Max M. Kampelman Papers

Copyright Notice:

Version 3
August 20, 2018

White Burkett Miller Center Of Public Affairs The University Of Virginia

March 19, 1990

Dear Max:

I'm pleased to return your text of a superb presentation at the Miller Center. I hope we're not made too many errors.

Please return with any changes you might suggest. Many thanks.

With every good wish,

Sincerely,

Ken Thompson

University of Virginia Post Office Box 5106 Charlottesville, Virginia 22905 804.924.7236

Arms Control

MAX M. KAMPELMAN

NARRATOR: We at the Miller Center have been hoping for some months that Ambassador Kampelman might join us, because he has played a unique part in the history of two different subjects we have been discussing here. One is the matter of arms control and the other is that of the Reagan oral history project.

Ambassador Kampelman has had a rich background in various fields: in education, beginning with a bachelor's degree and a J.D. degree from New York University, and a master's and a doctorate from the University of Minnesota; he has taught political science at the University of Minnesota, Harvard, Claremont, and Bennington. He has served as treasurer of the American Political Science Association. Thus, he has played a very central role in the fields of education, government and law—in the latter field he was a partner in Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver, and Kampelman for decades.

As for the field of government, he was senior adviser to the U.S. delegation to the United Nations from 1966 to 1967 and then had a whole series of appointments in the Reagan administration. I'll mention them quickly: ambassador and chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which met in Madrid from 1980 to 1983; co-chairman in 1984 of the U.S. delegation to observe the elections in El Salvador; ambassador and head of the U.S. delegation to the negotiations on nuclear and space arms from 1985 to 1989; and counselor of the Department of State since 1987.

He is the author of *The Communist Party vs. the CIO: A Study in Power Politics, the Strategy of Deception,* and *Three Years at the East-West Divide.* He moderated "Washington Week in Review" from 1967 to 1970.

One could go on at even greater length than I have with this recitation. We are terribly pleased that Max Kampelman has, with his very busy schedule, found time to join us, and he will tell us something about both of our subjects; you may ask questions on both the arms control and the Reagan history subjects. Thank you very much.

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: Thank you very much. You do have the Reagan project, and I'll be very happy to cover that and answer any questions you have about it. You also have a keen interest in the arms issue, which we can talk about as well. I suppose we might share observations about the overall direction of the Soviet Union in general, at least the extent to which I will include Soviet developments in my talk.

I should say that the appointment that I had to Madrid, which was in 1980, was an appointment originally made by President Carter. I was reappointed by President Reagan, and then President Reagan did get me involved in the arms issue.

I had an experience with the American communist movement many years ago as a youngster, which was linked with some trade union work that I did. Actually, I worked my way through school, and thus got involved with the Garment Workers' Union in New York. Those unions, you may know, were involved in a rather intensive conflict due to the effort of the Communist party to take over the trade union movement in America. The Garment Workers' Union was in the forefront of those unions resisting the efforts of the Communist party to take over the unions, and I therefore found myself, as a student, getting somewhat involved in that effort. That interested me very much; I observed it. Then as a law student—and I went to night law school—I found myself, because I'd been active in the Garment Worker's Union, being dragged into a conflict

taking place within the American law student group due to the communists making an effort to capture that group. Other students, knowing I had some experience, got me involved in that, too.

As I continued with graduate work at the University of Minnesota, all of this tended to merge together. I became active in politics as a political scientist. The political science department at the University of Minnesota was a department that got active in the politics of the state. Hubert Humphrey, for example, was a product of that political science department. In 1946 we found ourselves with the Democratic Farmer Labor party captured by what we thought was the communist link. The communist movement was very active in Minnesota, and in fact it controlled the CIO there in 1946.

I go into this because one of the questions always in my mind has concerned the differences that might exist between, let's say, how American communists might act, and how Soviet communists might act. I've been struck by that on occasion. Not that I'm prepared to write a book on the subject, but it has interested me. Certain similarities of patterns have interested me as I've observed them in these experiences over the years.

For example, one way that I found the American communist movement was able to gain great influence within the American labor movement—and it did, as is documented in the book that Ken mentioned, which grew out of my doctoral dissertation—was by a readiness to be patient and to stay at the meetings on into the night when other folks got tired and decided to go home to their beds. I found that to be a pattern in dealing with the Soviets as well, which is an interesting commentary here.

Now maybe I can move into the process of negotiating with the Soviets, which fits into this pattern. If there is a book in Moscow called *How to Negotiate With the Americans*, or maybe *How to Negotiate With the West*, I would think that

a first principle in that book would be "wait 'em out," and there are fascinating reasons for this. In the West we are subject to certain rules of internal regulation that the Soviets have not traditionally been subject to.

Let me illustrate this pattern with an example. In Madrid, toward the end of our meeting, the head of their delegation at that time was a deputy foreign minister, ~~named Iliachev (?).~~ He was then about 76 years old. I remember his 75th birthday; it happened on a weekend, and he got a call from Brezhnev. The first thing Monday morning he told me about this wonderful call he had gotten from Brezhnev. He was very proud of it. He was a man who used to be the editor of *Pravda*, a man of some influence in the Soviet system, although by then not in the mainstream, though still a deputy foreign minister. Anyhow, we were finally making progress in Madrid and this man had to have a cup of coffee with me. (He spoke no English at all, but we had an interpreter.) He said that he had been reviewing the history of our negotiations in Madrid and that he was struck again by the fact that the Soviets had made all the concessions and that the Americans had made no concessions. He thought that was unfair. "That is not way to run a negotiation," he told me.

I responded by acknowledging the accuracy of what he said. The fact of the matter is that they had made most of the concessions, and we had made very few in that area. But I said, "I want to explain this to you, Mr. Minister"—and this goes to the point of the first rule of the communist negotiating pattern—I said, "Let's assume for a moment that you want to end up here." I indicated a spot on the table in front of me. "There is nothing to prevent you from starting off here. Now let's assume we want to end up here in the negotiations. Now you might think, 'why don't we start at the other end of the table?' But we can't. We can't because in my country the starting point for negotiations has to appear reasonable to the American society. If we start with an unreasonable position,

we are hurt. Now the definition of reasonableness is one that depends on a combination of what the Congress thinks is reasonable, what the various agencies of the executive branch think is reasonable, what the American press thinks is reasonable, and what the opposing political party thinks is reasonable. If you include all these criteria, you get criticized. So there is an internal pressure that prevents me from starting way out here. I've got to start some place closer to where I am willing to settle. You are starting far from a reasonable compromise,and you come into this negotiation and say, 'Let's meet halfway.' And I say, "Where are you going to meet, over here? I can't do that." That's not the way we will negotiate with you, so the only way we can have any kind of an agreement with you is if you make the concessions, because it isn't even enough for us to have to start there because of American pressures. Once we arrive at a position, we then have to take it up with our NATO allies, and they have their own ideas as to what is reasonable. So instead of maybe starting there, we have to keep moving this way a little bit. That's the reality of dealing with us, and if you want an agreement with us, you have to understand that."

The fact of the matter is that the pattern of our relationships with them has put us on the defensive for years because of their argument, "We'll meet halfway." We then appear unreasonable if we don't want to meet them halfway. Given their knowledge that pressures are always on us, from our publics, from the opposing political party, from our allies, and from the press, they operate on the assumption that if they wait, internal pressures will lead us to move. If there is no agreement, obviously, it must be our fault. I've run into this at these arms negotiations constantly: If there is no agreement, it is our fault.

There is also a cultural pattern. I used to teach at Bennington College, and there was a very capable anthropologist there whose name is Edward Hall. Some of you may know one particularly good book of his called *The Silent Language.*

He is a cultural anthropologist. He left Bennington to move to Washington and the State Department employed him. He used to say that our culture was such that we liked to fill the voids. If two people are talking to each other, and there is a silence, there is a need to fill that silence by saying something. Soviets don't have that need. So what are you going to say in the periods of silence? Well, maybe you will make a concession, or maybe you say something that gives them some kind of insight about your position. Again, all of this supports the view that their first rule is, "Wait; the West will make concessions, and we won't have to pay for them." That's something that we have to keep in mind very much.

I suppose given the fact that I'd had some experience in this area, that I'd worked with them, that I had taught problems of democracy, I had taught Marxism and Leninism a little bit, I simply didn't play that game, and I think it is essential that we not play that game. The capacity for calculated patience really is one of the important ~~aspects~~ REQUIREMENTS.

I remember my wife came to Madrid at one point early on. I was there for the first part of it alone because she wasn't feeling too well, but she joined me later. She happened to arrive on a day in which we were invited by the Spanish to visit the Duke of Alba's home where there were magnificent works of art. So Maggie came with me and we went looking through those works of art. That same ~~Hiachev (?)~~ LEADER was there and I introduced them. I went off looking at some paintings, and I didn't realize that Maggie and he were continuing to talk until I heard his shouting back there; he was pulling Maggie over to me by the hand and saying something in Russian, which then got translated: "See, she too says that you are a stubborn man." But I say this because I think it is a characteristic of THE NEGOTIATION with which we must cope.

The Soviet negotiators with whom I have met are extraordinarily capable people. They are experts in their field. They stay with the subject matter for

many years. Our people tend to get rotated around; these people stay with the subject matter for a long period of time. That subject matter becomes their career.

They also have a great deal more at stake individually than Americans have. If I get fired, maybe some university will hire me. Some people who get fired became *heroes* after getting fired. Universities are out to grab them. A Soviet negotiator, though, is in a privileged position: where they live, whether they have to stand in line for food, the kind of food and clothing they can buy, education for their children, medical facilities for the family, careers. In fact, there is a tremendous amount of nepotism in the Soviet society. This all depends on their remaining in good favor, and the best way not to get hurt is simply not to be too creative, but to be steadfast and to follow instructions. Thus they have a great deal at stake in being considered loyal, capable, successful people. Most Americans don't really have quite the same inhibitions, which gives us a little bit more flexibility, more creativity in moving, and a little bit more use of imagination to find ways around ~~this~~ PROBLEMS.

This also accounts for traditionally slow reactions by the Soviets. And I learned a long time ago that the "*nyet*" is not necessarily a "no." It is an immediate "no." "No" is the safest thing to say to a new idea. But they take the proposal and cable it back to Moscow. Moscow then goes through these issues very, very thoroughly, and you never know when something will come out of that. When you don't expect it, you may get an answer to something you've proposed way back because they've finally studied it. It will frequently take a long time.

I remember one issue in the space area involving test-free zones. I was sitting next to my Soviet counterpart, ~~Viktor Karpov~~ AT A LUNCH. and we were beginning to play around with an idea in Washington which had been advanced to us by some

scientists who were not in the government. I had a feeling that our scientists had talked to some Soviet scientists about this, and I didn't know whether it was official talk or unofficial talk. So I was sitting next to ~~Karpov~~ MY COLLEAGUE, and I said, "~~Viktor~~," I have a question to ask you now. Our scientists are urging a certain idea upon us, and I want to know whether we ought to put any time into that. They got it from one of your scientists. Was your scientist speaking for the government, or was he just speaking for himself?" He said—and you have to remember this was after two years of negotiating during which we had developed a pretty good rapport—"You had better tell me what the idea is; I'm not familiar with it." So I told him as best I could. (I am not a scientist, nor am I an arms control expert, although I've learned a great deal about arms; I think I am an expert on the negotiating process, and I know the Soviets quite well.) He asked a lot of questions about it, and we discussed it.

Shortly after lunch, George Shultz and Edward Shevardnadze were meeting in Shultz's office and within a few minutes ~~Karpov~~ MY COLLEAGUE and I joined them. Shevardnadze turned to both of us and said, "How have you two fellows been doing this morning?" I said, "Not too well." Then ~~Karpov~~ MY COLLEAGUE said, "We are exploring something that I don't fully understand yet." Shevardnadze hadn't heard of it before, I'm convinced, but AFTER LISTENING TO US he and Shultz said, "Well, follow it through."

It has been, I think, a year and a half or two years now and we don't have a response from the Soviets on the subject yet. Every once in a while I get a question about it. We've now had lots of discussions about it—I'm now out of the process, but by now we've had lots of discussions about it. They are skeptical about it; they are unsure of it; they are a little suspicious of it; they don't quite want to say "no" yet. It is interesting how long it has taken them. I'm sure they are thoroughly exploring it, but it's an indication of how careful they are in

many of the details of what they do. It is just an illustration really of this process.

Another thought—and I suppose this is an integral part of the negotiating process—is that you must keep your ears open and your antenna up. We began our arms negotiations in March of 1985. (I want to remind you that Chernenko died and Gorbachev came into office that March. I think it was the day before our formal negotiations were to begin that Chernenko died.) As of that point I had not really met any of the Soviets. We had not been introduced, and I had not been involved in INF or START earlier, so I didn't know these people. With the death of Chernenko, I had my people call them on the telephone and say—I'm not a Russian speaker, but I have a lot of Russian speakers around—that we've noted Chernenko's death, and that if the Soviets would like to postpone the opening of talks, we would have had no problem with that. If they wanted to go back to Moscow for the funeral or if they simply wanted to observe the day, that would be fine as far as we were concerned. Their response was a rather immediate one, saying, "No, no, the negotiations will start as scheduled." They added that the mourning book would be open for signatures at the Soviet mission. That's where we started.

Now, I will say that within a day or two they let me know that Gorbachev had reviewed all their instructions, even while Chernenko was still alive. We now have learned that that probably was correct. Probably Gorbachev was acting even while Chernenko was in office because Chernenko was ill, so I imagine they didn't lie to me when they said that to me. But this was their way of saying, "We speak with authority." Nevertheless, the change did mean that in addition to their "Wait'em out" rule, I think the Soviets were floundering for about a year, not knowing where they were.

You have to remember that within a few months thereafter their foreign minister "disappeared" into the presidency, and a new foreign minister came on the scene. The day Shevardnadze's name was announced as the foreign minister, and Andrei Gromyko was promoted to the presidency, we had some senators in Geneva. I had invited the Soviets to meet these senators at a reception, so obviously when the Soviets came in the first question I and others asked them was, "What do you know about Shevardnadze and who is he?" It was very clear to me that none of them—and these were senior people—had even met Shevardnadze. Shevardnadze was a member of the Politburo, but he had had no exposure to international relations; this was not his field. So they didn't know anything about him.

You could see how the safest thing to do within that kind of society is to be paralyzed and not act, and that's the way it was for about the first year. I had two counterparts: there was Karpov, who was my counterpart as the head of the negotiating team, because I was the head of ours. Secondly, there was ~~Julij Kwizinski~~, who headed their space negotiations; I also had a specific responsibility for space and the Strategic Defense Initiative; Kwizinski, by the way, participated in the "walk in the woods" with Paul Nitze. ~~Kwizinski~~ is now their ambassador to Bonn.

I had lunch with ~~Kwizinski~~ early on. We opened in March and this must have been in June or July. ~~Kwizinski who took the walk in the woods with Paul~~ was ~~really~~ the ~~only~~ creative fellow that I have run into in the traditional Soviet bureaucracy, but he got hurt for his walk in the woods with Paul; he was a ~~little~~ bit of a free-wheeler.

I remember saying to him, "~~Julij~~, I saw that Gorbachev wrote a letter to the Union of Concerned Scientists in America. I don't understand the letter." He said, "Well, it's a clear letter. I don't know why you don't understand it." I

replied, "Well, because he has a reference in there to 'reaffirming' the ABM Treaty. I don't know your system, but we don't know how to 'reaffirm' treaties. But you obviously do reaffirm treaties. When you reaffirm a treaty, does that treaty have greater validity than a treaty you did not reaffirm?" He began looking at me skeptically. I said, "Do you reaffirm treaties more than once?" He replied, "Stop pulling my leg." He knew English well and knew the idioms. I said, "I really don't understand this." So he said, "Well, you know what we want. We want to be certain that as we go ahead and reduce arms with you, if we can come to an agreement, that you do not suddenly put an ABM system into space. And we want to make sure you are not going to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. So that's why we are asking you to reaffirm it and tell us you are not going to withdraw from it." I said, "Well, the treaty itself says we will not withdraw; It's a perpetual treaty." "Yes," he replied, "but you have a right to give six months' notice and withdraw." I said, "Yes; is that not enough time for you?" He said, "No, it is not enough time for us." I asked, "How much time do you want to make certain that we are not going to withdraw within that period?" He said, "At least ten years."

Let me say that this was the first indication I had gotten as to where they were heading, or at least where he thought they ought to be heading. You are to remember that up until then, and I will say for the following twelve months, all they had talked about was how opposed they were to the militarization of space. They did not want to put a military system in space. That was their position. I used to say to them, "Get off that. That's a slogan, not a negotiating position. When you are ready to negotiate, give me a negotiating position that I can talk to you about." Well, this *was* a negotiating position, and I cabled back immediately to Washington and said, "That's where they are heading." I had discounted, frankly, that ten years to maybe seven or eight years in my own head.

KWITZINSKY WANTED A RESPONSE.

K~~wizinski said to me, "How does that sound to you?~~ I said, "Well, ~~July~~ JULY, it sounds much better than the slogans you've been giving me, because I can understand that. Let me think about that. You have to come up with a more realistic period, but I would encourage you to think about it also." Now of course I knew in my head very well that the SDI would take quite a few years before we were ready to deploy it, so I did not feel we would be hurt by such a commitment of time.

A YEAR LATER,

It took until the following June, again at a lunch, but this time with Karpov, who had taken over space and SDI, to renew the discussion. (By then KWITZINSKY ~~Kwizinski~~ was in Bonn.) Karpov said, "Tomorrow, Max, I'm coming in with a new position," and I said, "What's your position?" He said, "We are going to suggest a commitment by each side not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a period of time," which is what I had gotten a year earlier ~~from Kwizinski~~. I said, "I'm glad to hear that, because I haven't taken anything you've said seriously in this area," and I asked, "How long?" He said, "Twenty years."

Well, the twenty years moved, within a very short order of time, to fifteen ~~to twenty~~ years. Then I got a position saying, "Up to fifteen years," which was a strange position. Then at Reykjavik, Gorbachev came up with the ten years that I'd heard a lot earlier. In the meantime Reagan had written a letter to Gorbachev in which he had talked about six or seven years, so we were in an area of negotiating on this.

Why don't we stop here and throw it open to questions?

NARRATOR: Was Reykjavik as much of a disaster as Henry Kissinger claims it was?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: It was both a disaster and a breakthrough; it was both. The disaster was the realization that Ronald Reagan was prepared to go down to zero on all nuclear weapons, and this was a shocker to our European friends, as well as to many Americans. We still are experiencing some problems with our European friends on that realization. I want to add a word about that. Ronald Reagan is opposed to nuclear weapons. This was not something frivolous; this was not something he hadn't thought about; this was not something he got tricked into. The fact of the matter is he wants to go down to zero on nuclear weapons.

I can tell you for a fact that I don't know a single one of his advisers when he was President who agreed with him. I was present at meetings where rather polite issue was taken with him, in his presence, and he never budged on it.

Let me give you one response that I heard him give, which I thought was quite effective. I don't agree with him on the nuclear weapons going down to zero now, certainly not now. I suppose if all CONVENTIONAL weapons were reduced to infinitesimal proportions, it would be perfectly good for nuclear weapons to go down to zero. ~~However,~~ I remember his ~~saying,~~ THOUGHT: "The Soviets had Chernobyl; we could have Chernobyl. Let's assume the next Chernobyl is not a power plant, but a nuclear weapon plant, and it is in the United States. Public opinion in the United States and public opinion throughout the West will lead us to get rid of these nuclear weapons, just as in the power area, where we are at the point now where you cannot ~~really~~ PRACTICALLY, except in France, put up a nuclear power plant and get away with it, given public opinion. Look what's happening to the American industry." Then he said, "At that point it will be unilateral disarmament. We will be the ones, the West will be the ones, pressed by public opinion to get rid of the nuclear weapons. The Soviets will not be restrained by that, given the fact they are increasing their nuclear energy in the power field; they are increasing while

Europe is decreasing it." So he continued, "Let's do this through negotiation instead of doing it by the inevitable accident requiring us to do it." That was an argument, which I must say to you, I had not thought of before, and which had some appeal to it. But that was the negative part of Reykjavik.

On the other hand, I will say to you that breakthroughs in many areas were very significant. The breakthroughs in INF and in START took place there. There were lots of agreements in principle which were not LATER finalized or formalized.

I think, though, they left very irritated with one another, GORBACHEV AND REAGEN as both thought about it, they appreciated that a great deal had been done, and both then began to talk about the pluses that came out of Reykjavik.

QUESTION: Let me get into your favorite area, Max: human rights. Like you, I was drawn unwillingly into the frustrations of negotiations with the Soviets (though I put in only three years whereas you put in about eight). My assignment happened to be with the Geneva conventions on human rights and I found out that the Soviets will not negotiate unless you give them an incentive, a point you made very succinctly last night. In this case they refused to meet with the American delegation. Basil O'Connor was our ambassador. They wouldn't meet in Prague; they wouldn't meet in the United States or anywhere until we got to an International Red Cross convention in Stockholm with Count Bernadotte presiding. There a full delegation showed up; this was the first time that they had ever deigned to meet with the American delegation and we thought, "Oh boy, now at last we are going to be able to negotiate with them." The first day the leader got up and said, "We will not take part in any negotiation where the representatives of fascist Spain are present." Then they sat for seven weeks up

in the balcony listening to proposals. We used to call them the "seven blocks of granite."

The next year at the diplomatic convention at Geneva, representatives of "fascist" Spain were again present. But this time a full delegation showed up from the Soviet Union and did their best to sabotage the conventions. Ultimately, though, what was the incentive? Well, 81 nations had signed on in Stockholm, and they said, "Well, now we ought to go." That's the background.

Then came Afghanistan, and this leads me to my question. There is no doubt but that the Soviets violated the Geneva conventions in Afghanistan. The Najibullah government and the KhAD, which is the KGB there, gave none of the rights which are guaranteed by the Geneva conventions. My question to you, sir, is what should the United States be doing to publicize the violations of the Geneva conventions in Afghanistan or anywhere else?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: I personally believe that whenever there are violations of an agreement, one has to publicize them. One has to dramatize them; one has to protest them energetically. I deeply regret the fact that we did not do so when Iraq used poisoned chemicals. We were just *pro forma* about it. We were *pro forma* about it primarily because we didn't want Iran to win the war, and so we quietly ~~encouraged~~ supported Iraq. I think that was a serious mistake. I hope we don't, but we may have to pay serious prices for that mistake. I think you have to call a spade a spade when there is a violation of a treaty.

After you call a spade a spade—that's rhetoric—you then have to decide what you want to *do* about the violation, as opposed to what you want to *say* about it. What you want to do about it is really always an ad hoc decision based on weighing pros and cons of what is in your interest to do. I don't know, for example, that any blanket formulae like "impose sanctions," or "boycott" are the

kinds of formulae one should automatically impose, though you may want to. You may make an independent judgment—weigh the pros, weigh the cons, and decide to do this. There are times you may want to say, "OK, let's consider not the Geneva conventions on the rules of war, but let's take the Helsinki Accords on human rights," which is what you asked about. Clearly the Soviets violated it beginning with the month after they signed it in 1975. They signed the Accord and then very soon thereafter they took Helsinki monitors and began to put them in jail.

Now you could say, as I indicated last night to the students with whom I met (and as Ronald Reagan said in the campaign of 1980), that we are not going to send our athletes to Moscow. Or we could refuse to send our diplomats to Madrid to the next meeting on human rights with the Soviets on the grounds we would be dignifying their actions. You could say that. I didn't agree with that. My view was, and our government's view was: We go there and use that forum to attack some more instead of abandoning the opportunity to attack and criticize in a public forum. But you have to make individual judgments about such violations. I don't know, Bill, any other way to answer this question.

The business of sanctions and boycotts is in a sense purifying to the soul. It is a nice thing to do, but you have to ask yourself whether it is an effective thing to do. Sometimes it may be.

I feel, for example, our boycott of the Moscow Olympics was effective. It hurt them no end, but it also had a particular advantage to it, namely, there were dates to that boycott. The Olympics began on day one and ended on day X, and then we were over it. But if you boycott or impose a sanction with regard to something that doesn't end on a certain day as the Olympics do, do you continue it forever? When you end it, are you then ~~putting~~ giving a seal of approval ~~on it?~~ It's

really a very difficult thing. When you start something, you better have clearly in your head how it is going to end, or you are in trouble.

QUESTION: How important is developing a personal rapport in these negotiations? And how do you do so if neither one of the party speaks the other's language, and you have to work through an interpreter?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: First, let me say that, though I think a personal rapport is useful since you are going to be with the people for a long period of time, and you conceivably can pick up a few things, I do think it is possible to run a negotiation without a personal rapport. I don't know that it gives you all that much. It potentially can give you something, if you can pick it up.

It's harder to do if you don't know the language, but it's possible to do. I do not know the Russian language. Fortunately, in Madrid enough people on the Soviet delegation knew the language, but they had three different heads of their delegation in Madrid during the time I was there.

During the preparatory meeting, they had their ambassador to Spain head up their delegation. The man who now happens to be the ambassador to Washington, Yuri Dubinin, was their ambassador to Spain. He headed up the delegation. He had been involved in the writing of the Helsinki Final Act, so he knew a lot about it. He spoke no English then. (He now is very good in English, but he knew no English at that time.) He expected to be the head of the delegation throughout the meeting, ~~He wasn't, frankly, because he fell flat on his face and took a licking in the preparatory meeting. So~~ BUT they replaced him with ~~this Iliachev (?) man~~ ILIACHEV, a deputy foreign minister, who knew no English. Then ~~they~~ HE WAS replaced ~~Hiachev (?)~~ with Kovalyev (?), another deputy foreign minister who knew no English. Nevertheless, ~~putting Dubinin aside,~~ I am not

sure that good rapport is essential to good negotiations. Dubinin and I didn't develop a personal relationship until he came to Washington. Now ~~he is all smiles, and~~ we have a good personal relationship. I managed to maintain a good relationship with the other two Soviets despite our language difficulty.

QUESTION: But you don't get their personal opinions, right?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: That is true; you don't. You certainly don't get them as you would if they spoke English, OR I ~~English~~ RUSSIAN. You can develop a relationship, but not as good as if you know the language. ~~I mean I could talk with Kwizinski about the Union of Concerned Scientists.~~

Let me ~~give you an example; Kwizinski is a very good example.~~ ELABORATE. The first few times I had lunch with ~~him,~~ MY COLLEAGUE IN LONDON, he had an interpreter present even though I knew he knew English thoroughly. I didn't bring an interpreter with me. At the end of the second meeting, I said to him, "Look, you are not talking to me at these luncheons; you are talking to that piece of paper over there. You are talking to your interpreter. It makes no sense for us to do this. I'm wasting my time because I want to talk to you, and I want you to talk to me; I don't want you to talk to Moscow, THROUGH ME. You are careful now because this fellow is going to cable everything you said back to Moscow. You know English. If you want to talk to me, then you and I should talk together; otherwise let's not do it." I said, "If you can't do it, I understand that. Maybe your government doesn't want you to talk to me alone. That's fine." Well, we never again had an interpreter, so you are right; one can do these extra things if a personal rapport exists.

COMMENT: Interpreters come from the Pedagogical Institute, and they also have an ancillary function in all these things.

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: They do, and they also report back everything that they write, and that is inhibiting to them.

QUESTION: Given your statement of the principle of Soviet negotiation as extreme patience, the thoroughness with which they will study issues and the perception of the Soviet government as monolithic, it is intriguing to have Gorbachev come on the scene and see these dramatic new ideas rolling out of Moscow almost on a weekly basis. Obviously he is not participating in the negotiating process, so that may not be changing. But what impact is there in having a new leader who seems to be putting out these innovative ideas so rapidly in terms of the negotiations that are ongoing?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: It's a good question and it permits me to complete the circle because there are some changes that he has instilled. He is impatient with negotiating processes. He has indeed been rude to his negotiators. He doesn't understand why it takes so long, and that's quite different. I don't think these people ever had that kind of an experience with Andrei Gromyko.

In January of 1987 they brought in a new counterpart to me, again a deputy foreign minister—first deputy foreign minister—named ~~Varenov (?)~~ Vorontsov, and he had lots of other things to do. I met him 15 January 1987, at which time he very candidly said to me, "I've got other things to do; I'm handling the Gulf and Afghanistan. You can see that's a big agenda," which of course I recognized. "But," he said, "my government has asked me to come here to see what I could do about getting these negotiations moving. What suggestions do you have?" This was a very good, businesslike approach. I told him what suggestions I had, and then I told him that, as a matter of fact, I had not even been quite sure they were

serious negotiators for most of 1985 and 1986, which was accurate. I gave him suggestions that I had made that had been turned down. We called the rest of the negotiating team together for the next day and laid it out.

As of that time I was ~~going to be~~ the Counselor to the State Department with the arms negotiations being one of my responsibilities. He told me he could only be in Geneva maybe four or five times a year, although he said, "I'll be here as often as need be," so I said to him, "Look, I too am in a similar position. I have to be in Washington most of the time. Let's just agree that we both get back here periodically and that we both get back here at the same time," which we did. I think we got back five or six times in the course of the year to take inventory of what was happening during our absence. We tried to overcome some things and push things through a little bit further. Gorbachev had injected that.

When there were meetings between either Reagan and Gorbachev or Shultz and Shevardnadze, there was great pressure on the Soviet negotiators to have something to show. The Soviets like to have a statement come out of it showing movement at the conclusion of a high-level meeting. So this pressure was there to move a little faster. ~~They frequently miscalculate this.~~

~~Now Varensov left at the end of 1987, and they retreated somewhat, though not fully, to their old patterns.~~ Let me use Madrid as an example of a miscalculation, where patience ~~can hurt you and~~ hurt them, as it did. They were very eager to have the Madrid meeting come up with an agreement to hold another meeting among the thirty-five countries on military confidence-building measures, which they called a meeting on disarmament. We had accepted the French idea for such a meeting as well. The first decision made by Ronald Reagan as President was to support that French idea, which was a turning point because when Ronald Reagan became President, none of us really knew how he was going to feel toward NATO or toward our allies, and this was a pro-NATO

decision. I think the fact that Al Haig was secretary of state at that point helped immensely in that move, ~~because that was the pressure on him~~, and ~~he went along with it.~~ REAGEN SUPPORTED NATO.

Why did they want this meeting? I feel— and you are never really quite sure—that they were desperately trying to stop us from deploying the Pershings and cruise missiles on the mainland of Europe. They knew this was a hot political potato for the Germans, the Belgians, the Norwegians, the Danes, and the British. They felt that if an agreement would come out of Madrid to have what they would call a meeting on disarmament, even though it was a meeting on confidence-building ~~business~~ MEASURES, that this would permit them to go to the publics in Europe and say, "Why are you putting in more American missiles which is confrontational at a time when we've now agreed to hold a meeting on disarmament?" A clever move on their part. I knew this and so frankly I was not in a hurry.

When I took this job, I asked Cy Vance how long I would be needed, and he said, "Three or four months." It lasted three years. However, the fact of the matter was, if there was going to be an agreement, I was not that much in a hurry, although it was going to take a long time, I knew. As usual, they were not in a hurry either. They stalled and stalled and stalled, and by the time they finally came to terms—which meant agreeing with us as they finally did—the die was cast on the Pershings and cruise missiles. They no longer could stop it. That was their miscalculation.

I think had they made the same concessions they made at the end at some earlier time, I would have been in a position of saying, "How could I not take the concessions?"

NARRATOR: Mr. Ambassador, the question we've asked everybody in the Reagan oral history has been: Were the institutional relationships about right as you saw them? Were your relations with the secretary the right kind of relationships? Did you have access to the President? Did you get support for your negotiating positions as apparently Paul Nitze did not after the "walk in the woods," or did he?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: You have to understand that I was not on the scene during the walk in the woods. I didn't enter the scene, the disarmament scene, until 1985. I was in Madrid while Paul was talking INF, including the walk in the woods, and as a matter of fact Paul and I both went to Bonn—I from Madrid, he from Geneva—to brief Chancellor Kohl on both of these negotiations at the same time. So I had a chance to talk to Paul and see where he was going. I'll speak only for myself, not for Paul.

I could not have had more access or better access than I had in Madrid and in Geneva. I have absolutely nothing to complain about in those areas. The Madrid access ~~with~~ to Carter was clear, but it was only for a few months. The Madrid access ~~with~~ to Reagan was somewhat accidental. I was at a conference on armaments in Munich, in the audience, when the head of the conference asked me if I would be willing to come up front and talk about the Madrid meeting, and I did. Present in the audience, although I did not know it, was the new national security adviser, Judge William Clark. At the end of my talk I went back to the rear, sat in my seat, and he came over to me. I'd never met him. He said, "Have you ever had a chance to discuss this with President Reagan?" I said, "No." Now you have to remember that he was new; this was early in the Reagan administration also, right after Dick Allen left. "Well," he said, "I'd like you to talk to the President about this. I think the President should hear what you have

to say." I said, "I'd be delighted," so he arranged a meeting which turned out to be a seminar in the Oval Office. The President, Vice President Bush, Meese, Baker, Deaver—really the top people—Clark, McFarlane. We must have spent an hour and a half talking about the Madrid meeting and talking about the Soviets. That, of course, opened up a lot of doors as far as the President was concerned, and I did have perhaps three or four additional experiences with the President during the Madrid meetings.

For example, at one point—I'm thinking now of what would be useful for your study—I felt we would get an agreement. I didn't know how long it would take, but I felt the Soviets were going to give us what we needed. It might be, let's say, a year and a half before the meeting would be over. I just sensed that. By then Shultz was secretary of state. I said to Shultz, "Look, I think we are going to get an agreement. Does the President want an agreement?" It was a good question, because he'd never had an agreement with the Soviets before. Shultz said, "Haven't you ever asked him?" I said, "No, never quite in those words." He said, "Didn't you see him last week?" I said, "Yes, I did see him last week, but there were other people in the room, and I just didn't feel I wanted to ask when there were other people in the room." He said, "Well, let's find out." He picked up the phone and within a few minutes we were over at the White House. He said, "Mr. President, Max has a question to ask you." I asked him the question, and I got the answer: "Sure I want an agreement, if it's our agreement. If it is an agreement in our interest, and if it's one that you and George are prepared to recommend, sure I want it."

At one point I ~~was~~ BECAME dissatisfied with our position, a position which I had formulated. In Madrid I wrote all the instructions ~~for myself.~~ FROM WASHINGTON TO ME. You have to understand that Washington did not think anything would come out of Madrid. The result was nobody paid any attention to what I was doing in Madrid. I wrote

my own instructions. People knew me; I had a lot of friends—you know I'd been in Washington a long time—who had confidence in me. Nobody thought an agreement would come out of Madrid. So the attitude was, "Let Max do what he wants to do."

At one point after the meeting at which I asked, "Do you want an agreement, Mr. President," I began to feel that what we were asking of the Soviets was not enough. For me it was not enough. We were asking for them to agree to certain important words, but I wanted some people out of the Soviet Union. At that point I just was sufficiently irritated with the system, irritated with the Soviets, and fed up with the increasing inhumanity that I wanted them to say "Uncle," if I can use that word, and that meant I wanted people out of there.

This was not the position we had arrived at with NATO when we started the Madrid meeting. But you have to remember that when we started the Madrid meeting, it was based on an assumption that the rest of the West wasn't even certain we should be emphasizing human rights as much as we were. There was a previous meeting in Belgrade at which the United States was the only country to mention the names of the victims of Soviet repression, and the United States mentioned six names. Three years later the Madrid negotiations opened. I want to tell you that by the end of the Madrid meeting, I think eighteen or nineteen countries mentioned the names of the victims, which they had refused to do three years earlier, and I think more than 200 or 250 names were mentioned rather than the six. So there was a lot of movement in the human rights area. It was a united NATO group. When I mentioned my feelings to George Shultz, and I said that I was simply uncomfortable with it, personally, he said, "Well, we have to ask the President."

Incidentally, I want to say to you, since you are doing the Reagan oral history project, that as far as George Shultz was concerned, he was constantly

saying, "I have to go talk to the President." If anybody misses that point, it is a mistake. As you know I was Counselor to the State Department; I worked with George Shultz. There were four of us who regularly met: John Whitehead, Mike Armacost, myself, and Shultz, every single day on any issue, and Shultz constantly said, "Get a paper for me; I've got to take this up to the President." So in this case, we had to take this to the President. So I went to the President and told him what I felt we had to do to change our position. I also told him that none of our allies would be in favor of it. He said, "Do you have to tell them?" I said, "Well, I don't have to tell them that boldly, but I certainly have to tell you, and I have to know whether you are going to support me in this." There was no hesitation on his part to support me.

Sure enough when the Germans began to suspect the change, Chancellor Kohl got on the telephone, called Ronald Reagan, complained about the fact that I seemed to be exceeding the requests of the Soviets. I'm told by people who took notes—because Kohl doesn't speak English and Reagan didn't speak German, so we had people on the phone taking the notes—that Reagan was great about it. In fact, I saw the notes.

NARRATOR: There are two other questions we've asked everybody, one of which you may not want to discuss. What were the obstacles? We are going to have Richard Perle here on September 21 and the media has played up the divisions between Defense and State, particularly in the Weinberger era, and naturally that is one issue that we'd hoped to get into.

The other question is, what was your impression of the President? We've asked this in each of the oral histories. What was your impression of the President as a political leader at your first meeting? Did you modify that view

in any way as you went along, and what do you think history's judgment is going to be of this President?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: Let me answer them in turn. Our interagency process is a cumbersome process, but it is a necessary process. It is particularly cumbersome when one of the important agencies is skeptical about the results and wonders whether there should be any result at all. In my opinion Cap Weinberger probably did not wish to have an arms reduction agreement, though I haven't the slightest doubt in my mind that Ronald Reagan did. Since Cap was a loyal Cabinet member, he was going to go along with what the President wanted. You can understand that with his mindset, he couldn't conceive of an agreement ~~really~~ that was in the U.S. interests. We felt that he could persuade the President when the time came that the agreement being talked about was not in the U.S. interest, and therefore he could handle it. That created lots of delays in our ability to come up with a U.S. position. So if you asked me what was the greatest problem, I would say this was it.

On the other hand, one could ask whether I would change the interagency system. Not a bit. I had an interagency system in Geneva. We had three negotiations running simultaneously: INF, START, and space. I was the head of the negotiations overall and I handled space. Each one of these three negotiating groups had representatives from five government agencies on it as members: State Department, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the intelligence agencies. These were in addition to the National Security Council, or the White House, which was always present in all of these things, though not formally a delegate. So you see what a large group we had. We also had our own interagency group, and I insisted on

that. They insisted as well; the President wanted it. We talked out these things among ourselves, you see.

Let me say to you, since you have Richard Perle coming here, that I would not say the same thing about Richard Perle that I've just said about Cap. I believe Richard Perle *was* prepared to have an arms agreement, whereas I don't believe Cap was. Now Richard may tell you, "No, Cap wanted one, too, but it had to be in our interest," but I don't think so. I've talked enough with Cap to know.

Let me also say this about Richard Perle. When I got an agreement together in Madrid (and, as I indicated to you, nobody expected it), and the State Department saw there was an agreement, we then had to go to Defense to get approval. The people in the State Department said, "Defense won't accept the agreement; they don't want an agreement." I knew the decision-maker for the Madrid meeting was Richard Perle, so I said, "Well, talk to them." "Oh, no, *we* are not going to talk to them," which was a foolish kind of thing for the particular head with whom I was speaking to say. He said, "*You* talk to them." So I said, "All right, I'll go see Richard." ~~It was a Sunday, so~~ I dropped by his home ON A SUNDAY and we talked about the agreement. Richard said, "Max, do you think it's a good agreement?" I said, "It's a good agreement, Dick." So he said, "Let's go for it," just like that. He had confidence in me; he knew what we were doing and we did it.

First, let me tell you why I think Richard wanted an arms agreement: He wanted an arms agreement that he ~~was in control of.~~ DEVELOPED. By that I mean an agreement of which he knew the provisions, because he knew that *he* wasn't going to sell out the United States. He really was not sure about the next guy, particularly if the next guy was in the State Department, but he knew that *he* would not sell out the United States.

He and I used to talk about this. He saw an agreement under Ronald Reagan as a very rare opportunity to make profound worldwide political changes. For Ronald Reagan, with his talk of "evil empire," and "strong defense," to make the moves toward peace and to achieve something that nobody else could achieve, would in effect repudiate growing pacifism in the churches, and growing pacifism in the leftist political parties, because none of them could achieve anything. It would also strengthen the Thatchers and the Kohls of this world because the conservatives could say, "We are the true peacemakers; we are negotiating from strength, which we have to do. We are negotiating from firmness. You have to understand the nature of the adversary." There is a tremendous political kind of thrust to it, and Richard understood that.

Let me give you another illustration. John Warner of Virginia and Sam Nunn of Georgia came up with an idea for "nuclear risk reduction centers." I want in the candor of this room to say to you that I still do not understand how nuclear risk reduction centers are going to work, ~~other than~~ by that tremendous name, "risk reduction". I always used to feel the fellow who developed the concept of ~~a windfall~~ profits tax was a genius—nobody can be against a windfall profits tax. Well, a "risk reduction center" has much of the same advantage. I attended many meetings at the White House when we were trying to figure out what this nuclear risk reduction center was, and what John and Sam did have in mind. But they did have it in mind, and obviously, given the power these two people had in the Senate ~~Arms~~ Service Committee, nobody was going to be against it. They were both going to visit Gorbachev in Moscow. They ~~said~~, "How would you feel if we were to take this up with Gorbachev?" Everybody said, "Of course, let them take it up with Gorbachev." They thought, "Maybe he will kill it." They did take it up with Gorbachev, and Gorbachev thought it was great.

Later we heard from the Soviets, "Gorbachev didn't quite understand what was meant by your two senators. Would you tell us what they had in mind?"

In any case, an agreement was made to negotiate nuclear risk reduction centers, and Sam and John both came to Geneva. They were both, I want to say, very serious, careful observers of our negotiations, and both were in Geneva many times. At one point, they were both as angry as can be, and they took me aside and said, "Max, we are just very upset. What do you advise us to do?" I said, "What's the problem?" They said, "Well, the problem is that the person chosen to negotiate the nuclear risk reduction for the United States is Dick Perle, and you know he is going to kill it." I said—and I think they were both surprised—"The best thing that could happen to you fellows is to have Dick Perle negotiate this treaty, because he will produce it, because he knows that what he comes up with will be good for the country. So don't be concerned about it. If somebody else were negotiating this, Dick would be against it." Well, you know that's exactly what happened. The Soviets, who thought of Richard Perle as some black demon, came over to me at the conclusion of very brief negotiations—it didn't take long—to say how impressed they were with Richard. So, anyhow, that's a long answer to your first question about the interagency process.

I do want to say, however, that there is another obstacle to the negotiations, which is that the United States simply still does not have a policy on mobile missiles; we still do not have agreement among ourselves on a land-based missile. The fight between the MX and the Midgetman or some alternative (or none of them at all) is still not resolved, and that is a barrier.

At one point somebody said to the President in my presence, "Mr. President, if Gorbachev came to you tomorrow and said, 'OK, we've got a lot done, but we've got a few things left; you write the treaty and I'll sign it,' Mr. President, we still couldn't write the treaty." That's part of our problem. There are still

some questions—they are fewer in number now, and we are working them out, but we don't have everything yet in hand. That's obviously a handicap.

Now your other question has to do with my perception of the President. I don't know that I can see a difference between the President the first time I met him and the President the last time I met him, because the first time I met him in office was the seminar I mentioned to you which was a rather positive experience. It was an extraordinarily good meeting and he participated; he listened more than he spoke, but he participated; he was actively involved in it. I have always found him attentive and responsive. Have I ever seen him nodding off? Yes, but I will confess to you that I have nodded off sometimes as well.

I remember being at a meeting in NATO after Moscow with George Shultz reporting, and I was sitting right in the front row, but in back of him. I kept awake while he was reporting, but when he had finished, all the other fifteen had to make some comments, and I just kept nodding off; I couldn't keep my eyes open. I was tired after the Moscow trip. I stood up, left and came back, and still it was not enough. Anyhow, yes, I have seen the President nod off.

He does not have, in my opinion, a mastery of detail. I am impressed with his instincts, really impressed with his instincts. He gets something in his head and it stays with him. We had lots of arguments around the table in his presence on the question of mobile missiles. The differences of the agencies would again be presented to him. The first time after he listened to this and then said, "I just want to tell you how I feel about this." He said, "Let's assume we don't have an agreement with the Soviets on mobiles. Are we going to go ahead and build mobiles? Is Congress going to give us the money we need for the Midgetman? The answer is probably no. Are the Soviets going to continue to build their ~~SS-25s~~ MOBILES? " WE WOULD THEN BE DISADVANTAGED. The answer is undoubtedly yes. Why is it in our interest not to have ~~an~~ LIMITATIONS

agreement on mobile missiles? They are not going to agree to stop producing the SS-25s. Why not have some mutual restraint?" It made sense to me.

A few months later we had the argument all over again. He repeated the same argument. Each time when he did this, this was, in effect, his decision. He had an instinct about these things; it was a political instinct, more than an instinct based on mastery of all of the facts, but the instinct was rather good.

There is another point in connection with that discussion I had with him about my wanting to get some people out. At the end of it he walked over to his desk, opened a drawer, took out a sheet of paper and gave it to me, and said, "Max, if you can, get these people out, too." I don't know how he got the names or why he had the names; obviously it was in his head. So I want to say to you that my general reaction to Reagan—and I speak to you as a Democrat—is a very positive one.

There is an article in the *National Interest* by a professor of political science at Berkeley, Aaron Wildavsky, on the Reagan presidency. It's a little early to express judgments about how history will resolve anything, but Aaron, at this early stage (and Aaron is also a Democrat), evaluates the Reagan presidency in extremely favorable terms. I think it is worthwhile for your study to look at Aaron's piece. It is a perceptive piece.

I would say one problem with the Reagan administration was its inability to work as closely with the Congress as I think they should have. I think, for whatever reasons, they simply did not take as much advantage of it as they should have and could have. I think more would have been accomplished had this thing been better executed.

COMMENT: Ken, I wonder if I could underline something Max said about the importance of access to the President of the United States. I think that access means everything.

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: You underline it. You are right.

COMMENT: I used to brief President Roosevelt twice a day. I briefed him very sadly one day about the fact that a reporter named Stanley Johnson had broken the news that we had broken the Japanese codes and thus won the Battle of Midway. He called in the attorney general immediately. He said, "I want to sue them under the espionage statute, both of them." They hated each other, he and Colonel Robert McCormick, the editor and publisher of the *Chicago Tribune.* While that was going on, I had a visitor at the White House from the navy chief co-director. He said, "Goode, you have to stop this lawsuit. You have got to stop it." I said, "Who, me? You don't know how the President hates Colonel McCormick." But I had access, and when the President came into Dr. McIntire's office that day, I told them about this visitor. Roosevelt asked, "What reason did he give?" I said, "He said that we are close to breaking the Japanese flag officer's code, but if you have a lawsuit against the press, it is going to leak." He said, "Who was your visitor?" I said that it was the navy chief co-director, Captain Stafford. He said, "You mean 'Saffo?' I know 'Saffo.' You can tell him I'll drop the lawsuit." That's the importance of access.

QUESTION: Do you foresee the prospect of the Soviet Union being deloused, killing off the bugs, and knocking down barriers to people leaving the country, even if they don't decide to let everybody in?

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN: Gorbachev and those who support him know they have a failed system. It doesn't work. You know under the czars Russia exported food; today they can't feed their own people. The system is a failure. They know that. Their task is how to bring it into the modern era technologically, economically, and commercially. It is a very difficult task.

If I have any gifts, I know that prophesy is not one of them, so I'm hesitant to judge this. I know logically that they cannot do it. If I were betting, I would say they cannot do it. But I learned a long time ago that politics, including international politics, is not rational and not logical, and they might do it. I'm not yet prepared to bet that they won't do it.

They have to do it if they are going to survive as a system. They understand the need to humanize their system now, because they have been the pariahs of the world. They are in a situation where no people any place in the world would voluntarily subject themselves to their system, and they know that. That couldn't have been said twenty years ago. The acknowledgement of their failures and inhumanities is widespread. They know that; this is not a surprise to those who are intelligent about it, so they have to change the system.

They'd like to make as few changes as possible. ~~They~~ The leaders look upon themselves as Leninists. We ought not to kid ourselves about that. They want to make as few changes as possible. They'll make as many as they have to and as few as they can get away with. That's Gorbachev's problem; what can he get away with as he makes these changes. There is tremendous resistance throughout the system, really unusual resistance.

You have brave, heroic, intellectual leaders saying fantastic things openly. You can speak to some of the maverick young lawyers, some not even so young, talking about the need to change their legal system. I had one lawyer say to me, "We made a mistake when we went to adopt the Roman system. We should have

gone to the Anglo-Saxon system. We would then know now how we can move to your system of law." They want to do that. This man ~~says~~ SAID that he knows that at the Gorbachev level there is support, but between the Gorbachev level and his level, there is total opposition.

Let's take the case of psychiatric hospitals. A group of psychiatrists have just returned from a historic visit—I think they visited eleven or fifteen Soviet psychiatric institutions that they selected. They made a point of not telling the Soviets which institutions until one week ahead of time, so they couldn't scrub them all in time. You do have a group of younger psychiatrists who have now formed an association who want to make changes, but at the levels in between, there is resistance to the changes. The man who heads up the Ministry of Health (a man incidentally who, HUGH SAKHAROV AND THEN as a leader of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985—a shameful step in my opinion) is one of the fellows refusing to acknowledge the necessity for changes in the use of psychiatric hospitals for political punishment. This man, named Yevgeny Chazov, opposes these changes, yet he received a Nobel Peace Prize. He is the fellow who helped put Andrei Sakharov away and he gets the Nobel Peace Prize. When you think about it, you must be struck by the outrage of it. So you have this dichotomy: At the top level and among heroic people down below there are those who want to change it, but there is resistance in between. I don't know if it will work or not. My own opinion is that it is in our interest if it does work.

NARRATOR: I think this is one discussion which could well be continued until dusk this evening and then some. But those of us who remember from earlier days the excitement of the group around Senator Hubert Humphrey, who had at his right hand Max Kampelman, haven't been a bit surprised by the intellectual,

political excitement of the discussion today. One can just hope and pray that somebody as capable as Max Kampelman will occupy the position he has been occupying for the last nine years. We are ever so thankful to you for coming.