common Market countries were planning to meet during the recess, and the U.S. ^{BOTH OF US WOULD THEREBY} ~~would be excluded.~~ ^{FROM THE PLANNING} ~~He added that could be dangerous for us because we would not know what was happening.~~ ^{DURING THE RECESS} So I asked him whether he could arrange a meeting ^{WHICH} in Norway. He said it would be good for ^{HIS GOVERNMENT} them ^{THIS WOULD ALSO} to host NATO because there would soon be an election in Norway ^(IN NORWAY) and it would strengthen the NATO feeling. ~~So I suggested we meet in September in Oslo and everybody agreed.~~

At the Oslo meeting, it was very clear we were ~~poles~~ apart. I ^{STATED} ~~said~~ firmly we would not do business as usual because there had been no change in Poland, and we had agreed not to negotiate until the

^{MAYBE CAN}
situation there had changed. The Europeans said their publics required continued negotiation. ~~Regardless, we did not reopen negotiations with the Soviets, though we did schedule another NATO~~ ^{caucus} meeting ^{FOR} in Lisbon. Moreover, ^A after two days in Lisbon, we agreed to meet again in Brussels. This series of meetings yielded a very good ^{RESULT} ~~resolution~~. By talking with each other, we finally persuaded them we were firm. ^{PRESIDENT} In that respect, ^{REPUTATION FOR} Reagan's intransigence was very helpful because ^{OUR POSITION} they all knew ^{WE} were not bluffing. I simply told our allies I could not conduct business as usual because: a) I am against it myself, and b) even if I were not, I could not possibly persuade the Reagan Administration to soften its stance. The Europeans understood this argument, and ^{CAME UP WITH} ~~acquiesced~~. ^{A PLAN WHICH SERVED OUR NEEDS AND BEST INTERESTS.}

Question: I have a question about the long hiatus that occurred in the preparatory session after your initial proposal for quick resolution of the agenda issues. Do you think the Soviets simply lacked instructions and could not arrive at a compromise on the procedures? I ask this question because, at our previous seminar, several participants observed the Soviets tend to enter a meeting with a fixed position which they will not alter until they receive new instructions.

Kampelman: The Soviets did not lack instructions; ^{I WAS SUGGESTING A} ~~however, they~~ ^{CHANGE IN} ~~were slow to follow~~ their instructions. It took about a

week or ten days before it became clear to me they had rejected my offer. In the interim, they had cabled to Moscow. ~~I know they cabled because they told me they cabled regularly.~~

~~Indeed, one of the advantages of our informal~~
~~relationship was that they told me a good deal about~~
~~their process.~~ ^{Also developed between us which could be helpful. They were}
~~At one point, I told the KGB person who~~
~~was running the delegation that I seldom spoke from a~~
~~prepared text,~~ ^{I agree to provide the Soviet delegation}
~~regularly, I asked whether it would be easier for him if~~
~~I gave him exact copies of my statements.~~ ^{with} ^{once he transcribed them.}
~~He said that~~
~~would be very helpful, so I assigned a person to record~~
~~all my statements because I did not want to be~~
~~misquoted. Thus, even when I spoke extemporaneously,~~
~~somebody recorded it. It would then be typed and a copy~~
~~would be sent to the Soviet delegation.~~

It is worth noting that for many months after the Afghanistan invasion, the CSCE provided the only forum in which we could talk to the Russians. We were not talking in Vienna, Geneva, the UN, Moscow or Washington. For that reason, we discussed a wide range of issues in Madrid.

One reason the Soviets were slow to compromise in the preparatory session was ^{that} they thought they could easily

divide the West on procedural issues. They were wrong.
^{ON ONE OCCASION,} While ^{AN} discussing ^{OF IMPORTANCE} one issue with the Soviets, I suggested
they should also talk to the British, ^{FRANCE,} ~~the~~ Germans or the
Dutch. I said this because I knew our allies agreed
with us. In contrast, they would not ^{WON} suggest we talk
separately to the Hungarians because they could not be
~~COMFORTABLE SITUATING SUCH A RELATIONSHIP~~
~~confident of Hungary's support.~~ Thus, our alliance
cohesion surprised the Soviets and eventually forced
them to ^{MOVE IN OUR DIRECTION} ~~compromise~~ after they realized they could not
divide us.

Interestingly enough, the ^{NOT MYSTERY} ~~biggest~~ dispute over a
procedural issue took place while I was gone. While I
was away for a long weekend, my deputy, Spencer Oliver,
together with ^{AMBASSADOR KASSEL} ~~Kassel~~, the FRG ^{AMBASSADOR} ~~fellow~~ delegate, ^{ASSUMED NATO} ~~decided~~
~~on a policy.~~ ^{LEADERSHIP IN} The Russians could not blame me for this
because I was not there to agitate. Regardless, the
West, ^{FORCING} ~~led by the FRG,~~ forced the meeting to continue for
24 hours without ^A ~~break.~~ This was a case of procedural
issues becoming highly emotional. My deputy was fully
committed to the issue. He was constantly waking me
throughout the night by telephoning to tell me what was
happening. I wanted to be informed, but I told him to
resolve the issues as he thought best. In the end, ^{WON} ~~he~~
won the ^{ACCOMPLISHED} ~~battle.~~

Question: At several points in the CSCE negotiations, the neutral

countries were very active. Their involvement sets an interesting precedent for the current Stockholm talks as well as for possible future multilateral negotiations on non-proliferation. With this in mind, can you tell us the impact of the neutrals' activities on the U.S.-Soviet dialogue, and on the U.S. posture towards its allies?

Kampelman: Let me first say that, in my opinion, the neutrals' active involvement benefited us at the meetings. They provided a splendid way to bridge the differences between East and West. Regrettably, they were not active enough. ^{Also} ~~Also~~, They were [^] not as constructive as they could have been because the four--Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Finland--had ~~some~~ differences among themselves. These were mostly personality differences which could have been resolved. But they ^{also} ~~^~~ made the tactical error of including the "non-aligned" countries: Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Malta and others. As a result, they could not [^] agree among themselves on how to proceed.

I encouraged every effort by all of the neutrals. However, I did ask them not to introduce any proposal that would surprise me because I wanted to know what they were doing. I told them they should know what I could accept and what I could not accept, and that I

~~They~~^{flexibility} could accept very little. They made some errors of judgment, ~~in this regard~~. At times, they were somewhat too timid. Nevertheless, the neutrals made important contributions and can be expected to do so in the future.

The Soviet attitude towards the neutrals was ambivalent. On a few occasions when the Soviets agreed with us on an issue, I proposed we jointly seek the neutrals' ~~support~~^{participation}. Their typical response was to say we did not need the neutrals' ~~support~~. They ~~wanted~~^{preferred} to do things on a bilateral basis^{with us}. As it turned out, however, bilateral discussions almost never elicited important concessions because they did not want to appear to be conceding to the U.S. Thus to elicit major Soviet concessions, we had to use the neutrals, and at the crucial moment the Spanish, to set forth proposals. The only exception was when Brezhnev spoke to the 26th Party Congress and made a concession concerning the ~~security~~^{SECURITY} geographical area under consideration. This was early in the conference, ~~however, before the Soviets hardened their stance towards the U.S.~~

After the ¹⁹⁸² eight-month^{hiatus} hiatus, we entered the reconvened meeting with new proposals and new requests. One of these was a Danish proposal concerning free trade^{UNION, A SUBJECT}, which was not included in the Helsinki Final Act. The Danes

WITH THE ^{INITIAL} OF THE TEN,
initiated this proposal, ^{as} a demonstration to Washington
that they were not asking the U.S. to engage in business
as usual. I thought it was an interesting idea, but
questioned whether they would adhere to it. So I
pointedly asked the Danish delegate whether he ^{AND THE OTHERS} would
abandon the proposal under pressure. He suggested we
discuss the idea ^{AT THE CHANCE} with NATO. ^{AT THE CHANCE} We raised the issue at the
^{BRUSSELS} Lisbon meeting, and I asked whether others would support
the proposal. I said I needed to be able to present a
firm commitment to my government in Washington because
otherwise ^{IT WOULD BE A USELESS GESTURE.} ~~they would fear being abandoned.~~

When the conference reconvened, the neutrals entered
with a proposal ^{REFLECTING AMERICAN NATO VIEWS, BUT INADEQUATE FOR THE U.S.} ~~on free trade which contradicted ours.~~
The neutrals' position may have been acceptable to the
^{BRITISH} Europeans, but it would not have been acceptable to my ^{U.S.}
~~constituency in Congress.~~ I told the neutrals, somewhat
~~apologetically,~~ that I could not accept their proposal,
and added that I had warned them previously about this.
In response, ^{THE} neutrals ^{LATER} amended their paper, ^{AND CAME CLOSE TO} ~~to agree with~~
us. ~~The Russians were very angry that they were then~~
~~the only ones defending the neutrals' paper, but there~~
~~was little they could do at that point.~~

Question: Did you ever bluff the Russians or try to bluff them?

Kampelman: I am not a bluffer generally. I may occasionally have

added a bit of rhetorical fluff to a position, but I am not by temperament a bluffer in any kind of negotiation. I tried to be very straight both with our allies and with the Soviets.

~~Incidentally, the Russians were most upset by the fact that Rumania openly disagreed with them at the end of the conference. (For a long time, the Poles and Hungarians were working internally to persuade the Russians to change their stance on certain issues. But they did so quietly, which is very different.)~~ Near the end of the conference, the U.S. and Soviets had narrowed, ^{DIFFERENCES. BUT} their differences. ^(BUT THE US WAS) Meanwhile, the Soviets had adopted a ^{IN A BINA} new position at the advice of the delegation. Andropov sent a letter to the heads of state of all 35 participating countries saying he would accept the neutral document ^{AS IS WITHOUT FURTHER CHANGE.} The Soviet delegates then argued that their position was unalterable because Andropov had signed his name to ^{THE} his piece of paper. I replied by saying ^{DELEGATION} they had made a mistake by advising Andropov to sign the letter. I said ^{(NEED SOME CHANGE) IN} very clearly I could not accept ^{GAVE} the neutrals' position, and I explained my reasons to the neutrals. I stated my terms and said that if those terms could not be met, we would agree to disagree.

Then the Rumanians did something which surprised ^{NEWLY} everyone. ~~(It did not surprise me because the Rumanian~~

~~delegate had told me he had new instructions from his capital.~~ He announced ^{A POSITION} to the entire conference that ~~which undermined the Andropov~~ Rumania would no longer support the neutrals' position, ^{AND IN EFFECT SUBVERTED US.} in spite of Andropov's letter. Naturally, this undercut the Soviet position and rendered it ~~irrelevant~~ ^{irrelevant}. Fortunately, we found the Soviets a face-saving exit from their predicament. The hosts convened a meeting to say it was time for the meeting to end, despite the remaining differences. They then set forth a proposal which gave us what we wanted, and it was over. The Soviets ^{DELEGATES} were ~~very~~ angry, but Moscow acquiesced.

My uncompromising approach worked only because we had a reasonable position. If we had not had a reasonable position, the allies would not have supported us. This is generally true. The allies will accept either a substantive or a political defense of our position, but it must be a reasonable defense to win their support. It must also be reasonable for the neutrals to understand it. This does not mean they will always agree with us, but they should at least understand our position. If we adhere firmly to an incomprehensible position, we will be accused of obstructing agreement. At the CSCE, no one could say we were trying to sabotage the negotiation because they knew we had a reasonable position.

✓ This factor was also important in maintaining the support of ^{our}~~my~~ domestic constituency. It was very important to me not to lose ^{that}~~my~~ domestic constituency. Thus, I had to set forth a position they could accept. This was not my foremost priority, but it was an important priority. They were one of my audiences. Indeed, whenever I spoke I had that audience in mind. The 35 delegations were one audience. The Soviet Union was another audience, since I knew they were taping the talks, and I wanted my speeches to be preserved in their ^{THE DISSIDENTS BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN WERE ANOTHER AUDIENCE OF IMPORTANCE.} computer. [^] But Western public opinion was equally important to ^{US}~~me~~. For that reason, I held numerous press conferences. I appeared on the BBC and spoke with World Service at least once a week. Indeed, I spoke with them as often as they wanted. In addition, I made myself available to European television and any press people who expressed interest in the conference.

The Soviets were not happy about my media campaign. At one meeting they said, in a rather aggrieved way, that misinformation was coming out of the meetings. (Indeed, ^{PROBABLY INADVERTENT} there was some misinformation coming out of these ^{OUR MEETINGS} meetings.) They added ~~these~~ were supposed to be closed meetings, not open to the public, and I should not be talking to the press.

I responded by saying that I understood their concern,

and I was glad the Soviets were not suggesting I was the source of misinformation. (They never said I was the source, so I assumed they were not accusing me.) Then I said that one reason for the misinformation was that we were not disseminating enough ^{DIRECT} ~~accurate~~ information. I added that our delegation would be prepared ^{FOR THE MEETING} to hold one public session per week. But I felt compelled to say the U.S. is a democratic society, and I represented the people of our country. I must speak with the press, I said, so my people know what I am doing ^{IN THEIR NAME} ~~for them~~. However, I promised I ^{DID NOT} ~~would never~~ tell the press what any other delegation said at the meeting. I would only discuss the U.S. position. ~~I kept this promise and by so doing, eased the Soviet concerns about confidentiality.~~

Question: Can you speak about the use of the back channel in these negotiations?

Kampelman: Let me first give an ^{EXPERIENCE} ~~illustration~~ that initiated me ^{TO} ~~in~~ ^{THIS} ~~this~~ process. During the preparatory meeting, it became increasingly clear that we had to take a position on the French CDE proposal. In December 1979, before Afghanistan, Secretary Vance had indicated at the NATO ministerial that we would support the French proposal. ~~Brzezinski felt this was unauthorized.~~ So ^{WE} after the ^{BY} Afghanistan invasion, ~~Brzezinski had us pull~~ back from


that position. By the following October, we still had not taken a position on the French proposal. Meanwhile, the conference was scheduled to begin on November 11 and the Department was pressing very hard for the U.S. to officially support the French.

I was asked to attend a meeting in the Situation Room at the White House, chaired by the Secretary of State. As it happened, the Deputy Secretary, Warren Christopher, chaired the meeting because Secretary Muskie was not available. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Directors of ACDA and the CIA were all there to discuss the issue. At first, I said very little because I was still learning the situation and wanted to hear what others had to say. Then Mr. Christopher asked me for my view. I said forthrightly that my view was parochially limited to what I saw as my opportunities and responsibilities in the negotiation. Then I offered my viewpoint, ^{WHICH WAS IN THE MAIN ACCEPTED.} ~~at which point Brzezinski suggested that I should be left responsible to decide if and when to~~ support the French proposal. Christopher said he had had the same thought, but had been afraid to express it. So they agreed.

When I left the meeting, Ridgeway, who was then the Counselor to the State Department, and George Vest both approached me to ask whether I understood what had

happened. I said I had an idea, but was not quite sure. They told me that although this was very unusual, I had just decided the issue. I replied I did not want to decide then; I wanted to use it as a bargaining lever. So I waited.

The election took place and Reagan won. I received a call from the Department saying, that ^{SINCE} ^{MAIN} the meeting was scheduled for November 11, ~~Since that is only one week away, they asked, should you not state our position on the French proposal.~~ ^{SINCE I CAN NOW CARRY OUT MY JUDGMENT.} I said I ~~had~~ ^{DIP} not ^{BELIEVE} yet fully formulated our position. Although I favored the French proposal, I did not want the Carter Administration ^{SINCE} to make that decision. ~~I thought it would be a serious mistake because when Reagan took office, he was likely to discard every decision made by Carter.~~ The State Department ^{SENT THE ISSUE} ~~protested that this was not fair to Carter, and that we could not stall the government until January 20. After hearing my arguments, they suggested I cable my views to the President, but cautioned they would recommend against my approach. I did as they suggested, and the President agreed to leave the decision to Reagan. Thus, I never committed myself on this issue.~~

4. ANOTHER ILLUSTRATION: 

Sometime in October I decided I was going to make my opening speech on November 17. I spoke to a junior State Department employee for whom I had a great deal of

respect. He was a very capable young man with whom I had worked closely, and I liked his thinking. I told him exactly what I wanted to say in my speech, and asked if he would write a draft for me, since I would not have time to write it myself. He said he would love to write the draft. ~~Later, he would~~ ^{then} call ^{at} me periodically to say he was very busy, working seven days a week, and had not had a chance to write the draft. About a week beforehand, he told me over the telephone he would surely get it done that weekend. ~~However,~~ ^{My} my deputy did ~~not think I could depend on him and~~ volunteered to write it himself. I agreed.

I was ~~supposed~~ ^{scheduled} to present the speech on Monday, the 17th. At first, I did not press my deputy because I knew he was very busy. ~~Finally, the Friday before I was supposed to speak, I asked him for his draft. He said he would do it.~~ Regrettably, he had a habit of getting up at 5:00 in the morning to ^{work} ~~do these things~~, so I decided on Sunday to write the speech myself. ~~My deputy did bring me a speech on Monday morning, but I had no use for his speech since I had written my own.~~

Obviously, there was no time to clear the speech. Frankly, it never occurred to be to clear it. Nobody had ever told me to clear my speeches. But even if I had wanted to, I did not have time to clear the speech.

If the State Department person had written it for me, it would have been a cleared speech. But I never did receive a draft from him, so I delivered my own and sent a cable to Washington with a copy.

Somehow the Reuters correspondent in Madrid heard from one of my staff that the speech had not been cleared. He asked the Reuters person in Washington to ask the spokesman at one of their daily press conferences whether the speech had been cleared. The Reuters person in Washington did as he was asked, whereupon the spokesman, knowing every speech is cleared, replied that of course it ^{HAD BEEN} ~~was~~ cleared. Ambassador Kampelman's speech is government policy, he said. He did not know what I said, but he knew it was government policy. Yet, the Reuters correspondent in Madrid had reason to believe the speech ^{HAD BEEN} ~~was~~ not cleared. ^{THE ISSUE WAS, OF COURSE,} ~~So he asked to speak with~~ ~~CLEARED UP, BUT IT WAS AN AMUSING AND INTERESTING EXPERIENCE.~~ Roz. Roz then called me on the telephone to ask what I ^{THE DEFLECTION SAID} ~~had said in my speech because she did not want to lie to~~ ~~anyone. I told her she did not need to lie, and that~~ ~~she should simply tell them exactly what happened. She,~~ ~~then agreed to stick her neck out by saying the speech~~ ~~was not cleared, but it was government policy. She~~ ~~added that she hoped it was government policy. She~~ ~~later called me to say I was tougher than she would have~~ ~~liked on some things, but it was government policy.~~

At that time, my cochairman was Griffen Bell. Although he did not spend much time there, he happened to be in Washington while this was taking place. Somehow, he incorrectly thought the State Department was unhappy that the speech had not been cleared, and was unhappy about the speech, though he personally thought it was a great speech. So he got excited and called the President, which I did not know. After receiving this call, the President sent me a letter saying what a great speech I had made on November 17. I doubt the President ever read the speech.

Let me add one final word in regard to the speech of November 17. Shortly before the Christmas recess the next month, there was a cocktail reception, ~~for me~~, I arrived somewhat late, after one Eastern European Ambassador had drunk too much vodka. He was a nice man. He approached me, put his arms around me and said that he was taking my speech of November 17 home to show to his son. That was interesting because the speech contrasted democracy with Leninism, but began by saying that the United States and ^{RUSSIA HAD} ~~the Soviet Union~~ could never ~~FOUGHT EACH OTHER IN WAR.~~ ~~be engaged in nuclear war.~~ It also discussed the similarities between the two--the Cossacks and the cowboys, for example. I started with a positive tone because I ~~did not want to alienate anyone.~~ ^{WANTED ATTENTION, BUT IT ENDED WITH A} But then I ~~explained the fundamental reason that I thought there~~ ^{FIRM ATTACK ON LENINISM,}

~~were differences between us and the need for us to
grapple with those differences.~~